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# **Working Paper**

The relationship between insider trading and volumeinduced return autocorrelation

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# The Relationship between Insider Trading and Volume-Induced Return Autocorrelation

#### Abstract

As was established in Llorente et al. (2001) the dynamic relationship between return and volume is a function of information asymmetry. This study extends their analysisby linking the volume induced return autocorrelation coefficients with the level of disclosedinsider trading. Using New Zealanddata, we documenta strong link betweenthe sustainability of tradegenerate drice changes and the extent of insider trading. This relationship is robust to alternative econometric pecifications and remains significant even after controlling for conventional measuresof information asymmetry such as bid-ask spreads size and analyst following. This suggests that volume induced autocorrelation may be a suitable criterion on which to rankfirms on the level of private information trading.

JEL Classification:C22,G14 Keywords:Insidertrading,returnautocorrelation

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# I. Introduction

Llorente, Michaely, Saar, and Wang (2001, henceforthLMSW) develop a theoretical model with heterogeneouslynformed agents to show that the returnvolume dynamic of individual stocks is governed by the degree of informational asymmetry. In particular, the stocks with a high proportion of private information trading volume exhibit return continuations whereas tocks in which investors trade predominantlyfor portfolio rebalancingreasonshave a negative volume induced return autocorrelation. The rational ebehind this result is that whenever an insider exploits nonpublic information by trading in securities, prices will partially reflect the information before it is announced, e. the price impact of an insider tradewill be permanent.Conversely, dealings driven by allocational motives tend to generate return reversals. The stock price will initially move in the direction of the hedging transactionin order to encourageother market participants to take the other side. However, since the trade does not reflect any superior knowledge of future payoffs the stock price is likely to reboundin the next period. By conditioning on volume, the LMSW model isolates the aforemention eith pact of tradingon serial correlations of returns.

LMSW perform a crosssectional regression analysis of the tradegenerated first-order autocorrelation coefficient and provide persuasive evidence that its magnitude can be successfully explained by the standard informational asymmetry proxies such as capitalization, bid-ask spreads and analyst following. In a related paper, Grishchenko Litov and Mei (2002) examined marketindex constituents from

18 emergingmarkets and concluded that stocks in countries that enforce insider trading laws and provide better investor protection exhibit less return continuation following high volume days. It has to be noted, however, that the dichotomous variable for a successfub rose cution insider trading charges used in their study is a rather indirect measure of the degree of speculative trading based on private information. The authors were unable to develop a more explicit proxy due to a lack of data. It is our intention to empirically expand on the model of LMSW by explicitly including insider transaction is not the model. Specifically, the analysis focuses on the corporate insider trading reports filed with the New Zealand Stock Exchange (NZSE) and investigated the relationship between the degree of insider trading and volume-induced autocorrelations.

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The following section describes the sample and variable construction. Section 3 outlines the methodology and provides empirical results. Section 4 concludes the paper.

# 2. Data

The sampleemployedin this study was drawn from companied sted on the NZSE between January 1995 and Decembe 2003 for which insider trades could be collected. This resulted in a sample of 83 companies, 577 firm-years and 3031 insider trades. Information on insider transactions came from the NZSE and company annual reports. Data on company prices, volume, bid-ask spreads and market capitalization were collected from Thompson Financial Datastream while analyst following data came from Datex. The analyst following data, however, was

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Insiders, defined as directors, substantialshareholdersand executives, are required to disclose changes in their shareholdingsunder the Securities Market Act 1988 and Securities Market AmendmentAct 2002. For more information on the institutional setting of insider trading in New Zealandwe would refer the reader to Eterbari, Tourani Radand Gilbert (2004).

only available from 1997 necessitating a smaller sample be used in some specifications.

The insider trading variable is defined as the absolutevalue of net insider trading volume (volume of purchasesminus volume of sales) scaled by the total volume of trading in a given company year (as consistent with the reasoning of John and Lang (1991), Lustgarten and Mande (1995) and Roulstone (2003)). Scaling by the total volume follows directly from the LMSW model which predicts that the relation between the volume induced return autocorrelation and the significance of speculative rades relative to hedging trades is monotonic.

# [Table 1 abouthere]

The market value of equity for our sample is distributed with an arithmetic mean of NZ\$520 million and a median of only NZ\$82 million, indicating that the sample comprises both the smallest and largest firms listed on the NZSE. The Bid-Ask spread has a mean of 4.31% and a median of 2.44%. The relatively high magnitude of spreads likely attributable to the poor liquidity of the New Zeal and market. To reduce the excess kewnes in these two variables a log transformation of the datawas used. There was at least one analyst following a company in 51% of the firm-years and in total 60% of the firms were followed in at least one year. The disclose drades of insiders make up 4.4% of the total volume traded and 2.9% of the volume traded each year appears to be informed trading by insiders. The summary statistics for the variable employed in our study are shown in Table 1.

