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Optimal Linear Income Taxation and Education Subsidies under Skill-Biased Technical Change

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Optimal Linear Income Taxation and Education Subsidies under Skill-Biased Technical Change

Abstract

This paper studies how linear tax and education policy should optimally respond to skill-biased technical change (SBTC). SBTC affects optimal taxes and subsidies by changing i) direct distributional benefits, ii) indirect redistributional effects due to wage-(de)compression, and iii) education distortions. Analytically, the effect of SBTC on these three components is shown to be ambiguous. Simulations for the US economy demonstrate that SBTC makes the tax system more progressive, since SBTC raises the direct distributional benefits of income taxes, which more than offset their larger indirect distributional losses, and it increases education distortions. Also, SBTC lowers optimal education subsidies, since SBTC generates larger direct distributional losses of education subsidies, which more than offset their larger indirect distributional gains, and it exacerbates education distortions.

JEL-Codes: H200, H500, I200, J200, O300.

Keywords: human capital, general equilibrium, optimal taxation, education subsidies, technological change.

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1 Introduction

Skill-biased technical change (SBTC) has been an important driver of rising income inequality in many developed countries over the last decades (see, e.g., Van Reenen, 2011). Skill-biased technology raises the relative demand for skilled workers. If relative demand grows faster than relative supply, the skill-premium increases, and so does income inequality.¹ The idea that income inequality is the result of the “race between education and technology” dates back to Tinbergen (1975). He suggested that governments should increase investment in education to compress the earnings distribution in order to win the race with technology. Goldin and Katz (2010, Ch.9, pp. 350-351) take up Tinbergen’s metaphor and argue that in the US policy should respond to SBTC with a more progressive tax system and more financial aid for higher education.

Despite the obvious relevance of SBTC for explaining rising skill premia and wage inequality, very little analysis exists on the normative question whether it is a good idea to make tax systems more progressive or to stimulate investments in higher education in response to SBTC. Therefore, this paper studies how skill-biased technical change affects optimal linear taxes and education subsidies. We do so by extending the standard model of optimal linear income taxation of Sheshinski (1972) with endogenous skill formation and embed it in the ‘canonical model’ of SBTC, where high-skilled and low-skilled workers are imperfect substitutes in production (Katz and Murphy, 1992; Violante, 2008; Acemoglu and Autor, 2011).² In our model, individuals differ in their earning ability. They decide how much to work and whether to enroll in higher education. Only individuals with a sufficiently high ability become high-skilled, everyone else remains low-skilled. The wages of high-skilled and low-skilled workers are endogenously determined by relative demand, relative supply, and the level of skill bias. An inequality-averse government maximizes social welfare by optimally setting linear income taxes and education subsidies. Our findings are the following.

We start our analysis by deriving optimal tax and education policies for *given skill bias*. As is usual in optimal taxation, optimal policies trade off the redistributive benefits against the efficiency costs of each policy instrument. The benefits consist of direct and indirect redistributive impacts. The linear income tax directly reduces income inequality, but also generates general-equilibrium effects on wages that result in larger pre-tax income differentials: by discouraging investment in education, the relative supply of skilled workers falls and the relative wage of skilled workers increases.³ We refer

¹For the canonical model of SBTC see Katz and Murphy (1992), Violante (2008) and Acemoglu and Autor (2011).

²Dixit and Sandmo (1977) and Hellwig (1986) elaborate further on the optimal linear tax model.

³Although relative wages may also respond to relative changes in hours worked, this mechanism does not play a role in our model, since we assume that high-skilled and low-skilled workers have equal labor-supply elasticities. Hence, relative labor supply does not change in response to changing the linear tax rate. See also Jacobs (2012).

to this indirect distributional effect as the ‘wage decompression’ effect of income taxes. Moreover, education subsidies result in distributional losses, since high-skilled individuals have higher incomes than low-skilled individuals. However, these direct distributional losses can be countered by an indirect ‘wage compression’ effect. By increasing the relative supply of skilled workers the skill premium declines and this reduces income inequality. For the income tax and the education subsidy, the direct and indirect distributional impacts are traded off against the distortions of labor supply and of the investment in education, respectively.

We then analyze how optimal policy should respond to a *change in skill bias*. We show that the optimal policy response depends on the effect of SBTC on both, the direct distributional impact and indirect distributional impact via wage (de)compression effects and on the distortions in education. The distortions in labor supply are invariant to SBTC due to a presumed constant elasticity of labor supply. We derive analytically that the effect of SBTC on direct distributional impacts, indirect distributional effects via wage (de)compression, and on distortions in skill formation are all ambiguous.

To resolve the theoretical ambiguities, we quantify the impact of SBTC on optimal tax and education policy by calibrating our model to the US economy using data from the US Current Population Survey and empirical evidence on labor-market responses to tax and education policy. We simulate the response of optimal taxes and education subsidies to a rise in skill bias such that the skill premium rises with 24 percent, in line with the observed increase in the skill premium between 1980-2016. Moreover, we show that education is optimally subsidized on a net basis before the shock in skill bias so as to compress the wage distribution. Hence, investment in higher education is distorted upwards. Our main finding is that the optimal income tax rate increases with SBTC, while the optimal education subsidy declines with SBTC.

To understand which mechanisms drive these policy responses to SBTC, we numerically decompose the impact of SBTC into the main theoretical determinants of tax and education policy: direct and indirect distributional effects and distortions. We find that the optimal tax rate increases because the direct distributional benefits of taxing income increase and the distortions of subsidizing education (on a net basis) become larger, which overturns the larger indirect wage-decompression effects of taxing labor income. The optimal education subsidy declines with SBTC, since both the direct distributional losses and the (upward) distortions of subsidizing education increase more than the larger indirect, wage-compression effects of subsidizing education.

The main lesson of our paper is that the impact of SBTC on optimal tax and education policy is far from straightforward. Indeed, while our model is stylized, it conveys a number of important messages for thinking about the optimal policy response to SBTC. While SBTC typically raises income inequality and the skill premium, thus calling for higher taxes and lower education subsidies for redistributive reasons, SBTC also affects the

power of tax and education policy to (de-)compress wages, which in our simulations works in the opposite direction. Moreover, we show that it is not obvious how tax distortions on skill formation change in response to SBTC; in our simulations they increase. Our simulations furthermore demonstrate that SBTC calls for a more progressive income tax system, while the subsidy rate on investment in higher education should decline. Therefore, we show that the suggestions of Tinbergen (1975) and Goldin and Katz (2010) to promote stronger investment in higher education to win the race against technology need not be correct. Although these authors are right to emphasise the larger benefits of wage compression with SBTC, our analysis reveals that (at least) two other effects need to be taken into account as well to determine whether optimal education subsidies should increase: larger inequality between skilled and unskilled workers and larger distortions of excessive investment in education. We show that these latter two effects dominate wage-compression effects quantitatively.

The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature and outlines our contributions to the literature. Section 3 sets up the model. Section 4 analyzes optimal policy. The simulations are discussed in Section 5. Finally, Section 6 concludes. Proofs of all propositions, additional derivations and backgrounds materials are contained in the Appendix.

2 Related literature

We analyze optimal linear income taxes and education subsidies in an extension of the optimal linear tax model due to Sheshinski (1972) with an endogenous education decision on the extensive margin and endogenous wage rates for high-skilled and low-skilled labor as in Roy (1951).⁴ We merge this model with the canonical model of SBTC which goes back to Katz and Murphy (1992), Violante (2008), and Acemoglu and Autor (2011). This allows us to analyze optimal linear education subsidies and to explore the consequences of SBTC for optimal policies. Our paper makes a number of contributions to four strands in the existing literature.

First, we contribute to the literature that analyzes optimal income taxes jointly with optimal education subsidies, see, for example, Bovenberg and Jacobs (2005), Maldonado (2008), Bohacek and Kapicka (2008), Anderberg (2009), Jacobs and Bovenberg (2011), and Stantcheva (2017). In contrast to these papers, we analyze optimal tax and education policies with education on the extensive margin rather than on the intensive margin. Still, we confirm a central result from this literature that education subsidies are employed to alleviate tax distortions on education. However, education subsidies generally do not fully eliminate all tax-induced distortions on education, as in Bovenberg and Jacobs (2005).

⁴See also Dixit and Sandmo (1977) and Hellwig (1986) for extensions and further analysis.

