

Petkova, Kunka; Weichenrieder, Alfons

Conference Paper

Price and Quantity Effects of the German Real Estate Transfer Tax

Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2017: Alternative Geld- und Finanzarchitekturen - Session: Postersession, No. P00-V14

Provided in Cooperation with:

Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association

Suggested Citation: Petkova, Kunka; Weichenrieder, Alfons (2017) : Price and Quantity Effects of the German Real Estate Transfer Tax, Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2017: Alternative Geld- und Finanzarchitekturen - Session: Postersession, No. P00-V14, ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Kiel, Hamburg

This Version is available at:

<https://hdl.handle.net/10419/168305>

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:

Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.

Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.

Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte.

Terms of use:

Documents in EconStor may be saved and copied for your personal and scholarly purposes.

You are not to copy documents for public or commercial purposes, to exhibit the documents publicly, to make them publicly available on the internet, or to distribute or otherwise use the documents in public.

If the documents have been made available under an Open Content Licence (especially Creative Commons Licences), you may exercise further usage rights as specified in the indicated licence.

Price and Quantity Effects of the German Real Estate Transfer Tax

by

Kunka Petkova*

(Vienna University of Economics and Business)

and

Alfons J. Weichenrieder#

(Goethe University Frankfurt, Vienna University of Economics and Business &
CESifo)

This version: 9 February 2017

Abstract

The paper analyzes the tax effects of the German real estate transfer tax (RETT). While in Germany the vast majority of single-family houses are owner occupied, apartments are usually held by private and incorporated investors. For this reason, our empirical regressions deal with the number and the prices of transactions separately for these two market segments. Our findings suggest that, for single-family houses, the RETT leads to an elasticity of transactions of -0.23, but the RETT has no significant effect on the prices of the traded houses. Conversely, for apartments, we find no significant effects on the transactions, but the price effect of the RETT tends to be negative.

Keywords: real estate transaction tax, stamp duty, housing market, taxation, financial transaction tax

JEL classification: H24, R21

Addresses of authors

Kunka Petkova
Vienna University of Economics
and Business
Doctoral Program in International
Business Taxation (DIBT)
1020 Vienna
kunka.petkova@gmail.com

Alfons J. Weichenrieder
Goethe University Frankfurt
Faculty of Economics and Business
Administration
60323 Frankfurt (Main)
a.weichenrieder@em.uni-frankfurt.de

*Financial support by the Austrian Science Fund (FWF): W1235-G16 is gratefully acknowledged.

#We appreciate the provision of data on price and quantity indices for housing transactions by GEWOS GmbH, Hamburg and thank Sylwia Bialek and Grant Scobie and Sebastian Wunsch for helpful discussions.

1 Introduction

While taxes on the transfers of housing properties are pervasive around the world, until recently, the economic effects of these taxes have received only limited attention by economists (Dachis et al., 2011).¹ At the same time, real estate transfer taxes (RETTs) may have obvious negative effects on the efficiency of the housing market and may reduce the number of mutually beneficial transactions. As the tax can be avoided by not selling a presently owned property and buying a different house, the tax is expected to lead to a fall in transactions, a reduction of mobility of homeowners, and may bias homeownership away from frequent movers towards infrequent movers (O’Sullivan et al., 1995). Even for immobile owners, the tax may lock-in owners into dwellings that do not fit their preferences. For example, the tax may prevent that large houses are made available for large families by older couples and singles with a reduced demand for space.²

However, a RETT does not only affect transactions of owner-occupied housings. In several countries, including Germany, the tax will also fall on ownership changes of property that is rented out and held as a capital investment. In this case, the tax will not reduce the mobility of the respective dwellers, i.e. the tenants. Indeed, frequent movers may exactly self-select into the rental market to avoid transfer taxes. Instead, the transfer tax in this situation may be considered as a specific financial transaction tax that reduces the fungibility of the asset, but not worker mobility. Empirically, the average holding period of apartments, which are usually rented-out, at least in Germany, is shorter than the holding period of houses that are usually owner occupied.³ Hence, the asset fungibility problem should therefore be more salient in the case of apartments. As a result, if fungibility is more highly valued in the case of apartments than in the case of

¹ For an overview of land transfer taxes in the EU, see European Commission (2015, chap. 3.2).

² According to survey evidence provided by Sánchez and Andrews (2011, p. 15), family and housing related motives are behind most cases of residential mobility in many developed countries.

³ For the different ratios of transactions and the stock of houses and apartments see, e.g., Deutsche Bundesbank (2015).

houses, then a high transfer tax rate should tend to reduce asset values of apartments more than this applies in the case of single-family houses.

Indeed, a major distinction between single-family houses and apartments is connected to ownership. While some 81% of the families that are living in owner-occupied housing own a single-family house (i.e., a house with just one housing unit), only some 19% live in an apartment.⁴ At the same time, single-family houses make up for less than a third of all German housing units. This suggests that, unlike single-family houses, the vast majority of apartments are held as a form of capital investment.⁵

From the above discussion, one may expect that an increase of a RETT may lead to a fall in transactions and a reduction in prices, where the latter effect, because of higher turnover rates, may be higher for apartments than for houses.

In this paper, we will look for such price and quantity effects of the RETT in the German housing market. Until 2006, there was a tax rate of 3.5% on the purchase price of German real estate (*Grunderwerbsteuer*) that was uniformly applied in all states (Bundesländer), although the revenues accrue to the state in which the transaction takes place. Since 2006, the RETT is no longer set at the federal level. Instead, each of the 16 German states is not only entitled to receive the tax revenue, but may decide on its own individual rate. The current level of the land transfer tax in Germany varies between 3.5% and 6.5%.

Our panel data regressions exploit these state differences and look at the tax effects on the index of state-wide indices of housing transactions and transaction prices. Our findings can be summarized as follows. For single-family houses, we find that a one percent increase of the tax rate leads to a fall of some 0.23 percent in the number of transactions. At the same time, there is an insignificant effect on transaction prices. Conversely, for apartments, the effect of

⁴ Statista (2016).

⁵ It should be noted that a RETT is also triggered by direct or indirect transfers of at least 95% of the interest in a partnership or of shares in a company owning real estate in Germany.⁵ The tax can be avoided if only 94.9% are sold to a single buyer or by having the shareholder either keep the remaining 5.1% or sell it to a second one not connected to the other shareholder.

a tax increase is insignificant when it comes to the number of transactions, but there tends to be a negative effect when we look at transaction prices. These differences between types of dwellings, to the best of our knowledge, have not received attention in the literature. They may reflect that, more than in the case of single-family houses, apartments may be viewed as capital investments where an increase in the transaction tax leads to a loss of asset value due to reduced fungibility.

