

Danilowicz-Gösele, Kamila

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“A” IS THE AIM?

Kamila Danilowicz-Gösele

GEORG-AUGUST-UNIVERSITÄT GÖTTINGEN

“A” is the Aim?

Kamila Danilowicz-Gösele¹

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Abstract

This paper analyzes professors' effect from a fundamental first-year course in Economics on students' later performance in follow-on courses with a special attention given to the problem of self-selection bias of students toward certain professors. Based on an extensive dataset consisting of administrative data on more than 2,900 students from the university of Göttingen, an instrumental variable (IV) strategy is used. The obtained results indicate that professors have powerful effects on students' achievement. However, the sign of this effect is ambiguous, and depends on the mathematical rigor of the course and the examination style.

Keywords: university, education, grade inflation

JEL classification: I23, I21, I28

¹Chair of Public Economics, Georg-August University Göttingen, kdanilo@uni-goettingen.de

1 Introduction

Academic grades are said to reflect students' achievement and thereby the effectiveness of educational institutions and their accountability to potential employers. However, in the past decades, confidence in the reliability of the grades has been badly shaken by studies exposing the trend towards grade inflation. Several studies have shown that rise in grades has become an issue in both secondary and tertiary education across many countries, thereby stressing the need to provide explanations for the phenomenon of grade inflation. [Rojstaczer and Healy \(2010\)](#) conducted a study of grading patterns in more than 160 American colleges and universities and found a nationwide rise in average grades of nearly a tenth of a point change per decade, with A being the most commonly awarded grade at American colleges and universities.

This paper addresses this concern by focusing on the differences in grading policies between professors assigned to the same mandatory first-year course in Economics. Firstly, the analysis reveals that there are huge differences in grading even within the same course. Secondly, the effect of having a certain professor in the mandatory first-year course on student's later performance is highly significant and cannot be solely explained by differences in professors' grading. However, the sign of this effect is ambiguous, and depends on the mathematical rigor of the course and the examination style. Furthermore, the results demonstrate a highly significant effect of having the same professor for many classes, although switching from a tough to an easy grader seems to be the best strategy for improving grades. Our analysis shows that the obtained effects are quite meaningful. All else being equal, having a certain professor in Microeconomics I is associated with an improvement of the expected grade in a follow-on course by up to 1.385 grades. The overall result indicates that both grading policies and learning outcomes vary between professors within the same course.

When talking about grade inflation, it is important to distinguish between awarding higher grades *per se* and improvement in grades as a result of better performing students who are learning more and/or being taught better. The difficulty with the latter explanation lies in the fact that a growing number of educational researchers claim that it is raining A's in the education system without continuous evidence of increasing academic performance.

Strong evidence that students are indeed doing worse today relative to a decade ago is provided by researchers from the National Center for Education and Statistics in 2015, who claim that SAT scores in critical reading, writing and math have dropped

each year within the analyzed period from 2004 till 2012 (Kena et al., 2015). Moreover, according to the report published by the National Bureau of Economic Research of the University of California, students decreased their class and studying time from 40 hours per week in 1961 to 27 hours per week in 2003 (Babcock and Marks, 2011).

Since concerns about grade inflation are not new, researchers have already offered many explanations for the upward trend in grades. Some of these explanations focus on changes in educational institutions including changes in enrollment patterns (Prather and Kodras (1979)), curricula (Prather and Kodras (1979)) or grading policies (Birnbaum (1977)).

Although the teaching body is expected to individually regulate grading policies, because of their effect on the reputation of the institutions they work for and students' career chances, it is commonly known that unregulated institutions are very often challenged to maintain certain continuous standards. This is also the case for the colleges and universities, which have troubles maintaining academic standards in the absence of any regulation. Against this background, educational researchers found out that teachers' characteristics such as teaching quality (De Paola (2009)), teaching experience (Rivkin et al. (2005); Clotfelter et al. (2007)), gender (Neumark and Gardecki (1998); Bettinger and Long (2005); Carrell et al. (2010)) and age (?), have statistically significant effects on students' grades. However, there is less agreement on the influence of the instructor rank (Sonner (2000)), part-time or full-time status or salary (Nelson and Lynch (1984); Pressman (2007); Hoffmann and Oreopoulos (2009)). In addition, there is strong evidence that changes in the use of student evaluations (Krautmann and Sander (1999); Stratton et al. (1994); Johnson (2003) and Eiszler (2002)) or the public availability of median grades (Bar et al. (2009)) may also influence the extent to which instructors exaggerate students' grades.

Other kinds of explanations draw attention to changes in students' behavior including students' freedom in choosing departments, courses or certain professors. At many universities, there is a visible trend towards learning that is more relevant to students' interests and goals. Therefore, today's students have much more freedom in designing their study paths, being able to choose from a wide range of major/elective courses dependent on their interest, abilities, difficulty level, instructor, work load or examination structure. In some cases, they can even decide whether the grade from a taken class will appear on their transcript of records or not. Thus, in order to improve the overall grade, students may act strategically by taking advantage of the mentioned differences, which will result in attending carefully-selected courses or in opting for non-visible grades.

The study of [Sabot and Wakeman-Linn \(1991\)](#) shows that students are significantly more likely to enroll in a subsequent course of a department where they have already received a relatively higher grade. Another finding of their study is that grades obtained in low-grading departments are better predictors of students' later performance than grades received from grade-deflating departments. A similar finding is reported in a study of [Ost \(2010\)](#), who found out that low grades in science classes can be used as a predictor for students' participation in subsequent science courses.

Given all this, it is not surprising that, in many countries, such as United States, Canada, England, Scotland and Wales, online professor rating sites, such as "Rate My Professors.com", become so popular. In this case, students have the possibility to rate their professors according to *easiness*, *helpfulness*, *clarity*, *hotness* and the rater's *interest* in the class, in order to help fellows to choose the appropriate classes and/or professors. Some studies, such as [Miles and Sparks \(2013\)](#), examined the effect of online professor ratings and found out, that such websites indeed have an influence on students' choices for selecting professors, however it is not very clear to what extent.

