

Ivlevs, Artjoms; King, Roswitha M.

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To Europe or Not to Europe? Migration and Public Support for Joining the European Union in the Western Balkans

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Artjoms Ivlevs

University of the West of England and IZA

Roswitha King

Østfold University College

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IZA – Institute of Labor Economics

Schaumburg-Lippe-Straße 5–9
53113 Bonn, Germany

Phone: +49-228-3894-0
Email: publications@iza.org

www.iza.org

ABSTRACT

To Europe or Not to Europe? Migration and Public Support for Joining the European Union in the Western Balkans

For decades, countries aspiring to join the European Union (EU) have been linked to it through migration. Yet little is known about how migration affects individual support for joining the EU in prospective member states. We explore the relationship between migration and support for EU accession in the Western Balkans. Using data from the Gallup Balkan Monitor survey, we find that prospective and return migrants, as well as people with relatives abroad, are more likely to vote favourably in a hypothetical EU referendum. At the same time, only people with relatives abroad are more likely to consider EU membership a good thing. Our results suggest that migration affects attitudes toward joining the EU principally through instrumental/utilitarian motives, with channels related to information and cosmopolitanism playing only a minor role. Overall, our study suggests that migration fosters support for joining a supranational organization in the migrants' countries of origin, which, in turn, is likely to affect political and institutional development of these countries.

JEL Classification: F22, F24, J61, O52

Keywords: migration, return migration, European Union,
european integration, Western Balkans

Corresponding author:

Artjoms Ivlevs
Department of Accounting
Economics and Finance
Bristol Business School
University of the West of England
Bristol BS16 1QY
United Kingdom
E-mail: a.ivlevs@uwe.ac.uk

1. INTRODUCTION

Migration has, for better or worse, played a key role in the process of European integration (Azrout et al., 2011; Hobolt et al. 2011; Gerhards and Hans 2011, de Vreese et al. 2008; McLaren 2007; Favell, 2011; Kuhn, 2015; Geddes, 2014; Lawless, 2015). Much of Europe's contemporary economic and social landscape has been shaped by rural, regional, and cross-border labor migration dating back to pre-industrialization times (Favell, 2011). Today, the right to move and work freely within Europe is one of the Common Market's pillars, and people engaged in transnational European Union (EU) mobility are more likely to support European integration (Kuhn, 2015). Meanwhile, immigration from the New Member States which joined the EU in 2004 and 2007 and, even more so, immigration from outside Europe are increasing Euroscepticism,² especially in 'old' member states. It is, for example, well documented that an immigrant presence in one's place of residence and unfavorable attitudes toward immigration are strong determinants of opposition toward further EU enlargement (Azrout et al., 2011; Hobolt et al. 2011; Gerhards and Hans 2011, de Vreese et al. 2008; McLaren 2007).³ The 2016 EU referendum in the UK, where the majority voted to leave, provides a vivid example of a negative effect of intra-EU migration on European integration. Central to this referendum's campaign was immigration from new EU member states, which, for some time, had been fuelling anti-EU sentiment in the country (Geddes, 2014; Ivlevs and Veliziotis, 2018; Lawless, 2015).

² We define Euroscepticism as opposition to the EU, its policies, and further integration.

³ There is also a large, more general literature on immigration's effects on anti-immigration sentiment of receiving populations. See Pottie-Sherman and Wilkes (2017) for a summary of the evidence.

In this context, one question has been overlooked: How does migration affect public support for joining the EU in *prospective* EU countries? This article sets out to answer this question, which is important for several reasons. First, historically, prospective EU countries have been linked with ‘old’ EU member states through migration (Brunnbauer, 2009), and migrants might have provided insider knowledge about EU countries, thus influencing views about joining the EU among those staying behind. For example, people from the successor states of Yugoslavia actively participated in the post-WWII guestworker programs in the industrialized countries of Western Europe. In 1971, one in five of all employed Yugoslavs worked abroad, mainly in West Germany and Austria but also in France, Switzerland, and Sweden (Brunnbauer, 2009). This migration, later followed by family reunification (Zimmerman, 1987) and war refugee flows, has not only sustained livelihoods for thousands of households but also been a source of information about the EU in the migrant origin countries, potentially affecting willingness to join the EU. Second, public support for European integration has a significant bearing on the EU’s democratic legitimacy (Gabel, 1998; Hobolt and De Vries, 2016; Recchi and Kuhn, 2013). Given current economic woes and declining enthusiasm for further European integration and expansion *inside* the EU, it is of interest whether the European project is still in high standing in the eyes of *prospective* EU members and whether factors like migration could drive attitudes in these countries toward joining the EU.

In this article, we study the relationship between migration and support for joining the EU in the successor states of Yugoslavia (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Kosovo, Montenegro, Serbia) as well as Albania. These countries are

the next in line to join the EU⁴ and are characterized by a high incidence of migration, much of it to the EU. Yet support for EU membership in the Western Balkan region is far from universal and varies greatly within and between countries. For example, in Croatia's referendum on joining the EU in January 2012, one third of the participating population voted against joining (BBC, 2012). In 2010, the share of people considering EU membership a good thing varied from 87% in Kosovo, 81% in Albania, and 73% in Montenegro to 44% in Serbia and 25% in Croatia (Gallup, 2010). Polls also reveal declining support for the EU between 2010 and 2015 across the Western Balkan region (Belloni, 2016).

Several factors may have contributed to rising Euroscepticism in the Western Balkans. The ongoing problems in the EU – economic hardships in neighboring Greece following the Euro crisis, the 2015 refugee crisis, and the 2016 UK referendum on whether to stay in the EU – may cast doubt on the EU's ability to deliver peace and prosperity (Belloni and Brunazzi, 2017; Ker-Lindsay, 2017; Yamron, 2017). Some countries of 'old' Europe have recently witnessed an increase in anti-immigration sentiment and a rise of far-right parties, in part attributable to the realities of post-2004 immigration from Central and Eastern Europe (Geddes, 2014; Halla, 2017). Such developments may make people in the Western Balkans wonder whether they are welcome in the EU and contribute to their Euroscepticism (Ker-Lindsay, 2017). Among internal factors, war and conflict memories may still be fresh in the Western Balkans and predispose some people against joining the EU over resentment that the EU took sides in the Balkan conflict. For example, parts of Serbia's population likely harbour

⁴ Croatia joined the EU in 2013 but was not yet an EU member at the time the interview survey (2009-11) on which this study is based. Slovenia, another successor state of Yugoslavia, joined the EU in 2004 and was not included in the survey examined here.

negative feelings because many EU member states were among the first to recognize the statehood of independent Kosovo, which formerly was part of Serbia (Nuttall, 2017; Belloni, 2016).

Against this background, we study whether migration-related variables – willingness to emigrate, having relative(s) abroad, and being a return migrant – have constrained or, on the contrary, propelled euro-optimism in the Western Balkan region. In Section 2, we hypothesize that migration affects support for joining the EU through a combination of instrumental motives and making residents better informed about the EU. We are also interested in whether migration in general, with its presumed ‘cosmopolitan effect,’ or only migration specifically to the EU shapes public attitudes toward joining the bloc. We use data from a large and underexplored Gallup Balkan Monitor survey, described in Section 3, that contain rich information about both migration and EU preferences and allow a nuanced analysis of migration’s effect on the sentiment toward joining the EU.

Our empirical analysis, presented in Section 4, reveals that migration-related variables are important determinants of support for EU membership among prospective members of the Western Balkans. People considering emigration, people with relatives in an EU country, and return migrants who have worked or studied in the EU are all more likely to vote favorably in a hypothetical EU referendum. However, positive sentiment is not necessarily shown toward the more general consideration of whether EU membership would be a good thing. As we discuss in Section 5, these results suggest that migration affects attitudes toward joining the EU mainly through instrumental motives, while informational and cosmopolitanism-related channels receive little support.

In developing these ideas, this article contributes to two strands of literature. First, we add to the literature on migration's influence on support for European integration that has so far focused on 'old' EU member states, within-EU mobility, and migration from outside Europe (Azrout et al., 2011; De Vreese et al. 2008; Hobolt et al. 2011; Gerhards and Hans, 2011; McLaren, 2007; Kuhn, 2015). The perspective of countries aspiring to join the EU remains unexplored, and we fill this gap by focusing on the links between emigration and support for joining the EU in the Western Balkans. Second, we contribute to the literature on international migration's effects on the political and institutional development in migrants' origin countries (Barsbai et al., 2018; Batista and Vicente, 2011; Chauvet and Mercier, 2014; Docquier et al., 2016; Ivlevs and King, 2017; Pfütze, 2012). We add to this body of knowledge by showing that migration fosters support for joining a supranational institution (the EU). As it has been argued and shown that joining the EU contributes to the democratic and institutional reforms in candidate countries (Elbasani, 2013; Pop-Eleches, 2007; Pridham, 2005; Schimmelfennig, 2007; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2008), it is likely that migration will foster the political and institutional development in the successor states of former Yugoslavia – through increased support for joining the EU.

