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Costs, size and returns to scale among Canadian and U.S. commercial banks

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Costs, size and returns to scale among Canadian and U.S. commercial banks

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Costs, size and returns to scale among Canadian and U.S. commercial banks

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Abstract

I compare returns to scale in the U.S. and Canadian banking system from 1996 to 2015. I estimate a parametric trans-log cost function and, for robustness, an input-oriented distance function. I do this in a way that is commensurate with the limitations of these models. Among the ten largest commercial banks, I find evidence for small but statistically significant increasing returns to scale (RTS). This reflects the descriptive data that offers little evidence for extremely large scale economies. Comparatively, I find constant RTS for the Canadian banks. They paid fewer costs per asset, particularly lower labour costs and legal penalties. Comparing income statement items, I find that, despite higher firm concentration in Canada, the U.S. banks had higher net interest margin rate, paid a lower rate of interest on funds, and had higher credit losses per financial assets. If the U.S. banking system is more competitive, this questions whether an increase in bank competition will create a net positive outcome for society.

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1 Introduction

Whether large banks operate with increasing returns to scale (RTS) has important policy implications for social welfare and for the political economy of the U.S. Since the Great Financial Crisis, there has been significant anger and scepticism among the public toward large U.S. banks. Many politicians would like to see their size limited. One-time democratic presidential candidate, Bernie Sanders, publicly stated that he would pass legislation restricting the size and scope of banking operations. This has spurred a debate about the relationship between bank efficiency and size, particularly with regards to the largest U.S. financial institutions. If research proves that larger banks create greater efficiency, then there are social benefits to justify increasing recent increasing bank size. Since 1996, if not before, the U.S. banking system has seen a significant amount of consolidation. To illustrate, in 1996, the U.S. Big Four¹ banks controlled 14.3 percent of all U.S. domestic bank assets while the next five largest controlled just 4.6 percent. Through expansions, mergers, and acquisitions this total had increased to 53 percent and 8.5 percent respectively in 2015. Similarly, in 1996, banks with fewer than \$100 billion total assets in real 2012 USD controlled 61.5 percent of U.S. domestic bank assets – this total fell to 14.5 percent in 2015. These facts ask the question: why has there been such a large increase in the concentration of bank total assets? [De Elejalde \(2012\)](#) observes that from 1994 to 2007, the number of branches in a local market, both metropolitan and rural, remained constant. He finds that very few banks exited the market by branch closure. Most mergers and acquisitions were between banks that operated in different markets – ownership changed rather than the local market structure. Regulatory changes such as the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act and the repeal of Glass-Steagall in 1999 certainly created an opportunity for banks to operate in multiple states – but what advantages did the banks gain from this expansion? And did this expansion increase consumer welfare? First, I will present some stylized facts about the U.S. banks categorized by size. Second, I contrast these facts against the Canadian domestic chartered banks, a highly concentrated banking system dominated by the ‘Big Six’². Third, RTS are estimated for the largest U.S.

¹These banks are JP Morgan Chase, Bank of America, Citigroup, and Wells Fargo.

²The Big Six banks are the Bank of Montreal (BMO), Canadian Imperial Bank of Canada (CIBC), Toronto Dominion (TD), Bank of Nova Scotia (BNS), Royal Bank of Canada (RBC) and the National Bank of Canada (NB).

commercial banks. To compare the advantages in increased bank size among U.S. and Big Six banks, I estimate a translog cost function and input-oriented distance function using a panel-dynamic estimator.

In the broadest terms, if a bank can, holding all else equal, increase revenue or decrease expenses, then it is more efficient but the source of this improved efficiency is less certain. For example, the cause could be increasing market power, the introduction of new businesses such as wealth management, or improved risk-return on its portfolio. The institution could be capitalizing on market frictions such as imperfect information. Decreasing interest and noninterest expenses per asset might be generated from increasing RTS, or it could be from increasing market power as in [Kumar \(2013\)](#). On the other hand, [Hughes and Mester \(2013\)](#) argue that increasing bank size creates more diversified asset portfolios. According to the Congressional Oversight Panel, Citigroup required \$476.2 billion in cash and government guarantees during the Financial Crisis of 2007-2009. While anecdotal, this need for assistance seemingly contradicts the argument that large banks have superior diversification and risk management. [Sarin and Summers \(2016\)](#) find that, using volatility as a measure of riskiness, banks were more risky following the implementation of Dodd-Frank than prior to the crisis. They attribute this to a decline in the franchise value, or the market value of equity, that leads to a higher probability of insolvency so that the stability and profitability of large banks is thrown into question. With respect to cost efficiency, Old Mutual, a South African financial services group that offers insurance, asset management and banking operations in Europe, the United States and Africa, announced it would split its operations into four separate businesses by 2018. CEO Bruce Hemphill stated ‘the ability to create scale and synergies is not what it was before the crisis’ and implied that each business line would be worth more separately than as a conglomerate.³ While the regulatory concerns for an international bank are clear, it is interesting that management and investors believe that its constituent parts have greater value than the benefits from diversification and size. Most recently, Deutsche Bank, Germany’s largest bank and a major presence in the U.S., has been unable to sufficiently reduce costs to return to profitability.

While I discuss how size is related to revenue per asset, my paper focuses on the potential cost-savings from larger banks. [Kumar \(2013\)](#) shows that RTS and market power are often

³This was announced in early March 2016 <https://www.ft.com/content/722af2b2-e758-11e5-bc31-138df2ae9ee6>.




Figure 1: Non-interest expense per asset

Note: Noninterest expense excludes the provision for credit losses and corporate taxes. Source: FR-Y-C9, OSFI

confounded. If a bank has market power, then it will be able to offer a lower rate of interest (price) on deposits. Estimates of RTS often identify this as a benefit from increasing size however [Kumar \(2013\)](#) hypothesizes that the gains might actually come from competition, or lack thereof, at the branch-level. [Allen et al. \(2013\)](#) find that following a merger of two banks, mortgage rates increased in geographic areas where both institutions had competing branches. For these reasons, RTS estimates can be biased upwards and may reflect an upper-bound on the actual values. Respecting this potential source of bias, I show evidence that the ten largest U.S. commercial banks operated, on average, with constant RTS. I also find evidence that the smaller banks in this sample may have operated with increasing RTS. The Big Six Canadian banks, each with significant operations in the United States, operated with constant RTS; even when smaller, they were significantly more cost efficient than their U.S. rivals in terms of noninterest expenses per asset, including labour expense per asset. Despite this fact, there appears to be little evidence to show that Canadian banks reduced costs as they increased the size of their balance sheets and noninterest income.

Following the U.S. financial crisis, a number of Canadian banks increased their retail-

banking and wealth management presence in the United States significantly. In 2015, the top-tier U.S. bank holding company (U.S. BHC or BHC) owned by Toronto Dominion held total assets of \$250 billion in real 2012 U.S. dollars (USD), and it was the 12th largest BHC in the United States. Similarly, the U.S. BHC of BMO held \$115 billion and that of RBC held \$122 billion. Historically, the Canadian banks had mixed results regarding expansion into the United States⁴. Using descriptive data, I find that the Canadian banks maintained lower noninterest expenses per asset than U.S. banks. This may not be entirely surprising as labour costs in Canada are typically less than those in the U.S. According to BC Stats, the average technology worker in Canada earned \$1,480 per week while those in the U.S. earned \$2,536⁵. Interestingly, the Canadian banks also maintained a lower net interest rate margin than the large U.S. BHCs which prior to the financial crisis, also enjoyed higher rates of return. Considering that the Canadian banking system suggests an oligopoly industry structure while the U.S. suggests a more competitive one, all else being equal, the U.S. banks should offer lower average prices. It seems counter-intuitive that Canadian bank customers pay lower rates. On the other hand, it is possible that with more intense competition, U.S. domestic BHCs are more willing to make risky loans than the more staid Canadian banks.

I follow the specification and estimation technique in [McKeown \(2017b\)](#) while allowing for some minor alterations due to limitations in the U.S. and Canadian data. My parsimonious specification limits the number of right-hand side variables and produces a well-defined cost function despite the limited sample size. The panel dynamic estimator (PDOLS) is appropriate for panel data with a long time series component when the series is cointegrated. The RTS estimates in my paper are similar to those of [Restrepo-Tobón and Kumbhakar \(2015\)](#) who find that RTS are marginally increasing. Comparing U.S. and Canadian commercial banks, revenue based efficiency ratios show that the U.S. BHCs consistently outperformed the large Canadian banks from 1996 to 2007, but subsequent to the financial crisis and after accounting for the associated losses, performance seemed to converge. Lastly, the U.S. banks benefited from lower borrowing costs. By comparison, the Canadian banks kept noninterest cost per asset less than those of the U.S. throughout

⁴Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce left the U.S. market place during the financial crisis. Its capital markets business suffered a \$2.4 billion dollar legal penalty for relating to Enron Corp. and suffered deep losses due to sub-prime exposure. It subsequently sold all U.S. operations to Oppenheimer Holdings Inc.

⁵The cost of workers in San Francisco or New York is much higher than the U.S. average. These values are in Canadian dollars. <http://www.bcstats.gov.bc.ca/StatisticsBySubject/BusinessIndustry/HighTechnology.aspx>.

the entire sample period. Furthermore, the Canadian banks generally engaged in less risky lending as evidenced by interest rates and the provision for credit losses. Taken together, I conclude that the U.S. domestic banks earned a higher return because they took on more risk and paid higher noninterest costs to do so. Conversely, the Canadian banks held less risky portfolios, engaged in less trading activity, and minimized noninterest costs. In fact, following the financial crisis, the difference in pre-tax ROA between the two narrowed.

The remainder of my paper is organized as follows: section 2 describes the literature and how my paper contributes. Section 3 describes the translog cost function, and section 3.2 details how it can be used to accurately estimate RTS. Section 4 analyses the data using diagrams and descriptive statistics. If very large increasing RTS exist, as some research suggest, then these cost benefits should appear in the descriptive statistics. The section is divided into two halves: section 4.2 compares U.S. domestic bank revenues and costs by size, and section 4.3 compares large U.S. commercial banks with the Big Six. Section 5 outlines the estimation strategy. Section 6.1 discusses the results for the translog cost function while 6.2 describes and estimates the input-oriented distance function. Section 7 summarizes the main results.

2 Literature review

This section summarizes the recent debate on the merits of large banks by dividing the field into papers that find positive net impacts from increasing bank size and those that find negative or neutral net impacts.

2.1 Studies that find larger banks are more efficient

[Wheelock and Wilson \(2012\)](#) estimate a fully nonparametric cost function using data from 1984 to 2006, and they employ two separate samples with over 850,000 observations each. In order to accommodate this, they use parallel programming techniques and a supercomputer. To reduce the curse of dimensionality, they apply principal component analysis to reduce the number of right-hand side variables. While this is an impressive exercise, the results do not seem to fit with the observed data. Measuring ray-scale economies assumes that the median-size bank operates with constant returns to scale. From this starting point, they

find increasing RTS, so banks are gaining more from more and more output. If a bank is 120 times larger than the median bank, then it has approximately \$12 billion in total assets. If it increased assets by 10%, then total costs will increase just 3%. As figures 8 to 10 show, these large cost benefits to size cannot be observed in the data. [Wheelock and Wilson \(2012\)](#) choose to use a sample where there were many small banks. For example, a bank with total assets of \$12 billion represented the 99.36 percentile. While this increases the number of observable banks, it fails to account for the great mass of bank assets which are held by the largest institutions. To further illustrate the weight on smaller banks, the FR-Y-C9 for 2006 shows that all top-tier BHCs with less than \$12 billion in real 2012 dollars accounted for \$1.47 trillion in total assets while the larger BHCs accounted for the remaining \$11.94 trillion. [Wheelock and Wilson \(2012\)](#) recognize an issue with their calculation and suggest that the problem stems from out-of-sample asset mixes. They choose a new measure of RTS: expansion path scale economies (EPSE). At each observation, assets increase 5% and decrease 5% and the percentage change in total costs is measured. Even with this new measure, they find increasing RTS for nearly every observation at the 99% measure of significance. [Restrepo-Tobón and Kumbhakar \(2015\)](#), criticizing the result, argue that EPSE is a poor measure of returns to scale if RTS values are not monotonically increasing (or decreasing) in assets; using a similar sample, they show that RTS is not monotonic. More recently, [Wheelock and Wilson \(2015\)](#) use a non-parametric local-linear technique to estimate the relationship between cost, revenue, and profit. They find that the largest banks faced increasing RTS as recently as 2015. The benefits from raising additional revenue attributed to increased size were positive but not as large as the effect on costs.

[Hughes and Mester \(2013\)](#) estimate a risk-adjusted almost ideal demand system with cross-sectional data from 2003, 2007 and 2010. An ideal demand system includes revenue in the analysis. If the risk-preference of managers is unaccounted for, they find little evidence for increasing RTS. However if it is included, they find significant increasing RTS. They conclude that any study which fails to account for risk-taking must be misleading but this is by no means certain. They go on to add that large banks enjoyed superior diversification benefits and cost savings from large information systems. While their work was robust to the inclusion, and exclusion, of various bank sizes however one must be cautious about introducing additional variables in an effort to estimate RTS. Multicollinearity can become

an issue. If an exogenous variable is correlated with assets and it is introduced to the model without the estimated parameter appearing in the RTS equation then the correlation between exogenous variables may create an erroneous result, particularly if the exogenous variable itself is not included in the measure of RTS. [Kumar \(2013\)](#) suggests that failing to account for market power will result in RTS estimates that are biased upwards. It is possible this accounted for the positive correlation between profitability and size. [Hughes and Mester \(2013\)](#) estimate a static model using data from 2003, 2007, and 2011 and find large increasing RTS. [Admati and Hellwig \(2014\)](#) observe that this coincides with large BHCs being both profitable and more profitable than small BHCs. While [Hughes and Mester \(2013\)](#) control for bank size in some statistical estimations, [Admati and Hellwig \(2014\)](#) note that they do not directly address the cost funding advantage from increased size or bank behaviour. Studying banks in the 90 percentile of total assets, [Acharya et al. \(2016\)](#) show that becoming larger produces significant funding advantages even at relatively small banks. [Babihuga and Spaltro \(2014\)](#) find evidence that large systemically important financial institutions enjoyed considerable cost funding advantages.