Although there is a vast amount of research on grade inflation, there is little attention to grading differences within higher education, especially within the same field of study or within the same course. This paper contributes to this body of literature by assessing the effect of grading and teaching differences from a mandatory first-year course on students' performance in follow-on courses at a German University. Even though all professors assigned to the mandatory first-year course have a very similar teaching and examination style, and students in most cases follow the curriculum, there is no random placement of students into the classroom and thus have to be aware of students' self-selection toward certain professors. For this reason, this paper proposes a instrumental variable (IV) strategy by instrumenting student's choice of a professor through a random assignment of professors, on the semester basis, to the mandatory first-year course. In this case, we follow the faculty's recommendation to write the exam in the second semester of studies. Therefore, taking the exam with a professor who was assigned to the course in the student's second semester will influence the student's later performance. On the contrary, the fact that a professor is assigned to the course in the student's second semester does not affect the student's later achievements if a student decides, against the faculty's recommendation, to write her exam in an earlier or later semester.

The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides a brief overview of the institutional background. The data set, variables used and the empirical framework are

presented in Section 3. Section 4 presents the results and Section 5 concludes with summarizing the findings of the analysis.

2 Institutional Background

Since the aim of the paper is to study the differences in professors' grading and its effect on students' performance in follow-on classes, this paper chooses one of the mandatory first-year courses offered at the faculty of Economics, namely Microeconomics I. It is an introductory undergraduate course that teaches the fundamentals of microeconomics. The reasons for our choice are three-fold. Firstly, this course is mandatory for all students enrolled at the faculty of economic sciences at Göttingen University, thus providing us with extensive and diverse observations. Secondly, within the faculty of economic sciences, Microeconomics I is the course with the greatest number of professors assigned, thus indicating variation according to their characteristics such as grading policy. Last but not least, since Microeconomics I is one of the first courses economic students are required to take in their undergraduate programs, it also serves as a prerequisite for many follow-on classes. Therefore, its accompanying effect of different grading policies, if existent, should be strong enough to be observed in students' later achievements.

Based on the explicit information provided on students' university records, we are able to restrict our analysis to students enrolled at the faculty of economic sciences who have participated in the Microeconomics I exam either once or multiple times but always with the same professor.

Although professors' assignment to the Microeconomics I course is to a greater extent random and thus not known in advance to the students, we are still aware of the self-selection bias toward certain professors. The reason for this is that, students are, to some extent, free to choose when they want to take this course. The only restricting factor is the examination regulation, according to which the credits for this course must be earned by the end of the student's fifth semester. For this reason, they can postpone taking the course to a later semester or even after taking the class in their second semester they can still decide to drop-out of the exam. In fact, it might be tempting for some students to postpone the Microeconomics I exam until a professor, known for "easy grading", will offer it.

In order to control for students' potential self-selection bias, we follow the recom-

mentation of the Economics faculty. Hence, in our analysis we will distinguish between students who followed faculty's recommendation and students who postponed the exam to a later date. In addition to this we could also think about other factors, such as illness or other circumstances beyond students' control, that lead to postponing the exam.

The follow-on courses that we decided to look at are Microeconomics II and Public Finance, the latter one combines the introductory and the advanced course which are both taught by the same professor. Both courses aim to further deepen the study in microeconomics, thus having Microeconomics I as a prerequisite. All examined courses have a similar structure and consist of lecture and tutorials on a weekly basis. The lectures are taught by one of the university professors, tutorials, however, are taught either by scientific assistants (Public Finance) or trained students who already passed the respective course (Microeconomics I and II).

3 Data and Methodology

3.1 Dataset and descriptives

Dataset

This paper employs a unique administrative data set of 2,920 students enrolled at the faculty of economic sciences of the Göttingen University who participated in the Microeconomics I exam between 2006 and 2011.¹ The detailed and anonymized data includes students' characteristics such as high school leaving degree, gender, type of health insurance or parental address, as well as students' university records such as chosen field of study, grades, examiners, attempts and examination dates.

Dependent Variables

Our outcome variables are students' grades from three undergraduate courses offered at the faculty of economic sciences, namely Microeconomics I, Microeconomics II and Public Finance.

The data set is restricted to students who either took the exam in Microeconomics I one time or multiple times but always with the same professor. In case of multiple

¹Göttingen is a small city in Lower Saxony (Germany) where students account for 22% of the city's population ([Statistisches Bundesamt, 2009](#)). According to the statistics of the University of Göttingen, there are currently more than 4,300 students enrolled at the Faculty of Economic Sciences, which amounts to around 15 percents of all students on campus.

examination attempts, we will use the grade a student received on her first examination attempt in this course, implying that every student in our data has only one grade in Microeconomics I.

For the two other courses, Microeconomics II and Public Finance, we will use the best grade the student received in all her attempts.

In order to make the results internationally comparable, German grading scale, with 1.0 as the best possible grade and 4.0 as the minimum passing grade, has been translated to the U.S. grading scheme.

Independent Variables

Within the analyzed period from 2006 to 2011, five different professors were assigned to teach the Microeconomics I course. To include these in our analysis, we create an indicator variable for each professor, reflecting the student's enrollment decision concerning Microeconomics I. For example, if a student took her first Microeconomics I exam with *Professor 1*, her indicator variable for this professor will equal one. Consequently, the remaining four indicator variables (*Professor 2*; *Professor 3*; *Professor 4*; *Professor 5*) will be zero.

Assuming that students can benefit from having the same professor in different subjects, we include one further indicator variable *Same Professor* to capture the effect of having the same professor in the two analyzed courses.

The high school grade point average (GPA) will be used as a control for students' ability. GPA serves as a predictor of academic success believing that this measure captures more than just the students' abilities or achievements but also certain behavioral factors. Likewise course grades, high school GPA is converted to the U.S. grading scale.

In the analysis, we also account for students' socio-economic background by using the students' health insurance type and the purchasing power index of her parents' zip-code area. The type of health insurance is suited as a proxy for students' educational and socio-economic background because of the organization of the German health care insurance system, which is characterized by the dual system of public and private health insurance. While almost everyone is eligible for public health insurance, the private health insurance can be chosen only due to certain income criteria or employment status.² Since in most cases students are insured through their parents, their health

²In 2008 the number of people being privately insured (civil servants, self-employed or high earners) with a university degree was almost three times as high as that within the total German population (Finkenstädt and Keßler (2012); Statistisches Bundesamt (2009))

insurance status also provides information about their educational background.

