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Working Paper Political integration of foreigners: How does foreigners suffrage impact natives' attitudes?

CREMA Working Paper, No. 2020-05

Provided in Cooperation with: CREMA - Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts, Zürich

Suggested Citation: Koukal, Anna Maria; Portann, Marco (2020) : Political integration of foreigners: How does foreigners suffrage impact natives' attitudes?, CREMA Working Paper, No. 2020-05, Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA), Zürich

This Version is available at: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/225547

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Working Paper No. 2020-05

CREMA Südstrasse 11 CH - 8008 Zürich www.crema-research.ch

Political Integration of Foreigners How does foreigners suffrage impact natives' attitudes?

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April 2020

Abstract

Today's world is characterized by globalization and international mobility, yet most democratic participation rights are still tied to traditional forms of citizenship. As a consequence, non-citizen are the largest group without franchise. We examine how citizens evaluate and react to the enfranchisement of non-citizens in Switzerland. This paper combines a novel dataset about the enfranchisement process of non-citizens with individual and aggregated data about citizens' attitudes toward non-citizens and their perception of democracy. We find evidence that citizens become more skeptical toward additional migration, yet show a tendency to reduce ethnocentric attitudes toward non-citizens residing in Switzerland and are more satisfied with democracy once non-citizen are granted the right to vote.

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1 Introduction

Many people would reflexively claim to be advocates of universal voting rights and slogans such as "women's votes matter" and "no taxation without representation" come easily. Contrastingly, the conventional link between voting rights and citizenship is rarely questioned. Increasing international mobility has rendered migrants the largest group without suffrage. As a striking example for residents aged 30 to 40, the share of migrants is about 40 percent in Switzerland.¹. This proportion is in magnitude similar to the disenfranchisement of women in the last century. This paper adds a new perspective to the economic literature by analyzing consequences of foreigners enfranchisement on natives' attitudes.

The granting of non-citizens voting rights as pillar of more general integration has only gained modest attraction. (see Aleinikoff, 2013). Since 1993, European citizens held local voting rights in every EU member state and Sweden even grants local voting rights to all migrants after three years of residence.² As political participation is attributed to influence key areas of integration, such as strengthening civic virtue, fostering satisfaction with democracy or increasing trust, the question arises whether and how political integration impacts integration in more general. (Frey, 1997; Frey et al., 2004; Frey and Stutzer, 2006; Fennema and Tillie, 2014; Morales and Giugni, 2014). Therefore, policy maker also have a stake to understand consequences of non-citizens voting rights on natives. To the best of our knowledge, the scarce empirical literature has so far only focused on the reactions of non-citizens after their enfranchisement (e.g. Tillie, 1998; Vernby, 2013; Koukal, 2013; Slotwinski et al., 2017).

To investigate impacts on natives, we need a setting which allows to compare natives exposed to a political process with participating migrants to natives without this feature. Moreover, outcomes of interest, such as attitudes towards migrants or perception of democracy, need to be observable, before and after suffrage extension. Swiss institutions, foremost federalism and comprehensive democratic participation, provide such a laboratory for our analysis. First, suffrage is not installed by the national parliament, but by the actual electorate at the subnational level. This allows to observe multiple and staggered introductions within a common institutional and cultural frame. Second, the design of voting rights for non-citizens differs across

¹ In some cantons, it is above 50 percent (e.g., Basel County and Basel City). In 2017, non-citizens accounted for 24 percent of the Swiss resident population, 12 percent of Germany's and 47 percent of Luxembourg's (Source: Eurostat).

² For a detailed description of non-citizen suffrage across Europe, see Earnest (2003); Groenendijk (2008); Aleinikoff (2013).

cantons and municipalities. Third, while enfranchisement can only take place in direct democratic decisions if a majority of voters is in favor, we can distinguish initial preferences at the municipal level. Fourth, the enfranchisement decision is exogenous to the individual municipality or individuum, as the majority of the canton is decisive. Fifth, the high degree of democratic involvement in Switzerland and the dominant prevalence of local voting rights for foreigners should amplify the observability of potential effects. Finally, our empirical analysis combines three rich datasets. First, an original municipality-level dataset about non-citizens' enfranchisement identifies the treatment. Second, individual panel data from the Swiss Household Panel (SHP) reveals citizens' perception of democracy and their attitudes toward non-citizens. Third, a municipality-level panel covering the results of federal referenda on policy measures concerning non-citizens and immigration serves as a second source of outcome variables. Drawing on these datasets, we apply a difference-in-differences framework.³

We find that citizens tend to be less open towards additional immigration when non-citizens are enfranchised at the local level. Regarding subpopulations, the analysis suggests that this effect is strongest among individuals whose educational attainment and income are comparatively low. Moreover, our results indicate that extending suffrage is, on average, associated with limited changes in citizens' attitudes towards non-citizens already residing in Switzerland. Only among individuals living in jurisdictions with a high share of foreigners do we find convincing evidence that enfranchising foreigners on the local level increases citizens openness toward them. With respect to citizens' perception of democracy, we find strong evidence that the enfranchisement of non-citizens increases citizens' satisfaction with democracy. Contrary to our expectations Swiss individuals who have been exposed to non-citizen voting rights also evaluate their political influence as being higher when compared to Swiss individuals without exposure to non-citizen voting rights. However, when looking at individuals living in municipalities, that have been forced by the canton to grant suffrage to foreigners, we find the opposite effect.

This paper is organized as follows. The next section reviews the related literature. In section 3 we provide an overview over the Swiss institutional setting. Section 4 describes the structure of our dataset. Section 5 introduces our estimation strategy and hypotheses. Section 6 presents and discusses our result. In section 7 we summarize our main results, draw some conclusions and provide an outlook.

³ Note that suffrage for foreigners is always conditioned on a minimum length of stay, which varies between one year and ten years of residence (Adler et al., 2015).

2 Literature Review

Most empirical contributions on the effects of non-citizens' voting rights are devoted to the enfranchised non-citizens themselves. Either by investigating the preferences foreigners express or by studying effects of their voting rights on their behavior in areas that are considered socially relevant. Similar to the literature about the effects of enfranchising women on the size and composition of government, Vernby (2013) analyzes the effect of non-citizens' enfranchisement on the structure and size of public policy.⁴ Drawing on a sample of 183 Swedish municipalities, Vernby (2013) finds that enfranchisement leads to increasing public spending for education, family, and social services. Tillie (1998) adds to the literature by analyzing party choices of non-citizens in Dutch municipalities. Working with survey data, Tillie (1998) identifies ethnicity as a main driver of party choice, shows that non-citizens have preferences across the entire range of Dutch parties and tend to adapt to the left-right political discourse. In line with these results, some studies examine the voting behavior of naturalized individuals naturalization (see Wüst, 2003; Savodelli, 2006; Kroh and Tucci, 2009). Working with Swiss voting and election data Koukal (2013) compares revealed preferences of enfranchised non-citizens and citizens in Switzerland. She finds evidence for a lower status quo bias of foreign voters.

Concentrating on non-citizens' behavior Slotwinski et al. (2017) examine a regulation in Denmark that automatically grants suffrage to immigrants after three years of residence. Working with register data, they evaluate the effects of suffrage on migrants' compliance with the law. They find strong evidence that being granted an opportunity to vote enhances compliance with the law among male migrants.

Compared to the scarce literature on the effects of migrants' political integration, the effects on economic integration have been subject of extensive research.⁵ Closely related to this paper is the literature that explores to what extent uncertainties about the effects of immigration on employment, job competition and wages shape anti-immigrant attitudes (Scheve and Slaughter, 2001; Mayda, 2006; Malhotra et al., 2013). Whether the competition that migrants add on the job market is a driver of negative attitudes toward immigrants has been debated controversially. While some authors find evidence that additional competition on the labor market drives

⁴ For the effects of female enfranchisement on government expenditure, see Abrams and Settle (1999); Lott and Kenny (1999); Aidt et al. (2006).

⁵ For a broad review on the impact of immigration on labor market outcomes, see Borjas (2014) or Card and Peri (2016).

anti-immigrant attitudes (e.g. Scheve and Slaughter, 2001; Mayda, 2006), other question this result (Sides and Citrin, 2007; Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2007).

A prominently theory on the effect of outgroup size on anti-outgroup attitudes is the cultural threat hypothesis. The main hypothesis is that natives fear immigrants because they pose a threat to their cultural identity (Kinder and Kam, 2010; Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2007). Following this approach, the size of the foreign population shows to have a positive effect on the support of far-right parties in different settings (see e.g., Edo et al., 2019 or Halla et al., 2017).

Several contributions which are related to the motivation of our research questions highlight the potential of participatory democratic institutions to foster cooperation (Acemoğlu and Robinson, 2012), trust (e.g. Rainer and Siedler, 2009) and civic virtue (Frey, 1997). In addition, the opportunity to participate in the democratic process is said to foster individuals' sense of self-determination, which results in positive procedural utility (see Frey et al., 2004). The enfranchisement of non-citizens may, therefore, change citizens' views toward the enfranchised group and vice versa. Strongly related to the concept of procedural utility is political discourse. In addition to the actual voting right, democratic participation offers the possibility to participate in the political decision-making process. Political discourse is a tool to develop new ideas (Hayek, 1968) for the political market (Frey and Bohnet, 1993). Non-citizens may contribute additional perspectives and ideas to the political discourse, in keeping with the spirit of these approaches.

Despite the sizeable literature regarding the role of economic and cultural threat, little is known about how competition and enhanced discourse in the political sphere affects attitudes toward immigrants and perception of democracy. This paper aims to fill these gaps.

3 Swiss institutional setting

In most countries non-citizens voting rights are implemented by a national parliament. However, in Switzerland, the entire Swiss electorate decides by popular votes whether and to what extent they want to enfranchise non-citizens. These popular referendums are conducted as secret ballots at all federal levels (municipal, cantonal, and federal). Thus, the Swiss electorate decides in each canton separately about enfranchising noncitizens for cantonal and municipal decisions. So far this resulted in approximately 40 referendum votes on enfranchising non-citizens in 16 out of 26 Swiss cantons.⁶ A list of all referenda covered in the paper is listed in Table A.2 and A.3 in the appendix.