Using proprietary data from a limited sample of ten large banks, a research paper from [Clearing House \(2011\)](#) finds that larger banks generate larger returns to scale, returns to scope, and innovate faster than smaller banks. Following from this paper and using ‘write-in’ text fields reported by individual U.S. BHCs from 2008 to 2012, [Kovner et al. \(2014\)](#) separate the noninterest expense category reported in Y-9C filings into more detail. Larger banks spent relatively less on the three largest components of noninterest expenses: corporate overhead, information technology including data management, and legal fees, but they spent relatively more on consulting and advisory fees and expenses related to goodwill and intangible assets. On average, a \$1 billion increase in total assets resulted in a 0.1 to 0.2 percent noninterest expense cost savings. These savings were fairly constant for banks of varying size, although there was some evidence that the largest banks might have benefited the most. Both of these studies warn that limiting the size of banks will decrease efficiency. For example, [Kovner et al. \(2014\)](#) estimate that a bank size maximum limit of 4 percent of GDP would have increased aggregate noninterest expenses by \$2 to \$4 billion dollars per quarter.

Internationally, [Beccalli et al. \(2015\)](#) study 103 European banks from 2000 to 2011 using

stochastic frontier analysis, translog cost function. They find that there are increasing RTS for most banks – it is highest for banks with more investment banking, liquidity, equity capital, and TBTF status. [Boot \(2016\)](#) suggests that the enormous size and scope of these universal banks could be generating the result. Implicit or explicit government guarantees, such as TBTF, may give artificial advantages to size when competing against single business line competitors and smaller banks. [Elsas et al. \(2010\)](#) studied international banks from 1996 to 2008 – they find evidence for economies of scope through revenue diversification. Using market returns, universal banks did not trade at a discount to more specialized financial institutions.

2.2 Studies that find larger banks may not be more efficient

[Feng and Serletis \(2010\)](#) and [Feng and Zhang \(2012\)](#) find increasing RTS using a Bayesian output-oriented distance function. However this method requires that inputs remain exogenous while outputs are endogenous. [Restrepo-Tobón and Kumbhakar \(2015\)](#) observe that this method violates the standard assumption in the literature that inputs are endogenous and outputs are exogenous. Allowing for this discrepancy, [Feng and Zhang \(2014\)](#) estimate a random stochastic output distance function that allows for heterogeneous technology. They find that from 1997 to 2010, technology was independent of bank assets – a large bank did not necessarily have better technology than a smaller bank. [Restrepo-Tobón and Kumbhakar \(2015\)](#) estimate a non-parametric input distance function which requires the assumptions that outputs are exogenous and inputs are endogenous. They find evidence for small increasing RTS and that many banks operated at constant, or even decreasing, RTS. According to their estimates, a reduction in the size of banks would have little detrimental impact on cost efficiency. Both [Feng and Zhang \(2014\)](#) and [Restrepo-Tobón and Kumbhakar \(2015\)](#) estimate distance functions are advantageous in that they avoid potential mis-measurement of input prices – the criticism of [Kumar \(2013\)](#) may not apply. [Davies and Tracey \(2014\)](#) study large international banks using a translog cost function. Without adjustment, they find increasing RTS however they then adjust interest expense for Too-Big-To-Fail (TBTF). This is done using corporate bond ratings. Once this TBTF implicit subsidy is accounted for and using a sample of large international banks from 2001 to 2010, they find RTS were constant. [Brewer and Jagtiani \(2013\)](#) study mergers and acquisitions

among banks and find that a purchasing bank is willing to pay a premium if the post-merger bank has assets over \$100 billion.

Using a Panel Vector Autoregressive (VAR) model and a Bayesian Panel VAR, [Miles and Sapci \(2017\)](#) estimate a translog and Fourier cost function using data from 198 commercial banks and a sample beginning in the third fiscal quarter of 1992 until 2014, second fiscal quarter. They divide total costs into fixed, quasi-fixed such as labour, and variables costs. As bank size increases, RTS is decreasing. For the largest banks, they find these operated with decreasing RTS and that this result was similar to early studies on RTS such as [Noulas et al. \(1990\)](#) and [Hunter et al. \(1990\)](#). The relatively low cut-off for a TBTF institution could be problematic. [Hughes and Mester \(2013\)](#) choose \$100 billion as the minimum for TBTF. [Hughes and Mester \(2013\)](#) and [Restrepo-Tobón and Kumbhakar \(2015\)](#) find that RTS is actually higher for the largest banks. By having so many institutions qualify as TBTF, variation becomes unobservable. Using data from 1994 to 2013 on 44 of the top 50 U.S. commercial banks by size as of 2013, [Inanoglu et al. \(2016\)](#) estimate a number of different stochastic frontier models including output-distance and translog cost functions. They estimate these with both parametric and semi-parametric estimators (SPEs). Despite a large number of different models and estimators, they find that the largest surviving banks exhibited decreasing cost efficiency and operated with decreasing RTS. There was no evidence that banks operated with increasing RTS. In fact, they find a negative correlation between bank size and cost efficiency.

[Minton et al. \(2017\)](#) investigate the relationship between size and market value in a reduced form model. Using Tobin's Q ratio from 1987 to 2006, they find that as bank size increases, the relative value of the bank decreases. This is a surprising result although not unprecedented. If periods subsequent to the implementation of Dodd-Frank are included, these results from [Minton et al. \(2017\)](#) do not hold. [Gandhi and Lustig \(2015\)](#) find that from 1970 to 2013, larger banks earned a lower risk-adjusted return than their smaller competitors. Both these studies have a long time series that might be capturing accurate but out-dated facts. Section 4.2 compares banks of varying size from 1996 to 2015. Banks with more assets earned a higher pre-tax ROA than their smaller competitors. This is more or less true throughout the entire sample period including the financial crisis. Consequently, investors must be assigning a significantly higher amount of risk to these large banks. This

runs counter to the arguments of [Ueda and Di Mauro \(2013\)](#) and others who find that large banks had an incentive to become larger in order to be TBTF. [Kane \(2014\)](#) expresses a common opinion among researchers that large bank share-prices are discounted at an artificially low required return which in turn generates inflated prices. [Minton et al. \(2017\)](#) create a figure illustrating Tobin's q banks with more and less than \$50 billion assets. From 1987 to 1998, the smaller banks had a higher Tobin's Q; from 1989 to 2011, it is often equal, from 2011 to 2015, large banks had a higher Tobin's q. After the Dodd-Frank Act was passed in July of 2010, descriptive statistics suggest that a structural break occurred although it is not readily apparent whether this is due to Dodd-Frank or something else. [De Elejalde \(2012\)](#) finds that incumbent single-market banks can be more profitable than multi-market banks, but that entry or start-up costs for a new single-market bank are higher than those of a pre-existing bank that expands into a new market. [Koetter and Noth \(2013\)](#) study 457 German banks from 1996 to 2008 and find that increased profit from IT investment depends on the efficiency of its use rather than size of the investment.

2.3 Canadian and U.S. banks

[Bordo et al. \(2015\)](#) write a detailed history of how the U.S. and Canadian banking systems developed based on the political economy of each country. In the United States, multiple regulatory authorities developed at the state and later at the federal level. Prohibitions on inter-state bank were designed to protect states' rights and to limit the power of the Federal Government. This led to the development of a fragmented financial system with many small, regional banks operating in protected markets. That number has been decreasing since the 1980's – the trend accelerated in 1994 with the introduction of the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act and in 1999 with the repeal of the Glass-Steagall legislation. These allowed commercial banks to acquire investment banks and insurance companies across state lines. Despite this trend, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) reported that 6,799 deposit-insured banks continued to operate in 2014. [Freedman \(1998\)](#) and [Armstrong \(1997\)](#) described the Canadian banking system in the 20th century. In 2014, there were 25 domestic banks, 24 foreign subsidiaries and 27 foreign bank branches operating in Canada which changed little from 1996. The Federal Bank Act prohibited foreign ownership of banks from exceeding 25%, and no individual was allowed to own

more than 10 percent of any bank. Since 1998, foreign banks were required to separately capitalize a subsidiary which operated in Canada. HSBC Canada was the largest of these foreign bank subsidiaries. For more on the structure of the Canadian banking system, see [McKeown \(2017a\)](#).

[Calmès et al. \(2013\)](#) compare the U.S. and Canadian banking systems from 1986 to 2009. Using data on commercial banks, they find that the U.S. banks performed better in normal times while the Canadian banks enjoyed fewer downturns and less volatility. Noninterest income is more volatile among the Canadian banks than their U.S. peers. Given these results, they find it difficult to reach a definitive conclusion on which system is stronger. Also during this time period, U.S. banks produced more securitization income with higher earnings per asset. In section 4.3, Figure 11 shows that the U.S. banks generated a higher return on assets than the Canadian banks prior to the financial crisis. However there were a number of explanations for this. One clear difference in U.S. banking was the securitization of assets, particularly mortgages, into MBS and CDOs. This culminated in over-lending to the risky sub-prime mortgage market. It is not entirely clear how much of the pre-crisis profit among U.S. BHCs was sustainable and how much was a one-off. More recently, in 2015 the U.S. commercial banks appeared to be returning to historical levels of profitability. See figure 11. [Calmès and Théoret \(2014\)](#) finds that bank loans among Canadian and U.S. banks had become more resilient to shocks, but noninterest income remained volatile. [Allen et al. \(2006\)](#), using performance ratios from 1982 to 2002, showed that the Canadian banks were as productive as U.S. banks. They also estimated a translog cost function that showed Canadian banks operated with increasing RTS that was higher than their U.S. counterparts.

The work by [Restrepo-Tobón and Kumbhakar \(2015\)](#) deserves further comment both for its importance and close relation to my paper. [Restrepo-Tobón and Kumbhakar \(2015\)](#) limit their sample to include banks with more than \$500 million in total assets, and they estimate a nonparametric cost function similar to that of [Wheelock and Wilson \(2012\)](#). Using an input-oriented distance function, they find that the median bank in each sample operated at close to constant RTS. For example, less than 1 percent of observations had increasing RTS greater than 1.03 percent. This implies that if a bank were to increase assets by 10 percent then total cost will increase by close to 9.7 percent. It is also worth noting that many banks were operating with decreasing RTS in their samples. Another interesting

results is that banks with the highest frequency of increasing RTS were in the largest quartile of BHCs. In section 4.2, I present some descriptive statistics that show banks with \$10 to \$100 billion in total assets experienced periods of decreasing RTS between 1996 and 2015. Comparatively, the largest banks experienced slightly increasing or constant RTS. Restrepo-Tobón and Kumbhakar (2015) also estimate a nonparametric cost function. Using this method, increasing RTS were observed in 73 percent of observations and the average value was higher. They report that a 10 percent increase in all outputs would have resulted in just a 8.6 percent increase in total costs – a considerably larger estimate of RTS than the input-oriented cost function.

3 Model

3.1 Intermediary model of banking

The following section draws on McKeown (2017b). While RTS and efficiency depend on the cost structure of a bank, a necessary first step is to choose an appropriate framework to model the operations of a bank. This paper adopts the intermediation approach to banking where deposits are considered inputs, and assets and fee income are treated as outputs. An alternative approach, put forward by Berger and Humphrey (1992) and known as the value-added approach, considers demand deposits as outputs. However the intermediary approach is preferred by most researchers as it is intuitive – banks match lenders and savers while charging a fee (interest rate spread) for the service. This also matches theory including what is taught to undergraduate and first year graduate students. Furthermore, interest expense is typically the largest expense that banks face and seems counter-intuitive to exclude from an analysis of costs. Lastly, the data available from OSFI sometimes failed to clearly distinguish between demand deposits, notice deposits, and longer term deposits such as guaranteed-investment certificates (GICs). This would be more of an issue under the value-added approach. Other inputs include equity, borrowing (repurchase agreements and subordinated debt), labour, and physical capital. Banks use these inputs to create outputs, namely: loans, marketable securities and fee income from investment banking, wealth management and retail operations.

This paper uses the technique first proposed by Christensen et al. (1973) and later

developed by [Kopp and Diewert \(1982\)](#), known as the transcendental log (translog) cost function. It makes use of duality to show that it is possible to estimate a cost function without knowing the underlying production function. In a universal bank, there are often separable outputs but all costs are grouped together. This makes it impossible to match outputs with the respective inputs. In order for duality to apply, it is necessary for the market to be perfectly competitive. Namely, that maximizing the profit function and minimizing the cost function result in the same output quantities. Additionally, firms must act as price takers such that the usage of inputs and the quantity of outputs does not impact the price of the inputs. As stated earlier, if the banks have market power, then this omitted variable will bias the RTS estimates upward. Regarding the other inputs, the assumption that each firm is a price-taker seems reasonable. Although the banks in this sample are large, individually they are not so large as to affect the price of computers, buildings, rent or real estate prices (at least through direct purchase or usage) or labour.

A cost function can capture many of the key features that drive bank profitability. [Dietrich and Wanzenried \(2011\)](#) used data from 372 commercial banks in Switzerland covering 1999 to 2009. They found that bank profits were driven by operational efficiency, the growth of total loans, funding costs, share of net interest to noninterest income, and the effective tax rate. Clearly, managing costs is an extremely important component of bank profitability. To make a thorough analysis possible, it is desirable to have a cost function that captures as many of these key features as possible.

