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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2002
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 803
Verlag: 
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo), Munich
Zusammenfassung: 
The main drawback of the public-policy contest is that the notion of contest success function, a crucial component of the contest model, does not have micro-foundations and, therefore, the random behavior of the government seems ad-hoc. In the present paper we propose a partial micro-foundation for the public-policy contest. The possible rationalization of random government behavior is illustrated in the case of the all-pay auction and Tullock's lottery logit functions. We also clarify how stake asymmetry, lobbying-skill asymmetry and return to lobbying effort determine the relative desirability, from the government's point of view, of these CSFs
Schlagwörter: 
interest groups
policy makers
lobbying
public-policy contests
contest success function
rationalization of random government's behavior
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper
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