Up to now, voting rights for non-citizens neither exist nor were subject to public debate at the federal level. Non-citizens are enfranchised if the majority of the current electorate in a canton accepts the respective proposal. Municipalities without an accepting majority are overruled by the cantonal majority. To avoid conflicts, some cantons adopted opt-in rules for municipalities. In those cantons the majority of cantonal voters decided to concede the right to extend the franchise to non-citizens at municipalities within the cantons. Eventually in those three cantons, voter majorities in 26 municipalities decided to extend the franchise for municipal matters to non-citizens.

Table 1 lists all cantons in which suffrage has been extended to non-citizens. Note that suffrage is conditioned on the length of stay, which varies between one and ten years (Adler et al., 2015). The cantons' autonomy also results in a variety of configurations of which voting rights are granted to non-citizens. For instance, some cantons decided to grant active or passive (or both) voting rights (denoted as "full" in Table 1).

A survey conducted by Adler et al. (2015) indicates that non-citizens are visible in the political process. An example is the canton of Vaud in which non-citizens can be elected at the local level (passive voting rights). Out of 165 municipalities taking part in the survey 115 stated to currently have non-citizen parliamentarians in their municipality (Adler et al., 2015, p.24).

4 Data

To answer our research questions, we need rich information about voting rights in municipalities and cantons, as well as adequate measures of individual attitudes. Therefore, we combine three different datasets: (1) a dataset covering the results of referenda on enfranchising non-citizens at the municipality level, (2) municipality level panel data covering outcomes of federal referenda about immigration policy (3) individual data on characteristics and attitudes from the Swiss Household Panel (SHP).

⁶ The respective cantons are: Aargau, Appenzell Ausserrhoden, Bern, Basel-City, Fribourg, Geneva, Grison, Glarus, Jura, Lucerne, Neuchâtel, Schaffhausen, Solothurn, Uri, Vaud, Zurich

Vote date	Acceptance	Effective date	Canton	Suffrage type	Enforcement	Municipalities
						w/ enforcement
						,
20.03.1977	0.8	01.01.1979	Jura	active local; active cantonal	enforced	all
30.04.1995	Cantonal assembly	per municipality	Appenzell A.R.	full local	conceded to municipalities	4
24.09.2000	0.77	01.01.2002	Neuchâtel	active cantonal	enforced	all
22.09.2002	0.56	14.04.2003	Vaud	full local	enforced	all
18.05.2003	0.60	per municipality	Grison	full local	conceded to municipalities	22
16.05.2004	0.58	01.01.2005	Fribourg	full local	enforced	all
23.03.2005	0.77	per municipality	Basel-City	full local	conceded to municipalities	0
24.04.2005	0.52	24.04.2005	Geneva	active cantonal	enforced	all
17.06.2007	0.54	17.06.2007	Neuchâtel	passive local	enforced	all
28.09.2014	0.54	28.09.2014	Jura	passive local	enforced	all

Table 1: Overview: Suffrage introductions at the cantonal level

Sources: Cantonal chancelleries, cantonal constitutions, Alder et al. (2015).

4.1 Referenda on suffrage extensions to non-citizens

We use a self-collected municipality level dataset about the entire enfranchisement of non-citizens. We collected and digitized outcomes from 38 municipal referenda on non-citizens enfranchisement from cantonal archives. Most parts of the data were only available as paper printouts. A full list of covered referenda on the implementation of non-citizens voting rights is presented in Appendix Table A.2 and A.3. Note that a part of the votes on enfranchising non-citizens was integrated in a package of constitutional revisions.⁷

Concerning cantons and language regions the enfranchisement situation is different across Switzerland. Similar to the Swiss female enfranchisement process, the French speaking cantons are pioneers in granting non-citizens the right to vote. The canton of Jura and Neuchâtel also offer voting rights at the cantonal level. However, voting activities on enfranchising non-citizens are spread across Switzerland. Up to now, votes were conducted in 16 out of 26 cantons. In the German speaking part of Switzerland, three cantons adopted opt-in rules (Grison, Appenzell Innerrhoden, Basel City). So far 26 municipalities in two cantons installed local voting rights on the municipality level. The actual implementation of non-citizens voting rights takes various forms: full local rights including the possibility to run for a political mandate, active voting rights only, cantonal active rights only etc. The majority of cantons only grants local (concerning the municipality level) voting rights to non-citizens. Therefore, in our empirical analysis we will focus on the effects of local suffrage. A list of implementation dates is presented in Table 1.

⁷ For further research, we plan to gain a deeper understanding of the other elements of those constitutional revisions to make sure that the effects we find derive from the franchise extension and not other aspects of these constitutional revisions.

4.2 Federal referenda: A measure of attitudes toward migrants

A main challenge of this paper is to find suitable measures on how citizens respond to the enfranchisement of non-citizens in their jurisdiction. A common approach measure attitudes towards certain groups is to consider survey data (see e.g. Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2007, Mayda, 2006 or Burns and Gimpel, 2000). The direct democratic system of Switzerland provides an ideal setting for an alternative approach. Switzerland has conducted more popular votes than all other countries and thus allows to study reveled preferences of the current electorate concerning laws on immigration and migrants (see Vatter, 2018). Therefore, in addition to survey data, we consider outcomes in popular initiatives and referenda as a proxy of attitudes towards migrants (aggregated at the municipality level).

We specifically concentrate on federal referenda as a measure of citizens' attitudes towards non-citizens. Usually the Swiss electorate is invited to decide about initiatives, referenda or counterproposals on the federal level at three to four ballot meetings per year. We construct a dataset covering the votes connected to migrants and immigration in the period 1990-2017. Table A.1 in the appendix provides an overview of the covered list of 25 referenda.

Our approach has the following features. First, results of national referenda are available disaggregated for all Swiss municipalities and offer comparable, nation-wide information about (aggregated) preferences. Second, and most importantly, noncitizens are not entitled to vote at the federal level. Hence, the preferences we measure are those of Swiss citizens only and are not permeated with non-citizens who have gained the right to vote, as a consequence of additional non-citizen voting rights.⁸ Third, we can match outcomes of federal votes with our dataset on non-citizen voting rights at the municipal level.

To control for various municipal characteristics, we can either take advantage of the panel structure employing municipality fixed effects or we draw on federal census data. ⁹ To study the effect of non-citizen voting rights on citizens' attitudes towards

⁸ We are aware of the fact that the size of the electorate changes with the number of naturalized persons. If naturalizations are systematically increasing (ore deceasing) after non-citizens are enfranchised, this would affect our results. However, in an eyeballing exercise this seems not to be the case.

⁹ In addition to the census data we can also rely on measures provided by Ladner (1988) who offers information about the institutional settings of municipalities starting in 1988. A deeper analysis

foreigners we can either take the full list of votes related to migration and immigrants or analyze subjects that are repeatedly voted upon. A main concern of our approach is that popular votes are different and hence difficult to compare. However, there are at least four domains of popular votes that allow us to observe similar proposals before and after the introduction of non-citizens voting rights. The respective categories are: (1) votes about the relationship to the European Union (EU) with 5 votes in the 2000 to 2009 period. (2) votes concerning regulation of additional immigration (Immigration) with 3 votes in the 1996 to 2016 period. (3) Votes connected to refugees with 6 votes in the 1999 to 2016 period and (4) votes about naturalization (Naturalization) with 5 votes in the 1994 to 2017 period. The allocation to domains is listed in Table A.1 in the appendix. For the full sample of referenda we also included all other proposal connected to migrants, which were difficult to classify.

To achieve comparability of referenda results, the municipal result is transformed in such a way, that a higher yes share always corresponds to a higher degree of openness towards the immigration related question. This allows to observe and compare voting behavior of municipalities over the course of time. Consider as an example the initiative "against mass immigration" which took place in February 2014. In this popular vote a higher yes share indicates a preference for a stricter regulation of immigration. For this case a municipality that exhibits a yes share of 70 percent will receive an openness value of 30 percent in our dataset. We change the variable, such that a value of 100 corresponds to full openness towards foreigners, while a value of 0 corresponds to complete isolation.¹⁰

4.3 Individual perspective: Swiss Household Panel

Our second approach to measure citizens' attitudes towards non-citizens is to draw on individual survey data. The Swiss Household Panel (SHP) provides detailed information about individuals, including information on their attitudes towards non-citizens, their evaluation of democracy and a rich set of individual background characteristics such as income or education. As the SHP is constructed as an annual panel questionnaire, it allows us to exploit the variation over the observed period on the individual level. The SHP data collection started in 1999 with 13,000 interviews in approximately 5,000 households. When using the sample weights, as we do throughout all regressions that draw on SHP data, the panel is representative of the

of the institutional setting is subject to a further research project. In this paper institutional variation is absorbed by municipality fixed effects.

¹⁰ Other interesting outcome variables at the municipality level are the number of naturalizations and turnout of the native population, which we plan to consider in future research.

whole Swiss population. Since we analyze the effects of voting rights on Swiss citizens and the minimum voting age is 18, we restrict the sample to all Swiss citizens, who are at least 18 years old. In this paper we restrict the analysis to SHP questions that were posed in each wave. Due to missing observations, we end up with around 50,000 observations.

The variables of interest can be divided into two groups: attitudes towards non-citizens and perception of democracy. To capture the first, we employ the variables *NativePri*ority and *AntiEUAttitude*. On a scale from 1 to 3 *NativePriority* measures whether citizens should have the same chances in life as foreigners (*NativePriority* = 1) or whether citizens should be treated preferentially (*NativePriority* = 3). Therefore, (*NativePriority* = 3) should capture the degree of ethnocentrism, which is the belief that the own ethnic group is more valuable than another group. *AntiEUAttitude* measures on a scale from 1 to 3 whether Switzerland should become a member of the European Union (*AntiEUAttitude* = 1) or should not become a member of the European Union (*AntiEUAttitude* = 3).The motivation to consider *AntiEUAttitude* as an outcome variable is twofold: First, it allows to compare outcomes from federal vote outcomes to individual data outcomes. Second, the literature has shown that perceived threat of immigrants is a driver of Euroscepticism (see Lubbers and Scheepers, 2007, 2010). Therefore one could interpret (*AntiEUAttitude* = 3) as a measure for perceived threat.