Since investment in education generates infra-marginal rents for all but the marginally skilled individuals, the government likes to tax education on a net basis to redistribute income from high-skilled to low-skilled workers – *ceteris paribus*. This finding is in line with Findeisen and Sachs (2016); Colas et al. (2020), who also analyze optimal education policies with discrete education choices.⁵

Second, we contribute to the literature on optimal income taxation and education subsidies in the presence of general-equilibrium effects on the wage distribution. Feldstein (1972) and Allen (1982) study optimal linear income taxation with endogenous wage rates. Income taxes need to be lowered if they generate wage decompression. This is the case if the (uncompensated) elasticity of high-skilled labor supply is larger than the (uncompensated) elasticity low-skilled labor supply (and vice versa). In this case, high-skilled labor supply decreases more than low-skilled labor supply in response to a higher tax rate, and wage differentials increase accordingly. However, in our model, elasticities of high-skilled and low-skilled labor supply are the same, so this mechanism is absent. Instead, linear income taxes lead to wage decompression, because they reduce investment in education. Intuitively, the skill premium rises as the supply of high-skilled labor falls relative to low-skilled labor. Therefore, wage decompression results in distributional losses and optimal income taxes are lowered – *ceteris paribus*.⁶ Dur and Teulings (2004) analyze optimal log-linear tax and education policies in an assignment model of the labor market.⁷ Like Dur and Teulings (2004), we find that education might be subsidized on a net basis to exploit wage-compression effects for income redistribution. Jacobs (2012) analyses optimal linear taxes and education subsidies in a two-type version of the model of Bovenberg and Jacobs (2005) and shows that optimal education subsidies are *not* employed to compress the wage distribution. The reason is that with education on the intensive margin, the wage-compression effect of education subsidies is identical to the wage-compression effect of income taxes, hence education subsidies have no distributional value added over income taxes, but generate additional distortions in education. Our model does not have this property, since we analyze education on the extensive margin.

⁵Also related is Gomes et al. (2018) who study optimal income taxation with multi-dimensional heterogeneity and occupational choice. They find that it is optimal to distort sectoral choice with sector-dependent non-linear income taxes to alleviate labor-supply distortions on the intensive margin. We find no such role for education subsidies or taxes, since labor-supply distortions are identical for high-skilled and low-skilled workers, since income taxes are linear and labor-supply elasticities are constant.

⁶Under optimal non-linear income taxation, Stiglitz (1982) and Stern (1982) show that marginal tax rates for high-skilled workers are lowered to encourage their labor supply, thereby compressing wages. Jacobs (2012) adds human capital formation on the intensive margin to these models and shows that education policies are used as well for wage compression. Rothschild and Scheuer (2013) and Sachs et al. (2020) generalize the two-type Stiglitz-Stern model to continuous types and explore the role of general-equilibrium effects in setting optimal non-linear income taxes.

⁷Krueger and Ludwig (2016) study optimal income taxation and education subsidies in a dynamic framework. Like this paper, they highlight the interaction between income taxes and education subsidies. Moreover, they also emphasize the role of education subsidies for wage compression. Unlike this paper, they do not study the effect of SBTC on optimal policy.

Third, this paper is most closely related to four papers that study the response of optimal policies to technical change (Jacobs and Thuemmel, 2018; Loebbing, 2020; Ales et al., 2015; Heathcote et al., 2014).⁸ Using a nearly equivalent model of the labor market as in the current paper, Jacobs and Thuemmel (2018) study optimal education-dependent non-linear taxes. In contrast, they find that wage-compression effects never determine optimal policy.⁹ Intuitively, any redistribution from high-skilled to low-skilled workers via a compression of the wage distribution can be achieved as well with the education-dependent tax system, while the distortions in skill formation of compressing wages can be avoided. This paper adds to Jacobs and Thuemmel (2018) by showing how optimal policy should be set if the government can, realistically, not employ skill-dependent income tax rates.¹⁰ In this case, the government can redistribute more income over and above what can be achieved with the income tax system alone by exploiting general-equilibrium effects on wages. For this reason, education may even be subsidized on a net basis, which can never occur in Jacobs and Thuemmel (2018). In simulations for the US economy, very similar to the ones in this paper, they find that overall tax progressivity optimally rises in response to SBTC, like in the current paper. Furthermore, the optimal net tax on education falls with SBTC. Together with rising marginal tax rates, this implies that optimal education subsidies *rise* with SBTC, which contrasts to the current paper. This result entirely depends on the availability of skill-dependent tax schedules.

Loebbing (2020) studies the interaction between optimal non-linear income taxes and directed technical change. He finds that progressive tax reforms can induce directed technical change that compresses the wage distribution. The intuition is that progressive reforms increase the relative labor supply of low-skilled workers, which makes it more attractive for firms to develop technologies that are complementary with low-skilled labor. This, in turn, leads to pre-tax wage compression. In contrast to this paper, Loebbing (2020) endogenizes technical change and studies non-linear instead of linear income taxes, but he does not study optimal education policy.

Heathcote et al. (2014) study the impact of SBTC on the optimal degree of tax progressivity using a parametric tax function in a model with endogenous human capital formation and imperfect substitutability of skills.¹¹ In the absence of wage-compression effects, SBTC raises optimal tax progressivity. However, if wage-compression effects are present, optimal tax progressivity remains modest, but still higher than in the model

⁸Related is also Heckman et al. (1998) who estimate structural dynamic OLG-models with skill-specific human capital accumulation technologies and SBTC. Using the same model, Heckman et al. (1999) demonstrate that general-equilibrium effects on wages largely offset the initial impacts of tax and education policies. These papers do not analyze optimal tax and education policies like we do.

⁹The allocations are generally affected by general-equilibrium effects on the wage structure.

¹⁰In this respect, our focus on linear policies is not a fundamental constraint, since also a linear tax system with education-dependent marginal tax rates can achieve the same redistribution as wage compression. The reason is that wage rates are linear prices so that linear tax rates are sufficient to achieve the same income redistribution.

¹¹This extension is dropped in the published version of the paper (Heathcote et al., 2017).

without SBTC. These results are in line with our finding that optimal taxes should become more progressive in response to SBTC. In contrast to Heathcote et al. (2017), we also analyze optimal education policy and find that optimal education subsidies decline due to SBTC.

Finally, Ales et al. (2015) analyze how the non-linear income tax should adjust to technical change in a task-based model of the labor market with exogenous human capital decisions.¹² They also derive that general-equilibrium effects are exploited to compress the wage redistribution. Based on a calibration to US data, Ales et al. find that wage polarization calls for higher marginal tax rates at the very bottom of the income distribution, lower tax rates on low- to middle-incomes, and higher tax rates at high-incomes (but not at the very top).¹³ In contrast to Ales et al. (2015), we allow individuals to choose their education to analyze not only the optimal response of income taxes, but also the optimal response of education subsidies to SBTC. We do so in a neoclassical model of the labor market instead of a task-based model. We assume that the income tax system is linear, and – like in Ales et al. (2015) – cannot be conditioned on education. We confirm their finding that the tax system becomes more progressive in response to SBTC. Moreover, we add optimal education policy and show that SBTC reduces optimal education subsidies. Moreover, quantitatively, SBTC matters more for education policy than for tax policy.

3 Model

This section presents our model consisting of individuals, firms and a government. Utility maximizing individuals supply labor on the intensive margin and optimally decide to become high-skilled or remain low-skilled. Profit maximizing firms demand high-skilled and low-skilled labor, while facing SBTC. The government optimally sets progressive income taxes and education subsidies by maximizing social welfare.

3.1 Individuals

There is a continuum of individuals of unit mass. Each worker is endowed with earnings ability $\theta \in [\underline{\theta}, \bar{\theta}]$ which is drawn from distribution $F(\theta)$ with corresponding density $f(\theta)$. Individuals have identical quasi-linear preferences over consumption c and labor supply l :

$$U(c, l) \equiv c - \frac{l^{1+1/\varepsilon}}{1 + 1/\varepsilon}, \quad \varepsilon > 0, \quad (1)$$

¹²For task-based assignment models see, e.g., Acemoglu and Autor (2011).

¹³Wage polarization refers to the hollowing out of earnings in the middle of the income distribution. See for example Acemoglu and Autor (2011), Autor and Dorn (2013), and Goos et al. (2014).

where ε is the constant wage-elasticity of labor supply.¹⁴ Consumption is the numéraire commodity and its price is normalized to unity.

In addition to choosing consumption and labor supply, each individual makes a discrete choice to become high-skilled or to remain low-skilled. We indicate an individual's education type by $j \in \{L, H\}$ and define \mathbb{I} as an indicator function for being high-skilled:

$$\mathbb{I} \equiv \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } j = H, \\ 0 & \text{if } j = L. \end{cases} \quad (2)$$

To become high-skilled, workers need to invest a fixed amount of resources $p(\theta)$, which captures expenses such as tuition fees, books and the (money value of) effort. High-skilled individuals also forgo earnings as a low-skilled worker. We model the direct costs of education as a weakly decreasing function of the worker's ability θ :

$$p(\theta) \equiv \pi \theta^{-\psi}, \quad \pi \in (0, \infty), \quad \psi \in [0, \infty).$$

If $\psi > 0$, individuals with higher ability have lower direct costs. Hence, more able students need to spend less on education, e.g., because they have lower costs of effort, lower tuition fees, require less tutoring, or obtain grants. If $\psi = 0$, all individuals face the same direct costs of education. Parameter ψ determines the elasticity of enrollment in higher education with respect to its costs, which will be calibrated at empirically plausible values in our simulations.

