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Papa Does Preach: Daughters and Polarisation of Attitudes toward Abortion

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DISCUSSION PAPER SERIES

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Harvard Kennedy School and IZA

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ABSTRACT

Papa Does Preach: Daughters and Polarisation of Attitudes toward Abortion*

This article examines the hypothesis that having daughters polarises male politicians' attitudes toward abortion rights. Using French and U.S. voting records, I estimate that having daughters decreases support for abortion law by 25% for right-wing congressmen in France, and increases support for Democrats by 12%. I find similar behavioural patterns for voters using electoral surveys. Robustness checks confirm that this result is not an artefact of family stopping rules. I rationalise these findings in a model predicting that fathers with paternalistic preferences adopt a more polarised political position on abortion when they have a daughter rather than a son.

JEL Classification: D72, D83, J16

Keywords: voting, polarisation, gender, political behaviour, attitudes, abortion

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Introduction

By the end of the 1970s, the majority of Western countries had enacted reproductive rights laws. Since then, several generations of women have been exposed to greater availability of reproductive technologies, such as medical abortion. This long period of exposure would suggest that rights around reproductive choice are no longer controversial. However, in most Western countries abortion is still a contentious issue that is politically operative. Recently, proposals to ban abortion have triggered protests in several European countries (Kassam 2014, Davies 2016) and polls suggest that public opinion in the United States is still divided over whether abortion is morally acceptable.¹

As representative parliaments remain male-dominated worldwide,² it is crucial to understand what informs men's political decisions on reproductive rights. In her groundbreaking article, Washington (2008) explores the relationship between family environment and voting behaviour of congresspersons in the United States. She finds that, for a given number of children, an additional daughter increases the propensity of U.S Congress members to vote liberally, particularly on matters of reproductive rights. She concludes that "for those voting on reproductive rights, the females in their lives would be particularly salient."

These findings beg an important question: does increasing salience of women's issues necessarily lead to more liberal views? The present article examines the hypothesis that male politicians' attitudes toward abortion do respond to the presence of a daughter, but differently according to their general ideology. This *polarisation effect* of daughters means that the presence of a daughter is associated with more pro-abortion views for left-wing fathers, and with more anti-abortion views for right-wing fathers.

To test this hypothesis, I use several sources of data. First, I built a new biographical dataset of the universe of French congresspersons in 1974, the year abortion was legalised in France. Secondly, drawing on the data set from Washington (2008) on U.S congresspersons

¹According to a recent Gallup poll from May 2017 (Saad 2017), half of Americans say abortion should be "legal only under certain circumstances", while 29% say it should be legal in all circumstances.

²Only 23.5% of all national parliamentarians were women as of October 2017 (Inter-Parliamentary Union 2017). In France in 1974, the year abortion law was passed, women represented 2% of the French National Assembly. In the American 105th Congress, they composed 11% of members.

of the 105th congress, I examine the heterogeneity of Washington's estimates according to congressmen's political parties. Having one additional female child reduces the probability of voting for abortion right by 8 percentage points for right-wing members of the French National Assembly, and has zero effect on left-wing members. It increases the probability of voting for teenage access to abortion by 7 percentage points for Democratic congressmen in the U.S, while it has no effect on Republican congressmen. In both contexts, legislators from one group deviated from the party line based on private motives, while the other group still voted on the party line. For those voting according to personal circumstances, the polarisation effect corresponds to about 12% to 25% of the baseline probability of voting for abortion law. These results suggest that life events shape political beliefs and can significantly affect the policymaking process on pivotal votes.

Third, I turn to the demand side and use attitudinal data to investigate the effect of the presence of a daughter on voters' views toward abortion rights. I consider post-electoral surveys conducted in 2014 in seven European countries (CED-EU14, Sauger, Dehousse, and Gougou 2015) and the 2006 Cooperative Congressional Election Studies pre-electoral survey for the U.S (CCES 2006, Ansolabehere 2006). I show that voters follow the same behavioural pattern as politicians in terms of support for abortion rights. I further explore whether the polarisation effect of daughters that I estimate on voting behaviour is in conflict with good representative democracy. Using U.S data, I provide evidence that congressmen who respond to the presence of daughters in their voting behaviour do so irrespective of the preferences of their constituency. Finally, using French congressional data, I find suggestive evidence that politicians are not punished for following private incentives and that these congressmen do not seem to vote strategically on this issue, even if they anticipate a close election.³

This paper addresses several endogeneity issues that have not been discussed in the existing literature. First, the polarisation effect could be driven by a more general shift toward more conservative or progressive views. If daughters have an effect on their fathers' political affiliation, it would be coherent to observe a shift in attitudes toward a specific issue such as

³I use official results of local and parliamentary elections digitalised from printed booklets for the 1978 elections (Pons and Tricaud 2017)

abortion. I provide several falsification tests and reject this hypothesis of endogenous political leaning. Secondly, the existence of a stopping rule of fertility pattern might threaten the validity of the results, so I also address the issue of endogenous family composition by using the gender of the first child as an instrument for the number of daughters.⁴

Finally, I rationalise my findings in a simple theoretical model where I consider fathers' choices on policies that have a direct impact on women's welfare, such as abortion right. In this model, fathers have a certain taste for the policy - their *ideology* -, and they also care about the utility of their offspring, daughter or son. Although fathers take into account their children's ideology, they have paternalistic preferences. In other words, they use their own ideology to value the *direct* impact of the policy on their daughter's welfare. One prediction of this model is that fathers with paternalistic preferences adopt a more polarised position on abortion when they have a daughter rather than when they have a son. This model sheds light on a mechanism that could explain why increasing salience of women's issues does not necessarily lead individuals to adopt more liberal views.

The paper contributes to several strands of the literature. First, it adds to the understanding of the political economy of women's rights expansion. The positive impact of reproductive rights on women's choices and economic opportunities has been extensively studied (Goldin and Katz 2002, Bitler and Zavodny 2002, Bitler and Zavodny 2004, Goldin 2006, Chiappori and Oreffice 2008) but these papers focus essentially on individuals' private benefits associated with reproductive rights. Akerlof, Yellen, and Katz (1996) argue that the legalization of abortion, as any technical change, can create both winners and losers. They show in a theoretical model that the introduction of a new technology of birth control can be detrimental to certain women, through a decline in the incentive to obtain a promise of marriage. Women who welcome these new reproductive technologies no longer find it necessary to condition sexual relations on such promises. On the other hand, women who want children, or who do not want an abortion for moral or religious reasons find themselves pressured to participate in premarital sexual relations without marriage guarantees. Pezzini (2005) shows empirically

⁴A potential threat to this identification strategy is the risk of sex-selective abortion. Therefore I also use a test based on sex-ratios à la Angrist and Evans (1998).

that women's life satisfaction increases on average following the extension of birth control rights, but this effect is not observed for women who identify themselves as religious. With respect to this literature, my article explores how this perceived gain/loss in welfare might translate back into fathers' moral beliefs and political preferences. If the introduction of these technologies has a direct - and contrasted - effect on women's welfare, little is known on the formation of fathers' opinions on this particular issue. Studies have examined how fathers' altruism toward their daughter is a key driving force in the evolution of society towards a more egalitarian system (Fernandez 2014), therefore opening the black-box of paternalistic preferences is relevant to better understanding the evolution of gender norms.

Secondly, this article contributes to a line of research studying the impact of children's gender on family processes. Following the seminal work of Warner (1991) and Washington (2008), several articles have used attitudinal surveys and have found conflicting results on the effect of offspring's gender on political opinions and on support for traditional gender roles (Oswald and Powdthavee 2010, Shafer and Malhotra 2011, Conley and Rauscher 2013, Glynn and Sen 2015, Lee and Conley 2016a, Lee and Conley 2016b). One possible explanation for this apparent divide in empirical findings across datasets is the fact that previous studies have considered average effects. To my knowledge, the present paper is the first one to consider heterogenous effects of offspring's gender across ideological groups, and to suggest that gender norms might not univocally affect individuals' preferences and behaviours. Overall, my findings suggest that when individuals form opinions about a complex societal issue, they might do so in a way that preserves their cultural and political identity.⁵

Finally, it fits into the literature related to the political economy of legislative decision-making. Studies have shown that beyond reelection motives, politicians' own ideology is a crucial determinant of roll-call voting patterns (Levitt 1996) and that political parties might exhibit less influence on a legislator's voting on moral and religious issues (Ansolabehere, Snyder, and Stewart 2001, Snyder and Groseclose 2000). Additionally, Washington (2008) was the first paper to point out the importance of personal circumstances in explaining voting

⁵This is in line with recent evidence by Kahan (2015) on climate-science communication.

behaviours. In a recent contribution, McGuirk, Hilger, and Miller (2017) show that elected officials can be influenced by changing their private incentives and that this can be a critical factor in models of policy formation. In particular, they show that having a draft-age son significantly reduces legislator support for pro-conscription bills. My results provide new evidence that legislators might be motivated by private concerns, but that these concerns are not necessarily contradicting their ideological views, but rather reinforcing them.

The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. The first section describes the data, the identification strategy is presented in the second section, the main results are discussed in the third section, the fourth section presents the model, the last section concludes.

1 Institutional context and data description

1.1 Politicians

1.1.1 French National Assembly members dataset

I built an original dataset on French congresspersons from biographical information contained in *Who's Who* books from 1962 to 2002. These books contain, for each congressperson, the first name of each child, by order of birth.⁶ I collected a rich set of information on precise party affiliation, age, marital status, occupation and constituency.

In France, contraception and abortion were forbidden and criminalised by a law passed in 1920. In the late 1960s, several political movements and medical associations started to bring abortion to the forefront of public debate (Mossuz-Lavau 2002). The issue gained attention through political petitions and public trials.⁷ In 1974, when abortion was legalised, the right held the majority of seats at the French National Assembly. Government ministers are often chosen from the pool of congresspersons.⁸ Table 1 gives the 1974 composition of the French

⁶I coded unisex first names when I could not identify the gender of the congressperson's child. The results are unchanged if I assign a specific gender identity to these unisex first names.

⁷According to an IFOP survey published in the *Nouvel Observateur* in April 26, 1971, 55% of French respondents declared that women should be free to have an abortion if they wanted to, but 47% considered abortion as a crime (source found in Mossuz-Lavau 2002).

⁸The detail of votes is given in Table 18 in Appendix.

National Assembly after nomination. Statistics show that the average age of French National Assembly members is over 54 years-old, suggesting that these congresspersons were likely to have completed their reproductive lives in 1974. The majority of members had two or three children. Finally, only nine women out of 490 were members of the National Assembly at the time, which corresponds to less than 2% of each political group. Therefore the impact of the gender of a congressperson on his/her voting behaviour cannot be precisely estimated.

Attitudes toward abortion are measured using roll call votes of the 1974 abortion law.⁹ They were collected using official registers (*Journal Officiel*) that list the results of major votes. A classification of the different types of votes in the French National Assembly is given in Appendix A.1. Importantly, the French parliamentary system allows me to rule out the issue of change in party affiliation. Change in party affiliation - within a legislature and in general - is rare and therefore will not bias the results. As pointed out by Godbout and Foucault (2013), party unity is very high among French congresspersons and the policy space in the legislature is primarily one-dimensional. However, in the French context congresspersons have limited voting independence with respect to their political group, especially on the left (Nay 2003). Therefore one might expect that congresspersons who traditionally never deviate from the party line are likely to do so only if they have strong preferences with respect to the issue at vote, especially in such a context of high political polarisation on most economic and social issues (Rosenthal and Voeten 2004).

