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Efficient diffusion of renewable energies: A roller-coaster ride

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Efficient diffusion of renewable energies: A roller-coaster ride

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Abstract

When the supply of intermittent renewable energies like wind and solar is high, the electricity price is low. Conversely, prices are high when their supply is low. This reduces the profit potential in renewable energies and, therefore, incentives to invest in renewable capacities. Nevertheless, we show that perfect competition and dynamic pricing lead to efficient choices of renewable and fossil capacities, provided that external costs of fossils are internalized by an appropriate tax. We also investigate some properties of electricity markets with intermittent renewables and examine the market diffusion of renewables as their capacity costs fall. We show that the intermittency of renewables causes an S-shaped diffusion pattern, implying that a rapid build-up of capacities is followed by a stage of substantially slower development. While this pattern is well known from the innovation literature, the mechanism is new. Moreover, the S-shaped pattern is followed by another acceleration phase towards the end of the diffusion process. We also find that technology improvements such as better storage capabilities have substantial effects not only on the speed of market penetration, but also on its pattern. Finally, fluctuations of energy prices rise with the share of renewables. If regulators respond with a price cap, this leads to a faster market diffusion of renewables.

Keywords: renewable energies, peak-load pricing, intermittent energy sources, technology diffusion, price caps, energy transition

1 Introduction

When the G7 leading industrial nations agreed at their 2015 meeting to phase out the use of fossil fuels by the end of the century, the Economist wrote that: “In just a few years, the aim of a carbon-free energy system has gone from the realms of green fantasy to become official policy in the world’s richest countries.”¹ The adoption of the 2015 Paris agreement, in which 195 countries committed to the need for deep reductions in greenhouse gas emissions, extended this momentum

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¹ The Economist, “The G7 and climate change”, June 10, 2015, <http://www.economist.com/news/international/21653964-why-g7-talking-about-decarbonisation-sort>.

to a global level. At the same time, the costs of renewable energies are decreasing rapidly. For example, within the period 2009-2014, the costs of solar PV modules fell by three-quarters, and those of wind turbines by almost a third (IRENA 2015). This suggests that the economic viability of a transition from fossil to renewable energies is also improving. However, especially wind and solar power—the fastest-growing renewable energies—are peculiar products. Not only are they non-storable (at reasonable costs); their supply is also intermittent as it depends heavily on the fluctuations of wind speeds and solar radiation. We show that this has substantial implications for the efficient market diffusion of renewable energies. It is not a smooth process but one characterized by varying diffusion speeds—comparable to a roller-coaster ride.

We build on and extend the peak-load pricing model to analyze capacity investments and production decisions for an economy in which electricity can be produced from dispatchable fossil and intermittent renewable energies. In its simplest version, the peak-load pricing model considers two periods that differ in their demand (e.g., day and night). It finds that base consumers should be charged with production costs only, while peak consumers should also bear capacity costs.² By contrast, we focus on supply fluctuations that are caused by the intermittency of renewable energies. As pointed out by Ambec and Crampes (2012), the effects of supply and demand fluctuations are similar because renewables are always dispatched first due to their lower operating costs, meaning that fossils face residual demand. In particular, since the supply of renewables is intermittent, the residual demand for fossils becomes intermittent. However, what differentiates our paper from the standard peak-load pricing literature is that the level of renewables and, therefore, the magnitude of intermittency is endogenous.

Intuitively, this leads to the following price pattern and investment incentives. When supply of renewable energies is high, the electricity price is low. As the share of renewables in the energy system rises, there will be extended periods in which they can meet all of the demand for electricity. As a result, prices drop to the level of the short-term operating costs for renewables, which are essentially zero. Conversely, prices are high when the supply of renewables is low. This price pattern reduces the potential of renewables to earn profits, and one might expect that it leads to inefficiently low investments in renewable energies. However, one might also suspect that insufficient investments in fossil capacities occur because the expansion of renewable energies reduces the utilization of conventional power plants. Our analysis shows that both concerns are unfounded. With perfect competition and dynamic pricing of electricity, markets will lead to efficient choices of renewable and fossil capacities provided that environmental costs are internalized by an appropriate tax.

We also examine the market diffusion of renewables as their capacity costs fall. For this purpose, we model intermittency by assuming that the availability of installed renewable capacities is a continuous random variable with a known distribution. Prices depend on the realization of this random variable and on the share of renewables in the energy systems, which determines their impact on the overall energy market. In particular, when the market share of renewables

² A first version of the model was developed by Boiteux (1949) and Steiner (1957). Crew, Fernando, and Kleindorfer (1995) provide an excellent survey that also covers extensions to several technologies, multiple periods, and uncertainty.

is low, prices always exceed the marginal costs of fossil fuels, and as a result renewable energies are fully used. As the market share of renewables rises, there will be extended periods in which prices equal the marginal costs of fossils and fall below this level up to the marginal costs of renewables. This has profound implications for the incentives to invest in renewable and fossil capacities. When renewables have become sufficiently cheap to compete with fossils, they initially enter the energy system only slowly. Market penetration speeds up substantially once the installed capacities are sufficient to displace fossil capacities if availability is high. However, the build-up of renewables drops dramatically once they can meet the entire energy demand at times of high availability. Intuitively, the price drop that results from further renewable capacities would then be borne primarily by the renewables themselves, and only to a lesser extent by fossils.

Roughly speaking, we find that the initial phases of market diffusion follow an S-shaped pattern. This coincides with the standard result in the innovation literature that the usage of new technologies over time typically follows an S-curve.³ However, the mechanisms that lead to this result are quite different. In the most popular endemic model, it is the lack of information available about the new technology that limits the speed of usage. In our paper, it is the intermittency of renewables that slows down their market penetration. Moreover, we find that the S-shaped pattern is followed by another acceleration phase towards the end of the diffusion process.

The diffusion pattern of renewables is closely related to their competitiveness. This is usually assessed by comparing the levelized cost of electricity (LCOE) for renewables to that of conventional fossil technologies (e.g., IRENA (2015) and IEA (2015)). In our static framework, the LCOE would be defined as the *constant* price of power that equates revenues to expected costs. However, several authors have criticized the LCOE metric as flawed. Specifically, they point out that the market value of electricity varies widely over time, and that intermittent renewables cannot be dispatched when they would be most valuable (e.g., Joskow (2011) and Borenstein (2012)).⁴ Instead of using the LCOE, Joskow (2011) suggests evaluating all technologies based on the expected market value of the electricity supplied, their total life-cycle costs, and their expected profitability. However, in our framework of competitive markets, this alternative is not very useful because in equilibrium, capacities are chosen such that all technologies are equally competitive. Moreover, although we agree that the LCOE is a flawed metric, we will show that it can be quite useful in understanding the relative competitiveness of intermittent and dispatchable technologies, provided that it is interpreted appropriately.

Since renewables are a relatively new technology, one would expect not only falling capacity costs, but also substantial technology improvements that affect their availability. An obvious example are advances in the ability of solar panels and wind turbines to work at low solar radiation and wind speeds. Similar effects arise from improved storage capabilities and grid extensions that enable improved smoothing of regional differences in wind and solar radiation

³ See Griliches (1957) for the seminal contribution and Geroski (2000) for a survey.

⁴ Hirth (2013) highlights that the market value of intermittent renewable technologies is also affected by issues such as location (grid-related costs) and uncertainty (balancing costs), but these are not relevant in our simple analytical model.

patterns. Intuitively, such technological progress speeds up the market diffusion of renewables. We find that it may also have profound implications for the *pattern* of market diffusion. For example, if the minimum availability of renewables is low, substantial back-up capacities of fossil fuel plants are needed, even if these lie idle most of the time. Increasing the minimum availability of renewables makes it possible to leapfrog not only this diffusion stage, but also those of high and low diffusion speeds that we outlined in the preceding paragraphs. The reason is that a higher minimum availability corresponds with a reduced impact of intermittency, which makes renewables more similar to a standard product and, thus, moderates some of the peculiarities of their diffusion process.

The preceding results are based on the assumption of dynamic pricing of electricity, which, at present, is often restricted to larger commercial customers (Borenstein and Holland 2005, Joskow and Wolfram 2012). However, recent technological advances have dramatically lowered the costs of smart metering technologies, and many regions have set ambitious targets for their deployment.⁵ This suggests that dynamic electricity pricing is likely to become more relevant for smaller commercial and residential customers too. Moreover, several studies have found evidence that households do actually respond to higher electricity prices by lowering usage (Faruqui and Sergici 2010). The combination of marginal cost pricing and a higher share of intermittent renewables will lead to stronger price fluctuations and, in particular, to high maximum prices if availability is low. Policy makers may consider this politically unacceptable and impose price caps in response. We find that this speeds up the market diffusion of renewables. The reason is that fossils sell most of their output when prices are high; hence they are affected more severely by price caps than renewables.

The paper most closely related to ours is that of Ambec and Crampes (2012), who also analyze the efficient mix of reliable and intermittent technologies as well as its decentralization by competitive markets. However, in their paper, the availability of renewables is restricted to be either 0 or 1. Therefore, it is never efficient to build up capacities of renewables beyond the level at which they are used in state 1 of high availability, since these capacities would not be available in the other state, 0. By contrast, in our paper, the availability of renewables can take any value between 0 and 1. Therefore, it is often efficient to build up capacities that lie idle for high values of availability but are used for lower values. Such periods of excess capacity are crucial for the pattern of market penetration with renewables that is at the core of our paper. They also explain prices that equal the (very low) marginal cost of renewables that obtain in our model but not in Ambec and Crampes (2012).

In their paper, Ambec and Crampes (2012, p. 321) write that “the economics of intermittent sources of electricity production are still in their infancy.” While this is probably still the case, the number of studies has been increasing. Ambec and Crampes (2015) build on their earlier paper with an analytical assessment of carbon taxes, feed-in tariffs, and renewable portfolios (see also Garcia, Alzate, and Barrera (2012))). While they maintain the assumption of only two

⁵ For example, the EU Third Energy Package requires Member States to ensure implementation of intelligent metering systems with a deployment target of at least 80 percent by 2020, conditional on a positive economic assessment of the long-term costs and benefits.

states of availability, Andor and Voss (2014) are more similar to our model in that they allow the availability of renewables to take any value in the interval $[0, 1]$. However, their model does not include a second, fossil technology, and their focus lies on efficient subsidy schemes. Other related theoretical contributions are Twomey and Neuhoff (2010) as well as Rouillon (2015). The former takes the capacity of the intermittent technology as given, and the latter the level of the reliable technology. By contrast, the feed-back effects from capacity investments in one technology on the incentives to invest in the other one feature prominently in our paper. In addition, the focus of the two papers lies on optimal intermittent generation decisions in markets with market power. Chao (2011) considers uncertain supply of conventional and renewable technologies, where the main difference between the two is that demand is (negatively) correlated with supply from renewables, but uncorrelated with supply from conventional energies. More generally, the focus of the literature on supply (and demand) uncertainty lies on outage costs and rationing rules (see Kleindorfer and Fernando 1993). We ignore these complications by assuming that variations in the availability of renewable capacities are perfectly predictable.⁶ Most other papers that analyze investment incentives with intermittent renewables are either country-specific numerical simulations (e.g., Green and Vasilakos 2010) or empirical studies (e.g., Liski and Vehviläinen 2015).

