Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/97246 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2013
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Discussion Paper No. 1572
Verlag: 
Northwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Evanston, IL
Zusammenfassung: 
Two players choose whether to cooperate on a project. Each of them is endowed with some evidence, and if both possess a sufficient amount then cooperation is profitable. In order to facilitate cooperation the players reveal evidence to one another. However, some players are concerned about privacy, and so revelation of evidence that does not result in cooperation is costly. We show that in equilibrium evidence can be exchanged both incrementally and all at once, and identify conditions under which the different rates of evidence exchange are optimal.
Schlagwörter: 
Cooperation
Privacy
Communication
JEL: 
D80
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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