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Contested World Orders: Rising powers, non-state actors, and the politics of authority beyond the nation-state

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Rising Powers, Non-State Actors, and the
Politics of Authority Beyond the Nation-
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Discussion Paper

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Contested World Orders: Rising Powers, Non-State Actors, and the Politics of Authority Beyond the Nation-state

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Contested World Orders: Rising Powers, Non-State Actors, and the Politics of Authority Beyond the Nation-state

Matthew Stephen and Michael Zürn^{*}

Abstract

In this WZB Discussion Paper we develop an analytical framework for the research project 'Contested World Orders', a collaborative effort between researchers based at the German Institute of Global and Area Studies (GIGA), the Peace Research Institute Frankfurt (PRIF), and the Berlin Social Science Center (WZB). In this project, we analyse the interests in and demands for change in world order from the side of rising powers and transnational non-governmental organizations (NGOs) using a common analytical approach. As part of a broader empirical research project, this paper outlines the theoretical and conceptual framework, guiding research questions, and basic methodological propositions. First, we outline key reasons that global order is contested, namely the confluence of the rise of international authority combined with a shift in the distribution of international power. Second, we outline a conceptual approach for the analysis of the preferences and political strategies of rising powers and NGOs as two potential sources of contestation. Finally, we outline issues of case selection and guiding hypotheses.

Keywords: world order, rising powers, NGOs, contestation, global governance

Zusammenfassung

Im vorliegenden WZB-Diskussionspapier entwickeln wir einen analytischen Rahmen für das Forschungsprojekt 'Contested World Orders', eine Zusammenarbeit von Wissenschaftlern des German Institute of Global and Area Studies (Giga), des Peace Research Institute Frankfurt sowie des Wissenschaftszentrums Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB). Das Projekt untersucht unter Verwendung eines gemeinsamen analytischen Rahmens die Interessen an und Forderungen nach einer Veränderung der Weltordnung im Hinblick auf sogenannte „rising powers“ und transnationale Nichtregierungsorganisationen (NGOs). Als Teil eines umfassenderen empirischen Forschungsprojekts skizziert das vorliegende Papier den theoretischen und konzeptionellen Rahmen, leitende Forschungsfragen sowie grundlegende methodologische Überlegungen. Zunächst benennen wir den Anstieg internationaler Autorität verbunden mit einer Verschiebung der internationalen Machtverteilung als Hauptgründe für eine „umkämpfte Weltordnung“. Im Anschluss umreißen wir einen konzeptionellen Ansatz zur Analyse der Präferenzen und politischen Strategien

^{*} This paper serves as a framework for a common Leibniz-Project on Contested Word Order with GIGA (Hamburg), PRIF (Frankfurt) and WZB (Berlin) as participating institutions. We want to thank our partners for their most valuable input to this draft.

von rising powers und NGOs als zwei potentiellen Quellen von Kontestation. Abschließend skizzieren wir Fragen der Fallauswahl und leitende Hypothesen.

Schlüsselwörter: Weltordnung, rising powers, NGOs, Kontestation, Global Governance

Introduction

World order is becoming increasingly contested. Rising powers are changing the international distribution of power and displacing many smaller developed countries from the top of the international hierarchy. Having entered strong growth paths a few decades ago, the continental economies of China and India are emerging in the top ranks of the world hierarchy, with countries like Brazil and Russia also (re-)gaining the status of 'major' powers.¹ A changing distribution of power has long been associated with fundamental changes to the hierarchies and structures of international politics. But compared to the past, international politics today has become highly institutionalised. As a result, demands for change are not only directed towards other states, as in earlier instances of power transitions, but are increasingly directed towards international institutions. At the same time, it is not only rising powers but also transnationally organized non-state actors (NGOs) who are emerging as new actors on the international scene. NGOs are often associated with a more 'civilized' and less power-driven state of world politics. To add complexity, these power shifts are mediated by the outlooks, preferences, and strategies that incumbent states and important international institutions adopt in response to the demands for change.

While the combined implications of these changes are not widely understood, each of the mentioned changes has been reflected separately in the discipline of International Relations. The rise of new powers is predominantly seen through the lenses of the traditional understanding of an 'international system' characterised by the strategic interactions of unitary states under anarchy. Power transition theory is the most obvious example for this perspective.² But, as institutionalists point out, the exclusivity of state actors, underpinned by traditional notions of sovereignty, has been modified through the increased institutionalisation of world politics. 'Global governance' has emerged as a way to incorporate these new features of international politics into the persistence of

¹ See Kevin Gray and Craig N. Murphy, "Introduction: Rising powers and the future of global governance." *Third World Quarterly* 34:2 (2013): 183–193; Andrew Hurrell "Hegemony, Liberalism and Global Order: What Space for Would-be Great Powers?" *International Affairs* 82:1 (2006): 1–19; Robert Kappel, "The Challenge to Europe: Regional Powers and the Shifting of the Global Order." *Intereconomics* 46:5 (2011): 275–286; Amrita Narlikar, *New Powers: How to Become One and How to Manage Them* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010); OECD, *Perspectives on Global Development 2010: Shifting Wealth* (Paris: OECD Publishing, 2010); Nolte, Detlef, *Macht und Machthierarchien in den internationalen Beziehungen: Ein Analysekonzept für die Forschung über regionale Führungsmächte*, *GIGA working papers*, No. 29, 2006; Alasdair R. Young, "Perspectives on the Changing Global Distribution of Power: Concepts and Context," *Politics*, 30:S1 (2010): 2–14.

² A.F.K. Organski and Jacek Kugler, *The War Ledger* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981); Randall Schweller, "Managing the Rise of Great Powers: History and Theory." In *Engaging China. The Management of an Emerging Power*, eds. Alastair I. Johnston and Robert R. Ross (London: Routledge, 1999), 1–33.

the traditional state system, which, while contested in prescriptive terms,³ indicates descriptively at a minimum a departure from the idea of an 'international system' as the unmediated interaction of self-interested states in anarchy.⁴ Global governance is, according to this view, also no longer limited to intergovernmental organizations and formal inter-state diplomacy. A multi-layered system of overlapping and differentiated institutions and actors has emerged that goes beyond the traditional world of governments and intergovernmental organizations, even though international organisations remain premier venues by which decisions are made and agreements enforced.⁵

Moreover, it is argued that the emergence of a transnational civil society also questions the exclusivity of state actors in the international realm. Transnational civil society and private agents have taken on a direct role in both providing new 'governance' mechanisms and in providing new sources of criticism and change in global governance.⁶ Widespread economic and societal globalization or 'denationalization' has not only generated increased functional demand for coordination and cooperation between states,⁷ but many scholars of international relations have noted an increased societization of international politics, characterised by the rise to prominence of a putatively 'global' or 'transnational' civil society, the increased role of formalised transnational NGOs and even sites of governance by private authority.⁸

³ Compare Commission on Global Governance, *Our Global Neighbourhood: The report of the Commission on Global Governance* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995) with, e.g. Ulrich Brand, "Order and Regulation: Global Governance as a hegemonic discourse of international politics?" *Review of International Political Economy* 12:1 (2005): 155–176; Henk Overbeek, "Global Governance: From Radical Transformation to Neo-Liberal Management," *International Studies Review* 12:3 (2010): 697–702.

⁴ Thomas Biersteker, "Global Governance." In *Routledge Handbook of Security Studies*, eds. Myriam Dunn Cavelty and Victor Mauer. (Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2010), 439–450; Andrew Hurrell, *On Global Order*. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 95; Michael Zürn, "Global Governance as Multi-level Governance." In *Oxford Handbook of Governance*, ed. David Levi-Faur. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 20), 730–48.

⁵ Arguably, such developments were foreshadowed in Bull's notion of a 'new medievalism', but has been carried forward into more recent studies of 'governance' or 'authority' 'beyond the state'. See Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society. A Study of Order in World Politics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977); James N. Rosenau and Ernst Otto Czempiel (eds.) *Governance Without Government* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992).

⁶ See *inter alia* Deborah D. Avant, Martha Finnemore, and Susan K. Sell (eds.) *Who Governs the Globe?* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010).

⁷ See David Mitrany, "The Functional Approach to World Organization", *International Affairs*, 24:3 (1948): 350–363; Craig N. Murphy, *International Organization and Industrial Change: Global Governance since 1850* (London: Polity Press, 1994); Michael Zürn, "Globalization and Global Governance." In *Handbook of International Relations*, eds. Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse, and Beth A. Simmons. (London: Sage, 2013), pp. 401–25.

⁸ For an overview, see Tim Büthe, "Governance through Private Authority: Non-state Actors in World Politics", *Journal of International Affairs*, 58:1 (2004): 281–290; Alejandro Colas, *International Civil Society*, (Cambridge: Polity, 2002); Richard Price, "Transnational Civil Society and Advocacy in World Politics", *World Politics*, 55:4 (2003): 579–606. For the liberal approach, see Ann Florini (ed.) *The Third Force. The Rise of Transnational Civil Society* (Tokyo and Washington, DC: Japan Centre for International Exchange and Carnegie Endowment for

There is a widespread perception that these three developments—shifting international power, institutionalisation of world politics, and the rise of transnational civil society organisations—have far-reaching implications for the global order in material, institutional, and ideational terms. We contend, however, that these implications can only be understood if the three developments are studied in relation to each other. The prevailing mode of studying rising powers and NGOs, as if they act on two different stages, obscures the reality that both type of actors often put forward their demands and ideas to the same addressees: international institutions as the core sites of global governance. In this paper we aim therefore at bringing these three components of change together by suggesting a conceptual framework that looks at agents that seek to contest, stabilize or control global order. We do this by analysing the demands of rising powers and non-governmental organisations towards international institutions. Both types of actors are relatively new sources of influence in international affairs, and both are perceived as holding different preferences for global governance than traditional centres of power. But how do these two sets of agents relate? Do rising powers' and transnational NGOs demands' intersect or diverge? Do these demands have a systemic nature or do we observe variance over different policy fields and forms of international institutions? Do they challenge or advocate the aggregation of political authority beyond the nation state? Will transnational NGOs prolong the normative influence of the West or are they potential allies of new powers? How are transnational NGOs affected by a more equal distribution of power?

