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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2024
Quellenangabe: 
[Journal:] Theoretical Economics [ISSN:] 1555-7561 [Volume:] 19 [Issue:] 1 [Year:] 2024 [Pages:] 365-405
Verlag: 
The Econometric Society, New Haven, CT
Zusammenfassung: 
We study a model in which two players with opposing interests try to alter a status quo through instability-generating actions. We show that instability can be used to secure longer-term durable changes, even if it is costly to generate and does not generate short-term gains. In equilibrium, instability generated by a player decreases when the status quo favors them more. Equilibrium always exhibits a region of stable states in which the status quo persists. As players' threat power increases, this region shrinks, ultimately collapsing to a single stable state that is supported via a deterrence mechanism. There is long-run path-dependency and inequity: although instability eventually leads to a stable state, it typically selects the least favorable one for the initially disadvantaged player.
Schlagwörter: 
Instability
social conflict
stochastic games
JEL: 
C72
C73
C78
D74
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
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