Following [McKeown \(2017b\)](#), the constrained translog cost function has the following form:

$$\begin{aligned} \log\left(\frac{C}{W_1}\right) &= \alpha_0 + \sum_{q=1}^m \alpha_q y_q + \sum_{j=2}^k \beta_j (w_j - w_1) + \frac{1}{2} \sum_{q=1}^m \sum_{w=1}^m \sigma_{qw} y_q y_w \\ &+ \sum_{q=1}^m \sum_{j=1}^k \sum_{j \neq q} \gamma_{qj} (y_q w_j - y_1 w_1) + \frac{1}{2} \sum_{p=1}^k \sum_{j=2}^k \delta_{pj} (w_p w_j - w_1 w_1) + \epsilon_{it} \end{aligned} \quad (1)$$

Where lower case letters indicate a log variable, q represents outputs, w represents input prices, and ϵ is a random error term. Equation 1 is ready for estimation. Returns to scale are measured by:

$$RTS = \left(\sum_{q=1}^m \frac{\partial \log(C)}{\partial \log(Y_q)} \right)^{-1} \quad (2)$$

$$RTS = \left(\sum_{q=1}^m \frac{\partial \log(C_1/W)}{\partial \log(Y_q)} \right)^{-1} = \left(\sum_{q=1}^m \alpha_q + \sum_{q=1}^m \sum_{j=1}^{k-1} \gamma_{qj} w_j + \sum_{q=1}^m \sum_{g=1}^m \sigma_{qg} y_g \right)^{-1} \quad (3)$$

Returns to scope exist if a proportionate increase in all assets generates greater cost savings than an increase in just one output. They are calculated as:

$$\frac{\partial \ln(C)}{\partial \ln(Y_q) \ln(Y_w)} = \frac{\partial \log(C)}{\partial \log(\ln(Y_q) \ln(Y_w))} \quad (4)$$

For more detail on the model and estimation techniques, see [McKeown \(2017b\)](#).

3.2 Does the translog cost function provide accurate estimates?

As previously argued, the translog cost function can provide accurate inference if its limitations are appropriately satisfied. Recently in the banking literature, there have been a number of criticisms of the parametric translog cost function. [Wheelock and Wilson \(2012\)](#) criticized the parametric translog cost function for being too inflexible. Considering that it is derived from a Taylor series approximation of a nonlinear function, inference loses accuracy the further its distance from a point of observation. Using data from each quarter in 1986 to 2006, [Wheelock and Wilson \(2012\)](#) estimate a parametric function for the largest and smallest 50 percent of bank observations per quarter and conduct a Wald test to determine if the coefficients are statistically different. They find that the coefficients differ significantly in nearly every fiscal quarter. However this test is not an entirely fair – the median bank was quite often extremely small relative to the largest bank in each sub-sample. For example, in the fourth fiscal quarter of 2006, the median bank had assets less than \$100 million and this was the largest median bank in the entire sample used by [Wheelock and Wilson \(2012\)](#). Considering that the largest bank in that quarter, Citigroup Inc., had assets of \$1.96 trillion, it should be of little surprise that a parametric translog cost function fails to accurately capture the extreme variation.

Another difficulty relates to the curvature of an estimated cost function. [Restrepo-Tobón](#)

and Kumbhakar (2015) focus on these limitations in order to derive a superior calculation of RTS in a non-parametric framework. In a second-order parametric specification, the RTS estimates are limited in the shape they can assume to a two-dimensional space of returns to scale and bank size. For example, the curve may have an ideal cost function ‘u-shape’ but it may not have more unusual shapes that might signify changes in RTS over a range of asset values. This can be problematic in practice. For example in section 4, banks with a range of \$10 to \$100 billion total assets appeared to exhibit a positive relationship between noninterest expense per asset and total assets or decreasing RTS. However for banks with more than than \$100 billion, the relationship appeared to be negative – expenses per asset declined modestly as banks assets grew. This would be difficult to capture in a second-order parametric translog cost function that according to theory should have a u-shaped average cost curve.

In order to account for the limitations of a translog cost function, I limit the tested sample to the largest commercial banks in Canada and the United States. This mitigates the problems arising from too much dispersion in the sample, namely, that the estimated cost function will fail to capture the correct curvature of the cost function and lead to an erroneous measure of RTS. Additionally, if some banks have a different cost structure and output, it could be difficult to capture in a cost function or input-oriented distance function. Investment banks, wealth management companies, and monoline lenders such as credit card companies are excluded from the sample. Commercial banks typically have less reliance on noninterest income than investment bank BHCs such as Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley. I also exclude credit card companies such as Capital One which further reduces dispersion of output quantities in the sample. An additional advantage from removing the smaller banks is that the remainder almost certainly enjoyed a too-big-to-fail (TBTF) implicit subsidy from the government. This is the definition used by Hughes and Mester (2013), and it is generally agreed among researchers that a bank with more than \$100 billion in total assets is likely to be TBTF. In fact, this is a conservative estimate as previous studies define it at a lower level. Few researchers disagree with Restrepo-Tobón and Kumbhakar (2015) and Haldane (2010) that banks with less than \$500 million in total assets exhibit increasing RTS. Most of the policy debate relates to the largest banks and whether they should be allowed to continue to expand or be forcibly constrained. It is also these

large and growing banks in the U.S. and Canada that pose the greatest threat to financial stability and are the most ardent proponents of increasing bank size. Consequently, these concessions create more accurate estimates of RTS within the limitations of a parametric translog cost function and contribute to the policy debate.

An alternative to the translog cost function is the input-oriented distance function, and [Restrepo-Tobón and Kumbhakar \(2015\)](#) estimate a non-parametric version. The setup is similar to the translog cost function in that both require output decisions be exogenous and input decisions be endogenous. The advantage of the input-oriented distance function is that it does not require the assumption of duality or any competitive framework for it to generate accurate results. As its name suggests, it uses inputs rather than prices. For example, the price of funds would be calculated as interest expense divided by interest-paying liabilities. An advantage to using inputs rather than prices is that their definition is straight-forward. For example, defining the price of legal fees, a noninterest expense, is problematic. A drawback is that less information is being used. For example, either the quantity of interest-paying liabilities or the interest expense may be used, but not both. The input-oriented distance function uses outputs and input quantities while the translog cost function makes use of total costs, outputs, input expenses, and input quantities. Consequently, more of the available information is included in the translog cost function. In particular, the weighted average cost of capital plays a prominent role in banking credit cycles⁶ and this is omitted in any input-cost function. See [McKeown \(2017b\)](#) for details. In section 6.2, I estimate an input-oriented distance function and compare it to the results from a translog cost function in section 6.1.

4 Data and analysis

4.1 Data sources

The U.S. data in this paper was collected from U.S. Bank Holding Companies (BHCs); each BHC above \$500 million in total assets must submit accounting data, through the FR Y-9C quarterly filings, to the Chicago Federal Reserve. [Avraham et al. \(2012\)](#) describes

⁶Banking credit cycles refers to the phenomenon that banks tend to increase lending and interest expenses when the economy is expanding while they tend to decrease lending and interest expenses in when the economy is contracting.

the structure of U.S. BHCs. By its most basic definition, a BHC is a corporation that controls one or more banks. They observe that the vast majority of bank assets in the U.S. financial system are held by BHCs and their subsidiaries. By 2012, four BHCs owned over 2,000 subsidiaries and the ten largest BHCs held \$15 trillion worth of total assets; this represented a five-fold increase since 1991. Furthermore, many of these holding companies engaged in non-banking activities such as securities dealing, underwriting and commodities trading.⁷ To eliminate double-counting, the sample used in my paper includes only top-tier BHCs which report data that on a consolidated basis. Top-tier BHCs are identified using information from the fourth quarter of 1996, 1999, 2003, 2005, and 2009. I exclude all foreign BHCs because they may not report all costs associated with U.S. activity such as overseas head office expenses and shareholder equity. U.S. regulations require banks to satisfy leverage requirements, but the equity does not need to be held within the U.S. or on the balance sheet. For the purposes of this paper, it also conveniently removes the large Canadian bank BHCs that operated in the United States. Following standard practices in the literature, the U.S. GDP deflator converts all income statement and balance sheet data into real 2012 U.S. dollars. For comparability with Canadian bank data, my sample covers the same time period, 1996 to 2015.

In Canada, accounting data were taken from the Office of the Superintendent of Financial Services (OSFI), bank financial statements, Compustat and CANSIM. OSFI makes income statement items available quarterly while balance sheet data are published monthly. For comparability, all monthly data are averaged into quarterly values. The sample period covers the first fiscal quarter of 1996 through to the fourth quarter of 2015. Considering only the six largest Canadian banks, which account for roughly 90% of all bank assets, this creates a time series of 80 quarters, six banks and a maximum of 480 observations. Canadian banks file quarterly on the last day of January, April, July, and October. Hence the Canadian GDP deflator, with the fourth quarter ending on the last day of December, does not match the correct three-month period. Consequently, the CPI is used to convert income statement and balance sheet items into real 2012 Canadian dollars. At the beginning of 2012, all Canadian banks switched from Canadian GAAP to IFRS accounting standards. This causes some difficulties in data compatibility after 2011, specifically the calculation of

⁷Avraham et al. (2012) described how investment banks that previously held commodities prior to 1997 were allowed to continue to buy and hold commodities, so some activities were granted grandfather clauses

equity capital and some securitized mortgages.⁸ See [McKeown \(2017a\)](#) for further details.

4.2 Returns and costs at U.S. banks

This section demonstrates how U.S. commercial banks differ by size. *First*, this justifies removing the smaller banks from my sample in section 6 – they may operate with a fundamentally different business model. *Second*, it offers insight on the profitability and cost structure of U.S. BHCs. *Third*, the descriptive statistics do not support previous studies that find large increasing RTS. Although large banks enjoy some benefits relative to smaller banks, the overall cost advantages appear modest. Section 4.3 extends the analysis to the Canadian big six banks and illustrates how these banks differ by revenue and cost. The comparison between banks of differing size is done using diagrams and descriptive statistics while in section 6, the estimated RTS are presented for a sample of U.S. banks with more than \$100 billion real 2015 US dollars in total assets and contrasted against a sample of Canadian banks. Ratios are presented using equally weighted means.

U.S. BHCs include a large number of financial institutions that collect only a limited amount of deposits. To ensure that the BHC's in my sample are comparable deposit-taking intermediaries, I define a commercial bank as one which consistently earns no more than 70 percent of its taxable earnings from noninterest income. Alternatively, at least 30 percent of pre-tax earnings is from interest and dividends. This removes BHCs that are not holding a sufficient quantity of loans and securities. For example at the beginning of the financial crisis, investment banks such as Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley formed into BHCs at the federal government's request in order to access the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP), but most of their income is from trading and investment banking activities. There also exist BHCs whose businesses focused on a limited number of activities such as credit cards (Capital One) or wealth management (The Charles Schwab Corporation). These are removed to ensure that the commercial banks in the sample were offering similar financial services. As previously stated, foreign banks are also excluded. Accounting issues sometimes occur directly after a merger or prior to a bank becoming insolvent. As [Allen et al. \(2006\)](#) recount, if a merger is treated as an acquisition, costs in that quarter increase significantly in one period before return to normal. I account for this by treating mergers as the creation of

⁸Traditionally, Canadian banks are less active in the securitization market than banks operating in the United States. However the change in balance sheet assets remains non-trivial.

a new bank and dropping data that is erroneous. Still, there remain some unusual outliers. For example one outlier, First American Financial Corporation in 2012, had \$6 billion in total assets and a noninterest expense to asset ratio of 70.7 percent – the sample mean was just 3.28 percent. To eliminate outliers in an objective fashion for each of the U.S. BHC figures, I drop any observations below the 1st percentile and above the 99th percentile of the entire sample. This eliminates some unusual observations that would otherwise obfuscate the trend.




Figure 2: Average net interest income less PCL

Note: net interest is calculated as interest and dividend income less the sum of interest expenses less the provision for credit losses (PCL) per asset. Source: FR-Y-C9

Mean ratios are categorized by bank assets and calculated using an equally weighted average. The following figures in this section compare the profitability of U.S. BHCs according to three aggregated categories: banks with less than \$10 billion in real 2012 total assets, those with more than \$10 billion but less than \$100 billion, and those with more than \$100 billion. After 2006, only banks with more than \$500 million in total assets were required to submit the Y9C filing. After this year, the number of banks in the sample with




Figure 3: Interest expense

Note: Average interest expense is calculated as interest expenses divided by total asset. Source: FR-Y-C9

fewer than \$1 billion in total assets declined until there were only a few of these left in the sample by 2015. To ensure an appropriate number of observations in each year, I choose \$10 billion as a cut-off between small and medium-sized commercial banks. Across years, banks are allowed to transition from one bin to another.⁹ In some figures, the medium-sized bank category is removed if it does not provide insight into the transition from small-to-large. Results are similar if total assets or non-financial items, such as goodwill and net capital assets,¹⁰ are excluded.

Figure 2 shows how the interest rate spread, measured as the sum of interest and dividend revenue less the provision for credit losses (PCL) and interest expense per asset, evolved over time. Even after accounting for these credit losses, the smallest U.S. BHCs

⁹It was common for banks to increase assets into a larger category, but only once did a bank transition from more than \$10 billion in quarter to less than that in the next.

¹⁰Originally, I separated out these non-financial items because it was possible that larger banks would have a higher proportion of non-financial assets. For example, goodwill increases with mergers and acquisitions and larger banks merge and acquire more often. I also exclude assets that have off-setting liabilities such as derivatives and bankers acceptances. However the results are similar, regardless.




