

A Service of

ZBW

Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft Leibniz Information Centre for Economics

Lutz, Stefan

Working Paper R&D, IP, and firm profits in the North American automotive supplier industry

Working Paper Series: Business and Law, No. 12

Provided in Cooperation with: Faculty of Business and Law, Frankfurt University of Applied Sciences

Suggested Citation: Lutz, Stefan (2018) : R&D, IP, and firm profits in the North American automotive supplier industry, Working Paper Series: Business and Law, No. 12, Frankfurt University of Applied Sciences, Frankfurt Research Institute for Business and Law, Frankfurt a. M.

This Version is available at: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/176682

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:

Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.

Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.

Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte.

Terms of use:

Documents in EconStor may be saved and copied for your personal and scholarly purposes.

You are not to copy documents for public or commercial purposes, to exhibit the documents publicly, to make them publicly available on the internet, or to distribute or otherwise use the documents in public.

If the documents have been made available under an Open Content Licence (especially Creative Commons Licences), you may exercise further usage rights as specified in the indicated licence.



WWW.ECONSTOR.EU



Institut für wirtschafts- und rechtswissenschaftliche Forschung **Frankfurt** Research Institute for Business and Law



Working Paper Series: Business and Law

Working Paper No. 12

R&D, IP, and firm profits in the North American automotive supplier industry

Stefan Lutz

März 2018

Fachbereich 3 Wirtschaft und Recht | Business and Law

R&D, IP, and firm profits in the North American automotive supplier industry^{*}

Stefan Lutz¹

European Management School Mainz, Universidad Complutense de Madrid, and Frankfurt University of Applied Sciences

27 March 2018

Economic theory implies that research and development (R&D) efforts increase firm productivity and ultimately profits. In particular, R&D expenses lead to the development of intellectual property (IP) and IP commands a return that increases overall profits of the firm.

This hypothesis is investigated for the North American automotive supplier industry by analyzing a panel of 5000 firms for the years 1950 to 2011.

Results indicate that R&D expenses in fact increase profitability at the firm level. In particular, increases in the R&D expense to sales ratio lead to increases in the profit contribution of intangible assets relative to sales. This indicates that more R&D intensive IP should command higher royalty rates per sales when licensed to third parties and within multinational enterprises alike.

JEL classification: D24, L20, L62, M21

Keywords: productivity, intellectual property, royalties, MNE, transfer pricing

^{*} The author would like to thank seminar participants at the University of East London for helpful comments and suggestions and Keshav Goel for diligent research assistance. Support by the German University in Cairo and by the Instituto Complutense de Analisis Economico at Universidad Complutense de Madrid, Spain, is also gratefully acknowledged.

¹ European Management School, Professorship for Economics, Rheinstrasse 4N, Mainz, Germany, s.lutz@ems.de.

1. Introduction

The effects of R&D investments on productivity have long been the focus of research. There exists consensus theoretically that R&D investments increase productivity both in the aggregate and on the firm level and that is generally confirmed by empirical studies; see e.g. Griliches (1998) and Mairesse/Sassenou (1991) for an overview. However, due to conceptual problems with the central R&D capital model (based on production functions) and econometric problems such as endogeneity and data heterogeneity, much of the empirical work thus far presented remains controversial; see e.g. Griliches (1998), chapter 12.

This investigation does not try to identify the underlying production function but focuses instead on the profit and return structure resulting from earlier monetary and tangible capital formation treating the residual difference between the total value of assets of the firm and the sum of monetary and tangible assets as intellectual property (IP) capital. Total return to all assets is then decomposed using the weighted average cost of capital concept to yield a residual return on the IP asset. For a definition of intellectual property, we can refer, e.g., to Clarkson (2001) who states: "Intellectual property law identifies five major sources legal protection: patents, trademarks, industrial designs, confidential information/trade secrets, and copyright" (p. 5) and "Intellectual asset rights for a technology can be licensed" (p. 7) and from those transactions value can be imputed.

Econometric problems of earlier studies are partly avoided by simply using a much larger data set, both across sections (several thousand firms) and within time-series (up to 11 years of average time observations per firm).

I principally follow Clarkson (2001), who presents a model to test the relationship between the R&D-to-sales ratio and the profit contribution of intangible assets as percentage of sales. He

finds that this relationship is significant and positive for the pharmaceutical industry and I apply the same methodology to the North American automotive supplier industry.

The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces the economic and institutional background, the resulting research questions posed here, as well as the hypotheses to be investigated. The underlying theory is presented in Section 3. Section 4 describes the data used. Section 5 presents the general modeling and summarizes the results. Section 6 concludes. Statistical and econometric results are presented in the appendix.