The government levies linear taxes t on labor income and provides a non-individualized lump-sum transfer b . The tax system is progressive if both t and b are positive. In addition, high-skilled individuals receive a flat-rate education subsidy s on total resources $p(\theta)$ invested in education. We do not restrict the education subsidy to be positive, hence we allow for the possibility that high-skilled individuals may have to pay an education tax. The wage rate per efficiency unit of labor is denoted by w^j . Gross earnings are denoted by $z_\theta^j \equiv w^j \theta l_\theta^j$. Workers of type θ with education j thus face the following budget constraint:

$$c_\theta^j = (1 - t)z_\theta^j + b - (1 - s)p(\theta)\mathbb{I}. \quad (3)$$

The informational assumptions of our model are that individual ability θ and labor effort l_θ^j are not verifiable, but aggregate labor earnings $\bar{z} \equiv \int_{\underline{\theta}}^{\bar{\theta}} z_\theta^j dF(\theta)$ and aggregate education expenditures $\int_{\underline{\theta}}^{\bar{\theta}} p(\theta) \mathbb{I} dF(\theta)$ are. Hence, the government can levy linear taxes on income and provide linear subsidies on education. These informational assumptions

¹⁴Since income effects are absent, compensated and uncompensated wage elasticities coincide. This utility function is employed in nearly the entire optimal-tax literature with endogenous wages, see, e.g., Rothschild and Scheuer (2013) and Sachs et al. (2020). The reason is that income effects in labor supply and heterogeneous labor-supply elasticities substantially complicate the analysis if general-equilibrium effects on wages are present, see also Feldstein (1972), Allen (1982), and Jacobs (2012).

imply that income taxes can be levied as proportional withholding taxes at the firm level and universities can collect education subsidies while proportionally reducing the costs of education to students.¹⁵ Importantly, the tax implementation does not exploit all information available to the government. In particular, we realistically assume that marginal tax rates are not conditioned on education choices, in contrast to Jacobs and Thuemmel (2018). Consequently, income taxes can no longer achieve the same income redistribution as a compression of wage rates, hence exploiting wage-compression effects becomes socially desirable.

Workers maximize utility by choosing consumption, labor supply and education, taking wage rates and government policy as given. For a given education choice, optimal labor supply is obtained by maximizing utility in (1), subject to the budget constraint in (3), which leads to

$$l_\theta^j = [(1-t)w^j\theta]^\varepsilon. \quad (4)$$

Labor supply increases in net earnings per hour $(1-t)w^j\theta$, and more so if labor supply is more elastic (higher ε). Income taxation distorts labor supply downward as it drives a wedge between the social rewards of labor supply ($w^j\theta$) and the private rewards of labor supply $((1-t)w^j\theta)$.

By substituting the first-order condition (4) into the utility function (1), and using the budget constraint (3), the indirect utility function is obtained for all θ and j :

$$V_\theta^j \equiv \frac{[(1-t)w^j\theta]^{1+\varepsilon}}{1+\varepsilon} + b - ((1-s)p(\theta))\mathbb{I}. \quad (5)$$

A low-skilled individual chooses to invest in education if and only if she derives higher utility from being high-skilled than from remaining low-skilled, i.e., if $V_\theta^H \geq V_\theta^L$. The critical level of ability Θ that separates the high-skilled from the low-skilled individuals is determined by $V_\Theta^H = V_\Theta^L$, and is given by:

$$\Theta = \left[\frac{\pi(1-s)(1+\varepsilon)}{(1-t)^{1+\varepsilon}((w^H)^{1+\varepsilon} - (w^L)^{1+\varepsilon})} \right]^{\frac{1}{1+\varepsilon+\psi}}. \quad (6)$$

All individuals with ability $\theta < \Theta$ remain low-skilled, whereas all individuals with $\theta \geq \Theta$ become high-skilled. A decrease in Θ implies that more individuals become high-skilled. If w^H/w^L rises, more individuals invest in higher education. The same holds true for a decrease in the marginal net cost of education $(1-s)\pi$. The income tax potentially distorts the education decision, since the direct costs of education are not tax-deductible, while the returns to education are taxed. Investment in education is also distorted because income taxation reduces labor supply, and thereby lowers the ‘utilization rate’ of human

¹⁵This implies that, although the government can subsidize education at a flat rate, it cannot infer individual ability θ from aggregate investments in education.

capital. If labor supply would be exogenous ($\varepsilon = 0$), and education subsidies would make all education expenses effectively deductible (i.e., $s = t$), human capital investment would be at its first-best level: $\Theta = [\pi/(w^H - w^L)]^{\frac{1}{1+\varepsilon+\psi}}$ (see Jacobs, 2005; Bovenberg and Jacobs, 2005). Due to the Inada conditions on the production technology, there is a strictly positive mass of both high-skilled individuals and low-skilled individuals (i.e., $0 < \Theta < \infty$) if $\varepsilon > 0$, $0 \leq t < 1$, and $w^H > w^L$. Throughout this paper we assume that the primitives of our model are such that the high-skilled wage rate is above the low-skilled wage rate: $w^H > w^L$.

3.2 Firms

A representative firm produces a homogeneous consumption good, using aggregate low-skilled labor L and aggregate high-skilled labor H as inputs according to a constant-returns-to-scale CES production technology:

$$Y(L, H, A) = B \left(\omega L^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} + (1-\omega)(AH)^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} \right)^{\frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1}}, \quad A, B > 0, \quad \omega \in (0, 1), \quad \sigma > 1, \quad (7)$$

where B is a Hicks-neutral productivity shifter, ω governs the income shares of low- and high-skilled workers, σ is the elasticity of substitution between low- and high-skilled labor, and skill bias is parameterized by A . We model technology like in the canonical model of SBTC (Katz and Murphy, 1992; Violante, 2008; Acemoglu and Autor, 2011). All theoretical results generalize to a general constant-returns-to-scale production technology that satisfies the Inada conditions and has an elasticity of substitution σ that is larger than unity, i.e., $\sigma \equiv \frac{Y_H Y_L}{Y_{HL} Y} > 1$ (see the Appendix).

The competitive representative firm maximizes profits taking wage rates as given. The first-order conditions are:

$$w^L = Y_L(L, H, A), \quad (8)$$

$$w^H = Y_H(L, H, A). \quad (9)$$

In equilibrium, the marginal product of each labor input thus equal its marginal cost. Moreover, in equilibrium, wage rates w^L and w^H depend on skill bias A . With $\sigma > 1$, w^H/w^L increases in A , which is essential for the model to generate an increasing skill-premium. To improve readability, we suppress arguments L, H , and A in the derivatives of the production function in the remainder of the paper.

Since we have normalized the mass of individuals to one, average labor earnings \bar{z} equals total income, which in turn equals output Y :

$$\bar{z} \equiv \int_{\underline{\theta}}^{\Theta} z_{\theta}^L dF(\theta) + \int_{\Theta}^{\bar{\theta}} z_{\theta}^H dF(\theta) = Y. \quad (10)$$

3.3 Government

The government maximizes social welfare, which is given by

$$\int_{\underline{\theta}}^{\Theta} \Psi(V_{\theta}^L) dF(\theta) + \int_{\Theta}^{\bar{\theta}} \Psi(V_{\theta}^H) dF(\theta), \quad \Psi' > 0, \quad \Psi'' < 0, \quad (11)$$

where $\Psi(\cdot)$ is a concave transformation of indirect utilities of low- and high-skilled workers. The government budget constraint states that total tax revenue equals spending on education subsidies, non-individualized transfers b , and an exogenous government revenue requirement R :

$$t \left[\int_{\underline{\theta}}^{\Theta} w^L \theta l_{\theta}^L dF(\theta) + \int_{\Theta}^{\bar{\theta}} w^H \theta l_{\theta}^H dF(\theta) \right] = s \int_{\Theta}^{\bar{\theta}} p(\theta) dF(\theta) + b + R. \quad (12)$$

3.4 General equilibrium

In equilibrium, factor prices w^L and w^H are such that labor markets and the goods market clear. Labor-market clearing implies that aggregate effective labor supplies for each skill type equal aggregate demands:

$$L = \int_{\underline{\theta}}^{\Theta} \theta l_{\theta}^L dF(\theta), \quad (13)$$

$$H = \int_{\Theta}^{\bar{\theta}} \theta l_{\theta}^H dF(\theta). \quad (14)$$

Goods-market clearing implies that total output Y equals aggregate demand for private consumption and education expenditures and exogenous government spending R :

$$Y = \int_{\underline{\theta}}^{\Theta} c_{\theta}^L dF(\theta) + \int_{\Theta}^{\bar{\theta}} (c_{\theta}^H + p(\theta)) dF(\theta) + R. \quad (15)$$

3.5 Behavioral elasticities

Before deriving the optimal tax formulas, it is instructive to derive the behavioral elasticities with respect to the income tax and education subsidy. Table 1 provides these elasticities. The derivations are given in Appendix A.

