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Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2012
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Bonn Econ Discussion Papers No. 02/2012
Verlag: 
University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE), Bonn
Zusammenfassung: 
This paper analyzes the sequential admissions procedure for medical subjects at public universities in Germany. Complete information equilibrium outcomes are shown to be characterized by a \emph{stability} condition that is adapted to the \emph{institutional constraints} of the German system. I introduce \emph{matching problems with complex constraints} and the notion of \emph{procedural stability}. Two simple assumptions guarantee existence of a student optimal procedurally stable matching mechanism that is strategyproof for students. n the context of the German admissions problem, this mechanism weakly Pareto dominates all equilibrium outcomes of the currently employed procedure. Applications to school choice with affirmative action are also discussed.
Schlagwörter: 
University Admissions
Matching
Stability
Strategyproofness
Complex Constraints
JEL: 
C78
D02
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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