2. Background and research questions

In general, there is a large body of theoretical and empirical economic research showing that profitability increases with R&D expense; a large part of this is summarized in Hall/Mairesse/Mohnen (2010), Griliches (1998) and Mairesse/Sassenou (1991). The underlying mechanism lies in the build-up of R&D capital – in the form of intangible assets or intellectual property (IP) – as a result of R&D activities. Hall/Mairesse (2009) use Compustat data for about 5600 manufacturing, trade, and services firms for the years 1996 to 2005 and find significant positive effects of past R&D intensity on gross margins and EBIT margins. For the automotive industry, e.g. Jaruzelski et al. (2005) report that firms with above average R&D to sales ratios have on average a greater gross margin than those with below average R&D/sales.

Other research establishes "that intangible asset capitalization is associated with market values. In other words, market participants behave as if parts of R&D, labor and advertising expenditures were treated as assets that represent significant future economic benefits to the firm"; see Sydler et al. (2014) in an analysis of the pharmaceutical industry; see also e.g. Lev and Sougiannis (1996). Other research, in turn, establishes a relationship between profit margins and royalty rates for intangible assets; see Kemmerer/Lu (2008) and Goldscheider et al. (2002). For example, using data from RoyaltySource and Compustat for 21 years up to 2007, Kemmerer/Lu report that for a sample of 3800 firms from 14 4-digit SIC industries, average royalty rates lie between 25 percent of gross margin and 25 percent of EBIT margin. Regressing the royalty rates on EBIT margins yields a stable result of 50 percent whereas Goldscheider et al. (2002) present the well-known 25-percent rule. The 25-percent rule states that when licencing IP, a license should be set such that 25% of resulting profits go to the licensor and 75% to the licensee; see also Goldscheider (2011) who argued that this rule reflects commonly accepted practice in many industries.

Based on these two bodies of research, it can be shown that profit margins as percentage of sales are increasing in R&D intensities i.e. in R&D spending as percentage of sales. Clarkson (2001) shows this for the pharmaceutical industry and concludes that increases in R&D intensity lead to increases in the contribution of intellectual property (or intangible assets) to profits measured as percentage of sales (CPIA); a one percent increase in R&D intensity tends to increase CPIA by half a percent. This is consistent with the Sydler et al. (2014) analysis of the pharmaceutical industry showing that R&D expenditures lead to the formation of IP assets which in turn increase a firm's returns relative to book value.

These general observations should principally also hold for the automotive industry; compare e.g. Kroninger (2016), Egeland and Matshede (2015), PwC (2008). However, also due to the historically increasing role of IP for this industry, changes over time of the relationship between IP and profitability including structural breaks are to be expected; compare Sydler et al. (2014), Cadogan (2010).

3. Theoretical Basis

Following Clarkson (2001) we can equate a firm's total cost of capital with its total return on assets:

(1) WACC =
$$r_i \frac{V_i}{V_t} + r_m \frac{V_m}{V_t} + r_{tan} \frac{V_{tan}}{V_t}$$

where *WACC* is the weighted average cost of capital, V_i denotes the value of IP (IP capital), V_m denotes monetary assets, V_{tan} denotes tangible assets, V_t denotes total assets, r_i denotes return on V_i , r_m denotes the return on V_m , and r_{tan} denotes the return on V_{tan} .

The left-hand side of equation (1) represents the WACC as the weighted cost of the liability side of the balance sheet; this is defined in detail in equations (4) to (6) below. Compare e.g. Munn (2002) for traditional WACC approaches. This is equated with the ride-hand side of equation (1) as the weighted sum of returns on the asset side of the balance sheet. The WACC is then treated like a known variable and equation (1) is rearranged to yield the following:

(2)
$$r_i = (WACC - r_m \frac{V_m}{V_t} - r_{tan} \frac{V_{tan}}{V_t}) / (\frac{V_i}{V_t})$$

Since this is derived from equation costs to returns (the liability to the asset side of the balance sheet), we do not make specific assumptions about financing structure and need not evoke Modigliani-Miller (1958, 1963) for a capital structure irrelevance assumption.

We can now define the contribution of profits due to intangible assets as a share of sales, CPIA, as

(3)
$$CPIA = r_i * \left(\frac{V_i}{V_t}\right) / WACC * EBIAT / sales$$

where EBIAT is profit before interest but after taxes and represents debt-free net income, i.e. net income plus interest expense after tax.

Given information on *WACC*, V_t , V_m r_m , V_{tan} , r_{tan} and *EBIAT*, *CPIA* can be calculated. With information on R&D expense and sales, the relationship between CPIA and the R&D expense to sales ratio can be investigated. Note that in contrast to other studies, such as Sydler et al. (2014), a separate calculation of a measure of IP Capital is not necessary.

The US t-bill rate can be used for measuring r_m and the US t-bond rate for measuring r_{tan} as well as the risk-free rate of interest r_f (used to calculate individual firm WACC values).