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a literature review of recent papers on the economic effects of RETTs. Section 3 provides an introduction to the effect of transaction taxes on asset values. Section 4 contains our empirical results before Section 5 concludes.

2 Literature Review

While for a long time RETTs have been largely neglected, there is a recent wave of papers looking at the empirical effects in various countries.

Many of the studies rely on panel data with different tax changes in different regions of a country. Dachis, Duranton and Turner (2008) analyze the impact of the introduction of a 1.1% land transfer tax in Toronto that did not apply in the surrounding region. They find that the introduction of the tax resulted in a 16% fall in housing sales and a 1.5% reduction in housing values. Davidoff and Leigh (2013) estimate that the Australian stamp tax on house sales lowers house prices with a tax elasticity around 0.26 and reduces housing turnover with an elasticity of 0.3.

There is also a quickly growing literature that uses tax notches, i.e. discontinuities in the tax schedule, for the identification of tax effects.⁶ Most of these studies find significant effects of RETTs on the transaction volume in the market.

Despite the fact that for ten years now the German tax rates are regionally differentiated, there has been only limited research on the

⁶ See Hilber and Lyytikäinen (2013), Best and Kleven (2013), Kopczuk and Munroe (2015), Besley et al. (2014), Slemrod et al. (2016).

empirical effects of the German RETT. Fritzsche and Vandrei (2016) look at single-family home transactions in selected German states. Their estimates suggest that a one-percentage-point increase in the RETT reduces transactions by 6%. In a recent discussion paper, Büttner (2016) looks at the tax rate elasticity of tax revenues and finds that across the German federal states a one percent tax increase leads to significantly less than a one percent increase in revenue, which is interpreted as evidence for behavioral effects and a sizable excess burden.

While the present paper is certainly not the first paper that looks at the behavioral effects of a RETT, to the best of our knowledge it is the first that distinguishes between prices and transactions for apartments and single-family homes and uses a new data source that has not previously been used to study tax effects.

At least for the German housing market, the distinction between apartments and single-family homes is potentially very important. As highlighted above, the rate of self-occupancy is much different for these two housing categories. While transaction taxes therefore may reduce labor mobility or increase commuting when applied to single-family homes, the main effect for apartments may be a reduced asset fungibility. Thus, the next section provides a short introduction into the relevant theory of transaction taxes.

3 Transaction Taxes and Asset Values

Transaction taxes are not only prominent when it comes to property sales. They have recently also received large attention in connection to the plans for a EU-wide financial transaction tax. The literature on financial transaction costs argues that such costs may not only reduce the number of trades, but also asset prices.⁷ Clearly, transaction taxes are part of the transaction costs. The insight that a transaction tax can be expected to decrease asset values, however, is

⁷ See Amihud and Mendelson (1986).

not restricted to financial assets but extends to real assets that are subject to a transaction tax in the case of an ownership change.⁸

Following Matheson (2011, 2012), assume that an asset produces a real cash flow, say a net rental income, of CF_t at time t , that for simplicity may be assumed to grow at an exogenous rate g and is discounted at an exogenous interest rate $r > g$. Each time the asset changes owner, an ad valorem tax at rate T has to be paid on the transaction. If the holding period of each owner of the asset is constant and denoted by N , then the tax inclusive price at time 0 that a purchaser may pay the incumbent owner can be written as

$$V(0) = \int_0^N CF_t \cdot e^{-(r-g)t} dt + (1 - T)e^{-rN}V(N). \quad (1)$$

In such a simple framework, it can be shown (Matheson, 2011, p. 39-41) that the proportional reduction of the tax inclusive purchase price can be expressed as

$$\Delta V(T) = \frac{T e^{-(r-g)N}}{1 - (1-T)e^{-(r-g)N}}. \quad (2)$$

Table 1 illustrates this result for $r - g = 1\%$ and different holding periods N . Clearly, the shorter the holding period, the larger the negative impact of a given tax rate on the transaction price. We will come back to this insight in the empirical section below.

Another observation that may be highlighted is that the price fall described by equation (2) is triggered even with a constant holding period N . This in turn implies that a price decrease may not necessarily require a reduction in transaction volume, which would be reflected in longer holding periods.

⁸ A distinct issue is that in both markets (housing, financial assets) there is the question whether a transaction tax can reduce market bubbles. We do not embark on this question here.

Table 1. The Interplay of Holding Period and Proportional Reduction of Asset Value

| Holding Period (years) | 5 | 10 | 30 | 100 |
|------------------------|--------|--------|--------|-------|
| Tax rate 3% | | | | |
| $\Delta V(3\%)$ | 36.91% | 22.19% | 7.90% | 1.72% |
| Tax rate 6% | | | | |
| $\Delta V(6\%)$ | 53.92% | 36.33% | 14.64% | 3.37% |

Note: Based on equation (2) and $r - g = 0.01$. For a similar table adapted to holding periods and tax rates of financial securities cf. Matheson (2012).

Several authors have been surprised by their large estimated tax effects, which sometimes suggest that a one euro increase in the land transfer tax leads to a more than a one euro drop in house transaction prices (see, e.g., Davidoff and Leigh, 2013, p. 403; Kopczuk and Munroe 2015; Ihlanfeldt and Shaughnessy, 2004). The tax capitalization effects illustrated in Table 1 are a potential explanation for these findings. As a once and for all tax increase will affect all future transactions, capitalization effects may well exceed the tax due on a single transaction today, in particular, if the average holding period of real estate is short.

4 Empirical Results

In this section, we use the panel variation of RETT rates across German states to evaluate their impact separately on transactions and prices of housing units. Table 2 illustrates the development after the decentralization of the tax rate decision, following a constitutional change enacted in 2006.⁹ Since then, only two states (Bavaria and Saxony) have kept the initial rate of 3.5%. All other states have raised the tax rate at least once. The tax rate in all countries is applied on the transaction value as fixed in the contract drawn up before a notary. Formally, the buyer of the property is required to pay the tax and the change of ownership is pending until the tax payment has been received. While the decision on tax rates has been decentralized, all states have to follow the same definition of the tax base.

⁹ *Gesetz zur Änderung des Grundgesetzes*, 28 August 2006 (BGBl. I 2006, p. 2034).