Additionally, the purchasing power index within the zip-code area of the students' home address serves as another compelling measure of students' socio-economic background, considering that the German zip-code areas are fairly small and assuming that there is some residential sorting due to income. It relates to the per-capita income of a zip-code area with the average per-capita income of Germany, thus expressing the purchasing power of a region. The index is normalized to 100, meaning that an area with an index value of 110 has a purchasing power of greater than ten percent as compared to the German average.

Furthermore, since there is a lack of agreement in educational research about gender differences we include gender as a control variable in our analysis. Gender is measured as a dichotomous variable coded as 1 for female and 0 for male.

Summary Statistics

The summary statistics in Table 1 show that the number of observations in the two analyzed follow-on courses, Microeconomics II and Public Finance, does not equal our sample size in Microeconomics I. This is due to the fact that study and examination regulations vary among degree programs at the faculty of economic sciences, meaning that some courses are not necessarily required as part of undergraduate studies. For Microeconomics I, the mean-value for a sample of 2,920 students is 2.12. For Microeconomics II, the mean-value for a sample of 1,255 students is 2.03 and thus only slightly lower than the mean-value of Microeconomics I. The highest mean-value of 2.33 appeared for a sample of 964 students in Public Finance.

Nearly half of the students in the sample took their Microeconomics I exam with *Professor 1*, and one third of the students with *Professor 5*. Possible explanations for these differences in the attendance rates include the fact, that these both professors offered this course more often.

In our sample the mean-value of High School GPA is approximately 2.5 which is higher, meaning better, than the mean of the grades obtained in Microeconomics I, Microeconomics II and Public Finance, respectively. This can be explained by the fact that a grade of 0.0, meaning failed, is not possible for the high school leaving certificate. The share of female students in all courses is about 40 percent. The purchasing power index is slightly lower for students in the Public Finance class and almost the same for students in Microeconomics I and in Microeconomics II. Microeconomics I has the lowest share of students with a private health insurance.

Table 1: Summary Statistics

Variable	Observations	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Grade in Microeconomics I	2920.00	2.12	1.11	0.00	4.00
High School GPA	2920.00	2.46	0.55	1.20	4.00
Female	2920.00	0.41	0.49	0.00	1.00
Private Health Insurance	2920.00	0.17	0.38	0.00	1.00
Purchasing Power Index	2920.00	99.09	11.76	70.16	258.82
Prof. 1 Dummy	2920.00	0.43	0.49	0.00	1.00
Prof. 2 Dummy	2920.00	0.10	0.30	0.00	1.00
Prof. 3 Dummy	2920.00	0.07	0.25	0.00	1.00
Prof. 4 Dummy	2920.00	0.11	0.31	0.00	1.00
Prof. 5 Dummy	2920.00	0.30	0.46	0.00	1.00
Easy Graders Dummy	2920.00	0.41	0.49	0.00	1.00
Tough Graders Dummy	2920.00	0.59	0.49	0.00	1.00
Grade in Microeconomics II	1255.00	2.03	1.13	0.00	4.00
High School GPA	1255.00	2.46	0.58	1.20	4.00
Female	1255.00	0.39	0.49	0.00	1.00
Private Health Insurance	1255.00	0.19	0.40	0.00	1.00
Purchasing Power Index	1255.00	99.10	11.71	70.16	186.99
Prof. 1 Dummy	1255.00	0.38	0.48	0.00	1.00
Prof. 2 Dummy	1255.00	0.06	0.25	0.00	1.00
Prof. 3 Dummy	1255.00	0.03	0.16	0.00	1.00
Prof. 4 Dummy	1255.00	0.18	0.39	0.00	1.00
Prof. 5 Dummy	1255.00	0.35	0.48	0.00	1.00
Easy Graders Dummy	1255.00	0.53	0.50	0.00	1.00
Tough Graders Dummy	1255.00	0.47	0.50	0.00	1.00
Grade in Public Finance	964.00	2.23	1.07	0.00	4.00
High School GPA	964.00	2.50	0.57	1.20	4.00
Female	964.00	0.40	0.49	0.00	1.00
Private Health Insurance	964.00	0.19	0.39	0.00	1.00
Purchasing Power Index	964.00	98.93	11.54	70.16	169.56
Prof. 1 Dummy	964.00	0.37	0.48	0.00	1.00
Prof. 2 Dummy	964.00	0.05	0.22	0.00	1.00
Prof. 3 Dummy	964.00	0.03	0.17	0.00	1.00
Prof. 4 Dummy	964.00	0.19	0.39	0.00	1.00
Prof. 5 Dummy	964.00	0.35	0.48	0.00	1.00
Easy Graders Dummy	964.00	0.54	0.50	0.00	1.00
Tough Graders Dummy	964.00	0.46	0.50	0.00	1.00

Grades transformed to 1-4 Scale, with 4 being the best grade and 1 being the worst grade that is still considered a pass. A grade of 0 means that the student failed the respective course.

3.2 Empirical Approach

In fact, we do not have course placement in the sense of a random assignment, meaning that the students could up to some extent freely decide on the timing of their exams and hence choose professors they want to write the exams with. Thus, although we cannot observe any assignment pattern, students' long-term expectations about who will teach Microeconomics I in following semesters should not be underestimated. In order to control for the potential self-selection bias of the students, we will follow the faculty's recommendation to take the Microeconomics I exam in the second semester of undergraduate studies.

In our analysis, we first examine the grading policy of the five professors assigned to Microeconomics I. Since we first want to analyze how does *tough* or *easy* grading from a fundamental undergraduate course correspond to students' later university performance, we divide the sample of professors in two groups (*Tough Graders* vs. *Easy Graders*) according to their grading standards. To examine the effect of having a *Tough Grader/Easy Grader* in Microeconomics I on the grade obtained in the respective follow-on class, ordinary least square (OLS) regressions are applied. Thus, in the baseline empirical model, student's performance can be described using a linear relationship with student's grade from a single class as the dependent variable and a vector of independent variables. The baseline model is then given by

$$y_{ic} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 GPA_i + \beta_2 S_i + \beta_3 P_i + \varepsilon_i \quad (1)$$

where y_{ic} is the grade for student i in course c ; GPA_i is the GPA of student i ; S_i is a vector of individual characteristics of i such as gender and socio-economic background, P_i is the dummy variable either for the professor the student i wrote her Microeconomics I exam with or for the group (*Tough Graders/Easy Graders*) her professor belongs to; ε_i is an error term. In all regressions, robust standard errors are clustered by semester. However, since the number of clusters is less than 30, it is possible that the estimated standard errors are biased downward. Therefore, we follow (Cameron et al., 2008) and report the wild bootstrap p-values below the coefficient estimates in brackets.