2. MIGRATION AND SUPPORT FOR EU MEMBERSHIP: THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS

This section presents an analytical framework for examining if and how attitudes toward joining the EU might be influenced by migration-related considerations and experiences, especially willingness to migrate, having relatives abroad, and being a return migrant. We start by outlining the main explanations for public support of European integration (we

consider joining the EU as one dimension of European integration) and then discuss how migration-related phenomena fit into these conceptual frameworks.

2.1. Main explanations of public support for European integration

The literature on the determinants of support for European integration has distinguished between and among three core explanations for why people would support European integration: 1) utilitarian, 2) identity, and 3) cue-taking (see Hobolt and De Vries, 2016). The *utilitarian* approach posits that people will support EU integration if they see a personal (egocentric) or collective (sociotropic) benefit from deeper integration. It is often assumed that at the individual level, people with higher levels of human and financial capital – education, income, and occupational skills – benefit most from European integration as they better adapt to competition and are more likely to take advantage of the opportunities offered by a liberalized European market (Anderson and Reichert, 1995; Gabel and Palmer, 1995; Inglehart, 1970; Tucker et al., 2002). At the same time, low-skilled residents lose out as deeper integration leads to production shifting across borders and more job insecurity (Gabel and Palmer, 1995). Factors capturing human and financial capital, and in particular education, have, indeed, been found to be important predictors of support for EU integration (Hakhverdian et al., 2013).

At the collective level, a utilitarian cost-benefit analysis predicts that people living in countries that gain from European integration in terms of net fiscal transfers, trade expansion, more prominent stance in international relations, and so on will be more supportive of it (Anderson and Reichert, 1995; Eichenberg and Dalton, 1993). The utilitarian motives also find reflection in studies of EU sentiment in aspiring and new EU member states. Socio-

economic factors (income, education) matter in explaining support for the EU (e.g., Caplanova et al., 2004), and, in addition, ‘winners’ from post-communist transition (captured by self-reported improvement of financial situation) and supporters of free-market reforms tend to be more pro-European (Tucker et al., 2002; Caplanova et al., 2004; Loveless, 2010).

The main proposition of the *identity* approach is that attitudes toward EU integration are driven by “group attachments, loyalties, values, and norms that define who a person is” (Hooghe and Marks, 2004, p.415). European integration leads to a pooling of sovereignty that potentially erodes national self-determination; therefore, people with stronger attachment to their country, national identity, and national pride are expected have more negative attitudes toward EU integration (Hobolt and De Vries, 2016). Empirically, identity-related factors have been shown to be at least as important as utilitarian considerations in predicting support for European integration (Carey, 2002; Hooghe and Marks, 2004), although the identity motives have not been explicitly tested in studies on new and aspiring EU member states (Tucker et al., 2002; Caplanova et al., 2004; Loveless, 2010). It should further be noted that different identities are not exclusive – people may have local/regional, national, and European identities at the same time – and that inclusive identities are more likely to be positively linked to support for European integration relative to exclusive national identities (Hooghe and Marks, 2005). It is also not clear to what extent European identity is endogenous to support for the EU, as the latter may be causing the former (Hobolt and De Vries, 2016).

The basis of the third set of explanations related to *cue-taking* is that most people have little direct personal experience with the EU and, therefore, limited knowledge about it (Anderson, 1998). In the absence of direct information, people rely on proxies, or informational

‘shortcuts,’ to evaluate the EU (Hobolt and De Vries, 2016). Such cues are often provided by domestic politics: given that national governments typically negotiate integration processes and people tend to follow national politics closely (Hobolt and De Vries, 2016) the evaluations of the performance of national governments, leaders, and parties are projected onto European integration (Franklin et al., 1995, Hobolt and De Vries, 2016). Empirical studies indeed show that greater support for domestic governments is associated with greater support for European integration (Anderson, 1998; Franklin et al., 1995).⁵ Apart from domestic politics, people may also rely on social networks— relatives, friends, colleagues, and neighbors – for informational shortcuts (Tanasoiu and Colonescu, 2008). Regardless of who provides the cues, the question of information content is important as well. While it has been argued that *any* information about the EU promotes support for integration (Inglehart et al., 1991) because people who are more familiar with the process of European integration become less threatened by it, it is reasonable to assume that negative information about the EU will lead to less favorable attitudes about European integration. This assumption is supported by empirical studies showing that the way in which national media frame European integration is related to people’s attitudes toward the European project itself (Azrout et al., 2012; Schuck and De Vreese, 2006; Vliegenthart et al., 2006).

2.2. Migration and support for joining the EU

⁵ However, an inverse relationship is also possible, as people dissatisfied with their own governments’ performance may be willing to delegate more decision-making power to the EU, and vice versa (Sanchez-Cuenca, 2000).

This section outlines our expectations of how migration-related phenomena – willingness to migrate, having relative abroad, and being a return migrant – might affect individual attitudes toward joining the EU. We differentiate between migration to EU and to non-EU countries and discuss each type in turn.

2.2.1. Willingness to migrate to an EU country

Being part of the EU can bring a number of tangible benefits, the most obvious being visa-free travel to west European countries, many of which are primary destinations for prospective migrants in the Western Balkans (Ivlevs and King, 2017). Visa-free travel would be desirable for job seekers, for those working abroad and visiting their families back home, and for family members residing in the Western Balkans and visiting relatives in the EU. In addition, prospective migrants might expect that sooner or later, EU membership would bring legal, work-permit free employment opportunities and access to social services. These motivations are consistent with the utilitarian, or cost-benefit, approach, outlined earlier, for explaining people's support for European integration (Gabel and Palmer, 1995): certain groups of people, in our case prospective migrants, are more likely to support European integration because they expect personal benefits from it.

It is also likely that in the process of preparation to move to an EU country, prospective migrants collect information about their destination and, as a result, become better informed about the EU. As discussed in the previous section, given that information about the EU increases support for the European project, probably because people more familiar with the EU are less threatened by it (Inglehart, 1991; Janssen 1991), one can expect that willingness

to migrate also indirectly affects support for joining the EU through having better information about the EU.

These considerations lend themselves to the following set of testable hypotheses:

H1a: People planning to emigrate to an EU member state are more likely to support their own country's EU accession.

H1b: People planning to emigrate to an EU member state are better informed about the EU.

2.2.2. Relatives abroad

The EU preferences of people whose relatives migrated to the EU may be driven by several, potentially conflicting, channels of influence. Separation from a family member typically brings some unhappiness to those staying behind: for example, Graham et al. (2015), Ivlevs et al. (2019), Marchetti-Mercer (2012) and Nobles et al. (2015) document that migrants' family members staying in the origin countries report greater-than-average stress and depression. Whether EU accession would intensify this feeling is unclear. If EU membership allows migrants to find better jobs more easily, stay abroad longer, or bring other family members with them, those left behind may feel negatively affected. However, if EU membership brings more travel and visiting opportunities, those staying behind could feel positively affected. It is also possible that migrants' relatives gain utility from knowing that migrants fulfil their potential abroad to a degree that could not be achieved in the home country (Ivlevs et al. 2019). Receiving remittances is an additional factor that can affect migrant relatives' attitudes toward joining the EU. Remittances represent a non-negligible income gain in the Western Balkan countries (Ivlevs and King, 2017), and EU membership

could increase remittances through better work opportunities for migrants and more reliable and cheaper ways of transferring their remittances. Receiving remittances has been shown to boost the evaluations of the best possible life for migrant household members staying behind, above and beyond having relatives abroad (Ivlevs et al., 2019), meaning that people in remittance-receiving households would support deeper EU integration.

On balance, if the positive effects associated with travelling, fulfilment, and remittances outweigh the negative ‘separation’ effect, people with relatives residing in the EU would favour EU membership. If, however, the separation effect is stronger, migrant relatives would oppose further integration with the EU. Either way, migrant relatives’ support for joining the EU would be driven by utilitarian cost-benefit considerations. Besides utilitarian motives, migrant relatives may also become more pro-European indirectly because they are better informed about the EU. Being better informed may come from migrants’ communication with family members back home, from direct experience via visiting EU-resident migrants, or a combination thereof. This argument links with the importance of information in the cue-taking approach to explaining support for European integration: migration expands the range of information sources about the EU, probably leading to more direct and varied knowledge about the bloc.

These considerations lead us to the second set of hypotheses:

H2a: People whose relatives reside in an EU country are more likely to support their country’s membership in the EU.

H2b: People whose relatives reside in an EU country are better informed about the EU.

2.2.3. Return migrants

Return migrants have had the opportunity to acquire substantial experiential information about the EU member state(s) in which they resided. They may have experienced better governance, institutions, rule of law, social protection, and more economic opportunities compared to their home country. If the expectation is that these better quality institutions are transferred to the home country via accession, the returning migrant may be more likely to support EU membership. It is, however, also possible that the return migrant may have experienced some of the EU's darker sides, such as high inequality, high social segmentation, high prices, and discrimination in wages and housing; the decision to return may indeed have been driven by bad experiences. Such experiences, projected onto their home countries, may account for a more reserved attitude toward EU membership.

