Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/79673 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2013
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Working Paper No. 13-1
Verlag: 
University of California, Department of Economics, Davis, CA
Zusammenfassung: 
We characterize the class of symmetric two-player games in which tit-for-tat cannot be beaten even by very sophisticated opponents in a repeated game. It turns out to be the class of exact potential games. More generally, there is a class of simple imitation rules that includes tit-for-tat but also imitate-the-best and imitate-if-better. Every decision rule in this class is essentially unbeatable in exact potential games. Our results apply to many interesting games including all symmetric 2x2 games, and standard examples of Cournot duopoly, price competition, public goods games, common pool resource games, and minimum effort coordination games.
Schlagwörter: 
imitation
tit-for-tat
decision rules
learning
exact potential games
symmetric games
repeated games
relative payoffs
zero-sum games
JEL: 
C72
C73
D43
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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