To measure how the evaluation of democracy is affected, we use *DemocracySatisfaction* and *PoliticalInfluence*. In the first question participants are asked how satisfied they are with the way democracy works in Switzerland. The second question asks about participants' perceived influence in the political process. Both variables range from zero (unsatisfied/no influence) to 10 (completely satisfied/very strong influence).

An important feature of the SHP data is, that we received the municipality of residence for all households in the survey. This allows to merge the SHP data on attitudes with municipality characteristics and our data on the enfranchisement of non-citizens in the respective municipality of residence. Summary statistics for variables taken from the SHP are given in the Appendix Table A.4.

5 Empirical strategy and hypotheses

5.1 Basic approach

To measure the effects of non-citizen enfranchisement on citizens we pursue a difference-in-differences estimation approach. We compare how attitudes of individuals and voting behavior of municipalities change once municipalities extend the franchise to part of their non-citizens. Since non-citizen voting rights have been implemented in different cantons (or municipalities) in different years, these events have generated sufficient variation over time and across space. As a control group we use municipalities and individuals who are not exposed to non-citizens voting rights. As outlined in Section 4, we either use municipalities or individuals as units of observation. The respective regression models are:

$$Attitude_{ct} = \delta_c + \tau_t + \beta_1 \ Local \ Suffrage_{ct} + Votes_{ct} \ \beta_2 + \epsilon_{ct} \tag{1}$$

$$Attitude_{it} = \delta_i + \tau_t + \beta_1 \ Local \ Suffrage_{it} + Votes_{it} \ \beta_2 + \epsilon_{it} \tag{2}$$

In equation (1) the dependent variable is the voting result of municipality c in federal referendum t. For each municipality c and referendum t, Local Suffrage_{ct} either takes the value 0, if the respective municipality does not have suffrage for non-citizens at the time of voting, and 1 otherwise. In most specifications we include municipality fixed effects δ_c or individual fixed effects δ_i , and time fixed effects τ_t .¹¹ Municipality fixed effect capture time invariant municipality characteristics such as municipality institutions, culture, location and general openness towards foreigners. Whereas individual fixed effects control for time-invariant characteristics on the individual level such as gender, religion, general openness or ability.

Additionally, we are able to identify if a municipality agreed to implement noncitizens suffrage or not.¹² Therefore we also estimate a model in which we interact with a variable, which we call *LocalSuffrageOutvoted*. This variable takes on the value of 1, if a municipality disagreed to enfranchise non-citizens, but was overruled by the majority in the canton, and 0 otherwise. This approach allows us to further control for self selection into the treatment group.

¹¹ We use different types of fixed effects capturing time such as month and wave fixed effects for the individual level

¹² We have 5 groups of municipalities in our dataset: (1) municipalities that never voted about enfranchising non-citizens, (2) municipalities that accepted suffrage and got it, (3) municipalities accepting suffrage without getting it, (4) municipalities rejecting suffrage but getting it and (5) municipalities rejecting suffrage and not receiving suffrage. Detailed results are available on request.

In some cantons and municipalities additional votes to further extend the franchise to foreigners take place. For instance, they may reject to grant non-citizens the right to vote at the cantonal level or there is an accepted vote to concede the right to implement voting rights for non-citizens at the municipal level. Thus, we use a series of control variables for those votes, denoted by $Votes_{ct}$ in some specifications.¹³

In both approaches β_1 is the coefficient of interest and corresponds to the differential effect of the enfranchisement of non-citizens on citizens living in municipalities which have extended the franchise. Note that our setting differs from the classical difference-in-differences setting, where additionally treatment group and after treatment variables are required. In our case this is not necessary as we employ municipality and time fixed effects. Moreover, our setting gains strength, as municipalities enfranchise foreigners staggered, and thus, issues of spurious correlations are reduced. In equation (2), the units of observation are the responses of SHP participant i on an attitude question in survey year t. Analogously to equation (1) and the analysis based on municipal data, Local $Suffrage_{it}$ denotes whether individual i at time t lives in a municipality with local non-citizen suffrage in action. Again, we take advantage of the panel structure of our dataset and employ individual and time fixed effects and control for other votes that affect suffrage for foreigners. Compared to our first approach based on municipal data, we can thereby analyze within individual changes and exclude ecological fallacy issue, i.e., the problem that municipal voting results in federal referenda may change due to compositional changes of those voters who decide to turn out.

At the individual level Sides and Citrin (2007) and Vatter (2018) mention various important predictors of attitudes towards foreigners such as economic interests, education and information about migrants. Therefore, we consider heterogeneous effects across sociodemographic and municipal dimensions and estimate our models for subpopulations.

Identification

Whether or not a canton (or a municipality) enfranchises non-citizens is a decision of the respective electorate. Therefore, the timing of our treatment is not per se exogenous to underlying factors. However, enfranchisement of non-citizens varies

¹³ We use separate dummy variables accepted and rejected suffrage extensions at the cantonal level, and cantonal concessions for municipalities to decide about the introduction of voting rights for foreigners. Detailed results for these variables are available upon request.

over time and across cantons (or municipalities). Moreover, as mentioned above, municipalities have limited authority over the treatment as they can be overruled by the canton. We will exploit this feature of our dataset in the empirical analysis. In our estimation approach we control for general openness for non-citizen enfranchisement in two ways. First by using municipality or individual fixed effects and second, we estimate interactions with municipalities that were outvoted in the enfranchisement referendum. Those factors lend plausibility to the identifying assumption.

To gain an understanding how strongly our treatment and control group differ before the treatment we compare pre-trends. A visual analysis of the common parallel trends presentations is not feasible in our context, because we observe different treatments over time. This makes it difficult to properly compare a treatment and control group. Therefore, we follow the approach of Bertocchi et al. (2018) and depict differences between treatment and control group for the period running up to the enfranchisement of non-citizens. Econometrically, we do this by regressing the respective outcome variables on year dummies and interactions between year dummies and a dummy for treated municipalities or individuals respectively. A treated municipality (or individual) is dropped from our sample after non-citizens are enfranchised in the respective municipality. Figure A.1 depicts the exercise for the municipality data and Figure A.2 for the outcome variables on the individual level.¹⁴ While Figure A.2 shows no significant pre-treatment differences in all outcome variables, Figure A.1 depicts a lower level of openness for municipalities of the control group. This difference should be captured by the municipality and vote fixed effects.

5.2 Hypothesis development

As we estimate the effect of non-citizen suffrage on different outcomes, the meaning of β_1 changes with the dependent variable. For all estimations β_1 captures trend breaks in the respective outcome variable that coincidence with the timing of enfranchisement.

Procedural and instrumental utility of democratic involvement

In social psychology and economics, it is well established that group membership affects behavior of group members in various ways such as altruistic or prosocial behavior. Drivers of those effects is group identification through labeling and the formation of social ties via individual interactions of group members (e.g. Akerlof and

¹⁴ Note that the larger confidence intervals in the later treatments stems from a small number or treated municipalities.

Kranton, 2000, 2005 or Goette et al., 2012). In line with the literature that attributes effects of increased cooperation, trust and compliance with the law to participatory institutions (Rainer and Siedler, 2009, and Slotwinski et al., 2017), it seems plausible, that after the enfranchisement non-citizens are seen and experienced as part of the electoral in-group. Therefore, we expect $\beta_1 < 0$ for the variable *NativePriority* our preferred measure on the individual level. For *openness_{ct}* we expect $\beta_1 > 0$, especially when voting about non-citizens that have a high probability to belong to the newly enfranchised group.

According to the Condorcet jury theorem, also the quality of democratic decisions under uncertainty improves in the number of voters, if their individual errors are independently distributed.¹⁵ Involving more and different people in the decisionmaking process should therefore increase legitimacy of political decisions, the amount and quality of information available, enrich the political discourse, and affect procedural utility in a positive way (Hayek, 1968;Frey, 1997; Frey et al., 2004). With respect to these considerations we would expect $\beta_1 > 0$ for *DemocracySatis faction*.

Since suffrage extensions are decided in popular referenda, we can also identify those municipalities, in which a majority of voters rejected the extension, but were outvoted by the majority of the canton. Therefore, we estimate a model according to equation 3, which includes *LocalSuffrageOutvoted*. This variable takes on the value one, if an individual *i* lives in a municipality that has been outvoted and zero otherwise. Thus, β_3 captures the differential effect for outvoted municipalities. Analogously equation 4 captures the same procedure for our approach using municipality data from referenda outcomes.

$$Attitude_{it} = \delta_i + \tau_t + \beta_1 \ Local \ Suffrage_{ct} + \beta_2 Local \ Suffrage \ Outvoted_{ct} + \beta_3 Votes_{it} + \epsilon_{it}$$
(3)

$$Openness_{ct} = \delta_c + \tau_t + \beta_1 \ Local \ Suffrage_{ct} + \beta_2 Local \ Suffrage \ Outvoted_{ct} + \beta_3 Votes_{ct} + \epsilon_{ct}$$
(4)

There are at least two reasons why we expect coefficient $\beta_2 < 0$. First, external interventions have, at least in the short term, the potential to crowd out intrinsic motivation (see Frey, 1997). A second possibility is that municipalities opposing a

 $^{^{15}}$ For a discussion and application of the Condorcet jury theorem to politics, see Stadelmann et al. (2014).

suffrage extension may differ in their sociodemographic characteristics and expect voting rights for foreigners to have negative consequences. For the moment we cannot disentangle these two explanations but plan to do so in the future.

Competition on the political market

Taking into account the literature connected to *PoliticalInfluence* we would expect $\beta_1 < 0$ as citizens are sharing their political influence with additional voters (see Koukal and Eichenberger, 2017). If sharing voting rights is perceived as costly in the sense of $\beta_1 < 0$, we would expect the effect to be strongest for individuals living in municipalities with a high share of non-citizens and for those municipalities that have been forced by the canton to extend suffrage.