On the instrumental side of the motivation spectrum, one particular reason why EU return migrants might favor their country's accession to the EU is related the transfer of pension payments. Return migrants with employment history in one or several EU member states face fragmented pension and social security entitlements (Holzmann et al., 2005) and may look toward their home country's EU accession as a way to simplify the collection of future retirement benefits. Furthermore, return migrants may be considering another phase of work-related migration to the EU. EU accession would make it simpler to keep this option open. Finally, return migrants are particularly likely to be well-informed about the EU, which, as already mentioned, by itself should increase their support for European integration.

These considerations lead us to the third set of hypotheses:

H3a: People with migration experience to an EU country are more likely to support their country's membership in the EU.

H3b: People with migration experience to an EU country are better informed about the EU.

2.2.4. Migration to the EU versus migration to non-EU countries

So far, we have looked at migration specifically to the EU. But will migration to non-EU countries also dispose people favorably toward joining the EU? For example, people aspiring to emigrate to or visit, say, Canada might find their home country's EU membership to be a helpful 'jumping board' for moving to Canada. Indeed, most 'new' EU members states started enjoying visa-free travel to Australia, Canada, and the United States after joining the EU in 2004,⁶ and some (e.g., the Baltic States, Slovakia) have been described as "winners" in terms of global mobility rights (Mau et al., 2015). The willingness to join the EU in order to be able to visit or migrate elsewhere follows the 'utilitarian' logic in explaining attitudes toward European integration (Gabel and Palmer, 1995; Hobolt and De Vries, 2016). It is also possible that people considering emigration or associated with the diaspora are favorably inclined to any developments that increase transnational interaction, openness, and choices and, therefore, favorably inclined toward the EU. This situation would reflect the cosmopolitan outlook associated with migration (Brown, 2018; Cook, 2012; Nedelcu, 2012).

We formalize these considerations in the following hypothesis:

⁶ For example, Canada lifted travel restrictions for Estonia in 2006, Latvia and the Czech Republic in 2007, and Poland, Slovakia, Lithuania, and Hungary in 2008; Canada also has easier access to work permits for visa-exempt citizens. Australia lifted travel restrictions for new EU member states in 2008, as did the United States in 2009 (except Poland). Source: DEMIG POLICY database (<https://www.imi.ox.ac.uk/data/demig-data/demig-policy-1>) and the European Visa Database (<http://www.mogenshobolth.dk/evd/default.aspx>) .

H4a: People willing to emigrate to a non-EU country are more likely to support their country's membership in the EU.

H4b: People with relatives residing in a non-EU country are more likely to support their country's membership in the EU.

H4c: Migrants who have returned from a non-EU country are more likely to support their country's membership in the EU.

3. DATA, VARIABLES, AND EMPIRICAL MODELS TO BE TESTED

3.1. Data

To test our hypotheses, we use data from the Gallup Balkan Monitor survey. The survey, best described as repeated cross-sections, was conducted in Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Kosovo, Macedonia (FYROM), Montenegro, and Serbia in 2006, 2008, 2009, 2010, and 2011 by the international opinion poll agency, Gallup. The core Gallup World Poll questionnaire was augmented with questions relevant to the Western Balkan countries and translated into the respective countries' languages. Face-to-face interviews, taking approximately 45 minutes, were conducted at respondents' homes and restricted to one member per household. Approximately 1,000 people were interviewed in each country each year.

The samples of respondents were designed to be nationally representative and followed a three-stage probability-based respondent selection methodology. In the first stage, Primary Sampling Units (PSUs) were randomly selected from a pool of PSUs based on census, administrative, and migration information. In the second stage, households were selected with the help of a

standard random route technique. In the third stage, respondents within households were selected using either Kish-grid or the most recent birthday rule.⁷ Certain politically sensitive regions (e.g., Northern Serb enclaves in Kosovo, Republic Srpska in Bosnia and Herzegovina) were intentionally overrepresented in the sample; this is why in our analysis we apply the weighting proposed by Gallup for the purpose of re-balancing. More information on survey methodology and implementation is available in Gallup (2010).

Given that some key questions, such as a question on the experience of living abroad and a question on voting in a hypothetical EU referendum, were asked only in 2009, 2010, and 2011, we exclude years 2006 and 2008 from our analysis.

3.2. Variables

3.2.1 Dependent variable(s): support for joining the EU

We use two questions to capture public support for joining the EU. First, respondents were asked: “If there was a referendum on Sunday on joining the EU, what would you vote?” Possible answers included “[Country] should join” and “[Country] should not join.” We created a binary variable *vote yes in an EU referendum*, taking the value ‘1’ if the respondent thought the country should join and ‘0’ if the respondent thought the country should not join.⁸ Overall, for the years 2009-11, 84% of respondents would have voted ‘yes’

⁷ Under the most recent birthday rule, the survey interview is conducted with a household member who had the most recent birthday. This approach assures a random selection of respondents from households.

⁸ We excluded respondents who answered “don’t know” (9.8%) or refused to answer (1.4%). It is, however, possible that excluding a significant proportion of respondents might result in a selection bias, which is why we

(and 16% ‘no’). At the country level, the share of positive vote was 50% in Croatia, 74% in Serbia, 87% in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 88% in FYR Macedonia, 91% in Montenegro, 95% in Kosovo, and 97% in Albania.

Second, respondents were asked: “Do you think [Country’s] membership in the EU would be a good thing?,” with possible answers “a bad thing,” “neither good nor bad thing,” and “a good thing.” We created a categorical variable *EU membership good*, taking the value ‘1’ if the answer was “bad,” ‘2’ if “neither good nor bad,” and ‘3’ if “good.”⁹ The whole-sample distribution of answers is 11%, 23%, and 66%, respectively. The share of those who considered EU membership a good thing was 29% in Croatia, 46% in Serbia, 64% in FYR Macedonia, 66% in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 74% in Montenegro, 89% in Albania, and 91% in Kosovo.

Although one would expect a high correlation between the two variables (in our case, the Pearson correlation coefficient is 0.74, and the polychoric correlation coefficient is 0.92), there may be people who would vote ‘yes’ in a referendum but not necessarily consider their country’s membership in the EU a good thing. Arguably, a vote in a hypothetical referendum could draw on personal and instrumental considerations to a greater extent than the answer to

estimated additional models where the dependent variable incorporated excluded respondents. In particular, we merged the “don’t know” and refused to answer categories and added them as a ‘neutral’ category in an ordered probit model and as a third category in a multinomial probit model. The results, available on request, are consistent with the model which included only ‘yes’ and ‘no’ answers.

⁹ We again exclude the ‘don’t know’ answers (5.1%) and refusals (0.4%). In a robustness check, we merged them with the ‘neither good nor bad’ category and obtained qualitatively similar results (available on request).

the question on whether the EU membership was a good thing. The latter could be interpreted more broadly and include considerations of EU membership's effects on shaping the country's future.

3.2.2. Dependent variable: Being well informed about the EU

The variable *being well informed about the EU* is based on the question, "Please rate how much you are informed about the European Union." In accordance with possible answers to this question, the variable takes four values from 1 (not at all informed) to 4 (very well informed).¹⁰

3.2.3 Main regressors: migration-related variables

We created three migration-related variables capturing 1) willing to migrate to an EU country in the future, 2) having relatives in an EU country, and 3) having previous experience of living in an EU country. The first variable, *willing to move to the EU*, is based on the question, "Ideally, if you had the opportunity, would you like to move permanently to another country, or would you prefer to continue living in this country?" If respondents said they wanted to move, they were subsequently prompted to indicate a preferred destination. If the indicated country belonged to the EU-27, the answer was coded as 1, in all other cases (prefer

¹⁰ The summary statistics for this and other variables are available in Table A1 of the Supplementary Appendix.

to continue living in this country/would like to move permanently to a country other than the EU-27 member states) the answer was coded as 0.¹¹

The variable *relatives in the EU* draws on the question, “Do you have relatives or friends who are living in another country whom you can count on to help you when you need them, or not?” If the respondent said yes, s/he was asked to indicate in which country such relatives or friends lived. The variable was coded 1 if the indicated country was an EU-27 member state and 0 in all other cases.

The variable *been in the EU* draws on the question, “Have you already studied or worked abroad?” For positive answers, the country of work or study was solicited. The variable took value 1 if the indicated country belonged to the EU-27 and 0 otherwise (had not worked or studied abroad or had worked or studied in a country other than an EU member state).

Finally, to test hypotheses H4a-H4c, we created three dummy variables capturing migration to a non-EU country: 1) *willing to move to a non-EU country*, 2) *having relatives/friends in a non-EU country*, and 3) *been in a non-EU country for work or study*.

