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Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2008
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
IZA Discussion Papers No. 3697
Verlag: 
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA), Bonn
Zusammenfassung: 
This paper analyzes an urn-ball matching model in which workers decide how intensively they sample job openings and apply at a stochastic number of suitable vacancies. Equilibrium is not constrained efficient; entry is excessive and search intensity can be too high or too low. Moreover, an inefficient discouraged-worker effect among homogenous workers emerges under adverse labor market conditions. Unlike existing coordination-friction economies with fixed search intensity, the model can account for the empirical relation between the job-finding rate and the vacancy-unemployment ratio, provided that search costs are small and that search intensity is sufficiently procyclical.
Schlagwörter: 
Matching function
coordination frictions
unemployment
JEL: 
E24
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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