However, when considering the hypothesis of Meltzer and Richard (1981), enfranchising new groups could shift the pivotal voter to another income bracket. In other words, the perception of political influence could be related to the sociodemographic characteristics and political preferences of the enfranchised non-citizens. In this spirit, also $\beta_1 > 0$ seems plausible under specific assumptions. In the empirical analysis we try to capture this idea by considering the political position of citizens and non-citizens in the same district.

 $\beta_1 > 0$ could also indicate that individual influence is regarded as relatively high, as the native population has access to all levels of democratic involvement, whereas non-citizens are restricted to specific areas. $\beta_1 > 0$ could therefore reflect some sort of benchmarking process.

6 Results

This section presents and discusses the results of the approaches described in 5. To gain an understanding of heterogeneous effects, we consider outvoted municipalities and the share of foreigner present in a municipality at the municipality level. For the individual level we consider education, income, political position, and civic engagement.

6.1 Results for the municipal level

By presenting means for different groups of municipalities, Table 2 maps a first descriptive approach to the data. Table 2 suggests that local suffrage fosters openness in

Sample	Local suffrage	Ν	Mean	Max	Min	Sd
Full sample	yes	9158	59.01	97.6	5.8	14.84
	no	45667	47.18	100	0	18.56
Recent effanchisements	yes	7014	59.25	94.7	6.47	14.74
	no	45667	47.18	100	0	18.56
Treated	yes	9158	59.01	97.6	5.8	14.84
	no	5845	57.1	96	1.35	17.8
Outvoted treated	yes	8399	59.05	97.6	5.8	14.74
	no	5470	57.52	96	6.88	17.67
Accepted treated	yes	6366	60.34	97.6	6.47	14.48
	no	3958	58.51	96	7.07	17.3
EU	yes	1658	63.23	89.29	5.78	11.19
	no	9311	44.79	96	0	19.13
Naturalization	yes	2030	69.21	97.6	9.52	10.52
	no	8770	46.02	87.7	6.5	13.88
Immigration	yes	792	57.77	90	8	11.25
	no	5817	52.79	95.45	6.4	14.27

Table 2: Mean Comparison for the Dependent Variable "Openness"

Notes: In the full sample all cantons are considered, recent enfranchisement is defined as cantons being observed before and after the enfranchisement, treated refers to municipalities enfranchising non-citizens in the period of observation, outvoted refers to municipalities rejecting the enfranchisement but being overruled by the canton.

referenda on immigration policy. The mean values of openness are consistently larger in those samples in which non-citizens are enfranchised. This is true for different samples ranging from the full sample of municipalities and votes to those municipalities enfranchising non-citizens in the observed period. However, it is important to note that this picture is still shaped by municipality characteristics, referenda and time effects. Table 2 also provides a glance of the rich variation that our dataset has to offer. For example, we can distinguish voting behavior of municipalities that agreed to extend suffrage from those which were outvoted in the respective enfranchisement vote.¹⁶

Regarding our estimations we first look at the full sample of Swiss municipalities. The respective results are shown in panel A of Table 3. In panel B we reduce the sample to recent enfranchisement, allowing us to observe municipalities before and after the implementation of non-citizens voting rights. Therefore, we exclude Jura and Neuchâtel, which introduced non-citizens voting rights already before the period we analyze. In both panels we estimate four specifications in which either the subsamples on votes about the EU, (additional) immigration, naturalization, or the full sample

¹⁶ In future research, we plan to further explore these differential situations.

of votes on topics related to migration are considered. All results are estimated using municipality, vote and year fixed effects. Additionally, we estimate a model with and without control variables. To consider urbanization we add population in logs, the share of labor force in agriculture, the share of married persons, and the share of foreigners, whereas the employment share considers the evolution of the economic environment.

Quite in contrast to the descriptive picture presented in Table 2, Table 3 suggests that enfranchising non-citizens on the local level seems to negatively impact openness of citizens towards migrants when considering EU related referenda, additional immigration, and general openness. Enfranchising non-citizens at the local level reduces citizens' openness with respect to EU-related referenda by approximately three percentage points when compared to municipalities without non-citizens' enfranchisement. This effect seems substantial, especially when considering tight vote outcomes.

Dependent variable: openness												
Subsample	Ε	U	Immig	ration	Natura	lization	All	votes				
Local suffrage	-2.735^{***} (0.309)	-2.668^{***} (0.323)	-1.080^{***} (0.343)	-2.118^{***} (0.379)	$2.086^{***} \\ (0.337)$	$2.469^{***} \\ (0.348)$	-3.164^{***} (0.199)	-3.463^{***} (0.214)				
Control Variables	no	yes	no	yes	no	yes	no	yes				
Municipality fixed effects	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes				
Vote fixed effects	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes				
Year fixed effects	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes				
n. Obs.	10,945	10,945	6,510	6,510	10,685	10,685	54,818	54,818				
R2	0.940	0.941	0.896	0.899	0.898	0.900	0.765	0.765				

Table 3: Effects of enfranchising non-citizens on citizens – evidence from municipal data

A: Full sample

B. Cantons with recent enfranchisements and control group

Dependent variable:openness

Subsample	EU		Immig	gration	Natura	lization	All votes		
Local suffrage	-3.040^{***} (0.309)	-2.900^{***} (0.323)	-1.182^{***} (0.345)	-2.158^{***} (0.379)	$2.339^{***} \\ (0.341)$	$2.645^{***} \\ (0.352)$	-3.436^{***} (0.199)	-3.689^{***} (0.215)	
Control Variables Municipality fixed effects Vote fixed effects Year fixed effects	no yes yes yes	yes yes yes yes	no yes yes yes	yes yes yes yes	no yes yes yes	yes yes yes yes	no yes yes yes	yes yes yes	
n. Obs. R2	$10,530 \\ 0.942$	$10,530 \\ 0.943$	$6,261 \\ 0.895$	$6,261 \\ 0.899$	$10,261 \\ 0.897$	$10,261 \\ 0.899$	$52,674 \\ 0.775$	$52,\!674 \\ 0.776$	

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at the individual level: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Control variables: population in logs, foreigners (share), married (share), employed (share), agricultural (share).

Panel EU contains vote ID: 6,8,12,13,17

Panel Immigration contains vote ID: 3,7,22

Panel Naturalization contains vote ID: 1,10,11,16,25

A. Full sample												
Dependent variable	Ν	ativePriori	ty	Ar	ntiEUAttituo	le	Demo	cracy Satisf	faction	Po	olitical Influe	ence
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Local Suffrage	-0.0278 (0.0215)	-0.0268 (0.0215)	-0.0269 (0.0231)	$\begin{array}{c} 0.0671^{***} \\ (0.023) \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.0658^{***} \\ (0.0213) \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.0618^{**} \\ (0.0232) \end{array}$	0.0902^{*} (0.0469)	$\begin{array}{c} 0.0927^{**} \\ (0.0472) \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.1196^{**} \\ (0.0513) \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.1660^{***} \\ (0.0637) \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.1704^{***} \\ (0.0637) \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.2336^{***} \\ (0.070) \end{array}$
Local Suffrage Outvoted			-0.040 (0.0491)			$\begin{array}{c} 0.0513 \\ (0.0493) \end{array}$			-0.1703 (0.1075)			-0.2782^{**} (0.1304)
Controls for other votes	no	yes	yes	no	yes	yes	no	yes	yes	no	yes	yes
Wave fixed effects	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Person fixed effects	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Month fixed effects	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
n. Obs.	52315	52315	50100	51044	51044	48892	53166	53166	50952	53308	53308	51076
R2	0.6065	0.6065	0.6072	0.7308	0.7308	0.7295	0.6259	0.6260	0.6230	0.5721	0.5722	0.5738

Table 4: Effects of onfrom	nchiging non citizons	on all citizons	vidonco from i	ndividual data
Table 4. Effects of efficience	non-chizens	s on an citizens – e	vidence from i	nurviuuar uata

B. Cantons with recent enfranchisements and control group

Dependent variable	Ν	ativePriori	ty	AntiEUAttitude			Demo	cracy Satisf	faction	Political Influence			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	
LocalEnfranchisement	-0.0340 (0.0225)	-0.0326 (0.0225)	-0.0340 (0.0239)	$\begin{array}{c} 0.0742^{***} \\ (0.0223) \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.0658^{***} \\ (0.0213) \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.0632^{**} \\ (0.024) \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.0976^{**} \\ (0.0488) \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.1007^{**} \\ (0.0491) \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.1292^{**} \\ (0.0528) \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.1636^{**} \\ (0.0656) \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.1662^{**} \\ (0.0658) \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.2044^{***} \\ (0.072) \end{array}$	
LocalEnfrOutvoted			$\begin{array}{c} 0.0020\\ (0.0518) \end{array}$			0.0684 (0.0521)			-0.2176^{*} (0.113)			-0.2291^{*} (0.1336)	
Controls for other votes	no	yes	yes	no	yes	yes	no	yes	yes	no	yes	yes	
Wave fixed effects	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	
Person fixed effects	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	
Month fixed effects	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	
n. Obs.	47699	47699	47729	46556	46556	46543	48525	48525	48557	48641	48641	48629	
R2	0.6033	0.6033	0.6034	0.7266	0.7268	0.7268	0.6150	0.6152	0.6153	0.5681	0.5681	0.5682	

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at the individual level: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.

With around two percentage points, the effect is slightly smaller with regard to votes connected to additional migration.¹⁷. Both effects are highly significant at the one percent level and stay robust in all the estimated specifications. Considering the federal votes on the naturalization process, the picture is different. Local suffrage for non-citizens increases the willingness of citizen voters to facilitate naturalization by 2.5 percentage points when compared to a municipality without non-citizens enfranchisement. The obtained result hints in the direction of a conceptional distinction between non-citizens who have been in the country for a longer period, and future immigrants. Moreover, the results are a first indication that granting non-citizens voting rights is not automatically associated with an increased openness towards migrants in general. Quite to the contrary, similar to the results of Koukal and Eichenberger (2017) the results are an indication that the enfranchisement of non-citizens might come at a price.