1.1.2 U.S congressmen

I use data from the 105th American Congress from Washington (2008).¹⁰ I rely on decomposed voting record scores compiled by the National Organization of Women (NOW) and biographical information from *Congressional Directory* and other sources combined by Washington. As explained in her paper, for each vote in accordance with the NOW position, the organization awarded 5 points to produce a score that ranges from 0 to 100, with a mean of

⁹Also known as the "Veil law" after Simone Veil, the health minister who drafted the bill.

¹⁰The author made her data available on the *American Economic Review* website, see <https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/aer.98.1.311>

74 for Democrats and 12 for Republicans.

1.2 Electoral surveys

I use both European and U.S contemporary electoral surveys. The CED-EU14 (Sauger, Dehousse, and Gougou 2015) is an internet survey that was conducted a few days after the 2014 European election in seven countries. It contains nationally representative samples of 4,000 people in each country in Austria, France, Germany, Italy, and Spain, and 1,000 people in Greece and Portugal. I also use the 2006 Cooperative Congressional Election Study (Ansolabehere 2006), a 36,500-person national survey of the American electorate designed to study how Americans view Congress and hold their representatives accountable during elections and to measure the distribution of political attitudes and preferences within states and congressional districts. The 2006 survey consists of a single wave conducted in the early fall, and it is the only wave that contains information on the children's gender.

Contrarily to most cross-national surveys, these two surveys contain a specific question on attitudes toward abortion. It also includes information on both the number of children and of daughters of the respondents present in the household, as well as their educational level, household income, political affiliation, and religious practice.¹¹ Finally, one feature of the Cooperative Congressional Election Study can help bridge the gap between individuals' attitudes and how their opinions might translate into laws. Individuals are asked about a proposal in Congress to ban a type of late-term abortion sometimes called "partial-birth abortion." They are told that "the proposed legislation could also be the opening to a broader ban on abortion" and are asked about their vote if they were faced with this decision. I can therefore compare the impact of having a daughter on two different measures of abortion views: one measuring private views and one framed in terms of public interest.

¹¹Survey respondents might have children who do not live in the household anymore. Due to this measurement error, the estimates obtained from regressions on these samples will provide a lower bound of the polarisation effect.

2 Identification strategy

Following Washington (2008), the identification strategy is based on the assumption that conditional on the number of children, the number of female children is a random variable. This assumption will not be satisfied if a man follows a fertility "stopping rule". I discuss this issue in Section 3.4. I first use the following linear probability model:

$$Y_i = \alpha + \beta_1 \text{Atleastoneddaughter}_i + \beta_2 \text{Atleastoneddaughter}_i * \text{Right}_i \quad (1) \\ + \beta_3 \text{Right}_i + \eta \text{Numberofchildren}_i + \delta X_i + \epsilon_i$$

The coefficients of interest are β_1 and β_2 . The β_1 coefficient measures the impact of having at least one daughter on abortion vote. The β_2 coefficient measures the heterogeneous effect depending on political affiliation. I then a linear probability model on separate samples based on political affiliation taking into account the total number of daughters.

$$Y_i = \alpha + \beta \text{Numberofdaughters}_i + \gamma_i + \delta X_i + \epsilon_i \quad (2)$$

where γ is a set of fixed effects for total number of children.

For a French congressperson i , Y_i is a dummy variable equal to one when he voted "yea" to the 1974 law. The measure of political affiliation (right-wing) is based on party affiliation at the beginning of the term of office.

For a respondent i in the European dataset, Y_i is a dummy equal to one if the respondent fully agrees with the statement "women should be free to decide on matters of abortion" (score 10 out of 10). I choose this specification 10 from a 0-10 continuous scale because of the right-skewed distribution of scores to this question, as shown in appendix (Figure 1).¹² Because over 50% of respondents pool at 10, this dummy accurately captures attitudes in favor of abortion.¹³ The measure of political affiliation is based on respondents' self-declared positions

¹²The skewed distribution of answers to this question in the population suggests that the results might be sensitive to extreme values. I confirm this result by running a multinomial logit regression with country fixed effects presented in Table 19 in Appendix.

¹³It contrasts with the approach of Conley and Rauscher (2013), who used questions in which abortion was

on a 0-10, left-to-right scale. Right-wing political affiliation is proxied by a dummy variable equal to one if the respondent answers with a score greater or equal to 5 to the question "How would you place yourself on a Left-Right scale from 0 to 10?".¹⁴

For an American respondent i in the 2006 CCES dataset, Y_i is equal to one if he declares that "by law, a woman should always be able to have an abortion as a matter of personal choice". The distribution of abortion views is presented in Figure 2: 43.64% of respondents from the sample support pro-choice views. The measure of political affiliation (right-wing) is measured by responses on their position on the ideological spectrum. A respondent is considered conservative if she gives a response equal to 4 or 5 on a spectrum from very liberal (1) to very conservative (5).

The coefficients of interest is β . It measures the impact of each additional daughter on attitudes toward abortion. X_i includes individual characteristics, such as age and age squared, number of children, and a dummy equal to one when the congressperson is a doctor.¹⁵ Controlling for marital status does not affect the results. Certain specifications using the CED-EU14 or CCES datasets include controls for each level of household income, each educational level, the intensity of religious practices, and country fixed-effects. For specifications using the CCES dataset, I also include race and employment status.

framed as a medical question and not as a positive right for women.

¹⁴I also use variations in the definition of the right-wing group using a dummy variable equal to one if the respondent answers with a score greater or equal to 6 to the question "How would you place yourself on a Left-Right scale from 0 to 10?". Given the spike at 5 in the distribution of answers to this question, the number of right-wing respondents decreases greatly with this new measure (from 68% to 39% of respondents from the sample of male respondents older than 18 with children). Results are less significant but pointing in the same direction.

¹⁵I control for this occupation type because it was especially prevalent among French National Assembly members. Moreover, the consequence such legislation has on members of the medical profession is particularly salient.

3 Results and discussion

3.1 Results on politicians

3.1.1 French National Assembly members dataset

Table 2 displays the results of the OLS regression for two votes on the same law: November 28, 1974, and December 20, 1974. As expected, right-wing congresspersons are less likely to vote in favor of the abortion law. On the contrary, and as shown in Table 1, almost 100% of left-wing congresspersons followed the party line and voted "yea". The interaction coefficient shows a negative relation between having at least one daughter and the probability of voting "yea" when the congressperson is right-wing, with estimates ranging from 14 to 20 percentage points. The magnitude of the effect corresponds to almost 30% of the impact of right-wing political affiliation on abortion support. This result suggests that having a daughter might not necessary cause more progressive attitudes when it comes to gender issues, but rather a higher political polarisation. Within the political context prevailing at the time - party discipline being extremely high in the French National Assembly, especially for left-wing parties -, it is interesting to observe that right-wing congresspersons were more likely to deviate from the party line. In columns (1) and (3) of Table 2, I set the number of children to zero when they were not indicated in the *Who's who* books. Dropping these observations does not significantly change the results (columns (2) and (4)). There is a slightly less significant coefficient for the treatment of the November 28, 1974 vote. I also choose the multiple implementation method for the missing values and find similar results.¹⁶ Finally, these results are robust when abstention and "nay" votes are treated separately. Importantly, this vote was pivotal: 56.53% of French congresspersons voted for abortion law. If all right-wing congressmen had voted their conscience following the polarisation effect of daughters, the law would not have been passed.

Table 3 displays the results when introducing a dummy variable for each additional daughter, in order to see whether the magnitude of the effect is correlated with the total number of

¹⁶Results available upon request.

daughters. Only the coefficient of the first daughter remains significant. This suggests that the polarisation effect, if it exists, appears with the first daughter.

Instrumental variable: sex of the first born. To further address the endogeneity issue associated to the optimal stopping-rule, I use an instrumental variable approach using the sex of the first born as an instrument for the total number of daughters. Estimates of the IV and OLS strategies of equation (2) are presented in Table 4. Results derived from the IV strategy are virtually the same as with OLS and suggest the same pattern of polarisation effect of daughters for right-wing congressmen.

3.1.2 Comparison with the U.S congressmen

In Table 5, I compare estimates of the polarisation effect of daughters obtained on the sample of French congressmen with the sample of U.S congressmen used by Washington (2008). I use the score measuring congressmen's vote (excluding women) on teen access to abortion. I split the sample by political affiliation (Democrats/Republicans) and report the coefficient of the number of girls on the probability of voting in favor of abortion laws for each congressmen's datasets. I also test for equality of coefficients across the two Democrats/Republicans samples and report the corresponding p -value. The polarisation effect of daughters is consistent across datasets. One additional daughter is associated with a decrease of 8 percentage points in the probability of voting in favor of abortion law for right-wing French congressmen,¹⁷ which corresponds to 25% of the baseline probability. The coefficient is comparable to the one found for the U.S sample. The average propensity to vote along with the NOW position on teen access to abortion for an American Democratic congressman increases by more than 7 percentage points with each female child, which corresponds to about 12% of the baseline probability. The point estimate is negative and non significant for Republican congressmen. The test of equality of coefficient confirms that the effect is statistically different between the two political samples. The polarisation effect is relatively larger for the French right-wing Congressmen. It can be partly explained by the fact that a right-wing majority introduced

¹⁷The vote is the December 20, 1974 vote after the law had been discussed by a Joint Committee.

the bill at the French National Assembly, therefore the baseline probability of supporting the law was higher for conservative members than in the U.S context.

3.2 Results on voters' attitudes

In order to investigate the presence of a similar pattern on the demande side, I consider voters' views using post-electoral surveys. The data generating processes for voting records and electoral surveys are fundamentally different, and could reflect different set of incentives. On the one hand, a congressperson's voting is likely to be strategic as records are publicly available, and voters could hold politicians accountable for their voting history, while electoral surveys are anonymous and not compulsory. I use sociodemographic information contained in electoral surveys to both validate the mechanism and to identify potential sources of heterogeneity. I first estimate specification (2) and observe the same pattern for stated preferences of survey respondents than for politicians. Results are presented in Table 6 both for European and U.S citizens. One additional daughter is associated to more pro-abortion views for liberal respondents, while I observe non significant effect for conservative respondents. Importantly, the sign of the effects goes systematically in the same direction. The magnitude of the effect corresponds to 6 to 9% of the baseline mean. I can also reject equality of coefficients across the two samples based on political affiliation for each dataset. For the European dataset, introducing country fixed effects or a dummy for each income and educational level, does not reduce the magnitude of the effect.

I then investigate whether the magnitude of the effect varies across children's age. Results for American respondents are presented in Table 7. The point estimate is larger and statistically significant for liberal respondents whose oldest child is older than 12 years old compare to when their oldest child is younger than 12, however the two coefficients are not statistically different. This is suggestive evidence that the polarisation effect is larger on average when children get older.