The WACC can be calculated as

(4)
$$WACC = (1 - d_a) * ROE + d_a * (1 - t) * r_m$$

(5)
$$V_t = \frac{E_i(1-\tau)}{(D_t/V_t)r_i^d(1-\tau) + (1-(D_t/V_t))(r_f + \alpha_i\sigma_i) - g_i} - D_i$$

with an assumed average tax rate of t=0.4, d_a is the debt to V_t ratio, D_t is total debt, and roe is the rate of return to equity. Following Damodaran (2011a, 2011b) and Lutz (2012a, 2012b), roe can be expressed by:

(6)
$$ROE = r_f + \alpha * \sigma_{ROE}$$

where individual return volatility per firm is calculated as the moving standard deviation of the ratio of net income to total equity.

4. The Data

I analyze North-American firm level data from Compustat for the NAICS code range 334000 to 336999. The data set spans the years 1950 to 2011 and includes over 5000 firms. About 75% of that data spans the years 1980 to 2010; so there are fewer observations in earlier years and in the last year of the sample. However, all observations from all years are included in the estimations;

using only data from 1980 to 2010 for estimations would not qualitatively change the results (not reported in the paper).

Data on US treasury bills and bonds is taken from the IMF's International Financial Statistics.

A full list of data sources utilized and data obtained is given in Table 1 in the appendix. A list of variables used is given in Table 2 in the appendix.

Summary statistics are provided in Tables 3a and 3b. These include descriptive time-series data of our sample on numbers of firms per year and related R&D expense and profitability variables.

5. Modeling and results

Given the panel data available, we can use the following generalized regression model to investigate the economic hypotheses presented:

(8)
$$y_{i,t} = \alpha + BF_i + \Gamma G_{i,t} + \Delta M_t + \varepsilon_{i,t} + \eta_i$$

where the dependent variable $y_{i,t}$ is a profit or sales level indicator (e.g. EBIT, sales, or profit margin) of company *i* in period *t*; F_i is a vector of determinants specific to firm i but invariant over time (such as country or industry); $G_{i,t}$ is a vector of determinants that may vary between firms and also over time (e.g., R&D expense); M_t is a vector of period-specific determinants outside of a particular firm (e.g. global economic factors and market indicators); $\varepsilon_{i,t}$ is an idiosyncratic error term that may vary between firms and also over time and is independently distributed with $E(\varepsilon_{i,t}) = 0$; and η_i represents unobserved heterogeneity across firms, i.e., a company specific random effect that is independently distributed. For the detailed model specification of equation (8) in Section 5, let I= number of firms, T = number of years, (TxI) the product of T and I; let β , γ , δ be the number of included F, G, and M variables, respectively. The general model specification in Section 5 inludes a constant α , line vectors B(1x β), $\Gamma(1x \gamma)$, $\Delta(1x\delta)$, matrixes F($\beta x(TxI)$), G($\gamma x(TxI)$), M($\delta x(TxI)$), and column vectors Y, ε , η with dimension (1x(TxI)). The exact number of variables per model varies with the models and is reported in Tables 4.1-4.4.

This general specification allows for either random-effects (RE) or fixed-effects (FE) modeling, where the random or fixed effects are firm-specific components. The more general approach is to allow for random firm-specific effects; the case where these effects are fixed, that is determinate constants instead of random variables, is a special sub-case. All model variants reported below were estimated with both FE and RE panel models. All models are estimated also with lagged explanatory variables to capture the effects of past research expenditure on present firm performance and profits. All models were also run with controls for years in order to address historical differences and structural breaks. Compare e.g. Cadogan (2010) or Sydler et al. (2014) for related discussions on model specifications.

Controlling model estimations for years also aims at addressing the value reference issue as discussed in Lev and Sougiannis (1996) and Ciftci, et al (2014). This issue includes the observation that "R-squared is lower for intangible-intensive industries than for non-intangible-intensive industries and has declined over time for intangible-intensive industries" (Ciftci, et al, Abstract).

The data available contains several firm-specific, time-invariant variables that can be assumed to capture a significant part of present fixed effects (e.g. country, industry indicators, functional dummies, etc.). Hence a random-effects specification seems to be a priori more appropriate. However, Hausman tests for FE versus RE modeling undertaken for the models reported below (not reported here) tend to reject the null of consistency in the RE modeling – consequently the FE models reported should be considered more reliable. Estimations and results are summarized below.

In a first exercise, I investigated the principal effect of R&D spending on profit, sales, and the profit-sales margin. Estimations yielding the following results are reported in Table 4.1.