Figure 4: Interest revenue

Note: Average interest revenue is calculated as interest and dividend revenue divided by total assets.
 Source: FR-Y-C9

earned the highest spread and did so consistently from 1996 to 2015. This suggests the lending strategy of smaller banks differs fundamentally from those of larger banks. Interestingly, medium-sized banks earned interest rate margins similarly to the larger banks prior to the financial crisis but suffered severe loan-losses during the financial crisis. Subsequently, they began to earn net interest spreads similar to smaller banks. There is some anecdotal evidence that might suggest why this occurred. It is possible that banks earning higher interest rate spreads are more engaged in retail banking where the cost of deposits is quite low. However Figure 3 suggests that larger banks paid lower interest expenses, so this explanation does not seem to hold. Figure 4 suggests that smaller banks earned a higher rate of interest while Figure 5 shows that larger banks incurred a higher rate of credit losses per asset; this was especially true prior to and during the financial crisis. If larger banks focused more on trading income, then they may be purchasing low-yield assets such as reverse repos and government t-bills to support their trading operations. For an extreme example of how a bank may choose to allocate assets to earn trading income, consider the




Figure 5: Provision for credit losses

Note: The average provision for credit losses (PCL) is calculated as PCL divided by total assets. Source: FR-Y-C9

fourth quarter financial report of investment bank Morgan Stanley in 2012 – they reported a net interest income loss of \$0.199 billion but a trading income gain of \$6.99 billion. Following the financial crisis, many investment banks were earning low rates of return. Some of these focused attention on the retail banking market. For example, the investment bank Goldman Sachs announced the creation of a retail banking branch named Marcus in the second quarter of 2016, partially shifting their strategic focus. It is possible that many of the medium-sized commercial banks, recognizing lower returns to trading, re-allocated their asset portfolios to earn more interest revenue instead of supporting their trading activities.

Noninterest income includes all income except interest or dividends such as retail bank fees, trading income, and foreign exchange fees. Figure 6 illustrates four interesting features of U.S. commercial banks. *First*, it shows that the largest U.S. BHCs made significantly more from noninterest-related activities than smaller banks. Prior to 2007, the average commercial bank with more than \$100 billion in assets earned more than three times more




Figure 6: Non-interest revenue

Note: Average noninterest revenue per asset includes trading gains and losses, and bank fees. Banks with between \$10 and \$100 billion would appear somewhere in between. Source: FR-Y-C9

than those with fewer than \$10 billion in assets. *Second*, higher noninterest income is associated with greater volatility. Medium-sized banks earned less than larger banks, but they also had somewhat lower volatility. Among banks with fewer than \$10 billion in total assets, average noninterest income held relatively steady at 1% of assets. *Third*, beginning in 2006 – the same period aggregate U.S. home prices began to fall – the average noninterest income of medium-sized banks began to move toward those of smaller banks. *Fourth*, in 2006, average noninterest income among larger commercial banks peaked. The earnings of smaller commercial banks significantly differed from those of larger banks which reflected the different business models of each. [DeYoung and Torna \(2013\)](#) find that U.S. banks relying on non-traditional banking activities such as securitization and trading income had a higher probability of financial distress during the financial crisis.

Combining net interest and noninterest income then subtracting noninterest expenses generates earnings before taxes. Figure 7 illustrates this pre-tax return per asset. Prior




Figure 7: Pre-tax ROA

Note: Average pre-tax return on assets is calculated as pre-tax income divided by total assets. Source: FR-Y-C9

to the financial crisis, medium and large-sized commercial banks earned a higher pre-tax income than those with less \$10 billion in total assets. Interestingly, there is little separating the large and medium-sized banks despite some differences in proportion of net interest income to noninterest income. Prior to the crisis, larger banks were earning a 2 percent net return on assets while their smaller competitors were earning approximately 1.5 percent. The volatility from noninterest income remains visible. During the crisis, all bank types suffered heavy losses. Subsequent to 2010, pretax earnings had decreased by 50 to 75 basis points in each category. The earnings spread between banks with less than \$10 billion and more than \$100 billion total assets had narrowed, but it had not been eliminated. To summarize, U.S. commercial banks have an incentive to become larger as net income is increasing in size. Within the range of banks with fewer than \$100 billion total assets, studies that include profits in their evaluation of RTS, such as [Hughes and Mester \(2013\)](#) and [Wheelock and Wilson \(2015\)](#), are likely to find increasing RTS.

Do large banks experience greater cost efficiency over smaller competitors? Figure 8




Figure 8: Compensation per worker

Note: Average employee compensation is presented in real 2012 USD. Source: FR-Y-C9

shows real labour expense per worker for the three bank size categories. The smaller banks pay the least per asset followed by the medium-sized banks and then the largest – salaries were increasing with bank size. Generally, staff engaged in retail banking are paid less than those in activities that require fewer employees but more skill such as wealth management. In 2015 according to the Occupational Outlook Handbook, the median U.S. bank teller earned \$26,410 per year; a loan officer earned \$63,420, and a financial manager earned \$117,990.¹¹ For all commercial BHCs, the number of employees is decreasing as assets increase. Figure 9 shows noninterest expense per asset, sometimes called cost efficiency. It is striking that the ratio is roughly the same for each bank category and changes little from year-to-year. Miles and Sapci (2017) divide banks into four categories: those with less than \$500 million in average assets, medium banks with up to \$2.5 billion, large banks with up to \$20 billion, and TBTF with more than \$20 billion. They show that from 1990 to 2015, cost

¹¹These are based on having five years experience. A financial manager is defined as ‘producing financial reports, directing investment activities, and developing strategies and plans for the long-term’.




Figure 9: Non-interest expense per asset

Note: The major component of noninterest expense is labour compensation, which makes up 35-50% of the total. Source: FR-Y-C9

efficiency was slightly declining or stagnant for small and medium banks while increasing for larger and TBTF banks. However in 2015, the value of the ratio itself was lowest for the smallest banks followed monotonically in rank by medium, large, and TBTF sized-banks. Despite this trend, smaller U.S. commercial banks remained slightly more cost efficient in 2015. Average employee compensation per asset was fairly constant at 1.5 percent, and this was true for all bank sizes. [Anderson and Joeveer \(2012\)](#) study RTS where rents, defined as pre-tax income, is shared between bank employees and shareholders. They find that large banks accrued larger rents but as banks became larger, a higher proportion of these rents was captured by employees. However the data suggests that on average employees were compensated 1.5 percent of assets regardless of size, profit, or year. Putting the results from [Anderson and Joeveer \(2012\)](#) aside, it is also possible that the business models of larger commercial banks required more specialized skills such as financial management, securities trading, and investment banking. Among university students, these jobs are considered highly desirable, so it is not unreasonable to believe they would attract talented

individuals.

The remainder of this section identifies a few remaining features of interest. Figure 3 illustrates how rates of interest follow the credit cycle. Expansionary economic periods are associated with increased lending and rising interest rates while contractionary periods are associated with decreased lending and falling rates. It is noteworthy that the larger banks paid less interest in nearly every year except in the lead-up to the 2007-2009 crisis. There are a number of possible explanations: larger banks could have relied more on short-term funding through repos and money markets than longer-term fixed-rate GICs and bonds. Alternatively, the largest banks were known to have an implicit guarantee from the government if the bank should become insolvent. It might have influenced these rates during the contraction phase, particularly the contraction coinciding with the financial crisis. In an [IMF report \(2014\)](#) on global financial stability, banks designated as Global Strategically Important Banks (G-SIBS) enjoyed as much as a 100 basis point funding advantage over similar, but smaller and unprotected, rivals. [Davies and Tracey \(2014\)](#) find that large international banks exhibit constant RTS when the implicit subsidy is controlled for. Otherwise, they find that large international banks operated with modestly increasing RTS. [Kumar \(2013\)](#) partially attributes the difference to certain consumers who prefer large bank branch networks and pay for it through lower interest rates on their deposits.

Risk is not easy to observe, but an available option is the provision for credit losses (PCL). Management chooses the PCL to account for both future and present losses. It closely follows net write-offs which is calculated as actual credit losses less recoverables. Figure 5 shows that, prior to 2006, banks with fewer than \$10 billion in assets also had a lower average PCL per asset than banks with more than \$100 billion in assets. All else being equal, smaller commercial banks were better able to collect on their loans. The larger banks also experienced larger losses following the dotcom bubble. From Figure 4, banks with more than \$100 billion in real 2012 USD earned less interest revenue per asset. If these large banks held assets that were inherently more risky than the smaller banks, then one would expect the larger banks to charge a higher premium. However in this diagram, the reverse is observed, namely that the banks with fewer than \$10 billion charged the highest interest rates and experienced fewer losses from bad loans. Banks with \$10 to \$100 billion fall in between. Previously, it was mentioned that large banks often purchase assets to facilitate

trading operations but this does not explain the difference in PCL. Perhaps these smaller commercial banks maintained a comparative advantage in their local markets. [De Elejalde \(2012\)](#) finds that single-market banks had an advantage in lending to small businesses and farms. He attributes this to relationship lending that can better capitalize on qualitative information to assess the riskiness of opaque borrowers. It is possible that smaller BHCs are also able to maintain a local comparative advantage over larger rivals which results in higher interest revenue and fewer net write-offs.

Figure 10 shows scatterplot diagrams of top-tier U.S. BHCs; noninterest expenses per asset are plotted against total assets. A line of least squares is produced in each figure. For banks with fewer than \$10 billion in assets, there are many observations in the sample hence the scatterplot appears as a dark cloud. The slope of the line of least squares was slightly below zero suggesting small noninterest cost savings per asset as bank size approached \$10 billion assets. For banks with assets from \$10 to \$100 billion, an interesting result is observed: the line is upward sloping which suggests decreasing RTS, a cost disadvantage from increasing size. If only observations prior to 2004 are considered, then the line of least squares is horizontal while if only those after 2004 are included, the line slopes upward again. It is also worth noting that if only observations following the financial crisis are included, the line of least squares is also upward sloping. [Restrepo-Tobón and Kumbhakar \(2015\)](#) also find that smaller banks were more likely to exhibit decreasing or constant RTS. Why did these medium-sized American banks experience increasing noninterest expenses? First, they were paying high investment costs, in physical capital and research, in order to scale-up. This appeared to be the case for large U.S. banks prior to 2005 when they experienced higher noninterest costs per asset than their peers. Similarly, they could have paid a premium to acquire competitors and expand. A common suspicion in the literature is that these banks could be attempting to scale up in order to enjoy TBTF status and the ensuing implicit subsidy. Since the financial crisis, no bank with greater than \$100 billion in total assets became insolvent.




Figure 10: Banks assets below \$10 billion

Note: From top-left-to-right, the diagram shows banks total assets less than \$10 billion, those with assets from \$10 to \$100 billion, and those with more than \$100 billion. Values are in real 2012 USD. The y-axis is noninterest expense per asset which excludes the PCL and taxes. The diagrams include annualized observations of 13,403, 900, and 413, respectively. Annual observations cover 1996 to 2015. Observations below the 1st percentile and those above the 99th percentile from the entire sample were dropped. Source: FR-Y-C9

Using descriptive statistic, the largest US commercial banks earned a higher return on assets than their smaller competitors, but they also earned a higher share of income from volatile noninterest revenue and had higher net write-offs than smaller and medium-sized BHCs. For the most part, noninterest expenses per asset appeared to be unrelated to bank size. The report from [Clearing House \(2011\)](#) and the work of [Kovner et al. \(2014\)](#) suggest that larger banks pay lower noninterest expenses. This could be true among the banks with more than \$100 billion in real 2012 assets. However it is not distinctly noticeable for all bank sizes. Many smaller banks operated with a noninterest expense to asset ratio that was equal to the larger banks. [Koetter and Noth \(2013\)](#) find that the efficient use of IT matters – the amount of expenditure does not guarantee future cost reduction or revenue generation. [Mai et al. \(2012\)](#) find similar results. Whether the average bank experiences decreasing costs by increasing size is the focus of section 6.

4.3 Comparing the U.S. and Canadian banks

For comparability, the following analysis focuses on ratios with units of currency in both the numerator and denominator – this avoids unnecessary currency conversion. The primary focus is on the largest Canadian and U.S. banks because this is where the public policy debate around bank size is focused. Consequently, I compare the Canadian Big Six against U.S. commercial banks with more than \$100 billion in total assets.¹² Figure 11 compares pre-tax ROA; it illustrates that U.S. banks were much more profitable prior to the financial crisis than the Canadian Big Six. As previously stated, this spread may have been unsustainable given the U.S. sub-prime boom-and-bust. For the most part, Canadian banks avoided this market. Subsequent to the onset of the financial crisis in 2007, U.S. banks suffered a negative return while the decline in Canadian pre-tax ROA was significant but less severe, accounting for a 50 percent decline in average return. Although following the crisis, this spread had narrowed considerably. Since 2013, the average large U.S. bank earned approximately 20 basis points more than their Canadian counterparts.

Why did U.S. BHCs earn a higher pre-tax ROA than Canadian banks? Figure 12 shows interest expense per asset; while it is quite similar for the banks of both countries, the average Canadian bank typically paid an additional 15 to 30 bps. The cost of repos,

¹²Choosing a higher cutoff, or for that matter a modestly lower one, does not materially change the result. Similarly, restricting the sample to the U.S. Big Four generates similar results.




Figure 11: Pre-tax return on assets

Note: Pre-tax ROA is calculated as taxable income per asset. Source: OSFI, FR-Y-C9

outside of the financial crisis, was a few basis points more than the yield on a U.S. T-Bill of similar maturity. From 1996 to 2015, the Canadian banks paid a higher rate than their U.S. counterparts and this was fairly consistent over time. The yield on three-month Canadian government T-Bills was often less than that of the U.S. three-month T-Bill. Following the onset of the financial crisis, the U.S. bank rate and T-Bill yields were lower than their Canadian counterparts. An additional contributing factor was that U.S. banks were more likely to access the repo market for additional funding than the Canadian banks that relied more on deposits. These differing preferences for funds could influence the average interest expense paid.