3.2.4. Control variables

¹¹ While a natural criticism of such emigration willingness/intentions variables is that intentions do not necessarily follow actual moves, longitudinal studies suggest that the two are highly correlated. See Ivlevs (2015) for the summary of the evidence and limitations of emigration willingness/intentions variables.

Following the literature on individual-level determinants of attitudes toward European integration (e.g., Caplanova et al., 2004; Loveless, 2010; Tucker et al., 2002; Tanasoiu and Colonescu, 2008; Jackson, 2011), all regressions included the following standard socio-demographic controls: age and age squared, gender, education levels (primary, secondary, and tertiary), income levels (dummies for within-country household per capita income quintiles and a dummy for non-reported income), subjectively evaluated change in the standard of living (better, the same, or worse), being unemployed, and religious denominations (Catholic, Orthodox, Muslim, and other).

In addition, we controlled for *support for national government* and *strong European identity*, both of which have been shown to be significant predictors of public support for European integration (Franklin et al., 1995; Ray, 2003; Tanasoiu and Colonescu, 2008; McLaren, 2004; Hooghe and Marks, 2004). These variables are based on the questions: a) “Please indicate how good of a job the [Country’s] government does?,” with possible answers ‘poor’ (1), ‘fair’ (2), ‘good’ (3), and ‘excellent’ (4), and b) “How strongly do you identify yourself with Europe?,” with possible answers ranging from ‘not at all’ (1) to ‘extremely strongly’ (5).

Focusing on the Western Balkan context, we also wanted to control for individual assessments of the international community’s role in the region’s evolving politics. For example, people in the Western Balkans may have diverging opinions about the international community’s involvement in post-Yugoslavian military conflicts and the process of Kosovo’s independence. As EU countries played a dominant role in the region’s politics, people’s assessments of that role might have influenced their attitudes toward joining the EU. We,

thus, created a variable, *helpful international community*, which draws on the question: “Thinking of the last 15-20 years and taking everything into account, overall how would you describe the International community’s role [in your country]?” The variable took values 1 (extremely harmful) to 5 (extremely helpful).

Finally, to control for all year- and country-specific influences on both the migration variables and attitudes toward joining the EU, we included year- and country-fixed effects (dichotomous variables for each country and each year).¹² Among other things, the inclusion of country-fixed effects ensures that the relationship between the variables of interest is estimated at the within-country level and not driven by differences between countries.

3.3. Empirical models to be tested

We model support for EU membership of individual i living in country j as follows:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Support for EU membership}_{i,j} = & \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 * \text{migration-related variables}_{i,j} + \\ & \alpha_2 * \text{informed about the EU}_{i,j} + \\ & \alpha_3 * \text{controls}_{i,j} + \\ & \alpha_4 * \text{year fixed effects} + \\ & \alpha_5 * \text{country fixed effects}_j + \end{aligned}$$

¹² As a robustness check, we also included country-year fixed effects (a dichotomous variable for each country-year pair), which would account for the effect of temporal changes in country-level variables on attitudes toward joining the EU. Our results regarding the link between emigration and attitudes toward joining the EU remained essentially unchanged.

$$\text{idiosyncratic error term}_{i,j} \quad (1)$$

where migration-related variables relate to migration to the EU and $\alpha_0 - \alpha_5$ are the parameters (parameter vectors) to be estimated.

Note that the migration-related variables and the variable *informed about the EU* are all included as regressors in Model 1. Such model specification allows us to separate migration-related variables' utilitarian effect from 'informedness' about the EU, which might also be driven by migration. Migration-related variables' influence on 'informedness' about the EU is tested, using the following model:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Well informed about the EU}_{i,j} = & \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 * \text{migration-related variables}_{i,j} + \\ & \alpha_2 * \text{controls}_{i,j} + \\ & \alpha_3 * \text{year fixed effects} + \\ & \alpha_4 * \text{country fixed effects}_j + \\ & \text{idiosyncratic error term}_{i,j} \end{aligned} \quad (2)$$

Finally, Model 3 focuses on the effects of variables capturing migration to a non-EU country on support for EU membership. Among other things, this model tests for a 'cosmopolitan effect': the possibility that international mobility and orientation in general make people more positively inclined toward joining international collaborations, such as the EU. Note that variables capturing migration to the EU and 'informedness' about the EU are also included, leaving people with no connection to migration as a reference group.

$$\begin{aligned}
\text{Support for EU membership}_{i,j} = & \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 * \text{migration-related variables (non-EU)}_{i,j} + \\
& \alpha_2 * \text{migration-related variables (EU)}_{i,j} + \\
& \alpha_3 * \text{informed about the EU}_{i,j} + \\
& \alpha_4 * \text{controls}_{i,j} + \\
& \alpha_5 * \text{year fixed effects} + \\
& \alpha_6 * \text{country fixed effects}_j + \\
& \text{idiosyncratic error term}_{i,j}
\end{aligned} \tag{3}$$

In the case of a binary dependent variable (*vote yes in an EU referendum*), we estimate the model with binary probit. Where the dependent variable is categorical and ordered (*EU membership a good thing* and *well informed about the EU*), we use ordered probit.¹³

Given a potential correlation within the group of migration-related variables (e.g., people may be more likely to express willingness to migrate if they have past migration experience or relatives abroad), we first include the three migration-related variables separately and then estimate a model where they are included jointly.

4. RESULTS

Table 1 presents the correlates of attitudes toward EU membership. To save space, here and in what follows, we present only the coefficient of the variables that are central to our

¹³ As a robustness check, we estimated our models with logit and OLS, and the results are consistent with the probit estimations.

analysis (migration-related variables and ‘informedness’ about the EU); the coefficients of control variables are available in the Supplementary Appendix (Tables A2-A4). All three migration-related variables are positive and statistically significant predictors of the likelihood of voting ‘yes’ in a hypothetical EU referendum (Panel A). Considering the case where migration variables are included separately (Columns 1-3) and keeping other factors constant, people willing to migrate to the EU are 2.5 percentage points more likely, those with relatives in the EU 2.1 percentage points more likely, and EU return migrants 3.1 percentage points more likely to say they would vote favorably in an EU referendum. The magnitudes of these marginal effects slightly decline (to 2.1, 1.8, and 2.5 percentage points, respectively) when the three migration variables are included jointly (Column 4). This reflects a positive correlation between them, which is to be expected. However, even when included jointly, the three variables remain positive and statistically significant. This finding indicates that each migration-related variable exerts a positive influence on the likelihood of voting ‘yes,’ regardless of the other two migration-related variables' effect.

Panel B of Table 1 reports the results for the model explaining the likelihood of considering membership of one’s country in the EU a good thing. Regardless of whether included jointly or separately, the variables capturing willingness to emigrate to the EU and return migration are statistically insignificant. Only people with relatives or friends in the EU are more likely to say that their country’s membership in the EU would be a good thing. In terms of marginal effects, relatives of EU migrants are 1.1 percentage point less likely to consider EU membership a bad thing, 0.9 percentage point less likely to consider EU membership neither good nor bad, and 1.9 percentage points more likely to consider EU membership a good

thing.¹⁴ These results provide mixed support for H1a, H2a, and H3a. On the one hand, respondents from all three migration-related categories are more likely to vote favorably in a hypothetical EU referendum. On the other hand, only EU migrants' relatives are more likely to consider that their country's membership in the EU would be a good thing, while prospective and return EU migrants do not distinguish themselves from the rest of the population.

Table 1: Migration and support for country's membership in the EU

	A. Dependent variable: Voting yes in a hypothetical EU referendum; binary probit marginal effects				B. Dependent variable: EU membership a good thing; ordered probit coefficients			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Willing to move to the EU	0.025***	-	-	0.021**	0.067	-	-	0.051
Relatives in the EU	-	0.021***	-	0.018***	-	0.079**	-	0.070**
EU return migrant	-	-	0.031***	0.025**	-	-	0.097	0.074
Well informed about the EU	0.013***	0.013***	0.013***	0.013***	0.210***	0.209***	0.208***	0.207***
Individual-level controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country-fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year-fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	16,858	16,858	16,858	16,858	17,871	17,871	17,871	17,871
Pseudo R ²	0.257	0.257	0.257	0.258	0.191	0.191	0.191	0.191
Chi ²	2084	2085	2082	2125	2761	2761	2761	2762

Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, heteroscedascity-robust standard errors used to calculate regressors' level of significance. See Table A2 of the Supplementary Appendix for complete econometric output.

Source: Gallup Balkan Monitor survey and authors' calculations.

Note that the effects of the migration-related variables, presented above, have been obtained while keeping 'informedness about the EU' constant. 'Informedness' was included as a

¹⁴ These marginal effects are based on the estimated coefficient of the *relatives in the EU* variable in specification 8.

control in all regressions of Table 1, and, as expected, being well informed about the EU is a positive and statistically significant predictor of positive attitudes toward EU membership (both voting favorably in an EU referendum and considering EU membership a good thing).