In order to understand all the behavioral elasticities with respect to tax and education policy, it is instructive to first consider the case in which general-equilibrium effects on wages are completely absent, i.e., $\sigma \rightarrow \infty$. In this case, the production function becomes linear, and high- and low-skilled labor are perfect substitutes production. Consequently,

Table 1: Elasticities with respect to tax rate t and subsidy rate s

$$\begin{aligned}
 \varepsilon_{w^H,t} &\equiv -\frac{\partial w^H}{\partial t} \frac{1-t}{w^H} = -\varsigma \left(\frac{(1-\alpha)\delta}{\sigma+\varepsilon+\varsigma\delta(\beta-\alpha)} \right) < 0, & \varepsilon_{w^H,s} &\equiv \frac{\partial w^H}{\partial s} \frac{s}{w^H} = -\varsigma \left(\frac{(1-\alpha)\delta}{\sigma+\varepsilon+\varsigma\delta(\beta-\alpha)} \right) \rho < 0, \\
 \varepsilon_{w^L,t} &\equiv -\frac{\partial w^L}{\partial t} \frac{1-t}{w^L} = \varsigma \left(\frac{\alpha\delta}{\sigma+\varepsilon+\varsigma\delta(\beta-\alpha)} \right) > 0, & \varepsilon_{w^L,s} &\equiv \frac{\partial w^L}{\partial s} \frac{s}{w^L} = \varsigma \left(\frac{\alpha\delta}{\sigma+\varepsilon+\varsigma\delta(\beta-\alpha)} \right) \rho > 0, \\
 \varepsilon_{l^H,t} &\equiv -\frac{\partial l_\theta^H}{\partial t} \frac{1-t}{l_\theta^H} = \varsigma \left(\frac{\sigma+\varepsilon+\delta(\beta-1)}{\sigma+\varepsilon+\varsigma\delta(\beta-\alpha)} \right) \varepsilon > 0, & \varepsilon_{l^H,s} &\equiv \frac{\partial l_\theta^H}{\partial s} \frac{s}{l_\theta^H} = -\varsigma \left(\frac{(1-\alpha)\delta}{\sigma+\varepsilon+\varsigma\delta(\beta-\alpha)} \right) \varepsilon \rho < 0, \\
 \varepsilon_{l^L,t} &\equiv -\frac{\partial l_\theta^L}{\partial t} \frac{1-t}{l_\theta^L} = \varsigma \left(\frac{\sigma+\varepsilon+\delta\beta}{\sigma+\varepsilon+\varsigma\delta(\beta-\alpha)} \right) \varepsilon > 0, & \varepsilon_{l^L,s} &\equiv \frac{\partial l_\theta^L}{\partial s} \frac{s}{l_\theta^L} = \varsigma \left(\frac{\alpha\delta}{\sigma+\varepsilon+\varsigma\delta(\beta-\alpha)} \right) \varepsilon \rho > 0, \\
 \varepsilon_{\Theta,t} &\equiv \frac{\partial \Theta}{\partial t} \frac{1-t}{\Theta} = \varsigma \left(\frac{\sigma+\varepsilon}{\sigma+\varepsilon+\varsigma\delta(\beta-\alpha)} \right) > 0, & \varepsilon_{\Theta,s} &\equiv -\frac{\partial \Theta}{\partial s} \frac{s}{\Theta} = \varsigma \left(\frac{\sigma+\varepsilon}{\sigma+\varepsilon+\varsigma\delta(\beta-\alpha)} \right) \rho > 0.
 \end{aligned}$$

Note: The term $\beta \equiv \frac{(w^H)^{1+\varepsilon}}{(w^L)^{1+\varepsilon} - (w^L)^{1+\varepsilon}} = \frac{1}{1 - (w^L/w^H)^{1+\varepsilon}}$ is a measure of the inverse skill-premium, $\delta \equiv \left(\frac{\Theta l_\theta^L f(\Theta)}{L} + \frac{\Theta l_\theta^H f(\Theta)}{H} \right) \Theta$ measures the importance of the marginal individual with ability Θ in aggregate effective labor supply, and $\rho \equiv \frac{s}{(1-s)(1+\varepsilon)} > 0$ captures the importance of education subsidies in the total direct costs of education. Finally, $\varsigma \equiv \frac{1+\varepsilon}{1+\varepsilon+\psi}$ is a measure of the total education elasticity, which takes into account the feedback with labor supply.

all the terms in brackets in the expressions for the elasticities are either zero or one. The first two rows in Table 1 indicate that the wage rates of high-skilled and low-skilled workers are then invariant to taxes and education subsidies ($\varepsilon_{w^j,t} = \varepsilon_{w^j,s} = 0$). The other elasticities become very simple. Labor supplies only respond to income taxes, but not to education subsidies ($\varepsilon_{j,t} = \varsigma\varepsilon$, $\varepsilon_{j,s} = 0$). An increase in the income tax rate depresses labor supply of both high-skilled and low-skilled workers and more so if the wage elasticity of labor supply ε is larger. Labor supply is also more elastic with respect to taxation if the education elasticity $\varsigma \equiv \frac{1+\varepsilon}{1+\varepsilon+\psi}$ increases, because education and labor supply are complementary in generating earnings. Intuitively, if labor supply increases, the returns to the investment in education increase. And, if education increases, aggregate labor supply increases since the high-skilled work more than the low-skilled (see Jacobs, 2005; Bovenberg and Jacobs, 2005). The education subsidy does not affect labor supply of high-skilled and low-skilled workers. With quasi-linear preferences, labor supply only depends on the net after-tax wage, which is unaffected by the education subsidy. Education responds to both taxes and education subsidies ($\varepsilon_{\Theta,t} = \varepsilon_{\Theta,s}/\rho = \varsigma$). A higher income tax rate discourages education, because not all costs of education are deductible. The education response is stronger if the education elasticity $\varsigma \equiv \frac{1+\varepsilon}{1+\varepsilon+\psi}$ is larger. Complementarity of education with labor supply makes the education response more elastic also here. Moreover, the education subsidy boosts education more if the share of direct costs in education ρ is larger.

The behavioral elasticities change in the presence of general-equilibrium effects on the wage structure (i.e., $0 < \sigma < \infty$), so that in Table 1 the terms in brackets are no longer equal to 0 or 1. Now, the elasticities of wages with respect to the policy instruments, i.e., $\varepsilon_{w^j,t}$ and $\varepsilon_{w^j,s}$, are non-zero. If a policy increases the supply of high-skilled workers relative to the supply of low-skilled workers, the high-skilled wage rate falls relative to

the low-skilled wage rate. These general-equilibrium effects change labor supply and education decisions, to which we return below. How strong these general-equilibrium effects on wages are, depends on the education elasticity ς , the elasticity of substitution in production σ , and the wage elasticity of labor supply ε . Policy can change relative supplies only via a change in investment in education, and not via changing labor supply (see also the discussion below). The smaller is ς , the smaller is the education response. The lower is σ , the more difficult it is to substitute high- and low-skilled workers in production. The lower is ε , the less elastic labor supply responds to a change in the wage. Hence, if ς , σ and ε are lower, general-equilibrium effects are stronger, i.e., $\varepsilon_{w^j,t}$ and $\varepsilon_{w^j,s}$ are larger in absolute value.

From the expressions for $\varepsilon_{\bar{w},t}$ follows that there are two reasons why both high-skilled and low-skilled labor supply decline if the tax rate increases. First, a higher income tax directly distorts individual labor supply downward. Second, an increase in the tax reduces investment in education, which in turn reduces relative supply of skilled labor, and wages of high-skilled labor increase relative to low-skilled labor as a result. Hence, the direct effect of a tax increase on high-skilled labor supply l_θ^H is dampened by the relative increase in w^H , whereas the drop in low-skilled labor supply l_θ^L is exacerbated by the relative decline in w^L . As a result, the labor-supply elasticity of low-skilled labor is higher than that of high-skilled labor ($\varepsilon_{l^L,t} > \varepsilon_{l^H,t}$).¹⁶ Similarly, by boosting enrollment in education, the subsidy on higher education increases the supply of high-skilled workers relative to the supply of low-skilled workers. This generates general-equilibrium effects on the wage structure: high-skilled wages fall and low-skilled wages rise. Consequently, the education response to education subsidies is muted by general-equilibrium effects on high-skilled and low-skilled wages. Finally, high-skilled labor supply falls and low-skilled labor supply increases if the education subsidy rises due to the changes in wage rates.