These questions have barely begun to be asked. In part, this is due to the varying theoretical views of IR scholars, whose basic ontologies of world politics have emphasised different actors and different forms of power. Power-based and state-centric theories naturally incline towards a focus on power transitions amongst major states, while attention to the growing role and influence of non-governmental organisations has come largely from scholars working within a societal and norm-based approach. Global Governance studies, in turn, has been the focus of institutionalist theorizing. Consequently, the existing literatures on great and rising powers, that on civil society and transnational NGOs and that on Global Governance, have developed largely in parallel and rarely in intersection. Here, we address this gap by systematically comparing these two relatively new sets

International Peace, 2000); and Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, *Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998); for a more critical take, see Louise Amoore and Paul Langley, "Ambiguities of Global Civil Society", *Review of International Studies* 30:1 (2004): 89–110; Robert W. Cox, "Civil Society at the Turn of the Millennium: Prospects for an Alternative World Order", *Review of International Studies*, 25:1 (1999): 3–28.

of actors, their demands and criticisms regarding global governance, and their patterns of interaction.

The text is structured as follows. Firstly, we position the contemporary power shift and the increased salience of transnational NGOs within the broader emergence of the heightened role of international institutions. Secondly, we outline the conceptualisation of our research project. This centres on four questions:

1. Who are the actors to be looked at?
2. How can we assess their beliefs and preferences?
3. How can we assess their choice of strategies and coalition partners?
4. Which cases should be selected for the study?

In doing so, we develop a framework that enables us to compare the demands and challenges posed both by newly empowered actors in the state sphere, and those emerging from transnational civil society. Finally, we formulate deductively several propositions about the relationship between rising powers, transnational NGOs, and the direction of the existing world order that can be applied to the following studies.

1. Why is the Global Order Contested?

Transnational NGOs and rising powers are seen as animals so different that their study in one common framework seems to be odd. Rising powers are associated with size, with power, with hard structures and hierarchy, with billions of people, and with an emphasis on sovereignty; NGOs are associated with speed, with ideas, with flexible structures and networks, with a small membership base and with cosmopolitanism undermining sovereignty. There is however one commonality between them: both gear their demands and actions to a significant extent towards international institutions. Both can be seen as actors challenging the current status quo of world order; both contest the existing international institutions. We see two distinct processes that have contributed to the increasingly contested nature of international institutions expressed in these demands: the rise of international authority, and a changed distribution of power in international relations. Whereas the former reason is often associated with the rise of NGOs and the latter with rising powers, in fact both developments have contributed to the rise of both types of new actors.

1.1 The Rise of International Authority

The traditional Westphalian notion of sovereignty emphasized the principle of non-intervention in domestic affairs and, closely related to this, the consensus principle. While major powers have never fully respected sovereignty,⁹ the principle has been widely considered to be central in international politics. It involves three norms: first, that the ruler of a state exercises sole authority over the territory of that state; second, that all states are judicially equal; and third, that state parties are not subject to any law to which they do not consent. On this view, international institutions are considered to be instruments of the territorial state.

The time since the Second World War, especially spanning the last two to three decades, has brought changes that have undermined Westphalian sovereignty.¹⁰ In addition to violations of those principles by major powers known for centuries, international institutions have developed procedures that contradict the consensus principle and the principle of non-intervention. Some international norms and rules compel national governments to take measures even when they have not agreed to do so. In some cases, decisions made by international institutions even affect individuals directly, like those taken by the United Nations Security Council Al-Qaida and Taliban Sanctions Committee or by transitional administrations. Both types of activities – those that bind states thus affecting private actors only indirectly and those that affect individuals directly – are indications that international institutions have public authority.¹¹ In general, *international institutions have authority when the addressees of their policies recognize that these institutions can make competent judgments and binding decisions.*¹² International institutions exercise authority in

⁹ See Stephen Krasner, *Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999).

¹⁰ E.g. Edgar Grande and Louis W. Pauly (eds.) *Complex Sovereignty: Reconstituting Authority in the 21st Century* (Toronto: Toronto University Press, 2005); Nicole Deitelhoff and Michael Zürn, "Internationalization and the State: Sovereignty as the External Side of Modern Statehood." In *The Oxford Handbook of Transformations of the State*, eds. Evelyne Huber, Matthew Lange, Stephan Leibfried, Jonah Levy, Frank Nullmeier and John Stephens (Oxford: Oxford University Press, forthcoming).

¹¹ Armin von Bogdandy, Philipp Dann and Matthias Goldmann "Developing the Publicness of Public International Law: Towards a Legal Framework for Global Governance Activities" In *The Exercise of Public Authority by International Institutions. Advancing International Institutional Law*, eds. Armin von Bogdandy, Rüdiger Wolfrum, Jochen von Bernstorff, Philipp Dann and Matthias Goldmann (Heidelberg: Springer, 2010), 3-32.

¹² Michael Zürn, Martin Binder, and Matthias Ecker-Ehrhardt, "International Political Authority and Its Politicization." *International Theory* 4:1 (2012): 69–106. See also Scott Cooper, Darren G. Hawkins, Wade Jacoby and Daniel Nielson, "Yielding Sovereignty to International Institutions: Bringing System Structure Back In." *International Studies Review* 10:3 (2008): 501–524.

that they successfully claim the right to perform regulatory functions like the formulation of rules and rule monitoring or enforcement.

The new, authority-generating quality of international institutions shows at different phases of the policy cycle. Focusing, first, on the *negotiation* or *decision phase*, majoritarian decision making in international institutions indicates the authority shift. Majoritarian decision making increases the ability of international institutions to act, by cancelling the vetoes of individual states and overcoming blockades. Today, roughly two-thirds of all international organizations with the participation of at least one great power have the possibility to decide by majority.¹³ In addition, *transnational governance institutions*, which are able to partially escape the control of nation-states, have gained in importance. Some examples of private forms of transnational rule-setting include the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB), and the countless 'codes of conduct' and certification systems (e.g., Forest Stewardship Council, Rugmark, etc.).

Monitoring and verification of international rules are, likewise, increasingly carried out by actors who are not directly under the control of states. Two prominent examples are the International Monetary Fund (for the global financial system) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (for the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty).¹⁴ In addition to such bodies, the role of international secretariats in regulatory monitoring has increased notably in recent years.¹⁵ Regarding disputed cases of *rule interpretation*, there has been a significant increase in international judicial bodies. In 1960, there were worldwide only 27 quasi-judicial bodies; by 2004, this number had grown to 97. If we narrow the definition and include only those bodies that meet all of the prerequisites for formal judicial proceedings, then only five such bodies existed worldwide in 1960, climbing to 28 by 2004.¹⁶ Concerning *rule enforcement*, we can observe an increased readiness to levy material sanctions against violators. *Ius cogens* (independent and binding international law, not requiring the consent

¹³ Daniel Blake and Autumn Payton, "Voting Rules in International Organizations: Reflections of Power or Facilitators of Cooperation?" *Paper presented at Paper presented at the 49th Annual Convention of the International Studies Association*, 26–29 March 2008, San Francisco.

¹⁴ Xinyuan Dai, *International Institutions and National Policies* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 50–53.

¹⁵ Bernd Siebenhüner and Frank Biermann, "International Organizations in Global Environmental Governance: epilogue" In *International Organizations in Global Environmental Governance*, eds. Frank Biermann, Bernd Siebenhüner and Anna Schreyögg (Abingdon: Routledge, 2009), 264–269.

¹⁶ See <<http://www.pict-pcti.org/matrix/matrixintro.html>>; see also Karen Alter, *The New Terrain of International Law: Courts, Politics, Rights* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2013).

of states) in the meantime reaches beyond the prohibition of wars of aggression include *inter alia* the prohibition of crimes against humanity, genocide, and apartheid. Furthermore, especially since 1989, the international community has begun to respond to cases of gross violation of *ius cogens* increasingly with military force and economic sanctions.¹⁷

Overall, a dense network of international and transnational institutions of unprecedented quality and quantity has developed in recent decades. Many of these new institutions are far more intrusive than conventional international institutions. They can circumvent the resistance of most governments *via* majoritarian decision-making and dispute settlement procedures, through the interaction of monitoring agencies with transnational society, and by dominating the process of knowledge interpretation in some fields. With the – most often consensual – decision to install international institutions with such features, state parties become subject to a law other than their own, to which they have either not agreed upon (mission creep) or do not agree any more (costly exit option). At least in some issue areas, the global level has achieved a certain degree of authority and has thus partially replaced the consensus principle of the traditional international system.

Problems of legitimation and growing resistance can be seen as a reaction to the increased authority and distributional significance of institutions beyond the traditional national context. Growing resistance against international institutions occurs to the extent that international institutions exercise authority but cannot build on sufficient stocks of legitimacy.¹⁸ This understanding of a growing post-national dynamic between ‘power’ and ‘resistance’ or ‘governance’ and ‘opposition’ has found expression in varying conceptual vocabularies emerging from a variety of theoretical perspectives, all of which attach a significant role to the trend for the exercise of authority beyond the national context to become increasingly contested.¹⁹ Especially in the 1990s, during the height of American power and the expansion of liberal economic globalisation, much of this contestation was associated with transnational protest activism and the anti-globalisation movements,

¹⁷ Martin Binder, “Humanitarian Crises and the International Politics of Selectivity.” *Human Rights Review* 10:3 (2009): 327–348 at 340.

¹⁸ Michael Zürn, Martin Binder, and Matthias Ecker-Ehrhardt, “International Political Authority and Its Politicization.” *International Theory* 4:1 (2012): 69–106.

¹⁹ *Inter alia*, Louise Amoore, *The Global Resistance Reader* (London: Routledge, 2000); David Armstrong, Theo Farrell, and Bice Maiguashca, *Governance and Resistance in World Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003); Feargal Cochrane, Rosaleen Duffy and Jan Selby, *Global Governance, Conflict and Resistance* (Houndmills: Palgrave, 2004). Michael Zürn and Matthias Ecker-Ehrhardt (Eds.) *Die Politisierung der Weltpolitik: Umkämpfte internationale Institutionen* (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 2013); and a Special Section on ‘Governance and Resistance’ in *Review of International Studies*, 29, (2003).

symbolised and propagated by spectacular protest events on the sidelines of major world summits. Many international institutions were associated with the propagation of liberal economic norms and intrusive policy agreements, ultimately with a disruptive and socially corrosive form of capitalism. The agents of contestation were associated with domestic and transnational social mobilisation, often conceived as part of the emergence of a putatively 'global' civil society resisting a neo-liberal world order.²⁰ Two extensions of this view are important: It is not only NGO's but also states who challenge the current world order and many protests are not necessarily against international institutions, but ask for more global governance.