Attitudes measured by surveys might reflect individuals' preferences, but might not necessarily reflect the choice they could make for society, were they in a position of power. I

use one feature of the Cooperative Congressional Election Study that can help bridge the gap between individuals' attitudes and how their opinions might translate into laws. In Table 8, I estimate specification (2) where the dependent variable is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the respondent declares that he would vote for a proposal to ban a type of late-term abortion called "partial-birth abortion" that could open to a broader ban on abortion if he were faced with this decision. One additional female child decreases the probability that a liberal respondent declares voting for an abortion ban if he were elected in congress by over 5 percentage points, which corresponds to 16% of the baseline probability. The presence of daughters does not significantly affect this outcome for Conservative respondents.

3.3 Electoral cost and accountability

The empirical investigation has established that the presence of daughters polarises fathers' views toward abortion. This result holds both on the supply side (voting records) and on the demand side (survey responses). These findings might suggest that contexts where politicians follow private concerns are not necessarily at odds with representative democracy.¹⁸ However in principle, by following private motives, politicians could deviate from their constituency's ideal point and consequently could be punished in the next election. I therefore investigate how the polarisation effect interacts with the preferences of the constituency in matter of abortion, and whether politicians are being punished by the electorate for following private motives.

3.3.1 Preferences of the constituency

I first investigate how politicians' voting behaviour responds to their constituency's preferences toward abortion right. Two different mechanisms can be at play. First, politicians themselves might self-select into constituencies that share similar preferences on societal issues such as abortion (selection mechanism). Second, politicians might endogenously respond

¹⁸In the candidate citizen models (Osborne and Slivinski 1996, Besley and Coate 1997), whoever wins office implements her ideal policy. Therefore voters are likely to support candidates whose ideal point is most closely aligned to their own.

to the preferences of their constituency by adjusting their vote, anticipating the electoral cost of deviating from the voters' ideal points (accountability mechanism). I first show that on average, Democrats do vote according to their constituency's preferences in matter of abortion, while Republicans don't. Figure 3 plots the correlation between the average support for abortion by state and the average voting behaviour of congressmen on teen access to abortion by state. The x-axis represents the average support for abortion right computed by state on the population of all respondents (men and women) from the CCES. The y-axis corresponds to the average vote of congresspersons by state, i.e the average by state of a dummy variable equal to one if the congressperson votes according to the NOW position on teen access to abortion. The linear fit is indicated separately for Democrats and Republicans. There is a clear positive correlation between Democrats' probability of voting liberally on matter of abortion and the average support for abortion right in the state, while there is no such positive relation for Republicans. This brings additional evidence to Poole and Rosenthal (1984) suggesting that two representatives from the same state but from different parties are highly dissimilar. I then investigate whether the polarisation effect result holds for the most conservative of the Democratic congressmen, who are elected in states where the support for abortion is low. I interact the number of daughters with a dummy equal to one if the representative comes from a state whose average support for abortion is below median. The average support for abortion by state is a standardised measure derived from the CCES 2006 dataset on the sample of adult respondents (irrespective of gender). The median is computed separately for Republicans and Democrats. Results are presented in Table 16. I do not find significantly different effect for Democrats with daughters according to how liberal/conservative their constituency is in matter of abortion. Moreover, I do not find evidence that Democrats who have daughters select into states where the average support for abortion right is higher. These findings suggest that the polarisation effect of daughters affects Democrats' voting behaviour regardless their voters' ideal point.

3.3.2 Implications for reelection

My results on the French National Assembly suggest that French right-wing congressmen who voted "nay" on the 1974 abortion vote deviated from the party line because of personal circumstances, as it was a right-wing government which drafted the bill. In the French context, where party discipline at the French National Assembly is particularly high, deviating from the party line can be particularly costly for congressmen. In order to see whether the polarisation effect can have an electoral cost for politicians, I investigate how the probability of reelection can be correlated with the 1974 abortion vote for the right-wing congressmen. I use official results of local and parliamentary elections digitalised from printed booklets for the 1978 elections (Pons and Tricaud 2017). I measure the electoral cost of the polarisation effect of daughters on the 1974 abortion vote on the sample of right-wing congressmen using several outcomes. First I look at the probability of re-running in the 1978 parliamentary elections. I then look at the vote share obtained for the first round of the election. Finally, I look at the probability of winning conditional on re-running. Results are presented in Table 15. Controls include age and age squared, marital status, and in columns 2, 4 and 6 the number of daughters, and number of children fixed effects. I find no evidence of a correlation between the vote on the 1974 abortion law and the probability of running again or being reelected (conditional on running again). This is suggestive evidence that voters have not punished congressmen for following private motives, potentially because they were not aware of this specific voting behaviour (myopic voter hypothesis). The vote share in the first round of the parliamentary election is not significantly correlated with abortion vote either. This last result suggests that candidates who did not follow their private motives on abortion vote (i.e not subject to the polarisation effect of daughters) are not systematically those who could anticipate a close election in 1978.

3.4 Robustness checks

3.4.1 Political leaning

In order to study whether the polarisation results are driven by a more general pattern of party indiscipline in the French National Assembly, I run several falsification tests using other reforms, presented in Table 9. I run specification (1) on another reform related to women's rights: the law on divorce passed in 1974 (columns 5 and 6). The effect of the presence of daughters is not statistically significant, as party affiliation seems to drive most voting behaviours. This confirms that personal circumstances will only matter in context where representatives can vote their conscience, and that party discipline is an important predictor of most votes on gender issues. One could argue that abortion is an ethical issue. Therefore if daughters made their congressional parents more liberal or conservative on moral and ethical issues, this could potentially influence voting behaviour on death penalty. My results suggests that this is not the case in the French context, as shown in columns (7) and (8). Finally, I also investigated the impact of the presence of daughters on a more recent abortion vote, the 2001 law (the 12-week time-limit to have an abortion) in columns (9) and (10). However, the government did not share the same political color as the president in 2001 (*cohabitation*), party discipline was therefore much higher in the French National Assembly, and I do not observe a sufficient deviation from the party line, for either the left or the right. I also take selection bias into account: if voters chose to support politicians based on their individual characteristics, such as the gender composition of their children, one could argue that the voting pattern observed is simply due to endogenous selection of congresspersons. However, I argue that this information was not available to voters. Analysing electoral archives collected by the CEVIPOF,¹⁹ I find no evidence that the gender composition of the children was made public in political programs. While congresspersons do sometimes provide some biographical information, they rarely mention children and never mention the number of daughters they have. Moreover, one might argue that the polarisation effect I identify could be driven by a more general shift toward more conservative or progressive views. More precisely, if daughters

¹⁹CEVIPOF electoral archives are available online at <https://archive.org/details/archiveselectoralesducevipof>

had an effect on their fathers' political affiliation, it would be coherent to observe a shift in attitudes toward a specific issue such as abortion. I test the hypothesis of endogenous political leaning using the CED-EU14 dataset. I run the same model on the same sample, where the dependent variables capture other political issues such as attitudes toward public debt, tax, same-sex marriage, immigration and political affiliation. Results are reported in Table 14, and I do not find consistently significant results. I perform similar falsification tests on the CCES sample using attitudes toward same-sex marriage, climate change, and find no effect of the number of daughters.²⁰ More importantly, I find zero effect of the presence of daughters on right-wing political affiliation. I can therefore argue as Lee and Conley (2016a) that political affiliation does not seem to be affected by the share of daughters, and that abortion is a specific issue in the study of parents' socialisation by their female children, potentially because fathers acknowledge the direct effect such a policy can have on their daughters' welfare.

3.4.2 Family composition

One major concern in the literature on the effect of children's gender on parents' behaviour is the potential existence of a stopping rule of fertility pattern, i.e. the existence of a correlation between family size and the number of daughters. This would suggest that fathers might have an underlying preference for sons (Blau, Kahn, Brummund, Cook, and Larson-Koester 2017). To complement the IV approach developed in paragraph 3.1.1, I provide additional tests using the entire biographical dataset of French congresspersons. Following Angrist and Evans (1998), I run a test based on sex ratios of children. Specifically, I look at the probability of having a second or a third child conditional on the gender mix of children. As shown in the first two columns of Table 10, this test is not significant, which suggests that congresspersons do not have different preferences for daughters or sons. I run the same test conditional on having one son or one daughter and find similar results. I can therefore reject the hypothesis of an optimal stopping-rule among congress members. In order to look at the existence of a specific pattern for the right, and to avoid sample size constraints, I combined several

²⁰Results available upon request.

legislations all together to implement the sex ratios-test.²¹ The results are presented in the last four columns of Table 10 and show no significantly different pattern for the right compare to the other Congress persons. I perform the same test for American citizens in Table 11, separately for liberal and conservative respondents. I test whether the gender composition of children affects the probability of having at least a second child, and at least a third child. I then test for the equality of coefficients across political affiliation. I can reject the hypothesis that liberal and conservative respondents have different optimal stopping rules. The birth order is not available in the CED-EU14 dataset, however I can provide a balancing test to investigate whether fathers of one daughter share sociodemographic characteristics that could be correlated with different attitudes toward abortion.²² Results are displayed in Table 12.²³ I observe a small but significant difference in the probability for the household of being at the very bottom of the income distribution. All the other sociodemographic characteristics are not statistically different for the group of fathers of a son and of a daughter. Finally, as pointed out by Lee and Conley (2016a), it could be the case that personal ideology and choosing to marry into a family with preexisting boys or girls, or choosing to adopt a boy or girl, might be correlated. The present datasets unfortunately do not allow to distinguish between biological children and step- or adopted children. However, results are robust when excluding Congress persons who did remarry, in order to account for potential step-children.

4 Theoretical framework

The purpose of this model is to rationalise the empirical findings and to explore potential mechanisms of the polarisation effect. Given the empirical results, I choose to focus on men's private benefits associated to reproductive rights and I assume that private motives are a crucial factor in policy formation. Although legislative voting is known to be partly determined by strategic concerns (Levitt 1996, Snyder and Groseclose 2000, McCarty, Poole, and

²¹1962-1967, 1968-1973, 1973-1978 and 1978-1981. Regressions include usual sociodemographic controls as well as tenure in office.

²²The Trivers-Willard hypothesis (Trivers and Willard 1973) suggests that fathers with low socioeconomic status will skew toward female children because the reproductive risk is lower.

²³The same balancing check for the CCES data is presented in Table 13.

Rosenthal 2001), I assume here that politicians have the possibility to vote their conscience on this issue.²⁴ As a consequence, the model treats policy preferences like a consumer good, and the predictions of the model apply in the same manner to politicians as to parents who are not politicians.

One key assumption of the model is that abortion becomes a salient issue for fathers of daughters, because they anticipate the direct impact that abortion would have on their daughter's welfare. I argue that fathers frame the welfare impact of abortion using their own political beliefs. This is equivalent to assuming altruistic and paternalistic behaviour, i.e., what fathers think is right or wrong for their daughters is not independent from their personal political beliefs. Having a daughter might not necessarily cause them to change their view of the world, but it could reinforce their beliefs on morality. The model builds on altruism and paternalistic preferences to describe the polarisation effect daughters might have on their fathers' beliefs. Finally, it accounts for the importance of heterogeneous treatment effects and the cultural context in interpreting the impact of children's gender on their father's views.