4 Optimal policy and SBTC

4.1 Optimal policy

The government maximizes social welfare (11) by choosing the marginal tax rate t on labor income, the lump-sum transfer b , and the education subsidy s , subject to the government budget constraint (12). In order to interpret the expressions for the optimal tax rate t and the subsidy s , we introduce some additional notation.

¹⁶Relative wage rates w^H/w^L change only due to the effect of taxes on the education margin, not due to direct changes in labor supply. This is because the direct effect of a tax increase on individual labor supplies does not lead to a change in relative supply H/L , since all individual labor supplies fall by the same relative amount.

First, we define the net tax wedge on skill formation Δ as:

$$\Delta \equiv tw^H \Theta l_{\Theta}^H - tw^L \Theta l_{\Theta}^L - sp(\Theta). \quad (16)$$

Δ gives the increase in government revenue if the marginal individual with ability Θ decides to become high-skilled instead of staying low-skilled. If $\Delta > 0$, education is taxed on a net basis. $tw^H \Theta l_{\Theta}^H$ gives the additional tax revenue when the marginal individual becomes high-skilled. $tw^L \Theta l_{\Theta}^L$ gives the loss in tax revenue as this individual no longer pays taxes as a low-skilled worker. The government also loses $sp(\Theta)$ in revenue due subsidizing education of individual Θ .

Let the social welfare weight of an individual of type θ be defined as $g_{\theta} \equiv \Psi'(V_{\theta})/\eta$, where η is the Lagrange multiplier on the government budget constraint. Following Feldstein (1972), we define the distributional characteristic ξ of the income tax as:

$$\xi \equiv \frac{\int_{\underline{\theta}}^{\Theta} (1 - g_{\theta}) z_{\theta}^L dF(\theta) + \int_{\Theta}^{\bar{\theta}} (1 - g_{\theta}) z_{\theta}^H dF(\theta)}{\bar{z}\bar{g}} > 0. \quad (17)$$

ξ equals minus the normalized covariance between social welfare weights g_{θ} and labor earnings z_{θ}^j . ξ measures the social marginal value of income redistribution via the income tax, expressed in monetary equivalents, as a fraction of taxed earnings. Marginal distributional benefits of income taxation are positive, since the welfare weights g_{θ} decline with ability θ . We have $0 \leq \xi \leq 1$, where ξ is larger if the government has stronger redistributive social preferences. For a Rawlsian/maxi-min social welfare function, which features $\Psi'_{\underline{\theta}} = 1/f(\underline{\theta}) \gg 1$ and $\Psi'_{\theta} = 0$ for all $\theta > \underline{\theta}$, we obtain $\xi = 1$ if the lowest ability is zero ($\underline{\theta} = 0$). In contrast, for a utilitarian social welfare function with constant weights $\Psi' = 1$, we obtain $\xi = 0$.¹⁷ We also derive that $\xi = 0$ if z_{θ}^j is equal for everyone so that the government is not interested in income redistribution. An alternative intuition for the distributional characteristic ξ is that it measures the social value of raising an additional unit of revenue with the income tax. It gives the income-weighted average of the additional unit of revenue (the '1') minus the utility losses (g_{θ}) that raising this unit of revenue inflicts on tax payers.

Similarly, we define the distributional characteristic of the education tax ζ :

$$\zeta \equiv \int_{\Theta}^{\bar{\theta}} \theta^{-\psi} (1 - g_{\theta}) dF(\theta) \geq 0. \quad (18)$$

ζ captures the marginal benefits of income redistribution from the high-skilled to the low-skilled via a higher tax on education (lower education subsidy). In contrast to the

¹⁷Note that the absence of a redistributive preference in this case relies on a constant marginal utility of income at the individual level. In general, with non-constant private marginal utilities of income, also a utilitarian government has a preference for income redistribution, i.e., $\xi > 0$.

expression for ξ , the distributional benefits in ζ are not weighted with income, since the education choice is discrete. Moreover, there is a correction term $\theta^{-\psi}$ for the fact that the costs of education decline with θ , and more so if ψ is larger. If costs of education are larger for individuals with a lower ability θ , and every individual receives a linear subsidy on total costs, the low-ability individuals receive higher education subsidies in absolute amounts. Hence, the distributional benefits of taxing education decline if the low-ability individuals need to invest more to obtain a higher education. If the costs of education are the same for each individual, we have that $\psi = 0$, and the distributional characteristic ζ only depends on the social welfare weights g_θ .

Finally, we define the income-weighted social welfare weights of each education group as

$$\tilde{g}^L \equiv \frac{\int_{\underline{\theta}}^{\Theta} g_\theta z_\theta^L dF(\theta)}{\int_{\underline{\theta}}^{\Theta} z_\theta^L dF(\theta)} > \tilde{g}^H \equiv \frac{\int_{\Theta}^{\bar{\theta}} g_\theta z_\theta^H dF(\theta)}{\int_{\Theta}^{\bar{\theta}} z_\theta^H dF(\theta)}. \quad (19)$$

The social welfare weights for the low-skilled are on average higher than the social welfare weights for the high-skilled, since the social welfare weights continuously decline in income. Armed with the additional notation, we are able to state the conditions for optimal policy in the next proposition.

Proposition 1. *The optimal lump-sum transfer, income tax and net tax on education are determined by*

$$\bar{g} \equiv \int_{\underline{\theta}}^{\bar{\theta}} g_\theta dF(\theta) = 1, \quad (20)$$

$$\frac{t}{1-t}\varepsilon + \frac{\Delta}{(1-t)\bar{z}}\Theta f(\Theta)\varepsilon_{\Theta,t} = \xi - (\tilde{g}^L - \tilde{g}^H)\varepsilon_{GE}, \quad (21)$$

$$\frac{\Delta}{(1-t)\bar{z}}\Theta f(\Theta)\varepsilon_{\Theta,s} = \frac{s\pi}{(1-t)\bar{z}}\zeta - \rho(\tilde{g}^L - \tilde{g}^H)\varepsilon_{GE}, \quad (22)$$

where $\varepsilon_{GE} \equiv (1-\alpha)\varepsilon_{w^L,t} = -\alpha\varepsilon_{w^H,t} = \frac{\alpha(1-\alpha)\varsigma\delta}{\sigma+\varepsilon+\varsigma\delta(\beta-\alpha)}$ is the general-equilibrium elasticity.

Proof. See Appendix B. □

The optimality condition for the lump-sum transfer b in (20) equates the average social marginal benefit of giving all individuals one euro more in transfers (left-hand-side) to the marginal costs of doing so (right-hand-side), see also Sheshinski (1972), Dixit and Sandmo (1977) and Hellwig (1986).¹⁸

The optimal income tax in (21) equates the total marginal distortions of income taxation on the left-hand side with its distributional benefits on the right-hand side. On the left-hand side, $\frac{t}{1-t}\varepsilon$ captures the marginal deadweight loss of distorting labor

¹⁸The inverse of \bar{g} is the marginal cost of public funds. At the tax optimum, the marginal cost of public funds equals one, since the government always has a non-distortionary marginal source of public finance. See also Jacobs (2018).

supply. The larger the wage elasticity of labor supply ε , the more distortionary are income taxes for labor supply. $\frac{\Delta}{(1-t)\bar{z}}\Theta f(\Theta)\varepsilon_{\Theta,t}$ denotes the marginal distortion of the education decision due to the income tax. A higher marginal tax rate discourages individuals from becoming high-skilled. The larger is the elasticity $\varepsilon_{\Theta,t}$, the larger are the distortions of income taxation on education. The higher the net tax wedge on human capital (in terms of net income) $\Delta/(1-t)\bar{z}$, the more income taxation distorts education, and the lower should the optimal tax rate be. $\Theta f(\Theta)$ measures the ‘size of the tax base’ at the marginal graduate Θ . The higher is the mass of individuals $f(\Theta)$ and the larger is their ability Θ , the more important are tax distortions on education.