Finally, our paper is related to the literature on price caps. Joskow and Tirole (2007) mention regulatory opportunism as one motivation for imposing caps on prices so as to keep them low. Stoft (2003) argues that price caps are useful to reduce market power and price volatility. Fabra, Von der Fehr, and De Frutos (2011) focus on market design and investment incentives. They find that in a model with a single technology of energy production, a price cap leads to underinvestment. Our analysis shows that this result needs to be qualified for the case of two competing technologies. In particular, a price cap leads to investments below the efficient level for the reliable technology but to investment above the efficient level for the intermittent technology.

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we introduce the model. Sections 3 and 4 derive efficient production decisions and capacity choices for a renewable and a fossil technology. In Section 5, we show that the efficient solution can be implemented by competitive markets. Section 6 examines the market diffusion of renewables, with a focus on the effects of falling capacity costs and technology improvements. Finally, in Section 7, we show that price caps tend to accelerate the market diffusion of renewables. Section 8 concludes and an appendix contains all proofs.

2 The model

Consider a market in which electricity can be generated from two technologies, $j = r, f$. We denote by $\beta_j > 0$ the constant costs of providing one unit of capacity, $Q_j \geq 0$, and by $b_j \geq 0$ the constant costs of producing one unit of output, $q_j \geq 0$. Technology f represents a dispatch-

⁶ There has indeed been tremendous progress in the reliability of forecast models (Iversen, Morales, Møller, and Madsen, 2015).

able fossil technology—like conventional power plants that burn coal or gas. Dispatchability means that electricity production can be freely varied at every point in time up to the limit of their installed capacity (see, e.g., Joskow 2011).⁷ Technology r is a renewable technology with intermittent supply—like wind turbines, solar PV, or solar thermal plants. Intermittency is represented by an availability factor, $\sigma \in [a, 1]$, where $0 \leq a < 1$. Thus, a higher a can be interpreted as a higher reliability of the renewable technology.⁸ $F(\sigma)$ is the cumulative distribution function of σ and $f(\sigma)$ its density. For substantial parts of the paper, we assume a uniform distribution, $f(\sigma) = 1/(1-a)$, as this keeps the analysis tractable.⁹ In conclusion, the available capacity is σQ_r for renewables and Q_f for fossils. Finally, we assume that renewables have lower variable costs than fossils, $0 \leq b_r < b_f$, and that the production cost of fossils, b_f , include their costs for the environment (e.g., due to a Pigouvian tax). The latter assumption implies that we abstract from market failures that would arise from unregulated environmental externalities in order to keep the paper focused on the effects of intermittency.

In line with the literature on peak-load pricing, we consider one period that corresponds to the lifetime of installed capacities (assumed to be the same for all technologies) and abstract from issues of discounting.¹⁰ Let $x(\sigma)$ denote electricity demand in state σ , and $p(x)$ the inverse demand function. Hence the “gross surplus” in a particular state σ is $\int_0^{x(\sigma)} p(\tilde{x}) d\tilde{x}$. Subtracting variable and fixed costs of the two technologies and accounting for the different states of σ yields expected welfare, W , as the sum of expected consumer and producer surplus:

$$W = \int_a^1 \left[\int_0^{x(\sigma)} p(\tilde{x}) d\tilde{x} - \sum_j b_j q_j(\sigma) \right] f(\sigma) d\sigma - \sum_j \beta_j Q_j. \quad (1)$$

For parsimony, we assume a linear demand function. Moreover, in order to assure that it is always efficient to install a positive capacity level, we assume that the maximum willingness to pay (WTP) exceeds the total costs per unit of fossils.

Assumption 1. $p(x) = \frac{A-x}{\gamma}$, where $WTP_{max} = \frac{A}{\gamma} > b_f + \beta_f$.

We consider the following timing: In the first stage, a regulator chooses optimal capacities for renewables and fossils based on the known distribution of the availability of renewables. In

⁷ Note that conventional energy technologies differ in their dispatchability, mainly due to differences in ramp-up times that may be substantial, especially for nuclear energy but also for lignite. We ignore ramp-up times here for the sake of parsimony.

⁸ One may interpret r as a mix of renewable technologies that also includes non-intermittent technologies such as biofuels and storage capacities such as pumped-storage hydropower plants. A reliability of a close to 0 would reflect that in a mix of wind and solar only, both have a very low availability for some points in time. For example, in Germany, the minimum availability of installed wind and solar capacities in 2015 was 0.43 percent, and the maximum availability 59.49 percent. Normalizing the maximum availability to 1 leads to a value of $a = 0.0072$ (own calculations based on data from the four German transmission system operators, downloaded from www.netztransparenz.de on 11 January 2016). Conversely, a higher a could represent a higher share of non-intermittent renewables or (more stable) offshore wind power as well as better storage capabilities.

⁹ A log-normal distribution fits better to real-world data, but it would not allow us to obtain closed-form solutions that we use in some parts of the paper, especially in Section 6.1.

¹⁰ In particular, we abstract from the complex dynamics that arise when new plants are built in addition to existing ones.

the second stage, the regulator chooses optimal production of renewables and fossils for a specific realization of the availability of renewables, σ . By backwards induction, we first examine the second stage, where capacities, Q_r, Q_f , and σ are given. By Assumption 1, we have $Q_r + Q_f > 0$, but we allow for situations with fossils only ($Q_r = 0$) as well as renewables only ($Q_f = 0$).

3 Production decisions

In stage 2, capacities, $\mathbf{Q} := (Q_r, Q_f)$, are already installed, and the regulator chooses production, $\mathbf{q} := (q_r, q_f)$, and consumption, x , for a given availability of renewables, σ . He does so to maximize the difference between the gross surplus and variable production costs in a particular state σ , subject to the constraints that supply equals demand and that supply from technology j cannot exceed the available capacity of this technology. Denoting the value function of this problem by $w(\mathbf{Q}, \sigma)$, we have

$$w(\mathbf{Q}, \sigma) := \max_{\mathbf{q}, x} \int_0^x p(\tilde{x}) d\tilde{x} - \sum_j b_j q_j, \quad \text{such that} \quad (2)$$

$$\sum_j q_j - x = 0, \quad (3)$$

$$\sigma Q_r - q_r \geq 0, \quad (4)$$

$$Q_f - q_f \geq 0. \quad (5)$$

Observe that the non-negativity constraints, $q_j \geq 0$ for $j = r, f$ and $x \geq 0$, can be ignored because the solution of the unconstrained problem will never involve negative quantities. This follows from Assumption 1 that the maximum WTP exceeds variable costs. The Kuhn-Tucker Lagrangian is

$$\begin{aligned} \mathcal{L}(\mathbf{q}, x) = & \int_0^x p(\tilde{x}) d\tilde{x} - \sum_j b_j q_j + \lambda \left(\sum_j q_j - x \right) \\ & + \mu_r (\sigma Q_r - q_r) + \mu_f (Q_f - q_f), \end{aligned} \quad (6)$$

where λ, μ_r and μ_f are the multipliers for the supply-equals-demand and capacity constraints, respectively. Supply, $\sum_j q_j$, and, therefore, x , are zero if and only if no fossil capacities are installed and $\sigma = a = 0$, which means that renewable capacities are completely unavailable. However, from the perspective of the overall optimization problem, this is a measure zero event and can therefore be neglected. Using this and substituting the linear inverse demand function yields the first-order conditions (superscript * denotes efficient levels)

$$\frac{\partial \mathcal{L}}{\partial x} = \frac{A-x}{\gamma} - \lambda = 0, \quad (7)$$

$$\frac{\partial \mathcal{L}}{\partial q_r} = -b_r + \lambda - \mu_r \leq 0 \quad [= 0, \text{ if } q_r^* > 0], \quad (8)$$

$$\frac{\partial \mathcal{L}}{\partial q_f} = -b_f + \lambda - \mu_f \leq 0. \quad [= 0, \text{ if } q_f^* > 0]. \quad (9)$$

Together with the complementary slackness conditions,

$$\mu_r \geq 0, \quad \mu_r [\sigma Q_r - q_r] = 0, \quad (10)$$

$$\mu_f \geq 0, \quad \mu_f [Q_f - q_f] = 0, \quad (11)$$

this determines the endogenous variables, $p(\mathbf{Q}, \sigma)$, $x(\mathbf{Q}, \sigma)$, $q_r(\mathbf{Q}, \sigma)$ and $q_f(\mathbf{Q}, \sigma)$ as a function of installed capacities, \mathbf{Q} , and the availability of renewables, σ .

Several outcomes can be distinguished, depending on the market diffusion of renewables and their availability. First, stage 1 may have led to only fossil capacities (called *diffusion stage F*), only renewable capacities (*diffusions stage R*), or capacities of both types (*diffusion stage FR*). Second, we will show that in the two diffusion stages with renewables, in equilibrium four different cases may obtain that depend on the realization of the availability factor, σ .

We now analyze the different outcomes, starting in a situation with low available capacities of renewables and then turning to those with higher levels. Thus, we first consider diffusion stage *F*, in which only fossil capacities have been installed. Given that neither supply nor demand are intermittent in this diffusion stage, excess capacities would never be used, so it cannot be efficient to install them. Therefore, $x^* = q_f^* = Q_f > 0$ and the price follows from the specification of inverse demand in Assumption 1 as $p^* = (A - Q_f)/\gamma$.

Next, consider diffusion stage *FR*, where fossil and renewable technologies have been installed. We focus on a graphical exposition and relegate the formal analysis to Appendix A. In particular, Figure 1 depicts demand and supply for different levels of available renewable capacities, σQ_r . Renewables have lower production costs and are therefore always dispatched first. Accordingly, in all four cases, the supply curve starts with a horizontal segment at the level of variable costs of renewables, b_r . Once the available renewable capacity is fully used, the supply curve jumps to the level of variable costs of fossils, b_f . At the level where also the fossil capacity is fully used, the supply curve is vertical.

Case 1 (we denote equilibrium values in the four different cases with subscript $i = 1, \dots, 4$) refers to the situation where σQ_r is low, so the intersection with the (inverse) demand curve occurs in the last, vertical segment of the supply curve. Thus, both (available) capacities are fully used, i.e., $q_{r1}(\sigma) = \sigma Q_r$ and $q_{f1}(\sigma) = Q_f$, while prices as well as quantities follow immediately, as given in the first line of Table 1. An increase in σQ_r shifts the supply curve to the right and reduces the equilibrium price until the upper horizontal segment of the supply curve starts to intersect with the demand curve, i.e., until $(A - \sigma Q_r - Q_f)/\gamma = b_f$. Solving for σ yields the




Fig. 1: Equilibrium on electricity market

first cut-off point, denoted $\sigma' := \min \{(A - \gamma b_f - Q_f)/Q_r, 1\}$, such that case 1 obtains for all $\sigma \leq \sigma'$. This definition of σ' takes into account that the upper bound of the support of $f(\sigma)$ is 1.

