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The development-military relationship: the start of a new alliance?

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The Development-Military Relationship: the Start of a New Alliance?

- *The growing importance of military interventions in crisis and conflict situations as well as of other security challenges are leading to an increased number of points of contact between development actors and military actors.*
- *We can distinguish four areas of interfacing between development policy and the military: (1) security and stability, both essential framework conditions for development policy; (2) joint strategic planning and conception (e.g. institutional mechanisms such as the German Federal Security Council, on which the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) has a seat, and interministerial country strategies); (3) the use of development-policy funds to finance noncivil measures (e.g. use of European Development Fund resources to finance the Peace Facility for Africa) and the funding of civil measures conducted by the military; and (4) interfaces involving operational approaches (e.g. the interministerial approach pursued in providing support for the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre in Ghana or for the German reconstruction team in Kunduz, Afghanistan).*
- *While there is reason to welcome many of these points of contact between development policy and military, serving as they do to enhance the overall coherence of given policies, we can at the same time pinpoint some sensitive areas that pose an inherent risk of instrumentalizing development policy and blurring lines of competence. These would include e.g. subordination of development policy to strategic military considerations (as in the case of the US Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan) or the use of development-policy resources to fund military missions.*
- *Development policy has a strategic interest in shaping its interfaces with other externally oriented policy fields, including security policy. One of the crucial tasks facing it is therefore to define its position on the character which should and can be given to this process.*
- *Development policy has three options for its approach to shaping the development-military relationship: distance (avoidance of any direct contacts to military actors), cooperation (joint approaches), and complementarity (coordinate and subsidiary approaches). The benefits of each of these options will depend on the specific conditions given in concrete cases, although, in view of the sensitivity of the development-military relationship, it would generally appear advisable to envisage a complementary strategy involving a subsidiary approach on the part of the actors involved and based on jointly defined, shared goals in selected areas.*
- *Development policy's future concern must be to make more intensive use of the possibilities of development-military communication, e.g. through a mutual exchange of personnel, and to work for an elaboration at the government level of more joint country and regional strategies, which should, among other things, accord greater weight to development-policy considerations in areas of concern for security policy.*

Background

"No development without security" is proving more and more to be a development-policy paradigm, one that calls for new approaches in the field of development policy. In Germany as well as among other donors, there was in the past a discernible distance between development and military actors and their tasks. In recent years this distance has rapidly diminished. Thus far, however, too little reflection and discussion have been devoted to the consequences implied by this state of affairs.

There are several reasons why the changing relationship between development policy and the military has entered the focus of public attention:

1. There are at present a number of "protracted crises" which are characterized de facto by trusteeship rule – and therefore involve functions that extend beyond purely military tasks (e.g. Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq). These situations often involve efforts aimed at stabilizing fragile security, restoring effective statehood, and embarking on a course of economic and social reconstruction. Nation-building tasks, already a major element of international peace missions, are taking on a growing role in this context.
2. Development policy, interested in gaining more constructive influence in post-conflict situations, in some

cases even expects contributions from the field of security policy and advocates or calls for military intervention. To cite two instances: In August 2003 the German Minister for Economic Cooperation and Development called for peacekeeping troops to be sent to Liberia; and, in a 2003 appeal, international non-governmental organizations active in Afghanistan called for an expansion of the ISAF (International Assistance Force) mandate there.

The World Bank analysis "Breaking the Conflict Trap" (Collier et al. 2003) documents the close mutual relationship between development-policy and military engagement. The report even assumes that development policy is in a position to provide help in lessening risks in post-conflict situations that could be sufficient to permit reductions in military presence.

3. Other policy fields, above all foreign and security policy, are coming more and more to expect, and call for, an active involvement of development policy in post-conflict situations. Experiences made with past military missions are cited as reasons: As the European Security Strategy (ESS) paper prepared by the High Representative of the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) puts it, "In almost every major intervention, military efficiency has been followed by civilian chaos."

4. Finally, the growing number of overseas missions directly involving the German *Bundeswehr* have served to move the overall spectrum of German policies and their potential scopes of action into the focus of public attention.