Instrumental Variables Regression (IV)

Estimates of β_3 , the coefficient of professor's dummy variable from Microeconomics I exam, may be biased under OLS regressions due to the potential self-selection bias of students toward certain professors. For instance, if all weak students chose to write the Microeconomics I exam with an *Easy Grader*, the professor's effect in Microeconomics II would be much more negative. For this reason we treat the professor's dummy P_i as an endogenous regressor, assuming that P_i and ε_i are somehow correlated. Since we are treating P_i as endogenous, we need one or more additional variables that are correlated with P_i but not correlated with ε_i . When analyzing grades obtained in the Microeconomics II and the Public Finance exam, we group up professors according to their grading standards, so that P_i from the baseline model will be then replaced by $P(\textit{tough})_i$ representing the *Tough Graders*.

To account for the potential self-selection bias, we propose standard IV approach. Implementing the IV approach requires a two stage least squares estimation (2SLS) to be performed. This approach starts with the first stage of analysis, which is necessary given that the potential self-selection of students toward certain professors may affect both independent and dependent variables. In the first stage $P(\text{tough})_i$ becomes the dependent variable and the independent variables include all control variables from the second stage as well as the instrumental variable. Addressing the faculty's recommendation to write the Microeconomics I exam in the second semester, we create an instrumental variable, that is equal to one if a student took the Microeconomics I exam with a professor who was supposed to offer this course in her second semester of studies, and equal to zero otherwise. Therefore, taking the exam with a professor who was assigned to the course in the student's second semester will influence the student's later performance. On the contrary, the fact that a professor is assigned to the course in the student's second semester does not affect the student's later achievements if a student decides, against the faculty's recommendation, to write her exam in an earlier or later semester. The instrument should not have any influence on the outcome variable. Moreover, these excluded exogenous variables must not influence grade y_{ic} directly, otherwise they should be included in the Equation 1. Since we have five different professors assigned to the Microeconomics I exam, we will have five instrumental variables, one for each professor. Therefore, the endogenous regressor *Tough Graders* will be instrumented by three (*Professor 1; Professor 2 and Professor 3*) additional exogenous variables.

The first stage equation looks as follows:

$$P(\text{tough})_i = \pi_o + \pi_1 GPA_i + \pi_2 S_i + \pi_3 Professor1_i + \pi_4 Professor2_i + \pi_5 Professor3_i + \varepsilon_i \quad (2)$$

The second stage implements the Equation 1, in which the dependent variable is regressed on the predicted values from the first stage regression plus the control variables. It is assumed that the instrumental variables are uncorrelated with any omitted variables, thus removing the bias in the relationship between student's grade in a course and student's choice of the professor to write the exam with. In the following we will apply the above instrumental approach to the subsamples of students who obtained, besides the grade from the Microeconomics I, at least one grade in the Microeconomics II and/or in the Public Finance exam.

An important condition to obtain consistent estimation is that the instruments are

not weak. This can be tested with the Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk F statistic, which is a robust analog to the Cragg Donald statistic and thus superior in the presence of heteroskedasticity, autocorrelation or clustering (Baum et al. (2007)). It is an F statistic for the joint significance of the instruments in the first stage regression, which tests whether the instruments jointly explain a sufficient amount of the variation in the endogenous regressor. If the instruments are weak the standard errors can become considerably larger and the t statistics considerably smaller than those from OLS, indicating the loss of precision.

The other general specification is the Hansen test that implements a test of overidentifying restrictions and is robust to heteroskedasticity. The null hypothesis of this test is that instruments (overidentifying restrictions) are valid (Cameron and Trivedi (2010)). Therefore the rejection of the null hypothesis is an indication that at least one of the instruments is not valid.

4 Results

Having a certain professor in Microeconomics I exam may be associated with a different grading and teaching style, which in turn will influence students' performance in follow-on courses. On the one hand, it is likely that students who took their Microeconomics I exam with a *Tough Grader*, and thus learned more, will perform better in Microeconomics II exam. This would suggest that besides different grading policies, we also find significant differences in learning outcomes. On the other hand, it may also be that the students learned the same as they would with an *Easy Grader* and just got a worse grade, which would simply refer to differences in grading policies.

4.1 Microeconomics I

By looking at students' performance in Microeconomics I, we estimate the effect of having a certain professor on the grade obtained from the first attempt in the Microeconomics I exam. This effect may arise from a number of professors' characteristics, for instance grading policy, teaching or examination style, or combination of those. For this course, our benchmark student is male, holds a public private insurance and is average with regard to all continuous variables.

The OLS estimation results can be found in Table 2. According to the results, the choice of a professor in Microeconomics I has a significant impact on the grade achieved

in this subject. Hence, taking Microeconomics I exam with *Professor 1*, *Professor 2* or *Professor 3* results in lower grades than writing the exam with *Professor 5* (baseline). Thus, professors seem to vary considerably in their grading standards, even within a single course. This finding raises further questions whether the observed grading differences have a significant influence on students' later achievements.

Estimating the effect of professors' grading standards on students' later achievements assumes that these standards are relatively consistent over time, that they are not affected by the composition of students attending the course. To analyze this, we divided the sample of professors into two groups according to their grading standards each semester and analyzed if their position changes over time. The first group, *Tough Graders*, consists of *Professor 1*, *Professor 2* and *Professor 3*, and the second group, *Easy Graders*, of *Professor 4* and *Professor 5*. We found that there was no movement between those groups, which led us, since we are not primarily interested in professors' individual characteristics, to use this classification for our subsequent analysis. It is not surprising that, when including these two groups as control variables, one finds a highly significant and negative effect of the *Tough Graders* on students' obtained grade in Microeconomics I.