Where previous approaches have tended to assume that the agents of contestation emerge primarily or exclusively from the non-state realm of civil society, this study is designed to extend previous attempts at bridging the gaps between the 'politics of governance' with the 'politics of resistance'.²¹ At the same time, we see governance and contestation as part of a single process of political decision making and claims making beyond the nation state in a broader 'reflexive' dynamic of global governance, in which progressively more political actors pay attention to and reflect on political order beyond national borders.²² We therefore also expect a growing utilization of international institutions to the extent that they exercise authority. Many governments, transnational non-governmental organizations and social movements publicly address international institutions in a positive way, for instance, by calling for drastic intensification of climate policy measures at the international level. Similarly, there have been numerous recent demands for much stronger interventions by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and multilateral development banks as a response to the financial crisis. At the same time, various groups seek permanent access to international institutions in order to facilitate their influence on internal agendas and policy formulation, as well as to hold these institutions accountable in the phases of policy implementation.²³

²⁰ Michael Zürn, "Global Governance and Legitimacy Problems." *Government and Opposition*, 39:2 (2004): 260–287 at 283.

²¹ Bice Maiguashca, "Governance and Resistance in World Politics", *Review of International Studies* 29:1 (2004): 3–28 at 5–6.

²² Michael Zürn, Martin Binder, and Matthias Ecker-Ehrhardt, "International Political Authority and Its Politicization." *International Theory* 4:1 (2012): 69–106.

²³ Jonas Tallberg, Thomas Sommerer, Theresa Squatrito, and Christer Jönsson, *Opening Up: The Access of Transnational Actors to International Organizations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013).

In short, the rise of international political authority has increased the contestedness of international institutions. It has increased the political opportunities for transnational activities on the side of NGOs, and it has become a major object of interest for non-Western states.

1.2 Power Shift

The second dynamic is external to international institutions themselves, and accompanies the global redistribution of wealth within the international society of states, the constituent members of international institutions. The economic growth of major countries outside the G7 group of developed states has shifted the balance of power away from the traditional custodians of the international institutional order. For example, the OECD directs attention to the ‘BRIICS’ countries of Brazil, Russia, India, Indonesia, China and South Africa, the six largest non-OECD countries in the world.²⁴ In 1995, these six countries’ gross national products represented around a third of that of the G7. By 2013, this portion had risen to nearly three-quarters. In addition, expectations about the future have fuelled perceptions of importance of today: the OECD expects this growth trend to continue so that by 2030 the BRIICS will represent nearly one-and-a-half times the economic output of the G7.²⁵ In 2008, the United States’ National Intelligence Council surveyed these trends and concluded:

The US most likely will remain “first among equals” among the other great powers in 2030 because of its preeminence across a range of power dimensions and legacies of its leadership role. More important than just its economic weight, the United States’ dominant role in international politics has derived from its preponderance across the board in both hard and soft power. Nevertheless, with the rapid rise of other countries, the “unipolar moment” is over and Pax Americana—the era of American ascendancy in international politics that began in 1945—is fast winding down.²⁶

²⁴ OECD, *Globalisation and Emerging Economies: Brazil, Russia, India, Indonesia, China and South Africa* (Geneva: OECD Publishing, 2008).

²⁵ Calculated for the year 1995 from the IMF World Development Indicators; for the years 2013 and 2030, from the OECD. For further attempts to adumbrate the contemporary power shift in quantitative terms, see Robert Kappel, “The Challenge to Europe: Regional Powers and the Shifting of the Global Order”, *Intereconomics* 46:5 (2011): 275–286; Christopher Layne, “This Time It’s Real: The End of Unipolarity and the Pax Americana”, *International Studies Quarterly* 56:1 (2012): 203–13; Alasdair R. Young, “Perspectives on the Changing Global Distribution of Power: Concepts and Context.” *Politics* 30:S1 (2010): 2–14.

²⁶ National Intelligence Council, *Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World* (Washington, DC: National Intelligence Council, 2008), x.

From this longer historical perspective, the 'unipolar moment'²⁷ of American power after the Cold War appears more as a hiatus than an enduring feature of the international system.

There is a virtual theoretical consensus that international institutions reflect to some extent existing relations of power, regardless of whether the fundamental subjects of that power are considered to be states or social groups, or whether international institutions exercise a more than epiphenomenal role in world politics.²⁸ Consequently, power shifts will lead to new challenges for existing institutions. There are at least three separate mechanisms by which an increased share of the world's economic activity translates into a new power position regarding international institutions, with consequent expectations for a renegotiation of global governance arrangements by rising powers.

First, economic expansion increases the resources upon which a state can draw in its dealings with other states. Economic resources can be converted into instruments of 'direct' and 'relational' power, such as bureaucratic capacity, epistemic resources, and the ability to furnish material (dis)incentives and side-payments. They can also ultimately be converted into military capabilities, as often underlined by realist theories. Second, having a large economy also conveys bargaining power through the leverage of access to large internal markets, which are particularly relevant in economic policy fields such as trade.²⁹ Economic size conveys the potential for 'asymmetrical interdependence' in relation to smaller states, and increasingly 'symmetrical' interdependence with the economic hegemon.³⁰ This bargaining power and influence is reinforced to the extent that economic size is associated with a central position in world networks, fostering rising states' 'network power'.³¹ Finally, a country's share of the world economy is significant from a systemic point of view. Countries with particularly large shares of the world economy have a functional

²⁷ Charles Krauthammer, "The Unipolar Moment." *Foreign Affairs* 70:1 (1991): 23–33. See also William Wohlforth, "The Stability of a Unipolar World." *International Security* 24:1 (1999): 5–41.

²⁸ Robert W. Cox, "Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory", *Millennium – Journal of International Studies* 10:2 (1981): 126–155; Robert O. Keohane, *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984); John J. Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions", *International Security* 19:3 (1994): 5–49; Beth A. Simmons and Lisa L. Martin, "International Organizations and Institutions", in *Handbook of International Relations*, eds. Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse, and Beth A. Simmons (London: Sage, 2002), 192–211.

²⁹ Stephen Krasner, "State Power and the Structure of International Trade." *World Politics: A Quarterly Journal of International Relations* 28:3 (1976): 317–347.

³⁰ Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye. *Power and Interdependence*. 3rd Edition (New York: Longman, 2001).

³¹ Emilie M. Hafner-Burton, Miles Kahler and Alexander H. Montgomery, "Network Analysis for International Relations." *International Organization* 63:3 (2009): 559–92.

importance to the global economy that makes them 'systemically significant'. The threshold for systemic significance has moreover been lowered as a result of economic globalisation, as it increases the need for states to coordinate and collaborate in their decisions in order to govern effectively. Consequently, new powers have achieved a kind of veto or spoiling capacity over collective decisions in global governance. It is some time now since it was still reasonable to assert that "Even in specific issue areas, developing countries rarely have national power capabilities to bargain effectively with the more industrialized states, much less to change international regimes."³² Two decades ago the G7 countries could override the rest of the world if they agreed. Today, little can be agreed without the consent of China, India, and several other new powers.

In addition to the power that flows from material resources and centrality to global economic processes, another indication of the emergence of new centres of power lies in their increased *status* flowing from their recognition by established powers.³³ The shift from the G7 to the G20 as the primary intergovernmental forum for the governance of the global economy is the clearest indicator of the increased status of some major non-G7 countries, but it can also be observed in other institutional domains, such as the changes in the inner circle of negotiators in climate and trade politics, and in statements such as President Obama's public recognition that India is "not simply emerging; India has emerged".³⁴ This external recognition is, moreover, complemented by the increased 'self-identification' of some states as 'rising powers', which can be seen in the proliferation of new coalitions and networks of rising powers,³⁵ such as IBSA (since 2003), BRICS (since 2008-2009), and BASIC (since 2009). The biggest emerging economies are forming clubs in order to accelerate the 'winding down' of American ascendancy, and they bring new preferences and ideas to the table of increasingly authoritative international institutions.

³² Stephen Krasner, *Structural Conflict: The Third World Against Global Liberalism* (London: University of California Press, 1985), 36.

³³ See Philip Nel, "Redistribution and Recognition: What Emerging Regional Powers Want." *Review of International Studies* 36:4 (2010): 951-74; T.V. Paul, Deborah Welch Larson, and William C. Wohlforth (eds.) *Status in World Politics*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014).

³⁴ Barack Obama, "Remarks by the President to the Joint Session of the Indian Parliament in New Delhi, India". The Whitehouse, 08 November 2010. Available <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2010/11/08/remarks-president-joint-session-indian-parliament-new-delhi-india>.

³⁵ Daniel Flemer, "Network Powers: Strategies of Change in the Multipolar System", *Third World Quarterly* 34:6 (2013), 1016-1036.

Many of today's rising powers have been long-standing critics of the established order, either on the 'inside' as members of the developing world, or externally as champions of revolutionary change. Today, they increasingly focus on international institutions as venues by which to shape the international order according to their own preferences and values.³⁶ The power shift is therefore a cause for increased contestation of international institutions independent of the authority they have gained in recent decades. In the end however the question is how these newly empowered states will relate to international institutions that have already acquired significant levels of political authority and domestic intrusiveness. At the same time, the power shift has opened up new opportunities for NGOs. They can point to the need to include a Southern perspective and they can to some extent mediate existing international conflicts. The confluence of the rise of international authority and the international power shift has thus empowered NGOs *and* rising powers.

2. Research Design

A complete account of contested world orders would look at preferences of rising powers and NGOs in a first step, then at the observable behaviour and strategies of these actors in a second step, and finally at counter-strategies of incumbent powers.³⁷ The informational requirements for such a complete account are enormous and almost impossible to fulfil in a study that focuses on multiple rising powers and multiple NGOs in multiple issue areas in a comparative study. Here, we outline our research design with regard to four key features: (1) the actors we examine, (2) their beliefs and preferences, (3) the strategies and coalition partners they adopt, and (4) the cases we select.

2.1 Actors: The Variety of Rising Powers and NGOs

Rising powers and NGOs have both been identified as especially significant agents of contestation in the antagonisms of contemporary global governance. This raises the question of the extent to which

³⁶ Matthew D. Stephen, "Rising Regional Powers and International Institutions: The Foreign Policy Orientations of India, Brazil and South Africa." *Global Society* 26:3 (2012): 289–309; Matthew D. Stephen, "Rising Powers, Global Capitalism and Liberal Global Governance: A Historical Materialist Account of the BRICs Challenge." *European Journal of International Relations*. Online First: DOI 10.1177/1354066114523655 (2014); Michael Zürn and Matthew D. Stephen, "The View of Old and New Powers on the Legitimacy of International Institutions." *Politics* 30:S1 (2010): 91–101.

