Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/288817 
Authors: 
Year of Publication: 
2020
Citation: 
[Journal:] Homo Oeconomicus [ISSN:] 2366-6161 [Volume:] 37 [Issue:] 1-2 [Publisher:] Springer International Publishing [Place:] Cham [Year:] 2020 [Pages:] 87-104
Publisher: 
Springer International Publishing, Cham
Abstract: 
In this paper we prove that the symmetric Nash solution is a risk neutral von Neumann–Morgenstern utility function on the class of pure bargaining games. Our result corrects an error in Roth (Econometrica 46:587–594, 983, 1978) and generalizes Roth’s result to bargaining games with arbitrary status quo.
Subjects: 
Bargaining games
Nash solution
Risk neutrality
JEL: 
A12
A30
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by Logo
Document Type: 
Article
Document Version: 
Published Version

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