Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/76380 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2003
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 836
Verlag: 
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo), Munich
Zusammenfassung: 
We consider the issue of steady-state optimal factor taxation in a Ramsey-type dynamic general equilibrium setting with two distinct distortions: i) taxes on capital and labour are the only available tax instruments for raising revenues, and ii) labour markets are subject to a static inefficiency resulting from wage bargaining. If considered in isolation, under broad assumptions the two distortions create conflicting demands on the wage tax, while calling for a zero capital tax. By combining the two distortions, we arrive at the conclusion that both instruments should be used, implying that the zero-capital tax result in general is no longer valid under imperfectly competitive labour markets.
Schlagwörter: 
optimal taxation
imperfectly competitive labour markets
capital accumulation
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper
Erscheint in der Sammlung:

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
392.64 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.