Afghanistan, the Balkans, Liberia, and – for some donors – Iraq are topical examples for these trends.

Legitimacy of military missions as a precondition for development policy in post-conflict situations

As far as development policy is concerned, there should, as a matter of principle, be no doubts as to a military mission's legitimacy and mandate under international law before any consideration is given to involvement in reconstruction efforts. International peace missions have in large part, and increasingly, been entrusted with civil nation-building tasks in the framework of peace support and governance operations and multidimensional missions. Today the need for mandated military missions for this purpose is widely acknowledged. Preemptive interventions and other military activities without an adequate mandate, and thus without sufficient legitimacy under international law – such as the military intervention in Iraq in 2003 – have attracted considerable controversy and are widely rejected.

Perspectives of different actors involved

The development-military relationship is influenced by national factors such as the closeness, or distance, between development policy and foreign policy, the share that humanitarian aid and emergency relief account for in the work done by development cooperation (DC), and national traditions and experiences made with military interventions.

Viewed from the *perspective of development policy*, closer cooperation between the actors involved entails above all a substantial risk that the former may find itself subordinated to short-term military strategies. However, development policy here has, among other things, chances to bring more influence to bear on overall policy as well as to benefit from an improved security situation, a condition essential e.g. for civil reconstruction efforts in afflicted countries.

In the framework of the new peace missions, like those in the Balkans and Afghanistan, *the military* is itself becoming increasingly involved in carrying out genuinely civil tasks. In the framework of the concept "Civil-Military Cooperation" (CIMIC) both the *Bundeswehr* and NATO routinely conduct strategically conceived (force protection) civil reconstruction projects that have impacts on the domain of development policy. While focusing on the aim of increasing the acceptance of military presence in conflict areas, military actors nevertheless see the risk of a watering down of their military mandate (so-called mission creep).

International differences

While German development policy has had a tradition marked by a relatively distanced relationship to security policy and military actors, the situation among some other donors is quite different. As regards the US, for instance, the examples of Afghanistan and Iraq are illustrations of the way in which development policy may assume a role immediately supportive of strategic military goals. Here, it is in part difficult to discern any clear-cut separation of the tasks of development policy and the military. The UK is widely seen as an object lesson in innovative interministerial action, one in which development policy has retained, or indeed even enlarged, the self-assured role it plays. This goes not least for the new mechanism of joint conflict prevention pools (see the "Examples" box below).

Development and humanitarian NGOs, taking up the debate underway in the field of humanitarian aid, have engaged in an intensive discussion over the problem complex involved in the military-civil relationship. European NGOs in particular, pointing to the principles of neutrality and impartiality, largely reject cooperation with military actors and voice criticism of any blurring of the boundaries between military and civil aspects.

Development-military interfaces

In recent years the interfaces and overlaps between development policy and the military or security policy have grown dramatically in number. They can be classified under four categories:

1. *Security and stability as framework conditions for development policy*
In most post-conflict situations the framework conditions needed by development actors for their reconstruction work are predicated on the stability and security brought about by military measures. Ongoing conflicts are marked by the following, additional aspect: as representatives of international engagement, aid organizations are more and more becoming direct soft targets for local conflict parties. In the cases of Afghanistan and Iraq, this situation is taking on dramatic dimensions, one main reason being that the international conflict parties are blurring the lines between military and civil activities.
2. *Strategic planning and conception*
 - *Interministerial cooperation and mechanisms:* These serve the purpose of information-sharing and development of joint strategies in and among the various policy fields concerned. In the framework of this interministerial cooperation the BMZ is, for instance, able to bring its influence to bear on cross-cutting government concepts and the formulation of country strategies. The BMZ has, for example, played a role in shaping the structure of the German reconstruction team currently deployed in Kunduz as well as on the formulation of the mandate for the military component involved. The mechanisms of cooperation include, among others, the Federal Security Council, ministerial consultations, and in particular interministerial cooperation, e.g. coordination of the German contribution to the G8 Africa Action Plan (GAA).
 - *Deliberate integration and subordination of development policy in short-term political and military strategies:* This would include in particular the extensive use of instruments of development policy, but also of humanitarian aid, in the framework of military approaches, e.g. in Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in Afghanistan.
3. *Funding of noncivil measures and missions as well as civil activities conducted by the military*
 - *Development policy funding for noncivil measures and missions:* There are a number of different current examples which can, as far as their character is concerned, be viewed as a shift of the boundaries defining the traditional practices of development policy. For instance, € 5 million of undisbursed funds were made available from the European Development Fund (EDF) to support the ECOWAS peace mission in Liberia. In November 2003 the decision was taken to set up a Peace Facility for Africa (an initial € 250 million) that is to be financed from the EDF and used to fund noncivil peace missions in Africa.