We have, however, also hypothesized that migration-related variables can have an independent effect on being well informed about the EU. The empirical test of this hypothesis is presented in Table 2. Having worked or studied in the EU has a positive and statistically significant correlation with the probability of being well informed about the EU. The coefficient of the relatives-in-the-EU variable is positive but statistically insignificant. Interestingly, controlling for work/study experience in the EU and for having relatives in the EU, people willing to move to the EU are somewhat less likely to say they are well informed about the EU (Column 4 of Table 2). The results thus provide support for H3b, but not H1b or H2b.

Table 2: Migration and informedness about the EU

	Dependent variable: Well informed about the EU; ordered probit coefficients			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Willing to move to the EU	-0.031	-	-	-0.056*
Relatives in the EU	-	0.029	-	0.019
EU return migrant	-	-	0.226***	0.233***
Individual-level controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country-fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year-fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	18,539	18,539	18,539	18,539
Pseudo R ²	0.0550	0.0551	0.0560	0.0562
Chi ²	1363	1366	1396	1398

Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, heteroscedascity-robust standard errors used to calculate regressors' level of significance. See Table A3 of the Supplementary Appendix for complete econometric output.

Source: Gallup Balkan Monitor survey and authors' calculations.

With a final set of regressions, we test the hypotheses that variables capturing migration to non-EU countries are positively associated with support for EU accession (Model 3, H4a-H4c). The results are presented in Table 3. People considering emigration to a non-EU country are 2.2 percentage points more likely to vote favorably in a hypothetical EU referendum (Columns 1 and 4). They are also more likely to consider EU membership a good thing (columns 5 and 8); in terms of marginal effects, prospective migrants to non-EU countries are 2 and 1.7 percentage points less likely consider EU membership a 'bad' and, respectively, 'neither good nor bad' thing, and 3.7 percentage points¹⁵ more likely to consider EU membership a 'good' thing. These results strongly support H4a that people considering emigration to a non-EU destination are more likely to support their country's accession to the EU.

¹⁵ These marginal effects were calculated after estimating specification 8 of Table 3.

The estimates of the two other variables of interest (having relatives in a non-EU country and having worked/studied in a non-EU country) are statistically insignificant, regardless of the way attitudes toward EU accession are captured (voting in a referendum or considering EU membership a good thing) and whether the regressors of interest are included in the model jointly or separately. H4b and H4c are, thus, not supported by the data.

Finally, note that the results of the migration-to-the-EU variables, which were also included in Model 3 and reported in Table 3, remain qualitatively unchanged.

Table 3: Migration to non-EU destinations and attitudes towards EU membership

	A. Dependent variable: Voting yes in a hypothetical EU referendum; binary probit marginal effects				B. Dependent variable: EU membership a good thing; ordered probit coefficients			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Willing to move (non-EU)	0.022**	-	-	0.022**	0.129***	-	-	0.136***
Relatives abroad (non-EU)	-	0.007	-	0.006	-	-0.050	-	-0.056
Return migrant (non-EU)	-	-	-0.017	-0.021	-	-	-0.069	-0.077
Willing to move (EU)	0.027***	-	-	0.023**	0.082*	-	-	0.066
Relatives abroad (EU)	-	0.022***	-	0.018***	-	0.072**	-	0.061*
Return migrant (EU)	-	-	0.031***	0.024**	-	-	0.094	0.071
Individual-level controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country-fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year-fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	16,858	16,858	16,858	16,858	17,871	17,871	17,871	17,871
Pseudo R ²	0.257	0.257	0.257	0.259	0.191	0.191	0.191	0.191
Chi ²	2093	2088	2080	2135	2778	2760	2759	2776

Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, heteroscedascity-robust standard errors used to calculate regressors' level of significance. The set of control variables includes informedness about the EU. See Table A4 of the Supplementary Appendix for complete econometric output.

Source: Gallup Balkan Monitor survey and authors' calculations.

5. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

This study set out to assess whether emigration affects attitudes toward joining the EU in prospective EU member states - Albania and the successor states of Yugoslavia. To answer our research question, we used data from the Gallup Balkan Monitor survey, a large and underexplored dataset containing rich information on attitudes toward joining the EU and migration in the Western Balkan countries. We first discussed the ways in which migration can affect attitudes toward EU membership and then estimated the relationship between migration-related variables – willingness to migrate, having relatives abroad, and being a return migrant – and the likelihood of providing an affirmative answer to the following two questions:

- (i) *“If there were a referendum on Sunday on joining the EU, what would you vote?”*
- (ii) *“Do you think [your country’s] membership in the EU would be a good thing?”*

The results revealed intriguing differences in migration’s effects on responses to these, on first sight, similar questions regarding public support for the EU. Prospective migrants, return migrants, and people with a migrant family member or close friend in the EU are, across the board, more likely to vote yes in a hypothetical referendum on whether to join the EU.

Responses to the second question, however, deliver a less clear picture. Only people who had relatives or close friends in the EU were more likely to think that their country’s membership in the EU would be a good thing. Return migrants and prospective migrants were, in this regard, indistinguishable from people without migrant connections.

One possible interpretation of this situation is that a vote in a national referendum would draw relatively more strongly on personal utilitarian/instrumental motives, related to

anticipated opportunities for easier job search and travel. The question, whether one's country's membership in the EU would be a good thing, lends itself to broader interpretation, including one's view on whether membership would be a good thing for the country's future development. People may doubt that their country would have a good future inside the EU but still vote 'yes' in a hypothetical referendum because they expect concrete benefits for themselves. Also, for those willing to emigrate permanently, their home country's future may be of lesser concern. Overall, these results suggest that utilitarian considerations play a significant role in explaining public support for joining the EU in the Western Balkans, which in turn advances theory by adding migration-related variables to the battery of factors (income, education etc.) through which utilitarian considerations can manifest themselves (Gabel and Palmer, 1995; Hobolt and De Vries, 2016). Also, differential responses to the 'twin questions' helps sharpen the split between self-centred instrumental motives and sociotropic concerns.

We also tested how migration-related variables correspond to being well informed about the EU, which by itself can positively affect pro-EU sentiment. Not surprisingly, a strong positive information effect is seen in people who lived or studied in the EU. Having a migrant relative or close friend in the EU, however, does not show any significant influence on 'informedness,' suggesting that information transfer through relatives or friends residing in the EU is of limited effectiveness. In terms of the cue-taking approach to explaining public support for the EU (Hobolt and De Vries, 2016), our results show that relatives and friends residing in the EU may not be a source of informational 'shortcuts' about the EU (see Tanasoiu and Colonescu, 2008). Similar lack of significant effects is observed for prospective EU migrants. Here, an explanation may be that people with concrete plans to

emigrate face concrete questions, which make them painfully aware of all the things they do not know. They do not feel well informed about the EU because they apply more discriminating standards of ‘informedness.’ Overall, we obtain limited support for migration’s potential ‘informational effect’ on joining the EU: it works for return migrants but not for prospective migrants or migrant relatives and friends staying in home countries.

To test for migration’s potential ‘cosmopolitan effect’ on joining the EU, we looked at attitudes toward EU membership of people with migration connections to countries outside the EU. Support for the ‘cosmopolitan’ effect is limited. People who lived or studied in a non-EU country, as well as those whose relatives resided in a non-EU country, were not found to be more likely to vote favorably in a hypothetical EU referendum or to consider EU membership a good thing. Only people willing to emigrate to a non-EU country show evidence of higher support for their country’s EU membership. This finding, however, could indicate instrumental motives at work, insofar as EU membership may be seen as a ‘jumping board’ for emigration to countries other than EU.

Where do these findings leave us? This article contributes to scholarly discourse in several ways. First, the existing literature on migration’s influence on support for European integration has focused on perspectives from ‘old’ EU member states, within-EU mobility, and migration from outside Europe (Azrout et al., 2011; De Vreese et al. 2008; Hobolt et al. 2011; Gerhards and Hans, 2011; McLaren, 2007; Kuhn, 2015), leaving the perspectives of countries aspiring to join the EU unexplored. We have filled this gap by focusing on the links between emigration and public opinion on European integration in the Western Balkans – countries next in line to join the EU.

Second, our study adds to the broader literature on the determinants of EU preferences in prospective member states. There is substantial evidence on the individual-level determinants of attitudes toward EU membership in countries that joined the EU in 2004 and 2007 (e.g., Caplanova et al., 2004; Loveless, 2010; Tucker et al., 2002; Tanasoiu and Colonescu, 2008; Jackson, 2011). These contributions have sought to establish how support for joining the EU is affected by factors particularly relevant in the transition context, such as attitudes to free markets, experience of transition from planned to market economy, and perceptions of social inequality. Despite the salience of emigration from the Western Balkan region, variables capturing migration-related phenomena have never entered the analysis. Our study, thus, offers an explicit treatment of emigration-related variables – willingness to emigrate, having relatives abroad, and being a return migrant – as potential antecedents of people’s support for joining the EU.