Table 2. German RETT Rates in Percent of Purchase Price

| Year | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 |
|------------------------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| Baden-Württemberg | 3.5 | 3.5 | 3.5 | 3.5 | 3.5 | 3.5 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 5 |
| Bavaria | 3.5 | 3.5 | 3.5 | 3.5 | 3.5 | 3.5 | 3.5 | 3.5 | 3.5 | 3.5 | 3.5 |
| Berlin | 3.5 | 3.5 | 4.5 | 4.5 | 4.5 | 4.5 | 4.5 | 5 | 5 | 6 | 6 |
| Brandenburg | 3.5 | 3.5 | 3.5 | 3.5 | 3.5 | 3.5 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 6.5 |
| Bremen | 3.5 | 3.5 | 3.5 | 3.5 | 3.5 | 3.5 | 4.5 | 4.5 | 4.5 | 5 | 5 |
| Hamburg | 3.5 | 3.5 | 3.5 | 3.5 | 4.5 | 4.5 | 4.5 | 4.5 | 4.5 | 4.5 | 4.5 |
| Hesse | 3.5 | 3.5 | 3.5 | 3.5 | 3.5 | 3.5 | 3.5 | 3.5 | 5 | 6 | 6 |
| Mecklenburg-Vorpommern | 3.5 | 3.5 | 3.5 | 3.5 | 3.5 | 3.5 | 3.5 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 5 |
| Lower Saxony | 3.5 | 3.5 | 3.5 | 3.5 | 3.5 | 3.5 | 4.5 | 4.5 | 4.5 | 5 | 5 |
| North Rhine-Westphalia | 3.5 | 3.5 | 3.5 | 3.5 | 3.5 | 3.5 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 6.5 |
| Rhineland-Palatinate | 3.5 | 3.5 | 3.5 | 3.5 | 3.5 | 3.5 | 3.5 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 5 |
| Saarland | 3.5 | 3.5 | 3.5 | 3.5 | 3.5 | 3.5 | 3.5 | 4.5 | 5.5 | 5.5 | 6.5 |
| Saxony | 3.5 | 3.5 | 3.5 | 3.5 | 3.5 | 3.5 | 3.5 | 3.5 | 3.5 | 3.5 | 3.5 |
| Saxony-Anhalt | 3.5 | 3.5 | 3.5 | 3.5 | 3.5 | 4.5 | 4.5 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 5 |
| Schleswig-Holstein | 3.5 | 3.5 | 3.5 | 3.5 | 3.5 | 3.5 | 3.5 | 5 | 5 | 6.5 | 6.5 |
| Thuringia | 3.5 | 3.5 | 3.5 | 3.5 | 3.5 | 3.5 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 5 |
| Average Tax Rate | 3.5 | 3.5 | 3.6 | 3.6 | 3.6 | 3.7 | 4.2 | 4.6 | 4.8 | 5.0 | 5.3 |

Note: Tax rates are shown as applicable in January of the respective year.

4.1 Price and Quantity Effects

In the following, we make use of indices of property transactions and average purchase prices that have been generated at the state level. The data on the real estate transactions for the period between 2003 and 2014 for all 16 federal states in Germany is proprietary data that have been provided by GEWOS GmbH, Hamburg. The transactions are divided into two groups: single-family homes and apartments.¹⁰ The base year, 2003 has an index of 100 in all states. The number of property transactions in the following years has been compared to this base year and adjusted accordingly. For the estimation of the price effects, we use the average purchase prices (given in €1.000) of single-family homes and apartments for the period between 2003 and 2014 as provided by Statista.

Using the GEWOS index of transaction numbers, we exploit a panel data structure. Table 3 presents the results that are separately calculated for the index of single-family homes and apartments. We rely on a log-log specification where the coefficient of the tax rate

¹⁰ In German: *Einfamilienhäuser* and *Eigentumswohnungen*.

variable, $\text{Ln}(\text{tax rate})$ can be interpreted as the elasticity of transaction numbers with respect to a change in the tax rate. Column (1) starts with a parsimonious model for single-family houses that contains state fixed effects, density dependent time fixed effects (as explained below), and the log of the tax rate. For selected years, in which the tax rate was changed within a calendar year, we are using the average rate with the length of the respective rate applicability as the weighting factors. A possible problem that could arise is that tax changes are anticipated and may lead to transactions being pulled forward in time to avoid tax increases. Such effects may blow up the tax base in a year preceding a tax increase and lower it in the year of the increase. For this reason, we designed two variables that are designed to pick up possible time shifts. $D(\text{Year before tax increase})$ is constructed with the help of a dummy that indicates state-years that precede a tax increase in January of the next year. The relevant dummy has been multiplied with the tax increase. Likewise, $D(\text{Year of tax increase})$ marks state-years with a tax increase in January and is also scaled by the tax increase.

Several tax increases did not take place at the start of the year, but somewhere during the year. In this case, the average tax rate may exaggerate the effective tax if tax payers shift transactions into the more lowly taxed part of the same year. For this reason, we construct a variable $D(\text{Within year increase})$ that is positive only in state-years with a tax change between February and November of the calendar year.¹¹ Again, this variable incorporates also the size of the tax increase.

While all estimations of Table 3 allow for time-fixed effects, there is the possibility that time-trends for the property market are different for urban and more rural states. For this reason, we additionally allow time-fixed effects to differ between two groups of states.¹²

¹¹ Since empirical evidence with selected micro data (Fritzsche and Vandrei, 2016) suggests that anticipation effects in Germany are short-lived and seem to be restricted to a time window of approximately two months before and after the tax hike, we decided to encode $D_{i,t-1}(\text{Year before tax increase}) = D_{i,t}(\text{Year of tax increase}) = 0$ in the case of a tax increase in the middle of year t .

¹² Based on a threshold of 70% of space with sparse population according to the German Statistical Office, we classified six states as "rural" (Bavaria, Brandenburg, Rhineland-Palatinate, Saxony-Anhalt, Schleswig-Holstein and Thuringia).

