Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/296850 
Year of Publication: 
2023
Series/Report no.: 
ISER Discussion Paper No. 1205
Publisher: 
Osaka University, Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER), Osaka
Abstract: 
O'donoghue and Zweimüller (2004, J. of Econ. Growth), a seminal work, showed that broadening leading breadth in patent protection can stimulate innovation. However, the empirical literature has consistently found skeptical results on the positive effect. To fill the gap, we build another framework where the quality improvement size is derived as an interior solution. In our model, broadening leading breadth can negatively affect innovation because each innovator is incentivized to free-ride the other innovators' quality improvements. As a further analysis, we quantitatively investigate the growth effect of intervention in patent licensing negotiation using two different profit division rules derived from a cooperative game. We find that intervention in patent licensing negotiation increases the growth rate and stabilizes the economy.
Subjects: 
Patent protection
Leading breadth
Schumpeterian growth
Endogenous qualityincrements
Cooperative game
JEL: 
C71
D45
O30
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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