The results presented in Table A.5 consider the primary openness to foreigners before their enfranchisement. The interaction term *Local Suffrage* * *Outvoted* indicates differential effects for municipalities that opposed the enfranchisement, but received it against their will. Note that the base effect of outvoted is omitted, because outvoted is constructed as a binary variable that is time-invariant. The estimation results presented in Table A.5 are an indication, that the reduction of *openness* is more pronounced for outvoted municipalities. For the full sample of referenda the additional effect of suffrage for outvoted municipalities is substantial (-4,72 percentage points) and highly significant at the one percent level. We find similar effects for the EU category with an even higher differential effect for outvoted municipalities of around minus 7 percentage points, but at the same time municipalities that choose to enfranchise non-citizens increased their openness toward the EU. For the category naturalization, the picture is similar to the main specification. When compared to municipalities that agreed to enfranchise non-citizens, outvoted municipalities increase their openness toward naturalizations by around two percentage points more.

Applying our first approach, we find evidence that non-citizens' enfranchisement significantly reduces the openness of citizens towards (additional) migrants. ¹⁸ This effect is more pronounced for municipalities that were outvoted in the enfranchisement decision. On the other side, we also find evidence that openness towards the affected group of non-citizens, those which are present in Switzerland since a longer period and therefore have the opportunity to naturalize, increases.

 $^{^{17}}$ Results were robust to the subsample of refugee referenda. Results are provided on request

¹⁸ This result was replicated, when looking at the category refugees. Results can be provided on request.

A potential explanation for this result could be, that citizens differentiate between different goups of foreigners. Namely those foreigners which are likely to be affected by the enfranchisement versus additional immigrants. Non-citizens belonging to the resident population could be regarded as being closer to the electoral in-group, whereas the price of additional migration increase as they now have the potential to use the option of voice in the political process. This consideration might explain why $\beta_1 > 0$ when looking at referenda on the conditions to naturalize foreigners and $\beta_1 < 0$, when we look at referenda votes on the regulation of additional migration.

6.2 Results for the individual level

Individual survey data allow to better investigate heterogeneity of potential effects. In addition, compared to data aggregated on the municipality level, we can also rule out that results may be driven by compositional differences because either citizen move between municipalities or because different voters turn out for different referenda.

All voters

Panel A of Table 4 presents results for all Swiss individuals over the period of 1999 to 2016, the complete sample period of the SHP. We investigate the effect of municipal enfranchisement of non-citizens on citizens' attitudes towards immigrants and perception of democracy. In all specifications we run OLS regressions. We use the corresponding sample weights provided by the SHP to get a representative sample for the Swiss population and calculate robust standard errors clustered for individuals, as we observe each individual multiple times. Moreover, we perform robustness checks with different clustering approaches of the standard errors such as two-way clustering and bootstrapping. The differently estimated standard errors paper.¹⁹

While all specifications include fixed effects for individuals, survey waves and months we present three specifications differing in the number of included controls. In specifications (1), (4), (7), and (10) we do not include variables, that control for the enfranchisement history of a municipality apart from *Local Suffrage*. All other specifications include dummy variables signifying whether referenda on the introduc-

¹⁹ Additional estimations are provided on request.

tion of suffrage extensions to foreigners took place, were granted on the cantonal level or if cantons voted about conceding the right to decide about enfranchisement to municipalities. Finally, in specifications (3), (6), (9), and (12) we include *Local Suffrage Outvoted* which captures the differential effect for those individuals living in municipalities in which a majority of voters opposed the introduction of local suffrage for foreigners. Note, that we cannot measure the individual voting behavior. However, in the robustness and heterogeneity analysis we additionally proxy the voting behavior of individuals with their political position, education and income.

With respect to the outcome variable *NativePriority*, we observe that after noncitizens' enfranchisement individuals tend to be less supporting the view that citizens should be treated preferentially. However, regarding the entire sample, these effects are not significant at any conventional level. In contrast, for the second variable on attitudes (*AntiEUAttitude*), we find evidence that suffrage extension is associated with a more opposing view on Switzerland becoming a part of the European Union. Given that the variable is measured on a scale from one to three, these changes of 0.5 to 0.6 are substantial and fully in line with the results from Section 6.1. As Lubbers and Scheepers (2007, 2010) empirically show, a driver of Euroscepticism is perceived threat from immigrants. Therefore, a possible interpretation of our results could be, that the citizens' fear of additional immigration increases after non-citizens are enfranchised.

So far we have concentrated on citizens' views on foreigners, but how do citizens assess the effects of the additional electorate on the quality of democracy? Advancing to variables measuring the perception of the political system, we see that satisfaction with the working of democracy (*Democracy Satisfaction*), as well as perceived political influence (*Political Influence*) increase.²⁰ Both effects are statistically significant in all specifications of Table 4. In terms of size the effect on(*Political Influence*) is with 0.23 percentage points rather small and corresponds to approximately a tenth of a standard deviation. Since a majority of voters has voluntarily decided to extend the franchise, these findings are not completely surprising for the overall population of citizens. For municipalities in which a majority of voters opposed the suffrage extension, the differential effect of non-citizens' enfranchisement is negative, but not significant. However, individuals from outvoted municipalities exhibit a significantly

²⁰ This effect was also materialized in actual political participation, which also increased for individuals living in a municipality with non-citizens voting rights. Additional tables are available on request.

negative effect on their perceived political influence after locally enfranchising foreigners when compared to those from municipalities which supported the law.

Since we include time, month, and wave fixed effects in our estimations and suffrage extensions take place staggered, our findings should not pick up time trends. Moreover, as indicated in Figure A.2, we do not find evidence for significant differences between the treatment and the control group, before the enfranchisement of noncitizens. However, a large fraction of treated individuals stems from the Cantons of Jura and Neuchâtel. Since those cantons installed local voting rights for foreigners before the period of observation, we cannot exploit within individual variation for these cantons. Therefore, in panel B we exclude those individuals from the sample. Essentially, our results are robust to this exercise. In contrast to Panel A, we find statistically significant results for individuals living in outvoted municipalities. When compared to individuals from municipalities that accepted the new electorate, individuals from outvoted municipalities are less satisfied with democracy, and perceive their political as being lower, after foreigners are enfranchised.

In sum, the results connected to *AntiEUAttitude* confirm the picture arising from Section 6.1. As discussed in Section 5 this could indicate that the out-group definition changes in such a way that additional immigrants are perceived as additional competition or threat. Regarding the results for *DemocracySatisfaction* our results are first evidence, that political integration of non-citizens may have positive spillovers for the quality of democracy, especially if the regulation was self-chosen. In the spirit of the Condorcet Jury Theorem a potential explanation could be a higher quality of democratic outcomes.

A potential limitation of our findings is, that we cannot fully rule out that other aspects connected to the enfranchisement of non-citizens or general effects of referenda are driving the result. In the following section we gain a deeper understanding of the effects by analyzing subpopulations.

A. Low education												
Dependent variable	N	lativePrior	ity	An	tiEUAttitı	ıde	Demo	cracy Satist	faction	Pol	itical Influ	ence
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Local Suffrge	-0.0137 (0.0662)	-0.0127 (0.0663)	$\begin{array}{c} 0.0390 \\ (0.0729) \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.0944^{*} \\ (0.0522) \end{array}$	0.0895^{*} (0.0525)	0.0978^{*} (0.0572)	-0.0589 (0.1423)	-0.0589 (0.1423)	-0.0462 (0.1504)	-0.0734 (0.1721)	-0.0633 (0.1736)	-0.0712 (0.1854)
Local Suffrage Outvoted			-0.3278^{**} (0.137)			-0.0192 (0.1319)			-0.0899 (0.3509)			-0.0211 (0.3692)
Controls for other votes	no	yes	yes	no	yes	yes	no	yes	yes	no	yes	yes
Wave fixed effects	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Person fixed effects	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Month fixed effects	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
n. Obs.	7628	7628	7632	7258	7258	7254	7673	7673	7671	7726	7726	7732
R2	0.5968	0.5969	0.5969	0.7398	0.7400	0.7400	0.6214	0.6214	0.6215	0.5663	0.5664	0.5662

Table 5: Effects of enfranchising non-citizens by educational attainment

B. High education

Dependent variable	Ν	lativePrior	ity	An	tiEUAttitı	ıde	Demo	cracy Satis	faction	Pol	itical Influe	ence
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Local Suffrage	-0.0062	-0.0032	-0.032	-0.0367	-0.0375	-0.0286	0.2209**	0.2227^{**}	0.2831^{***}	0.1951^{*}	0.1896^{*}	0.1918^{*}
	(0.0389)	(0.039)	(0.0379)	(0.0394)	(0.0396)	(0.0422)	(0.0835)	(0.0842)	(0.0889)	(0.1053)	(0.1015)	(0.1104)
Local Suffrage Outvoted			0.1773^{*}			-0.0422			-0.4065^{**}			-0.0648
			(0.0998)			(0.091)			(0.2058)			(0.2635)
Controls for other votes	no	yes	yes	no	yes	yes	no	yes	yes	no	yes	yes
Wave fixed effects	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Person fixed effects	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Month fixed effects	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
n. Obs.	14228	14228	14223	14052	14052	14047	14515	14515	14510	14477	14477	14472
R2	0.5974	0.5976	0.5770	0.7423	0.7426	0.7426	0.6183	0.6183	0.6187	0.5726	0.5728	0.5730

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at the individual level: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.

Educational attainment and income

Swiss institutions require direct-democratic legitimacy of suffrage extensions. Hence, average effects for the whole Swiss population as shown in Table 4 may not show negative changes in citizens' attitudes as long as the consequences of their decisions turn out to meet their prior expectations. However, as discussed in Section 2, effects may differ substantially for subpopulations. Hainmueller and Hiscox (2007) find evidence, that more educated individuals are significantly less racist and more likely to be pro immigration. As Scheve and Slaughter (2001), and Sides and Citrin (2007) point out, education is also an important factor in shaping attitudes toward immigrants in a labor market context. At the same time Matsusaka (1995) and Hessami (2016) highlight education as an important factor shaping both democratic participation and processing information about the democratic process.

