Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/89729 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2014
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 4579
Verlag: 
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo), Munich
Zusammenfassung: 
In a non-renewable resource market with imperfect competition, both the resource rent and current prices influence a large resource owner’s optimal supply. New information regarding future market conditions that affect the resource rent will consequently impact current supply. Bleaker demand prospects tend to accelerate resource extraction. A more pessimistic outlook for future demand may, however, slow down the early resource extraction of producers with sufficiently large resource stocks and thus more limited resource rent, because the supply from these producers is driven more by current market considerations than by changes in the resource rent. As producers with relatively smaller resource stocks accelerate their supply in response to bleaker demand prospects, producers with sufficiently large resource stocks will reduce their current supply. A numerical model of the European gas market illustrates that the effect of the shale gas revolution is an accelerated supply by most gas producers, but a reduced supply by Russia who loses market shares even before the additional gas enters the market.
Schlagwörter: 
resource extraction
Cournot competition
European gas market
JEL: 
Q31
Q33
Q42
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper
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