- *Development-policy funding for civil activities conducted by the military:* One main example that deserves mention here is the BMZ's funding of CIMIC measures conducted by the *Bundeswehr*.
- *Military competition for DC funds:* To conduct CIMIC measures, the military competes e.g. with the *Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit* (GTZ) or NGOs for funds in the fields of humanitarian aid and development assistance.

Examples bearing on the debate over development military interfaces

- *Integration of military and development actors in Afghanistan:* The strategy of using reconstruction teams to stabilize the security situation and accelerate reconstruction in Afghanistan may be seen as a particularly important precedent. The PRTs of the US in particular are an example of integrated civil-military "units" used directly to integrate reconstruction activities within the US military strategy. In the framework of its reconstruction team in Kunduz, Germany is relying on a three-pillar concept consisting of independent but coordinated sectors (development policy, foreign policy, defense) as a means of deliberately distinguishing its approach from that pursued by the US.
- *Proactive interministerial cooperation in the UK:* The UK has been working for some time now with a proactive cooperation model which provides for strategic cooperation between development policy and the military – on the one hand, within the Conflict and Humanitarian Affairs Department (CHAD) of the Department for International Development (DFID) and on the other hand by developing an interministerial strategy and funding instrument (so-called Conflict Prevention Pools) for the government's conflict-related work abroad.
- *Intensive cooperation between development policy and the military at the European level:* The rapid pace of developments at the European level are of particular importance for future development-military interfaces. In the European Union there are a number of approaches that – building on the "Programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflicts" (Gothenburg 2001) – are aimed at expanding the EU's civil and military capacities and – in particular – their combined use. The task facing the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) is to systematically integrate the whole of the EU's external relations, including development policy. One element of great importance to the EU's overall external relations may be seen in the European Security Strategy (ESS) adopted by the Council in December 2003.

4. Operational approach

- *Interministerial projects:* The German support for the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAIPTC) is seen as a pilot project for the development of a coherent and interministerial concept involving the German Foreign Office (AA), the Federal Ministry of Defence (BMVg), and the BMZ.
- *Military conduct of typical DC measures:* This may be observed above all in the framework of CIMIC (e.g. in the field of vocational training).

The Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre

The Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAIPTC) in Ghana was set up in 1998 as a regional training center; the aim was, among other things, to tap Ghana's experience in peace missions and make it available to other African countries. The training program includes e.g. courses on military-police tasks as well as preparatory training for military observers.

Germany is using various instruments to support the development of the KAIPTC in the framework of its G8 Plan for Africa:

- Development of a course model on the use of civil forces for peacekeeping; the project is being funded by the BMZ and implemented by the Berlin *Zentrum für Internationale Friedenseinsätze* (Center for International Peace Missions / ZIF); the GTZ is responsible for handling and transacting the project.
- The German Foreign Office funds are being used to construct/equip the Centre, the Federal Ministry of Defence is responsible for implementing the measures.
- Support for training operations is provided by a German *Bundeswehr* instructor specialized in the field of civil-military cooperation. In Germany African training personnel is trained by the Federal Ministry of Defence and the German Foreign Office.