The right-hand side of (21) gives the distributional benefits of income taxation. The larger are the marginal distributional benefits of income taxes – as captured by ξ – the higher should be the optimal tax rate. This is the standard term in optimal linear tax models, see also Sheshinski (1972), Dixit and Sandmo (1977), and Hellwig (1986). In addition, $(\tilde{g}^L - \tilde{g}^H)\varepsilon_{GE} > 0$ captures the distributional losses of general-equilibrium effects on the wage structure. We refer to this term as the ‘wage decompression effect’ of income taxes. Income taxation reduces skill formation. Hence, the supply of high-skilled labor falls relative to low-skilled labor. This raises high-skilled wages and depresses low-skilled wages. Consequently, social welfare declines, since the income-weighted welfare weights of the low-skilled workers are larger than the income-weighted welfare weights of the high-skilled workers ($\tilde{g}^L > \tilde{g}^H$). The direct gains of income redistribution (ξ) are therefore reduced by decompressing the wage distribution $((\tilde{g}^L - \tilde{g}^H)\varepsilon_{GE})$. The general-equilibrium elasticity ε_{GE} captures the strength of the wage decompression effect of income taxes. A lower elasticity of substitution σ and a lower labor-supply elasticity ε provoke stronger general-equilibrium responses that erode the distributional powers of income taxation. If the effective labor supply around the skill margin is relatively low compared to aggregate labor supply, i.e. $\delta \equiv \left(\frac{\Theta l_{\Theta}^L f(\Theta)}{L} + \frac{\Theta l_{\Theta}^H f(\Theta)}{H}\right) \Theta$ is small, general-equilibrium effects will not be important for setting optimal tax rates. In the absence of general-equilibrium effects ($\sigma = \infty$), the general-equilibrium elasticity is zero ($\varepsilon_{GE} = 0$), and the wage decompression effect is no longer present.

Like Feldstein (1972), Allen (1982) and Jacobs (2012), we find that optimal linear income taxes are modified in the presence of general-equilibrium effects on wages. However, our economic mechanism is different. In all these papers, general-equilibrium effects depend on differences in (uncompensated) wage elasticities of labor supply between high-skilled and low-skilled workers. In particular, if high-skilled workers have the largest uncompensated wage elasticity of labor supply, then linear income taxes depress labor supply of high-skilled workers more than that of low-skilled workers, and this decompresses the wage distribution. Optimal income taxes are lowered accordingly. However, the reverse is also true: if low-skilled individuals have the highest uncompensated wage elasticity of labor supply, then income taxes generate wage compression, and are optimally

increased for that reason. High- and low-skilled individuals can have different uncompensated labor-supply elasticities due to differences in income elasticities or compensated elasticities. This mechanism is not relevant here, since we assume no income effects and compensated wage elasticities of labor supply are equal for both skill types. Hence, the relative supply of skilled labor does not change due to changes in relative hours worked. Income taxes unambiguously generate wage decompression in our model, since education is endogenous, in contrast to these papers that abstract from an endogenous education decision.

The optimality condition for education subsidies is given in (22). The left-hand side gives the marginal distortions of taxing education on a net basis. The right-hand side gives the distributional benefits of doing so. If $\Delta > 0$, human capital formation is taxed on a net basis. Education distortions are larger if the optimal net tax on education $\frac{\Delta}{(1-t)\bar{z}}$ is larger. $\Theta f(\Theta)$ is the same as in (21). It captures the size of the tax base at the marginal graduate. $\varepsilon_{\Theta,s}$ is the elasticity of education with respect to the subsidy on education. The larger is this elasticity, the more skill formation responds to net taxes, and the lower should be the optimal net tax on education.

For given distributional benefits of net taxes on education on the right-hand side of (22), and for a given elasticity of education on the left-hand side of (22), the optimal subsidy s on education rises if the income tax rate t increases, so as to keep the net tax Δ constant. These results are similar to Bovenberg and Jacobs (2005) who show that education subsidies should increase if income taxes are higher so as to alleviate the distortions of the income tax on skill formation – *ceteris paribus*.¹⁹

Note that there is no impact of education subsidies on labor-supply distortions. Intuitively, a marginally higher education subsidy does not directly affect labor supply on the intensive margin. However, the subsidy does affect labor supply indirectly via changes in the wage distribution.

The distributional gains of net taxes on education are given on the right-hand side of (22). Since $\zeta > 0$, taxing human capital yields net distributional benefits. The higher is the distributional gain of taxing education ζ , the more the government wishes to tax education on a net basis. In contrast to Bovenberg and Jacobs (2005), it is generally not optimal to set the education subsidy equal to the tax rate (i.e., $s = t$) to obtain a zero net tax on education (i.e., $\Delta = 0$). Since investment in education generates infra-marginal rents for all but the marginally skilled individuals, the government likes to tax education on a net basis to redistribute income from high-skilled to low-skilled workers. This finding is in line with Findeisen and Sachs (2016); Colas et al. (2020), who also analyze optimal education policies with discrete education choices.²⁰

¹⁹See also Maldonado (2008), Bohacek and Kapicka (2008), Anderberg (2009), Jacobs and Bovenberg (2011), and Stantcheva (2017).

²⁰Related is Gomes et al. (2018) who show that it is optimal to distort occupational choice in two-sector model if optimal income taxes cannot be conditioned on occupation as in our model.

Furthermore, education subsidies (rather than taxes) generate what we call wage compression effects. $\rho(\tilde{g}^L - \tilde{g}^H)\varepsilon_{GE}$ captures the wage compression effects of subsidies on education. Wage compression gives distributional gains, since the income-weighted welfare weights of the low-skilled are higher than that of the high-skilled ($\tilde{g}^L > \tilde{g}^H$). The general-equilibrium elasticity ε_{GE} captures the strength of wage-compression effects. If wage-compression effects are sufficiently strong, education may even be subsidized on a net basis rather than taxed on a net basis (i.e., $\Delta < 0$), which is in fact the case in our baseline simulation below. This finding confirms Dur and Teulings (2004) who analyze optimal log-linear tax and education policies in an assignment model of the labor market and find that optimal education subsidies may need to be positive.

The finding that education may be subsidized on a net basis contrasts with Jacobs (2012), who also analyzes optimal linear taxes and education subsidies with wage compression effects. However, he models education on the intensive rather than the extensive margin, as in Bovenberg and Jacobs (2005). Education subsidies should then not be employed to generate wage compression, because the wage-compression effect of linear education subsidies is identical to the wage-compression effect of linear income taxes. Hence, education subsidies have no distributional value added over income taxes, but only generate additional distortions in education.

Our findings also differ from Jacobs and Thuemmel (2018). They analyze optimal non-linear income taxes that can be conditioned on skill type in an otherwise very similar model as we study. Importantly, they find that wage compression effects do *not* enter optimal policy rules for both income taxes and education subsidies. Hence, they find that education is always taxed on a net basis, in contrast to this paper. The reason is that any redistribution from high-skilled to low-skilled workers via a compression of the wage distribution can be achieved as well with the income tax system, while the distortions of compressing wages on investments in education can be avoided. Our analysis shows that tax and education policies should be geared towards wage compression in the realistic case that tax rates cannot be conditioned on education. By exploiting general-equilibrium effects on wages the government can redistribute more income beyond what can be achieved with the income tax system alone.²¹

4.2 Effects of SBTC on optimal policy

To understand the mechanisms behind the optimal policy response to SBTC, we study the model's comparative statics. SBTC affects optimal policy through three channels: i)

²¹Furthermore, we should note that it is not the linearity of the tax schedule that drives our results. If we would allow for skill-dependent linear tax rates, wage compression effects will also not be exploited for income redistribution, because skill-dependent linear taxes can achieve exactly the same income redistribution as wage compression. The reason is that wage rates are linear prices so that linear tax rates are sufficient to achieve the same income redistribution as wage compression.

Table 2: Effect of SBTC on determinants of optimal tax and subsidy rate

		Distributional benefits	Education distortions	Wage-compression effects
Comparative statics of the optimal tax rate				
Term in (21)		ξ	$\frac{\Delta}{(1-t)\bar{z}}\Theta f(\Theta)\varepsilon_{\Theta,t}$	$(\tilde{g}^L - \tilde{g}^H)\varepsilon_{GE}$
Direction	$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{analytical} \\ \text{numerical} \end{array} \right.$	$\begin{array}{c} \uparrow\downarrow \\ \uparrow \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} \uparrow\downarrow \\ \downarrow \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} \uparrow\downarrow \\ \uparrow \end{array}$
Comparative statics of the optimal subsidy rate				
Term in (22)		$\frac{s\pi}{(1-t)\bar{z}}\zeta$	$\frac{\Delta}{(1-t)\bar{z}}\Theta f(\Theta)\varepsilon_{\Theta,s}$	$\rho(\tilde{g}^L - \tilde{g}^H)\varepsilon_{GE}$
Direction	$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{analytical} \\ \text{numerical} \end{array} \right.$	$\begin{array}{c} \uparrow\downarrow \\ \uparrow \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} \uparrow\downarrow \\ \downarrow \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} \uparrow\downarrow \\ \uparrow \end{array}$

Note: Derivations for the analytical comparative statics are provided in Appendix F. The details of the numerical comparative statics are given in Table 5.

distributional benefits, ii) education distortions, and iii) wage-compression effects. We do not report the effect of SBTC on labor-supply distortions; The marginal excess burden of income taxes ($\frac{t}{1-t}\varepsilon$) is not affected by SBTC, since the labor-supply elasticity ε is the same for all individuals.