- 1) A one-percent increase in R&D spending tends to increase EBIT by ¹/₂ to ³/₄ percent
- 2) A one-percent increase in R&D spending tends to increase sales by 0.1 to 0.4 percent
- A one-percent increase in R&D-sales ratio tends to increase the EBIT-sales margin by ¹/₄ to 1/2 percent

The first two relations have been estimated with IV RE and FE models using logs in the variables and they explain over 80% of the EBIT variation and over 90% of the sales variation in the data.

In a second exercise, I follow Clarkson's methodology in order to isolate the effect of R&D spending on the value of intangible assets and the return to intangible assets. According to the step-by-step procedure applied, I report several sets of regressions:

- Regressions in logs show that R&D increases EBIT and sales, but EBIT by a larger percentage. These regressions explain at least 80% of variation in all model setups. It follows that R&D increases the EBIT margin! The corresponding estimations are reported in the first four models in Tables 4.1. and 4.2., respectively.
- Additional regressions of EBIT-sales margin against lagged R&D expenditure as share of sales show that past R&D-sales ratios significantly influence present EBIT-sales margins. The corresponding estimations are reported in the last two models in Tables 4.1. and 4.2., respectively.

- 3) Regressions of intangible asset levels (measured as total assets minus tangible and current assets) against past R&D levels indicate that past R&D explains at 75% of current intangible asset values (for the Delphi data set). Intangible asset values are increasing in R&D! Undertaking the regressions from set 3 with sales ratios also yields significant positive results with the R&D-sales ratio explaining about a quarter of the intangible-asset-sales ratio. The corresponding estimations are reported in Table 4.3.
- 4) Lastly, CPIA contributions to profit by intangible asset values following the method of Clarkson have been calculated. The wacc/roe calculations were done following Damodaran (2012b) and Lutz (2012b) where roe= tbond-rate +alpha*risk and risk is measured as the individual firm's volatility of returns to capital. Here the results show a stable positive relationship between the R&D-sales ratio and CPIA. The corresponding estimations are reported in Table 4.4.

According to the model estimates, an increase of one percent in the R&D to sales ratio increases the profit contributions of intangible assets by 1/4 to 1.25 percent of sales. The models explain between one third and half of the variation in the profit contributions of intangible assets.

6. Conclusions

I conclude that there is strong evidence that firm profits, profit margins and the contributions by returns to IP increase with R&D in the automotive (supplier) industry. While the reverse causality – from past sales and profits to current R&D expenditure – may also be present, our model specifications examined the relationships between past R&D expenditures over several years with current sales and profits and the results obtained appear to be robust.

These results in turn imply that royalty rates (as percentage of sales) should increase in R&D intensity (as percentage of sales). This is so because licensors and licensees often negotiate

royalty rates to target a stable profit split (Goldscheider et al. (2002) and therefore a stable positive relationship between profit (shares) and royalties can be observed (Kemmerer/Lu (2008)). For the automotive industry, royalty rates to target a stable profit split are also common; this has been confirmed to me during several expert interviews with managers from the US automotive industry conducted in 2012.

In conclusion, there is strong support for the notion that royalty rates (as percentage of sales) should increase in R&D intensity (as percentage of sales) of the licensor that created the licensed IP, because the profits (sales margins) to be gained by exploitation of the IP tend to increase in R&D intensity.

Literature

- Cadogan, G. (2010). Modelling And Forecasting Imported Japanese Parts Content Of Us Transplants: An Error Correction And State Space Approach, Working Paper. Available at SSRN eLibrary http://ssrn.com/abstract=1672478.
- Ciftci, M.; Darrough, M.; and Mashruwala, R. (2014). Value Relevance of Accounting Information for Intangible-Intensive Industries and the Impact of Scale: The US Evidence, European Accounting Review, 23:2, 199-226, DOI:10.1080/09638180.2013.815124.
- Clarkson, G. (2001). Avoiding Suboptimal Behavior in Intellectual Asset Transactions:
 Economic and Organizational Perspectives on the Sale of Knowledge, Harvard Law
 School John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics and Business Discussion Paper No. 330
 (published in Harvard Journal of Law & Technology, 14(2), 712-740).
- Damodaran, A. (2011a). Applied Corporate Finance, 3rd ed. (Wiley, Hoboken, NJ).
- Damodaran, A. (2011b). Equity Risk Premiums (ERP): Determinants, Estimation and Implications The 2010 Edition. Stern School of Business, New York University.
- Goldscheider, R. (2011). The classic 25% rule and the art of intellectual property licensing. Duke Law and Technology Review, 6, 1-22.
- Goldscheider, R., Jarosz, J. and C. Malhern (2002). Use of the 25 Percent Rule in the valuation of IP. <u>les Nouvelles</u>, December 2002, 123-133.
- Griliches, Z. (1998). R&D and Productivity: The Unfinished Business. In: Griliches, Z.
 (1998). R&D and Productivity: The Econometric Evidence (University of Chicago Press, Chicago, IL, USA), http://www.nber.org/books/gril98-1, Chapter 12.
- Hall, H.B. and Mairesse, J. (2009), Measuring corporate R&D returns. http://ec.europa.eu/ invest-in-research/pdf/download_en/kfg_report_no6.pdf (accessed 23 March 2013).