As σQ_r rises further, the supply and demand curve continue to intersect at the variable cost of fossils, b_f (case 2). Thus, neither the equilibrium price nor demand change. However, production from renewables successively replaces production from fossils, leading to increasing excess capacities of the latter. The respective values follow straightforwardly from Figure 1 and the demand function $x(p) = A - p\gamma$. They are stated in the second line of Table 1. This case continues until available renewable capacities are sufficient to satisfy the entire demand at $p = b_f$, i.e., until $\sigma Q_r = A - \gamma b_f$. This yields the second cut-off point, $\sigma'' := \min \{(A - \gamma b_f)/Q_r, 1\}$, such that case 2 obtains for all $\sigma \in (\sigma', \sigma'']$.

Tab. 1: Distinction of cases for $Q_r > 0$

i	availability	$p_i(\sigma)$	$x_i(\sigma)$	$q_{ri}(\sigma)$	$q_{fi}(\sigma)$
1	$a \leq \sigma \leq \sigma' = \frac{A - \gamma b_f - Q_f}{Q_r}$	$\frac{A - \sigma Q_r - Q_f}{\gamma}$	$\sigma Q_r + Q_f$	σQ_r	Q_f
2	$\sigma' < \sigma \leq \sigma'' = \frac{A - \gamma b_f}{Q_r}$	b_f	$A - \gamma b_f$	σQ_r	$A - \gamma b_f - \sigma Q_r$
3	$\sigma'' < \sigma \leq \sigma''' = \frac{A - \gamma b_r}{Q_r}$	$\frac{A - \sigma Q_r}{\gamma}$	σQ_r	σQ_r	0
4	$\sigma''' < \sigma \leq 1$	b_r	$A - \gamma b_r$	$A - \gamma b_r$	0

For further increases of σQ_r , demand intersects with the lower vertical segment of the supply curve (case 3). Now, the equilibrium price falls again in σQ_r , and the equilibrium values as given in the third line of Table 1 follow immediately from Figure 1. This case obtains until the available renewable capacity equals demand at the variable cost of renewables, b_r , which defines the third cut-off point $\sigma''' := \min \{(A - \gamma b_r)/Q_r, 1\}$. For even higher values of σQ_r , there are excess capacities of renewables, which leads to case 4 in Table 1.

Finally, consider diffusion stage R , where only renewable capacities have been installed. Here, the supply curve consists only of the lower horizontal and vertical segments. It follows immediately that case 3, with quantities and prices as given in Table 1, occurs for all $\sigma \in [a, \sigma''']$, and case 4 for all $\sigma \in (\sigma''', 1]$.

Proposition 1. *In diffusion stage F ($Q_f > 0, Q_r = 0$), equilibrium prices and quantities are $x^* = q_f^* = Q_f$ and $p^* = (A - Q_f) / \gamma$. In diffusion stage FR ($Q_f > 0, Q_r > 0$), the solution depends on the availability of renewables, σ , as summarized by the four cases in Table 1. In diffusion stage R ($Q_f = 0, Q_r > 0$), only cases 3 (for $\sigma \in [a, \sigma''']$) and case 4 in Table 1 obtain.*

4 Capacity choices

We now turn to the regulator's capacity choices that account for the resulting production decisions as analyzed in the previous section. As above, we first consider diffusion stage F of fossils only. Efficiency requires that the equilibrium price equals fossils' long-run marginal costs, $b_f + \beta_f$. Using the specification of inverse demand in Assumption 1, this yields demand, output, and optimal capacity $q_f = x = Q_f = A - \gamma(b_f + \beta_f)$. Moreover, suppose that the first marginal unit of renewables would be added to the system. Given its lower variable costs, it would always be employed. Assuming a uniform distribution of σ , this leads to an expected output of $\frac{1+a}{2}$ and expected associated costs of $\frac{1+a}{2}b_r + \beta_r$. The costs of producing the same output by fossils are $\frac{1+a}{2}(b_f + \beta_f)$. Comparing costs, it is efficient to employ renewables if and only if $\beta_r \leq \frac{1+a}{2}(b_f - b_r + \beta_f) := \bar{\beta}_r$. Intuitively, the critical capacity costs of renewables, $\bar{\beta}_r$, is higher the higher the capacity costs of fossils are, the larger the difference in the variable costs of fossils and renewables is, and the better the reliability of renewables is.

Next, consider diffusion stages FR and R . For these stages, $Q_r > 0$, so the intermittency of renewables has to be taken into account. Remember that we have denoted the difference between the gross surplus and production costs in a particular state σ that obtains from the optimization problem in stage 2 by $w(\mathbf{Q}, \sigma)$. Taking into account that prices and quantities vary over the support $[a, 1]$ of $F(\sigma)$, and accounting for capacity costs, the welfare maximization problem in stage 1 is

$$\max_{\mathbf{Q}} W(\mathbf{Q}) = \int_a^1 w(\mathbf{Q}, \sigma) dF(\sigma) - \sum_j \beta_j Q_j. \quad (12)$$

According to the Leibniz rule (e.g., Sydsaeter and Hammond 2005, p. 153),

$$\frac{\partial}{\partial Q_j} \int_a^1 w(\mathbf{Q}, \sigma) dF(\sigma) = \int_a^1 \frac{\partial w(\mathbf{Q}, \sigma)}{\partial Q_j} dF(\sigma) \quad \text{for } j = r, f \quad (13)$$

if $w(\mathbf{Q}, \sigma)$ and $\partial w(\mathbf{Q}, \sigma) / \partial Q_j$ are continuous. From Table 1 and equation (2), $w(\mathbf{Q}, \sigma)$ is obviously continuous *within* the four cases because prices and quantities are continuous within

these cases. To see that it is also continuous at the boundaries of two neighboring cases, note that $w_1(\mathbf{Q}, \sigma') = w_2(\mathbf{Q}, \sigma')$, $w_2(\mathbf{Q}, \sigma'') = w_3(\mathbf{Q}, \sigma'')$ and $w_3(\mathbf{Q}, \sigma''') = w_4(\mathbf{Q}, \sigma''')$ because prices and quantities are the same at these boundaries (see Table 1). Taking derivatives and using the same steps, it is straightforward to show that also $\partial w(\mathbf{Q}, \sigma) / \partial Q_j$ is continuous not only within the four cases, but also at their respective boundaries.

Thus, we can apply (13) to determine the first-order conditions w.r.t. Q_f and Q_r in the diffusion stages FR and R . Splitting up the overall integral into the four different cases, differentiating $w(\mathbf{Q}, \sigma)$ as given in (2), and substituting according to Proposition 1 the respective values for $\partial w_i(\mathbf{Q}, \sigma) / \partial Q_j$ from Table 1, we obtain¹¹

$$W_{Q_f} := \int_a^{\sigma'} (p_1(\sigma) - b_f) dF(\sigma) - \beta_f \leq 0 \quad [= 0, \text{ if } Q_f^* > 0], \quad (14)$$

$$\begin{aligned} W_{Q_r} := & \int_a^{\sigma'} (p_1(\sigma) - b_r) \sigma dF(\sigma) + \int_{\sigma'}^{\sigma''} (p_2(\sigma) - b_r) \sigma dF(\sigma) \\ & + \int_{\sigma''}^{\sigma'''} (p_3(\sigma) - b_r) \sigma dF(\sigma) - \beta_r = 0 \quad [\sigma' = \sigma'' = a \text{ if } Q_f^* = 0]. \end{aligned} \quad (15)$$

This specification takes into account that $Q_f > 0$ in stage FR but $Q_f = 0$ in stage R , while $Q_r > 0$ in both stages. Intuitively, capacities Q_f and Q_r are chosen such that their respective marginal costs, β_j , are equal to their expected marginal value after accounting for production costs, as given by the integral terms. In condition (14), the range of the integral reflects that only production in case 1 depends on Q_f . In condition (15), it reflects that production in case 4 is independent of marginal changes of Q_r due to excess capacities of renewables.

If both conditions bind, we are in diffusion stage FR . If only condition (15) binds, we are in diffusion stage R , for which cases 1 and 2 can be dropped (hence $\sigma' = \sigma'' = a$, see Proposition 1). Moreover, the transition from diffusion stage FR to R occurs when (14) binds at $Q_f = 0$. Hence, we can derive the capacity levels and capacity costs of renewables where fossils are squeezed completely out of the market by solving the binding equation (14) at $Q_f = 0$ for Q_r , and then using this to solve (15) at $Q_f = 0$ for β_r (remember that cases 1 and 2 cancel in (15) for $Q_f = 0$). We denote the resulting capacity levels and costs by \underline{Q}_r and $\underline{\beta}_r$. For $a = 0$, this yields¹²

$$\underline{\beta}_r = 2\gamma\beta_f^2 (A - \gamma b_r)^3 / 3(A - \gamma b_f)^4. \quad (16)$$

¹¹ For case 1, we used the equation

$$\int_0^{x_1} p(\tilde{x}) d\tilde{x} = \int_0^{x_1} \frac{A - \tilde{x}}{\gamma} d\tilde{x} = \frac{Ax_1 - 0.5x_1^2}{\gamma}$$

so that by substituting for x_1 from Table 1,

$$\frac{\partial}{\partial Q_f} \frac{Ax_1 - 0.5x_1^2}{\gamma} = \frac{A - x_1}{\gamma} = p_1(\sigma).$$

The other derivatives are calculated along the same lines.

¹² \underline{Q}_r and $\underline{\beta}_r$ can also be calculated for $a > 0$, but their values are very complex so that we omit them for the sake of parsimony (calculations available upon request).

Intuitively, $\underline{\beta}_r$ increases in b_f and β_f and decreases in b_r . This reflects that the market diffusion of renewables is completed earlier—i.e., already for higher capacity costs β_r —if fossils are more and renewables less expensive. The following proposition summarizes efficient capacity levels as a function of the capacity costs of renewables.

Proposition 2. *If capacity costs of renewables are $\beta_r \geq \overline{\beta}_r$, it is efficient to install only fossil capacities at the level $Q_f^* = A - \gamma(b_f + \beta_f)$. For $\beta_r \in (\underline{\beta}_r, \overline{\beta}_r)$, it is efficient to install fossil and renewable capacities at the levels that solve the system of binding equations (14) and (15). For $\beta_r \leq \underline{\beta}_r$, it is efficient to install only renewable capacities at the level that solves equation (15) with $\sigma' = \sigma'' = a$.*

5 Market efficiency

In the preceding section we determined welfare-maximizing levels of renewable and fossil capacities. We now ask whether this solution can also be achieved by decentralized markets. We assume that there are a large number of competitive firms that produce with either the fossil or the renewable technology. We index firms by superscript k so that production and capacity choices of a firm that produces with technology j are q_j^k and Q_j^k , respectively. Thus, overall production and capacity are $q_j = \sum_k q_j^k(\sigma)$ and $Q_j = \sum_k Q_j^k$, respectively. Expected profits of a firm k are

$$\pi_j^k = \int_a^1 (p(\sigma) - b_j) q_j^k(\sigma) dF(\sigma) - \beta_j Q_j^k, \quad (17)$$

where the integral term represents expected revenues after accounting for variable production costs, and the second term stands for capacity costs.