In Table 5 we study the effects of enfranchising non-citizens on citizens by educational attainment. Panel A shows results for citizens with low education (defined as ISCED 1,2, 3c), whereas Panel B presents results for highly educated citizens (defined as ISCED 5, 6). Analogously to Table 4, in panel B we restrict the sample to recent suffrage extensions, i.e., drop individuals who are exposed to municipal suffrage for non-citizens but cannot be observed before the introduction of suffrage for foreigners.

With respect to preferential treatment for citizens (*NativePriority*) we do not observe changes in attitudes of low educated citizens after enfranchising foreigners. However, those from outvoted municipalities exhibit a statistically significant reduction, implying a change towards more favorable treatment of foreigners. At a first glance this result seems counterintuitive. It could support the idea of contact via political institutions being a channel of reducing prejudices. However, since education can be seen as a proxy for economic status, this result could also point in the direction of Hainmueller and Hopkins (2014), who emphasize that negative effects of economic factors on attitudes towards foreigners are overestimated. At the same time, low educated citizens became more hostile to the idea of Switzerland joining the EU after suffrage extensions, confirming the results of most other EU specifications. While all coefficients for satisfaction with democracy and political influence show a negative sign, none of them is statistically significant.

Comparing Panel A to B reveals differential effects for highly educated citizens. Even though highly educated individuals do not systematically change their attitudes on prioritizing citizens over foreigners, highly educated from outvoted municipalities react with an increasing bias against foreigners, as can be seen from specification (3). Conversely, citizens with high education do not increase their rejection of a Swiss accession to the EU. While highly educated persons generally increase their satisfaction with democracy by approximately a sixth of a standard deviation and feel more influential in the political process after enfranchisements of foreigners, those from outvoted municipalities also show an increasing dissatisfaction with democracy as specification (9) shows. These results suggest that citizens with a high education react stronger to political issues when they belong to the winner of a vote, as well as when they lose a vote. This result may be driven by higher turnout among this group or a higher interest in politics. It is unclear to what extent this is a general feature of referenda or specific to suffrage extensions.

As an additional excercise, Table A.7 shows interactions for individuals with high income over the whole period (defined as the fourth quartile of the individual income distribution) and individuals with low income over the whole period (defined as the first quartile of the individual income distribution). The reference category are therefore individuals with a medium range income. The results are mostly in line with the results for educational attainment. When compared to the results for education attainment we find a significant reduction of individuals from the high income group for *NativePriority*, when compared to individuals with a medium income.

Share of foreigners in the municipality

Swiss municipalities greatly differ in their shares of foreigners. The local share of foreigners may mediate the effect of enfranchising non-citizens. There is evidence in the literature that actual group size of foreigners facilitate intergroup contact and has a tendency to reduce perceived threat (see Semyonov et al., 2004; Schlueter and Scheepers, 2010 or Jolly and DiGiusto, 2014). While contact with and knowledge about foreigners is likely to vary with the share of foreigners, also the impact on local policy outcomes may be affected by the size of the newly enfranchised group. Therefore, in Table 6 we investigate differential effects for municipalities with either a low or high share of foreign population. We focus on the two subsamples with a share of less than 12.3 % and more than 27.8 % of foreigner in the municipalities, which corresponds to the bottom and top quartile of observations within our dataset. Again, we restrict the analysis on recently decided franchise extensions, enabling us to study within individual changes over time.

For citizens living in a municipality with a small foreign population Table 6 (panel A), we observe no statistically significant but throughout positive effects on *NativePriority*, and *PoliticalInfluence*, and mixed effects for *DemocracySatisfaction*. However, specifications (4) to (6) exhibit a significant increase in the anti-EU-membership attitude. Together with the results on interactions with income presented in Table A.7 as well as the results on educational attainment, the increase of AntiEUAttitude seems to be driven by a perceived threat. However, we cannot rule out other explanations. When focusing on municipalities with a high share of foreigners, we find evidence, that individuals living in a municipality with a high share of foreigners significantly reduce *Native Priority* after the enfranchisement of non-citizens. This is an indication, that Swiss individuals that are likely to have intergroup contact (Schlueter and Scheepers, 2010) with the new electorate, reduce favoritism toward citizens. At the same time, specifications (7) to (12) suggest that citizens tend to increase their satisfaction with democracy and feel more influential, as long as they live in municipalities which favored the suffrage extension. For those individuals living in a municipality opposing the enfranchisement of foreigners, both measures of attitudes towards the political system point in the negative direction. In contrast to the results of Lubbers and Scheepers (2007, 2010), who find a positive relation of the share of foreigners and Euroscepticism, we do not find statistically significant effect concerning AntiEUAttitude.

When following the idea, that our results are driven by interaction with non-citizens or learning about political behavior of the newly enfranchised group, those mechanisms need time. To gain a first understanding for the development of our effects, we estimate the effect using time dummies. As Table A.8 indicates our effects concerning the perception of democracy seem not to be driven by short-term effects. Only *AntiEUAttitude* reacts immediately after the enfranchisement of non-citizens, but increases with distance to enfranchisement. Whereas the effects for *PoliticalInfluence* and *DemocracySatisfaction* get visible after three years.

A. Low share of foreigners in municipality													
Dependent variable	Ν	VativePriorit	У	Ar	ntiEUAttituo	de	Demo	cracy Satis	faction	Po	olitical Influ	ience	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	
Local Suffrage	0.0248 (0.0623)	0.0288 (0.0623)	$\begin{array}{c} 0.0125 \\ (0.0701) \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.1577^{***} \\ (0.0508) \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.1581^{***} \\ (0.0507) \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.1577^{**} \\ (0.0508) \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.0937\\ (0.1261) \end{array}$	$0.0966 \\ (0.1261)$	0.0289 (0.1419)	$\begin{array}{c} 0.1806 \\ (0.1719) \end{array}$	0.1827 (0.1720)	0.0708 (0.1875)	
Local Suffrage Outvoted			$\begin{array}{c} 0.0874 \\ (0.1389) \end{array}$			$\begin{array}{c} 0.0129 \\ (0.1166) \end{array}$			0.3577 (0.2445)			$0.6232 \\ (0.3905)$	
Controls for other votes	no	yes	yes	no	yes	yes	no	yes	yes	no	yes	yes	
Wave fixed effects	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	
Person fixed effects	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	
Month fixed effects	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	
n. Obs.	11050	11050	11050	10758	10758	10758	11222	11222	11222	12668	12668	12668	
R2	0.6325	0.62327	0.6327	0.7564	0.7564	0.7564	0.6483	0.6483	0.6484	0.5864	0.5868	0.6098	

Table 6: Effects of enfranchising non-citizens by shares of foreigners

B. High share of foreigners in municipality

Dependent variable	Ν	VativePriorit	y	Ar	ntiEUAttituo	de	Demo	cracy Satis	sfaction	Ро	litical Infl	uence
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Local Suffrage	-0.0766^{**} (0.0374)	-0.0766^{**} (0.0374)	-0.0766^{**} (0.0374)	-0.0369 (0.0385)	-0.0351 (0.0389)	-0.0489 (0.0411)	$\begin{array}{c} 0.1065\\ (0.0818) \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.1162\\ (0.0826) \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.1810^{**} \\ (0.0906) \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.2155^{**} \\ (0.1071) \end{array}$	0.1879^{*} (0.1097)	0.2259^{*} (0.1229)
Local Suffrage Outvoted			$0.0805 \ (0.0793)$			$0.0828 \\ (0.0798)$			-0.3685^{**} (0.1738)			-0.5343^{***} (0.1941)
Controls for other votes	no	yes	yes	no	yes	yes	no	yes	yes	no	yes	yes
Wave fixed effects	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Person fixed effects	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Month fixed effects	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
n. Obs.	10111	10111	10111	9772	9772	9772	10312	10312	10312	10317	10317	10317
R2	0.6432	0.6433	0.6433	0.7412	0.7413	0.7414	0.6283	0.6351	0.6355	0.6134	0.6136	0.6139

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at the individual level:*** pj0.01, ** pj0.05, * pj0.1.

Political position and political distance

In Switzerland referenda to enfranchise non-citizens are enhanced by left parties (Adler et al., 2015). As an additional measure of individual willingness to enfranchise non-citizens, we consider the stated political position in our heterogeneity analysis. Panel A of Table A.6 in the appendix, shows results for citizens with extreme right political positions (defined as the first quartile of the right-left distribution), whereas Panel B presents results for individuals stating an extreme left political position (defined as the first quartile of the right-left distribution). Our estimation results only reveal, that enfranchisement of non-citizens significantly affects the attitude towards the EU among politically right positioned individuals. The effect is strongest for individuals living in a municipality that was overruled in the enfranchisement decision. We interpret this as a strong indication, that individuals which opposed suffrage, increased their EU skepticism significantly more.

If the newly enfranchised group poses a political threat to the established electorate, we would except a manifestation in the political distance between the political position of the Foreign population and the Swiss population. To control for this possibility, we constructed different measures to proxy the political distance. In a first approach we took the absolute difference between the political position of an individual and the average position of foreigners in the same district. A limitation of this approach is, that the observed number of foreigners is too small to compare positions on the municipality level. We did not find any effect of the political distance on the effect of enfranchising non-citizens.²¹

Civic engagement

It is widely argued that public engagement is an important asset of social capital with positive benefits for communities and individuals (Putnam, 2000). Activities in associations or clubs, bring people together, build networks and foster trust. Since political participation is also attributed to influence key areas of migrants' integration such as civic virtue or trust (Frey, 1997; Frey et al., 2004; Frey and Stutzer, 2006). We are interested if individuals who engage in society, and therefore are more likely to interact with other people and to turn out, react differently to non-citizens enfranchisement. We proxy this dimension by considering subpopulations of individuals that indicate a membership in an association over the whole period or never state membership in an association. Results are presented in Table A.9 in the

²¹ Estimation results are provided on request.

appendix. The results for *PoliticalInfluence* and *DemocracySatisfaction* are in line with our expectations. Individuals that are engaged in associations are more satisfied with democracy after the enlargement of the electorate. On the other side, we find no effect for *NativePriority*, and similar to the results of the main sample a significant increase in Euroscepticism. Among the sample of socially engaged persons, this could be interpreted as a sort of resistance against additional migrants. Next to the various positive effects that are attributed to social capital, there is also research that mentions potential limits of strong social relations. As an example Waldinger (1995) describes how strong bounds can also generate exclusion to outsiders.