In addition, we find the expected highly significant and positive effect of the high school leaving grade as shown in Table 2. The higher the high school leaving grade, the better the grade the student obtains in Microeconomics I exam. Although the size of the coefficient may appear to be somewhat large, it provides an indication that this course is based on skills and methods already used in high school. For instance, Mathematics serves as a prerequisite for all analyzed courses and is generally counted more heavily in the calculation of the GPA. This result is consistent with the findings of a large body of existing research (see, e.g., Cyrenne and Chan, 2012; Girves and Wemmerus, 1988). Other controls are of lesser importance. The gender as well as the socio-economic variables, private health insurance and the purchasing power index of parents' zip-code area, do not show a significant effect in any of the regressions based on conventional hypothesis tests that are presented in Table 2. However, the purchasing power index is significant at the 5 percent level based on wild bootstrap p-values. These overall findings are in line with Danilowicz-Gösele et al. (2014) who found that socio-economic factors are, if at all, poor indicators of students' university performance.

Table 2: OLS regression estimates for Microeconomics I

Dependent variable: Grade in Microeconomics I				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
High School GPA			0.716*** (0.056) [0.000]	0.713*** (0.055) [0.000]
Female			-0.0731 (0.060) [0.360]	-0.0707 (0.061) [0.360]
Private Health Insurance			0.0631 (0.038) [0.160]	0.0604 (0.037) [0.160]
Purchasing Power Index			0.00243 (0.001) [0.040]	0.00258 (0.001) [0.040]
Course Assignment of Prof. 1	- 0.639*** (0.088) [0.040]		-0.732*** (0.089) [0.040]	
Course Assignment of Prof. 2	-0.622** (0.219) [0.200]		-0.728*** (0.180) [0.080]	
Course Assignment of Prof. 3	-0.564*** (0.118) [0.040]		-0.611*** (0.128) [0.040]	
Course Assignment of Prof. 4	-0.226 (0.179) [0.200]		-0.245 (0.178) [0.200]	
Tough Graders		-0.568*** (0.072) [0.040]		-0.653*** (0.068) [0.040]
Constant	2.512*** (0.068) [0.000]	2.452*** (0.047) [0.000]	0.581*** (0.178) [0.000]	0.508** (0.203) [0.000]
R ²	0.0673	0.0637	0.193	0.189
Observations	2920	2920	2920	2920
Cluster	18	18	18	18
F stat.	28	62	278	431

Notes: Stars indicate significance levels at 10%(*), 5%** and 1%***). Standard errors clustered at a semester level are given in parentheses below each coefficient estimate. Wild bootstrap p-values are given in brackets below each coefficient estimate.

4.2 Microeconomics II

Knowing that there are relatively big differences in grading between *Tough Graders* and *Easy Graders* in Microeconomics I, we want to analyze whether the grades obtained in this fundamental course correspond to students' performance in subsequent courses. Did the students who obtained better grades in Microeconomics I in fact learn more? Or do some of the grades just mirror the grade inflation trend?

As already mentioned before, today's students very often have the possibility to decide on courses or even professors within one single course. Hence, the endogenous variables *Tough Graders* will be instrumented by the respective exogenous variables, namely the assignment of professors to the Microeconomics I course. Our instrumental variables fulfill the two usual conditions: (1) they are correlated with the endogenous variable and (2) do not affect students' performance in subsequent courses independently.

Table 3 presents the OLS estimation results and Tables 4 and 5 the two-stage least squares estimates using the assignment-based instrument for professors. First stage F-statistic and Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F-statistic jointly confirm that all estimations presented in Tables 4 and 5 have a valid causal interpretation. With the Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions, denoted as Hansen's J statistic, the validity of the instruments cannot be rejected in specification 1 at the five percent level and in specifications 2 and 3, when controlling for having the same professor in both courses, at the ten percent level. This gives us confidence that our instrument set is appropriate.

There is a strong ex ante expectation that the better the grade in Microeconomics I, the better the performance in Microeconomics II. Surprisingly, Table 4 shows significant and positive effect of *Tough Graders* on students' grade in Microeconomics II in all specifications. The size of the effect depends on whether or not the control variable for having the same professor in both analyzed courses is included. In the first specification, having a *Tough Grader* in Microeconomics I is associated with an improvement of the expected grade in Microeconomics II exam by 0.453 grades. This effect becomes less important when controlling for the effect of the *Same Professor*. At first view, this result appears to be straightforward: students profit from the familiar teaching and examination style when taking several courses with the same instructor. However, this effect becomes less obvious when distinguishing between both professors' groups. According to the estimation results from specification 3, a student who took the Microeconomics I exam with one of the *Tough Graders* and the Microeconomics

II exam with one of the *Easy Graders* is less disadvantaged than a student who wrote both of her exams with the same *Tough Grader*. Indeed, this result becomes less surprising when we consider the fact that the *Tough Graders* from Microeconomics II are exactly the same ones we had in Microeconomics I. However, the worst off are those students who took the Microeconomics I exam with one of the *Easy Graders* and the Microeconomics II exam with one of the *Tough Graders*.

From the above results, we conclude that, other things being equal, students who wrote their Microeconomics I exam with one of the *Tough Graders* are performing better in Microeconomics II exam. On the basis of the above results, grades obtained in classes with low-grading professors are better predictors of students' later achievements than grades received from grade-deflating professors. These results are in line with the findings of [Sabot and Wakeman-Linn \(1991\)](#) and [Ost \(2010\)](#) and also confirm our speculation on the grade inflation within Microeconomics I course.

Furthermore, we find the expected highly significant and positive effect of the high school leaving degree on students' performance in Microeconomics II exam. An improvement of the high school GPA by one full grade is associated with an improvement of the expected grade in Microeconomics II by slightly more than 0.6 grades, which is only slightly slower than for Microeconomics I. This comparison indicates that the Microeconomics II course is based on concepts and skills that go somewhat beyond the high school level. In addition, we now find a significant negative effect for female, which is consistent with the existing literature on gender gap in Mathematics ([Ellison and Swanson \(2010\)](#); [Xie and Shauman \(2003\)](#)). In our case, this result can be explained by the composition of students within a single course. The Microeconomics I course is mandatory for all students enrolled at the faculty of economic sciences. The Microeconomics II course, on the contrary, only to the students majoring in Economics. Furthermore, our data reveals that due to some unobserved characteristics, female business students perform better in Mathematics than their female colleagues from Economics. These both insights may explain the significant negative effect for female in the Microeconomics II exam. However, this conclusion should be qualified only to some extent, because the wild bootstrap p-value for female is only significant in the last specification.

