Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/289841 
Year of Publication: 
2024
Series/Report no.: 
Working Paper No. 2402
Publisher: 
Johannes Kepler University of Linz, Department of Economics, Linz
Abstract: 
We examine who bears the costs of mandated workplace pension programs, exploiting the quasi-experimental rollout of automatic enrollment in the UK. Total compensation (take-home pay plus employer contributions) increases, driven by employer contributions, while the amount of take-home pay decreases. These effects differ by employer size, with take-home pay declining to an extent in the largest firms that we can rule out a pass-through to employees of more than 47%, significantly less than in smaller firms. Our findings provide the first evidence that large employers shift the cost of mandated automatic enrollment onto employees.
Subjects: 
Employer-sponsored retirement savings
Incentive design
Mandated benefits
Staggered difference-in-differences
JEL: 
D21
H22
J32
J38
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.