- *Military provision of concrete protection functions for development policy actors and measures; benefits of an improved security situation:* Apart from the general role played by the military in the field of security, concrete forms of cooperation may also develop on the ground.
- *Cooperation in training and capacity-building:* In various contexts military and development-policy actors are involved, on a reciprocal basis, in training and capacity-building functions as well as in dialogue forums, e.g. in the framework of the Federal College for Security Policy (BAKS), the *Bundeswehr* Command and Staff College (*Führungsakademie der Bundeswehr*), or the course on "Civil-Military Cooperation Abroad" (ZMZ A) offered by the German Academy for Crisis Management, Emergency Planning and Civil Defense (AKNZ).

Conclusions relevant to defining the position of development policy

Development policy – mindful of the fundamentally limited options open to external actors – has some important and useful potential means to contribute to addressing challenges which are typified by fragile security as well as by a need to restore effective statehood and to embark on the process of post-conflict economic and social reconstruction. This is all the more the case in view of the fact that peace missions have grown increasingly complex in nature. This contribution of development policy should, however, be made more visible.

Viewed against this background, development policy can be said to have a fundamental and strategic interest in defining and shaping its interfaces with other policy fields. It is therefore essential for development policy to define its position concerning the character that can and should be given to this task.

Development policy must define its position against the background of the following considerations: while various points of contact between development policy and the military may serve the end of developing a more coherent

approach to policy, it is possible to identify four, in part sensitive areas that must be taken into consideration in efforts devoted to the shaping of interfaces. These are the following cases:

- subordination of development policy to a military logic;
- implementation by the military of measures with a development character;
- development policy as a source of funding for military missions;
- development policy as a source of funding for civil activities conducted by the military.

Furthermore, any more pronounced linkage with military components may have direct implications for fundamental principles of development policy. We can distinguish two forms of principles: (1) general principles (the *civil character* of development policy and “*do no harm*”) and (2) development-policy principles with impacts at the operational level (above all *sustainability/long-term character* and *partner orientation/ownership*). In general terms, closer contact between development and military actors need not necessarily mean any curtailment of these principles; but in this case three fundamental conditions must be given:

- Acceptance of the military by both the local population and conflict parties.
- Independence of development-policy activities from military actors.
- Clearly outlined cooperation based on division of functions and limited in time.

Reference models and recommendations

The following three strategic reference models are distinguished here:

1. A *distance strategy* that would serve to emphasize development policy's independence from the constraints of security policy and short-term foreign-policy considerations.
2. A *cooperation strategy* characterized by closer coordination and joint approaches with actors involved in foreign and security policy.
3. A *complementary strategy* that would aim for goal conformity in the policy fields concerned and, in strategically selected fields, identification of complementary and coherent approaches involving security- and foreign-policy actors.

The advantages and significance of these reference models depend on the interface in question. They could seek orientation along the following lines:

1. Security and stability as framework conditions for development policy: complementary strategies.
2. Strategic planning and conception: strategies of a complementary to cooperative nature.
3. Funding: complementary strategies.
4. Operational approach: case-dependent strategies.

Viewed against this background, German development policy has a number of concrete points of departure for further formulating and shaping the development-military relationship:

- the German Federal Government should focus more on developing joint country and regional strategies;

- there is a need to foster routine relations and dialogue among the actors concerned, e.g. by appointing staff members as liaison persons in the relevant units of other ministries and to work out a model involving placement of development advisors with CIMIC units of the *Bundeswehr*;
- efforts should be made to counter any softening up of the Development Assistance Committee's (DAC) Official Development Assistance (ODA) reporting criteria, e.g. by allowing inclusion of noncivil measures;
- more efforts should be undertaken to evaluate experiences made at the operational level with a view to utilizing them for strategic considerations; German CIMIC measures should be subjected to systematic evaluation as regards their development-related impacts;
- more efforts should be devoted to increasing the visibility of the contributions provided by development policy;
- development-policy instruments and concepts should be more closely tailored to crises and post-conflict situations or reconceptualized with a view to such situations.

Above and beyond arrangements geared to individual cases, there is a need to define a set of general strategic cornerstones concerning the orientation of development policy in its relationship to military actors.



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Further reading:

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