Our socio-economic variables, students' health insurance type and the purchasing power index of her parents' zip-code area, are of lesser importance. When adding more control variables in specifications 2 and 3, we find a significant but very small positive effect for the income variable. Only in specification 3 the coefficient is significant,

both based on conventional and wild bootstrap hypothesis tests. However, in any of the regressions presented in Table 4 we do not find a significant effect for the health insurance status. This results are in line with the findings of [Danilowicz-Gösele et al. \(2014\)](#) implying that socio-economic factors do not determine students' academic achievements, even if they are significantly associated with it.

Table 3: Student Performance in Microeconomics II (OLS)

	Grade in Microeconomics II		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
High School GPA	0.656*** (0.067)	0.635*** (0.065)	0.653*** (0.066)
Female	-0.218** (0.076)	-0.215*** (0.072)	-0.210*** (0.070)
Private Health Insurance	0.0628 (0.086)	0.0448 (0.084)	0.0437 (0.079)
Purchasing Power Index	0.00394* (0.002)	0.00403* (0.002)	0.00432** (0.002)
Micro I: Tough Grader	-0.00995 (0.085)	-0.0348 (0.078)	0.617*** (0.156)
Same Professor		0.489*** (0.118)	
Same Professor - Easy Grader			0.898*** (0.184)
Same Professor - Tough Grader			-0.0208 (0.123)
Constant	0.0909 (0.253)	-0.198 (0.292)	-0.548* (0.311)
Observations	1230	1230	1230
Cluster	17	17	17

Notes: Stars indicate significance levels at 10%(*), 5%(**) and 1%(***). Standard errors clustered at a semester level are given in parentheses below each coefficient estimate.

Table 4: Student Performance in Microeconomics II (IV) (Second Stage)

Second stage	Grade in Microeconomics II		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
High School GPA	0.614*** (0.061) [0.000]	0.604*** (0.063) [0.000]	0.647*** (0.063) [0.000]
Female	-0.172* (0.088) [0.160]	-0.180** (0.083) [0.200]	-0.183*** (0.067) [0.080]
Private Health Insurance	0.0570 (0.090) [0.560]	0.0412 (0.086) [0.640]	0.0404 (0.077) [0.600]
Purchasing Power Index	0.00221 (0.002) [0.280]	0.00274* (0.002) [0.120]	0.00371** (0.002) [0.080]
Micro I: Tough Grader	0.453*** (0.114) [0.000]	0.311** (0.145) [0.080]	1.385*** (0.355) [0.000]
Same Professor		0.469*** (0.123) [0.000]	
Same Professor - Easy Grader			1.225*** (0.243) [0.000]
Same Professor - Tough Grader			-0.458** (0.207) [0.040]
Constant	0.132 (0.243) [0.440]	-0.155 (0.278) [0.400]	-0.812*** (0.309) [0.080]
Observations	1230	1230	1230
Cluster	17	17	17
Kleibergen-Paap Wald F stat	230.162	172.419	244.436
Hansens J statistic	4.619	2.135	1.382
Hansen p-value	0.099	0.344	0.501

Notes: Stars indicate significance levels at 10%(*), 5%(**) and 1%(***). Standard errors clustered at a semester level are given in parentheses below each coefficient estimate. Wild bootstrap p-values are given in brackets below each coefficient estimate.

Table 5: Student Performance in Microeconomics II (IV) (First Stage)

First Stage	Tough Graders		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
High School GPA	0.0829*** (0.026) [0.040]	0.0819*** (0.025) [0.040]	0.00388 (0.016) [0.880]
Female	-0.0881** (0.036) [0.120]	-0.0876** (0.036) [0.120]	-0.0338* (0.017) [0.240]
Private Health Insurance	0.00924 (0.025) [0.480]	0.00893 (0.025) [0.520]	-0.00262 (0.013) [0.960]
Purchasing Power Index	0.00356*** (0.001) [0.000]	0.00357*** (0.001) [0.000]	0.000713 (0.001) [0.120]
Course Assignment of Prof. 1	0.0881 (0.086) [0.520]	0.0784 (0.085) [0.600]	0.0927** (0.036) [0.080]
Course Assignment of Prof. 2	0.612*** (0.046) [0.000]	0.605*** (0.048) [0.000]	0.244*** (0.028) [0.000]
Course Assignment of Prof. 3	0.643*** (0.047) [0.000]	0.627*** (0.054) [0.000]	0.0970** (0.044) [0.080]
Same Professor		0.033 (0.042) [0.560]	
Same Professor - Easy Grader			-0.441*** (0.046) [0.040]
Same Professor - Tough Grader			0.530*** (0.061) [0.000]
Constant	-0.150 (0.095) [0.200]	-0.166* (0.093) [0.160]	0.304*** (0.071) [0.000]
Observations	1230	1230	1230
Cluster	17	17	17
F first-stage	175	199	56646

Notes: Stars indicate significance levels at 10%(*), 5%(**) and 1%(***). Standard errors clustered at a semester level are given in parentheses below each coefficient estimate. Wild bootstrap p-values are given in brackets below each coefficient estimate.

4.3 Public Finance

The second subsequent course we analyze is the Public Finance course. The OLS estimation results can be found in Table 6. Tables 7 and 8 report two-stage least squares estimates for our outcome variable across two different specifications. Instrumentation is strong and the results have a valid causal interpretation, as indicated by the first-stage F-statistic and Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F-statistic. Hansen's J statistic is far from rejection of its null, implying the validity of our instrument set.

Here again, we have a strong *ex ante* expectation that the grade obtained in Microeconomics I can be used as a predictor for student's performance in the Public Finance class. In the first specification, where we do not control for the effect of having the same professor in both analyzed courses, we find a highly significant but, surprisingly, negative effect of the *Tough Graders*. This conclusion has to be qualified to some extent, since the wild bootstrap p-value for the *Tough Graders* is insignificant. This negative effect becomes smaller once the control variable for having the same professor in both courses is included.

