Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/31758 
Year of Publication: 
2009
Series/Report no.: 
Jena Economic Research Papers No. 2009,007
Publisher: 
Friedrich Schiller University Jena and Max Planck Institute of Economics, Jena
Abstract: 
We study interaction effects between intra-firm conflicts and interfirm competition on a duopolistic market with seller firms employing one or more agents and implementing tournament incentives. We show that inter-firm competition leads to higher incentive intensity, higher efforts and output levels but lower profits.
Subjects: 
Tournament
worker compensation
strategic competition
JEL: 
C72
L22
M52
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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