4.1 Setting

In this model, I assume that individuals have single-dimensional preferences over a specific policy x distributed over $[0,1]$. In the present case, this policy is access to abortion. In the following, I focus on the utility of fathers. I assume that they have altruistic preferences, i.e., children's utilities are arguments of their parents' utility functions (Becker 1981). I focus on the simplest case where each couple has only one child.²⁵ I want to characterise their optimal choice of x .

²⁴The empirical investigation of the electoral implications of the polarisation effect in paragraph 3.3 helps to bring support to this assumption.

²⁵This assumption is supported empirically. As discussed in section 3.1.1, the polarisation effect is observed with the first child.

The father's utility is given by:

$$u_F(x) = \begin{cases} -(a-x)^2 + \beta u_M(x) & \text{if the child is a son} \\ -(a-x)^2 + \beta u_W(x) & \text{if the child is a daughter} \\ \text{with } 0 \leq \beta \leq 1 \end{cases}$$

where $u_F(\cdot)$ is a well-behaved concave utility function, a is the father's ideal point regarding the policy x , uniformly distributed over $[0,1]$, and $u_i(\cdot)$ with $i = W, M$ is the utility of the child. β represents the level of altruism.

The first key assumption is that women get both an ideological and a direct benefit/cost from abortion legislation x , while men only get an ideological cost/benefit.

ASSUMPTION 1: Women derive a combination of an ideological effect and a direct effect from the policy x , while men only derive an ideological effect from it.

The children's utility functions can be written as follows:

$$\begin{cases} u_M(x) = -(a_M - x)^2 & \text{if the child is a son} \\ u_W(x) = \underbrace{-(a_W - x)^2}_{\text{ideological}} + \alpha \underbrace{\left(a_W - \frac{1}{2}\right)x}_{\text{direct}} & \text{if the child is a daughter} \end{cases}$$

a_i , with $i = W, M$, represents the child's ideal point. α is the relative weight attributed to the direct effect compared to the ideological effect in the daughter's utility function. In the Appendix, I discuss the set of values of a_W to characterise interior solutions both for the father's and the daughter's maximisation problems.

The policy affects women via two channels: the ideological channel - the distance between the policy and their ideological ideal point - and the direct channel, which represents the direct impact of the policy on women's welfare. Women will be differently affected by the policy according to the location of their ideological ideal point with respect to the political center. The assumption that the welfare impact is dependent on women's ideological type is

derived from the literature on the impact of the introduction of new reproductive technologies on women's welfare (Akerlof, Yellen, and Katz 1996, Pezzini 2005, Chiappori and Oreffice 2008). For instance, women in favor of abortion benefit from the introduction of this birth control technology by better managing career and fertility decisions. On the contrary, and as discussed by the literature, access to abortion can be detrimental to those women who do not want to have abortions, or who define themselves as religious. The intuition behind the model is that individuals' world views (being to the left or right of $\frac{1}{2}$) shape the way a policy might affect their welfare. If a woman is left-wing ($a_W < \frac{1}{2}$), a right-wing policy x (close to 1) will decrease her utility both because the policy is far from her ideological ideal point and because with $a_W - \frac{1}{2} < 0$, the policy has a detrimental effect on her welfare. However, with a policy x slightly above $\frac{1}{2}$, there will be a trade-off between the distance to the ideological ideal point and the direct effect.

The second key assumption is that fathers have paternalistic preferences. They take into account the ideological preferences of their children when maximising their own utility, but they substitute their parameter a for a_W in the direct component of their daughter's utility function. The intuition is that fathers care about the utility of their children and respect their ideological tastes, but they assume that they have a better understanding of the consequences a policy might have on their daughter's welfare.²⁶ Therefore, their evaluation of the cost/benefit of such a policy may differ from that of the children themselves. Previous theoretical work has used paternalistic preferences to model the fact that parents care about their children's consumption patterns even after the children have grown up and left home (Pollak 1988). In a recent theoretical contribution on parenting, Doepke and Zilibotti (2014) give another interpretation of paternalistic preferences. They assume that children's preferences can be influenced by parents: parents may take actions that restrict or expand the children's choice set. Here, I will assume that fathers substitute their own parameter a for a_W .

²⁶The fact that fathers choose their optimal policy in part because they want to match the ideology of their children is a specific form of the standard altruism model that is partly supported by results presented in Table 7. I present suggestive evidence that the polarisation effect is larger on average when children get older, i.e. when children are old enough to form and express their ideology.

ASSUMPTION 2: Fathers have paternalistic preferences when it comes to the welfare implications of the policy. The utility function of a girl's father can be written:

$$u_{FW}(x) = -(a-x)^2 + \beta \left[-(a_W - x)^2 + \alpha \left(a - \frac{1}{2} \right) x \right]$$

4.2 Optimal choice of policy

I now derive the fathers' optimal policy choice when they have a son or a daughter respectively.

PROPOSITION 1: *When a father has a son and a positive level of altruism, his ideal policy x_{FM}^* will be such that he will be closer to his son's ideal point a_M .*

$$\begin{aligned} x_{FM}^* &= \frac{a + \beta a_M}{1 + \beta} > a && \text{if } a_M > a \\ x_{FM}^* &= \frac{a + \beta a_M}{1 + \beta} < a && \text{if } a_M < a \\ x_{FM}^* &= a && \text{if } a_M = a \end{aligned}$$

Proof is given in Appendix A.3. This result is quite intuitive, as I assume some level of altruism in the father's utility function. Suppose $\beta = 1$, then the policy is a perfect compromise between father's and son's ideal points. When $\beta < 1$, the optimal policy is closer to the father's ideal point, as the father values his son's utility less than his own. Moving closer to his own ideal point and moving away from his son's ideal point would increase his utility, while he only faces a utility cost of β .

PROPOSITION 2 (Polarisation effect of daughter): *When a father has a daughter and a positive level of altruism β , his ideal policy x_{FW}^* will be such that he will opt for a more extreme policy than he would if he had a son.*

$$\begin{aligned} x_{FW}^* &= \frac{a + \beta a_W}{1 + \beta} + \frac{\beta \alpha}{2(1 + \beta)} \left(a - \frac{1}{2} \right) > x_{FM}^* && \text{if } a > \frac{1}{2} \\ x_{FW}^* &= \frac{a + \beta a_W}{1 + \beta} + \frac{\beta \alpha}{2(1 + \beta)} \left(a - \frac{1}{2} \right) < x_{FM}^* && \text{if } a < \frac{1}{2} \end{aligned}$$

Proof is given in Appendix A.3. For a given child's ideological ideal point ($a_W = a_M$), the combination of altruism and paternalistic preferences leads fathers to opt for a more extreme policy than when they have a son. The effect depends on the father's view of the world ($a \leq \frac{1}{2}$ or $a \geq \frac{1}{2}$). A left-wing (resp. right-wing) father has a certain idea of the impact such a policy will have on their daughter's welfare. This model sheds light on a mechanism that could explain why fathers do not necessarily become more socially progressive when they have daughters. It can also explain the heterogeneity of treatment effects across periods and across cultural contexts. In particular, if the ideological ideal points a , a_W and a_M have different distributions across countries, i.e., if we observe a large political gender gap or heterogeneity of preferences across generations, we might expect different effects. I investigate this issue in the two following propositions.

In this simple version of the model, I consider β and α as exogenous.²⁷ However, according to the level of paternalism and altruism of fathers, the size of the polarisation effect might vary. This could explain why different studies in different cultural and historical contexts have provided conflicting results on the impact of children's gender on parents' political beliefs.

PROPOSITION 3 (Comparative statics): *For a given child's ideology, polarisation is higher when the direct impact of the policy on the daughter's welfare is large (α high), and when the degree of altruism is high (β high).*

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{d(x_{FW}^* - x_{FM}^*)}{d\alpha} > 0 \text{ and } \frac{d(x_{FW}^* - x_{FM}^*)}{d\beta} > 0 & \text{ if } a > \frac{1}{2} \\ \frac{d(x_{FW}^* - x_{FM}^*)}{d\alpha} < 0 \text{ and } \frac{d(x_{FW}^* - x_{FM}^*)}{d\beta} < 0 & \text{ if } a < \frac{1}{2} \end{aligned}$$

Proof is given in Appendix A.3. α only enters the direct effect of the policy, so the more the direct effect matters in the utility function, the larger the polarisation. β plays a role in both the ideological component and the direct effect of the policy. At a given level of child's ideology ($a_W = a_M$), the ideological component is similar for the fathers of daughters and the

²⁷A potential extension of the model would be to study the formation of paternalistic preferences in a dynamic setting, α being endogenous to parents' personal political types. This is left for future research.

fathers of sons. Therefore, the model predicts that polarisation will be larger in the context of a high degree of altruism.²⁸

Finally, I have shown that the polarisation mechanism holds for a given child's ideology. However, in reality a_W and a_M , the son's and daughter's ideologies, are unlikely to be the same (Edlund and Pande 2002). The next proposition investigates the impact of a gender gap in views toward abortion on the polarisation effect of daughter.

PROPOSITION 4 (Impact of a gender gap in ideologies): *Polarisation is less likely to occur if daughters and sons do not have similar views on abortion.*

$$x_{FW}^* - x_{FM}^* = \left(\frac{\beta}{1+\beta} \right) \left[(a_W - a_M) + \frac{\alpha}{2} \left(a - \frac{1}{2} \right) \right] > 0 \text{ if } a > \frac{1}{2} + \frac{2}{\alpha} (a_W - a_M)$$

$$x_{FW}^* - x_{FM}^* = \left(\frac{\beta}{1+\beta} \right) \left[(a_W - a_M) + \frac{\alpha}{2} \left(a - \frac{1}{2} \right) \right] < 0 \text{ if } a < \frac{1}{2} + \frac{2}{\alpha} (a_W - a_M)$$

Proof is given in the Appendix A.3. This result reflects the importance of the *ideological* effect. When $a_W > a_M$, that is when the daughter is more conservative than the son, left-wing fathers whose ideal points a are in the interval $[\frac{1}{2} - \frac{2}{\alpha}(a_W - a_M); \frac{1}{2}]$ will also switch to a more conservative ideal policy x_{FW}^* when they have a daughter. Conversely, when $a_W < a_M$, the son is more conservative than the daughter. Right-wing fathers whose ideal points a are in the interval $[\frac{1}{2}; \frac{1}{2} - \frac{2}{\alpha}(a_W - a_M)]$ will also switch to a more liberal ideal policy x_{FW}^* when they have a daughter. Therefore, the model predicts that the higher the gender gap in attitudes toward abortion, the less likely the polarisation. I give an empirical test of this proposition in Appendix A.5.

²⁸The present model predicts perfect symmetry in the direction and size of the polarisation effect according to father's ideological type. In Appendix A.4, I provide simple simulations to analyse how father's and children's respective ideologies might affect the size of the polarisation effect. Table 20 and graphical representations in figure 5 suggest that the polarisation effect is expected to be larger in contexts where parents and children share similar ideologies.