Table 3. Elasticity of Transactions

| | Single-family Houses | | | | | | Apartments | | | | | |
|---------------------------------------|----------------------|---------------------|---------------------|--------------------|---------------------|---------------------|------------------|--------------------|-------------------|--------------------|--------------------|---------------------|
| | (1) FE, OLS | (2) FE, OLS | (3) FE, OLS | (4) FE, OLS | (5) FE, OLS | (6) FE, Poisson | (7) FE, OLS | (8) FE, OLS | (9) FE, OLS | (10) FE, OLS | (11) FE, OLS | (12) FE, Poisson |
| Ln(Tax rate) | -0.231 [0.000]** | -0.191 [0.003]** | -0.219 [0.002]** | -0.167 [0.018]* | -0.227 [0.000]** | -0.228 [0.000]** | 0.064 [0.584] | 0.172 [0.212] | 0.115 [0.362] | 0.262 [0.034]* | 0.182 [0.164] | 0.187 [0.053] |
| D(Year before tax increase) | | 3.41 [0.047]* | | 3.397 [0.051] | 4.212 [0.006]** | 4.416 [0.000]** | | 9.308 [0.000]** | | 9.204 [0.001]** | 9.546 [0.000]** | 10.25 [0.000]** |
| D(Year of tax increase) | | -0.752 [0.589] | | -1.032 [0.527] | -1.024 [0.434] | -1.136 [0.312] | | -1.868 [0.662] | | -2.943 [0.392] | -1.218 [0.733] | -1.297 [0.699] |
| D(Within year increase) | | 0.025 [0.262] | | 0.03 [0.159] | 0.026 [0.143] | 0.025 [0.039]* | | 0.059 [0.145] | | 0.065 [0.080] | 0.068 [0.024]* | 0.077 [0.005]** |
| Ln(GDP) | | | -0.139 [0.676] | -0.176 [0.595] | 0.006 [0.982] | -0.02 [0.964] | | | 0.608 [0.305] | 0.515 [0.335] | 0.444 [0.299] | 0.489 [0.235] |
| Ln(l.Debt) | | | 0.013 [0.532] | 0.004 [0.845] | -0.001 [0.964] | -0.001 [0.972] | | | 0.015 [0.805] | -0.007 [0.909] | -0.027 [0.542] | -0.019 [0.584] |
| Ln(Population) | | | -0.185 [0.684] | -0.306 [0.516] | 0.428 [0.279] | 0.355 [0.535] | | | 0.42 [0.606] | 0.098 [0.900] | -0.699 [0.392] | -0.887 [0.262] |
| Ln(AL) | | | -0.108 [0.357] | -0.113 [0.342] | 0.115 [0.290] | 0.103 [0.440] | | | -0.205 [0.287] | -0.221 [0.239] | -0.408 [0.061] | -0.421 [0.028]* |
| Observations | 192 | 192 | 185 | 185 | 185 | 185 | 192 | 192 | 185 | 185 | 185 | 185 |
| State fixed effects | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Density dep. year fixed effects | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| City-state year fixed effects | NO | NO | NO | NO | Yes | Yes | NO | NO | NO | NO | Yes | Yes |
| R-squared States (Bundesländer) | 0.73 | 0.739 | 0.748 | 0.758 | 0.822 | -- | 0.809 | 0.825 | 0.827 | 0.843 | 0.866 | -- |

Note: Endogenous variable: log of index of housing transactions (2003-2014). Robust p-values in brackets. ** and * denote significance at the 1 and 5 percent confidence level. D(Year before tax increase) is the product of a dummy that indicates state-years that precede a tax increase in January of the next year and the size of the tax increase. D(Year of tax increase) marks state-years with a tax increase in January and is also scaled by the tax increase. D(Within year increase) is zero in state year without a tax change between February and November of the calendar year, but reflects the size of the tax increase otherwise. LnGDP, Ln(l.Debt), Ln(Population), and Ln(AL) represent the log of GDP, the log of the lagged debt level, the log of the population and the log of unemployed for the respective state.

According to the results from the parsimonious model presented in Column (1), the number of transactions goes down by 0.23% if the tax rate is increased by 1%. This implies that, for example, a tax increase from 3.5 percentage points to 5 percentage points (i.e., a 42% tax increase) should reduce transactions by $0.23 \times 42.9\% = 9.9\%$.

The next three models, which add variables that may capture anticipation effects and the local macroeconomic conditions, yield comparable magnitudes. Of these additional variables, only D(Year before tax increase), which captures additional transactions in the year preceding a tax increase, is significant. Columns (3) to (6) include essential macro variables like the log of GDP, the log of unemployed, and the log of state population that, however, do not turn out significant.

A possible variable that may drive both the tax base of the RETT and the decision to enact a tax increase is the debt level of the state. The debt level may decrease property values and may, as a result, influence purchases through the expectations of future tax increases and the respective tax capitalization. At the same time, it is the case that especially the particularly high indebted states have increased the tax rate, while the two most prudent low-debt states Saxony and Bavaria have been the only states that have kept the initial tax rate of 3.5%. Ignorance of the debt level could potentially lead to an omitted variables bias, as the debt level could both influence the decision to enact tax increases and the attractiveness of the property market. The introduction of the log of last year's debt level, $\text{Ln}(1.\text{Debt})$, however does not yield a significant coefficient. Presumably, the mere state-fixed effects are enough to pick up debt differences across states and reduce the significance of state specific macro variables.

Columns (5) and (6) use the same right-hand variables, but, as a further robustness test, add specific time fixed effects for the three city-states (Berlin, Bremen and Hamburg), as for those, the development of the housing market may differ beyond what the simple density-dependent time effects can pick up.

While, particularly for our single-family houses regressions, a Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg test does usually not reject the null

that errors are homoscedastic, we are aware that our log-log specification may lead to a bias if errors indeed are heteroscedastic.¹³ For this reason, Column (6) presents the results from a fixed-effects Poisson estimator with robust standard errors (Wooldridge 1999). Here, the transaction index has been introduced without taking the log, but the coefficient of the tax rate again can be interpreted as an elasticity. The results confirm the magnitude of the coefficients found in the simple OLS fixed effects estimates and the rounded point estimates of the OLS in Column (5) and the Poisson estimate in (6) are both -0.23 as in the parsimonious regression.

The results for apartments in columns (7) – (12) are quite different from those found for single-family houses. The elasticity here tends to be positive, but insignificant with the exception of column (8), and column (12) where the coefficient is almost significant at the five percent level. Note that in Columns (9) – (12), the macroeconomic variables, $\text{Ln}(\text{GDP})$, $\text{Ln}(\text{l.Debt})$, $\text{Ln}(\text{Population})$, and the log of the number of state unemployed, $\text{Ln}(\text{AL})$, are neither individually nor jointly significant, which indicates no advantage over the more parsimonious models (7) and (8).¹⁴ On the other hand, the rejection of homoscedasticity for Columns (7) – (11) supports using (12) as the preferred specification.

Summary statistics for these and following regressions are presented in Table 4. For clarity, some variables that have been used in log form in the regressions are reported without logs in this summary table.

Taken together, the results in Table 3 suggest that the RETT increases in German states have reduced transactions of single-family homes, but not of apartments. Keeping in mind that most houses are owner-occupied, while apartments are not, this difference in the result has an interesting implication. It means that the RETT has an effect on German housing transactions in precisely that market segment, where the mobility of dwellers may indeed be reduced, i.e., in the segment of owner-occupied family houses. Conversely, for apartments, where labor mobility for the huge majority of tenants would not be

¹³ See Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006).

¹⁴ The insignificance of state GDP may be due to its limited quality. See Burret, Feld and Köhler (2016).

reduced by a reduction of ownership transactions, we find no negative impact of the tax on ownership changes.