³⁷ We thus roughly follow the conceptual framework of Kahler, who distinguishes preferences over institutional design, from capabilities and strategies and counterstrategies. See Miles Kahler, "Rising Powers and Global Governance: Negotiating Change in a Resilient Status Quo." *International Affairs* 89:3 (2013): 711–729.

either set of actors can be considered a coherent group and social category, open to the kind of generalizable propositions that we aim for.

Structural realist theories provide propositions based on deductive reasoning that suggest that rising powers should behave in a similar manner due to their increasing material capabilities (which is their major constitutive feature). The most developed line of enquiry in this regard stems from theories of 'power transitions' and hegemonic cycles, for whom rising states tend to be 'dissatisfied' with the existing hierarchies, institutions and structures of the international system.³⁸ Realism has always attached a primary significance to a states' position in the international power hierarchy in shaping their outward behaviour.³⁹ Although the countries considered as central to the contemporary power shift (such as Brazil, China, India) exhibit considerable power variation, with China occupying a privileged position as it overtakes even the United States in terms of sheer economic weight,⁴⁰ one can expect from this perspective significant similarities among rising powers. On the other hand, other accounts stress the diversity of contemporary rising powers and the many varying factors – such as regime type, level of development, and normative compatibility with the existing order – that affect their behaviour and demands regarding global governance.⁴¹ Liberal and critical theoretical approaches have often emphasised the importance of domestic political and economic structures in shaping states' international behaviour.⁴² In this view, rising powers need to be distinguished according to their regime type, their levels of economic development, and their relations to their domestic and transnational social contexts. Constructivists complement both views by pointing to collective ideas about international order and the role of the country therein. In this view, it is collective intentions which may derive from either internal

³⁸ See Robert Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981); Ronald L. Tammen et al. *Power Transitions: Strategies for the 21st Century* (Washington, DC: C.Q. Press, 2000).

³⁹ John J. Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (New York: Norton, 2001), 10; Stephen Krasner, *Structural Conflict: The Third World Against Global Liberalism*. (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1985), 28.

⁴⁰ Leslie Elliott Armijo, "The BRICs Countries (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) as Analytical Category: Mirage or Insight?", *Asian Perspective* 31:4 (2007): 10–14; Andrew F. Cooper and Daniel Flesmes, "Foreign Policy Strategies of Emerging Powers in a Multipolar World: An introductory review", *Third World Quarterly* 34:6 (2013): 943–962 at 949–951.

⁴¹ Leslie Elliott Armijo, "The BRICs Countries (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) as Analytical Category: Mirage or Insight?" *Asian Perspective* 31:4 (2007): 7–42.

⁴² Robert W. Cox, "Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory", *Millennium – Journal of International Studies* 10:2 (1981): 126–155; Peter J. Katzenstein, "Conclusion: Domestic Structures and Strategies of Foreign Economic Policy", *International Organization* 31:4 (1977): 879–920; Andrew Moravcsik, "Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics," *International Organization*, 51:4 (Autumn, 1997): 513–553; Kees Van der Pijl, *Transnational Classes and International Relations* (London: Routledge, 1998).

constitution or external role that guide the strategy – separatist, integrationist or revisionist – of rising powers.⁴³ These collective ideas and the associated strategies can vary not only across rising powers, but also within a rising power over time. Such a constructivist reasoning is most sceptical about the value of the common category of rising powers.

Similar disagreements exist concerning the behaviour and broader role of transnational civil society organisations in global governance. Whether thought of as international,⁴⁴ transnational,⁴⁵ or global ‘civil society’,⁴⁶ or in the form of transnational ‘social movements’⁴⁷ and ‘advocacy networks’,⁴⁸ a vast literature has emerged which sees this non-state social space as contributing to far-reaching changes within the institutions and processes of global governance. One strand sees NGOs as means to ensure participation of world society in global decision-making and implementation.⁴⁹ In this view, they serve as “transmission belts” between society and governance units and contribute to the democratization of global governance.⁵⁰ By implication, the variety of NGO’s is high since it should reflect the plurality of perspectives and interests in world society. Other accounts stress the role of these agents in contesting and resisting features of existing international institutions.⁵¹ Yet simple equations of civil society with resistance are contested by accounts that emphasise the co-optation of civil society groups within the very machinery of global governance that they are supposed to contest. Gramscians have long argued that the apparent

⁴³ Jeffrey W. Legro, *Rethinking the World. Great Power Strategies and International Order*, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2007).

⁴⁴ Alejandro Colás, *International Civil Society: Social Movements in World Politics* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2002).

⁴⁵ Ann Florini (ed.) *The Third Force. The Rise of Transnational Civil Society* (Tokyo and Washington, DC: Japan Centre for International Exchange and Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2000).

⁴⁶ John Keane, *Global Civil Society?* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003); Mary Kaldor, *Global Civil Society: An Answer to War* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2003); Randall D. Germain and Michael Kenny (Eds.) *The Idea of Global Civil Society: Politics and Ethics in a Globalizing Era* (Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 2005).

⁴⁷ Robert O’Brien, Jan Aart Scholte and Marc Williams (Eds.) *Contesting Global Governance: Multilateral Economic Institutions and Global Social Movements* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000); Donatella dell Porta and Sidney Tarrow (Eds.) *Transnational Protests and Global Activism* (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2005).

⁴⁸ Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, *Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998)

⁴⁹ Jonas Tallberg and Christer Jönsson (eds.) *Transnational Actors in Global Governance: Patterns, Explanations, and Implications* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2010); Marianne Beisheim, “Nichtregierungsorganisationen und ihre Legitimität.” *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte* B 43 (1997): 21–29.

⁵⁰ Jens Steffek, Claudia Kissling and Patrizia Nanz (eds) *Civil Society Participation in European and Global Governance. A Cure for the Democratic Deficit?* (Houndmills: Palgrave, 2008); Jens Steffek and Christina Hahn (eds.) *Evaluating Transnational NGOs: Legitimacy, Accountability, Representation* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010).

⁵¹ Christopher Daase and Nicole Deitelhoff, “Internationale Dissidenz – Ein Forschungsprogramm.” In *Macht und Widerstand in der globalen Politik*, eds. Julian Junk and Christian Volk (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2013), 163–175.

separation of the 'state' from 'civil society' is more apparent than real,⁵² with dominant social forces able to transform "civil society into a mechanism for stability and control."⁵³ In this vein, the transnationalisation of civil society can be linked to the projection of influence of the particular state-society forms of the advanced, capitalist West, reducing civil society groups to the status of 'shock troops of the Empire',⁵⁴ in which "global civil society and human rights NGOs are seen as representing a culture that is Western and universalist in orientation and thus part and parcel of the configuration of power relations that maintain global governance structures."⁵⁵ In this view, the NGO's are more homogenous in outlook, yet with still significant variations. The "politicization" perspective finally emphasizes the multiple roles of NGOs even more: They can be sites of resistance against global governance, but they can also utilize international institutions to achieve their goals. In any case, Western views are much better represented than the South.⁵⁶ It is then exactly the interplay of NGOs with different views and goals that lead to the politicization of international institutions.

The diversity of nomenclature seems also to be indicative of the substantive diversity of this group of actors. Some point to a differentiation between transnational actors with a primarily instrumental motivation (such as multinational corporations, business associations and lobby groups) and those motivated by the pursuit of the 'common good' appears most salient, even if such a distinction must be treated "as a continuum rather than sharply divided classes of actors."⁵⁷ Similarly, we employ a distinction between groups that demand institutions and policies that are compatible with the short-term material interests of their members (*member driven*) from groups with defend purposes that do not necessarily foster material interests of members (*purpose driven*).

⁵² Joseph A. Buttigieg, "Gramsci on Civil Society", *Boundary 2*, 22:3 (Fall 1995): 1-32; Richard Higgott, Geoffrey Underhill and Andreas Bieler (Eds.) *Non-State Actors and Authority in the Global System* (New York: Routledge, 2000); Craig N. Murphy, "Understanding IR: Understanding Gramsci", *Review of International Studies*, 24:3 (1998): 417-425.

⁵³ Matthew D. Stephen, "Globalisation and Resistance: Struggles over common sense in the global political economy", *Review of International Studies* 37:1 (2011): 209-228 at 214.

⁵⁴ Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, *Empire* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000), 34-37, as cited in Ian Clark, "Legitimacy in a Global Order", *Review of International Studies* 29:S1 (2003): 75-95 at 78).

⁵⁵ Bice Maiguashca, "Governance and Resistance in World Politics", *Review of International Studies* 29:1 (2004): 3-28 at 12.

⁵⁶ Cf. the contributions in Michael Zürn and Matthias Ecker-Ehrhardt (Eds.) *Die Politisierung der Weltpolitik: Umkämpfte internationale Institutionen* (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 2013); see also Zürn et al 2012.

⁵⁷ Thomas Risse, "Transnational Actors and World Politics", in *Handbook of International Relations*, eds. Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse, and Beth A. Simmons (London: Sage, 2002), 255-274 at 256.

For all of these reasons, it appears unlikely that either of our two sets of actors – rising powers and transnational NGOs – speak with a single voice regarding the politics of authority beyond the nation state. Consequently, we focus on the articulation of demands and criticisms regarding specific international institutions including other forms of communication such as voting in the General Assembly. In order to better understand the real interaction of rising powers and NGOs regarding international institutions, we therefore need to look at specific rising powers and specific NGOs that can be seen as representatives of their actor type in order to find out which types of groups take similar positions.

2.2 Preferences and Beliefs

While international institutions have been increasingly affected by the rise of new state powers and the roles of NGOs, their impact on global governance will be a product not only of their increased influence but also their preferences and strategies. *Preferences* are properties of actors that differentiate between the desirability of alternatives;⁵⁸ indirectly these preferences give an indication of broader descriptive (ontological) and normative (ethical) beliefs.⁵⁹ *Strategies* are aspects of behaviour that actors adopt in order to give rise to their preferences.⁶⁰ Here we conceptualise each in turn.

The increased influence of our two sets of actors – rising powers and NGOs – increases the salience of their preferences regarding global governance. Of these preferences, we examine three dimensions that are especially important for the development of global governance. We formulate these in terms of three research questions:

1. What is the extent of support or opposition for the aggregation of political authority by the international institution (the *level* at which decisions are taken)?
2. To what extent does the actor advocate or oppose the institutionalisation of liberal policies and principles (the extent of liberal *policy* commitments)?