Finally, our study contributes to the literature on international migration’s effects on the development of political institutions in migrants’ origin countries. Closely related to the concept of ‘social remittances’ (Levitt, 1998),¹⁶ this literature has shown that emigration can enhance government accountability, political participation, and voting for pro-democratic parties and reduce public sector corruption in migrants’ home countries (Barsbai et al., 2018; Batista and Vicente, 2011; Chauvet and Mercier, 2014; Docquier et al., 2016; Ivlevs and King, 2017; Pfutze, 2012). Our study adds to this literature by showing that prospective and return migrants, as well as migrant relatives staying in the home countries, are more likely to support joining a supranational institution, such as the EU. Joining the EU, in turn, is likely to foster political and institutional development in these countries. Specifically, as a condition

¹⁶ Levitt (1998) defines social remittances as “ideas, practices, identities, and social capital that flow from receiving- to sending-country communities” (p.926).

for joining the EU, candidate countries must ensure the existence of institutions that guarantee democracy, the rule of law, human rights, and protection of national minorities (Pridham, 2005; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2008). Evidence suggests that the pressure of such political conditionality indeed contributed to democratization and institutional reforms in Central and Eastern European countries that joined the EU in 2004 (Elbasani, 2013; Pop-Eleches, 2007; Pridham, 2005; Schimmelfennig, 2007). Therefore, through raising support for joining the EU, emigration is likely to contribute to the political and institutional development of the successor states of Yugoslavia.

While we uncover an important relationship between migration, especially to and from the EU, and favourable attitudes toward joining the bloc, there are several limitations to our study. First, our results should be interpreted as conditional correlations rather than causal effects. Even after controlling for a wide range of factors, there may remain unobserved individual and/or household-level characteristics driving both migration and attitudes toward the EU. One way to move closer to causality, and a possible direction for future research, would be to use panel data, where migration histories and EU preferences of the same people are observed over time. Second, a question on whether EU membership is a good thing, which we use to capture favorable attitudes toward joining the EU, is very broad. While it may serve the purpose of distilling a net sentiment from a multitude of more narrowly targeted and possibly contradicting sentiments, responses to such a broad question must be treated with caution. A solution here could be to include in surveys a range of ‘good thing for *whom*’ questions, asking whether EU membership would be good for respondents themselves, their family members, or their country as a whole. Third, we have hypothesized that migration can affect pro-EU sentiment indirectly through being better informed about the

EU. A similar argument could go for European identity: for example, return EU migrants or people whose relatives reside in the EU may develop a stronger European identity, which would feed into a favorable stance toward joining the EU.¹⁷ Assessing migration's importance for European identity in prospective EU member states is beyond this study's scope and left for future research.

All things considered, our results show that migration is good for fostering positive attitudes toward joining the EU among the prospective member states of the Western Balkans. In the presence of seemingly pervasive Euroscepticism, migration can play a role in keeping the EU desirable. Our results point toward a preponderance of instrumental motives for joining the EU, compared to the 'grand ideas' of the EU's formative stage. Recalling that the EU's creation was first and foremost about peace in Europe, the motives for joining seem to have become 'smaller.' It may be an indicator of EU success, however, that one can afford to focus on 'small' things, especially in the Western Balkans, where grander things like peace and security may still not be taken for granted. Finally, in the context of a broader literature on emigration's effects on the development of migrant-sending countries, our study shows that migration increases support for joining a supranational institution (the EU), which, in turn, is likely to improve institutional quality in migrants' origin countries.

¹⁷ See Verhaegen et al. (2014) on how perceived economic benefits may affect European identity.

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Supplementary Appendix for the article:

“To Europe or not to Europe? Migration and public support for joining the European Union in the Western Balkans”

This document contains:

- Summary statistics about the variables included in the analysis (Table A1, page 2)
- Complete econometric output for Tables 1, 2 and 3 (Tables A2, A3 and A4 on page 3, 5 and 7, respectively).

Table A1: Summary statistics of the variables included in the analysis

	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Voting yes in a hypothetical EU referendum	0.839	0.368	0	1
EU membership good thing	2.593	0.686	1	3
Well informed about the EU	2.572	0.760	1	4
Intentions to move (EU)	0.145	0.352	0	1
Intentions to move (non-EU)	0.074	0.263	0	1
Relatives abroad (EU)	0.256	0.436	0	1
Relatives abroad (non-EU)	0.102	0.303	0	1
Return migrant (EU)	0.064	0.245	0	1
Return migrant (non-EU)	0.033	0.179	0	1
Age	41.600	16.425	15	99
Female	0.499	0.500	0	1
Primary education	0.304	0.460	0	1
Secondary education	0.537	0.499	0	1
Tertiary education	0.159	0.366	0	1
1 st income quintile	0.169	0.375	0	1
2 nd income quintile	0.172	0.378	0	1
3 rd income quintile	0.165	0.371	0	1
4 th income quintile	0.163	0.369	0	1
5 th income quintile	0.155	0.362	0	1
Income: no answer	0.176	0.381	0	1
Standard of living worse	2.094	0.814	1	3
Unemployed	0.130	0.336	0	1
Orthodox	0.382	0.486	0	1
Catholic	0.171	0.376	0	1
Muslim	0.401	0.490	0	1
Religion: other	0.046	0.210	0	1
Support for national government	2.000	0.905	1	4
Strong European identity	3.031	1.263	1	5
Helpful international community	3.449	0.970	1	5
Year 2009	0.322	0.467	0	1
Year 2010	0.343	0.475	0	1
Year 2011	0.335	0.472	0	1
Albania	0.156	0.363	0	1
Bosnia and Herzegovina	0.142	0.349	0	1
Croatia	0.131	0.338	0	1
Macedonia	0.141	0.348	0	1
Montenegro	0.131	0.338	0	1
Kosovo	0.157	0.364	0	1
Serbia	0.140	0.347	0	1

Source: Gallup Balkan Monitor and authors' calculations.

Table A2: Complete econometric output for Table 1 (this table reports probit coefficients and not the marginal effects)