Both coefficients, *Tough Graders* and *Same Professor* are highly significant in the last specification, both based on conventional and wild bootstrap hypothesis tests. In this case, the interpretation is a little bit different than in the case of Microeconomics II, since there is only one professor assigned to teach this course. In order to understand the obtained results, we need to take into account that the professor assigned to teach the Public Finance course is the one who gives the worst grades in Microeconomics I and thus a *Tough Grader*. Hence, the students who wrote their both exams, Microeconomics I and Public Finance, with the same professor are slightly better of than those students who took their Microeconomics I exam with one of the *Easy Graders*.

In contrast to the results found for Microeconomics II, the worst off are now students who have their Microeconomics I grade from one of the other two *Tough Graders*. A reason for the partly inconsistent results may be that, although both courses are strongly related to Microeconomics I, the Public Finance course is less mathematical and has a different examination style than Microeconomics II. In Microeconomics I and Microeconomics II students complete exam problems that are either similar to the multiple choice question type (true/false) or graded on the basis of the final result (fill-ins). However, exam problems in Public Finance include essay questions and calculations which gives professors more freedom in grading their students. For this reasons, we did not expect to find such a strong effect of having the same professor in both courses.

This finding suggests that there are differences in professors' characteristics, not only between the *Easy Graders* and the *Tough Graders*, but also within those groups. In order to analyze this, we create two sub-samples: the first one includes students who wrote their Microeconomics I exam either with the professor who gives the worst grades (*Professor 1*) or with the professor who gives the best grades (*Professor 5*). The second sub-sample consists of students who took their Microeconomics I exam again with the toughest grader (*Professor 1*) or with the second toughest grader (*Professor 2*). The results of estimating the effect of a single professor on the grade in Public Finance exam can be found in Tables 9 and 10. The baseline category is now represented by *Professor 1*. For both professors, *Professor 2* and *Professor 5*, we find highly significant and negative effect on student's performance in Public Finance. According to this result, having a tough professor in Microeconomics I does not always positively affect student's later performance in follow-on courses. Here, a student who took her Microeconomics I exam with a professor who "gives out" grades is better off than a student with the second toughest grader. On the one hand, it looks like, some of the *Tough Graders* teach better and demand higher performance from their students, others just give lower grades. On the other hand, *Easy Graders* do not always "only" inflate grades. Furthermore, looking at some other follow-on courses suggests that students benefit from having an *Easy Grader* in less theoretical courses where mathematical skills are not that essential and examinations thus require less calculations.

In addition, we find the expected highly significant and positive effect of the high school leaving degree on students' grade in Public Finance exam. Since the Public Finance course is a less mathematical one, we do not find a significant effect for female, which is again consistent with our previous argumentation about prevalent gender gap in mathematics. The effect of student's health insurance type is now highly significant and positive, which can be explained by the differences in students composition between Microeconomics and Public Finance. Microeconomics courses are mandatory for many students enrolled at the faculty of economic sciences. Public Finance, on the contrary, is completed mostly by the students from economics, who in contrast to their business colleagues, are less known for being fast climbers which in turn can relate to their wealthy family status.

Table 6: Student Performance in Public Finance (OLS)

	Grade in Public Finance	
	(1)	(2)
High School GPA	0.594*** (0.067)	0.576*** (0.070)
Female	0.0210 (0.075)	0.0190 (0.073)
Private Health Insurance	0.251*** (0.057)	0.273*** (0.057)
Purchasing Power Index	0.00330 (0.003)	0.00287 (0.003)
Micro I: Tough Grader	-0.0931 (0.103)	-0.690*** (0.108)
Same Professor		0.732*** (0.138)
Constant	0.404 (0.317)	0.487 (0.349)
Observations	961	961
Cluster	14	14

Notes: Stars indicate significance levels at 10%(*), 5%(**) and 1%(***). Standard errors clustered at a semester level are given in parentheses below each coefficient estimate.

Table 7: Student Performance in Public Finance (IV) (Second Stage)

Second stage	Grade in Public Finance	
	(1)	(2)
High School GPA	0.671*** (0.057) [0.000]	0.576*** (0.068) [0.000]
Female	-0.0757 (0.071) [0.240]	0.0178 (0.070) [0.920]
Private Health Insurance	0.271*** (0.070) [0.000]	0.274*** (0.055) [0.000]
Purchasing Power Index	0.00645** (0.003) [0.080]	0.00290 (0.002) [0.120]
Micro I: Tough Grader	-0.926*** (0.329) [0.120]	-0.723*** (0.110) [0.040]
Same Professor		0.761*** (0.142) [0.000]
Constant	0.313 (0.295) [0.400]	0.490 (0.337) [0.280]
Observations	961	961
Cluster	14	14
Kleibergen-Paap Wald F stat	208.172	3468.381
Hansens J statistic	2.365	2.652
Hansen p-value	0.306	0.266

Notes: Stars indicate significance levels at 10%(*), 5%(**) and 1%(***). Standard errors clustered at a semester level are given in parentheses below each coefficient estimate. Wild bootstrap p-values are given in brackets below each coefficient estimate.

Table 8: Student Performance in Public Finance (IV) (First Stage)

First Stage	Tough Graders	
	(1)	(2)
High School GPA	0.0970*** (0.024) [0.000]	0.0124 (0.008) [0.160]
Female	-0.108** (0.046) [0.040]	-0.0129* (0.007) [0.080]
Private Health Insurance	0.0135 (0.037) [0.840]	0.0291 (0.020) [0.120]
Purchasing Power Index	0.00446*** (0.001) [0.000]	0.00132* (0.001) [0.120]
Course Assignment of Prof. 1	0.109 (0.104) [0.280]	0.0139 (0.019) [0.440]
Course Assignment of Prof. 2	0.659*** (0.047) [0.000]	0.925*** (0.042) [0.000]
Course Assignment of Prof. 3	0.684*** (0.043) [0.000]	0.705*** (0.009) [0.000]
Same Professor		0.936*** (0.040) [0.000]
Constant	-0.296** (0.101) [0.040]	-0.120 (0.068) [0.120]
Observations	961	961
Cluster	14	14
F first- stage	158	20274

Notes: Stars indicate significance levels at 10%(*), 5%(**) and 1%(***). Standard errors clustered at a semester level are given in parentheses below each coefficient estimate. Wild bootstrap p-values are given in brackets below each coefficient estimate.