7 Conclusion

The exclusion of groups from political participation is widely seen as a challenge to the legitimacy of decision-making in democracies. With respect to the disenfranchisement of foreigners, the lack of political participation rights may hinder the integration process and reduce the quality of democratic results due to poor preference mapping. In this paper, we analyze whether and how non-citizens enfranchisement impacts citizens attitudes.

In our empirical analysis, we combine two perspectives in a difference-in-differences framework. First, we analyze aggregated preferences of citizens based on the results of federal referenda. Second, we consider individual-level data to measure citizens' evaluation of non-citizens' suffrage. The first question – whether citizens react to the enfranchisement of non-citizens can be answered with a clear affirmation. Our results indicate that citizens tend to be less open towards additional immigration when non-citizens are enfranchised at the local level, as measured by their levels of skepticism toward the EU and their positions on immigration laws. These results hint at differential effects for attitudes towards the additional influx of immigrants and non-citizens already residing in the country. Regarding subpopulations, the analysis suggests that increased skepticism towards the EU is strongest among individuals whose educational attainment is low and individuals with low income.

Moreover, our results suggest that extending suffrage to non-citizens is, on average, associated with limited changes in citizens' attitudes towards non-citizens already residing in Switzerland. Only among individuals living in jurisdictions with a high share of foreigners do we find convincing evidence that enfranchising foreigners on the local level reduces citizens' ethnocentrism. In addition – and, from a citizen's

perspective, even more interesting – citizens experience an increased satisfaction with democracy and with their own political influence in comparison to citizens who live in voting districts where non-citizens are disenfranchised. This finding supports the idea that an increase in democratic participation rights results in better outcomes. The effects denoting the perception of democracy seem not to be driven by short-term events. We find evidence that these effects need time to evolve, which hints at a learning or contact mechanisms.

The next step for further research is to gain a better understanding of whether results are rather driven by policy changes that stem from changes in the preferences of the electorate or through a learning channel via additional inter-group contact. This paper approaches this question by focusing on the proportion of foreigners in a municipality and differentiating between subpopulations of citizens by their levels of social engagement. However, further research could examine institutional differences between municipalities, which are absorbed in our fixed effect regressions. Finally, our results from municipalities that were forced to enfranchise non-citizens indicate that adverse effects may develop when people are forced to enfranchise non-citizens. Future research is needed to also gain a better understanding of such adverse effects.

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A Additional tables and figures

date	vote_id	vote type	accepted	vote title	domain
12.06.1994	1	compulsory referendum	0	Bundesbeschluss über die Revision der Bürgerrechtsregelung in der Bundesverfassung (Erleichterte Einbürgerung für junge Ausländer)	naturalization
04.12.1994	2	facultative referendum	1	Bundesgesetz über Zwangsmassnahmen im Ausländerrecht	immigrants
01.12.1996	3	initiative	0	Eidgenössische Volksinitiative «gegen die illegale Einwanderung»	imm igration
13.06.1999	4	facultative referendum	1	Asylgesetz (AsylG)	refugees
13.06.1999	5	facultative referendum	1	Bundesbeschluss über dringliche Massnahmen im Asyl- und Ausländerbereich	refugees
21.05.2000	6	facultative referen dum	1	Bilaterale Verträge mit der EU	EU
24.09.2000	7	initiative	0	Eidgenössische Volksinitiative «für eine Regelung der Zuwanderung»	imm igration
04.03.2001	8	initiative	0	Eidgenössische Volksinitiative «Ja zu Europa»	EU
24.11.2002	9	initiative	0	Eidgenössische Volksinitiative «gegen Asylrechtsmissbrauch»	refugees
26.09.2004	10	compulsory referendum	0	Bundesbeschluss vom 3.10.2003 über die ordentliche Einbürgerung sowie über die erleichterte Einbürgerung junger Ausländerinnen und Ausländer der zweiten Generation	naturalization
26.09.2004	11	compulsory referendum	0	Bundesbeschluss vom 3.10.2003 über den Bürgerrechtserwerb von Ausländerinnen und Ausländern der dritten Generation	naturalization
05.06.2005	12	facultative referendum	1	Bundesbeschluss vom 17.12.2004 über die Genehmigung und die Umsetzung der bilateralen Abkommen zwischen der Schweiz und der EU über die Assoziierung an Schengen und an Dublin	EU
25.09.2005	13	compulsory referendum	1	Bundesbeschluss über die Genehmigung und Umsetzung des Protokolls über die Ausdehnung des Freizügigkeitsabkommens auf die neuen EG- Mitgliedstaaten zwischen der Schweizerischen Eidgenossenschaft einerseits und der Europäischen Gemeinschaft und ihren Mitgliedstaaten andererseits sowie über die Genehmigung der Revision der flankierenden Massnahmen zur Personenfreizügigkeit	EU
24.09.2006	14	facultative referendum	1	Bundesgesetz vom 16.12.2005 über die Ausländerinnen und Ausländer (AuG)	immigrants
24.09.2006	15	facultative referendum	1	Änderung vom 16.12.2005 des Asylgesetzes (AsylG)	refugees
01.06.2008	16	initiative	0	Eidgenössische Volksinitiative «für demokratische Einbürgerungen»	naturalization
08.02.2009	17	facultative referendum	1	Bundesbeschluss vom 13. Juni 2008 über die Genehmigung der Weiterführung des Freizügigkeitsabkommens zwischen der Schweiz und der Europäischen Gemeinschaft und ihren Mitgliedstaaten sowie über die Genehmigung und die Umsetzung des Protokolls über die Ausdehnung des Freizügigkeitsabkommens auf Bulgarien und Rumänien	EU
29.11.2009	18	initiative	1	Eidgenössische Volksinitiative «Gegen den Bau von Minaretten»	immigrants
28.11.2010	19	initiative	1	Eidgenössische Volksinitiative «Für die Ausschaffung krimineller Ausländer (Ausschaffungsinitiative)»	immigrants
29.11.2010	20	counterproposal	0	Bundesbeschluss vom 10. Juni 2010 über die Aus- und Wegweisung krimineller Ausländerinnen und Ausländer im Rahmen der Bundesverfassung (Gegenentwurf zur Volksinitiative «Für die Ausschaffung krimineller Ausländer [Ausschaffungsinitiative]»)	immigrants/ immigration
09.06.2013	21	facultative referendum	1	Änderung vom 28. September 2012 des Asylgesetzes (AsylG) (Dringliche Änderungen des Asylgesetzes)	refugees
09.02.2014	22	initiative	1	Eidgenössische Volksinitiative «Gegen Masseneinwanderung»	immigration
28.02.2016	23	initiative	0	Eidgenössische Volksinitiative «Zur Durchsetzung der Ausschaffung krimineller Ausländer (Durchsetzungsinitiative)»	immigrants/ immigration
05.06.2016	24	facultative referendum	1	Änderung des Asylgesetzes	refugees
12.02.2017	25	compulsory referendum	1	Bundesbeschluss vom 30. September 2016 über die erleichterte Einbürgerung von Personen der dritten Ausländergeneration	naturalization

Table A.1: List of Federal Votes Connected to Immigrants

Vote date	Canton	Suffrage	Accepted	Yes share	Vote type
20.03.1977	JU	active local active cantonal	1	80%	complete revision
23.09.1990	NE	passive local	0	44%	law revision
27.09.1992	VD	full local full cantonal	0	26%	initiative
06.06.1993	GE	full local	0	29%	initiative
28.11.1993	GE	eligibility court of arbitration	0	45%	counterproposal
12.06.1994	BS	full local full cantonal	0	26%	initiative
26.09.1993	ZH	full local opt-in	0	26%	initiative
04.1 2 .1994	BE	full local full cantonal	0	22%	initiative
04.12.1994	BE	full local opt-in	0	40%	counterproposal
22.10.1995	UR	active cantonal	0	16%	initiative
30.04.1995	AR	local optin	1		complete revision
10.03.1996	AG	full local	0	16%	initiative
09.06.1996	JU	passive local opt-in	0	47%	referendum
16.03.1997	FR	full local	0	24%	initiative
23.11.1997	SO	full local full cantonal	0	12%	initiative
24.09.2000	NE	active cantonal	1	77%	complete revision
04.03.2001	GE	full local	0	48%	law revision
04.03.2001	SH	active local active cantonal	0	30%	partial revision
22.09.2002	VD	full local	1	56%	complete revision
18.05.2003	GR	full local opt-in	1	60%	complete revision
16.05.2004	FR	full local	1	58%	complete revision

Table A.2: Full List of Votes on Enfranchisements of Non-citizens

Source: Adler et al. (2015), cantonal archives, cantonal chancelleries.

Vote date	Canton	Suffrage	Accepted	Yes share	Vote type
16.05.2004	FR	full local	1	58%	complete revision
30.10.2005	BS	full local opt-in	1	77%	complete revision
24.04.2005	GE	full local	0	47%	initiative
24.04.2005	GE	active local active cantonal	1	52%	initiative
25.09.2005	SO	full local opt-in	0	39%	complete revision
17.06.2007	JU	full local for excecutive	0	49%	law revision
17.06.2007	NE	passive local passive cantonal	0	41%	initiative
17.06.2007	NE	passive local	1	54%	counterproposal
02.05.2010	GL	full local full cantonal	0		law revision
26.09.2010	BS	full cantonal	0	19%	initiative
26.09.2010	BS	active cantonal	0	39%	counterproposal
26.09.2010	BE	full local opt-in	0	28%	initiative
04.09.2011	VD	full cantonal	0	31%	initiative
27.11.2011	LU	active local opt-in	0	16%	initiative
22.09.2013	ZH	full local opt-in	0	25%	initiative
28.09.2014	JU	full local for excecutive	1	54%	law revision
28.09.2014	SH	full local full cantonal	0	15%	initiative
Source: Adler	et al. (201	5), cantonal archives, canton	nal chancelle	ries.	

