Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/287482 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2021
Quellenangabe: 
[Journal:] Review of Industrial Organization [ISSN:] 1573-7160 [Volume:] 60 [Issue:] 1 [Publisher:] Springer US [Place:] New York, NY [Year:] 2021 [Pages:] 109-145
Verlag: 
Springer US, New York, NY
Zusammenfassung: 
When knowledge sharing is non-contractible, we show that competing downstream firms may prefer to help improve an inefficient alternative supply source than help to improve the technology of the efficient actual supplier—even if this is costless. A downstream firm can have incentives to decrease the efficiency of the actual supplier in order to improve its outside options. Non-controlling partial backward ownership can—through the participation of the downstream firm(s) in the upstream profits—align the incentives of the supplier and its competing customers. This improves industry performance while simultaneously benefiting consumers. Partial backward ownership has similar effects as strengthening a downstream firm's bargaining power and making knowledge sharing contractible.
Schlagwörter: 
Innovation
Knowledge sharing
Minority shareholdings
Supply chain efficiency
Vertical partial ownership
JEL: 
L22
L40
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
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Dokumentart: 
Article
Dokumentversion: 
Published Version

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