Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/59002 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2012
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
DICE Discussion Paper No. 54
Verlag: 
Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE), Düsseldorf
Zusammenfassung: 
We provide a comparison of bidding behavior between multi-round and single-round auctions considering bid lettings for asphalt construction contracts that are known to have primarily private costs. Using a reduced-form differenc-in-difference approach as well as the nonparametric estimation technique that was proposed by Racine and Li (2004) we find that bidding is more aggressive in a sequential multi-round setting than in a simultaneous single-round format. We explore potential causes for the bidding difference across formats that are related to synergies and the level of bidder participation.
Schlagwörter: 
multi-unit auctions
procurement auctions
JEL: 
D44
H57
ISBN: 
978-3-86304-053-6
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
319.08 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.