Figure 13 shows that the average U.S. bank in each size category earned a higher net interest return on assets than the Canadian Big Six. Rather surprisingly, this markup was large, 50 to 100 percent of the Big Six, and consistent. This is a surprising but verifiable result. Comparable numbers can readily be obtained from the FRED database and Cana-




Figure 12: Interest expenses

Note: Interest expenses include interest paid on deposits, bonds, and repos. Source: OSFI, FR-Y-C9

dian bank annual reports. Why is there such a significant gap? A major difference between the two banking systems is the number of banks in the United States compared to Canada. This suggests that the U.S. banking system would be more competitive, but the literature is uncertain how competition affects the market for financial services. [Hellmann et al. \(2000\)](#) point out that competition, combined with moral hazard, can undermine prudent lending, so this could explain the data – more profits in a boom (pre-2007) and more losses in a bust (2007-09). [Schaeck et al. \(2009\)](#) use a [Panzar and Rosse \(1987\)](#) H-Statistic to estimate a reduced form revenue equation and measure market competition. They find that increased competition is associated with less aggregate risk – but this seems at odds with the data on US and Canadian banks. [Boyd and De Nicolo \(2005\)](#) review the empirical literature and find that the connection between profits and competition is inconclusive. More recently, [Berger et al. \(2009\)](#) study competition in 23 countries and find that more bank concentration leads to less risk-taking and a more stable financial system – the Canadian net interest




Figure 13: Net interest margin

Note: Net interest margin is calculated as net interest income less the provision for credit losses per asset.
Source: OSFI, FR-Y-C9

margin certainly appears stable.

What made the U.S. banks so much more profitable than their Canadian counterparts? Possibly, the large U.S. BHCs made riskier loans and held riskier securities than Canadian. If so, we would expect higher returns but also more bad loans. Figure 14 suggests this was true, the U.S. BHCs experienced more credit losses per asset than the Canadian banks. The average Canadian bank rarely had more than 50 bps credit losses over the sample while the U.S. large commercial banks had more than 200bps in 2009. Furthermore, the U.S. banks paid a higher effective tax rate than their Canadian rivals. Perhaps this pressured bank managers into riskier ventures to achieve a desired after-tax rate of return on equity. As mentioned earlier, the U.S. BHCs securitized assets much more than Canadian banks. The practice of dividing payments or underlying securities into ‘tranches’, where the least risky assets are separated from the riskiest, typically leaves the originator with some very illiquid assets known colloquially as toxic waste. This sort of risk-taking could explain why U.S.




Figure 14: Provision for credit losses

The provision for credit losses (PCL) is closely correlated with net write-offs. Source: OSFI, FR-Y-C9

PCL per asset was consistently above the Big Six until 2012 – after which point, most of the credit losses had been recognized.

Figure 15 shows how the average Canadian Big Six bank kept labour costs under control and below those of the average U.S. bank throughout most of the sample. Figure 16 illustrates how they were also able to keep other noninterest expenses under control. Other than labour this includes losses due to theft, insurance premiums, legal fees, sales taxes, advertising and promotional giveaways. Rent and equipment expenses per asset were equal in both countries, so this is not a possible explanation. Unfortunately, more detail information on U.S. noninterest expense is not available. It is likely that a significant contributor was legal penalties. The U.S. banks paid legal penalties averaging \$4 billion per annum from 2010 to 2015. It was also possible that large U.S. banks spent more on research and development, but according to the Canadian Bankers Association (CBA), the Canadian banks spent \$10.2 billion on research and development in 2015, a considerable




Figure 15: Labour expense per asset

Labour expense includes all employee compensation including stock options, bonuses and benefits. Source: OSFI, FR-Y-C9

sum. Another possible explanation is investment in technology, for which quality data is not available. According to McKinsey,¹³ among European banks, IT spending accounted for approximately 19 percent of their operating expenses in 2011 and 2012. Mai et al. (2012) explain that financial service firms were required to fulfill stringent regulatory requirements which translate into IT costs that do not contribute to the bottom-line. The U.S. regulatory bodies such as the FDIC and Federal Reserve have more stringent information requirements than the Canadian banks. Due to the diversity of international regulatory regimes, IT expenses varied among national jurisdictions. In the U.S., 26 percent of total IT expenses were paid to employees. Mai et al. (2012) state that European banks spent 30.5 percent of their IT budgets on ‘change-the-bank’ research and development, such as writing new software, and this was relatively stable from 2003 to 2010. Although the range of IT expenses as a

¹³‘More bank for your IT buck’ by Keiichi Aritomo, Driek Desmet, and Andy Holley, McKinsey & Company, June 2014. <http://www.mckinsey.com/business-functions/digital-mckinsey/our-insights/more-bank-for-your-it-buck>

percentage of operating expenses was relatively narrow, some business segments required more IT spending than others. The most IT intensive was retail banking where 16.5 percent of expenses were related to IT. Comparatively, the least intensive was wealth management with 13.5 percent of expenses related to IT. Given the small range, it is unlikely differences in business activities were the sole reason for such a large difference in noninterest expenses per asset, but it could have played a role. Regulation in the United States, with its more stringent regulatory regime, could explain a significant amount of the difference.




Figure 16: Noninterest costs

Note: noninterest expense excludes income taxes and the PCL. Source: OSFI, FR-Y-C9

[Allen et al. \(2006\)](#) contrast the Canadian and large U.S. banks with data from 1986 to 2002. Defining efficiency as the sum of net interest and noninterest income divided by noninterest expenses and number of employees, they find that the Canadian banks had similar productivity to U.S. banks. I also define efficiency as a ratio of income to noninterest expenses and compare efficiency against large U.S. and Big Six Canadian banks in Figure 17. By this metric, U.S. commercial banks consistently displayed greater efficiency than




Figure 17: Noninterest costs

Note: The sum of net interest and noninterest income less PCL. Source: OSFI, FR-Y-C9

the large Canadian banks from 1996 to 2007. However after U.S. home prices began to fall, the Big Six focus on reducing noninterest expenses had them better prepared for the downturn in revenues. Since then, the Canadian banks displayed greater efficiency until 2015 when the two series appear to converge. Canadian banks, such as RBC in its 2007 annual report, stated that improving the ratio of net interest and noninterest income to noninterest expenses was a major goal and benchmark of success.

To summarize, the Canadian banks were better able to manage noninterest expenses while the U.S. commercial banks enjoyed superior earnings at the cost of greater credit losses. These results were influenced by differing regulatory regimes, competition, labour costs, and the pre-crash U.S. mortgage market. In some cases, such as RBC in 2007, Canadian banks declared they willingly accepted a lower net interest margin to facilitate trading activities. This strategy may have coincided with accepting a less risky portfolio of assets. The increased competitive pressure among U.S. banks may have led to more, and

riskier, lending. Specialized trading firms such as the investment banks Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley may have captured a greater share of trading revenues forcing commercial banks to compete for in other financial services markets. In Canada, no large-sized domestic trading firms competed with the Big Six although they likely faced competition from the U.S. commercial and investment banks. Most of the major U.S. commercial and investment banks have trading and merger and acquisition subsidiaries in Canada. The extent of their business and trading activities varies from year-to-year, but they would have been in competition with the Big Six. However using data from OSFI, domestic Canadian banks accounted for more than 90 percent of aggregate trading revenue in each fiscal quarter from 1996 to 2015.

5 Estimation strategy

To make a strong comparison between the U.S. and Canadian banks, I plan to follow [McKeown \(2017b\)](#) as closely as possible. To differentiate my study from previous work such as [Inanoglu et al. \(2016\)](#), [Wheelock and Wilson \(2015\)](#), and [Restrepo-Tobón and Kumbhakar \(2015\)](#) and to ensure that the BHCs in my sample have similar business lines and are actual intermediaries, I define a commercial bank as one which consistently earns no more than less than 70 percent of its taxable earnings from noninterest income. Conversely, at least 30 percent of pre-tax earnings is from interest and dividends. This removes BHCs that are not actually a commercial bank but prefer to be incorporated as a bank holding company. For example at the beginning of the financial crisis, investment banks such as Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley formed into BHCs at the federal government's request in order to access the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP). There also exists BHCs whose businesses focused on a limited number of activities such as credit cards (Capital One) or wealth management (The Charles Schwab Corporation). I do not want their operations to influence those of commercial banks.

The Canadian banks had few mergers or acquisitions of note.¹⁴ The U.S. banking system

¹⁴One could argue that Toronto Dominion's acquisition of Canada trust was significant however it was quite small when compared to the mergers and acquisition activity among U.S. banks. The acquisition of Canada Trust resulted in a 21 percent increase in assets for TD in the second quarter of 2000. As described later in this paper, this falls well short of the 50 percent benchmark that I used to identify a significant U.S. merger.

from 1996 to 2015 witnessed many significant mergers and acquisitions, a net decrease in the number of banks, and a modest amount of entry. [Allen et al. \(2006\)](#) note that under accounting rules, banks may have included all merger costs in the same period in which they occurred. If so, this creates discontinuity in the data. In order to treat these uneven changes in cost, I include dummy variables for these types of mergers and any merger that increases the size of the surviving BHC by more than 50 percent.

5.1 Unbalanced panels and bias

The features of U.S. banks and data availability do raise certain concerns that require attention. Mergers and acquisitions among U.S. banks adds survivor bias into the results. There are many banks, most of them with fewer than \$100 billion total assets and an even greater proportion with fewer than \$10 billion, in the data. Policy is focused on the largest banks – these have been increasing market share at the fastest rate and politicians have expressed concern at this. Introducing many small observations would weigh the results away from these banks of interest – which is particularly problematic using parametric estimation techniques that equally weight each observation. Limiting the sample size to banks with a minimum size mitigates this problem, but it introduces additional bias: smaller banks that surpass this threshold are more likely using inputs efficiently, and perhaps efficiency is a prerequisite for increasing bank size. This implies the sample is no longer randomly selected; an unbalanced panel is created, and there is potential for mismeasurement. Unfortunately, there is no straight-forward solution. Studies such as [Allen et al. \(2006\)](#), [Inanoglu et al. \(2016\)](#), and [Restrepo et al. \(2013\)](#) restrict the sample size to banks that have observations over the entire sample period to ensure a balanced panel. They choose only the largest banks in a given time period to reduce the influence of smaller banks. Survivor bias remains an issue unless the banks that failed to survive, either through insolvency or acquisition, were truly random. During the financial crisis, a number of failing banks were acquired by competitors, so this assumption is controversial. [Wheelock and Wilson \(2012\)](#), [Wheelock and Wilson \(2015\)](#), and [Restrepo-Tobón and Kumbhakar \(2015\)](#) apply non-parametric estimation over a very large sample. This includes almost the entire population of banks and other financial institutions, so survivor bias is not an issue. However it includes many small banks that may not reveal much information about the largest banks.

Given the issues above and the limited number of observations on Canadian banks and large U.S. commercial banks, there is no perfect estimation strategy. For comparability to the Canadian banks, I consider quarterly data from 1996 to 2015. As a first pass, I will restrict the sample to create a balanced panel. Excluding foreign and non-bank financial BHCs, my benchmark estimates will include the ten largest U.S. domestic commercial banks as of the fourth quarter of 2015. A list of these banks can be seen in Table 1. Even among the top ten, the drop-off in total assets from the largest to smallest is considerable. I can then compare this benchmark sample to alternatives.

In [McKeown \(2017b\)](#), I used the modified augmented Dickey-Fuller test developed by [Sarno and Taylor \(1998\)](#) and the Levin-Lin-Chu test [Levin et al. \(2002\)](#) to test whether the residuals are stationary. Using Canadian data, the null of no cointegration was rejected at the 5 percent level of significance for all models. This was particularly straightforward since the Canadian data had no significant firm exit or entry and the panel was balanced. Restricting the sample to banks that survived the entire time period allows testing for a cointegrating relationship among the variables. The augmented Dickey-Fuller test rejected the null hypothesis of no cointegration at the 1 percent level of significance for all models.

Following from [McKeown \(2017b\)](#) and after testing for cointegration, I estimate a cost function using fixed effects OLS and a panel dynamic ordinary least squares estimator (PDOLS). PDOLS uses leads and lags of changes in the independent variables to more accurately estimate coefficients. These leads and lags are exogenous and reduce bias from any possible endogeneity between total costs, output and prices. If the series are cointegrated, this technique reduces estimate bias. I then calculate RTS using the elasticities in equation 3. The simulation tests in [Kao and Chiang \(2001\)](#) find that OLS estimates are biased downwards in finite samples which, given how I will calculate RTS, implies that it will be biased upwards. The more standard fixed effect model provides an estimate of RTS that can be interpreted as a ceiling on the true parameter.

The panel dynamic ordinary least squares (PDOLS) estimating equation, from [Mark and Sul \(2003\)](#) is:

$$y_{it} - \bar{y}_i = (X_{it} - \bar{X}_i)' \beta + \sum_{j=-q_i}^{q_i} b_j \Delta X_{it+j} \quad (5)$$

where i represents each bank. For each observation, the dependent variable cost (y_{it}) and the exogenous variables, outputs and prices (X_{it}), are de-meaned. Lead and lag changes in the exogenous prices and outputs are represented by the ΔX terms. One may interpret the β coefficients as being the long-run coefficients while short-run fluctuations are absorbed by the b coefficients. Given a maximum time series length of 80 time periods, [Mark and Sul \(2003\)](#) recommend one lead and one lag in the estimation, so that $q_i = 1$. This of course means that two degrees of freedom, from the first and final observation, are lost.