We derive analytically how an increase in skill bias affects the corresponding terms in the formula for the optimal income tax rate (21) and in the formula for the optimal subsidy rate (22). Appendix F contains the formal derivations and more detailed explanations.

Table 2 summarizes the analytical comparative statics and shows that the impact of SBTC is theoretically ambiguous on all elements of the expressions for optimal income taxes and optimal education subsidies in Proposition 1. Therefore, to gain a better understanding of the sign and quantitative size of these effects, we proceed by numerically analyzing the impact of SBTC on optimal policy. Table 2 summarizes the outcomes of our simulations of the impact of SBTC on optimal policy, to which we turn next.

5 Simulation

In this section, we simulate the consequences of SBTC for optimal tax and education policy. To do so, we first calibrate the model to the US economy. Then, we analyze the comparative statics of SBTC on optimal policy and reveal the mechanisms whereby SBTC affects optimal tax and education policy.

5.1 Calibration

The aim of the calibration is to capture the essence of SBTC: a rising skill-premium alongside an increase in the share of high-skilled workers. We calibrate our model to the US economy using data from the US Current Population Survey.²² We choose 1980 as the base year for the calibration, since evidence of SBTC emerges around that time. The final year is 2016.

To compute levels and changes in the skill premium and the share of high-skilled workers in the data, we classify individuals with at least a college degree as high-skilled and all other individuals as low-skilled. The share of high-skilled workers in the working population was 24% in 1980 and 47% in 2016. We define the skill premium as average hourly earnings of high-skilled workers relative to average hourly earnings of low-skilled workers:

$$\text{skill premium} \equiv \frac{w^H \frac{1}{1-F(\Theta)} \int_{\Theta}^{\bar{\theta}} \theta dF(\theta)}{w^L \frac{1}{F(\Theta)} \int_{\underline{\theta}}^{\Theta} \theta dF(\theta)}. \quad (23)$$

In the data, the skill premium changed from 1.47 in 1980 to 1.77 in 2016 which is an increase of 21%.

If available, we take the model parameters from the literature. We do so for the parameters of the utility function, the ability distribution, and the production function to match the labor-supply elasticity, pre-tax earnings inequality, and the substitution elasticity between high-skilled and low-skilled workers. Other parameters, including those of the cost function for education and the aggregate production function, are calibrated to match levels and changes in the skill premium and the share of high-skilled.

We set the compensated wage elasticity of labor supply to $\varepsilon = 0.3$, based on evidence reported in the surveys of Blundell and Macurdy (1999) and Meghir and Phillips (2010). Although estimated uncompensated labor-supply elasticities are typically lower, we use a somewhat higher value to approximate the compensated labor-supply elasticity. Moreover, in our model, ε can also be interpreted as the elasticity of taxable income. The empirical literature typically reports figures in the range of 0.15-0.40 for this elasticity, see the survey by Saez et al. (2012).

For the ability distribution $F(\theta)$, we follow Tuomala (2010) and assume a log-normal distribution with mean $\mu^\theta = 0.4$ and standard deviation $\sigma^\theta = 0.39$. We append a Pareto tail to the log-normal distribution with parameter $\alpha = 2$, which corresponds to empirical estimates provided in Atkinson et al. (2011).²³

Technology is modeled according to the production function in equation (7). We set the elasticity of substitution between skilled and unskilled workers at $\sigma = 2.9$, following

²²Details of the data and our sample are discussed in Appendix C.

²³We append the Pareto tail such that the slopes of the log-normal and Pareto distributions are identical at the cut-off. We proportionately rescale the densities of the resulting distribution to ensure they sum to one.

Acemoglu and Autor (2012).²⁴ We normalize the level of skill bias in 1980 to $A_{1980} = 1$. SBTC between 1980 and 2016 then corresponds to an increase from A_{1980} to A_{2016} , while keeping all other production function parameters fixed.

We choose a social welfare function with a constant elasticity of inequality aversion $\phi > 0$:

$$\Psi(V_\theta) = \begin{cases} \frac{V_\theta^{1-\phi}}{1-\phi}, & \phi \neq 1 \\ \ln(V_\theta), & \phi = 1 \end{cases}. \quad (24)$$

ϕ captures the government's desire for redistribution. $\phi = 0$ corresponds to a utilitarian welfare function, whereas for $\phi \rightarrow \infty$ the welfare function converges to a Rawlsian social welfare function.²⁵ In the simulations, we assume $\phi = 0.3$, which generates optimal tax and subsidy rates close to the ones observed in the data.

We calibrate the model for a given tax rate, transfer, and education subsidy. The marginal tax rate in 1980 was on average $t = 35\%$ (NBER, 2018). The transfer b is pinned down by the average tax rate, which was 18% in 1980. The subsidy rate is set at $s = 47\%$ in 1980 (Gumport et al., 1997). It corresponds to the share of government spending in total spending on higher education in 1981.^{26,27} At the calibrated equilibrium, the tax system also pins down the level of government expenditure R . When we later compute optimal policy, we keep the revenue requirement fixed.

It remains to calibrate the parameters of the cost function for education (π and ψ) as well as the parameters of the production function (B , ω , and A_{2016}). We do this by computing the equilibrium of our model, given the tax and transfer system, and set parameters such as to minimize a weighted distance between the moments generated by our model and the empirical moments. The parameters of the cost function for education are calibrated to match the share of college graduates in 1980 and the enrollment elasticity.

We calibrate ψ in the cost function for education to match an enrollment elasticity of 0.17. We base this elasticity on estimates in Dynarski (2000). Like many other studies, Dynarski (2000) reports quasi-elasticities which are based on the effect of changes in tuition subsidies (in percent) on college enrollment (in percentage points).²⁸ It is commonly estimated that a \$1000 increase in tuition subsidies increases college enrollment by 3 to

²⁴Katz and Murphy (1992) have estimated that $\sigma = 1.41$ for the period 1963 to 1987. Acemoglu and Autor (2012) argue that for the period up until 2008, a value of $\sigma = 2.9$ fits the data better.

²⁵The utilitarian social welfare function is non-redistributive, since the marginal utility of income is constant due to the quasi-linear utility function.

²⁶ $p(\theta)$ corresponds to all direct costs of higher education, which includes grants and subsidies in-kind via government contributions for universities. In contrast, our model abstracts from effort costs of attending higher education.

²⁷The OECD (2018) also provides data on subsidies and spending on higher education. However, the data only go back to 1995. According to the OECD, the share of public spending in total spending on tertiary education was 39% in 1995 in the US.

²⁸See Appendix C for the details of how we convert the quasi-elasticity from Dynarski (2000) to an elasticity.

Table 3: Calibration

Param.	Description	Value	Source
μ^θ	Abil. distr.: mean	0.40	Tuomala (2010)
ς^θ	Abil. distr.: st. dev.	0.39	Tuomala (2010)
α	Abil. distr.: Pareto param.	2.00	Atkinson et al. (2011)
ε	Labor supply elast.	0.30	Blundell and Macurdy (1999); Meghir and Phillips (2010)
A_{1980}	Skill-bias 1980	1.00	normalized
A_{2016}	Skill-bias 2016	2.89	calibrated
σ	Elasticity of substitution	2.9	Acemoglu and Autor (2012)
t	Tax rate	0.35	NBER Taxsim
s	Subsidy rate	0.47	Gumport et al. (1997)
b	Tax intercept	1785.56	calibrated
R	Gvt. revenue	1947.94	implied
π	Cost of educ.: avg. cost param. (in thsd.)	163.50	calibrated
ψ	Cost of education: elasticity	5.32	calibrated
B	Productivity parameter	1189.27	calibrated
ω	Share parameter	0.43	calibrated
ϕ	Inequality aversion	0.3	calibrated

5 percentage points, see Nielsen et al. (2010) for an overview.²⁹

The parameters of the production function (B , ω and A_{2016}) are calibrated to match levels and changes in the skill premium. We choose to match the share of college graduates exactly. Moreover, we put higher weight on matching the relative change in the skill premium than on matching its level, since we are primarily interested in the response of optimal policy to a change in wage inequality. We summarize all calibrated parameters in Table 3.

The implied moments are reported in Table 4. As expected, our model generates a level of the skill premium that is generally too high, since the wage distributions of low and high-skilled workers do not overlap: the least-earning high-skilled worker still earns a higher wage than the best-earning low-skilled worker. In contrast, the relative change in the skill premium is matched well. The employment shares are matched perfectly and the enrollment elasticity in the model is also close to its target.