Table 4. Summary Statistics

| | Obs | Mean | Std.Dev. | Min | Max |
|------------------------------|-----|-----------|-----------|--------|----------|
| Tax Rate | 192 | 0.0389193 | 0.0065053 | 0.035 | 0.065 |
| GDP (in €1.000.000) | 192 | 158020.5 | 159801 | 24382 | 624668 |
| l.Debt | 186 | 9648.871 | 5527.313 | 1845.8 | 31298.5 |
| AL | 192 | 226573.6 | 190366.7 | 34282 | 1057649 |
| Population | 192 | 5106126 | 4685176 | 652182 | 18100000 |
| Price Houses (in €1.000) | 192 | 157.7307 | 71.95047 | 59.8 | 420.4 |
| Price Apartments (in €1.000) | 192 | 121.2214 | 37.87135 | 55.4 | 295.5 |
| Transaction Index Houses | 192 | 96.86458 | 11.1549 | 67 | 142 |
| Transaction Index Apartments | 192 | 113.7344 | 28.60358 | 76 | 237 |

In a next step, we consider the price component of transactions for houses and apartments. This information is provided on a state-year level online by the German Statistical Office (Destatis). Table 5 collects the relevant results. Again, column (1) starts with a parsimonious OLS model containing state fixed effects, density dependent time fixed effects, and the log of the tax rate.¹⁵ The following three model specifications capture anticipation effects and the local macroeconomic conditions.

In the case of single-family houses, no impact of the RETT can be observed. The insignificance of the tax rate prevails if city-state time effects are added in Column (5) and when the estimation is done via a fixed effects Poisson model in Column (6).

While there is no evidence for a price effect on single-family houses, the RETT tends to have a negative effect on the prices of apartments. This is compatible with the expectation of a capitalization of the tax in the price of the property, as discussed in Section 3. Indeed, we get a negative price effect of the tax in all models (7) to (12), although the coefficient is not significantly negative once we add city-state time effects as done in (11) and (12). However, note that inclusion of

¹⁵ Note that using seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR) to estimate transactions and prices would not improve the efficiency of our estimations, as all regressions are using the same set of regressors. Relatedly, while the markets for apartments and single-family houses are probably interdependent, we cannot identify spillover effects between markets, as the tax rates for apartments and single-family homes are identical in any state-year cells.

density dependent time effects and city-state time effects tends to make it more difficult to identify tax effects, as this inclusion of dummies (although jointly significant) reduces the effective control group for tax increasing states.

Table 5. Price Reactions

| | Single-family Houses | | | | | | Apartments | | | | | |
|------------------------------------|----------------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|--------------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|-----------------|-----------------|---------------------|
| | (1) FE, OLS | (2) FE, OLS | (3) FE, OLS | (4) FE, OLS | (5) FE, OLS | (6) FE, Poisson | (7) FE, OLS | (8) FE, OLS | (9) FE, OLS | (10) FE, OLS | (11) FE, OLS | (12) FE, Poisson |
| Ln(Tax rate) | -0.038 | -0.037 | 0.004 | 0.024 | 0.029 | 0.038 | -0.15 | -0.147 | -0.131 | -0.103 | -0.065 | -0.051 |
| | [0.413] | [0.477] | [0.938] | [0.676] | [0.591] | [0.511] | [0.020]* | [0.037]* | [0.027]* | [0.107] | [0.319] | [0.338] |
| D(Year before tax increase) | | -0.236 | | -0.082 | -0.242 | -0.658 | | -0.98 | | -0.479 | -0.624 | -0.249 |
| | | [0.838] | | [0.936] | [0.790] | [0.544] | | [0.504] | | [0.702] | [0.559] | [0.767] |
| D(Year of tax increase) | | 0.118 | | -0.982 | -0.399 | -0.481 | | -0.477 | | -1.612 | -1.804 | -1.694 |
| | | [0.924] | | [0.473] | [0.767] | [0.687] | | [0.818] | | [0.387] | [0.321] | [0.349] |
| D(Within year increase) | | -0.02 | | -0.015 | -0.01 | -0.021 | | -0.028 | | -0.021 | -0.014 | -0.013 |
| | | [0.358] | | [0.484] | [0.645] | [0.168] | | [0.332] | | [0.358] | [0.606] | [0.492] |
| Ln(GDP) | | | 0.408 | 0.403 | 0.269 | 0.184 | | | 0.556 | 0.547 | 0.563 | 0.409 |
| | | | [0.091] | [0.104] | [0.163] | [0.502] | | | [0.014]* | [0.017]* | [0.016]* | [0.160] |
| Ln(l.Debt) | | | -0.043 | -0.045 | -0.056 | -0.049 | | | -0.055 | -0.06 | -0.084 | -0.08 |
| | | | [0.148] | [0.150] | [0.005]** | [0.052] | | | [0.045]* | [0.029]* | [0.000]** | [0.000]** |
| Ln(Population) | | | 1.074 | 1.057 | 0.299 | 0.435 | | | 0.874 | 0.851 | 0.599 | 0.43 |
| | | | [0.002]** | [0.003]** | [0.309] | [0.380] | | | [0.039]* | [0.047]* | [0.156] | [0.318] |
| Ln(AL) | | | 0.198 | 0.193 | -0.007 | -0.039 | | | 0.409 | 0.401 | 0.371 | 0.326 |
| | | | [0.030]* | [0.033]* | [0.936] | [0.679] | | | [0.000]** | [0.000]** | [0.000]** | [0.000]** |
| Observations | 192 | 192 | 185 | 185 | 185 | 185 | 192 | 192 | 185 | 185 | 185 | 185 |
| State fixed effects | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Density dep. year fixed effects | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| City-state year fixed effects | NO | NO | NO | NO | Yes | Yes | NO | NO | NO | NO | Yes | Yes |
| R-squared | 0.99 | 0.99 | 0.991 | 0.991 | 0.993 | -- | 0.96 | 0.96 | 0.967 | 0.967 | 0.971 | -- |
| States (Bundesländer) | 16 | 16 | 16 | 16 | 16 | 16 | 16 | 16 | 16 | 16 | 16 | 16 |

Note: Endogenous variable: log of index of housing prices (2003-2014). Robust p-values in brackets. ** and * denote significance at the 1 and 5 percent confidence level. D(Year before tax increase) is the product of a dummy that indicates state-years that precede a tax increase in January of the next year and the size of the tax increase. D(Year of tax increase) marks state-years with a tax increase in January and is also scaled by the tax increase. D(Within year increase) is zero in state year without a tax change between February and November of the calendar year, but reflects the size of the tax increase otherwise. LnGDP, Ln(l.Debt), Ln(Population), and Ln(AL) represent the log of GDP, the log of the lagged debt level, the log of the population and the log of unemployed for the respective state.