⁵⁸ Jeffry Frieden, “Actors and Preferences in International Relations,” In *Strategic Choice and International Relations*, eds. David Lake and Robert Powell. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999), 39–76; Sven Ove Hansson and Till Grüne-Yanoff. “Preferences.” In *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, ed. Edward N. Zalta (Stanford: Stanford University, 2011).

⁵⁹ Jeffrey W. Legro, *Rethinking the World: Great Power Strategies and International Order*. (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005).

⁶⁰ Arnold Wolfers, *Discord and Collaboration: Essays on International Politics* (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1962); Jeffry Frieden, “Actors and Preferences in International Relations,” In *Strategic Choice and International Relations*, eds. David Lake and Robert Powell. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999), 39–76.

3. What is the distance of these preferences from the institutional status quo?

Let us examine each of these dimensions in greater detail.

(1) The first question concerns the degree to which the actor under question demands international rules, institutions and authority. This dimension consists of two components. On the one hand, we want to know whether international rules are called for or are opposed. On the other hand, we aim at grasping the preferred institutional form. Here, we distinguish mere intergovernmental cooperation from international authority. These components can be thought of as a spectrum along which three major benchmarks can be identified: national discretion, intergovernmental coordination, and supranationalism. National discretion leaves all decisions to sovereign states, prioritising unilateral autonomy over international coordination. Mere intergovernmental coordination leaves the implementation and the decision whether or not to comply completely on the side of the states. Supranationalism denotes an authoritative international order. International authority involves institutional devices that undermine the consent principle of international politics. In this case, international organizations even foresee the possibility of majority decisions (with the possibility to press minorities to do something they have not agreed to) or install governance units that possess autonomy.

(2) The second question aims at grasping the content of the rules under question. In our analysis, the degree of liberalism is most apt to capture the decisive differences systematically and across cases. It has been suggested that the 'core commitment' of liberalism is to the concept of liberty,⁶¹ and it is subsequently associated with both economic openness (the lack of political barriers to the unhindered exchange of capital, goods, and labour) and political individualism. International institutions are liberal to the extent that they promote the reduction of political barriers to the cross national exchange of material goods (capital and commodities), labour power (services and migration), and ideas (cultural goods and knowledge). Demands and claims that ask for a reduction of barriers to allow for free exchange across borders are considered here as liberal. Mechanisms in support of 'human rights' broadly understood are compatible with both liberal and more interventionist demands, but in tendency, 'neoliberal' interpretations of individualist rights centre

⁶¹ Gerald Gaus and Shane D. Courtland, "Liberalism", *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Spring 2011 Edition), edited by Edward N. Zalta. Available <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2011/entries/liberalism/>, accessed 8 August 2013. Both liberalism and *liberty* derive from the Latin *liber*, meaning 'free'.

on the defence of private property rights. These demands can also be labelled “market-making-demands”,⁶² and have been seen as part of attempts at constitutionalising neoliberalism at a level beyond the nation state.⁶³ Essentially they ask for institutions that guarantee the free and unhindered exchange of goods and ideas. They are directed against national political interventions and can be labelled negative integration.⁶⁴ The other pole of this continuum may be labelled positive integration. These demands and claims ask for political interventions in order to reduce the unwelcome effects of free exchange, be it inequality, environmental degradation or the erosion of national cultures and habits. These word order demands either ask for global recognition of national autonomy or for stronger interventions on the international level such as global redistribution. In terms of human rights, such demands are associated with calls for greater socio-economic and welfare rights.

Combining the two dimensions of the *content* and *level* of regulations and institutions, we identify six varieties of world order demands.

Matrix 1: Six Types of World Order

Level	Content	
	Liberal	Interventionist
Supranationalism	Neoliberal Minimal Order (Negative Integration)	Cosmopolitan Constitutionalism (Positive Integration)
Intergovernmentalism	Liberal Intergovernmentalism (Coordinated Liberalism)	National Intergovernmentalism (Coordinated Dirigisme)
National Discretion	International Competition (Competition State)	Sovereign Autonomy (Mercantilism)

⁶² Wolfgang Streeck, “From Market Making to State Building? Reflections on the Political Economy of European Social Policy.” In *European Social Policy: Between Fragmentation and Integration*, eds. Stephan Leibfried and Paul Pierson (Washington D.C: Brookings Institution, 1995), 389–431.

⁶³ Stephen Gill, “Constitutionalizing Inequality and the Clash of Globalizations”, *International Studies Review* 4:3 (2002): 47–65.

⁶⁴ Dorette Corbey, “Dialectical Functionalism. Stagnation as a Booster of European Integration.” *International Organization* 49:2 (1995): 253–284; Fritz W. Scharpf, “Politische Optionen im vollendeten Binnenmarkt.” In *Europäische Integration*, eds. Markus Jachtenfuchs and Beate Kohler-Koch (Opladen: Leske + Budrich, 1996), 109–140; Michael Zürn, “‘Positives Regieren’ jenseits des Nationalstaates. Zur Implementation internationaler Umweltregime.” *Zeitschrift für Internationale Beziehungen* 4:1 (1997): 41–63.

World order demands which are simultaneously liberal but reject all forms of international coordination result in a competitive system of rival liberal capitalisms – a system depicted most vividly in the concept of a competitive ‘race to the bottom’ of market regulations and the idea of the market-oriented ‘competition state’.⁶⁵ A similar rejection of international coordination combined with non-market structures can be discussed as a ‘sovereign autonomy’ system, and which results in economic terms as a mercantilist order. The era of rival imperialisms and the lead up to World War Two can be considered historical precedents.⁶⁶ At the other extreme, world orders with high levels of supranational authority combined with the institutionalisation of liberal content can be considered the ideal type of a neoliberal minimal order in analogy to Nozick’s minimal state.⁶⁷ Many critics see the existing order as one of neoliberal global governance.⁶⁸ On the other hand, such a supranational order based on non-market coordination and interventionism can be thought of as representing attempts at authoritative global redistribution, or for providing the international rules necessary to preserve national autonomy. Some varieties of cosmopolitanism approach these demands,⁶⁹ while others represent a compromise with liberal constitutionalism in the form of global social democracy.⁷⁰ Between world orders demands of national discretion and supranationality are world orders of intergovernmental coordination, which compromise between national discretion and global supranationality. John Ruggie’s concept of ‘embedded liberalism’ as descriptor of the post-World War II order reflects a mostly intergovernmental order which sought a balance between liberal openness (coordinated liberalism) and domestic economic interventionism (coordinated dirigisme).⁷¹ The real world knows at best approximations to ideal types. The demands of different

⁶⁵ Philip G. Cerny, “Paradoxes of the Competition State: The Dynamics of Political Globalization”, *Government and Opposition* 32:2 (1997): 251–274.

⁶⁶ Robert W. Cox, *Production, Power and World Order: Social Forces in the Making of World History* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987), 151–210.

⁶⁷ Robert Nozick, *Anarchy, State and Utopia* (New York: Basic Books, 1974).

⁶⁸ Stephen Gill, “Constitutionalizing Inequality and the Clash of Globalizations”, *International Studies Review* 4:3 (2002): 47–65; Henk Overbeek, “Global Governance, Class, Hegemony: A historical materialist perspective”, in *Contending Perspectives on Global Governance: Coherence, Contestation and World Order*, eds. Alice D. Ba and Matthew J. Hoffmann (London: Routledge, 2005), 39–56.

⁶⁹ Alejandro Colás, “Putting Cosmopolitanism into Practice: the Case of Socialist Internationalism”, *Millennium* 23:3 (1993): 513–534; Andrew Linklater, *Critical Theory and World Politics: Citizenship, Sovereignty and Humanity* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2007).

⁷⁰ Danielle Archibugi and David Held (eds.) *Cosmopolitan Democracy: An Agenda for a New World Order* (London: Polity, 1995); Thomas W. Pogge, “Cosmopolitanism and Sovereignty”, *Ethics* 103:1 (1992): 48–75; Thomas W. Pogge, *World Poverty and Human Rights*, 2nd Edition (Cambridge: Polity, 2008).

⁷¹ John G. Ruggie, “International Regimes, Transactions and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order”, *International Organization* 36:2 (1982): 379–415.

actors will therefore be located in all parts of the two-dimensional space, not only at the poles of the dimensions.

(3) Thirdly, however, we also examine whether these demands reflect satisfaction with the institutional status quo (or alternatively, a revisionist posture). However, we need to further unpack the concept of 'satisfaction with the status quo'. The degree to which preferences are compatible with the status quo consists of two different things: the extent of (dis)satisfaction with the existing institutional order (defined here in bi-dimensional terms regarding the level of decision making and liberal policy content), and the extent of (dis)satisfaction with the way the status quo is currently implemented.

Regarding the institutional order, preferences can vary according to whether they seek more or less encompassing global governance, and more or less liberal policy commitments. By comparing the status quo with the demands of the actor under question, we can determine the distance and the direction of the change aimed for by a given actor. Preferences that lie northeast of the status quo ask for a more encompassing global governance, while preferences southwest of the status quo aim at creating a system in which states engage in competitive liberalisation. Preferences that diverge in a northwest direction seek strong liberal commitments enforced at a supranational level, while those that diverge to the southeast seek more sovereign autonomy.

Regarding institutional practices, it is possible that even if an actor is satisfied with the institutional status quo, it may be dissatisfied with its exercise and implementation. An important part of preferences therefore does not challenge the principles that guide a political institution, but challenge their practice. For instance, an actor may be in favour of a strong dispute settlement body in the WTO, and thus accept supranational authority in favour of liberal trade principles, but object to the practice of the DSB by pointing out that it does not rule without bias. Similarly, not all rejections of interventionism by the United Nations Security Council amounts to a rejection of a UN-based responsibility to protect; instead, what is often called into question is the selectivity of interventionism. In these cases, internal justifications of the concerned institution are taken as criteria for a negative judgement.⁷² Criticism of institutional *practice* is often done by reference to principles and norms acknowledged by the institution under question, such as transparency, equal

⁷² A procedure that has been labelled by Critical Theory in the tradition of Adorno and Horkheimer as "Ideologiekritik" (critique of the dominant ideology).

treatment, fairness and so on. These “internal criticisms” are identified as a third type. A hypothesised residual category is characterised by positions that are dissatisfied with the existing institutional structures, but accept their implementation in the meantime.