The crosssectional correlations between variables are also presented While neither size nor analysts following is significantly related to insider trading, its association with bid-ask spreads is positive and statistically significant. This conforms with the well-established inding that market makers increases preads in

response active insider trading in order to avoid considerable osses (Glosten and Milgrom (1985), Kyle (1985) and Copeland Galai (1988)). Furthermore, the information asymmetry proxies are strongly interrelated in the expected directions. Larger companies and companies with smaller bid-ask spreads for instance are covered by more analysts while size and bid-ask spreads are inversely related.

# 3. Methodology and Empirical Findings

To calculate the value of tradegenerate deturnautocorrelation we apply two LMSW empirical specifications the second of which removes the impact of market-wide variations from the analysis:

$$R_{i,t+1} = C_0 + C_1 R_{i,t} + C_2 R_{i,t} V_{i,t} + e_{i,t+1}$$
 [1]

$$R_{i,t+1} = C_0 + C_1 R_{i,t} + C_2 R_{i,t} V_{i,t} + C_3 R_{m,t+1} + e_{i,t+1}$$
 [2]

where  $R_{i,t}$  and  $R_{m,t}$  denote the continuously compounded eturn on security i and the NZSE ALL index on day t, respectively.  $V_{i,t}$  is the log, detrended urnover at date t, such that

$$V_{i,t} = ln((Vol_{i,t} / N_{i,t}) + c) - (1/200) \mathring{a}_{j=1}^{200} ln((Vol_{i,t-j} / N_{i,t-j}) + c)$$

where  $Vol_{i,t}$  and  $N_{i,t}$  are the number of sharest raded and the total number of sharest outstanding on day t for companyi, respectively Following LMSW we add a small constant c = 0.0000025 to the turnoverratio in order to avoid the problem of zero trading volume days. The detrending procedure accounts for the fact that daily turnoverse riest end to be nonstationary.

The parameter of interest,  $C_2$ , has been deemed to indicate whether the trading is dominated by portfolio rebalancing private information trades. To verify this assertion we estimate the  $C_2$  coefficient for each of the firm-years available in

sampleand regressit on the insider trading variable and information asymmetry proxies. The findings are reported below.

# [Table 2 abouthere]

The results in Table 2 Panel A examine the relationship between insider trading and volume induced return autocorrelation measure by the C<sub>2</sub> coefficient from equation[1]. The results show a significant relationship between the insider trading variable and the regressant indicating that the C<sub>2</sub> coefficients increase monotonically with the degree of speculative trading on nonpublic information. This supports the prediction of Lorente et al (2001) that positive C<sub>2</sub> coefficients are symptomatic of prevalent private information trading. The robustnes of the results to inclusion of other information asymmetry variables is verified in specifications (2), (3) and (4). Since all the informational asymmetry measure are highly cross-correlated they are not bundled together into one regression due to potential multicolinearity problems. Insider trading retains its predictive power in all of the models considered, however, inclusion of bid-ask spreadsor analyst following reduces its significance level. This could be due to the fact that bid-ask spreads partially reflect the degree of informed trading and analysts condition their investment decisions on the subset of information available to insiders.

PanelB in Table 2 presents the determinants of the  $C_2$  coefficient from a model incorporating the overall movement of the market. This specification takes into account a possible crossequation correlation of errors arising from sensitivity to common factors. The magnitude and statistical significance of the coefficients is directly comparable with the findings reported in PanelA. Moreover, the sensitivity of results to the exclusion of outliers has been examined by eliminating observations for which the absolute value of the fitted residual exceeded three times the estimated

residualstandarddeviation. The resultswere not materially altered. Lastly, we retest the model using an alternative definition of volume, where volume is defined as (ln(1+number of share traded)). This specification reduces the discrepancy between the theoretical and empirical representation of the LMSW model. The use of alternative volume definition, however, does not affect the conclusions drawn.

# IV. Conclusions

This study investigated the connection between volume-induced return autocorrelation and the relative significance of private information trading versus tradingfor portfolio rebalancing easons Insider transactions disclose do the NZSE have been used to construct a measure of informed trading prevalence. The findings validate the theoretical predictions of the LMSW model in that the return continuation following high volume days appear to be more likely for stocks with high degree of insider dealing. Consequently the volume-induced autocorrelation coefficient could be helpful in identifying periods in which ordinary shareholder are at a great disadvantage specially in markets in which insiders are not required to report their transactions.