Table 6. Adding up Elasticity Estimates

| | Single-family Houses | | | | | | Apartments | | | | | |
|------------------|----------------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-----------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|--------------|--------------|------------------|
| | (1) FE, OLS | (2) FE, OLS | (3) FE, OLS | (4) FE, OLS | (5) FE, OLS | (6) FE, Poisson | (7) FE, OLS | (8) FE, OLS | (9) FE, OLS | (10) FE, OLS | (11) FE, OLS | (12) FE, Poisson |
| I: Sales | -0.269 | -0.231 | -0.211 | -0.141 | -0.195 | -0.2 | -0.062 | 0.045 | 0.011 | 0.183 | 0.134 | 0.162 |
| | [0.000]** | [0.005]** | [0.002]** | [0.065] | [0.013]* | [0.005]** | [0.613] | [0.751] | [0.929] | [0.161] | [0.334] | [0.163] |
| II: Transactions | -0.231 | -0.191 | -0.219 | -0.167 | -0.227 | -0.228 | 0.064 | 0.172 | 0.115 | 0.262 | 0.182 | 0.187 |
| | [0.000]** | [0.003]** | [0.002]** | [0.018]* | [0.000]** | [0.000]** | [0.584] | [0.212] | [0.362] | [0.034]* | [0.164] | [0.053] |
| III: Prices | -0.038 | -0.037 | 0.004 | 0.024 | 0.029 | 0.038 | -0.15 | -0.147 | -0.131 | -0.103 | -0.065 | -0.051 |
| | [0.413] | [0.477] | [0.938] | [0.676] | [0.591] | [0.511] | [0.020]* | [0.037]* | [0.027]* | [0.107] | [0.319] | [0.338] |
| I + II - III | 0.0 | 0.003 | -0.004 | -0.002 | -0.003 | 0.01 | -0.024 | -0.02 | -0.027 | -0.024 | -0.017 | -0.026 |

Note: The table collects the tax rate coefficients from Tables 3, 5, and A1. The last line checks whether the estimated coefficients of the transaction and price regressions add up to the coefficient of the sales regression.

To check the consistency of the transaction and price estimations, we also use the index of total sales on the state-year level as (confidentially) provided to us by GEWOS GmbH. Note, that the sales value of a single transaction is simply the transaction price of the house or apartment. Therefore, the aggregate sales of a state derive from adding up the prices of all relevant transactions. The empirical results, which use the same set of models and covariates as in Tables (3) and (5), are found in the Appendix. The results are compatible with what can be expected from the previous regressions. On the one hand, for overall sales values of single-family houses, the tax rate coefficient is significantly negative and in the range of -0.2. On the other hand, the coefficient is insignificant (and positive) for apartments. Table 6 reports the tax rate coefficient for the sales regression in line (I), together with the coefficients in the transaction and price regressions. It shows that the tax rate coefficients from the three sets of regressions are consistent, as the coefficients from the price and transaction regressions add up fairly well to the coefficients that derive from the regression of sales volumes on the tax rate.

4.2 The Tax Rate Elasticity of Revenues

We proceed to relate the above found quantity and price elasticities to the elasticity of the overall tax revenues from RETT. Unfortunately, while the tax revenue data is available at the state-year level, there is no separate accounting for the tax revenues from sales of apartments and single-family houses. We again rely on log-log specification, as the tax revenues derive as a multiplicative interaction of tax base and tax rate.

A possible expectation may be that the overall tax revenue elasticity should be a weighted average of the sales elasticity for apartments and single-family houses. There are several reasons why this may be too simplistic. A first reason why the tax revenue elasticity may be different from such a weighted average of the sales elasticity for single-family houses and apartments is the existence of taxable nonresidential property sales.¹⁶ Another potential reason for

¹⁶ Based on figures of nonresidential property sales, provided by Jones Long LaSalle Germany, and total sales volumes, as reported by IVD Bundesverband, we find that nonresidential property sales should account for some 14% of total sales in 2014.

such a departure is that, according to discussions with property market experts, there may be time lags between transactions and tax revenues.¹⁷ Finally, there could be cases in which some of the tax revenue is evaded, although strong safeguards are in place. Indeed, there is currently a vivid political debate on RETT avoidance in Germany.¹⁸

Having these issues in mind, we turn to the empirical model, by using panel data on tax revenue¹⁹, and tax rates to evaluate the tax rate elasticity of revenues. For this exercise, we utilize tax revenues at the state-year level, and use the respective tax rate at the state-year level. For selected years, in which the tax rate was changed within a calendar year, again we use the average rate with the length of the respective rate applicability as the weight.

The results are in line with some of our previous results that indicate behavioral effects of the RETT increases. Depending on the exact specification, we receive a revenue elasticity between 0.58 and 0.72 that is significantly smaller than one.²⁰ In the case of a constant tax base, a one percent increase in the tax revenue would produce a one percent increase in revenues. Hence, our estimates indicate that tax increases trigger a reduction in the tax base that must come from price reductions, lower transaction values, more tax evasion, or a mixture of these effects.

¹⁷ For example, the case of a property sale to a developer who intends to resell after partitioning the property may lead to a deferred tax payment as, in this case, the tax payment may be deferred until the resale.

¹⁸ Hessisches Finanzministerium (2016).

¹⁹ Tax revenue data have been taken from Statistisches Bundesamt, Finanzen und Steuern, Fachserie 14, Reihe 4, various issues.

²⁰ Büttner (2016) estimates an elasticity of 0.6 in a related framework.

Table 7. Revenue Elasticity of the German RETT

| | Total Tax Revenues | | | | | |
|------------------------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|
| | (1) FE, OLS | (2) FE, OLS | (3) FE, OLS | (4) FE, OLS | (5) FE, OLS | (6) FE, Poisson |
| Ln(Tax rate) | 0.68 [0.000]** | 0.664 [0.000]** | 0.644 [0.000]** | 0.581 [0.000]** | 0.641 [0.000]** | 0.719 [0.000]** |
| D(Year before tax increase) | | 1.435 [0.506] | | 0.909 [0.695] | 0.193 [0.938] | 2.846 [0.076] |
| D(Year of tax increase) | | 2.438 [0.324] | | 4.046 [0.142] | 4.365 [0.163] | 1.21 [0.633] |
| D(Within year increase) | | -0.01 [0.769] | | -0.004 [0.906] | -0.006 [0.858] | 0.027 [0.254] |
| Ln(GDP) | | | 0.686 [0.228] | 0.738 [0.185] | 0.84 [0.077] | 0.86 [0.000]** |
| Ln(l.Debt) | | | 0.049 [0.318] | 0.062 [0.209] | 0.005 [0.899] | -0.025 [0.502] |
| Ln(Population) | | | 1.249 [0.093] | 1.341 [0.076] | 0.669 [0.353] | 0.254 [0.695] |
| Ln(AL) | | | 0.194 [0.296] | 0.215 [0.239] | 0.128 [0.509] | -0.019 [0.913] |
| Observations | 192 | 192 | 185 | 185 | 185 | 185 |
| State fixed effects | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Density dep. year fixed effects | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| City-state year fixed effects | NO | NO | NO | NO | Yes | Yes |
| H0: Ln(Tax rate) \geq 1 | 0.00** | 0.00** | 0.00** | 0.00** | 0.00** | -- |
| R-squared | 0.99 | 0.99 | 0.991 | 0.992 | 0.994 | -- |
| States (Bundesländer) | 16 | 16 | 16 | 16 | 16 | 16 |