Table A.3: Full List of Votes on Enfranchisements of Non-citizens continued

Variable	Min	Max	Mean	Sd
Native Priority	1	3	1.72	0.91
AntiEUAttitude	1	3	2.08	0.97
Democracy-Satisfaction	0	10	6.07	1.88
Political Influence	0	10	3.82	2.54
Local Suffrage	0	1	0.1	0.28
Local Suffrage Outvoted	0	1	0.02	0.11
Share of foreigners in municipality	0	0.59	0.2	0.1
Low education	0	1	0.19	0.38
High education	0	1	0.27	0.45
Number of observations				
All (including missing variables): 6	1532			
Observations from municipalities w	ith suf	frage e	xtensions	s: 10217

Table A.4: Summary statistics individual data

Notes: Figures refer to the sample with recent suffrage extensions as explained in section 6.2.

Observations with municipal suffrage for for eigners: 7172

A: Full sample											
Dependent variable: openness											
Subsample	EU		Immig	ration	Natura	lization	All votes				
Local Suffrage	$4.122^{**} \\ (1.692)$	$4.187^{**} \\ (1.699)$	-2.483^{**} (1.256)	-0.864 (1.344)	$0.342 \\ (1.048)$	-0.049 (1.023)	$0.861 \\ (1.015)$	$1.005 \\ (1.125)$			
Local Suffrage Outvoted	-7.126^{***} (1.718)	-7.148^{***} (1.724)	1.464 (1.277)	-1.327 (1.393)	1.869^{*} (1.089)	$2.714^{**} \\ (1.073)$	-4.228^{***} (1.024)	-4.725^{***} (1.134)			
Control Variables	no	yes	no	yes	no	yes	no	yes			
Municipality fixed effects	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes			
Vote fixed effects	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes			
Year fixed effects	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes			
n. Obs.	10,945	10,945	$6,\!510$	$6,\!510$	$10,\!685$	10,685	54,818	54,818			
R2	0.941	0.941	0.896	0.899	0.898	0.900	0.765	0.765			

Table A.5: Effects of enfranchising non-citizens on citizens – evidence from municipal data

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at the individual level: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.

A. Extreme right-wing political positions												
Dependent variable	NativePriority			AntiEUAttitude			Democracy Satisfaction			Political Influence		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Local Suffrage	-0.0669 (0.0540)	-0.0703 (0.0540)	-0.0436 (0.0565)	$\begin{array}{c} 0.1841^{***} \\ (0.0530) \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.1829^{***} \\ (0.0531) \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.1430^{**} \\ (0.0573) \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.0473 \\ (0.1122) \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.0503 \\ (0.1126) \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.0314 \\ (0.1271) \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.0924 \\ (0.1533) \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.0874 \\ (0.1534) \end{array}$	0.1283 (0.1732)
Local Suffrage Outvoted			-0.1402 (0.1382)			$\begin{array}{c} 0.2386^{**} \\ (0.1162) \end{array}$			0.0584 (0.2303)			$0.1715 \\ (0.2848)$
Controls for other votes Wave fixed effects Person fixed effects Month fixed effects	no yes yes yes	yes yes yes yes	yes yes yes yes	no yes yes yes	yes yes yes yes	yes yes yes yes	no yes yes yes	yes yes yes yes	yes yes yes yes	no yes yes yes	yes yes yes yes	yes yes yes yes
n. Obs. R2	$12481 \\ 0.6351$	$12481 \\ 0.6355$	$12476 \\ 0.6357$	$12476 \\ 0.7357$	$12476 \\ 0.7626$	$12463 \\ 0.7627$	$12784 \\ 0.6483$	$12784 \\ 0.6483$	$\begin{array}{c} 12779 \\ 0.6484 \end{array}$	$12750 \\ 0.6149$	$12750 \\ 0.5152$	$12745 \\ 0.6152$

Table A.6: Effects of enfranchising non-citizens by political positions

B. Extreme left-wing political positions

Dependent variable	N	ativePriori	ty	An	ntiEUAttituo	le	Demo	eracy Satis	faction	Pol	Political Influence		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	
Local Suffrage	-0.0274 (0.0296)	-0.0247 (0.0294)	-0.0154 (0.0317)	-0.0439 (0.0360)	-0.0441 (0.0362)	-0.0217 (0.0395)	$0.0938 \\ (0.0796)$	$0.0949 \\ (0.0800)$	0.1518^{*} (0.0858)	$\begin{array}{c} 0.0057\\ (0.1015) \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.0024\\ (0.1020) \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.0302 \\ (0.1123) \end{array}$	
Local Suffrage Outvoted			-0.0544 (0.0600)			-0.1258^{*} (0.0724)			-0.3280^{*} (0.1679)			-0.1610 (0.2041)	
Controls for other votes	no	yes	yes	no	yes	yes	no	yes	yes	no	yes	yes	
Wave fixed effects	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	
Person fixed effects	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	
Month fixed effects	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	
n. Obs.	16129	16129	16128	15640	15640	15640	16426	16426	16425	16392	16392	16391	
R2	0.6368	0.6370	0.6370	0.7265	0.7266	0.7266	0.6429	0.6430	0.6431	0.6175	0.6277	0.6276	

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at the individual level:*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Left/right wing is defined as the first Quartile of the political left-right distribution.

Dependent variable	Native Priority	AntiEUAttitude	Demcracy Satisfaction	Political Influence
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Local Suffrage	0.0054	0.1348**	0.1944^{*}	0.2834**
-	(0.0474)	(0.0501)	(0.1004)	(0.1368)
Suffrage [*] High Income	-0.2965***	-0.1565*	0.5619**	0.1451
	(0.0797)	(0.0846)	(0.2052)	(0.2055)
Suffrage*Low Income	0.2014	0.2645^{***}	-0.2709	-0.5684^{**}
	(0.1552)	(0.0860)	(0.2876)	(0.2227)
Controls for other votes	no	yes	yes	No
Wave fixed effects	yes	yes	yes	yes
Person fixed effects	no	no	no	no
Municipality effects	yes	yes	yes	yes
Month fixed effects	yes	yes	yes	yes
n. Obs.	34440	33524	35031	35138
R2	0.1953	0.3201	0.1959	0.1781

Table A.7: Interactions with income

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at the wave and municipality level:*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Dependent variable	Native Priority	AntiEUAttitude	Demcracy Satisfaction	Political Influence
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Suffrage: 0-3 years	$0.0020 \\ (0.0418)$	0.0408^{*} (0.0235)	-0.0254 (0.0891)	-0.0146 (0.1233)
Suffrage 3 years plus	-0.0119 (0.0462)	$\begin{array}{c} 0.1240^{**} \\ (0.0550) \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.2357^{***} \\ (0.0802) \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.3094^{***} \\ (0.0991) \end{array}$
Controls for other votes	no	no	no	no
Wave fixed effects	yes	yes	Yes	yes
Person fixed effects	no	no	no	no
Municipality effects	yes	yes	yes	yes
Month fixed effects	yes	yes	yes	yes
n. Obs.	47699	46556	48525	48641
R2	0.1646	0.2768	0.1677	0.1518

Table A.8: Effect over time

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at the individual level: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

A. Always association	A. Always association activities											
Dependent variable	NativePriority			AntiEUAttitude			Demo	cracy Satis	faction	Political Influence		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Local Suffrage	-0.0183	-0.0217	0.0175	0.1727^{***}	0.1690^{***}	0.1512^{**}	0.2548^{**}	0.2506^{**}	0.2359^{*}	0.5382^{***}	0.5358^{***}	0.6231^{***}
	(0.0546)	(0.0547)	(0.0595)	(0.0559)	(0.0561)	(0.0611)	(0.1212)	(0.1211)	(0.1379)	(0.1663)	(0.1665)	(0.1914)
Local Suffrage Outvoted			-0.1734			0.0776			0.0658			-0.3995
			(0.1363)			(0.1347)			(0.2356)			(0.2935)
Controls for other votes	no	yes	yes	no	yes	yes	no	yes	yes	no	yes	yes
Wave fixed effects	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Person fixed effects	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Month fixed effects	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
n. Obs.	7824	7824	7824	7709	7709	7709	7945	7945	7945	7960	7960	7960
R2	0.6218	0.6220	0.6221	0.7456	0.7457	0.7457	0.6191	0.6192	0.6192	0.5982	0.5983	0.5984

Table A.9: Effects of enfranchising non-citizens by association activities

B. Never association activities

Dependent variable	Ν	ativePriori	ty	Ar	ntiEUAttituo	de	Democracy Satisfaction			Political Influence		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Local Suffrage	-0.0377	-0.0352	-0.0399	0.0614^{**}	0.0624^{**}	0.0534^{**}	0.0753	0.0790	0.1207^{**}	0.1086	0.1115	0.1455^{*}
	(0.0244)	(0.0244)	(0.0259)	(0.0240)	(0.0242)	(0.0259)	(0.0529)	(0.0533)	(0.0575)	(0.0708)	(0.0711)	(0.0772)
				(0.1123)								
Local Suffrage Outvoted			0.0308			0.0600			-0.2766**			-0.2164
			(0.0553)			(0.0562)			(0.1242)			(0.1478)
Controls for other votes	no	yes	yes	no	yes	yes	no	yes	yes	no	yes	yes
Wave fixed effects	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Person fixed effects	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Month fixed effects	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
n. Obs.	39875	39875	39862	38847	38847	38834	40580	40580	40569	40681	40681	40669
R2	0.5998	0.5998	0.5999	0.7229	0.7230	0.7231	0.6126	0.6126	0.6128	0.5621	0.5621	0.5622

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at the individual level: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.