First consider diffusion stage *FR*, where fossil and renewable firms choose to install capacities. From Table 1, fossil firms only produce in cases 1 and 2. Moreover, in case 2, the price equals the marginal production costs, $p_2(\sigma) = b_f$, and in case 1, production of a fossil firm is $q_{f1}^k(\sigma) = Q_f^k$. Using this, expected profits become

$$\pi_f^k = \int_a^{\sigma'} (p_1(\sigma) - b_f) Q_f^k dF(\sigma) - \beta_f Q_f^k. \quad (18)$$

From (14), this term is equal to zero at the efficient capacity levels. Next, consider a renewable firm. From Table 1, for case 4, the price equals the marginal production costs, $p_4(\sigma) = b_r$, and in cases 1 to 3, output of a renewable firm is $q_r^k(\sigma) = \sigma Q_r^k$. Substitution into (17) yields expected profits

$$\pi_r^k = \int_a^{\sigma'} (p_1(\sigma) - b_r) \sigma Q_r^k dF(\sigma) + \int_{\sigma'}^{\sigma''} (p_2(\sigma) - b_r) \sigma Q_r^k dF(\sigma)$$

$$+ \int_{\sigma''}^{\sigma'''} (p_3(\sigma) - b_r) \sigma Q_r^k dF(\sigma) - \beta_r Q_r^k. \quad (19)$$

Comparing this with (15) shows that renewable firms also make zero profits at the efficient capacity levels.

Next, consider diffusion stage F , in which there are no intermittent energy sources, meaning that fossil capacities are always fully dispatched, i.e., $q_f^k = Q_f^k$. Thus profits of a fossil firm are $\pi_f^k = (p - b_f - \beta_f) Q_f^k$, which is equal to zero at the efficient price that equal fossils' long-run marginal costs, $b_f + \beta_f$. Finally, in diffusion stage R , only cases 3 and 4 are realized. Thus profits are as given by (19) after dropping cases 1 and 2 by setting $\sigma' = \sigma'' = a$. Comparing this with (15) shows that profits of a renewable firm in diffusion stage R are zero. This implies no incentives to enter or exit the market at any of the diffusion stages, and we obtain the following result.

Proposition 3. *The efficient levels of fossil and renewable capacities can be implemented by competitive markets.*

6 Market diffusion of renewables

6.1 Effects of falling capacity costs

Compared to fossils, renewables are still a new technology, for which falling capacity costs, β_r , are anticipated (see, e.g., Schröder, Kunz, Meiss, Mendelevitch, and Von Hirschhausen (2013)). In Proposition 2, we have already shown that renewables enter the market when capacity costs fall below the threshold value $\overline{\beta_r}$, and that they squeeze fossils completely out of the market when capacity costs fall below $\underline{\beta_r}$. Now we take a closer look at the market diffusion in the intermediate stage FR , where fossil and renewable technologies coexist.

For this stage, we know from Section 4 that $\sigma' \leq \sigma'' \leq \sigma'''$ and that each of these threshold values can be equal to 1. Thus, it may well be that only a subset of the cases in Table 1 obtains. However, some of them always do.

Lemma 1. *If it is optimal to install renewable and fossil capacities (diffusion stage FR), then capacity levels are chosen such that $\sigma' > a$. Hence there are always realizations of σ for which case 1 obtains and in which both technologies are used at full capacity. If it is optimal to install only renewable capacities (diffusion stage R), then capacity levels are chosen such that $\sigma''' > a$. Hence there are always realizations of σ for which case 3 obtains and in which renewables are used at full capacity.*

The lemma reflects the intuitive idea that capacities are only installed if they are at least used for low realizations of σ . Accordingly, in diffusion stage FR , only case 1 occurs if $\sigma' = 1$, which happens if $(A - \gamma b_f - Q_f^*) / Q_r^* \geq 1$ (see Table 1). Compared to the following situations, this is associated with the lowest level of renewables. Hence we refer to this diffusion stage as *very low renewables* (stage V). If $\sigma' < 1$ but $(A - \gamma b_f) / Q_r^* \geq 1$ so that $\sigma'' = 1$, which happens if Q_r^* is small, then only cases 1 and 2 obtain. We call this situation *low renewables* (stage L).

Next, if $\sigma'' < 1$ but $(A - \gamma b_r)/Q_r^* \geq 1$ so that $\sigma''' = 1$, which allows for higher values of Q_r^* than the previous situation, then cases 1, 2, and 3 obtain. We call this situation *medium renewables* (stage M). Finally, if $\sigma''' < 1$ all four cases obtain. We call this situation *high renewables* (stage H), which reflects that in case 4 there is excess capacity of renewables.

Intuitively, one gradually moves from diffusion stages V to H as the capacity costs of renewables fall. In order to take a closer look at the market penetration by renewables, consider the following example.¹³

Example. $A = 100$, $\gamma = 1$, $a = 0.1$, $b_r = 0.5$, $b_f = 6$, $\beta_f = 1$.

The solid curve in Figure 2 depicts efficient levels of renewable capacities as a function of β_r ; the dashed curve depicts fossil capacities. The vertical dotted lines separate the different diffusion stages, where we use the finer level of disaggregation as introduced above for stage FR . The table directly below the figure summarizes the characterization of the different diffusion stages after Lemma 1.

For high capacity costs of renewables, i.e., to the right of the last vertical dotted line, we are in diffusion stage F of fossils only. Remember that $\bar{\beta}_r$ is the level of renewable capacity costs at which expected costs of producing one unit of electricity from renewables and fossils are equalized. Accordingly, as β_r falls below $\bar{\beta}_r$, renewables are cheaper (at full usage) and start to replace fossil capacities until the latter are completely squeezed out of the market at $\beta_r = \underline{\beta}_r$. This pattern is consistent with the preceding analysis. What is more surprising is that the diffusion process is not smooth but varies substantially over the different stages.

Despite their cost advantage, renewables substitute the fossil technology only slowly in diffusion stage V . The reason is a countervailing effect. Remember that in stage V , only case 1 obtains, for which the electricity price is falling in the available renewable capacity, σQ_r . Thus, the price is low when a large supply of renewables is available. This reduces their competitiveness compared to fossils that always produce at full capacity in stage V . As capacity costs fall further, diffusion stage L is reached and the level of renewable capacities increases convexly. This reflects that now case 2 also obtains, for which the load factor of fossils falls by σQ_r (see Table 1). Moreover, for a high availability of renewables, $\sigma > \sigma'$, the price is no longer falling but constant at b_f . Both effects improve the relative competitiveness of renewables.

The speed of market penetration falls strongly as we reach diffusion stage M . Now case 3 also obtains, for which the price is again falling in the level of renewable capacities, as in case

¹³ Parameter values have been chosen such that their relation roughly corresponds to real-world data. Specifically, the value for the reliability of renewables, a , reflects a focus on intermittent renewables with periods in which availability is low (see Footnote 8). The value for b_r reflects that renewables have no fuel costs, only some operations and maintenance (O&M) costs in the order of 0 to 3.45 (USD-cent/kWh) for solar PV and 0.25 to 3.47 for wind onshore (IEA 2015). Variable production costs for fossils, b_f , are substantially higher and include fuel, carbon, and variable O&M costs. Fuel costs of natural gas (efficiency of 60%) vary between 3.12 (United States) and 8.19 USD-cent/kWh (OECD Asia); hard coal (efficiency of 46%) costs are around 3.16 USD-cent/kWh (OECD). Carbon costs vary between 1.01 (natural gas) and 2.21 USD-cent/kWh (hard coal) for a carbon price of 30 USD/tonne CO₂. Variable O&M costs range from 0.27 for natural gas-fired plants to 0.34 for coal-fired plants (median values). Finally, depending on the technical lifetime (30 years for natural gas-fired power plants to 40 years for coal-fired power plants), capacity costs of $\beta_f = 1$ (in USD-cent/kWh) correspond to investment costs of 1734 to 1998 USD/kW, which resembles real-world data for a mix of coal-fired and natural gas-fired power plants (all figures are own calculations based on IEA (2015)).




Fig. 2: Capacity choices in dependency of β_r .

1. Thus, the price of renewables declines when there is more available to sell. The reverse effect applies to fossils. They sell the most when the availability of renewables is low and prices are therefore high. Moreover, compared to stage L , the maximum price rises.

As we enter diffusion stage H , case 4 also obtains, for which the price is constant at marginal production costs of renewables, b_r . Hence, renewables gain no marginal profits for $\sigma > \sigma'''$. This dampens their build-up, especially as σ''' is falling in Q_r . However, fossils also suffer because they lie idle more often as renewable capacities rise. This and the effect of lower capacity costs of renewables dominates for lower values of β_r so that their build-up rate finally accelerates until fossils are completely driven out of the market.

Changing the parameters of the example would change the specific shapes of the curves in Figure 2. Nevertheless, the following proposition, which is based on the assumption of a uniform distribution, shows that the generic pattern as described above is a robust result.¹⁴

Proposition 4. *As capacity costs of renewables fall, it is efficient to install more renewable and less fossil capacities. Moreover, in diffusion stage V , $Q_r^*(\beta_r)$ is a linear function, in stage L it is convex, in stage M it is concave, and in stage H it is again a convex function.*

We now relate this diffusion pattern to the levelized cost of electricity (LCOE) as the standard metric to assess the competitiveness of different technologies. In our static framework, the LCOE

¹⁴ For fossil capacities, the opposite pattern of convexity and concavity obtains; i.e., $Q_f^*(\beta_r)$ changes its behavior from linear in diffusion stage C to concave in stage L , to convex in stage M , and again to concave in stage H (proof available upon request).

of technology j is the *constant* price for power that equates expected revenues and costs for a representative firm k (see Borenstein 2012). Thus, for $j = r, f$ we have

$$LCOE_j \int_a^1 q_j^k(\sigma) dF(\sigma) = b_j \int_a^1 q_j^k(\sigma) dF(\sigma) + \beta_j Q_j^k \quad (20)$$

$$\iff LCOE_j = b_j + \frac{\beta_j}{\eta_j}, \quad (21)$$

where $\int_a^1 q_j^k(\sigma) dF(\sigma)$ is (expected) output and $\eta_j := \int_a^1 q_j^k(\sigma) dF(\sigma) / Q_j^k$ is the (expected) load factor of technology j . Figure 3, which is based on the same parameter specification as Figure 2, depicts the LCOE (black curves, scale on left axis) and the load factor (grey curves, scale on right axis) of renewables (solid) and fossils (dashed) as functions of renewables' capacity costs β_r . First, consider the load factor. Fossil capacities are fully used in diffusion stages F and V , but their load factor drops by nearly 50 percent in stage L , while that of renewables remains constant. This substantially reduces the competitiveness of fossils, and it is the main driver for the exponential build-up of renewable capacities in this stage as depicted in Figure 2. Thereafter, i.e., in stages M and H , the load factors of fossils and renewables decrease roughly equally. This reflects that the market diffusion is smoother in stage H and mainly driven by the reduction of β_r .

