Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/73400 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2012
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
BGPE Discussion Paper No. 119
Verlag: 
Friedrich-Alexander-Universität Erlangen-Nürnberg, Bavarian Graduate Program in Economics (BGPE), Nürnberg
Zusammenfassung: 
DeLong (1990a) et al. show that in the presence of positive feedback traders rational speculation can be destabilizing, in that it drives the price of a risky asset above its expected value. A generalization of their seminal model with additional trading dates and an additional informative signal yields further interesting insights: it helps clarify when prices overreact, underreact, or even move in the wrong direction; when rational speculation is destabilizing or stabilizing; and whether overreaction is a symptom of market inefficiency or a manifestation of informational efficiency.
Schlagwörter: 
market efficiency
positive feedback trading
JEL: 
G12
G14
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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