A comprehensive account of preferences in global governance therefore needs to allow for three possibilities:

1. Satisfaction with the existing institutional features, and with its implementation;
2. Satisfaction with the existing institutional features, but not with its implementation;
3. Dissatisfaction with the existing institutional features.

Matrix 2 represents these two dimensions of satisfaction with the institutional status quo; these two dimensions must be applied to each of the cells outlined in Matrix 1 (above).

Matrix 2: Degrees of Satisfaction

Institutional features Implementation	Satisfied	Dissatisfied
	Satisfied	Dissatisfied
Satisfied	satisfied	dissonant
Dissatisfied	internal critique	dissatisfied

Consequently, our conceptual approach to preferences can be summarised in two steps, each with two dimensions. First, what preferences are revealed regarding the institutional features of *level of authority* and *extent of liberal policy commitments*? Second, to what extent do these preferences challenge the status quo regarding *institutional structure* and *institutional practice*? Locating the demands of rising powers and NGOs within this three dimensional framework of contestation should provide us with insight into the direction for the development of world order that they aspire to: away from or towards greater international authority, more or less liberalism, and the amount of change demanded (measured as distance from status quo), as well as challenging the dominant practice measured against normative criteria or defending the status quo.

2.3 Strategies

In order to realise their preferences, NGOs and rising powers will pursue specific strategies. In the context of rising powers, some authors have focused on the 'grand strategies' that states pursue to further their economic and security interests. In this context, concepts such as engagement, integration, non-alignment, and balancing, have been used to describe features of rising powers' grand strategies.⁷³ Regarding NGOs, suggested tactics have included the political use of information and symbols, leveraging powerful actors, and holding actors to account;⁷⁴ different strategies such as engagement (dialogue) and confrontation (naming and shaming) have also been contrasted.⁷⁵ Closer to what we have in mind was outlined in studies of the negotiation strategies that rising powers have adopted in relation to international institutions.⁷⁶ In particular, we focus on one fundamental aspect of strategies that is especially important in our context: the perception of foes and allies, of opponents and coalition partners. This dimension of strategy is applicable to both rising powers and NGOs, and is especially significant in relation to the interaction of these two sets of actors.

To capture variation on the strategies that rising powers and NGOs employ when they engage in public contestation, we thus focus on their chosen patterns of coalition formation. As we expect that public claims, statements, justifications and voting decisions reveal to a large degree states' preferences, we believe they can also give us an indication of their preferred strategies regarding coalitions and perceived opponents. Again we ask three questions.

1. Which are the agents targeted by the demands? Who is seen as the incumbent?
2. Which actors are considered as the major opponents aiming at drastically different goals?
3. Which actors are considered as supporters or even as coalition partners? What mechanisms are advised for utilizing the partnership?

⁷³ Hal Brands, "Evaluating Brazilian Grand Strategy Under Lula." *Comparative Strategy* 30:1 (2011): 28–49; Avery Goldstein, "The Diplomatic Face of China's Grand Strategy: A Rising Power's Emerging Choice", *The China Quarterly* 168 (2001): 835–864; Sunil Khilnani et al., *NonAlignment 2.0: A Foreign and Strategic Policy for India in the Twenty First Century* (New Delhi: Centre for Policy Research, 2012).

⁷⁴ Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, *Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998), 16–25.

⁷⁵ Morton Winston, "NGO Strategies for Promoting Corporate Social Responsibility." *Ethics & International Affairs* 16:1 (2012): 71–87.

⁷⁶ Amrita Narlikar, *New Powers: How to Become One and How to Manage Them*. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010); Amrita Narlikar, "Introduction: Negotiating the Rise of New Powers." *International Affairs* 89:3 (2013): 561–576.

The latter two questions are especially important to develop categories with which strategies can be conceptualized. As a first step, we would distinguish roughly between different types of partners and opponents. The combination leads to four archetypes of strategies that is applicable both to states and to civil society actors. The typology certainly needs to be refined in the process of research considering issues such as whether or not formal coalitions are envisioned or whether the partner states are seen in the OECD world.

Matrix 3: Actor Strategies

Partners	Opponents	States	NGOs
States		Intergovernmental Strategy	Sovereigntist Strategy (not very likely for NGOs)
NGOs		Like-Minded Strategy	World Society Strategy (not very likely for states)

In this framework, actors who pronounce both their major partners and opponents to be states can be said to adopt an intergovernmental strategy. Those who align mostly with states against NGOs adopt a sovereigntist strategy, while those who side mostly with NGOs against states pursue a strategy we describe as like-minded. Those whose major opponents as well as partners are NGOs can be said to adopt a world society strategy. We expect that understanding actors' strategies in these terms will provide a key to understanding the demands and interaction of rising powers and NGOs in relation to international authority today.

2.4 Public Statements as Indicators of Preferences and Strategies

We propose that a useful empirical entry point to the preferences and strategies of rising powers and NGOs lies in their public statements and justifications. The preferences and strategies of these actors contribute to the contestation of world order when they become part of international political debates. Studying the statements, claims and symbolic acts of rising powers and NGOs will not only provide insights about the preferences of these agents, it should also improve our understanding of

the strategies preferred and employed. We therefore focus on contestation in public spheres, and aim to derive preferences and strategies from analysing their public statements and claims. Both groups of actors under question necessarily engage in the public processes of contestation and deliberation involved in the politics of international institutions, and both are required to provide justifications for their preferred visions for global governance. Central to our understanding of the public contestation of international institutions are therefore political evaluations and criticisms.

Public discourse and political statements are important because they represent the threshold at which a privately held preference enters into the domain of political contestability. States and NGOs can privately aspire to profound changes in the global order (preferences), but these aspirations only become a feature of international politics and public debate if they become part of their strategic and communicative behaviour, at which point they become part of the terrain of political contestability. It is only by crossing the threshold onto the 'public transcript' of international politics that these aspirations and dissatisfactions⁷⁷ can be considered a feature of the public contestation of international institutions. We are aware that our focus on public contestation is not able to capture all aspects of and the full scale of conceivable strategies of resistance. For instance, one strategy of resistance may be to support a norm rhetorically but ignore it systematically when it comes to behaviour. Whereas public contestation certainly is a kind of resistance, there are other forms of resistance that do not entail public contestation. It has been persuasively argued by James Scott that to limit one's attention to those openly declared instances of public resistance is to obscure the world of passive, 'everyday resistance' and undeclared resentments "by which new political forces and demands germinate before they burst on the scene."⁷⁸ We take this as a healthy note of caution, but argue nonetheless that public communications and statements can both provide insight into preferences, and be meaningful in themselves as contributing to normative development.

Firstly, statements can be considered from a purely rationalist perspective as a mechanism by which states as well as non-state actors exchange information about their preferences, making promises about their future actions, and issuing credible promises or threats.⁷⁹ Of course,

⁷⁷ James C. Scott, *Domination and the Arts of Resistance: Hidden Transcripts* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990).

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, 199.

⁷⁹ For a discussion and critique, see Thomas Risse, "'Let's Argue!': Communicative Action in World Politics." *International Organization* 54:1 (2000): 1–39 at 8.

interpreting such statements must take into account the strategic nature of the international environment, so that statements cannot be read uncritically as reflections of 'true' preferences. Taking states' (or NGOs') statements at their face value risks conflating strategic discourse for honest reflections of underlying interests or preferences.⁸⁰ Even from a purely 'cheap talk' model of public statements, however, political evaluations and criticisms are important sources of information regarding the preferences that rising powers and non-state actors hold regarding international institutions. There may be instances of international interactions in which actors may have a strong interest in revealing their true preferences. In the case of NGOs, the reputation costs of disingenuousness could be fatally high. For powerful states, there are clear incentives, especially in bargaining situations, to exaggerate or downplay one's demands as a bargaining tactic. But there are, equally, reasons for state officials to stipulate their true preferences in order to elicit compromises from the opponent. Secondly, whereas an individual's real preferences may lie within "the most illusive of psychological data",⁸¹ the public statements of states can be cross-checked through other empirical strategies, including archival research and expert and decision-maker interviews.⁸² The interests of corporate entities such as NGOs and states can be publicly embedded in "symbols, speeches by officials, and even in institutional rules and procedures."⁸³ For both reasons, taking statements as clues to actor's preferences can be cautiously justified.

Secondly, a different interest in public acts of communicative contestation stems from interest in the discursive politics of legitimation and delegitimation.⁸⁴ This approach emphasises the role of legitimacy as a mechanism for political control,⁸⁵ but also as a mechanism by which existing institutions and relationships can be challenged and contested through strategic delegitimation.⁸⁶

⁸⁰ For a discussion, see Jeffry Frieden, "Actors and Preferences in International Relations," In *Strategic Choice and International Relations*, eds. David Lake and Robert Powell. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999), 39–76. For a different approach to the same underlying problem, see James C. Scott, *Domination and the Arts of Resistance: Hidden Transcripts* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990).

⁸¹ Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace* (New York: Knopf, 1948).

⁸² Michael Zürn, "Assessing State Preferences and Explaining Institutional Choice: The Case of Intra-German Trade", *International Studies Quarterly*, 41:2 (1997): 300–302.

⁸³ Jeffrey W. Legro, *Rethinking the World: Great Power Strategies and International Order*. (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005).

⁸⁴ Cf. contributions in Anna Geis, Frank Nullmeier and Christopher Daase (Eds.), *Der Aufstieg der Legitimitätspolitik. Rechtfertigung und Kritik politisch-ökonomischer Ordnungen, Leviathan Sonderband 40/27*, (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2012).

⁸⁵ Ian Hurd, "Legitimacy and Authority in International Politics", *International Organization*, 53:2 (1999), 379–408.