In order to ensure the Canadian and U.S. data are compatible, it is necessary to include trading revenue and gains (losses) from non-trading securities in noninterest income. This is a departure from [McKeown \(2017b\)](#) where cost function was estimated without trading revenue. Given the FR-Y-9C data, there is no readily apparent way to separate U.S. BHC trading revenue from noninterest income. Regarding the Canadian data, the sample ended in 2011 when the Canadian banks switched to a new accounting standard, IFRS. It is difficult to adjust the data to account for this regulatory change beyond the initial phase – the rule changes were significant enough to likely affect bank behaviour. For example, much more equity capital was required and keeping assets off-balance sheet became more difficult. Consequently, each Canadian bank is assigned a variable dummy variable that is equal to one in each time period following the implementation of IFRS – this corresponds to the first fiscal quarter of 2012 and creates six additional, cross-section specific variables.¹⁵ These dummies should help mitigate the impact of the regime change, and, consequently, the time series is increased by sixteen fiscal quarters. This allows a more current comparison of the U.S. and Canadian banks. For RTS estimates that exclude observations subsequent to the regime change, see [McKeown \(2017b\)](#).

5.2 Variable selection

Following from [McKeown \(2017b\)](#), I consider the following inputs: labour, physical capital, interest expense and the implied cost of equity. [Hughes and Mester \(2013\)](#) argue that any cost function that fails to include the cost of equity is fundamentally mis-specified. For example, if a bank relies on 100% equity financing, then it would require no other capital funding whatsoever, and could consequently be ranked as extremely efficient. Many banking

¹⁵I also omit the new NHA MBS asset category on the OSFI balance sheets since these existed but were not accounted for in prior periods.

studies on RTS fail to account for the cost of equity. Recently, there have been a number of exceptions. [Whelock and Wilson \(2012\)](#) consider the level of equity but only as an exogenous variable. [Restrepo et al. \(2013\)](#) and [Restrepo-Tobón and Kumbhakar \(2015\)](#) estimate an input-oriented function where the level of equity is an endogenous input. In order to estimate the cost of equity, I adopt the deduction from [Haldane \(2010\)](#) and assume that all large banks in my sample are perfectly diversified in the market portfolio. According to the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) in equation 6, each bank has a β equal to one. The result is a conservative estimate of the cost of equity for each bank in the sample regardless of its ownership structure.¹⁶ According to the survey by [Bruner et al. \(1998\)](#), most academics and practitioners settle on an expected market premium of 3-6 percent to generate the required return on capital. I choose an expected market premium above the risk-free rate of 4 percent or 1 percent per quarter. For estimation purposes, the risk-free rate is the holding period return on a 3-month t-bill. Banks regularly report return on book equity upwards of 15 or even 20 percent, so this is likely a conservative calibration.¹⁷ It is well-known that bank executives regard equity as the most expensive form of financing and, particularly prior to the financial crisis, banks operated at the minimum regulatory requirement.

$$r_i^e - r^f = \beta_i E(r^m - r^f) \quad (6)$$

r_i^e is the required return on equity for bank i , β_i is the CAPM measure of risk for bank i and $E(r^m - r^f)$ is the expected market premium.

It seems appropriate to include different sources of funding, such as repos, deposits and equity, as one aggregate variable, the weighted average cost of capital (WACC), rather than separately. Once a unit of funds is obtained, they become perfect substitutes for each other. In the translog cost function, they differ only on price. Given a varied source of funds and endogenous inputs, it would be logical for banks to choose the cheapest source of financing so they produce the most at the lowest cost. However it's not clear that i) the cheapest form

¹⁶In [McKeown \(2017b\)](#), I estimated the cost of equity using CAPM and Canadian stock returns. I found little cross-sectional difference in the beta estimates. In previous efforts, I limited the U.S. BHC sample to publicly traded banks, but I did not find significantly different results if beta allows for heterogeneity among banks.

¹⁷Measuring the required return on equity is tricky. If management's desired return on book equity is used, then this favours banks that have lower targets.

of financing is always available, hence violating the price-taker assumption of the translog cost function; ii) given the different maturities and funding risk associated with financing, it would be optimal to do so; iii) regulation would allow a bank to increase assets without an increase in equity.¹⁸ By including all funds in an aggregate variable, fewer parameters are estimated and the proportion of funding sources is strictly maintained. Other inputs include physical capital and labour. Table 3 demonstrates how input prices are calculated.

Outputs are collected into three variables: government and business assets, loans to household and fee income less account fees. This parsimonious specification has the benefit of limiting the number of parameters required for estimation, and it avoids potential multicollinearity among the square and cross-product output terms. To facilitate this selection, loans and securities from government and business are grouped together, and they remain separate from loans-to-households which are comprised of mortgages and consumer loans. Although this approach differs from the standard in the literature, [McKeown \(2017b\)](#) separates these two output categories into three and produces similar results. However if these two outputs are separated into four, then multicollinearity becomes an issue and the ML estimator fails to converge.

The third and final output term is noninterest income. It is well known in the literature that noninterest income is an imperfect proxy for service output but it is the best available. [Clark and Siems \(2002\)](#) study noninterest income as a proxy for service output; they determine that retail account fees distort noninterest income in an upward direction. Retail account fees can be quite large. Among Canadian banks and when the bank rate is close to zero, this fee income is often greater than the interest paid on short-term deposits. [Clark and Siems \(2002\)](#) suggest that bank managers already account for these revenues when setting various deposit prices. Therefore retail account fees are subtracted from noninterest income. Further, they recommend using noninterest revenue as the output variable over alternative methods. Although the instrument is imperfect, these services generate a significant portion of earnings before taxes, depreciation and amortization; it is important that they are accounted for properly in any analysis. Table 3 demonstrates the components of output.

Table 4 presents summary statistics for the top ten U.S. commercial banks, and Table

¹⁸Theoretically, if equity is more costly to issue, this could be captured by increasing the cost of equity without separating it from other sources of funds, but how to calibrate the cost of equity is not clear.

5 summarizes the Big Six Canadian banks. Prior to the 10th percentile, some Big Six observations have fewer than \$100 billion in real total assets. Over the sample, the average Canadian Bank was two-thirds the size of the average U.S. bank. This is because the four largest U.S. BHCs were about 2.5 times larger than the largest Canadian bank. There were also a large number of BHCs with more than \$100 billion in total assets that were smaller than the Canadian Big Six. Table 1 shows a list of the ten largest U.S. BHCs that make-up the sample. In order to avoid negative values in the Canadian data, noninterest income is never allowed to drop below \$4.99 million. This applies to both the U.S. BHCs and the Canadian Big Six; the value equates to the first percentile of noninterest income for the Canadian Big Six banks¹⁹. The Canadian banks in the sample have a maximum size that is approximately 2.5 times larger than the mean and a minimum size that is 1/6 the size of the mean. Comparatively, the U.S. BHCs have a maximum size that is approximately 5 times higher than the mean and a minimum that is also close to 1/6 the size of the mean. It should be noted that observations tend to cluster around \$100 billion while the U.S. ‘big-four’ became more than twenty-times this size.

With regards to the dispersion of the cost of funding, including both the interest expense and the implied cost of equity, the Canadian banks are relatively homogeneous. However this is not true for the U.S. commercial banks. No Canadian bank paid a rate that was more than 1.63 p.q. while the 75th percentile of U.S. BHCs had a rate of 1.94 p.q. Clearly, many U.S. banks paid quite a bit more than the Big Six. In sections 4.3 and 4.2, the Big Six, on average, paid a higher rate of interest than their large U.S. counterparts, and the larger U.S. banks a lower rate than the smaller. This highlights the relative homogeneity among the large Canadian banks. The summary data in table 4 excludes non-bank BHCs as previously discussed. Even among the banks that are classified as commercial banks, there is more variation.

¹⁹As a robustness check, the translog cost functions are estimated using the 10th percentile however the results are unchanged.

6 Results

6.1 Cost function

To determine if the series are cointegrated, a Modified Augmented Dickey-Fuller (MADF) test is performed and summarized in Table 6. Using the residuals from a the fixed-effect OLS estimation, the test rejects the null hypothesis that all series are order one unit processes. While the power of this test is inherently small, it does suggest that the panel dynamic estimator is appropriate. Table 7 compares RTS for the U.S. and Canada. It summarizes the estimates from both the short-run and long-run cost functions using the fixed effect (FE) and panel dynamic (PDOLS) estimators. RTS is calculated and tested at the mean of each independent variable – a value greater than one represents increasing RTS, a value of one represents constants RTS, and a value less than one represents decreasing RTS. Focusing on the U.S. commercial banks, the short-run cost function estimates small increasing RTS of 1.016 or 1.013 that are not significantly different from zero using robust standard errors. If physical capital is included to estimate a long-run cost function, then the fixed-effect estimates are similar – the panel dynamic estimator generates a value very close to one. Table 9 shows that the average value of RTS among actual observations was 1.020 or 0.999 depending on the estimator. Table 7 also summarizes the RTS among Canadian banks. If RTS is evaluated at the mean of outputs and inputs prices, none of the four estimations are significantly different from one. This result is similar to [McKeown \(2017b\)](#) – including trading gains and losses in noninterest income and extending the time series from 2011 to 2015 does not affect the main result. Section 4.3 shows that the Canadian banks had lower costs per asset than the U.S. banks; however this does not necessarily imply that they also had increasing RTS – among the Canadian banks, increasing bank size did not reduce relative cost.

For every observation, fitted values of RTS are estimated and tested at the 5 percent level of significance. Table 8 summarizes the result. Similar to [Restrepo-Tobón and Kumbhakar \(2015\)](#), some banks operated with increasing, decreasing and constant RTS at different times. In the short-run, many U.S. commercial banks demonstrated statistically significant increasing RTS. Figures 18 and 19 suggest that the smaller banks had the largest increasing RTS while banks with more assets exhibited constant or decreasing RTS. Although the

sample size is limited to the largest ten commercial banks, this result does not suggest that banks were increasing their ability to depress interest rates on deposits as they grew in size. Otherwise, I would expect to find more evidence for increasing RTS. Focusing attention on the long-run cost function that includes physical capital, the fixed-effect estimates are mostly unchanged from the short-run however the panel dynamic estimates show very few banks operated with decreasing RTS. Figures 20 and 21 graph estimated values of RTS against U.S. commercial bank assets. The curvature of the cost function mostly suggests that smaller banks experienced increasing RTS and these were exhausted as banks increased assets. Regarding the Canadian Big Six banks, the results are similar but less pronounced. This can be seen in Figures 22 and 23.

Table 14 summarizes a series of robustness tests. First, I consider changing the sample size to the largest six, eight, and fifteen commercial banks. These are ranked by total assets in the fourth quarter of 2015 and can be found in Table 13. Focusing on the short-run cost function, average RTS appear to be constant when only the largest banks are included in the sample. However, when the sample size is increased from the largest ten to largest fifteen U.S. commercial banks, RTS is increasing and statistically significant at 1 percent level of confidence. These results coincide with Figures 18 and 19 – banks with fewer assets experienced higher RTS values than larger banks. If loans and securities associated with businesses, financial intermediaries, and brokers are placed in a separate right-hand side variables from those associated with government or cash equivalents, then the results are unchanged – the null hypothesis of constant RTS cannot be rejected. If the implied cost of equity is removed from total costs and the weighted average cost of capital, then the fixed effect estimate of RTS are little changed, so the results are robust to modest alterations.

To summarize, I find that for the top ten U.S. commercial, constant RTS best describes the period from 1996 to 2015. The estimated values and curvature of the short-run cost function suggest that banks with fewer assets enjoyed higher RTS than the largest U.S. commercial banks. Described differently, RTS became exhausted as bank size increased. [Whelock and Wilson \(2015\)](#) find a similar result among the largest U.S. banks. They note that there are insufficient observations of banks with more than \$1 trillion in assets to determine whether RTS have truly been exhausted. Similarly, the Canadian banks displayed RTS that is close to constant over the same years. Due to the uncertainty about how to

price physical capital, the short-run cost function provides more reliable estimates than the long-run cost function.

6.2 Input-oriented distance function

Following [Restrepo-Tobón and Kumbhakar \(2015\)](#), I estimate a parametric input-oriented distance function (IDF) and compare the results of those of the translog cost function. If input prices are subject to inaccurate measurement, then the IDF will produce more accurate results than the translog cost function. However if the assumptions underlying the translog cost function are satisfied, then both methods should give identical results. [Kumbhakar et al. \(2015\)](#) explain that the IDF is a primal representation of a production function and requires no assumptions on market structure or firm behaviour. For the original derivations and the IDF's properties, see [Färe \(1988\)](#). The multiple-output, input-oriented distance function is defined as:

$$D_I(\mathbf{y}, \mathbf{x}) = \min_{\lambda} \{ \lambda | f(\mathbf{x}/\lambda) \in V(\mathbf{y}) \} \quad (7)$$

where $V(\mathbf{y})$ is the set of output requirements while \mathbf{x} is the vector of inputs. The distance function, $D_I(\mathbf{y}, \mathbf{x})$, is decreasing as outputs increase and it is increasing as inputs increase. In estimation, this distance acts as the residual or error term. IDF returns to scale are measured by:

$$RTS_{IDF} = - \left(\sum \frac{\partial \ln C(y, x)}{\partial \ln y_q} \right) \quad (8)$$

which is the traditional elasticity methodology and analogous to the cost function RTS in equation 3. I estimate two models: one where equity is included with other sources of funds and a second model where equity is considered as a separate input. The other inputs are net physical capital, labour, and other funds (deposits, bonds and repos). Including capital in the translog cost function is problematic because its price is poorly measured. Since it is now included as an input on the level, the IDF here should be considered a long-run function. The definition of outputs remains the same with real financial assets separated into: (i) loans and securities to households, (ii) to government and business, (iii) noninterest income. For the U.S. commercial banks, I replace the number of employees with the level

of employee compensation. From section 4.3, large banks may employ fewer workers per asset but they also pay each worker more.