5 Conclusion

This paper examines the hypothesis that male politicians' political attitudes toward abortion might respond differently to the presence of a daughter according to their general ideology. I provide evidence of a polarisation effect of daughters on their fathers' attitudes toward abortion using two samples of French and U.S congressmen. These results do not seem to be driven by endogenous political leaning, nor by family composition, and could contribute to reconcile two opposite strands of the literature on the socialisation effect of daughters on their fathers' political views. A simple theoretical model suggests that when fathers have paternalistic preferences with respect to the impact of a policy on their daughter's welfare, they tend to opt for a more polarised political position than when they have a son. As a consequence, these results advocate that future models of transmission of political preferences take into consideration the general political preferences of the parents. Understanding the extent to which paternalistic preferences are endogenously shaped by personal ideology and by different cultural contexts could be a direction for future research. This paper confirms that the socialisation effect of daughters is particularly salient on reproductive rights, but also suggests that when individuals form opinions about a complex societal issue, they might do so in a way that preserves their cultural and political identity.

Figures and tables

Figures


Figure 1: DISTRIBUTION OF VIEWS ON ABORTION - EUROPEAN CITIZENS



Note: The figure shows the percentage of respondents for each score given to the question "How much do you agree with the statement *Women should be free to decide on matters of abortion* on a 0 (totally disagree) to 10 (totally agree) scale". The sample is restricted to male respondents older than 18 with children.

Source: CED-EU14 dataset.


Figure 2: DISTRIBUTION OF VIEWS ON ABORTION - U.S CITIZENS



Note: The figure shows the percentage of respondents for each score given to the question "There has been some discussion about abortion during recent years. Which one of the opinions on this page best agrees with your view on this issue?". The sample is restricted to male respondents older than 18 with children.

Source: Cooperative Congressional Elections Studies 2006.

Figure 3: ACCOUNTABILITY BY PARTISANSHIP



Note: The figure shows the correlation between the percentage of respondents for each score given to the question "There has been some discussion about abortion during recent years. Which one of the opinions on this page best agrees with your view on this issue?" and the average voting behaviour of congressmen on teen access to abortion by state. The x-axis represents the average support for abortion right computed by state on the population of all respondents (male and female) from the CCES. The y-axis corresponds to the average vote of congressmen by state, i.e the average by state of a dummy variable equal to 1 if the congressman voted according to the NOW position on teen access to abortion. The linear fit is provided separately for Democrats and Republicans.

Source: Cooperative Congressional Elections Studies 2006 and Washington (2008)

Tables

Table 1: SUMMARY STATISTICS - 1974 FRENCH CONGRESSPERSONS

	Full sample	Right	Left
<i>Independent variables</i>			
Age	54.79	55.04	54.34
Woman	0.02	0.02	0.02
Substitute	0.11	0.16	0.02
Physician	0.04	0.04	0.03
Total number of children			
Number of children	2.71	2.87	2.29
No child	0.06	0.07	0.02
One child	0.14	0.12	0.22
2 children	0.33	0.28	0.45
3 children	0.21	0.24	0.14
4 children	0.15	0.16	0.12
5 children or more	0.07	0.10	.02
Number of girls	1.35	1.42	1.20
<i>Dependent variables</i>			
Vote Yes abortion Nov. 28, 1974 Law	0.58 (0.02)	0.34 (0.03)	0.99 (0.00)
Vote Yes abortion Dec. 20, 1974 Law after joint committee	0.57 (0.02)	0.32 (0.03)	0.99 (0.00)
N	490	312	178

The table reports summary statistics for the full sample, and for the left-wing and the right-wing Congress persons separately. Source: Author's calculations are from the French Congressperson dataset.

Table 2: POLARISATION EFFECT OF DAUGHTERS ON LEGISLATOR VOTING ON ABORTION LAW

	Vote abortion Nov. 28, 1974		Vote abortion Dec. 20, 1974	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Right-Wing	-0.520*** (0.070)	-0.528*** (0.071)	-0.502*** (0.071)	-0.512*** (0.071)
At least one daughter	-0.030 (0.026)	-0.029 (0.032)	-0.027 (0.025)	-0.031 (0.031)
(At least one daughter)*Right	-0.157** (0.078)	-0.146* (0.081)	-0.205*** (0.078)	-0.194** (0.081)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	426	331	426	331
Adjusted R^2	0.42	0.37	0.45	0.40
Sample mean	0.531	0.575	0.516	0.561

The table presents OLS estimates of the impact of having at least one daughter on the probability of voting "yay" to abortion law, interacted with political affiliation on the sample of French male politicians. The dependent variable is a dummy indicating that a congressman voted for abortion law in the first version (November 28, 1974) and the revised version (December 20, 1974). The coefficient of interest is the interaction of the presence of a daughter with political affiliation. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. In columns (1) and (3), missing values for the number of children are set to zero. Controls include age and age squared, the number of children, and a dummy equal to one when the congressman is a doctor. Abstentions are included in "nay".

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Source: Author's calculations are from the French Congressperson dataset.

Table 3: POLARISATION EFFECT OF THE FIRST DAUGHTER ON LEGISLATOR VOTING ON ABORTION LAW

	Vote abortion Nov. 28, 1974		Vote abortion Dec. 20, 1974	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Right-Wing	-0.521*** (0.0708)	-0.528*** (0.0717)	-0.502*** (0.0713)	-0.514*** (0.0715)
At least one girl	-0.0134 (0.028)	-0.0173 (0.030)	-0.0131 (0.028)	-0.0187 (0.029)
(At least one girl)*Right	-0.174* (0.090)	-0.169* (0.091)	-0.204** (0.091)	-0.200** (0.091)
At least two girls	-0.000 (0.028)	0.002 (0.032)	0.003 (0.028)	-0.001 (0.030)
(At least two girls)*Right	-0.003 (0.083)	0.001 (0.084)	-0.012 (0.082)	-0.011 (0.083)
At least three girls	-0.029 (0.034)	-0.044 (0.068)	-0.029 (0.034)	-0.065 (0.068)
(At least three girls)*Right	0.038 (0.079)	0.093 (0.105)	0.010 (0.077)	0.045 (0.102)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	426	331	426	331
Adjusted R^2	0.414	0.367	0.441	0.392
Sample mean	0.531	0.575	0.516	0.561

The table presents OLS estimates of the impact of each daughter on the probability of voting "yay" to abortion law, interacted with political affiliation on the sample of French male politicians. The dependent variable is a dummy indicating that a congressman voted for abortion law in the first version (November 28, 1974) and the revised version (December 20, 1974). The coefficient of interest is the interaction of the number of daughters with political affiliation. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. In columns (1) and (3), missing values for the number of children are set to zero. Controls include age and age squared, the number of children, and a dummy equal to one when the congressman is a physician. Abstentions are excluded.

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Source: Author's calculations are from the French Congressperson dataset.

Table 4: POLARISATION EFFECT OF DAUGHTER - IV STRATEGY - GENDER OF THE FIRST BORN

	Vote abortion Dec. 20, 1974			
	<i>Sample: Left</i>		<i>Sample: Right</i>	
	OLS	IV	OLS	IV
Number of daughters	0.007 (0.007)	0.001 (0.002)	-0.081* (0.033)	-0.097* (0.053)
Number of children fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	87	87	217	217
Adjusted R^2	0.180	0.177	0.043	0.041
Sample mean	0.994	0.994	0.313	0.313
First stage	Number of daughters		Number of daughters	
First child girl	1.222*** (0.127)		1.202*** (0.104)	
F-stat	41.57		703.76	
Number of children fixed effects	Yes		Yes	
Controls	Yes		Yes	

The table presents OLS and IV estimates of the impact of the number of daughters on congressmen's support for abortion. In each regressions, controls include age (and its square), marital status, a dummy equal to one when the congressman is a doctor and number of children fixed effects. The dependent variable is a dummy indicating that a congressman voted for abortion law in the final version (December 20, 1974). The IV strategy uses the gender of the first child as an instrument for the total number of daughters. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Source: Author's calculations are from the French Congressperson dataset

Table 5: POLARISATION EFFECT OF DAUGHTER ON MALE POLITICIANS' SUPPORT FOR ABORTION

Voting on abortion right					
<i>Panel A: 1974 French Congressmen</i>			<i>Panel B: US Congressmen from Washington (2008)</i>		
	Left	Right		Democrat	Republican
Number of girls	0.007 (0.007)	-0.081* (0.033)	Number of girls	0.0721* (0.038)	-0.010 (0.021)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Controls	Yes	Yes
N	87	217	N	170	212
Adjusted R^2	0.180	0.043	Adjusted R^2	0.389	0.123
Sample mean	0.994	0.313	Sample mean	0.605	0.056
p -value test equality of coefficients	0.009		p -value test equality of coefficients	0.051	

The table presents OLS estimates of the impact of the number of daughters on congressmen's support for abortion. In each regressions, controls include age (and its square), marital status, and number of children fixed effects. In Panel A, the dependent variable is a dummy indicating that a congressman voted for abortion law in the final version (December 20, 1974), and controls also include a dummy equal to one when the congressperson is a doctor. In the first columns, the sample is composed of left-wing congressmen, in the second column of right-wing congressmen. In Panel B, following Washington (2008), the outcome variable is a dummy indicating whether a congressman voted in accordance with the NOW position on teen access to abortion. Controls include race, party, service length (and its square) religion, region fixed effect, and percent of two-party district votes in favor of the most recent Democratic presidential candidate. The sample is composed of Democrat congressmen in the third column and of Republican congressmen in the last column. Robust standard errors in parentheses. The P-value of the test of equality of coefficients between the two political affiliations is reported below.

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Source: Author's calculations are from the French Congressperson dataset and Washington (2008)'s dataset.

Table 6: POLARISATION EFFECT OF DAUGHTER ON SUPPORT FOR ABORTION - CITIZENS

Attitudes toward abortion right					
<i>Panel A: European citizens (CED-EU14)</i>			<i>Panel B: US citizens (CCES)</i>		
	Liberal	Conservative		Liberal	Conservative
Number of girls	0.0283** (0.008)	-0.005 (0.011)	Number of girls	0.046* (0.024)	-0.005 (0.013)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Controls	Yes	Yes
Country FE	Yes	Yes			
N	1845	3895	N	2110	1151
Adjusted R^2	0.046	0.029	Adjusted R^2	0.152	0.036
Sample mean	0.500	0.370	Sample mean	0.577	0.134
p -value test equality of coefficients		0.084	p -value test equality of coefficients		0.054

The table presents OLS estimates of the impact of the number of daughters on men's support for abortion. In each regressions, controls include age (and its square), marital status, and number of children fixed effects. In the European dataset (CED-EU14) in Panel A, the dependent variable is a dummy variable indicating that the respondent fully agrees (score 10 out of 10) with the statement on abortion. Controls include country fixed effects, a dummy for each category of household income and educational levels. In the American dataset (CCES 2006) in Panel B, the dependent variable is a dummy equal to one if the respondent declares that "by law, a woman should always be able to have an abortion as a matter of personal choice". Controls include educational level, employment status, family income, race, religious practices and home ownership. Standard errors are clustered at the country level for the European dataset. The P-value of the test of equality of coefficients between the two political affiliations is reported below.

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Source: Author's calculations are from the CED-EU14 and the CCES 2006 datasets.