Turning to the LCOE, observe from (21) that $LCOE_r$ increases in β_r and, in addition to this standard effect, the LCOE of both technologies decreases in their respective load factors (remember that b_f, b_r and β_f are constant). Thus, $LCOE_f$ is increasing as β_r falls because the associated higher share of renewables leads to a lower load factor of fossils (see Figure 3). Obviously, this effect is most pronounced in stage L , where the drop in η_f is largest. By contrast, $LCOE_r$ is decreasing as β_r falls, which shows that the effect of lower capacity costs dominates the effect of the lower load factor of renewables.

When interpreting $LCOE_j$, it is important to note that Figure 3 depicts its values in the competitive solution, where both technologies are “equally competitive” by construction. Nevertheless, the LCOE of renewables and fossils are equalized only at $\bar{\beta}_r$, the point where renewables just enter the market. As β_r falls below $\bar{\beta}_r$, renewables have lower LCOE. This lends support to the aforementioned criticism of LCOE for use in assessing the competitiveness of renewables (see introduction). However, at the competitive solution, expected revenues and expected costs must be equalized for both technologies (see Section 5), i.e.,

$$p_j \int_a^1 q_j^k(\sigma) dF(\sigma) = b_j \int_a^1 q_j^k(\sigma) dF(\sigma) + \beta_j Q_j^k, \quad (22)$$

where p_j is the average price or “market value” of electricity supplied by technology j . Comparing this with equation (20) we have $LCOE_j = p_j$. This shows that (at the competitive solution) a higher LCOE does not only represent higher costs but also a higher market value. In particular, as β_r falls, $LCOE_f$ rises—i.e., fossils become more costly—due to their lower load factor. However, their market value also rises because their dispatchability becomes more valuable as the share of intermittent renewables increases. Conversely, for renewables, a lower

β_r leads to lower costs and also to a lower market value because their intermittency becomes more obstructive.¹⁵




Fig. 3: LCOE and expected utilization in dependency of β_r

6.2 Effects of technology improvements

Above, we analyzed the effects of falling capacity costs on the market diffusion of renewables. Since this is a relatively new technology, one would also expect more substantial technology improvements than for established fossil technologies. In our model, this is best captured by an increasing “reliability parameter”, a . This may occur for different reasons. First, the renewable technologies themselves may improve—for instance, when turbines are developed that are able to operate at lower wind speeds, or panels that are more efficient at absorbing low levels of solar radiation. Second, the power transmission grid may be enhanced so that regional differences in the availability of intermittent renewables can be exploited to improve their overall reliability. Third, better storage capabilities may bridge time gaps at which renewables are not available.

Intuitively, a higher reliability of renewables accelerates their market diffusion. In particular, remember from Proposition 2 that renewables become competitive once their capacity costs have

¹⁵ Reichelstein and Sahoo (2015) suggest correcting the standard LCOE metric by a factor, Γ_j , which is given by 1 plus the covariance between intra-day deviations of the available capacity from the average capacity factor and intra-day deviations of the price for electricity supplied by a specific technology from the average price (hence, $\Gamma_j = 1$ is the benchmark value for a technology to exhibit value synergies with the pricing pattern). Using this, they say that technologies are just cost-competitive if $\Gamma_j p = LCOE_j$, where $p := \int_a^1 p(\sigma) \sum_j q_j^k(\sigma) dF(\sigma) / \int_a^1 \sum_j q_j^k(\sigma) dF(\sigma)$ is the average price of the total electricity supplied by both technologies. Thus, from $LCOE_j = p_j$ it follows immediately that $\Gamma_j = p_j/p$ in our framework. In this interpretation, the standard LCOE metric overvalues renewables ($\Gamma_r < 1$) because on average they achieve a lower price than fossils ($p_r < p$). Conversely, the standard LCOE metric undervalues fossils ($\Gamma_f > 1$) because on average they achieve a higher price than renewables ($p_f > p$).

fallen to $\overline{\beta}_r = \frac{1+a}{2}(b_f - b_r + \beta_f)$. This level is increasing in a so that it becomes efficient to add renewables to the electricity system already at higher capacity costs. Moreover, again from Proposition 2 it is efficient to install renewables only once their capacity costs have fallen to $\underline{\beta}_r$. Intuitively, a higher reliability a of renewables raises their competitiveness such that they should replace fossils already at higher capacity costs, i.e., $\underline{\beta}_r$ is increasing in a . More surprisingly, a higher reliability a allows renewables to leapfrog some of the diffusion stages in Proposition 4. First, we formally state this and the preceding result (again using the assumption of a uniform distribution) and then explain its intuition.

Proposition 5. *As renewables become more reliable, both their market entry as well as their complete market capture already occur at higher capacity costs, i.e., $\overline{\beta}_r$ and $\underline{\beta}_r$ are increasing in a . Moreover, consider the process where capacity costs of renewables fall from $\overline{\beta}_r$ to $\underline{\beta}_r$. Diffusion stage V (very low renewables) occurs for all $a \in [0, 1)$. By contrast, diffusion stage H (high renewables) will not occur for $a \geq a^H := \frac{A - \gamma(b_f + \beta_f) - \gamma\sqrt{\beta_f[\beta_f + 2(b_f - b_r)]}}{A - \gamma b_r}$. Similarly, diffusion stages L (low renewables) and M (medium renewables) will not occur for $a \geq a^L := 1 - \frac{2\gamma\beta_f}{A - \gamma b_f}$, where $1 > a^L > a^H$.*

This leapfrogging is best understood when considering the hypothetical situation of $a = 1$. Renewables and fossils would then only differ in their patterns of capacity and production costs. Hence it would be efficient to switch from a system of fossils only to one of renewables only once their long-run marginal costs are equalized, i.e., at $b_r + \beta_r = b_f + \beta_f$. This abrupt transition is slowed down by the intermittency of renewables, which becomes less severe as a rises. Moreover, Proposition 5 shows that leapfrogging applies particularly to later diffusion stages. Remember that in stage H , there are excess capacities of fossils and renewables if availability of the latter is high. These high “backup capacities” are needed to satisfy demand at times of low availability. Intuitively, as renewables become more reliable, the need for such backup capacities falls. The same argument applies to diffusion stages M and L , although to a lesser extent because backup capacities are restricted to fossils.

7 Price caps and the market diffusion of renewables

In the preceding section, we determined the efficient market diffusion of renewables. From Section 5, we know that this solution obtains from competitive markets that are unregulated apart from a tax that internalizes the costs of CO₂ emissions. However, as the share of renewables increases, the electricity price depends increasingly on their availability. Regulators may perceive the resulting price fluctuations as politically unacceptable and respond with a price cap. We now analyze how this would affect the diffusion process of renewables.

In our model, the increasing share of renewables arises from their falling capacity costs.¹⁶ Obviously, this reduces the costs of producing a given level of energy in the diffusion stages with renewables. Due to the lower production costs, expected energy production rises. Intuitively,

¹⁶ In this section, we abstract from changes in the reliability parameter a for the sake of parsimony.

this leads to (weakly) lower expected prices in the competitive solution so as to balance demand and supply.¹⁷

By contrast, the maximum price rises as the market penetration of renewables increases. To see this, remember from Lemma 1 that in diffusion stage FR case 1 always obtains, and that prices are maximal if availability of renewables is at its minimum, i.e., for $\sigma = a$. Using the price for case 1 as given in Table 1, this yields $p_{max} = p_1(a) = \frac{A-aQ_r-Q_f}{\gamma}$. Moreover, from Proposition 4 the market share of renewables rises as their capacity costs, β_r , fall. Thus, p_{max} rises in the market share of renewables if a lower β_r leads to a lower $aQ_r + Q_f$. This is the case since from equation (26) in the proof of Proposition 4 we have

$$a \frac{\partial Q_r}{\partial \beta_r} + \frac{\partial Q_f}{\partial \beta_r} = \frac{6\gamma(1-a)(\sigma' - a)}{(\sigma' - a)^3 + 4(\sigma''' - \sigma''^3)} > 0, \quad (23)$$

where the inequality follows from $\sigma' > a$ and $\sigma''' \geq \sigma''$.

Now suppose that the regulator implements a price cap, denoted p_c . In order to be effective, p_c must be below the maximum prices, p_{max} , and above the long-run marginal costs of fossils, $b_f + \beta_f$. Otherwise, fossil capacities would never be built up. This yields $b_f + \beta_f < p_c < \frac{A-aQ_r-Q_f}{\gamma}$. Moreover, from Table 1 the unregulated price exceeds $b_f + \beta_f$ only in case 1. In particular, it equals the price cap if $p_c = p_1(\sigma) = \frac{A-\sigma Q_r-Q_f}{\gamma}$, and, accordingly, exceeds p_c for all $\sigma < \sigma_c := \frac{A-\gamma p_c-Q_f}{Q_r}$.

Thus, the price cap binds for all $\sigma < \sigma_c$, causing excess demand. It is well known that this leads to welfare losses when consumers are served randomly.¹⁸ We abstract from this complication as it is not the focus of our paper. Instead, we assume (as in Joskow and Tirole 2007) that consumers are served according to their willingness to pay, as would be the case without a price cap. For given capacity levels, therefore, the price cap does not affect efficiency but leads to a shift of surplus from producers to consumers.

This, however, will reduce firms' incentives to invest in energy production capacities in the first place. In particular, as stated in the proposition below, price caps have a stronger negative effect on the incentives to invest in fossils. The reason is that fossils sell most of their output when prices are high and, therefore, in situations where the price cap binds. For renewables the opposite pattern applies so that less of their output is affected by the price cap.

Proposition 6. *Consider a competitive electricity market with fossil and renewable capacities.*

1. *Unregulated maximum prices increase as the share of renewables in the energy mix rises. A price cap p_c that satisfies $b_f + \beta_f < p_c < \frac{A-aQ_r-Q_f}{\gamma}$ can moderate this.*

¹⁷ The caveat "weakly" accounts for the following consideration. In the efficient solution, there must be no incentives to enter or exit the market. In diffusion stage V , only case 1 obtains, for which fossils always produce at full capacity and sell the same quantity, independent of the price. Therefore, the expected price must equal their long-run marginal costs, $b_f + \beta_f$. Obviously, the same price obtains in stage F of fossils only. In stage L , case 2 also obtains, for which some fossil capacities lie idle. However, in case 2, the price equals the production costs of fossils, b_f . Hence expected profits of fossils would remain unchanged if they sold their entire capacity at this price. Thus, the expected price must again be equal to the long-run marginal costs of fossils. In conclusion, $E[p^F] = E[p^V] = E[p^L] = b_f + \beta_f$, where superscripts represent the diffusion stages and E is the expectation operator.

¹⁸ See Visscher (1973) for a seminal contribution on different rationing schemes as well as Crew et al. (1995) for a survey of different ways of interpreting rationing.

2. Such a price cap does not influence the level of capacity costs, $\overline{\beta}_r$, at which the market diffusion of renewables starts. However, the level of capacity costs, $\underline{\beta}_r$, at which renewables completely replace fossils is larger the stricter the price cap is.
3. Moreover, stricter price caps lead to more renewable and less fossil capacities, i.e., $\partial Q_r^c / \partial p_c < 0$ and $\partial Q_f^c / \partial p_c > 0$, where superscript c denotes capacities with a price cap. In particular, for any such price cap, renewable capacities are inefficiently high, $Q_r^c > Q_r^*$, while fossil capacities are inefficiently low, $Q_f^c < Q_f^*$.