Table 15 presents the results from the IDF estimates. RTS for the Canadian banks is little changed from the translog cost function estimates in Table 10. Looking at the U.S. banks with the number of employees as the input, mean RTS has increased by approximately 3 percent. If the number of employees is replaced with employee compensation, then mean RTS falls to a level similar to the results in the previous section. This is particularly satisfying because theoretically, a translog cost function should give the same results as an input-oriented distance function. Restrepo-Tobón and Kumbhakar (2015) estimate non-parametric translog and input-oriented distance function over a very large sample of U.S. banks. They find that the translog cost function gives higher RTS estimates than the input-oriented distance function – this could be attributed to the critique of Kumar (2013) who observes that larger banks gain market power which reduces interest expenses.

7 Conclusion

On average, the ten largest U.S. commercial banks operated with constant RTS. However by including the fifteen largest commercial banks, I find evidence that supports modest increasing RTS among the smaller banks in the sample. Domestic U.S. commercial banks may have enjoyed greater benefits from increasing size than the Big Six Canadian banks. In fact, every specification presented herein suggests that the Canadian banks most often operated with constant RTS. This differs from a previous study by Allen et al. (2006) who use data from 1986 to 2002. They find modestly increasing RTS among both banks and it is higher among Canadian than U.S. banks. Although the Canadian banks generally paid a higher rate of interest on funds, they paid significantly less in noninterest expenses per asset. One contributing factor was lower labour costs in Canada. A second potential factor was a domestic regulatory regime that made compliance less costly and imposed fewer legal penalties. The Canadian regulatory bodies and justice system do not impose large legal penalties while these were much more common in the United States, especially following the financial crisis. Perhaps more generally, the Canadian banking system went through less change over the sample. Although the Canadian banks increased their balance

sheets considerably, the market share of the Big Six was not much changed from 1996 to 2015. Conversely, the U.S. banking system went through a period of rapid market concentration followed by a severe financial crisis. This lengthy period of consolidation created opportunities for U.S. banks to exploit any potential scale economies. The cost effectiveness of the Canadian banks and the relatively new opportunities to operate over state-lines offers insight into the recent expansion of the Canadian banks into retail lending and wealth management in the United States.

By analysing the descriptive data, I find some interesting facts about the cost structure among different sized U.S. BHCs. The domestic U.S. commercial banks charged higher average interest rates on loans and expensed higher credit loss provisions. Combined, this suggests U.S. banks were making riskier loans. Among the largest banks with more than \$100 billion in real total assets, there appeared to be some increasing RTS while for banks with between \$10 billion and \$100 billion assets, there may have been decreasing RTS, possibly from ‘growing pains’ as these banks expanded to become more profitable in the future, and possibly to enjoy an implicit government guarantee. This is compatible with the results from [Restrepo-Tobón and Kumbhakar \(2015\)](#) who find small increasing RTS for larger banks but also found smaller banks were more likely to operate with decreasing RTS. Going forward, an interesting avenue of research would be to understand why medium-sized banks displayed increasing noninterest costs per asset when they grew from \$10 to \$100 billion in total assets. How much of these gains are generated by scale economies and how much might be related to market power is less clear however larger it is clear that U.S. banks paid lower interest, lower physical capital, and similar labour costs per asset. Given the diverse geographic coverage of large U.S. commercial banks, it is possible they are exerting market power to keep interest expense low, as in [Kumar \(2013\)](#). Even if this is generating some of the RTS, it remains much smaller and infrequent than a number of recent studies.

Regarding policy on the largest banks, restricting their size or dividing them into smaller units would only reduce efficiency by a small amount. The results are robust to both short-run and long-run cost functions and an input-oriented distance function. By respecting the limitations of a parametric translog cost function, I find results that match some of the descriptive data in section 4. Over the sample period, large U.S. commercial banks

operated with small increasing RTS and these results differ little from the non-parametric estimation in [Restrepo-Tobón and Kumbhakar \(2015\)](#). This questions whether the claim by [Wheelock and Wilson \(2012\)](#), that more sophisticated nonparametric techniques are required to uncover increasing RTS among U.S. banks, is valid. The point estimate of RTS can be very important. For example, in the last quarter of 2015, if the ten largest commercial banks increased output by 10 percent this would equate to \$960 billion in total assets and an increase in noninterest income of \$4.53 billion. If RTS was 1.01 for each bank, then the aggregate cost savings would be \$0.288 billion. If RTS was 1.05, then the aggregate savings would be approximately five times larger. With regards to the largest banks, the curvature of the estimated cost function strongly suggests that increasing RTS was larger for banks with fewer assets. This result is similar to those from [Wheelock and Wilson \(2015\)](#) who observe that the limited number of observations for banks with more than \$1,000 billion in assets make it difficult to show statistically significant RTS.

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8 Appendix




Figure 18: U.S. BHCs short-run returns to scale using fixed effects

Note: The figure is a scatterplot diagram of estimated RTS against total assets. A line of least squares has been fitted for illustration purposes.

Table 1: Balanced panel sample

BANK HOLDING COMPANY	RSSD-ID	ASSETS
BANK OF AMERICA CORPORATION	1073757	2183.1
BB&T CORPORATION	1074156	209.1
CITIGROUP INC.	1951350	1784.4
FIFTH THIRD BANCORP	1070345	141.4
JPMORGAN CHASE & CO.	1039502	2403.7
KEYCORP	1068025	96.0
PNC FINANCIAL SERVICES GROUP, INC., THE	1069778	359.7
SUNTRUST BANKS, INC.	1131787	189.3
U.S. BANCORP	1119794	414.6
WELLS FARGO & COMPANY	1120754	1783.4
TOTAL ASSETS		9564.8

Assets are from the fourth fiscal quarter of 2015 and presented in billions. Source: FR-Y-C9




Figure 19: U.S. BHCs short-run returns to scale using panel dynamic

Note: The figure is a scatterplot diagram which contrasts estimated RTS with total assets. A line of least squares has been fitted for illustration purposes.




Figure 20: U.S. commercial banks and long-run RTS with fixed effects

Note: The figure is a scatterplot diagram which contrasts estimated RTS with total assets. A line of least squares has been fitted for illustration purposes.




Figure 21: U.S. commercial banks and long-run RTS with PDOLS

Note: The figure is a scatterplot diagram which contrasts estimated RTS with total assets. A line of least squares has been fitted for illustration purposes.




Figure 22: Can. Big Six short-run RTS with FE

Note: The figure is a scatterplot diagram which contrasts estimated RTS with total assets. A line of least squares has been fitted for illustration purposes.




Figure 23: Can. Big Six short-run RTS with PDOLS

Note: The figure is a scatterplot diagram which contrasts estimated RTS with total assets. A line of least squares has been fitted for illustration purposes.

Table 2: Bank mergers and acquisitions

<i>U.S. BHC</i>	<i>DATE</i>
BANKAMERICA CORPORATION	19980930
FIFTH THIRD BANCORP	19991231
FIFTH THIRD BANCORP	19980630
FIFTH THIRD BANCORP	20010630
J.P. MORGAN CHASE	20001231
SUNTRUST BANKS, INC.	19981231
U.S. BANCORP	19970930

A dummy variable is assigned to each merger and acquisition. Source: FR-Y-C9

Table 3: Total cost, quantities, and prices

Variable		Description
	Funding	Sum of all demand, notice, chequing, non-chequing and fixed, deposits repurchase agreements and subordinated debt.
	Capital expense	Rental of real estate, premises, furniture and fixtures, computers and equipment.
	Implied equity expense	CAPM estimated cost of equity multiplied by total equity including common shares, contributed surplus and retained earnings
W_1	Price of labour	Labour expense / number of employees
W_2	Pre-tax WACC	(Interest expense + equity expense) / (funding + total equity)
W_3	Price of physical capital	Capital expense / number of employees
C_{SR}	Short-run cost	Labour, interest, and estimated equity expenses
C_{LR}	Long-run cost with physical capital	Labour, deposit, physical capital, and estimated equity expense
Y_1	Government & business securities & loans	Reverse repurchase agreements, corporate securities corporate securities, business loans, non-residential mortgage loans and any security issued by a government or loan to a government institution.
Y_2	Loans to households	Consumer loans and residential mortgages: both insured and uninsured.
Y_3	noninterest income	Credit and debit card service fees, mortgage, standby, commitment and other loan fees, acceptance, guarantees and letter of credit fees, Investment management and custodial services, Mutual(investment) fund, underwriting on new issues and securities commissions and fees, Foreign exchange revenue other than trading and other income (including investment banking fees and securitization income.)

Cost is the dependent variable and varies whether physical capital expense is included (C_{LR}) or excluded (C_{SR}). Similarly, the price of physical capital is included as an independent variable only if cost includes physical capital. Descriptions coincide with definitions from OSFI.

Table 4: Top ten U.S. BHC summary statistics

Expenses	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
interest	800	2.53	3.58	0.06	23.39
labour	800	2.51	2.86	0.08	10.89
physical capital	800	0.57	0.63	0.02	2.39
implied equity	800	1.52	1.87	0.11	10.30
Output	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
gov. & bus. loans & securities	800	337.77	455.79	10.80	1746.70
consumer & mortgage loans	800	194.67	206.08	9.56	862.15
noninterest income less fees	800	3.29	4.26	-7.38	20.62
Prices	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
labour per worker	800	23.76	6.51	9.36	92.36
weighted-average cost of capital	800	1.3%	0.96%	.24%	05.74%
physical capital per worker	800	5.76	2.13	2.63	21.29
employees	800	95,021	98,060	6,457	409,720
total assets	800	629.4	760.1	26.4	2786.3

Values are in billions of 2015 USD unless otherwise indicated. Observations are quarterly from 1996 to 2015. Source: FR-Y-C9

Table 5: Canadian Big Six summary statistics

Expenses	Obs	Mean	Std.dev.	Min	Max
labour	480	1,360	670	260	3,410
physical capital	480	397	150	106	711
weighted-average cost of capital	480	2,090	1,094	207	5,708
total	480	4,194	1,735	967	9,402
Output	Obs	Mean	Std.dev.	Min	Max
gov. & bus. loans & securities	480	219,134	110,248	40,052	563,119
consumer & mortgage loans	480	135,574	81,815	23,636	396,698
noninterest income	480	1,297	820	-1,852	4,488
Prices	Obs	Mean	Std.dev.	Min	Max
labour per worker	480	29.7	6.4	17.1	46.8
interest and implied equity	480	0.80%	0.39%	0.21%	1.63%
physical capital per worker	480	9.0	1.9	5.5	16.0
employees	480	45275	18,971	11,992	89,214
total assets	480	389,515	212,868	62,439	1,024,728

Values are in millions of 2015 CAD. Observations are quarterly and include the period 1996 to 2015. Source: OSFI

Table 6: Modified ADF test for residuals
US commercial bank short-run *US commercial bank long-run*

Obs.	Lags	MADF	Approx 5% CV	Lags	MADF	Approx 5% CV
78	2	100.4	18.3	2	88.2	18.3
76	4	68.7	18.5	4	66.1	18.5
74	6	90.4	18.6	6	81.1	18.6
72	8	67.1	18.8	8	69.3	18.8

H0: all 10 time series in the panel are I(1) processes

Can. Banks short-run *Can. Banks long-run*

Obs.	Lags	MADF	Approx 5% CV	Lags	MADF	Approx 5% CV
78	2	98.4	18.3	2	97.3	18.3
76	4	73.9	18.5	4	74.1	18.5
74	6	44.3	18.6	6	47.8	18.6
72	8	42.6	18.8	8	44.7	18.8

H0: all 6 time series in the panel are I(1) processes

Note: This table summarizes the results from the Multivariate Augmented Dickey-Fuller test for residuals. For the U.S. sample, there were 80 observations on 10 cross-sectional units, and for the Canadian sample, there were 80 observations on 6 cross-sectional units.

Table 7: Returns to scale

Model / estimator	<i>U.S. commercial banks</i>			<i>Canadian banks</i>		
	RTS	F-stat	P-value	RTS	F-stat	P-value
Long-run FE	1.016	0.25	0.631	0.981	0.040	0.858
Long-run PDOLS	1.002	0.06	0.813	0.990	0.260	0.613
Short-run FE	1.016	0.25	0.627	1.018	0.870	0.351
Short-run PDOLS	1.013	3.29	0.067	1.006	0.15	0.698

Note: Calculated and tested at the mean value of each independent variable. It should be noted that no actual observation may exist at this point. P-values were calculated using robust standard errors.

Table 8: Fitted and tested RTS

U.S. commercial banks					
Model / estimator	DRTS	IRTS	CRTS	Obs.	
Long-run FE	24	60	716	800	
Long-run PDOLS	356	307	117	780	
Short-run FE	73	71	656	800	
Short-run PDOLS	258	421	101	780	
Canadian banks					
Model / estimator	DRTS	IRTS	CRTS	Obs.	
Long-run FE	95	168	217	480	
Long-run PDOLS	70	108	290	468	
Short-run FE	113	166	201	480	
Short-run PDOLS	64	70	334	468	

Note: The columns represent decreasing (DRTS), increasing (IRTS) and constant returns to scale (CRTS) respectively. Each observation is tested for returns to scale at the 5 percent level of significance. Calculations were made using robust standard errors.

