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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2011
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Jena Economic Research Papers No. 2011,053
Verlag: 
Friedrich Schiller University Jena and Max Planck Institute of Economics, Jena
Zusammenfassung: 
In three party ultimatum games the proposer can first decide whether to exclude one responder, what increases the available pie. The experiments control for intentionality of exclusion and veto power of the third party. We do not find evidence for indirect reciprocity of the remaining responder after the exclusion of the other. Similarly, not excluding the second responder is only insignificantly reciprocated by it. Overall, we find little evidence that intentional exclusion has substantial effects on behavior.
Schlagwörter: 
exclusion
bargaining
ultimatum game
social preferences
experiment
JEL: 
C91
J52
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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