- Hall, B. H., Mairesse, J. and P. Mohnen (2010). Measuring the Returns to R&D. UNU-MERIT Working Paper #2010-006.
- Jaruzelski, B., Dehoff, K. and R. Bordia (2005). Money Isn't Everything. Strategy+Business. Issue 41.
- Kemmerer, J. E. and J. Lu (2008). Profitability and Royalty Rates Across Industries: Some Preliminary Evidence. SSRN Working Paper, http://ssrn.com/abstract=1141865 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1141865.
- Kroninger, T. K. (2016). Why should the automotive industry care about intellectual property? Varnum LLP, http://www.varnumlaw.com/blogs/varnum-etc/why-should-the-automotive-industry-care-about-intellectual-property/.
- Lutz, S. (2012a). Risk premia in multi-national enterprises. <u>North American Journal of</u> <u>Economics and Finance</u>, http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.najef.2012.06.016.
- Lutz, S. (2012b). Determination of market values and risk premia of multi-national enterprises and its application to transfer-pricing. <u>International Business Research</u>, 5(12), http://dx.doi.org/10.5539/ibr.v5n12p.
- Lev, B., & Sougiannis, T. (1996). The capitalization, amortization, and value-relevance of R&D, Journal of Accounting and Economics, 21(1), 107-138.
- Egeland, T. and C. Matshede (2015). Patent valuation in the automotive industry. Chalmers University of Technology, Gothenberg, Sweden.
- Modigliani, F. and M. Miller (1958). The cost of capital, corporate finance, and the theory of investment, American Economic Review 48:261–297.
- Modigliani, F. and M. Miller (1963). Corporate income taxes and the cost of capital: A correction, American Economic Review 53:433–443.

- Mairesse, J. and M. Sassenou (1991). R&D and Productivity: A Survey of Econometric studies at the Firm Level. NBER Working Paper No. 3666.
- Mun, J. (2002). Real Options Analysis Tools and Techniques for Valuing Strategic Investments and Decisions. Wiley-Finance. John Wiley & Sons, Inc.:Hobokken, NJ.
- PwC (2008). Intellectual property in the automotive industry: transfer pricing aspects. PwC, https://www.pwc.com.tr/tr/microsite/transfer-pricing/yayinlar/uluslararasiyayinlar/pages/intellectual_property_in_the_automotive_industry.pdf.
- Sydler, R.; Haefliger, S.; and Pruksa, R. (2014). Measuring intellectual capital with financial figures: Can we predict firm profitability?, European Management Journal 32:244-259.

Appendix

Table 1. Data sources

#	Data type	Source	Downloaded / data	Date
1	Firm data	Wharton	https://wrds-	21
	(balance	Research Data	web.wharton.upenn.edu/wrds/	August
	sheet,	Services (WRDS)	(Data set: compm/funda/ ann / Jan 1950 -	2012
	profit/loss)	² : Compustat	Jan 2012, TIC, all, NAICS ge 33000 and	
			NAICS lt 34000)	
7	U.S. stocks	International	International Monetary Fund (2012):	August
	and bonds	Financial	International Financial Statistics	2012
	data	Statistics	(Edition: August 2012). ESDS	
			International, University of Manchester.	
			DOI:http://dx.doi.org/10.5257/imf/ifs/20	
			<u>12-08</u> . Annual IFS series. Table title:	
			United States (August 2012), series	
			60CZF, 61ZF.	

² Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS) was used in preparing part of the data set used in the research reported in this paper. This service and the data available thereon constitute valuable intellectual property and trade secrets of WRDS and/or its third-party suppliers.

Variable	Definition
Firm	group(gvkey)
fyear	Fiscal year
at	Assets - Total
ebit	Earnings Before Interest and Taxes
ni	Net Income (Loss)
ppegt	Property, Plant and Equipment - Total (Gross)
sale	Sales/Turnover (Net)
txt	Income Taxes - Total
xrd	Research and Development Expense
mkvalt	Market Value - Total - Fiscal
loc	Current ISO Country Code - Headquarters
naics	North American Industry Classification Code
naicsn	North American Industry Classification Code
sic	Standard Industry Classification Code
state	State/Province
seq	Stockholders Equity - Total
ebiat	ebit-txt
rshf	ni/seq
std3rshf	3-period standard deviation of rshf
xrds	xrd/sale
countryn	group(loc)
roe	tbond+0.3*std3rshf
da	1-seq/at
wacc	da*(1-0.4)*tbill+(1-da)*roe
ai	mkvalt-act-ppegt
ais	ai/sale
margin	ebit/sale
nmargin	ni/sale
cpia_req	ria*ai/sale
ria	(wacc-act/mkvalt*tbill-ppegt/mkvalt*tbond)/(ai/mkvalt)
cpia	ai/mkvalt*ria/wacc*ebiat/sale
ln_var	ln(_var)
TBillRate_ifs	Treasury bill rate, percent per annum
TBondRate10y_ifs	Ten year government bond yield, percent per annum
tbond	TBondRate10y_ifs*100
tbill	TBillRate_ifs*100

