Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/94720 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
1998
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
IUI Working Paper No. 501
Verlag: 
The Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IUI), Stockholm
Zusammenfassung: 
Bergin and Lipman (1996) show that the refinement effect from the random mutations in the adaptive dynamics in Kandori, Mailath and Rob (1993) and Young (1993) is due to restrictions on how these mutation rates vary across population states. We here model these mutation rates as endogenously determined mistake probabilities, by assuming that players at some cost or disutility can control their mistake probability, i.e., the probability of implementing another pure strategy than intented. This is shown to corroborate the result in Kandori-Mailath-Rob and Young that the risk-dominant equilibrium is selected in 2 x 2-coordination games.
Schlagwörter: 
Evolution
Game theory
Mutations
JEL: 
C70
C72
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
758.86 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.