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Table 1 Summary Statistics

| Variable | Mean    | Median  | Standard  | CrossSectionalCorrelations |                     |                     |
|----------|---------|---------|-----------|----------------------------|---------------------|---------------------|
|          |         |         | Deviation | Size                       | Analysts            | BAS                 |
| INS      | 0.0292  | 0.0016  | 0.0876    | 0.0055<br>(0.8951)         | -0.0159<br>(0.7327) | 0.1265<br>(0.0023)  |
| Size     | 11.3934 | 11.3097 | 1.8252    | _                          | 0.6729<br>(0.0000)  | -0.8073<br>(0.0000) |
| Analysts | 2.7909  | 1.0000  | 3.2982    | _                          | _                   | -0.6380<br>(0.0000) |
| BAS      | -3.6499 | -3.7146 | 0.9475    | _                          | -                   | _                   |

Note - The p-values are shown in parenthesed NS is the absolute value of net insider trading volume (volume of purchases minus volume of sales) scaled by the total volume of trading in a given companyyear. Size is the natural logarithm of the average market value of equity during a given firm-year. Analysts is the number of analyst forecasts available for a company at the end of a calendaryear. BAS is the natural logarithm of the average bid-asks preaduring a given firm-year.

Table 2 Empirical determinants of the C2 coefficient

| PanelA: Regres                       |                   |                                 |  |  |  |
|--------------------------------------|-------------------|---------------------------------|--|--|--|
| Variable                             | Predicted<br>Sign | (1)                             | (2)  | (3)  | (4)  |
| Intercept                            |                   | -0.0012<br>(0.0035)             | 0.0960 <sup>**</sup><br>(0.0278)                                     | 0.0162 <sup>**</sup><br>(0.0046)               | 0.0510 <sup>**</sup><br>(0.0156)                     |
| INS                                  | +                 | 0.0745 <sup>*</sup><br>(0.0343) | 0.0755 <sup>*</sup><br>(0.0314)                                      | 0.0602<br>(0.0316)                             | 0.0551<br>(0.0304)                                   |
| Size                                 | -                 | _                               | -0.0085***<br>(0.0025)   | -  | _  |
| Analysts                             | -                 | -                               | -  | -0.0069 <sup>**</sup><br>(0.0014)              | _  |
| BAS                                  | +                 | -                               | _  | -  | 0.0142 <sup>***</sup><br>(0.0044)                    |
| Adj. R-squared                       |                   | 0.68%                           | 4.23%  | 7.19%  | 3.17%  |
| No. of obs.                          |                   | 577                             | 577  | 577  | 464  |
| PanelB: Regres                       | sionson the       | Market- Adjusted                | d Volume-Induced   | Return Autocorrelati                           | on Coefficient                                       |
| Variable                             | Predicted<br>Sign | (1)                             | (2)  | (3)  | (4)  |
| Intercept                            |                   |                                 |  |  |  |
| •                                    |                   | -0.0016<br>(0.0036)             | 0.092 <sup>***</sup><br>(0.0285)                                     | 0.0145 <sup>***</sup><br>(0.0046)              | 0.0482 <sup>***</sup><br>(0.0158)                    |
| INS                                  | +                 |                                 |  |  |  |
|                                      | +                 | (0.0036)<br>0.0727 <sup>*</sup> | (0.0285)<br>0.0737 <sup>*</sup>                                      | (0.0046)<br>0.0588                             | (0.0158)<br>0.0542                                   |
| Size                                 | + -               | (0.0036)<br>0.0727 <sup>*</sup> | (0.0285)<br>0.0737 <sup>+</sup><br>(0.0313)<br>-0.0083 <sup>++</sup> | (0.0046)<br>0.0588                             | (0.0158)<br>0.0542                                   |
| Size<br>Analysts                     | + +               | (0.0036)<br>0.0727 <sup>*</sup> | (0.0285)<br>0.0737 <sup>+</sup><br>(0.0313)<br>-0.0083 <sup>++</sup> | (0.0046)<br>0.0588<br>(0.0317)<br>-<br>-0.0064 | (0.0158)<br>0.0542                                   |
| INS Size Analysts BAS Adj. R-squared | -                 | (0.0036)<br>0.0727 <sup>*</sup> | (0.0285)<br>0.0737 <sup>+</sup><br>(0.0313)<br>-0.0083 <sup>++</sup> | (0.0046)<br>0.0588<br>(0.0317)<br>-<br>-0.0064 | (0.0158)<br>0.0542<br>(0.0304)<br>-<br>-<br>0.0135** |

Note-"", ", indicatesignificance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.

The White (1980) heteroscedasticity on sistents tandarderrors are shown in parentheses INS is the absolute value of net insidertradingvolume(volumeof purchasesninusvolumeof sales)scaledby the total volumeof tradingin a given companyyear. Size is the natural logarithm of the averagemarket value of equity during a given firm-year. Analysts is the number of analystforecastsavailablefor a companyat the end of a calendaryear. BAS is the natural logarithm of the average bid-ask spreaduring a given firm-year.

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