⁸⁶ Ian Hurd, "Breaking and Making Norms: American Revisionism and Crises of Legitimacy." *International Politics* 44:2 (2007): 194–213 at 189–190; Ian Hurd, "Myths of Membership: The Politics of Legitimation in UN Security Council Reform." *Global Governance* 14:2 (2008): 199–217; Randall L. Schweller and Xiaoyu Pu, "After

The interest in legitimacy can be traced not simply to new agents questioning the legitimacy of global governance, but also to the increased authority of supranational institutions. This mechanism of contestation has often been associated with the tactics of civil society organisations, such as naming and shaming campaigns. As Martha Finnemore explains, “Even actors with limited or no material capability can mount damaging attacks on the credibility, reputation, and legitimacy of the powerful. The tools to mount such attacks are not hard to come by in contemporary politics.”⁸⁷ But challenging the legitimacy of international institutions is also a mechanism by which institutionally marginalised powers can contest their subordination, especially when formalised routes to institutional change are difficult or blocked by incumbent powers, and the legitimacy discourses of states retains a prime position if states remain “the privileged constituency of legitimation for intergovernmental institutions.”⁸⁸ Such approaches lend themselves methodologically to the study of the ‘legitimation statement’ as the primary unit of analysis. Such an approach asks of public political actors “Which criteria and arguments do they use to assess their regime and to justify these evaluations?”⁸⁹ And it turns: It presses authority holders to justify by making explicit how they serve the common good.⁹⁰ While this can be dismissed as ‘rhetorical action’, many argue that such rhetorical action can have real effects or even slide uneasily into genuine deliberation via the mechanisms of the ‘civilizing force of hypocrisy’, ‘hypocrisy traps’, ‘rhetorical entrapment’, and “argumentative self-entrapment.”⁹¹ Consequently, the statements become meaningful in a second, normative sense. As Hurd explains, “public statements about a principle of legitimation might be

Unipolarity: China’s Visions of International Order in an Era of US Decline.” *International Security* 36:1 (2011): 41–72.

⁸⁷ Martha Finnemore, “Legitimacy, Hypocrisy, and the Social Structure of Unipolarity.” *World Politics* 61:1 (2009): 58–85 at 66.

⁸⁸ Steven Bernstein, “Legitimacy in Intergovernmental and Non-state Global Governance”, *Review of International Political Economy*, 18:1 (2011), 17–51 at 34.

⁸⁹ Steffen Schneider, Frank Nullmeier, and Achim Hurrelmann. 2007. “Exploring the Communicative Dimension of Legitimacy: Text Analytical Approaches.” In *Legitimacy in an Age of Global Politics*, eds. Achim Hurrelmann, Steffen Schneider, and Jens Steffek. Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, p. 126–155.

⁹⁰ See Michael Zürn, “Critical Citizens’ oder ‘Critical Decisions’ – Eine Erwiderung”. *Politische Vierteljahresschrift* 54: 1 (2013): 173–185 as a discussion of the interaction between justification and contestation, respectively legitimation and delegitimation.

⁹¹ Jon Elster, “Strategic Uses of Arguments”, In *Barriers to Conflict Resolution*, eds. Kenneth J. Arrow, Robert H. Mnookin, Lee Ross, and Amos Tversky. (New York: W.W. Norton, 1995), 236–257; Martha Finnemore, “Legitimacy, Hypocrisy, and the Social Structure of Unipolarity.” *World Politics* 61:1 (2009): 58–85; Thomas Risse, “Let’s Argue!”: Communicative Action in World Politics.” *International Organization* 54:1 (2000): 1–39; Frank Schimmelfennig, *The EU, NATO, and the Integration of Europe. Rules and Rhetoric* (Cambridge: Cambridge U.P. 2003); Catherine Weaver, *Hypocrisy Trap: The Rhetoric, Reality and Reform of the World Bank* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008).

turned around by others in ways the speaker never intended but from which they can't escape. International talk may be cheap, but it is never free."⁹²

For these reasons, we propose that public statements can be a useful resource with which to study the contested politics of authority beyond the nation state. Our focus on contestation, i.e. discursive statements, claims and symbolic acts, delimits the research and thus allows for comparisons and the development of hypotheses about the contestation of global governance (not the outcomes). It is however not restricted to the process of revealing preferences, we also include statements about who is considered as coalition partner or opponent and about which strategies should be taken. In this way, we want to study both preferences and cover (a part of the broader area of) strategies in contested world orders.

3. Case Selection

Which actors and which policy fields contribute the most analytical value to understanding the interaction of rising powers and NGOs over the development of world order? Case selection here is guided by three major considerations: capturing institutional variation regarding both international authority and the degree of liberal policy content, capturing actor-level variation regarding the population of our two sets of actors (NGOs and rising powers), and selecting from a variety of policy fields or issue areas.

Our selection of institutions as cases is guided by their internal features as well as the need to encompass a variety of issue areas. Issue areas are realms of social activity that share common features. These can be delineated in different ways depending on the analytical interest, such as the substantive policy field, the problem structure ('game') underlying it, the kinds of actors involved, and so on. Here, we attempt to include international institutions from three major issue areas of world order: welfare (the material basis for existence through allocation of economic goods), security (protection against physical threats), and authority (the organisation of freedoms and political participation).⁹³

⁹² Ian Hurd, "Myths of Membership: The Politics of Legitimation in UN Security Council Reform." *Global Governance* 14:2 (2008): 213.

⁹³ Ernst-Otto Czempiel, *Internationale Politik: Ein Konfliktmodell* (Paderborn: UTB, 1981).

We therefore draw our case studies from all four of the cells below, which positions international institutions regarding their authority, the extent of liberal content, and issue area. For example, the WTO combines high levels of international authority with a high degree of liberal policy content. The G7, and more recently the G20, are major institution that follows strictly intergovernmental procedures of decision making. It has no autonomous authority, but serves as an important cite for possible policy coordination of all sort amongst major powers. While the affinity for the proliferation of liberal tenets of governance was a feature of the G7, this trait is less obvious regarding the much more diverse G20. In this manner, we seek to draw case studies from a variety of issue areas from all four of the quadrants below. More precisely, we look at the WTO based trade regime, the international financial institutions, the Non-Proliferation Regime, the Climate Regime and the WHO. As international institutions that work across different issue areas we focus on the United Nations General Assembly and the G 8/G 20. As a case of so-called “private authority”,⁹⁴ i.e. public authority exercised by private actors, we take the governance of sports with respect to doping (IOC, FIFA).

Matrix 4: Case Selection

Liberal Content Authority	Low	High
Low	UNGA (encompassing) IAEA (security) UNFCCC (welfare)	G7/20 (encompassing)
High	WHO (welfare)	WTO (welfare) IFIs (welfare) IOC/FIFA (welfare)

With each case study, we want to study actor positions and strategies (as unit of analysis). With respect to rising powers, we plan to focus on a common stet of states across all the institutions.

⁹⁴ See Thomas J. Biersteker and John A. Hall (eds.) *The Emergence of Private Authority in Global Governance* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002); Claire A. Cutler, Virginia Haufler, Virginia, and Tony Porter (eds.) *Private Authority and International Affairs* (Albany, NY: SUNY Press 2002); and Klaus Dieter Wolf, Private Actors and the Legitimacy of Governance Beyond the State. Conceptional Outlines and Empirical Explorations. In: Arthur Benz und Ioannis Papadopoulos (eds) *Governance and Democracy*. (London: Routledge, pp. 200–227, 2006).

Indeed, the 'BRICS' category (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa) is a blessing in this respect, as it combines variation on regime type, level of economic development, economic size, and levels of material power.

Unfortunately, there is no equivalent of the BRICS in the world of transnational NGOs. With the support of Google hits, we therefore want to identify the most important ones conditioned by the following set of criteria: a) interest groups (with the subdivision between employers associations and units vs. common good NGOs (with the subdivision of mainly working within or against the institution); b) West vs. the Rest with the rest separated into BRICS countries and others as country of origin. For each of the seven types, we examine the most salient, as indicated by their visibility in Google-mediated internet searches.⁹⁵

4. Non-State Actors, Great Powers, and Global Governance: Propositions

A major interest underlying this project stems from descriptive and normative considerations: what are the implications of the emergence of rising powers and NGOs for the trajectory of world order? In order to arrive at sound judgments, our project also aims at developing and testing theoretical propositions about the contestation of world order. We want to know: which actors have preferences significantly different from the status quo? Is the difference mainly regarding the content or the institutional form? Which actors are rather in favour of the status quo? Do rising powers and NGOs systematically differ? Do they come out at different sides of the status quo? Do they see each other as opponents or as partners? Moreover, we expect to give differentiated answers to these questions depending on the type of rising power and the type of NGO. Different theoretical approaches to world politics provide us with different ways of understanding these questions, and can give rise to different expectations and propositions which can be evaluated with this material.

Hypothesis about Preferences

Great power realists hold that international institutions are epiphenomenal to the distribution of material power, and foremost military power, in the international system. International institutions

⁹⁵ For a typology of NGOs, see Michael Yaziji and Jonathan Doh, *NGOs and Corporations: Conflict and Collaboration* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 3–14; Peter Willetts, "What is a Non-Governmental Organization?" *UNESCO Encyclopaedia of Life Support Systems*, Article 1.44.3.7. Available <http://www.staff.city.ac.uk/p.willetts/CS-NTWKS/NGO-ART.HTM#Part7>. See also the World Association of Non-Governmental Organizations' *NGO Handbook*. Available: <http://www.ngohandbook.org/>

“reflect state calculations of self-interest based primarily on the international distribution of power. The most power states in the system create and shape institutions so that they can maintain their share of world power, or even increase it.”⁹⁶ It follows that rising powers will have preferences at variance to the established powers, whose institutions reflect their own interests, and will seek to challenge these institutions as their ability to do so increases.

H 1a: The more power a rising state has, the more its preferences diverge from the status quo.

Similarly, power transition theorists and theories about cycles of hegemonic conflict share an assumption that rising powers tend to be sources of conflict and contestation of existing international institutions. Both theories are also structuralist in the sense that a states' position in the international power hierarchy shapes to a large extent its avenues for behaviour, but differ crucially from great power realists in adding a consideration of rising powers' domestic structures. Power transition theory focuses on the two major antagonists: the biggest rising state and the established state.⁹⁷ The dominant state will defend the status quo, “from which it accrues substantial benefits”,⁹⁸ while when the rising challenger state approaches parity with the dominant state, it “greatly increases the probability of conflict.”⁹⁹ However, the potential for conflict is only severe when the rising state is also dissatisfied. In particular, “states with economic and political institutions similar to those of the dominant power likely will be satisfied with the status quo.”¹⁰⁰ This would imply that considerable variation should exist in rising power preferences. As the authors note, this places power transition theory in tune with democratic peace theory. Similarly, from the point of view of hegemonic cycles, it has been argued that because international institutions reflect the interests of powerful states, rising powers are likely to be dissatisfied with them.¹⁰¹ Nonetheless, it is possible for these tensions to be successfully contained, “provided that the interests and social purposes of the major economic powers are congruent.”¹⁰² Neither power transition not hegemonic stability theories believe that rising powers are necessarily revisionist –

⁹⁶ John J. Mearsheimer, “The False Promise of International Institutions.” *International Security* 19:3 (1994): 5–49 at 13.