Table 7: POLARISATION EFFECT BY AGE OF THE DAUGHTER - AMERICAN CITIZENS

Attitudes toward abortion right					
<i>Panel A: Oldest child between 0-11</i>			<i>Panel B: Oldest child older than 12</i>		
	Liberal	Conservative		Liberal	Conservative
Number of girls	0.041 (0.037)	-0.033 (0.022)	Number of girls	0.065** (0.032)	0.016 (0.016)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Controls	Yes	Yes
N	437	483	N	516	658
Adjusted R^2	0.11	0.05	Adjusted R^2	0.18	0.04
Sample mean	0.581	0.114	Sample mean	0.515	0.111
p -value test equality of coefficients	0.079		p -value test equality of coefficients	0.150	

The table presents OLS estimates of the impact of the number of daughters on men's support for abortion by political affiliation and by age of the children. The sample is composed of American male respondents (CCES 2006) whose oldest child is younger than 12 (Panel A) or older than 12 (Panel B). In each regressions, controls include age (and its square), marital status, number of children fixed effects, educational level, employment status, family income, race, religious practices and home ownership. The dependent variable is a dummy equal to one if the respondent declares that "by law, a woman should always be able to have an abortion as a matter of personal choice". Robust standard errors in parentheses. The P-value of the test of equality of coefficients between the two political affiliations is reported below.

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Source: Author's calculations are from the CCES 2006 dataset.

Table 8: CITIZEN CANDIDATE MODEL

Vote for abortion ban if elected in congress		
<i>Panel: US citizens (CCES)</i>		
	Liberal	Conservative
Number of girls	-0.0535** (0.023)	-0.0018 (0.0133)
Controls	Yes	Yes
Country FE	Yes	Yes
N	1164	1252
Adjusted R^2	0.00	0.01
Sample mean	0.324	0.824
<i>p</i> -value test equality of coefficients	0.048	

The table presents OLS estimates of the impact of the number of daughters on men's support for abortion if they were in the situation of voting in congress, on the sample of male American respondents (CCES 2006) and by ideology (liberal or conservative). The dependent variable is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the respondent declares that he would vote for a proposal to ban a type of late-term abortion called "partial-birth abortion" that could open to a broader ban on abortion if he were faced with this decision. In each regressions, controls include age (and its square), marital status, number of children fixed effects, a dummy for each category of household income and educational levels, employment status, family income, race, religious practices and home ownership. Robust standard errors in parentheses. The P-value of the test of equality of coefficients between the two political affiliations is reported below.

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Source: Author's calculations are from the CCES 2006 datasets.

Table 9: EFFECT OF THE PRESENCE OF A DAUGHTER ON LEGISLATOR VOTING BEHAVIOUR

	Vote abortion Nov, 1974		Vote abortion Dec, 1974		Vote divorce June, 1975		Vote death penalty Sept, 1981		Vote abortion Dec, 2000	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Right-Wing	-0.520*** (0.070)	-0.528*** (0.071)	-0.502*** (0.071)	-0.512*** (0.071)	-0.273*** (0.078)	-0.258*** (0.080)	-0.730*** (0.074)	-0.729*** (0.076)	-0.952*** (0.034)	-0.953*** (0.034)
At least one daughter	-0.030 (0.026)	-0.029 (0.032)	-0.027 (0.025)	-0.031 (0.031)	-0.020 (0.048)	-0.008 (0.055)	-0.006 (0.012)	-0.020 (0.018)	0.008 (0.006)	-0.003 (0.004)
(At least one daughter)*Right	-0.157*** (0.078)	-0.146* (0.081)	-0.205*** (0.078)	-0.194** (0.081)	0.038 (0.086)	0.079 (0.091)	-0.002 (0.080)	-0.008 (0.0782)	0.005 (0.039)	0.019 (0.039)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	426	331	426	331	326	421	425	344	548	402
Adjusted R^2	0.42	0.37	0.45	0.40	0.09	0.07	0.69	0.69	0.900	0.905
Sample mean	0.531	0.575	0.516	0.561	0.783	0.774	0.728	0.707	0.532	0.589

The table presents OLS estimates of the impact of having at least one daughter on voting behavior, interacted with right-wing political affiliation. The dependent variable is a dummy variable indicating that a congressperson voted for various laws: abortion law in the first version (November 28, 1974) and second version (December 20, 1974) in columns (1) to (4) when abstentions are excluded, divorce law in the first version (June 4, 1975) in columns (5) and (6), death penalty (September 18, 1981) in columns (7) and (8) in columns (9) and (10). In columns (5) to (10), abstentions are included in "nay". The coefficient of interest is the interaction of the presence of a daughter interacted with right-wing political affiliation. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. The uneven columns display results when missing values for the number of children are set to zero. Controls include age and age squared, the number of children, and a dummy equal to one when the congressperson is a physician.

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Source: Author's calculations are from the Congressperson dataset.

Table 10: ROBUSTNESS TEST: SAME SEX RATIO - FRENCH CONGRESSPERSONS

	Probability to have a third child					
	1973-1978 legislature		1962-1967 to 1978-1981 legislatures			
	(1)	(2)	All		Right	
(3)			(4)	(5)	(6)	
First two children girls	0.053 (0.077)	0.053 (0.077)	0.049 (0.035)	0.013 (0.050)	-0.027 (0.040)	-0.043 (0.055)
First two children boys	0.065 (0.076)	0.063 (0.076)	0.028 (0.035)	0.022 (0.049)	-0.022 (0.039)	-0.012 (0.052)
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Observations	248	247	1,137	577	880	471
Adjusted R^2	-0.004	-0.007	0.000	0.002	-0.002	0.009
Pre-treatment mean	0.584	0.584	0.593	0.593	0.635	0.635

The table presents OLS estimates of the impact of the sex of the two first children on the probability to have a third child. The sample is restricted to congresspersons with at least two children. In columns (1) and (2), the sample is composed of congresspersons from the 1973-1978 legislature only. In columns (3) and (4), the sample is composed of congresspersons from legislatures 1962-1967, 1968-1973, 1973-1978 and 1978-1981. In columns (5) and (6), the sample is restricted to the right-wing legislators of these legislatures. The dependent variable is a dummy indicating that a congressperson has three children. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. The even columns include controls for age, gender, and marital status. Regressions in columns (4) to (6) also include a control for tenure in office.

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Source: Author's calculations are from the Congressperson dataset.

Table 11: ROBUSTNESS TEST: SAME SEX RATIO - CCES

	Probability to have			
	At least a second child		At least a third child	
	Liberal	Conservative	Liberal	Conservative
First child girl	-0.016 (0.022)	-0.036 (0.023)		
<i>p</i> -value test equality of coefficients	0.545			
First two children girls			0.035 (0.038)	-0.038 (0.039)
First two children boys			0.067* (0.036)	-0.038 (0.037)
<i>p</i> -value test equality of coefficients			0.178	
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	2,124	1,852	1,088	1,121
Adjusted R^2	0.03	0.04	0.00	0.01
Sample means	0.511	0.605	0.309	0.374

The table presents OLS estimates of the impact of the sex of the first child on the probability to have at least a second child in columns (1) and (2), and of the two first children in columns (3) and (4) on the probability to have at least a third child. In columns (1) and (2), the sample is restricted to male respondents with at least one child and the dependent variable is a dummy indicating that the respondent has at least two children. In columns (3) and (4) with at least two children and the dependent variable is a dummy indicating that the respondent has three children. In columns (1) and (3), the sample is composed of liberal respondents (those who replied "very liberal" to "moderate" to the ideological self-placement question), in columns (2) and (4) the sample is limited to conservative respondents (those who replied "conservative" or "very conservative"). In each columns, controls include gender, age, age squared, educational level, employment status, family income, religious practices and home ownership. The P-value of the test of equality of coefficients between the two political samples is reported below.

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Source: Author's calculations are from the Congressperson dataset.

Table 12: BALANCING TEST - FATHERS OF ONE SON/ONE DAUGHTER

	One son	One daughter	Difference
Sociodemographic characteristics			
Low level of education	0.12	0.11	-0.00
Middle level of education	0.62	0.61	-0.01
High level of education	0.26	0.27	0.01
Age	50.36	50.80	0.44
Number of children	1	1	0.000
Married	0.59	0.60	0.00
Intensive religious practice	0.221	0.230	-0.009
Paid work	0.59	0.58	-0.01
Unemployed	0.09	0.09	0.00
Political opinions			
Importance for country: tax burden	5.99	6.00	-0.01
Importance for country: public debts and deficits	8.04	8.02	0.02
Left-Right	4.84	4.77	0.07
Immigration threat for jobs	6.95	7.05	-0.10
Pro Choice	0.48	0.49	-0.01
Household income			
Less than 750 euro a month	0.06	0.05	-0.02**
751-1000	0.07	0.08	0.01
1001-1500	0.15	0.15	-0.00
1501-1750	0.08	0.09	0.01
1751-2000	0.10	0.10	-0.00
2001-2500	0.12	0.13	0.02
2501-3000	0.12	0.11	-0.00
3001-4000	0.11	0.12	0.01
4001-5000	0.06	0.05	-0.01
5001-7000	0.03	0.03	0.00
7001-10000	0.01	0.01	-0.00
More than 10001 euro a month	0.01	0.00	-0.00
Observations		4316	

The table compares the characteristics of fathers of one son or one daughter, who are older than 25. In the first two columns, each cell reports the sample mean of different sociodemographic characteristics, political opinions and household income, in columns (1) for the sample of fathers of one son and in column (2) for the sample of fathers of one daughter. Column (3) reports the difference between the sample means.

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Source: Author's calculations are from the CED-EU14 dataset.

Table 13: BALANCING TEST - FATHERS OF ONE SON/ONE DAUGHTER - CCES

	One son	One daughter	Difference	N
Sociodemographic characteristics				
Age	45.71	45.63	-0.07	1891
White	0.78	0.78	-0.01	1891
Number of children	1.00	1.00	0.00	1891
Married	0.78	0.76	-0.02	1886
Full-time	0.65	0.69	0.04**	1884
Educational level				
No high school	0.02	0.02	0.00	1862
High school graduate	0.19	0.20	0.01	1862
Some college	0.33	0.31	-0.02	1862
2-year college	0.14	0.13	-0.01	1862
4-year college	0.19	0.21	0.02	1862
post graduate	0.13	0.12	-0.00	1862
Household income in US dollars				
less than 10,000	0.01	0.02	0.01	1861
10,000 - 14,999	0.01	0.02	0.01**	1861
15,000 - 19,999	0.02	0.02	0.00	1861
20,000 - 24,999	0.03	0.03	-0.00	1861
25,000 - 29,999	0.03	0.03	0.00	1861
30,000 - 39,999	0.06	0.07	0.01	1861
40,000 - 49,999	0.10	0.09	-0.01	1861
50,000 - 59,999	0.08	0.08	-0.01	1861
60,000 - 69,999	0.09	0.07	-0.02	1861
70,000 - 79,999	0.10	0.10	0.00	1861
80,000 - 99,999	0.13	0.13	0.00	1861
100,000 - 119,999	0.10	0.11	0.00	1861
120,000 - 149,999	0.07	0.06	-0.00	1861
150,000 or more	0.08	0.10	0.02	1861
Prefer not to say	0.11	0.09	-0.02	1861

The table compares the characteristics of fathers of one son or one daughter, who are older than 18. In the first two columns, each cell reports the sample mean of different sociodemographic characteristics, political opinions and household income, in columns (1) for the sample of fathers of one son and in column (2) for the sample of fathers of one daughter. Column (3) reports the difference between the sample means.

