Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/94952 
Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
1988
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
IUI Working Paper No. 202
Verlag: 
The Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IUI), Stockholm
Zusammenfassung: 
This paper concerns the design of a trading mechanism for a group of traders when their valuations of the good are private information and they bargain over who shall consume more than his initial endowment and who shall consume less. It is shown that there generally exists a set of initial endowments of the traded commodity such that it is possible to design a trading mechanism which is incentive compatible, individually rational and ex post efficient.
Schlagwörter: 
Efficient trading
mechanism design.
JEL: 
O24
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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