Table 9: U.S. commercial banks RTS yearly summary

Year	Short-run cost function						Long-run cost function					
	<i>Fixed effects</i>			<i>Panel dynamic</i>			<i>Fixed effects</i>			<i>Panel dynamic</i>		
	RTS	Std. dev.	Obs.	RTS	Std. dev.	Obs.	RTS	Std. dev.	Obs.	RTS	Std. dev.	Obs.
1996	1.064	0.0701	40	1.028	0.0668	30	1.041	0.0576	40	0.969	0.0067	30
1997	1.056	0.0725	40	1.023	0.0720	40	1.035	0.0605	40	0.969	0.0073	40
1998	1.045	0.0722	40	1.017	0.0714	40	1.028	0.0608	40	0.971	0.0083	40
1999	1.027	0.0747	40	1.004	0.0732	40	1.014	0.0629	40	0.976	0.0061	40
2000	1.019	0.0732	40	0.995	0.0704	40	1.006	0.0615	40	0.971	0.0058	40
2001	1.019	0.0739	40	0.991	0.0715	40	1.010	0.0628	40	0.982	0.0097	40
2002	1.025	0.0720	40	1.003	0.0740	40	1.020	0.0618	40	0.996	0.0075	40
2003	1.029	0.0729	40	1.011	0.0747	40	1.028	0.0627	40	1.006	0.0079	40
2004	1.027	0.0761	40	1.009	0.0795	40	1.026	0.0657	40	1.004	0.0089	40
2005	1.018	0.0765	40	0.997	0.0796	40	1.014	0.0655	40	0.989	0.0068	40
2006	1.014	0.0797	40	0.992	0.0816	40	1.008	0.0678	40	0.979	0.0058	40
2007	1.018	0.0795	40	0.985	0.0900	40	1.012	0.0676	40	0.979	0.0058	40
2008	1.020	0.0743	40	0.983	0.0929	40	1.019	0.0637	40	0.996	0.0075	40
2009	1.016	0.0800	40	0.997	0.0881	40	1.022	0.0684	40	1.016	0.0110	40
2010	1.018	0.0818	40	1.002	0.0852	40	1.026	0.0701	40	1.021	0.0104	40
2011	1.016	0.0813	40	0.994	0.0884	40	1.024	0.0708	40	1.023	0.0105	40
2012	1.011	0.0808	40	0.995	0.0882	40	1.021	0.0711	40	1.026	0.0117	40
2013	1.008	0.0814	40	0.994	0.0869	40	1.020	0.0718	40	1.031	0.0119	40
2014	1.003	0.0790	40	0.987	0.0831	40	1.015	0.0694	40	1.033	0.0115	40
2015	0.998	0.0758	40	0.983	0.0811	30	1.011	0.0669	40	1.034	0.0123	30
Total	1.023	0.0772	800	0.999	0.0803	780	1.020	0.0654	800	0.999	0.0244	780

Note: Mean returns to scale are presented by average per year. Using the panel dynamic OLS estimator, RTS are relatively flat across the sample period.

Table 10: Canadian bank RTS yearly summary

	Short-run cost function						Long-run cost function					
	fixed effects			panel dynamic			fixed effects			panel dynamic		
Year	Mean	Std.dev.	Obs.	Mean	Std.dev.	Obs.	Mean	Std.dev.	Obs.	Mean	Std.dev.	Obs.
1996	0.995	0.033	24	0.966	0.019	18	0.959	0.009	24	0.958	0.008	18
1997	1.022	0.032	24	0.997	0.022	24	0.974	0.010	24	0.971	0.011	24
1998	1.024	0.043	24	1.003	0.031	24	0.972	0.013	24	0.969	0.014	24
1999	1.031	0.040	24	1.014	0.032	24	0.978	0.012	24	0.974	0.012	24
2000	1.025	0.047	24	1.014	0.027	24	0.982	0.011	24	0.980	0.012	24
2001	1.032	0.049	24	1.019	0.025	24	0.988	0.016	24	0.984	0.015	24
2002	1.053	0.059	24	1.030	0.034	24	1.021	0.018	24	1.011	0.017	24
2003	1.045	0.064	24	1.023	0.038	24	1.026	0.016	24	1.015	0.015	24
2004	1.039	0.064	24	1.019	0.040	24	1.034	0.017	24	1.022	0.016	24
2005	1.020	0.069	24	1.007	0.043	24	1.020	0.014	24	1.011	0.013	24
2006	1.001	0.066	24	0.995	0.045	24	1.003	0.014	24	0.998	0.014	24
2007	0.995	0.064	24	0.991	0.047	24	0.994	0.015	24	0.989	0.015	24
2008	0.981	0.079	24	0.966	0.067	24	1.001	0.020	24	0.994	0.017	24
2009	1.034	0.084	24	1.017	0.057	24	1.048	0.031	24	1.033	0.028	24
2010	1.037	0.082	24	1.022	0.053	24	1.061	0.026	24	1.045	0.023	24
2011	1.031	0.072	24	1.022	0.047	24	1.056	0.021	24	1.042	0.019	24
	IFRS transition											
2012	0.979	0.068	24	0.978	0.053	24	1.062	0.017	24	1.046	0.016	24
2013	0.978	0.059	24	0.978	0.047	24	1.068	0.020	24	1.051	0.019	24
2014	0.988	0.056	24	0.989	0.044	24	1.078	0.021	24	1.060	0.021	24
2015	1.003	0.056	24	1.002	0.046	18	1.091	0.026	24	1.070	0.024	18
Total	1.016	0.064	480	1.003	0.046	468	1.021	0.043	480	1.011	0.037	468

Note: Mean returns to scale are presented by average per year. The short-run cost function estimates are relatively flat across the sample period however the long-run cost function estimates are upward sloping over time..

Table 11: U.S. commercial bank cost function estimates

cw	Short-run FE		Short-run PD		Long-run FE		Long-run FE	
	Coef.	Std. Err.	Coef.	Std. Err.	Coef.	Std. Err.	Coef.	Std. Err.
y_1	0.359	0.185	0.256	0.193	0.322	0.190	0.212	0.203
y_2	0.037	0.191	-0.181	0.202	0.308	0.216	0.168	0.236
y_3	-0.183	0.102	0.030	0.124	-0.188	0.105	-0.022	0.131
w_2w_2	0.910	0.080	0.879	0.078	0.953	0.089	0.914	0.092
w_3w_3					-0.636	0.342	-0.407	0.379
y_1w_2	0.022	0.009	0.028	0.009	0.031	0.009	0.036	0.010
y_1w_3					-0.103	0.029	-0.079	0.035
y_2w_1	0.333	0.034	0.307	0.036	0.201	0.050	0.210	0.054
y_2w_2	0.002	0.010	0.004	0.009	0.001	0.010	0.007	0.010
y_2w_3					0.104	0.038	0.057	0.043
y_3w_1	0.034	0.017	0.139	0.023	0.043	0.022	0.140	0.032
y_3w_2	-0.011	0.006	-0.009	0.008	-0.011	0.006	-0.014	0.008
y_3w_3					-0.001	0.022	0.005	0.031
w_1w_2	-0.078	0.013	-0.124	0.015	-0.060	0.027	-0.088	0.031
w_1w_3					0.033	0.117	-0.008	0.142
w_2w_2	0.039	0.005	0.038	0.004	0.057	0.006	0.059	0.006
w_2w_3					-0.072	0.023	-0.093	0.024
w_3w_3					0.063	0.042	0.105	0.049
y_1y_1	0.397	0.028	0.382	0.030	0.380	0.029	0.340	0.032
y_2y_2	0.287	0.031	0.299	0.032	0.274	0.033	0.260	0.034
y_3y_3	0.028	0.004	0.036	0.005	0.028	0.004	0.041	0.005
y_1y_2	-0.316	0.027	-0.284	0.027	-0.304	0.027	-0.249	0.028
y_1y_3	-0.009	0.008	-0.004	0.012	-0.010	0.009	-0.004	0.013
y_2y_3	-0.006	0.011	-0.044	0.015	-0.007	0.012	-0.046	0.016
t	-0.0015	0.0003	0.0000	0.0001	-0.0023	0.0003	-0.0020	0.0003
<i>cons.</i>	6.597	1.076			4.144	1.153		

Note: In the short-run cost model, the dependent variable (total cost) is the sum of interest, labour and the implied equity expense. In the long-run model, the dependent variable is the sum of interest, labour, implied equity, and physical capital expenses.

Table 12: Canadian bank cost function estimates

cw	Short-run FE		Short-run PD		Long-run FE		Long-run FE	
	Coef.	Std. Err.	Coef.	Std. Err.	Coef.	Std. Err.	Coef.	Std. Err.
y_1	2.795	0.432	3.368	0.375698	2.175	0.534	2.324	0.439
y_2	-2.076	0.330	-2.655	0.374	-2.041	0.396	-2.290	0.420
y_3	0.398	0.182	0.336	0.152	0.501	0.249	0.435	0.191
w_2w_2	0.596	0.105	0.769	0.101	0.438	0.128	0.502	0.113
w_3w_3					-1.101	0.557	-1.301	0.380
y_1w_2	0.068	0.014	0.033	0.012	0.077	0.016	0.056	0.014
y_1w_3					0.166	0.064	0.230	0.046
y_2w_1	-0.195	0.031	-0.275	0.028	-0.156	0.065	-0.196	0.047
y_2w_2	-0.002	0.012	0.030	0.010	0.000	0.014	0.027	0.011
y_2w_3					-0.051	0.058	-0.086	0.042
y_3w_1	0.024	0.013	-0.007	0.010	0.137	0.044	0.130	0.032
y_3w_2	-0.010	0.008	-0.021	0.006	-0.015	0.010	-0.029	0.008
y_3w_3					-0.109	0.044	-0.127	0.032
w_1w_2	-0.119	0.009	-0.093	0.007	-0.106	0.023	-0.084	0.018
w_1w_3					0.036	0.138	-0.067	0.091
w_2w_2	0.071	0.004	0.072	0.004	0.073	0.005	0.076	0.004
w_2w_3					-0.027	0.021	-0.029	0.015
w_3w_3					0.059	0.070	0.110	0.048
y_1y_1	0.397	0.028	0.337	0.028	-0.167	0.071	-0.249	0.058
y_2y_2	0.287	0.031	0.260	0.030	-0.012	0.052	-0.054	0.043
y_3y_3	0.028	0.004	0.039	0.005	0.021	0.008	0.028	0.006
y_1y_2	-0.316	0.027	-0.244	0.025	0.154	0.051	0.217	0.042
y_1y_3	-0.009	0.008	-0.004	0.012	-0.081	0.028	-0.093	0.020
y_2y_3	-0.006	0.011	-0.044	0.015	0.028	0.016	0.038	0.011
t	-0.0023	0.0002	-0.0026	0.0003	-0.0026	0.0002	-0.0030	0.0003
$cons$	-2.215	1.924			1.419	2.318		

Note: In the short-run cost model, the dependent variable (total cost) is the sum of interest, labour and the implied equity expense. In the long-run model, the dependent variable is the sum of interest, labour, implied equity, and physical capital expenses.

Table 13: Fifteen largest U.S. commercial banks in 2015

BANK HOLDING COMPANY	RSSD-ID	ASSETS
JPMORGAN CHASE & CO.	1039502	2,400
BANK OF AMERICA CORPORATION	1073757	2,180
WELLS FARGO & COMPANY	1120754	1,780
CITIGROUP INC.	1951350	1,780
U.S. BANCORP	1119794	415
PNC FINANCIAL SERVICES GROUP, INC., THE	1069778	360
BB&T CORPORATION	1074156	209
SUNTRUST BANKS, INC.	1131787	189
FIFTH THIRD BANCORP	1070345	141
KEYCORP	1068025	96.0
COMERICA INCORPORATED	1199844	72.0
HUNTINGTON BANCSHARES INCORPORATED	1068191	70.7
ZIONS BANCORPORATION	1027004	59.5
SVB FINANCIAL GROUP	1031449	43.6
BOK FINANCIAL CORPORATION	1883693	31.0
TOTAL ASSETS		9,827

Assets are from the fourth fiscal quarter of 2015 and presented in billions. Source: FR-Y-C9

Table 14: Robustness tests for U.S. commercial banks

	Short-run cost function more (fewer) banks					
	<i>fixed effect</i>			<i>panel dynamic</i>		
	RTS	F-stat	P-value	RTS	F-stat	P-value
Top 6 U.S. commercial banks	1.003	0.00	0.950	0.977	2.01	0.157
Top 8 U.S. commercial banks	1.024	0.83	0.391	1.001	0.01	0.929
Top 15 U.S. commercial banks	1.073	5.84	0.030	1.064	39.4	0.000
	Four output categories rather than three					
	<i>fixed effect</i>			<i>panel dynamic</i>		
	RTS	F-stat	P-value	RTS	F-stat	P-value
Short-run cost function	1.028	0.73	0.413	0.997	0.06	0.800
Long-run cost function	1.029	0.80	0.395	1.006	0.40	0.529
	Implied cost of equity removed					
	<i>fixed effect</i>			<i>panel dynamic</i>		
	RTS	F-stat	P-value	RTS	F-stat	P-value
Short-run cost function	1.018	0.22	0.647	0.994	0.31	0.579
Long-run cost function	1.035	0.83	0.386	0.979	4.59	0.032

Note: Commercial banks are ranked by total assets in 2015. The four output categories separate loans to businesses, financial intermediaries, and brokers from those to government and cash equivalents. The implied cost of equity is calculated using CAPM and shareholders equity. Calculations were made with robust standard errors.

Table 15: Input-distance function estimates of returns to scale

Country	Equity	Estimator	Mean RTS	IRTS	DRTS	CRTS
Canada	n	FE	1.012	228	94	146
Canada	n	PDOLS	1.020	153	76	239
Canada	y	FE	1.014	212	103	153
Canada	y	PDOLS	1.022	216	76	176
U.S.	n	FE	1.047	421	179	200
U.S.	n	PDOLS	1.022	351	299	130
U.S.	y	FE	1.044	364	142	294
U.S.	y	PDOLS	311	296	173	
Number of employees replaced with employee compensation						
U.S.	n	FE	1.021	196	52	355
U.S.	n	PDOLS	1.001	154	133	493
U.S.	y	FE	1.024	239	18	543
U.S.	y	PDOLS	1.008	143	46	591

Note: Models for each country are estimated, one with equity included in the weighted average cost of capital (n) and one with equity as a separate variable (y). The mean RTS is reported along with increasing (IRTS), decreasing (DRTS), and constant (CRTS) returns to scale. The quantity of employees relative to size is declining with more assets, but this is countered by increasing compensation per employee.