Note: Endogenous variable: log of yearly state RETT revenues (2003-2014). Robust p-values in brackets. ** and * denote significance at the 1 and 5 percent confidence level. D(Year before tax increase) is a variable : that multiplies a dummy, which equals one in state-years that precede a tax increase in January of the next year, with the size of the tax rate increase. Likewise, D(Year of tax increase) is constructed for state-years with a tax increase in January; D(Within year increase) is positive for state-years with a tax change between February and November of the calendar year. Again, the dummy is scaled by the tax increase. Ln(GDP), l.n(l.Debt) and Ln(Population) represent the log of GDP, the log of the lagged debt level and the log of the population for the respective state. H0: Ln(Tax rate) \geq 1 reports the confidence level at which the null can be rejected that the coefficient for Ln(Tax rate) is equal or larger than one. Ln(AL) is the log of the state's officially unemployed. Density dependent year fixed effects in column (5) allow that more densely populated states have different time-fixed effects.

The results in columns (2), and in columns (4) to (6) show insignificant coefficients for all three anticipation dummies and the comparison between (1) and (2) shows hardly any change in the estimated coefficient for the baseline tax effect.

While all estimations of Table 7 allow for time-fixed effects and time fixed effects that are different for rural states (see Footnote 12),

there is the possibility that time trends for the property market are even more specific for city states. Therefore, the estimations in Column (5) and (6) introduce those time effects along with the previous time fixed effects. Our main coefficient of interest, LN(Tax rate), is robust to this variation.

Columns (3) to (6) add macro variables that all turn out insignificant except the log of GDP in the Poisson fixed effects estimate. Even this estimate suggests a higher reaction of the tax base than the sales elasticities reported in Table 6. Various possible reasons for this have been discussed above.

5 Conclusion

The paper has empirically analyzed the tax effects of the German RETT. Our analysis has started from the observation that the German markets for single-family houses and apartments differ in their ownership patterns. While the vast majority of single-family houses are owner occupied, the ownership of apartments is with private and incorporated investors. Conversely, owner-occupied apartments are a small minority. For this reason, our empirical regressions have dealt with the number of transactions and the prices of transactions separately for these two market segments. Our findings suggest that, for single-family houses, the RETT leads to an elasticity of transactions around -0.23, but has no significant effect on prices of the traded houses. Conversely, for apartments, we could not find significant effects on transactions, but the price effect of the RETT tends to be negative. A stronger price effect of apartments may be explained by acknowledging that, for investors, the RETT acts like a financial transaction tax. As apartments are traded more frequently than single-family houses, such a financial transaction tax may have a larger effect for apartments. The different results for prices and transactions in the case of apartments may seem surprising. However, as highlighted in Section 3, a price capitalization effect is theoretically possible even when holding periods (and therefore transactions) are constant.

While previous papers have omitted the possible difference between owner-occupied housing and rented apartments, our results for single-

family houses are able to confirm previous results for single-family houses provided, for example, by O’Sullivant et al. (1995) and Besley et al. (2014). As in these studies, we find significant and non-negligible tax effects on the number of transactions. This suggests that the German RETT may imply a possible reduction of labor mobility. There may also be unnecessary mismatches between housing needs and housing characteristics that derive from the RETT (Sánchez and Andrews, 2011).

Unlike evidence provided for other countries (e.g., Davidoff and Leigh, 2013; Kopczuk and Munroe, 2015; Ihlanfeldt and Shaugnessy, 2004), there seems to be no price effect of the tax on single-family houses. If anything, these seem to be restricted to apartments.

Our estimates imply that the elasticity of total sales with respect to the tax rate is smaller than the tax revenue elasticities. Indeed, for apartments we fail to identify any negative tax rate elasticity of sales. This discrepancy in the development of the tax revenues and the development of housing sales may be due to non-residential property, which is also taxed in Germany and may have a higher elasticity. Another possibility may be tax avoidance effects that recently have received considerable attention in the political discussion and which may represent another margin not covered in this paper. The identification of these and other issues should benefit from availability of German micro-data on housing transactions that, so far, has not been made available to researchers in a comprehensive way.

Table A1. Elasticity of Sales Volumes

| | Single-family Houses | | | | | | Apartments | | | | | |
|------------------------------------|----------------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|--------------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|-----------------|-----------------|---------------------|
| | (1) FE, OLS | (2) FE, OLS | (3) FE, OLS | (4) FE, OLS | (5) FE, OLS | (6) FE, Poisson | (7) FE, OLS | (8) FE, OLS | (9) FE, OLS | (10) FE, OLS | (11) FE, OLS | (12) FE, Poisson |
| Ln(Tax rate) | -0.269 | -0.231 | -0.211 | -0.141 | -0.195 | -0.2 | -0.062 | 0.045 | 0.011 | 0.183 | 0.134 | 0.162 |
| | [0.000]** | [0.005]** | [0.002]** | [0.065] | [0.013]* | [0.005]** | [0.613] | [0.751] | [0.929] | [0.161] | [0.334] | [0.163] |
| D(Year before tax increase) | | 3.285 | | 3.396 | 4.059 | 4.64 | | 7.525 | | 7.94 | 8.162 | 9.144 |
| | | [0.074] | | [0.057] | [0.026]* | [0.003]** | | [0.007]** | | [0.006]** | [0.007]** | [0.001]** |
| D(Year of tax increase) | | -0.524 | | -1.998 | -1.411 | -1.62 | | -2.552 | | -4.853 | -3.291 | -3.553 |
| | | [0.749] | | [0.288] | [0.429] | [0.303] | | [0.470] | | [0.104] | [0.272] | [0.190] |
| D(Within year increase) | | 0.016 | | 0.028 | 0.029 | 0.035 | | 0.031 | | 0.043 | 0.055 | 0.062 |
| | | [0.607] | | [0.339] | [0.333] | [0.203] | | [0.615] | | [0.388] | [0.211] | [0.031]* |
| Ln(GDP) | | | 0.157 | 0.109 | 0.162 | 0.141 | | | 1.452 | 1.349 | 1.247 | 1.396 |
| | | | [0.668] | [0.765] | [0.626] | [0.742] | | | [0.018]* | [0.020]* | [0.008]** | [0.031]* |
| Ln(l.Debt) | | | -0.032 | -0.044 | -0.06 | -0.06 | | | -0.046 | -0.073 | -0.117 | -0.108 |
| | | | [0.499] | [0.383] | [0.123] | [0.081] | | | [0.530] | [0.351] | [0.017]* | [0.009]** |
| Ln(Population) | | | 1.087 | 0.941 | 0.951 | 0.97 | | | 1.445 | 1.11 | -0.007 | -0.18 |
| | | | [0.024]* | [0.052] | [0.035]* | [0.091] | | | [0.112] | [0.204] | [0.993] | [0.809] |
| Ln(AL) | | | 0.107 | 0.097 | 0.134 | 0.135 | | | 0.249 | 0.224 | -0.01 | -0.002 |
| | | | [0.377] | [0.429] | [0.335] | [0.403] | | | [0.223] | [0.261] | [0.961] | [0.990] |
| Observations | 192 | 192 | 185 | 185 | 185 | 185 | 192 | 192 | 185 | 185 | 185 | 185 |
| State fixed effects | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Density dep. year fixed effects | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| City-state year fixed effects | NO | NO | NO | NO | Yes | Yes | NO | NO | NO | NO | Yes | Yes |
| R-squared | 0.85 | 0.853 | 0.875 | 0.879 | 0.895 | -- | 0.849 | 0.855 | 0.87 | 0.878 | 0.898 | -- |
| States (Bundesländer) | 16 | 16 | 16 | 16 | 16 | 16 | 16 | 16 | 16 | 16 | 16 | 16 |