Table 2. List of variables

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
firm	54385	1937.03	1373.78	2	5144
fyear	54385	1992.87	11.0166	1950	2011
at	54365	1540.02	10870.2	0	479921
ebit	54385	99.1433	639.385	-12193	33790
ni	54372	40.6556	831.674	-85162	104821
ppegt	54192	766.367	5336.22	0	200717
sale	54385	1366.04	8000.68	-0.019	262394
txt	54379	29.2095	251.44	-5878	37162
xrd	54385	66.5922	402.967	-0.307	10924
mkvalt	18319	1916.6	10075.8	0.0007	467093
naicsn	54385	334773	1838.61	331000	339999
ebiat	54379	69.942	520.803	-37506	25507
rshf	53905	0.01793	35.6914	-894	7770.33
avg3rshf	46781	0.02467	32.8783	-5380	1850.22
std3rshf	46763	1.88655	40.4585	0.00138	5376.07
xrds	53440	0.97124	26.3349	-218.74	3309
countryn	54385	34.6064	7.35702	1	40
roe	46763	0.63405	12.1373	0.02934	1612.9
da	50108	0.44174	0.22225	0	1
wacc	43804	0.15616	2.45843	0.00377	473.162
ai	18128	610.989	8732.42	-248669	452978
ais	17676	26.6996	600.3	-643.63	55726.2
margin	53440	-2.3929	63.8009	-8869	394.474
nmargin	53427	-2.8388	81.8323	-8684	1332
cpia_req	15850	11.6948	599.408	-32816	43263.7
ria	16011	0.0003	16.5845	-1842.6	546.594
cpia	15849	-4.525	172.431	-15162	1276.43
tbond	54331	0.06857	0.02557	0.02402	0.13911
tbill	54385	0.05146	0.02882	0.00058	0.14078

Table 3a. Summary statistics (selected variables)