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Source: Author's calculations are from the CCES 2006 dataset.

Table 14: FALSIFICATION TEST

	Support for abortion	Attitudes toward tax burden	Public debt	Immigration	Same-sex marriage	Right-wing affiliation
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Proportion of daughters	0.0510* (0.0289)	0.0157 (0.0277)	0.00357 (0.0158)	0.0254 (0.0238)	-0.0109 (0.0274)	0.0000 (0.0158)
(Proportion of daughters)*Right	-0.0612* (0.0350)	-0.0279 (0.0321)	-0.00753 (0.0184)	-0.0302 (0.0278)	-0.0196 (0.0338)	
Right	-0.1000*** (0.0220)	0.126*** (0.0203)	0.0306*** (0.0116)	0.0902*** (0.0179)	-0.247*** (0.0214)	
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	5,740	5,394	5,717	5,626	5,733	5,761
Adjusted R^2	0.037	0.039	0.013	0.024	0.097	0.014
Sample mean	0.435	0.781	0.937	0.830	0.486	0.678

The table presents OLS estimates of the impact of the proportion of daughters on a series of opinion measures. Column (1) presents the baseline regression, for which the dependent variable is a dummy indicating that the respondent fully agrees (score 10 out of 10) with the statement "Women should be free to have an abortion". In column (2), the dependent variable is a dummy variable indicating that the respondent agrees (score from 5 to 10 out of 10) with the statement "Tax burden is an important issue for the country". In column (3), the dependent variable is a dummy variable indicating that the respondent agrees (score from 5 to 10 out of 10) with the statement "Public debts and deficits are an important issue for the country". In column (4), the dependent variable is a dummy variable indicating that the respondent agrees (score from 5 to 10 out of 10) with the statement "Immigration is an important issue for the country". In column (5), the dependent variable is a dummy variable indicating that the respondent agrees (score from 5 to 10 out of 10) with the statement "Same sex marriage should not be authorized". Finally, in column (6) presents the effect ratio between the number of daughters and the total number of children on right-wing political affiliation, proxied by a dummy variable equal to one if the respondent answers with a score greater or equal 5 to the question "How would you place yourself on a Left-Right scale from 0 to 10?". The coefficients of interest are the proportion of daughters, and the proportion of daughters interacted with political affiliation, except in column (6). Political affiliation is proxied by a dummy equal to one if the respondent answers with a score greater or equal to 5 to the question "How would you place yourself on a Left-Right scale from 0 to 10?". Robust standard errors are in parentheses. The model is estimated on the sample of men older than 18. In all specifications, controls include political affiliation, the number of children, age, age squared, and country fixed effects.

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Source: Author's calculations are from the CED-EU14 dataset.

Table 15: ELECTORAL COST OF THE POLARISATION EFFECT

<i>Panel: 1974 French Congressmen</i>	Re-run		Vote share 1st round		Reelection	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Vote "yea" to 1974 abortion law	-0.0504 (0.061)	-0.0797 (0.069)	-2.595 (2.041)	-1.745 (2.266)	-0.104 (0.067)	-0.0514 (0.077)
Number of daughters	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Number of children FE	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	286	218	185	147	185	147
Adjusted R^2	0.087	0.078	0.029	-0.040	0.036	-0.042
Sample mean	0.6416	0.6416	40.99	40.99	0.7664	0.7664

The table presents OLS estimates of the electoral cost of the polarisation effect of daughters on the 1974 abortion vote on the sample of right-wing congressmen. The dependent variables are the probability of re-running in the 1978 parliamentary elections (columns 1 and 2), the vote share obtained for the first round of the election (columns 3 and 4) and the probability of winning conditional on re-running (column 5 and 6). The coefficient of interest is a dummy indicating that the congressman voted for abortion law in the revised version (December 20, 1974). Abstentions are included in "nay". Controls include age and age squared, marital status, and in columns 2, 4 and 6 the number of daughters, and number of children fixed effects. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Source: Author's calculations are from the French Congressperson dataset and Pons and Tricaud (2017)

Table 16: POLARISATION EFFECT OF DAUGHTERS AND ATTITUDES OF THE CONSTITUENCY

Voting on abortion right		
<i>Panel: US Congressmen from Washington (2008)</i>		
	Liberal	Conservative
Number of girls	0.0861* (0.0461)	-0.0215 (0.0255)
Number of girls*(State w/ low support for abortion right)	-0.0199 (0.0701)	0.0228 (0.0316)
State w/ low support for abortion right	-0.0825 (0.1303)	-0.0057 (0.0710)
Controls	Yes	Yes
N	170	212
Adjusted R^2	0.39	0.12
Sample mean	0.605	0.056
in state w/ low support for abortion right	0.384	0.043
in state w/ high support for abortion right	0.793	0.071
p -value test equality of coefficients [Number of girls]	0.0256	

The table presents OLS estimates of the impact of the number of daughters on congressmen's support for abortion. In each regressions, controls include age (and its square), marital status, number of children fixed effects, race, party, service length (and its square) religion, region fixed effect, and percent of two-party district votes in favor of the most recent Democratic presidential candidate. The number of daughters is interacted with a dummy equal to one if the representative comes from a state whose average support for abortion is below median. The average support for abortion by state is a standardized measure derived from the CCES 2006 dataset on the sample of adult respondents (irrespective of gender). The median is computed separately for Republicans and Democrats. Following Washington (2008), the outcome variable is a dummy indicating whether a congressman voted in accordance with the NOW position on teen access to abortion. The sample is composed of Democratic congressmen in the first column and of Republican congressmen in the second column. Robust standard errors in parentheses. The P-value of the test of equality of coefficients between the two political affiliations is reported below.

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Source: Author's calculations are from Washington (2008)'s dataset and the CCES 2006 dataset.

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A Appendix (not for publication)

A.1 French parliamentary system: background

Three types of votes exist at the French National Assembly:

- "Show of hands" (the most frequent one). In this case, there is no record, only whether the law was adopted or not.
- Open votes (*scrutins publics*). The total number of votes is recorded, as well as voters who deviated from the majority vote of their party.
- Roll-call votes (*scrutins solennels*). This is the category of votes I can use.

The choice of votes that are public roll-call is not random. Votes on current affairs are adopted by show of hands. However: this potential bias should not overestimate the effect too much: preferences are revealed, strong polarisation. Votes are obtained and registered from the *Journal Officiel*. The date of vote differs from the date of publication in the *Journal Officiel*, so I had to report the vote date using the register from the *Table des lois*. I investigated several votes for the same law.

Table 17: **Vth and VIth legislatures**


	# of votes	Average turnout	# of days	# of MNA	Government	Parties in Government
V (1973-1978)	88	0.97	1826	490	Right	6
VI (1978-1981)	87	0.97	1145	491	Right	2

Note: The table presents OLS estimates of the impact of having at least one daughter on support for divorce law, interacted with political affiliation. The dependent variable is a dummy indicating that a congressperson voted for divorce law in the first version (June 4, 1975). The coefficient of interest is the interaction of the presence of a daughter with political affiliation. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. In columns (2) and (4), missing values for the number of children are set to zero. Controls include age and age squared, the number of children, gender, and a dummy equal to one when the congressperson is a physician. Abstentions are included in "nay".

Source: Godbout and Foucault (2013)

A.2 Additional tables and figures

Figure 4: GENDER GAP IN SUPPORT FOR ABORTION ACROSS COUNTRY



Note: The figure shows the average support for abortion views by gender and across country. For American respondents in the 2006 CCES dataset, it corresponds to the percentage of respondents who declare that "by law, a woman should always be able to have an abortion as a matter of personal choice". For European respondents in the CED-EU14 dataset, it corresponds to the percentage of respondents who totally agree with the statement "women should be free to decide on matters of abortion". Confidence intervals are at the 95% level.

Source: CED-EU14 and CCES datasets.

Table 18: VOTE BY PARTY - 1974 ABORTION LAW

Vote abortion Nov. 28, 1974 Law	Left	Right	Total
Abstention	0	6	6
Not present	0	5	5
Nay	0	189	189
Not voting	1	5	6
Yea	178	106	284
Total	179	311	490

Vote abortion Dec. 20, 1974 Law after joint committee	Left	Right	Total
Abstention	0	11	11
Nay	0	192	192
Not voting	1	9	10
Yea	178	99	277
Total	179	311	490

The table reports votes from the left-wing and the right-wing on two versions of the abortion law: November 28, 1974 and December 20, 1974 after the law was examined by a joint committee. The French Parliamentary system makes a distinction between Congress persons who abstain and those who are not voting.

Source: Author's calculations are from the Congressperson dataset.

Table 19: POLARISATION EFFECT OF DAUGHTER ON SUPPORT FOR ABORTION - MULTINOMIAL LOGIT

	Support for abortion				
	[0 Fully disagree]	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]
Proportion of daughters	0.390 (0.487)	-0.281 (0.696)	0.869 (0.678)	1.216*** (0.462)	-0.544 (0.632)
(Proportion of daughters)*Right	-0.791 (0.542)	0.154 (0.782)	-0.839 (0.741)	-1.260** (0.541)	0.136 (0.699)
Right	0.877*** (0.332)	0.307 (0.459)	0.788 (0.479)	0.249 (0.364)	-0.059 (0.355)
	[6]	[7]	[8]	[9]	[10 Fully agree]
Proportion of daughters	0.339 (0.372)	0.561* (0.314)	0.336 (0.267)	0.291 (0.273)	0.516** (0.226)
(Proportion of daughters)*Right	-0.179 (0.429)	-0.194 (0.360)	-0.294 (0.314)	-0.168 (0.325)	-0.543** (0.264)
Right	-0.136 (0.262)	-0.101 (0.224)	-0.262 (0.190)	-0.653*** (0.195)	-0.496*** (0.156)
	Controls			Yes	
	Observations			5,740	
	Pseudo R^2			0.0164	
	Wald $\chi^2(60)$			323.49	

The table presents multinomial logit regression estimates of the impact of the proportion of daughters on the support for abortion. Each discrete value corresponds to the answer, from 0 "Fully disagree" to 10 "Fully agree", to the question "Women should be free to have an abortion". The reference category for the multinomial logit is 5. The coefficient of interest is the ratio between the number of daughters and the total number of children, interacted with political affiliation. Political affiliation is proxied by a dummy equal to one if the respondent answers with a score greater or equal to 5 to the question "How would you place yourself on a Left-Right scale from 0 to 10?". Robust standard errors are in parentheses. The model is estimated on the sample of men older than 18. Controls include political affiliation, age, age squared, and the number of children.

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Source: Author's calculations are from the CED-EU14 dataset.

A.3 Mathematical Appendix

Proof of Proposition 1 The father maximises his utility over x

$$\max_x u_{FM}(x) = \max_x \{-(a-x)^2 + \beta [-(a_M-x)^2]\}$$

Differentiating u_{FM} with respect to x , we find the optimal political position

$$x_{FM}^* = \frac{a + \beta a_M}{1 + \beta}$$

We then derive that

$$\frac{a + \beta a_M}{1 + \beta} > a \Leftrightarrow a_M > a$$

and

$$\frac{a + \beta a_M}{1 + \beta} < a \Leftrightarrow a_M < a$$

If the father cares about his son's welfare ($\beta > 0$), he will then move to his son's ideal point. Finally, when the father and the son share the same preferences, father's utility is maximised at a .