Note: Endogenous variable: log of sales index (2003-2014). Robust p-values in brackets. ** and * denote significance at the 1 and 5 percent confidence level. D(Year before tax increase) is the product of a dummy that indicates state-years that precede a tax increase in January of the next year and the size of the tax increase. D(Year of tax increase) marks state-years with a tax increase in January and is also scaled by the tax increase. D(Within year increase) is zero in state year without a tax change between February and November of the calendar year, but reflects the size of the tax increase otherwise. LnGDP, Ln(l.Debt), Ln(Population), and Ln(AL) represent the log of GDP, the log of the lagged debt level, the log of the population and the log of unemployed for the respective state. State-density dependent year fixed effects are jointly significant in all columns.

References

- Amihud, Yakov, and Haim Mendelson (1986), "Asset Pricing and the Bid-Ask Spread", *Journal of Financial Economics* 17, 223-249.
- Besley Timothy, Neil Meads, and Paolo Suricoc (2014), "The Incidence of Transaction Taxes: Evidence From a Stamp Duty Holiday", *Journal of Public Economics* 119, 61-70.
- Best, Michael Carlos, and Kleven, Henrik Jacobsen (2013), *Housing Market Responses to Transaction Taxes: Evidence from Notches and Stimulus in the UK*, Working Paper, London School of Economics.
- Burret, Heiko T., Lars P. Feld, and Ekkehard A. Köhler (2016), "Fiscal Sustainability of the German Laender: Time Series Evidence", *FinanzArchiv/Public Finance Analyses*, forthcoming.
- Buettner, Thiess (2016), *Welfare Cost of the Real Estate Transfer Tax*, mimeo, University of Erlangen-Nuremberg.
- Dachis, Ben, Gilles Duranton, and Matthew A. Turner (2011), "The Effects of Land Transfer Taxes on Real Estate Markets: Evidence from a Natural Experiment in Toronto", *Journal of Economic Geography* 12, 327-354.
- Davidoff, Ian, and Andrew Leigh (2013), "How Do Stamp Duties Affect the Housing Market?", *Economic Record* 89, 396-410.
- Deutsche Bundesbank (2015), *Methodenbericht zu den Wohnimmobilienpreisindizes*, Frankfurt am Main, 16. Februar 2015, <https://www.bundesbank.de/Redaktion/DE/Standardartikel/Statistiken/publikationen/preise.html>.
- European Commission (2015), *Tax Reforms in EU Member States 2015 - Tax Policy Challenges for Economic Growth and Fiscal Sustainability*, Institutional Paper 008, Brussels.
- Ihlanfeldt, K., and Shaughnessy, T. (2004), "An Empirical Investigation of the Effects of Impact Fees on Housing and Land Markets", *Regional Science and Urban Economics* 34, 639-61.
- Hessisches Finanzministerium (2016), *Millionenschwere Steuertricksereien zügig bekämpfen*, Pressemitteilung, Hessisches Ministerium der Finanzen, 8 September 2016.
- Hilber, Christian A.L., and Teemu Lyytikäinen (2013), *Housing Transfer Taxes and Household Mobility: Distortion on the Housing or Labour Market?*, Government Institute for Economic Research VATT Working Papers 47/2013.
- Kopczuk, Wojciech, and David Munroe (2015). "Mansion Tax: The Effect of Transfer Taxes on the Residential Real Estate Market", *American Economic Journal: Economic Policy* 7, 214-57.
- Matheson, Thornton (2011), *Taxing Financial Transactions: Issues and Evidence*, IMF Working Paper 54/11.
- Matheson, Thornton (2012), "Security Transaction Taxes: Issues and Evidence", *International Tax and Public Finance* 19, 884-912.

- O'Sullivan, Arthur, Terri A. Sexton, and Steven M. Sheffrin (1995), "Property Taxes, Mobility, and Home Ownership", *Journal of Urban Economics* 37, 107-129.
- Sánchez, Aida Caldera and Dan Andrews (2011), To Move or not to Move: What Drives Residential Mobility Rates in the OECD?, OECD Economics Department Working Papers 846, OECD Publishing.
- Santos Silva, J.M.C., and Silvana Tenreyro (2006), "The Log of Gravity", *Review of Economics and Statistics* 88, 641-658.
- Slemrod, Joel, Caroline Weber, and Hui Shan (2016), The Behavioral Response to Housing Transfer Taxes: Evidence from a Notched Change in D.C. Policy, University of Michigan, SSRN-id2771229.
- Statista (2016), Wohneigentumsquote in ausgewählten Städten nach Eigentumswohnungen und Einfamilienhäusern im Jahr 2009. <http://de.statista.com/statistik/daten/studie/155698/umfrage/haushalte-mit-wohneigentum-nach-immobilie/> (downloaded, 13 September 2016).
- Carolin Fritzsche, and Vandrei, Lars (2016), The German Real Estate Transfer Tax: Evidence for Single-Family Home Transactions, ifo Working Papers No. 232.
- Wooldridge, Jeffrey M. (1999), "Distribution-free Estimation of some Nonlinear Panel Data Models", *Journal of Econometrics* 90, 77-97.