$\begin{tabular}{ c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c$	Average
$\begin{array}{ c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c$	
$\begin{array}{ c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c$	
$\begin{array}{ c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c$	
$\begin{array}{ c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c$	
$\begin{array}{c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c $	
$\begin{array}{c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c $	
$\begin{array}{ c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c$	
1958 33 .04181862 1959 33 .04159643 1960 39 .04160234 1960 39 .04160234 1961 41 .04679791	
1959 33 .04159643 1960 39 .04160234 1961 41 .04679791 1962 52 .04622581 1963 52 .04645989 .02864825 .17208183 1964 57 .04920585 .10899481 .25640983 1965 63 .04874116 .05391879 .22246505 1966 66 .04851276 .05825473 .22454052 1967 75 .08239294 .06071714 .23643387	
1960 39 .04160234 1961 41 .04679791 1962 52 .04622581 1963 52 .04645989 .02864825 .17208183 1964 57 .04920585 .10899481 .25640983 1965 63 .04874116 .05391879 .22246505 1966 66 .04851276 .05825473 .22454052 1967 75 .08239294 .06071714 .23643387	
1961 41 .04679791 1962 52 .04622581 1963 52 .04645989 .02864825 .17208183 1964 57 .04920585 .10899481 .25640983 1965 63 .04874116 .05391879 .22246505 1966 66 .04851276 .05825473 .22454052 1967 75 .08239294 .06071714 .23643387	
1963 52 .04645989 .02864825 .17208183 1964 57 .04920585 .10899481 .25640983 1965 63 .04874116 .05391879 .22246505 1966 66 .04851276 .05825473 .22454052 1967 75 .08239294 .06071714 .23643387	
1964 57 .04920585 .10899481 .25640983 1965 63 .04874116 .05391879 .22246505 1966 66 .04851276 .05825473 .22454052 1967 75 .08239294 .06071714 .23643387	
1965 63 .04874116 .05391879 .22246505 1966 66 .04851276 .05825473 .22454052 1967 75 .08239294 .06071714 .23643387	
1966 66 .04851276 .05825473 .22454052 1967 75 .08239294 .06071714 .23643387	
1967 75 .08239294 .06071714 .23643387	
1968 90 .08917022 .65010324 .2493162	
<u>1969</u> <u>96</u> <u>.0738535</u> <u>.09441627</u> <u>.22930614</u>	
1970 234 .11051225 .08182723 .19859182 1971 399 .04489734 .06930722 .07847149	
1972 491 .03647877 .08356062 .17674221 1973 570 .03088553 .08789939 .17757471	
1975 570 .05066555 .06769959 .17757471 1974 767 .03039975 .08542425 .25684577	
<u>1974</u> 107 .05059775 .00052425 .25004577 1975 773 .04461636 .0862524 .23443135	
<u>1976</u> 786 .0348744 .08768999 .23204745	
1977 771 .0338756 .08799722 .25934549	
1978 790 .04895852 .1070427 .35725399	
1979 835 .05608803 .1230126 .28441881	
<u>1980</u> <u>902</u> <u>.19702149</u> <u>.1271205</u> <u>.07377574</u>	
1981 967 .20699333 .1578595 .22771068	
<u>1982</u> <u>1,125</u> <u>.1963603</u> <u>.14928191</u> <u>.18846223</u>	
<u>1983</u> <u>1,234</u> <u>2.5818267</u> <u>.1507463</u> <u>.01000474</u>	
<u>1984</u> <u>1,303</u> <u>.16734036</u> <u>.14274375</u> <u>.70449239</u>	
1985 1,416 .273632 .12656434 1.5048382 1996 1454 2496976 11514296 2626462	
1986 1,454 .24962976 .11512106 26264632 1987 1.458 .35313462 .1190283 -4.4204179	
1987 1,458 .35313462 .1190283 -4.4204179 1988 1,408 .57976732 .13974224 .03014611	
1988 1,408 .57970752 .15974224 .05014011 1989 1,401 .85735083 .15628584 .06333706	
1989 1,401 .8575085 .15023564 .00555700 1990 1,401 .38375859 .12476007 08291916	
1990 1,401 1.50512059 1.12470007 1.00251310 1991 1,445 .45082161 .11949236 .21660423	
<u>1992</u> 1,514 .54486757 .16002771 .14682146	
1993 1,600 .72671998 .19195474 04193248	
1994 1,706 .30442691 .1549537618527267	
1995 1,875 .93851863 .11666554 .10142158	
<u>1996</u> <u>1,891</u> <u>2.3944955</u> <u>.14406699</u> <u>.03705963</u>	
<u>1997</u> <u>1,854</u> <u>.90751209</u> <u>.17390201</u> <u>.06661403</u>	
<u>1998</u> <u>1,930</u> <u>1.6429378</u> <u>.12287624</u> <u>.49942974</u>	.14638078
1999 1,873 1.3558145 .15618603 1.245576	-1.0583237
2000 1,780 3.0436565 .2793996202299623	.2732389
2001 1,702 1.1359925 .16319402 .09701145	.09238216
2002 1,663 1.7278879 .19004077 .61870458 2002 1.626 1.1650092 1.0122156 12040052	56223728
2003 1,636 1.1650982 .19133156 .12040953 2004 1,616 .95939638 .5116775 -2.1612725	.20275462 .7115438
2004 1,616 .95939638 .5116775 -2.1612725 2005 1,584 1.3623727 .24004927 06237868	.08639784
2005 1,584 1.3623727 .2400492706237868 2006 1,524 1.5625884 .13170451 .8426404	.15784096
2000 1,524 1.5023004 .15170451 .0420404 2007 1,465 .84572506 .12837754 .20063137	.10019286
2007 1,405 .34372500 .1237734 .20003137 2008 1,423 1.8705099 .09527514 .01448189	.0022496
2009 1,392 3,0177079 .08986617 .04448965	.11467628
2009 1,592 5.0177079 3.00500017 3.01410305 2010 1,291 .86667218 .14503386 11239394	29530764
2011 264 2.3628166 .1056944 .10837632	.38675232

Table 3b. Time series statistics (selected variables)

Model	(4.1.1) IV-FE	(4.1.2) IV-RE	(4.1.3) IV-FE	(4.1.4) IV-RE	(4.1.5) RE	(4.1.6) FE
Dep. Variable	lnebit	lnebit	Insale	Insale	margin	margin
lnxrd	0.7434***	0.5640***	0.4445***	0.0792***		
lnebit (-1)	0.0984**	0.4286***				
Insale (-1)			0.4443***	0.9064***		
margin (-1)					0.1684***	0.2653***
xrds (-1)					0.2731***	0.5391***
Observations	1252	1252	1602	1602	31741	31741
Groups (Firms)	384	384	467	467	2725	2725
R-sq. within	0.3597	0.3464	0.8506	0.8453	0.0110	0.0145
R-sq. between	0.8068	0.8894	0.9349	0.9861	0.0127	0.0006
R-sq. overall	0.8243	0.8864	0.9499	0.9892	0.0191	0.0106
Prob > chi2 (>F)	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000

Table 4.1. Results: Effects of R&D on EBIT, sales, and margins (1)

Notes. (i) Models (1), (3), and (6) estimated with fixed effects; Models (2), (4) and (5) estimated with random effects. Models (1) to (4) IV regressions with lnxrd instrumented by lagged observations of lnre, lnam, lntlcf and other variables. (ii) All equations include a constant and controls for years. (iii) *** denotes significant at the 1%, ** at the 5%, * at the 10% level.