⁹⁷ Ronald L. Tammen, Jacek Kugler, Douglas Lemke, Allan C. Stamm, Mark Abdollahian, Carole Alsharabati, Brian Efind, and A.F.K. Organski. *Power Transitions: Strategies for the 21st Century* (Washington, DC: C.Q. Press, 2000).

⁹⁸ Ronald L. Tammen et. al., *Power Transitions: Strategies for the 21st Century* (Washington: C.Q. Press, 2000), 9.

⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, 21.

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, 23.

¹⁰¹ Robert Gilpin, *The Political Economy of International Relations* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1987).

¹⁰² *Ibid.*, 91.

but they do consider growing power to be an essential prerequisite for dissatisfied powers to begin to challenge the international order. Consequently,

H 1b: The closer a rising power comes to parity with the dominant state, the more likely it is to challenge the status quo openly (unless its internal institutions are similar to those of the dominant state).

Curiously, it is the opposite logic that underpins some neoclassical realist accounts.¹⁰³ As Randall Schweller summarises, “By definition, rising powers are doing better than everyone else under the current order. It is not obvious, therefore, why they (of all states) would seek to spoil the established order.”¹⁰⁴ By such a reasoning, the fastest growing powers should be the *most* satisfied with the existing order. This gives rise to the counter-hypothesis,

H 1c: The more power a rising state has, the less its preferences diverge from the status quo.

Liberal approaches to international relations have often emphasized the significance of domestic factors in explaining state preferences, and rising powers are no exception.¹⁰⁵ From this point of view, states’ preferences are not structurally determined by the distribution of power, but arise from their domestic social bases. To the extent that existing international institutions represent the societal preferences of open, liberal democracies, the status quo should align with liberal interests. For example, it has been argued that the liberal trade policies of the rising powers assists in their integration into the existing order.¹⁰⁶ This has also been complemented by a liberal constructivist perspective, in which liberal democratic states internalise norms that lead to common ‘security communities’. The security community of liberal democracies aligns them with the status quo via three mechanisms: “collective identities and shared values; transnational political, economic, and cultural interdependence; and international structures of governance regulating

¹⁰³ Randall Schweller, *Unanswered Threats: Political Constraints on the Balance of Power* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006); Randall Schweller, “Emerging Powers in an Age of Disorder”, *Global Governance* 17:3 (2011): 285–297.

¹⁰⁴ Randall Schweller, “Emerging Powers in an Age of Disorder”, *Global Governance* 17:3 (2011): 288.

¹⁰⁵ Andrew Moravcsik, “Liberal International Relations Theory: A Scientific Assessment.” In *Progress in International Relations Theory*, eds. Colin Elman and Miriam Fendius Elman. (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press), p. 159–204; Andrew Moravcsik, “Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics.” *International Organization* 51:4 (1997): 513–553.

¹⁰⁶ G. John Ikenberry and Thomas Wright, *Rising Powers and Global Institutions* (Washington, DC: The Century Foundation, 2009), 5.

social order.”¹⁰⁷ This implies that any obstacles to the co-optation of rising powers into existing regimes and institutions would likely come not from inherent conflict between rising and established powers but from ‘blocking coalitions’ of vested interests at a domestic level, who have something to lose from continued liberalisation or the adaptation to western liberal ideas and ideologies.¹⁰⁸ Because the dominant states in the system have externalised a specifically liberal world order, the more liberal the domestic structures of the rising powers, the more they should be satisfied with the status quo.

H 2a: Liberal Order Hypothesis: The more liberal the internal order of a rising power, the more it favours the current liberal status quo.

H 2b: The more a state has benefitted from the current order (measured in growth rates), the more it favours the current status quo.

A related argument focuses more particularly on the nature of rising powers’ domestic political institutions: namely whether they are democratic or not. Many authors have assumed for different reasons that non-democratic states favour sovereignty as the primary principle of world order, such that non-democratic rising powers are likely to be particularly sceptical regarding the emergence of international authority.¹⁰⁹ Following this logic, we consider:

H 3: Authoritarian Sovereignty: It is especially the authoritarian states that emphasize sovereignty and challenge the liberal supranationalism of international institutions.

A related strand of literature argues that rising powers are characterised by societies that are both vastly unequal and rapidly changing. The governments of rising powers are therefore permanently short of legitimacy. While they realize that their rise has been made possible by the status quo order, they want to appear more radical to the domestic audience in order to shore up their

¹⁰⁷ Thomas Risse, “US Power in a Liberal Security Community.” In *America Unrivaled: The future of the balance of power*, ed. G. John Ikenberry. (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2002), 260–283 at 261.

¹⁰⁸ Hurrell, Andrew, “Hegemony, Liberalism and Global Order: What Space for Would-be Great Powers?” *International Affairs* 82:1 (2006): 1–19 at 7–8.

¹⁰⁹ Sophie Eisentraut and Alexandros Tokhi, “Authoritarian States and the Politicization of International Institutions”, Paper presented at the Colloquium Global Governance, WZB Berlin Social Research Center, August 2013; Alastair Iain Johnston, “Is China a Status Quo Power?” *International Security* 27:4 (2003): 5–56 at 14–15; Zaki Laidi, “BRICS: Sovereignty Power and Weakness.” *International Politics* 49:5 (2012): 614–632; Matthew D. Stephen, “Rising Regional Powers and International Institutions: The Foreign Policy Orientations of India, Brazil and South Africa.” *Global Society* 26:3 (2012): 289–309.

domestic legitimacy, often focusing on the shortcomings of Western institutions. It can be expected that the divergence between statements and claims in the international realm and statements and claims direct to the domestic audience is especially accentuated if it is an authoritarian system with especially high levels of internal inequality.¹¹⁰

*H 4a: Rhetorical Dissidence I: In claims and statements directed at the own population, rising powers are much more radical than in international statements and claims.*¹¹¹

H 4b: Rhetorical Dissidence II: This difference is especially accentuated in authoritarian states with high inequality

As mentioned above, transnational NGOs are often seen as representatives of civil society and the common good, especially if they cannot be easily portrayed as interest groups. Such groups stand procedurally for more open and more transparent international organisations¹¹² and in terms of content for strong international institutions that are able to national overcome vetos in the pursuit of the common good.¹¹³

H 5a: Civil Society Hypothesis I: Especially civil society NGOs (as opposed to interest groups) systematically favour more international authority.

H 5b: Civil Society Hypothesis II: Especially civil society NGOs (as opposed to interest groups) systematically favour positive integration over negative integration.

Those who are more critical of NGOs often see them above all as representatives of Western interests. In this view, an alliance of Western governments and non-state actors dominate international institutions. This coalition has laid the fundament for the Washington-Consensus and stand for a neo-liberal world order.

¹¹⁰ Andreas Nölke, "Eine B(R)ICS-Variante des Kapitalismus? Implikationen für Dissidenz und Herrschaft in der globalen Politik." Paper presented at the German Political Studies Association conference "Politik und Ökonomie in globaler Perspektive: Der (Wieder) Aufstieg des Globalen Südens", May 6, (Frankfurt, 2010).

¹¹¹ Ibid.

¹¹² Jens Steffek and Patrizia Nanz, "Emergent Patterns of Civil Society Participation in Global and European Governance." In *Civil Society Participation in European and Global Governance. A Cure for the Democratic Deficit?*, eds. Jens Steffek, Claudia Kissling and Patrizia Nanz (Houndmills, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 1-29; Jonas Tallberg, Thomas Sommerer, Theresa Squatrito, and Christer Jönsson, *Opening Up: The Access of Transnational Actors to International Organizations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013).

¹¹³ Paul Wapner, "Politics Beyond the State: Environmental Activism and World Civic Politics." *World Politics* 47:3 (1995): 311-340.

H 6: Western Dominance Hypotheses: Especially Western non-state actors favour further liberalization

A final proposition in terms of preferences concerns institutional inequality. A critical version of power-based theories points to the hypocrisy of the most powerful states in the international system.¹¹⁴ More specifically, top ranked powers use effectively international institutions to influence other states, but are powerful enough to resist international norms. In this sense, the US has established a system that may be labelled institutionalized inequality including veto rights and formal as well as informal privileges in international institutions.¹¹⁵ There is little reason to assume that rising powers behave differently.¹¹⁶ It can therefore be argued that the most powerful rising power increasingly demands the same privileges as the most powerful status quo power.

H7: Institutionalized Asymmetry Hypothesis: The most powerful rising powers demand privileges in the decision-making process.

Hypotheses about Strategies

Finally, we consider expectations about rising power and NGO strategies. Existing International Relations theory is relatively silent on political strategies. Whereas especially American politics theory has analysed strategies such as pork-and-barrel and minimal winning coalitions extensively, there is little systematic work in International Relations on this. We therefore formulate here a set of generic hypotheses that derive from different assumptions about the factors underpinning our actors' behaviour.

H 8: Preference-driven Coalitions: The closer the positions of agents are, the more likely they work together in a coalition.

H 9: Unit-driven Coalitions: Rising powers and NGOs do not coalesce, even if they have similar positions.

H 10: Ideology-driven Coalitions: Liberal Governments coalesce with NGOs; authoritarian states do not.

¹¹⁴ See e.g. Stephen Krasner, *Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999).

¹¹⁵ Michael Zürn, "Institutionalisierte Ungleichheit in der Weltpolitik. Jenseits der Alternative 'Global Governance' versus 'American Empire'." *Politische Vierteljahresschrift* 48:4 (2007): 680–704.

¹¹⁶ Michael Zürn and Matthew D. Stephen, "The View of Old and New Powers on the Legitimacy of International Institutions." *Politics* 30:S1 (2010): 91–101.

Conclusion

The rise of new powers and the emergence of transnational NGOs signal new challenges for the authority of international institutions. Externally, a redistribution of international power is causing an exogenous change to the power basis for existing institutions. Internally, the authority of international institutions has generated new political awareness and mobilisation on behalf of transnationally active publics. Together, both processes contribute to the increased contestation of international institutions.

Distinguishing between claims targeting institutions' authority and claims targeting liberal policy content, we aim to investigate empirically this contestation by both of these relatively new actor groups. Moreover, by focusing on their strategies of contestation, we seek for the first time to analyse both actors together. In this way, we hope to develop the conceptual and theoretical point of departure for the systematic and comparative study of the demands of rising powers, NGOs, and the implications for the emerging world order.

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