Table 9: Student Performance in Public Finance (IV) - Comparison (Second Stage)

Second stage	Grade in Public Finance	
	Professor 5	Professor 2
High School GPA	0.523*** (0.065) [0.000]	0.616*** (0.093) [0.000]
Female	0.104 (0.067) [0.080]	-0.0698 (0.075) [0.320]
Private Health Insurance	0.291*** (0.072) [0.000]	0.385*** (0.097) [0.000]
Purchasing Power Index	0.00260 (0.003) [0.520]	0.00119 (0.003) [0.840]
Micro I: Professor 5	-0.396*** (0.147) [0.040]	
Micro I: Professor 2		-0.522*** (0.137) [0.040]
Constant	0.836* (0.459) [0.120]	0.601 (0.474) [0.160]
Observations	697	410
Cluster	13	13
Kleibergen-Paap Wald F stat	69.702	206.523
Hansens J statistic	0.000	0.000

Notes: Stars indicate significance levels at 10%(*), 5%(**) and 1%(***). Standard errors clustered at a semester level are given in parentheses below each coefficient estimate. Wild bootstrap p-values are given in brackets below each coefficient estimate.

Table 10: Student Performance in Public Finance (IV) - Comparison (First Stage)

First Stage	Professor 5	Professor 2
High School GPA	-0.101*** (0.031) [0.080]	0.00980 (0.014) [1.000]
Female	0.129** (0.059) [0.120]	0.0146 (0.015) [0.640]
Private Health Insurance	-0.0199 (0.051) [0.680]	0.0526 (0.039) [0.280]
Purchasing Power Index	-0.00442*** (0.001) [0.040]	0.00203 (0.001) [0.200]
Course Assignment of Prof. 5	0.329*** (0.394) [0.000]	
Course Assignment of Prof. 2		0.917*** (0.064) [0.000]
Constant	1.062*** (0.136) [0.000]	-0.208 (0.149) [0.400]
Observations	697	410
Cluster	13	13
F first- stage	26	747

Notes: Stars indicate significance levels at 10%(*), 5%** and 1%***). Standard errors clustered at a semester level are given in parentheses below each coefficient estimate. Wild bootstrap p-values are given in brackets below each coefficient estimate.

5 Discussion

In recent years a great number of studies on higher education have emphasized factors that might influence students' performance. While most of those studies focus on students' characteristics such as previous academic performance, age or socio-economic status, less attention has been paid to the impact of professors' characteristics or professors' grading.

Therefore in this paper, we analyze the impact of professors' characteristics on students' achievement using data from almost 3,000 students from Göttingen University. By looking at three courses at the Faculty of Economic Sciences, we first capture the professor's effect from the mandatory first-year course (Microeconomics I) and then analyze its effect on student's performance in follow-on courses (Microeconomics II and Public Finance). Two main results emerge from our analysis. Firstly, we find that it matters, for student's later university performance in micro-related courses, which professor was teaching and giving the Microeconomics I exam. Our results suggest that students can benefit from having a tough or an easy grader in a fundamental

course, with the effects depending on the student's prior academic performance and design of the follow-on course, in particular the mathematical content of the course and the resulting examination form. Secondly, we show that the effect of having the same professor in Microeconomics I and in one of the two analyzed follow-on courses is significant and highly relevant. Thus, students benefit much more from the familiar teaching practices and the familiar examination style. In some cases, this positive effect can even compensate or partially compensate for the negative professor's effect from Microeconomics I course.

From the consideration of the above results two questions arise: How can we explain the arising differences in grading? and Do the *Tough Graders* indeed prepare students for more rigorous mathematical and analytical standards by teaching something different than their easy grading colleagues? In order to answer the first question, we should consider if there are, besides the grading, other substantial differences between both professor's groups included in our analysis. When looking at the groups individually, professors assigned to the *Easy Graders* are of higher age, have been employed longer at a university and do less research than their younger colleagues. Together, our results and these facts lead us to hypothesize that professor's age and teaching experience may be, above certain threshold, positively associated with students' grades. Older professors very often exude grandfather's mildness and thus have more understanding for the students. Another explanation for this result may stem from the fact that the longer a professor was teaching the same subject, the easier he is to predict.

Furthermore, we can think about other factors, besides individual characteristics of the teaching body, that potentially affect the grades and may differ between professors. One of them is the class size. Since all professors structure the course in the same way, offering lecture and tutorials on a weekly basis should not be an issue. Also the credentials of the faculty teaching team should not determine our results, since we do not observe striking differences in education level between the assigned professors and their assistants. In addition, all professors included in our data set have very similar status, implying that none of them are in a position of having to earn good evaluations in order to be able to keep their job. Nonetheless, some of the professors may generally tend to keep the students happy by giving them good, possibly inflated, grades. In particular, those professors, who are close to retire, are less stringent since they want to leave a good impression.

From the students' point of view, the benefit of having an *Easy Grader* or a *Tough Grader* in Microeconomics I depends to a great extent on the student's course choices

and her timing. If grades were the only aim, students may act strategically by taking advantage of the mentioned differences, which will result in postponing the exams until the desired professor is offering the class or in attending only carefully-selected courses. Our analysis shows that the obtained effects are quite meaningful. All else being equal, having a certain professor in Microeconomics I is associated with an improvement of the expected grade in a follow-on course by up to 1.385 grades. Therefore, making smart strategic choices about study pathways may lead to a considerable improvement of the final grade.

From the above results we conclude that there is much variability in grading not only between universities or faculties, but also from one professor to the next and between courses within a field. The increasing diversity especially within higher education system is valuable but comes at the expense of transparency in grading policies. Although grades are used to motivate students and to report the quality of student's performance for employers, researchers and politicians consistently raise arguments in favor of abandoning grades and rather encouraging students to pursue more than a perfect transcript.

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