8 Concluding Remarks

In this paper, we have analyzed the efficient market diffusion of intermittent renewable energies as their capacity costs fall. We have found that the effects of intermittency depend substantially on the market share of renewables, but that this relation is not smooth. In particular, renewables start to enter the electricity market when their LCOE has fallen to that of fossils. Initially, the market penetration is slow, but it speeds up substantially as soon as renewables reduce the load factor of fossils. Once the level of renewable capacities is high enough to satisfy the entire energy demand at times of high availability, their market penetration slows down substantially.

One must be careful when comparing this with real-world data on the development of renewable capacities because this development is heavily influenced by policies designed to foster renewables. This is particularly the case in countries that use a feed-in tariff (FIT), which shelters renewables but not fossils from low prices. Furthermore, the model is based on the assumption that demand responds to price signals, which is currently not the case for many consumers. With these caveats, our results appear consistent with past experience where market diffusion of renewables started at a slow rate but then accelerated substantially. Moreover, in some countries like Germany, energy supply from renewables is now nearly as high as national energy demand at times of maximum availability.¹⁹ Our model suggests that the market driven build-up of renewables is, therefore, likely to slow down substantially in the near future. Obviously, subsidies such as a FIT can compensate for this, but it would become increasingly costly to do so despite the decreasing capacity costs of renewables. If the target is an energy system that is completely based on renewables, then our analysis suggests that the most difficult stages of the energy transition are still to come.

Technological progress that dampens the effects of intermittency would brighten the picture. In particular, it might make it possible to leapfrog the later diffusion stages that require the most substantial back-up capacities and that are therefore the most expensive ones. Moreover, our findings show that price caps may not only help to cushion unwanted social effects that result from higher price fluctuations in a renewable-based energy system. Since they favor renewable

¹⁹ In 2015, average load in Germany was 57.55 GW, maximum supply of renewables 47.63 GW, and the lowest residual load 6.73 GW. Renewable production is highest between 12 am and 4 pm. Average load during these hours is 63.1 GW but minimum load only 42.5 GW (own compilations based on data from the four German transmission system operators, downloaded from www.netztransparenz.de and www.entsoe.de on 11 January 2016). Hence, theoretically, the installed capacity is already capable of satisfying the total demand at times of high supply and low demand.

over fossil technologies, they may actually accelerate the energy transition. Finally, our analysis suggests that markets work efficiently, even if prices are essentially zero over extended periods as the share of renewables in the energy mix increases. Thus, with dynamic pricing and competitive markets—and abstracting from other “technical” complications such as grid-related requirements and ramping costs—there is no need for the capacity markets that are currently under debate (Cramton, Ockenfels, and Stoft, 2013).

The analysis could be extended in several directions. First, one could account for market restrictions such as non-dynamic pricing and then analyze the performance of second-best policies such as FITs, renewable portfolios, and capacity markets. Second, one could try to make the model more general, e.g., by integrating more than two technologies, international trade, dynamic aspects of investment decisions, or a distribution that is more realistic than the uniform one. Presumably, this would require greater reliance on numerical simulations.

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Appendix

A Proof of Proposition 1

Diffusion stage FR There are different combinations of binding and non-binding capacity constraints: First, we may have $\mu_r(\sigma) > \mu_f(\sigma) > 0$. From the complementary slackness conditions (10) and (11) it follows that $q_r(\sigma) = \sigma Q_r$ and $q_f(\sigma) = Q_f$ (case 1). Second, $\mu_r(\sigma) > \mu_f(\sigma) = 0$ implies $q_r(\sigma) = \sigma Q_r$ and $q_f(\sigma) < Q_f$. We must distinguish whether (9) binds or not. If it does, we have $q_f(\sigma) > 0$, so that (using 7) $b_f = \lambda = p$ and (using inverse demand) $x = A - \gamma b_f$ as well as $q_f(\sigma) = x - \sigma Q_r$ (case 2). Alternatively, $q_f(\sigma) = 0$ for which $b_f > \lambda = \frac{A - \sigma Q_r}{\gamma} = p$ (case 3), where we have used (7) to obtain the price. Third, we may have $\mu_r(\sigma) = \mu_f(\sigma) = 0$ for which (8) and (9) cannot bind simultaneously. In particular, since $b_r < b_f$ only (8) binds and $q_f(\sigma) = 0$. Moreover, (7) and the binding condition (8) imply that $p = b_r$. From the inverse demand function, we then obtain $x = q_r = A - \gamma b_r$ (case 4).²⁰

The threshold value σ' that separates cases 1 and 2 is characterized by $\mu_f(\sigma) = 0$ and $x(\sigma) = \sigma Q_r + Q_f$. From (7) and (9), this yields $A - \sigma' Q_r - Q_f = b_f \gamma$. The threshold value σ'' that separates cases 2 and 3 is characterized by $p = \frac{A - \sigma Q_r}{\gamma} = b_f$. Finally, the threshold value σ''' that separates cases 3 and 4 is characterized by $p = \frac{A - \sigma Q_r}{\gamma} = b_r$.

Diffusion stage R If there are no fossil capacities, the choice variable q_f can be dropped from the maximization problem so that the solution follows from (7), (8) and (10). Condition (8) always binds (by Assumption 1) so that together with (7) we obtain $p(\sigma) = b_r + \mu_r(\sigma)$. From the complementary slackness condition (10) there are two cases. First, $x(\sigma) = q_r(\sigma) = \sigma Q_r$ and $\mu_r(\sigma) > 0$ so that $p = \frac{A - \sigma Q_r}{\gamma} > b_r$. Second, $q_r(\sigma) < \sigma Q_r$ and $\mu_r(\sigma) = 0$ so that $p(\sigma) = b_r$ and $x(\sigma) = q_r(\sigma) = A - \gamma b_r$. Finally, $\mu_r(\sigma) = \frac{A - x(\sigma)}{\gamma} - b_r \geq 0$ would be violated for all $x(\sigma) = \sigma Q_r > A - \gamma b_r$, which defines the threshold value $\sigma''' = \frac{A - \gamma b_r}{Q_r}$ as given in Table 1.

B Proof of Lemma 1

For $\sigma' = 1$ in stage FR and $\sigma''' = 1$ in stage R the proof is trivially satisfied, hence we ignore this possibility in the following. In contradiction to the first statement, suppose that $a \geq \sigma'$ in diffusion stage FR so that case 1 never obtains. Moreover, in cases 3 and 4 we have $q_f = 0$ (see Table 1). Hence for the decision to install fossil capacities only case 2 would be relevant, for which demand is $x = A - \gamma b_f$. From the definition of σ' , we can write $a \geq \sigma'$ equivalently as $a Q_r + Q_f \geq A - \gamma b_f$. Thus, there would be excess capacity of fossils except for the lowest realization of σ , which is a measure 0 event and, therefore, can be neglected for the investment

²⁰ A priori, there is a further combination of multipliers, namely $\mu_f(\sigma) > \mu_r(\sigma) = 0$, for which $q_f(\sigma) = Q_f$ by (11). Thus (9) binds, which yields a contradiction because the left-hand side of (8) is always larger than the left-hand side of (9) for $\mu_f(\sigma) > \mu_r(\sigma)$. Hence, this case cannot occur.

decision. Given that fossil capacities are costly, reducing them would unambiguously raise welfare. Turning to the second statement regarding stage R , suppose by contradiction that $a \geq \sigma''' \iff aQ_r \geq A - \gamma b_r$. Hence only case 4 would obtain, for which demand is $x = A - \gamma b_r$. Thus, there would be excess capacity of renewables, except for the lowest realization of σ , which cannot be welfare maximizing for the same reasons as in stage FR .

C Proof of Proposition 4

Note that the proposition relates to diffusion stage FR . Hence efficient capacity levels follow from the system of (binding) equations (14) and (15). Applying the implicit function theorem (see, e.g., Simon and Blume 1994, p. 355), thereby using $\partial W_{Q_f}/\partial \beta_r = 0$ and $\partial W_{Q_r}/\partial \beta_r = -1$, yields

$$\begin{pmatrix} \frac{\partial Q_r}{\partial \beta_r} \\ \frac{\partial Q_f}{\partial \beta_r} \end{pmatrix} = \frac{1}{\frac{\partial W_{Q_r}}{\partial Q_r} \frac{\partial W_{Q_f}}{\partial Q_f} - \frac{\partial W_{Q_r}}{\partial Q_f} \frac{\partial W_{Q_f}}{\partial Q_r}} \begin{pmatrix} \frac{\partial W_{Q_f}}{\partial Q_f} \\ -\frac{\partial W_{Q_f}}{\partial Q_r} \end{pmatrix}. \quad (24)$$

The partial derivatives on the right-hand side follow from differentiation of the first-order conditions (14) and (15). For this, remember that the different diffusion stages are characterized as follows (see table below Figure 2): $\sigma' = 1$ in stage V , $\sigma' < \sigma'' = 1$ in stage L , $\sigma'' < \sigma''' = 1$ in stage M , and $\sigma''' < 1$ in stage H . It follows that $\frac{\partial \sigma'}{\partial Q_f} = \frac{\partial \sigma'}{\partial Q_r} = 0$ in stage V . Moreover, from Table 1, in diffusion stages L , M and H the price for low realizations of σ is $p_1(\sigma') = b_f$. Using this,

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{\partial W_{Q_f}}{\partial Q_f} &= -\frac{1}{\gamma} \int_a^{\sigma'} dF(\sigma) < 0, \\ \frac{\partial W_{Q_f}}{\partial Q_r} &= -\frac{1}{\gamma} \int_a^{\sigma'} \sigma dF(\sigma) < 0. \end{aligned}$$

In diffusion stage V and L , $\sigma'' = 1$ so that $\frac{\partial \sigma''}{\partial Q_f} = \frac{\partial \sigma''}{\partial Q_r} = 0$. In stages M and H , $\frac{\partial \sigma''}{\partial Q_f} = 0$ and $\frac{\partial \sigma''}{\partial Q_r} = -\frac{\sigma''}{Q_r}$. Moreover, $p_1(\sigma') = p_2(\sigma') = b_f$ for $\sigma' < 1$, $p_3(\sigma'') = b_f$ for $\sigma'' < 1$, and $p_3(\sigma''') = b_r$ for $\sigma''' < 1$. It follows that $\frac{\partial \sigma''}{\partial Q_r} (b_f - b_r) - \frac{\partial \sigma''}{\partial Q_r} (p_3(\sigma'') - b_r) = 0$ because either $\sigma'' = 1$ so that $\frac{\partial \sigma''}{\partial Q_r} = 0$, or $\sigma'' < 1$ so that $p_3(\sigma'') = b_f$. Using this, all effects over the border of the integral when differentiating (14) and (15) cancel, and we get