Proof of Proposition 2 First we investigate the feasible set of a_W to characterise interior solutions both for the daughter's and the father's maximisation problem.

Maximising daughter's utility, one finds:

$$x_W^* = a_W \left(1 + \frac{\alpha}{2}\right) - \frac{\alpha}{4}$$

For x_W^* to be an interior solution, we need that

$$0 < a_W \left(1 + \frac{\alpha}{2}\right) - \frac{\alpha}{4} < 1$$

This is true if and only if

$$a_W > \frac{1}{\frac{4}{\alpha} + 2} \text{ and } a_W < \frac{4 + \alpha}{4 + 2\alpha}$$

For the simplest case ($\alpha = 1$), we find interior solutions for $a_W \in \left[\frac{1}{6}, \frac{5}{6}\right]$.

The father maximises his utility over x

$$\max_x u_{FW}(x) = \max_x \left\{ -(a-x)^2 + \beta \left[-(a_W-x)^2 + \alpha \left(a - \frac{1}{2} \right) x \right] \right\}$$

When considering the utility function of this daughter, he takes into account her ideology a_W but chooses his own parameter a to evaluate the cost/benefit such a policy could have on the daughter's welfare.

Assuming interior solutions, we differentiate u_{FW} with respect to x and find the optimal political position:

$$x_{FW}^* = \frac{a + \beta a_W}{1 + \beta} + \frac{\beta \alpha}{2(1 + \beta)} \left(a - \frac{1}{2} \right)$$

The left-hand term is identical to the optimal policy in the case of a son. Here, we assume positive values for both α and β . When $a > \frac{1}{2}$, i.e., when the father is right-wing, it is straightforward to see that the right-hand term is positive. Therefore for a given ideological ideal point of the child ($a_M = a_W$), the optimal position of a girl's father is more right-wing than that of a boy's father. Similarly, when $a < \frac{1}{2}$, the right-hand term is negative, therefore the optimal policy of a girl's father is to the left of the optimal policy of a boy's father. Therefore,

$$\begin{aligned} x_{FW}^* &= \frac{a + \beta a_W}{1 + \beta} + \frac{\beta \alpha}{2(1 + \beta)} \left(a - \frac{1}{2} \right) > x_{FM}^* & \text{if } a > \frac{1}{2} \\ x_{FW}^* &= \frac{a + \beta a_W}{1 + \beta} + \frac{\beta \alpha}{2(1 + \beta)} \left(a - \frac{1}{2} \right) < x_{FM}^* & \text{if } a < \frac{1}{2} \end{aligned}$$

For x_{FW}^* to be an interior solution, we need that

$$0 < \frac{a + \beta a_W}{1 + \beta} + \frac{\beta \alpha}{2(1 + \beta)} \left(a - \frac{1}{2} \right) < 1$$

This is true if and only if

$$a_W > \frac{\alpha}{4} - a \left(\frac{\alpha}{2} + \frac{1}{\beta} \right) \text{ and } a_W < \frac{1 + \beta}{\beta} + \frac{\alpha}{4} - a \left(\frac{\alpha}{2} + \frac{1}{\beta} \right)$$

Given that the utility function is an inverse U-shaped function over R , we characterise the corner solutions as follows:

$$\begin{aligned} x_{FW}^* = 0 & \quad \text{if } a_W \leq \frac{\alpha}{4} - a \left(\frac{\alpha}{2} + \frac{1}{\beta} \right) \\ x_{FW}^* = 1 & \quad \text{if } a_W \geq \frac{1 + \beta}{\beta} + \frac{\alpha}{4} - a \left(\frac{\alpha}{2} + \frac{1}{\beta} \right) \end{aligned}$$

Let us take a simple case, to study the consequences of these restrictions for the set of feasible a_W .

If $\alpha = \beta = 1$, a_W has to be in the interval $[\frac{1}{4}, \frac{3}{4}]$. Therefore, we find interior solutions for non-extreme values of the daughter's ideological ideal point.

Proof of Proposition 3 The polarisation effect is measured by:

$$x_{FW}^* - x_{FM}^* = \frac{\beta \alpha}{2(1 + \beta)} \left(a - \frac{1}{2} \right)$$

Assuming interior solutions, the comparative statics for β writes

$$\frac{d(x_{FW}^* - x_{FM}^*)}{d\beta} = \frac{2\alpha}{[2(1 + \beta)]^2} \left(a - \frac{1}{2} \right)$$

For any strictly positive value of α ,

$$\begin{aligned}\frac{d(x_{FW}^* - x_{FM}^*)}{d\beta} &> 0 \quad \text{if } a > \frac{1}{2} \\ \frac{d(x_{FW}^* - x_{FM}^*)}{d\beta} &< 0 \quad \text{if } a < \frac{1}{2}\end{aligned}$$

Assuming interior solutions, polarisation increases with the level of altruism. Finally,

$$\frac{d(x_{FW}^* - x_{FM}^*)}{d\alpha} = \frac{\beta}{2(1+\beta)} \left(a - \frac{1}{2} \right)$$

Therefore, with $\beta > 0$

$$\begin{aligned}\frac{d(x_{FW}^* - x_{FM}^*)}{d\alpha} &> 0 \quad \text{if } a > \frac{1}{2} \\ \frac{d(x_{FW}^* - x_{FM}^*)}{d\alpha} &< 0 \quad \text{if } a < \frac{1}{2}\end{aligned}$$

Assuming interior solutions, polarisation is larger when the direct impact of the policy on the daughter's welfare is large (α high).

Proof of Proposition 4 The polarisation effect is now measured by:

$$x_{FW}^* - x_{FM}^* = \left(\frac{\beta}{1+\beta} \right) \left[(a_W - a_M) + \frac{\alpha}{2} \left(a - \frac{1}{2} \right) \right]$$

Let $g = a_W - a_M$ be the gender gap in preferences. When g is positive, the daughter is more conservative than the son. The quantity $x_{FW}^* - x_{FM}^*$ can be written as a function $f(g)$ such that

$$f(g) = \left(\frac{\beta}{1+\beta} \right) \left[g + \frac{\alpha}{2} \left(a - \frac{1}{2} \right) \right]$$

For a given g , $f(g) = 0$ when $a = \frac{1}{2} - \frac{2}{\alpha}g$. When $g > 0$, that is when the daughter is more conservative than the son, $f(g) < 0$ for values of a such that $a < \frac{1}{2} - \frac{2}{\alpha}g$. Left-wing fathers whose ideal points a are in the interval $[\frac{1}{2} - \frac{2}{\alpha}g; \frac{1}{2}]$ will also switch to a more conservative ideal policy x_{FW}^* when they have a daughter, because of the importance of the *ideological* effect.

Conversely, when $g < 0$, that is when the son is more conservative than the daughter, $f(g) > 0$ for values of a such that $a > \frac{1}{2} - \frac{2}{\alpha}g$. Right-wing fathers whose ideal points a are in the interval $[\frac{1}{2}; \frac{1}{2} - \frac{2}{\alpha}g]$ will also switch to a more liberal ideal policy x_{FW}^* when they have a daughter. Therefore, when $|g| > 0$, the polarisation effect of daughter is reduced. The higher the gender gap in attitudes toward abortion, the less likely polarisation.

A.4 Simulation results




Table 20: **Model - Simulations**


Parameters	a	a_M	a_W	$argmax(u_{FW}(x))$	$argmax(u_{FM}(x))$	Polarisation size	Polarisation direction
$\alpha = 0.5$	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.2833	0.3	0.025	Left
	0.3	0.8	0.8	0.45	0.4667	0.0167	Right
$\beta = 0.5$	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.825	0.8	0.025	Right
	0.8	0.3	0.3	0.6583	0.6333	0.0167	Left

Note: The table presents results of simulations of the model presented in section 4.

The polarisation size corresponds to the difference between $|argmax(u_{FW}(x)) - argmax(u_{FM}(x))|$. Under specific assumptions for the parameter α and β , the polarisation effect is larger when father and offspring share similar ideological types ex-ante.

Figure 5: MODEL PREDICTIONS - GRAPHICAL ANALYSIS





The figures show the polarisation effect of daughters for different values of father's and offspring's ideology. In each graph, the solid line represents the utility function of a father of a daughter, and the dash line the utility function of a father of a son. Daughter and son share the same ideology ($a_W = a_M$). The first graph (blue lines) represents the situation in which both father and child are on the right of the political spectrum ($a_W = a_M = a = 0.8$). The father of a daughter's ideal point is at the right of the father of a son's ideal point (polarisation to the right). Conversely, the second graph (red lines) represents the polarisation to the left which occurs when father and child are on the left of the political spectrum ($a_W = a_M = a = 0.3$). Finally, the last two graphs show what happens when the father and the child do not share the same political preferences. In both cases, the polarisation effect occurs. For all simulations, the level of altruism β and the relative weight of the direct effect of the policy on welfare α are both set to 0.5.


A.5 Empirical test of Proposition 4

Proposition 4 of the model suggests that polarisation is less likely to occur if daughters and sons do not have similar views on abortion. As I cannot observe this variation for the same individual, I take advantage of the differing gaps between males and females in views on abortion across different countries, as shown in Figure 4.²⁹ I try to test the prediction of Proposition 4 in Figure 6. I compute for each country the difference between the percentage of women and the percentage of men who fully agree with the proposition "Women should be free to decide on matters of abortion" (score 10) from the sample of respondents younger than 25 years-old.³⁰ The x-axis corresponds to the gender gap in attitudes toward abortion of the "children". The y-axis corresponds to the polarisation effect obtained from the coefficient β_2 from specification (2) on the sample of male respondents older than 25 ("the fathers"). A negative and significant coefficient corresponds to the presence of a polarisation effect. Again, sample size limits the interpretation, but the figure provides suggestive evidence that polarisation is more likely to be observed in a context of low gender gap in attitudes toward abortion.

²⁹The difference between men's and women's political preferences has already been pointed out by Edlund and Pande (2002) in the American context.

³⁰Changing this age-threshold does not significantly affect the results.

Figure 6: POLARISATION EFFECT AND GENDER GAP IN ATTITUDES TOWARD ABORTION



Note: The figure shows the correlation between the polarisation effect of daughters and the gender gap in attitudes toward abortion. The y-axis corresponds to the polarisation effect of daughters. Coefficients correspond to the β_2 coefficient of specification 1. They are derived from an OLS regression by country with robust standard errors on the sample of male respondents older than 25 years-old. Controls include the number of children, age and age squared. Confidence intervals are at the 95% level. The x-axis corresponds to the difference between young women's and young men's views on abortion. For the European countries, each gender gap is computed at the country-level from the sample of respondents younger than 25 years-old, and corresponds to the difference between the percentage of women and the percentage of men who fully agree with the proposition "Women should be free to decide on matters of abortion" (score 10). For the U.S, the gender gap corresponds to the difference between the percentage of women and the percentage of men who declare that "by law, a woman should always be able to have an abortion as a matter of personal choice". The measure of political affiliation (right-wing) is measured by responses on their position on the ideological spectrum. A respondent is considered conservative if she gives a response equal to 4 or 5 on a spectrum from very liberal (1) to very conservative (5).

Source: CED-EU14 dataset and CCES 2006.