Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/74931 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2012
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
LICOS Discussion Paper No. 305
Verlag: 
Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, LICOS Centre for Institutions and Economic Performance, Leuven
Zusammenfassung: 
We investigate the effect of electoral rules and firms of government on public policy outcomes using a new dataset on agriculture and food policies from 74 countries over the 1960-2005 period. Using both cross-sectional and panel data analyses we find robust evidence that the specific nature of democratic institutions has important consequences for public policy. Proportional democracies and presidential democracies - compared to majoritarian and parliamentary democracies - give more public support to agriculture and less to food consumers. The magnitude of these constitutional effects are stronger for import-competitive sectors and staple food crops. The effects seem independent from the ideology orientation of governments.
Schlagwörter: 
Electoral rules
forms of government
agriculture and food policy
political economy.
JEL: 
D72
F13
H23
O13
P16
Q18
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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