	A. Dependent variable: Voting yes in a hypothetical EU referendum; binary probit coefficients				B. Dependent variable: EU membership a good thing; ordered probit coefficients			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Intentions to move to the EU	0.153*** (0.055)	- -	- -	0.128** (0.056)	0.067 (0.043)	- -	- -	0.051 (0.044)
Relatives in the EU	- -	0.128*** (0.041)	- -	0.109*** (0.041)	- -	0.079** (0.032)	- -	0.070** (0.032)
EU return migrant	- -	- -	0.204*** (0.072)	0.162** (0.073)	- -	- -	0.097 (0.063)	0.074 (0.064)
Age	-0.015*** (0.005)	-0.016*** (0.005)	-0.016*** (0.005)	-0.015*** (0.005)	-0.014*** (0.004)	-0.014*** (0.004)	-0.014*** (0.004)	-0.014*** (0.004)
Age squared/100	0.017*** (0.006)	0.017*** (0.006)	0.018*** (0.006)	0.017*** (0.006)	0.014*** (0.004)	0.014*** (0.004)	0.014*** (0.004)	0.014*** (0.004)
Female	0.005 (0.032)	0.003 (0.032)	0.011 (0.033)	0.010 (0.033)	0.003 (0.025)	0.002 (0.025)	0.006 (0.025)	0.005 (0.025)
Primary education	0.029 (0.046)	0.027 (0.046)	0.027 (0.046)	0.029 (0.046)	0.034 (0.036)	0.034 (0.036)	0.034 (0.036)	0.034 (0.036)
Tertiary education	0.073* (0.042)	0.072* (0.042)	0.074* (0.042)	0.075* (0.042)	0.056* (0.032)	0.056* (0.031)	0.057* (0.031)	0.057* (0.032)
2nd income quintile	-0.033 (0.060)	-0.038 (0.060)	-0.034 (0.059)	-0.034 (0.060)	-0.023 (0.046)	-0.026 (0.046)	-0.024 (0.046)	-0.025 (0.046)
3rd income quintile	-0.114** (0.057)	-0.116** (0.057)	-0.114** (0.057)	-0.115** (0.057)	-0.088* (0.046)	-0.090* (0.046)	-0.089* (0.046)	-0.090* (0.046)
4th income quintile	-0.012 (0.058)	-0.022 (0.058)	-0.019 (0.058)	-0.019 (0.058)	-0.015 (0.046)	-0.020 (0.046)	-0.018 (0.046)	-0.019 (0.046)
5th income quintile	-0.080 (0.062)	-0.090 (0.062)	-0.089 (0.062)	-0.088 (0.062)	0.004 (0.049)	-0.003 (0.049)	-0.000 (0.049)	-0.002 (0.049)
Income: no answer	-0.109* (0.056)	-0.113** (0.056)	-0.117** (0.056)	-0.110* (0.056)	-0.130*** (0.045)	-0.131*** (0.045)	-0.133*** (0.045)	-0.131*** (0.045)
Standard of living worse	-0.115*** (0.023)	-0.108*** (0.023)	-0.110*** (0.023)	-0.112*** (0.023)	-0.086*** (0.018)	-0.082*** (0.018)	-0.084*** (0.018)	-0.084*** (0.018)
Unemployed	-0.046 (0.054)	-0.045 (0.054)	-0.046 (0.054)	-0.045 (0.053)	0.013 (0.041)	0.013 (0.041)	0.012 (0.041)	0.013 (0.041)
Catholic	0.051 (0.060)	0.048 (0.060)	0.049 (0.060)	0.049 (0.060)	0.102** (0.048)	0.100** (0.048)	0.101** (0.048)	0.098** (0.048)
Muslim	0.469*** (0.059)	0.462*** (0.058)	0.472*** (0.059)	0.458*** (0.059)	0.481*** (0.043)	0.476*** (0.043)	0.481*** (0.043)	0.475*** (0.043)
Religion: other	0.248*** (0.077)	0.249*** (0.077)	0.245*** (0.077)	0.244*** (0.077)	0.115** (0.052)	0.113** (0.052)	0.113** (0.052)	0.112** (0.052)
Support for national government	0.096*** (0.022)	0.094*** (0.022)	0.094*** (0.022)	0.095*** (0.022)	0.100*** (0.018)	0.099*** (0.018)	0.098*** (0.018)	0.099*** (0.018)
Well informed about the EU	0.078*** (0.023)	0.077*** (0.023)	0.075*** (0.023)	0.075*** (0.023)	0.210*** (0.019)	0.209*** (0.019)	0.208*** (0.019)	0.207*** (0.019)
Strong European identity	0.193*** (0.015)	0.192*** (0.015)	0.192*** (0.015)	0.192*** (0.015)	0.148*** (0.011)	0.147*** (0.011)	0.147*** (0.011)	0.147*** (0.011)
Helpful international community	0.301*** (0.019)	0.299*** (0.019)	0.300*** (0.019)	0.302*** (0.019)	0.269*** (0.015)	0.268*** (0.015)	0.269*** (0.015)	0.269*** (0.015)
Albania	0.414*** (0.082)	0.415*** (0.082)	0.420*** (0.081)	0.388*** (0.083)	0.476*** (0.059)	0.474*** (0.059)	0.479*** (0.058)	0.460*** (0.059)
Bosnia and Herzegovina	0.145** (0.059)	0.145** (0.059)	0.148** (0.059)	0.145** (0.059)	0.133*** (0.046)	0.133*** (0.046)	0.134*** (0.046)	0.133*** (0.046)
Croatia	-0.861*** (0.065)	-0.865*** (0.065)	-0.868*** (0.065)	-0.864*** (0.065)	-0.636*** (0.051)	-0.637*** (0.051)	-0.640*** (0.051)	-0.635*** (0.051)
FYR Macedonia	0.006	0.019	0.013	0.009	-0.038	-0.032	-0.034	-0.035

	(0.059)	(0.059)	(0.058)	(0.059)	(0.043)	(0.043)	(0.043)	(0.043)
Montenegro	0.226***	0.236***	0.229***	0.236***	0.280***	0.285***	0.281***	0.286***
	(0.065)	(0.065)	(0.065)	(0.065)	(0.046)	(0.046)	(0.046)	(0.046)
Kosovo	0.050	0.061	0.060	0.054	0.445***	0.449***	0.450***	0.446***
	(0.071)	(0.071)	(0.071)	(0.071)	(0.058)	(0.058)	(0.058)	(0.058)
Year 2010	-0.079**	-0.069*	-0.076**	-0.077**	-0.139***	-0.134***	-0.137***	-0.138***
	(0.039)	(0.039)	(0.039)	(0.039)	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.030)
Year 2011	-0.238***	-0.224***	-0.231***	-0.231***	-0.209***	-0.203***	-0.207***	-0.205***
	(0.040)	(0.040)	(0.040)	(0.040)	(0.030)	(0.031)	(0.030)	(0.031)
Constant	-0.285*	-0.274	-0.234	-0.295*	-	-	-	-
	(0.172)	(0.171)	(0.171)	(0.171)	-	-	-	-
cut1	-	-	-	-	0.234*	0.231*	0.210	0.236*
	-	-	-	-	(0.131)	(0.130)	(0.130)	(0.131)
cut2	-	-	-	-	1.232***	1.230***	1.208***	1.235***
	-	-	-	-	(0.134)	(0.134)	(0.134)	(0.135)
Observations	16858	16858	16858	16858	17871	17871	17871	17871
Pseudo R ²	0.257	0.257	0.257	0.258	0.191	0.191	0.191	0.191
Chi ²	2084.307	2084.613	2081.838	2124.587	2761.454	2760.594	2760.812	2762.248
p > Chi ²	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000

Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, robust standard errors in parentheses. Reference groups: secondary education, 1st income quintile, Orthodox, living in Serbia, interviewed in year 2009.

Table A3: Complete econometric output for Table 2 (this table reports probit coefficients and not the marginal effects)

	Dependent variable: Well informed about the EU; ordered probit coefficients			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Intentions to move to the EU	-0.031 (0.032)	- -	- -	-0.056* (0.032)
Relatives in the EU	- -	0.029 (0.024)	- -	0.019 (0.025)
EU return migrant	- -	- -	0.226*** (0.043)	0.233*** (0.043)
Age	0.012*** (0.003)	0.012*** (0.003)	0.011*** (0.003)	0.011*** (0.003)
Age squared/100	-0.014*** (0.004)	-0.014*** (0.004)	-0.013*** (0.004)	-0.013*** (0.004)
Female	-0.329*** (0.021)	-0.329*** (0.021)	-0.318*** (0.021)	-0.319*** (0.021)
Primary education	-0.345*** (0.028)	-0.345*** (0.028)	-0.345*** (0.028)	-0.346*** (0.028)
Tertiary education	0.288*** (0.025)	0.288*** (0.025)	0.291*** (0.025)	0.291*** (0.025)
2nd income quintile	0.008 (0.037)	0.007 (0.037)	0.008 (0.037)	0.007 (0.037)
3rd income quintile	0.020 (0.036)	0.019 (0.036)	0.020 (0.036)	0.019 (0.036)
4th income quintile	0.111*** (0.037)	0.110*** (0.037)	0.109*** (0.036)	0.106*** (0.036)
5th income quintile	0.165*** (0.040)	0.163*** (0.039)	0.158*** (0.040)	0.155*** (0.040)
Income: no answer	0.034 (0.037)	0.035 (0.037)	0.032 (0.037)	0.030 (0.037)
Standard of living worse	-0.063*** (0.014)	-0.064*** (0.014)	-0.064*** (0.014)	-0.062*** (0.014)
Unemployed	-0.008 (0.034)	-0.008 (0.034)	-0.009 (0.034)	-0.009 (0.034)
Catholic	0.147*** (0.041)	0.145*** (0.041)	0.144*** (0.041)	0.143*** (0.041)
Muslim	0.116*** (0.031)	0.114*** (0.031)	0.112*** (0.031)	0.111*** (0.031)
Religion: other	0.174*** (0.050)	0.172*** (0.050)	0.170*** (0.050)	0.170*** (0.050)
Support for national government	0.061*** (0.013)	0.062*** (0.013)	0.061*** (0.013)	0.060*** (0.013)

Strong European identity	0.120*** (0.009)	0.120*** (0.009)	0.119*** (0.009)	0.119*** (0.009)
Helpful international community	0.061*** (0.013)	0.061*** (0.013)	0.061*** (0.013)	0.061*** (0.013)
Albania	-0.135*** (0.041)	-0.144*** (0.041)	-0.160*** (0.040)	-0.154*** (0.041)
Bosnia and Herzegovina	0.134*** (0.038)	0.134*** (0.038)	0.135*** (0.038)	0.135*** (0.038)
Croatia	-0.036 (0.046)	-0.032 (0.046)	-0.035 (0.046)	-0.038 (0.046)
FYR Macedonia	0.004 (0.037)	0.004 (0.037)	0.002 (0.037)	0.006 (0.037)
Montenegro	-0.169*** (0.041)	-0.167*** (0.041)	-0.163*** (0.041)	-0.163*** (0.041)
Kosovo	0.059 (0.045)	0.057 (0.045)	0.060 (0.045)	0.063 (0.045)
Year 2010	0.050** (0.024)	0.049** (0.024)	0.046* (0.024)	0.048** (0.024)
Year 2011	-0.096*** (0.025)	-0.096*** (0.025)	-0.097*** (0.025)	-0.094*** (0.025)
cut1	-0.911*** (0.102)	-0.898*** (0.101)	-0.917*** (0.101)	-0.929*** (0.102)
cut2	0.594*** (0.102)	0.607*** (0.101)	0.590*** (0.101)	0.578*** (0.102)
cut3	2.030*** (0.103)	2.044*** (0.102)	2.029*** (0.102)	2.017*** (0.103)
Observations	18539	18539	18539	18539
Pseudo R ²	0.055	0.055	0.056	0.056
Chi ²	1363.185	1365.542	1396.015	1398.432
p > Chi ²	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000

Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, robust standard errors in parentheses. Reference groups: secondary education, 1st income quintile, Orthodox, living in Serbia, interviewed in year 2009.