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{\partial W_{Q_r}}{\partial Q_f} &= -\frac{1}{\gamma} \int_a^{\sigma'} \sigma dF(\sigma) = \frac{\partial W_{Q_f}}{\partial Q_r} < 0, \\ \frac{\partial W_{Q_r}}{\partial Q_r} &= -\frac{1}{\gamma} \int_a^{\sigma'} \sigma^2 dF(\sigma) - \frac{1}{\gamma} \int_{\sigma''}^{\sigma'''} \sigma^2 dF(\sigma) < 0. \end{aligned}$$

Assuming a uniform distribution, $\int_a^{\sigma'} dF(\sigma) = \frac{\sigma' - a}{1 - a}$, $\int_a^{\sigma'} \sigma dF(\sigma) = [\sigma'^2 - a^2] \frac{1}{2(1 - a)}$, $\int_a^{\sigma'} \sigma^2 dF(\sigma) =$

$[\sigma'^3 - a^3] \frac{1}{3(1-a)}$, and $\int_{\sigma''}^{\sigma'''} \sigma^2 dF(\sigma) = [\sigma'''^3 - \sigma''^3] \frac{1}{3(1-a)}$. Collecting terms, we get

$$\frac{\partial W_{Q_r}}{\partial Q_r} \frac{\partial W_{Q_f}}{\partial Q_f} - \frac{\partial W_{Q_r}}{\partial Q_f} \frac{\partial W_{Q_f}}{\partial Q_r} = \frac{\frac{1}{3}(\sigma'^3 - \sigma''^3 + \sigma'''^3 - a^3)(\sigma' - a) - \frac{1}{4}(\sigma'^2 - a^2)^2}{(1-a)^2 \gamma^2} \quad (25)$$

so that

$$\begin{pmatrix} \frac{\partial Q_r}{\partial \beta_r} \\ \frac{\partial Q_f}{\partial \beta_r} \end{pmatrix} = \frac{12(1-a)\gamma}{(\sigma' - a)^3 + 4(\sigma'''^3 - \sigma''^3)} \begin{pmatrix} -1 \\ \frac{1}{2}(\sigma' + a) \end{pmatrix} \begin{pmatrix} < 0 \\ > 0 \end{pmatrix}. \quad (26)$$

The signs follow since $\sigma' > a$ by Lemma 1, and $\sigma''' \geq \sigma''$ by construction. Intuitively, as renewables become cheaper, it is optimal to install more renewable and less fossil capacities.

Turning to the statements in the proposition regarding convexity and concavity, we need to analyze the second-order derivatives. In diffusion stage V , $\sigma' = 1$ so that the first-order derivative is independent of β_r ; hence $\frac{\partial^2 Q_r}{\partial \beta_r^2} = \frac{\partial^2 Q_f}{\partial \beta_r^2} = 0$. In diffusion stage L , $a < \sigma' < \sigma'' = \sigma''' = 1$, where (using 26)

$$\frac{d\sigma'}{d\beta_r} = -\frac{1}{Q_r} \left(\frac{\partial Q_f}{\partial \beta_r} + \frac{\partial Q_r}{\partial \beta_r} \sigma' \right) = \frac{a - \sigma'}{2Q_r} \frac{\partial Q_r}{\partial \beta_r} > 0. \quad (27)$$

Hence we have

$$\frac{\partial^2 Q_r}{\partial \beta_r^2} = \frac{36\gamma(1-a)}{(\sigma' - a)^4} \frac{d\sigma'}{d\beta_r} > 0,$$

which proves convexity of $Q_r(\beta_r)$ in stage L . Turning to diffusion stage M , $\sigma'' < \sigma''' = 1$, where

$$\frac{d\sigma''}{d\beta_r} = -\frac{1}{Q_r} \frac{\partial Q_r}{\partial \beta_r} \sigma'' > 0. \quad (28)$$

Hence we have

$$\frac{\partial^2 Q_r}{\partial \beta_r^2} = \frac{36(1-a)\gamma \left[(\sigma' - a)^2 \frac{d\sigma'}{d\beta_r} - 4\sigma''^2 \frac{d\sigma''}{d\beta_r} \right]}{\left[(\sigma' - a)^3 + 4(1 - \sigma''^3) \right]^2} < 0.$$

Here the sign follows because the term in squared brackets in the numerator can be written as (using 27 and 28)

$$\left(8(\sigma''^3 - (\sigma' - a)^3) \right) \frac{1}{2Q_r} \frac{\partial Q_r}{\partial \beta_r}, \quad (29)$$

which is negative because $\sigma'' \geq \sigma' > a$. This proves concavity of $Q_r(\beta_r)$ in stage M . Finally, in diffusion stage H , $\sigma''' < 1$, where

$$\frac{d\sigma'''}{d\beta_r} = -\frac{1}{Q_r} \frac{\partial Q_r}{\partial \beta_r} \sigma''' > 0. \quad (30)$$

Hence we have

$$\frac{\partial^2 Q_r}{\partial \beta_r^2} = \frac{36(1-a)\gamma \left[(\sigma' - a)^2 \frac{d\sigma'}{d\beta_r} + 4 \left(\sigma'''^2 \frac{d\sigma'''}{d\beta_r} - \sigma''^2 \frac{d\sigma''}{d\beta_r} \right) \right]}{\left[(\sigma' - a)^3 + 4(\sigma'''^3 - \sigma''^3) \right]^2},$$

which is positive and, therefore, convex, since (using 28 and 30)

$$\sigma'''2 \frac{d\sigma'''}{d\beta_r} - \sigma''2 \frac{d\sigma''}{d\beta_r} = (\sigma'''3 - \sigma''3) \frac{1}{Q_r} \frac{\partial Q_r}{\partial \beta_r} > 0.$$

D Proof of Proposition 5

Remember that $\underline{\beta}_r$ and \underline{Q}_r follow from evaluating the binding equations (14) and (15) at $Q_f = 0$, where the latter implies that cases 1 and 2 in (15) disappear (see text immediately before Proposition 2). Hence, assuming a uniform distribution for σ , $\underline{\beta}_r$ and \underline{Q}_r are implicitly defined by

$$\int_a^{\sigma'} (p_1(\sigma) - b_f) d\sigma - (1-a)\beta_f = 0, \quad (31)$$

$$\int_a^{\sigma'''} (p_3(\sigma) - b_r) \sigma d\sigma - (1-a)\beta_r = 0, \quad (32)$$

where for $Q_f = 0$ we have $p_1(\sigma) = p_3(\sigma) = \frac{A - \sigma Q_r}{\gamma}$. Equation (31) is independent of β_r so that implicit differentiation of this expression yields

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{\partial \underline{Q}_r}{\partial a} &= - \frac{- \left(\frac{A - a \underline{Q}_r}{\gamma} - b_f \right) + \beta_f}{\int_a^{\sigma'} \frac{-\sigma}{\gamma} d\sigma} \\ &= \frac{-\gamma \left(\frac{A - a \underline{Q}_r}{\gamma} - b_f - \beta_f \right)}{\int_a^{\sigma'} \sigma d\sigma}, \end{aligned}$$

where we have used the fact that $p_1(\sigma') - b_f = 0$. Observe that

$$\frac{A - a \underline{Q}_r}{\gamma} - b_f - \beta_f \geq \int_a^{\sigma'} \left(\frac{A - a \underline{Q}_r}{\gamma} - b_f \right) f(\sigma) d\sigma - \beta_f \quad (33)$$

$$> \int_a^{\sigma'} \left(\frac{A - \sigma \underline{Q}_r}{\gamma} - b_f \right) f(\sigma) d\sigma - \beta_f = 0. \quad (34)$$

Here, the first inequality follows from $\int_a^{\sigma'} f(\sigma) d\sigma \leq 1$, the second inequality from $\sigma \geq a$, and the last equality from (31). It follows that $\frac{\partial \underline{Q}_r}{\partial a} < 0$. Intuitively, if renewables are more reliable, less capacities are needed to completely replace fossils.

Using this result, we can now show that $\partial \underline{\beta}_r / \partial a > 0$ as stated in the proposition. For any value a of the reliability parameter, consider an $a' > a$. By construction, we compare situations where $Q_f(a') = 0$ and $Q_f(a) = 0$. By contradiction, suppose that $\underline{\beta}_r(a') \leq \underline{\beta}_r(a)$. If the original level of renewable capacities were installed, i.e., $Q_r = \underline{Q}_r(a)$, then renewable firms would obviously make positive profits because renewable capacities are (weakly) cheaper and more reliable, while fossil capacities are still zero. This would lead to entry so that renewable capacities *increase*. However, we know from the above that $\underline{Q}_r(a') < \underline{Q}_r(a)$, a contradiction. Thus, we conclude that $\partial \underline{\beta}_r / \partial a > 0$.

It remains to prove the results regarding leapfrogging, which involves the calculation of a^L and a^H . In diffusion stage F , fossils are obviously the price-setting technology, and the price must exceed the variable costs of fossils so as to finance capacity investments. From Proposition 2, renewables enter the market as β_r falls below $\bar{\beta}_r = \frac{1+a}{2}(b_f - b_r + \beta_f)$. From Proposition 4, we know that the process of market penetration is continuous. Hence, for a marginal reduction of β_r below the level $\bar{\beta}_r$, fossils still remain the price-setting technology for all σ . Thus only case 1 obtains, which characterizes diffusion stage V (see Figure 1 and the table below Figure 2). Accordingly, stage V always obtains as capacity costs fall from β_r to $\underline{\beta}_r$, independent of the value of a .

Next, diffusion stage V changes over to stage L at (see Section 6.1 after Lemma 1)

$$\sigma' = \frac{A - \gamma b_f - Q_f}{Q_r} = 1. \quad (35)$$

Together with the binding first-order condition for Q_f and Q_r , (14) and (15), this defines Q_f^{VL} , Q_r^{VL} and β^{VL} as a function of a , where superscript VL marks the transition from stage V to stage L . However, stage L does not obtain if $\beta^{VL} \leq \underline{\beta}_r$ because in this case renewables have captured the complete market before stage L is reached. Suppose that capacity costs of renewables have fallen to $\underline{\beta}_r$, and remember that at $\underline{\beta}_r$ the first-order condition (14) binds at $Q_f = 0$. This together with evaluating (35) at $Q_f = 0$ can be solved for the critical value, denoted a^L , for which $\beta_r^{VL} = \underline{\beta}_r$ obtains. As higher values of a raise the competitiveness of renewables, stage L will obtain for $a < a^L$, and stage L will be leapfrogged—i.e., stage V is directly followed by stage R —if $a \geq a^L$. Solving (35) for Q_r and substitution into (14), both at $Q_f = 0$, thereby using $\sigma' = 1$, yields:

$$\begin{aligned} \int_a^1 ((A - \gamma b_f)(1 - \sigma)) d\sigma - (1 - a^L) \gamma \beta_f &= 0 \\ (A - \gamma b_f) \left(\frac{1}{2} - a^L + \frac{1}{2} (a^L)^2 \right) - (1 - a^L) \gamma \beta_f &= 0 \\ \frac{A - \gamma b_f - \gamma \beta_f}{A - \gamma b_f} \pm \frac{\gamma \beta_f}{A - \gamma b_f} &= a^L. \end{aligned} \quad (36)$$

If the +sign were correct, then we would get $a^L = 1$, which is excluded by the assumption of intermittent supply. Thus,

$$a^L = \frac{A - \gamma b_f - 2\gamma \beta_f}{A - \gamma b_f} < 1.$$

Moreover, for

$$\beta_f \geq \frac{A - \gamma b_f}{2\gamma} \quad (37)$$

we get $a^L \leq 0$, so that stages L , M and H are leapfrogged for all values of $a > 0$ if β_f and b_f are sufficiently large (see 37).²¹

²¹ Observe that (37) does not violate Assumption 1, which requires that $\beta_f < \frac{A - \gamma b_f}{\gamma}$. Moreover, remember

Next, diffusion stage L changes over to stage M at

$$\sigma'' = \frac{A - \gamma b_f}{Q_r} = 1. \quad (38)$$

At $Q_f = 0$, we have $\sigma'' = \sigma'$. It follows immediately that $a^M = a^L$, where a^M is defined (equivalently to a^L) as the critical reliability value for which $\beta_r^{LM} = \underline{\beta}_r$ obtains. Thus, if stage M is leapfrogged, then also the preceding stage L is leapfrogged.