Model	(4.2.1) FE	(4.2.2) FE	(4.2.3) RE	(4.2.4) RE	(4.2.5) FE	(4.2.6) RE
Dep. Variable	lnebit	Insale	lnebit	Insale	margin	margin
lnxrd (-1)	0.2547***	0.1067***	0.2253***	0.0805***		
lnebit (-1)	0.5036***		0.6480***			
Insale (-1)		0.7367***		0.8178***		
margin (-1)					0.1907***	0.2136***
xrds (-1)					0.3934***	0.3946***
xrds (-2)					-0.0010	-0.0220***
xrds (-3)					0.0069	0.0000
Observations	29769	47515	29769	47515	39921	39921
Groups (Firms)	2985	4056	2985	4056	3491	3491
R-sq. within	0.5165	0.7890	0.5143	0.7884	0.0051	0.0037
R-sq. between	0.9123	0.9677	0.9240	0.9688	0.0000	0.0364
R-sq. overall	0.8690	0.9617	0.8755	0.9632	0.0012	0.0057
Prob > chi2 (>F)	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000

Table 4.2. Results	: Effects of R	&D on EBIT,	sales, and	margins (2)
--------------------	----------------	-------------	------------	-------------

Notes. (i) Models (1), (2), and (5) estimated with fixed effects; Models (2), (3) and (6) estimated with random effects. (ii) All equations include a constant and controls for years. (iii) *** denotes significant at the 1%, ** at the 5%, * at the 10% level.

Model	(4.3.1) FE	(4.3.2) RE	(4.3.3) FE	(4.3.4) FE	(4.3.5) RE	(4.3.6) RE
Dep. Variable	lnai	lnai	ais	ais	ais	ais
lnxrd (-1)	0.0881***	0.5277***				
xrds			6.1616***	7.8259***	6.3858***	8.2368***
xrds (-1)			-0.3285***		-0.1039	
xrds (-2)			2.1246***		2.1011***	
Observations	10217	10217	16481	17676	16481	17676
Groups (Firms)	1940	1940	2330	2462	2330	2462
R-sq. within	0.0026	0.0026	0.2876	0.0879	0.2873	0.0879
R-sq. between	0.5837	0.5837	0.2127	0.1865	0.2171	0.1865
R-sq. overall	0.5384	0.5384	0.2806	0.1376	0.2817	0.1376
Prob > chi2 (>F)	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000

Table 4.3. Results: Effects of R&D on intangible assets

Notes. (i) Models (1), (3), and (4) estimated with fixed effects; Models (2), (5) and (6) estimated with random effects. (ii) All equations include a constant and controls for years. (iii) *** denotes significant at the 1%, ** at the 5%, * at the 10% level.

Model	(4.4.1) FE	(4.4.2) FE	(4.4.3) FE	(4.4.4) RE	(4.4.5) RE	(4.4.6) RE
Dep. Variable	сріа	cpia	сріа	сріа	cpia	cpia
cpia (-1)	0.0296***	0.0296***	0.0296***	0.7465***	0.7465***	0.7465***
xrds (-1)	0.3582***	0.3083***	0.2619***	1.1250***	1.1203***	1.0999***
xrds (-2)	0.2616	0.1162		-0.2294	-0.2898*	
xrds (-3)	0.0017			-0.0549		
Observations	12928	13145	13333	12928	13145	13333
Groups (Firms)	1919	1961	1985	1919	1961	1985
R-sq. within	0.0042	0.0032	0.0024	0.0007	0.0007	0.0007
R-sq. between	0.6235	0.7446	0.8545	0.9864	0.9875	0.9877
R-sq. overall	0.2409	0.2973	0.3563	0.5731	0.5731	0.5727
Prob > chi2 (>F)	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000

Table 4.4. Results: Effects of R&D on contributions to profit by intangible assets

Notes. (i) Models (1), (2), and (3) estimated with fixed effects; Models (4), (5) and (6) estimated with random effects. Models (1) to (4) IV regressions with lnxrd instrumented by lagged observations of lnre, lnam, lntlcf and other variables. (ii) All equations include a constant and controls for years. (iii) *** denotes significant at the 1%, ** at the 5%, * at the 10% level.