Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/289854 
Year of Publication: 
2024
Series/Report no.: 
WWZ Working Paper No. 2024/03
Publisher: 
University of Basel, Center of Business and Economics (WWZ), Basel
Abstract: 
We investigate whether US House representatives favour special interest groups over constituents in periods of low media attention to politics. Analysing 666 roll calls from 2005 to 2018, we show that representatives are more likely to vote against their constituency's preferred position the more special interest money they receive from groups favouring the opposite position. The latter effect is significantly larger when less attention is paid to politics due to distraction by exogenous newsworthy events like natural disasters. The effect is mostly driven by short-term opportunistic behaviour than the short-term scheduling of controversial votes into periods with high news pressure.
Subjects: 
Attention
campaign finance
interest groups
legislative voting
mass media
roll call voting
US House of Representatives
JEL: 
D72
L82
L86
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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