Finally, diffusion stage M changes over to stage H at

$$\sigma''' = \frac{A - \gamma b_r}{Q_r} = 1. \quad (39)$$

Solving this for Q_r and substitution into (14) at $Q_f = 0$ —i.e., using the same steps as above—yields (defining a^H as the critical reliability value for which $\beta_r^{MH} = \underline{\beta}_r$ obtains)

$$\begin{aligned} \int_a^{\frac{A-\gamma b_f}{A-\gamma b_r}} (A - \gamma b_f - \sigma(A - \gamma b_r)) d\sigma - (1 - a^H) \gamma \beta_f &= 0 \\ \frac{(A - \gamma b_f)^2}{2(A - \gamma b_r)} - a^H (A - \gamma b_f) + \frac{1}{2} (A - \gamma b_r) (a^H)^2 - (1 - a^H) \gamma \beta_f &= 0 \\ \frac{A - \gamma b_f - \gamma \beta_f}{A - \gamma b_r} \pm \frac{\gamma}{A - \gamma b_r} \sqrt{2\beta_f (b_f - b_r) + \beta_f^2} &= a^H. \end{aligned} \quad (40)$$

Observe that the root-term is larger than β_f . Thus, if the +sign were correct, we would get $a^H > \frac{A - \gamma b_f}{A - \gamma b_r} = \sigma'$, where the last step follows from $Q_r^{MH} = A - \gamma b_r$ and the definition of σ' . However, values of $a > \sigma'$ are in contradiction to Lemma 1. Therefore, we get

$$a^H = \frac{A - \gamma b_f - \gamma \beta_f - \gamma \sqrt{2\beta_f (b_f - b_r) + \beta_f^2}}{A - \gamma b_r} < 1. \quad (41)$$

Comparing terms, it follows immediately that $a^H < a^M = a^L$. This simply reflects that higher reliability levels are required in order to leapfrog more than the last diffusion stage H .²²

E Proof of Proposition 6

Consider a price cap $p_c \in \left(b_f + \beta_f, \frac{A - aQ_r - Q_f}{\gamma}\right)$, i.e., a cap above the long-run marginal costs of fossils and below the maximum price that would obtain in the unregulated market. From the discussion in the main text, the cap binds for all $\sigma < \sigma_c = \frac{A - \gamma p_c - Q_f}{Q_r}$. Substituting the

that the preceding calculations were based on the assumption that capacity costs of renewables have fallen to $\underline{\beta}_r$, which in turn depends on β_f . Thus it is indeed the combination of the capacity costs of fossils and renewables that determines whether leapfrogging occurs.

²² The numerator in (41) is decreasing in β_f . Hence there will again be a critical level such that if β_f falls below this level, then $a^H \leq 0$, so that stage H is leapfrogged for all values of $a > 0$. As above, this critical level obtains from setting the numerator of (41) equal to zero, but the expression cannot be solved nicely for β_f .

lower and upper value from the admissible range of the price cap, it follows immediately that $a \leq \sigma_c < \sigma'$. Thus, when accounting for the price cap, the first-order conditions (14) and (15) for optimal capacity choices become (superscript c denotes welfare with a price cap)

$$W_{Q_f}^c := \int_a^{\sigma_c} (p_c - b_f) dF(\sigma) + \int_{\sigma_c}^{\sigma'} (p_1(\sigma) - b_f) dF(\sigma) - \beta_f = 0, \quad (42)$$

$$\begin{aligned} W_{Q_r}^c &:= \int_a^{\sigma_c} (p_c - b_r) \sigma dF(\sigma) + \int_{\sigma_c}^{\sigma'} (p_1(\sigma) - b_r) \sigma dF(\sigma) \\ &\quad + \int_{\sigma'}^{\sigma''} (p_2(\sigma) - b_r) \sigma dF(\sigma) + \int_{\sigma''}^{\sigma'''} (p_3(\sigma) - b_r) \sigma dF(\sigma) - \beta_r = 0. \end{aligned} \quad (43)$$

This takes into account that the proposition relates to diffusion stage FR where both conditions bind. We need to show that the level of renewable (fossil) capacities is rising (falling) in the level of price cap. Since capacities without price caps are efficient, this immediately implies $Q_r^c > Q_r^*$, $Q_f^c < Q_f^*$. Applying the implicit function theorem yields

$$\begin{pmatrix} \frac{\partial Q_r^c}{\partial p_c} \\ \frac{\partial Q_f^c}{\partial p_c} \end{pmatrix} = -\frac{1}{\frac{\partial W_{Q_r}^c}{\partial Q_r} \frac{\partial W_{Q_f}^c}{\partial Q_f} - \frac{\partial W_{Q_r}^c}{\partial Q_f} \frac{\partial W_{Q_f}^c}{\partial Q_r}} \begin{pmatrix} \frac{\partial W_{Q_r}^c}{\partial p_c} \frac{\partial W_{Q_f}^c}{\partial Q_f} - \frac{\partial W_{Q_f}^c}{\partial p_c} \frac{\partial W_{Q_r}^c}{\partial Q_f} \\ \frac{\partial W_{Q_r}^c}{\partial Q_r} \frac{\partial W_{Q_f}^c}{\partial p_c} - \frac{\partial W_{Q_f}^c}{\partial Q_r} \frac{\partial W_{Q_r}^c}{\partial p_c} \end{pmatrix}. \quad (44)$$

The partial derivatives on the right-hand side follow from differentiation of the first-order conditions (42) and (43). Doing so for capacity levels, thereby using the same steps as in Appendix C and the fact that $p_1(\sigma_c) = p_c$, yields

$$\frac{\partial W_{Q_f}^c}{\partial Q_f} = -\frac{1}{\gamma} \int_{\sigma_c}^{\sigma'} dF(\sigma) < 0, \quad (45)$$

$$\frac{\partial W_{Q_f}^c}{\partial Q_r} = -\frac{1}{\gamma} \int_{\sigma_c}^{\sigma'} \sigma dF(\sigma) < 0, \quad (46)$$

$$\frac{\partial W_{Q_r}^c}{\partial Q_f} = -\frac{1}{\gamma} \int_{\sigma_c}^{\sigma'} \sigma dF(\sigma) = \frac{\partial W_{Q_f}^c}{\partial Q_r} < 0, \quad (47)$$

$$\frac{\partial W_{Q_r}^c}{\partial Q_r} = -\frac{1}{\gamma} \int_{\sigma_c}^{\sigma'} \sigma^2 dF(\sigma) - \frac{1}{\gamma} \int_{\sigma''}^{\sigma'''} \sigma^2 dF(\sigma) < 0. \quad (48)$$

Obviously, these terms are the same as those in Appendix C, apart from the adjustment of the range of the intervals that now start at σ_c rather than at a . In addition, differentiation of the first-order conditions with respect to the price cap yields (note that $p_c = p_1(\sigma_c)$ by definition of σ_c so that the effects via σ_c at the borders of the integrals cancel out)

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{\partial W_{Q_f}^c}{\partial p_c} &= \int_a^{\sigma_c} dF(\sigma) > 0, \\ \frac{\partial W_{Q_r}^c}{\partial p_c} &= \int_a^{\sigma_c} \sigma dF(\sigma) > 0. \end{aligned}$$

Assuming a uniform distribution, $\int_{\sigma_c}^{\sigma'} dF(\sigma) = \frac{\sigma' - \sigma_c}{1-a}$, $\int_{\sigma_c}^{\sigma'} \sigma dF(\sigma) = (\sigma'^2 - \sigma_c^2) \frac{1}{2(1-a)}$, $\int_{\sigma_c}^{\sigma'} \sigma^2 dF(\sigma) = (\sigma'^3 - \sigma_c^3) \frac{1}{3(1-a)}$, $\int_{\sigma_c}^{\sigma'} \sigma^3 dF(\sigma) = (\sigma'^4 - \sigma_c^4) \frac{1}{4(1-a)}$, $\int_a^{\sigma_c} dF(\sigma) = \frac{\sigma_c - a}{1-a}$ and $\int_a^{\sigma_c} \sigma dF(\sigma) = (\sigma_c^2 - a^2) \frac{1}{2(1-a)}$. Collecting terms and rearranging, we get

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{\partial W_{Q_r}^c}{\partial Q_r} \frac{\partial W_{Q_f}^c}{\partial Q_f} - \frac{\partial W_{Q_r}^c}{\partial Q_f} \frac{\partial W_{Q_f}^c}{\partial Q_r} &= \frac{(\sigma' - \sigma_c) [4(\sigma''^3 - \sigma''^2) + (\sigma' - \sigma_c)^3]}{12\gamma^2 (1-a)^2} > 0, \\ \frac{\partial W_{Q_r}^c}{\partial p_c} \frac{\partial W_{Q_f}^c}{\partial Q_f} - \frac{\partial W_{Q_f}^c}{\partial p_c} \frac{\partial W_{Q_r}^c}{\partial Q_f} &= \frac{(\sigma' - \sigma_c)(\sigma_c - a)(\sigma' - a)}{2\gamma(1-a)^2} > 0, \\ \frac{\partial W_{Q_r}^c}{\partial Q_r} \frac{\partial W_{Q_f}^c}{\partial p_c} - \frac{\partial W_{Q_f}^c}{\partial Q_r} \frac{\partial W_{Q_r}^c}{\partial p_c} &= \frac{(\sigma_c - a) [(\sigma' - \sigma_c)(3a\sigma' + 3a\sigma_c - 4\sigma'^2 - \sigma_c^2 - \sigma'\sigma_c) - 4(\sigma''^3 - \sigma''^2)]}{12\gamma(1-a)^2} < 0. \end{aligned}$$

Substitution into (44) yields $\partial Q_r^c / \partial p_c < 0$ and $\partial Q_f^c / \partial p_c > 0$. Finally, this immediately implies that the level of capacity costs, $\underline{\beta}_r$, at which renewables completely replace fossils in the competitive solution, is larger the stricter the price cap (remember that $\underline{\beta}_r$ is the level of renewable capacity costs at which the level of fossil capacities has just fallen to 0).

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