Table A4: Complete econometric output for Table 3 (this table reports probit coefficients and not the marginal effects)

	A. Dependent variable: Voting yes in a hypothetical EU referendum; binary probit coefficients				B. Dependent variable: EU membership a good thing; ordered probit coefficients			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Intentions to move to the EU	0.170*** (0.056)	- -	- -	0.144** (0.056)	0.082* (0.044)	- -	- -	0.066 (0.044)
Relatives in the EU	- -	0.133*** (0.041)	- -	0.111*** (0.042)	- -	0.072** (0.033)	- -	0.061* (0.033)
EU return migrant	- -	- -	0.200*** (0.072)	0.156** (0.073)	- -	- -	0.094 (0.063)	0.071 (0.064)
Intentions to move (non-EU)	0.141** (0.063)	- -	- -	0.137** (0.063)	0.129*** (0.047)	- -	- -	0.136*** (0.047)
Relatives abroad (non-EU)	- -	0.041 (0.051)	- -	0.036 (0.052)	- -	-0.050 (0.038)	- -	-0.056 (0.039)
Return migrant (non-EU)	- -	- -	-0.094 (0.092)	-0.115 (0.092)	- -	- -	-0.069 (0.067)	-0.077 (0.068)
Age	-0.014*** (0.005)	-0.016*** (0.005)	-0.016*** (0.005)	-0.014*** (0.005)	-0.013*** (0.004)	-0.014*** (0.004)	-0.014*** (0.004)	-0.013*** (0.004)
Age squared/100	0.017*** (0.006)	0.017*** (0.006)	0.017*** (0.006)	0.017*** (0.006)	0.014*** (0.004)	0.014*** (0.004)	0.014*** (0.004)	0.014*** (0.004)
Female	0.006 (0.032)	0.002 (0.032)	0.009 (0.033)	0.008 (0.033)	0.005 (0.025)	0.002 (0.025)	0.005 (0.025)	0.006 (0.025)
Primary education	0.029 (0.046)	0.028 (0.046)	0.027 (0.046)	0.030 (0.046)	0.035 (0.036)	0.033 (0.036)	0.034 (0.036)	0.033 (0.036)
Tertiary education	0.072* (0.042)	0.071* (0.042)	0.077* (0.042)	0.076* (0.042)	0.056* (0.032)	0.057* (0.032)	0.059* (0.032)	0.059* (0.032)
2nd income quintile	-0.032 (0.059)	-0.038 (0.060)	-0.034 (0.059)	-0.033 (0.059)	-0.022 (0.046)	-0.025 (0.046)	-0.023 (0.046)	-0.022 (0.046)
3rd income quintile	-0.116** (0.057)	-0.117** (0.057)	-0.114** (0.057)	-0.118** (0.057)	-0.089* (0.046)	-0.089* (0.046)	-0.089* (0.046)	-0.090* (0.046)
4th income quintile	-0.011 (0.058)	-0.023 (0.058)	-0.020 (0.058)	-0.019 (0.058)	-0.014 (0.046)	-0.019 (0.046)	-0.018 (0.046)	-0.016 (0.046)
5th income quintile	-0.080 (0.061)	-0.092 (0.062)	-0.088 (0.062)	-0.088 (0.062)	0.004 (0.049)	-0.001 (0.049)	0.000 (0.049)	0.001 (0.049)
Income: no answer	-0.108* (0.056)	-0.114** (0.056)	-0.117** (0.056)	-0.110* (0.056)	-0.129*** (0.045)	-0.129*** (0.045)	-0.133*** (0.045)	-0.128*** (0.045)
Standard of living worse	-0.117*** (0.023)	-0.108*** (0.023)	-0.110*** (0.023)	-0.114*** (0.023)	-0.087*** (0.018)	-0.083*** (0.018)	-0.084*** (0.018)	-0.086*** (0.018)
Unemployed	-0.050 (0.053)	-0.044 (0.053)	-0.045 (0.053)	-0.046 (0.053)	0.010 (0.040)	0.012 (0.041)	0.013 (0.041)	0.011 (0.041)
Catholic	0.055 (0.060)	0.049 (0.060)	0.048 (0.060)	0.053 (0.060)	0.106** (0.048)	0.099** (0.048)	0.100** (0.048)	0.100** (0.048)
Muslim	0.473*** (0.059)	0.464*** (0.058)	0.472*** (0.059)	0.463*** (0.058)	0.485*** (0.043)	0.475*** (0.043)	0.481*** (0.043)	0.476*** (0.043)
Religion: other	0.244*** (0.077)	0.249*** (0.077)	0.245*** (0.077)	0.241*** (0.077)	0.113** (0.052)	0.113** (0.052)	0.113** (0.052)	0.110** (0.052)
Support for national government	0.099*** (0.022)	0.094*** (0.022)	0.094*** (0.022)	0.098*** (0.022)	0.103*** (0.018)	0.099*** (0.018)	0.098*** (0.018)	0.102*** (0.018)
Well informed about the EU	0.077*** (0.023)	0.077*** (0.024)	0.076*** (0.023)	0.075*** (0.023)	0.209*** (0.019)	0.209*** (0.019)	0.209*** (0.019)	0.208*** (0.019)
Strong European identity	0.193*** (0.015)	0.192*** (0.015)	0.192*** (0.015)	0.193*** (0.015)	0.148*** (0.011)	0.147*** (0.011)	0.148*** (0.011)	0.148*** (0.011)
Helpful international community	0.301*** (0.019)	0.299*** (0.019)	0.300*** (0.019)	0.302*** (0.019)	0.269*** (0.015)	0.269*** (0.015)	0.269*** (0.015)	0.269*** (0.015)
Albania	0.403***	0.414***	0.421***	0.379***	0.467***	0.475***	0.480***	0.453***

	(0.082)	(0.082)	(0.081)	(0.083)	(0.059)	(0.059)	(0.058)	(0.059)
Bosnia and Herzegovina	0.145**	0.142**	0.150**	0.144**	0.133***	0.136***	0.135***	0.138***
	(0.059)	(0.059)	(0.059)	(0.059)	(0.046)	(0.046)	(0.046)	(0.046)
Croatia	-0.861***	-0.866***	-0.868***	-0.864***	-0.636***	-0.636***	-0.640***	-0.634***
	(0.065)	(0.065)	(0.065)	(0.065)	(0.051)	(0.051)	(0.051)	(0.051)
FYR Macedonia	-0.006	0.014	0.016	-0.004	-0.049	-0.026	-0.033	-0.039
	(0.059)	(0.059)	(0.058)	(0.059)	(0.043)	(0.043)	(0.043)	(0.043)
Montenegro	0.220***	0.234***	0.232***	0.232***	0.275***	0.287***	0.283***	0.286***
	(0.065)	(0.065)	(0.065)	(0.065)	(0.046)	(0.046)	(0.046)	(0.046)
Kosovo	0.043	0.058	0.061	0.046	0.438***	0.453***	0.451***	0.443***
	(0.071)	(0.071)	(0.071)	(0.071)	(0.058)	(0.058)	(0.058)	(0.058)
Year 2010	-0.075*	-0.068*	-0.077**	-0.073*	-0.135***	-0.135***	-0.138***	-0.135***
	(0.039)	(0.039)	(0.039)	(0.039)	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.030)
Year 2011	-0.239***	-0.224***	-0.231***	-0.232***	-0.210***	-0.203***	-0.207***	-0.206***
	(0.040)	(0.040)	(0.040)	(0.040)	(0.030)	(0.031)	(0.030)	(0.031)
Constant	-0.320*	-0.281*	-0.238	-0.339**	-	-	-	-
	(0.173)	(0.170)	(0.170)	(0.171)	-	-	-	-
cut1	-	-	-	-	0.267**	0.224*	0.211	0.264**
	-	-	-	-	(0.132)	(0.130)	(0.130)	(0.132)
cut2	-	-	-	-	1.266***	1.223***	1.210***	1.263***
	-	-	-	-	(0.135)	(0.134)	(0.134)	(0.135)
Observations	16858	16858	16858	16858	17871	17871	17871	17871
Pseudo R ²	0.257	0.257	0.257	0.259	0.191	0.191	0.191	0.191
Chi ²	2093.338	2087.684	2079.904	2134.609	2777.588	2759.721	2758.910	2776.456
p > Chi ²	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000

Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, robust standard errors in parentheses. Reference groups: secondary education, 1st income quintile, Orthodox, living in Serbia, interviewed in year 2009.