To illustrate how our model responds to SBTC, we simulate an increase in skill bias while keeping taxes, subsidies and transfers at their calibration values (referred to as status quo). The outcomes are plotted in Figure 1. The share of high-skilled workers exhibits a slight concavity in skill bias, while the skill premium increases almost linearly with skill bias. As a benchmark, we also simulate an economy without taxes and education

²⁹Regarding the response of enrollment to tax changes, there is less empirical evidence. In our model, the enrollment elasticities with respect to the tax and subsidy rate are mechanically related, hence we only target one of them.

Table 4: Calibration: Model vs. Data

Moment	Model	Data
Skill premium in 1980	3.47	1.47
Skill premium in 2016	4.31	1.77
Skill premium: relative change	0.24	0.21
Share of high-skilled in 1980	0.24	0.24
Share of high-skilled in 2016	0.47	0.47
Subsidy elasticity of enrollment	0.16	0.17

subsidies, which we refer to as the ‘laissez-faire’ economy.³⁰ Comparing the laissez-faire and the status quo economy shows the effect of policy: under laissez-faire, the share of high-skilled workers is lower, and correspondingly, the skill premium is higher. We attribute this difference primarily to the education subsidy in the status quo tax system. However, the differences between the two economies are small. Moreover, in both cases the effect of SBTC on the share of high-skilled and the skill premium is very similar.



Note: The horizontal axis corresponds to skill bias A . Status quo refers to the tax system used in the calibration, and summarized in Table 3. Laissez-faire corresponds to $t = 0$ and $s = 0$.

Figure 1: Effect of SBTC under status quo tax system, and under laissez-faire

5.2 Optimal policy and SBTC

We compute optimal policy for different levels of skill bias and show the results in Figure 2. The optimal tax rate t increases monotonically with skill bias from about 36% to 39% (Panel 2a). The optimal subsidy rate s falls monotonically from about 60% to 50% (Panel 2b). The optimal transfer as share of average earnings \bar{z} increases monotonically from about 20% to 30% (Panel 2c). Finally, Panel 2d shows the optimal net tax on skill formation Δ as a fraction of average earnings \bar{z} . Since the optimal net tax is negative, education is subsidized on a net basis. It follows that the wage-compression effects of

³⁰In the ‘laissez-faire’ scenario we adjust the transfer b to maintain government balance, which neither affects the share of high-skilled nor the skill premium.




Figure 2: Optimal policy under SBTC, skill bias A on the horizontal axis

education subsidies are stronger than the direct distributional losses of education subsidies. Moreover, the net tax as a fraction of average earnings increases monotonically from -5% to -2% . In other words, the net subsidy on education becomes smaller with SBTC.

5.3 Numerical comparative statics

To obtain the numerical comparative statics, we start out from the optimum at $A = 1$ and then increase the level of skill bias, while holding s and t fixed. We then compute how each of the terms in the first-order conditions (21) and (22) is affected by the increase in skill bias. For each term, we report its initial level and its change due to SBTC in Table 5. The table is organized such that the effect on policy variables is reported first, followed by terms which are directly related to SBTC. The remaining terms are grouped according to the three channels by which SBTC affects optimal policy: i) distributional benefits, ii) education distortions, and iii) wage-compression effects. The effects have already been summarized in Table 2. We now discuss them in detail.

Table 5: Numerical comparative statics of SBTC

	Initial Value	Change
Policy Variables		
b	1959.07	678.84
s	0.60	0.00
t	0.37	0.00
SBTC variables		
A	1.00	0.21
Θ	2.30	-0.18
w^L	563.72	51.95
w^H	634.45	99.07
α^\dagger	63.16	5.68
$(1 - F(\Theta))^\dagger$	25.00	4.51
Distributional benefits income tax and education tax		
ξ^\dagger	17.85	0.40
ζ^\ddagger	0.89	0.36
ζ/\bar{z}^*	0.08	0.02
Tax-distortions of skill-formation and decomposition		
$\frac{\Delta}{(1-t)\bar{z}}f(\Theta)\Theta\varepsilon_{\Theta,t}^\dagger$	-0.46	-0.35
Δ	-567.78	-312.71
\bar{z}	10729.99	2005.74
Δ/\bar{z}^\dagger	-5.29	-1.62
$f(\Theta)^\dagger$	21.85	6.14
Θ	2.30	-0.18
$f(\Theta)\Theta^\dagger$	50.30	9.03
$\varepsilon_{\Theta,t}^\dagger$	10.84	1.49
β	7.02	-2.11
δ	2.07	0.22
$\delta(\beta - \alpha)$	13.24	-3.57
Subsidy-distortions of skill-formation and decomposition		
$\frac{\Delta}{(1-t)\bar{z}}f(\Theta)\Theta\varepsilon_{\Theta,s}^\dagger$	-0.53	-0.40
$\varepsilon_{\Theta,s}^\dagger$	12.49	1.72
ρ	1.15	0.00
Wage (de)compression effects and decomposition		
$(\tilde{g}^L - \tilde{g}^H)\varepsilon_{GE}^\dagger$	57.08	8.32
$\rho(\tilde{g}^L - \tilde{g}^H)\varepsilon_{GE}^\ddagger$	65.78	9.59
$\tilde{g}^{L\dagger}$	104.22	1.32
$\tilde{g}^{H\dagger}$	69.27	1.71
$(\tilde{g}^L - \tilde{g}^H)^\dagger$	34.95	-0.39
ε_{GE}^\dagger	1.63	0.26
$g\Theta$	0.94	0.03

Note: † Table entries have been multiplied by 100. ‡ Table entries have been multiplied by 1e+04. * Table entries have been multiplied by 1e+07.

5.3.1 Comparative statics of the optimal tax rate

Distributional benefits of income taxes ξ . To understand how SBTC affects the distributional benefits of income taxes ξ , we need to understand how SBTC affects the income distribution and the welfare weights.

By raising the ratio of wage rates w^H/w^L , SBTC changes the income distribution: directly by increasing before-tax wage differentials, and indirectly by affecting labor-supply and education decisions. Since the increase in labor supply is larger the higher is the wage rate or the higher is a worker's ability, income inequality between and within skill-groups increases. Moreover, investment in education rises with SBTC, which also increases income inequality. General-equilibrium effects dampen the labor-supply and education responses by compressing wage differentials, but do not offset the direct increase in inequality. For given welfare weights g_θ , SBTC thus increases the distributional benefits of taxing income.

However, also the welfare weights change with SBTC. First, note that welfare weights decline with utility, since the government is inequality averse. High-ability workers experience the largest infra-marginal utility gain due to SBTC. As a consequence, social welfare weights for high-ability workers fall more than for low-ability workers.

The impact of SBTC on ξ is analytically ambiguous: it raises both the utility of the high-ability individuals relatively more and lowers their welfare weights more. In the numerical comparative statics, we find that SBTC raises the distributional benefits of taxing income (Table 5). The immediate effects on inequality thus dominate changes in welfare weights. *Ceteris paribus*, higher distributional benefits of income taxes ξ call for an increase in the optimal tax rate.

Education distortions of income taxes $\frac{\Delta}{(1-t)\bar{z}}\Theta f(\Theta)\varepsilon_{\Theta,t}$. We begin with the first term in the expression for education distortions of income taxes, $\frac{\Delta}{(1-t)\bar{z}}$. The net tax on education $\Delta \equiv tw^H\Theta l_\Theta^H - tw^L\Theta l_\Theta^L - sp(\Theta)$ is a function of the optimal tax and subsidy rates. On the one hand, Δ increases because SBTC raises the wage differential between the marginally high-skilled and the marginally low-skilled worker – *ceteris paribus*. On the other hand, if education is subsidized ($s > 0$), the net tax Δ falls, because subsidies increase as SBTC lowers the marginal graduate Θ , who has higher costs of education – *ceteris paribus*.³¹ Turning to the denominator, SBTC raises average income \bar{z} .

Next, we turn to the 'size of the tax base' at the marginal graduate, $\Theta f(\Theta)$. Analytically, the impact on this expression is ambiguous. SBTC lowers Θ , but whether or not $\Theta f(\Theta)$ increases depends on the location of Θ in the skill distribution, i.e., before or after the mode. We find numerically that the tax base $\Theta f(\Theta)$ increases with SBTC, hence distortions on education become larger for that reason (Table 5).

³¹If in contrast, $s < 0$, the net tax Δ unambiguously increases with SBTC.

Finally, SBTC changes the elasticity of education with respect to the tax rate $\varepsilon_{\Theta,t} = \varsigma \frac{\sigma + \varepsilon}{\sigma + \varepsilon + \varsigma \delta (\beta - \alpha)} > 0$. It raises the income share of the high-skilled workers α and reduces the measure of the inverse skill premium β . However, the impact of SBTC on δ is ambiguous, making its overall impact on $\varepsilon_{\Theta,t}$ ambiguous as well. In the numerical comparative statics, $\varepsilon_{\Theta,t}$ slightly increases.

Numerically, we find that education is distorted upwards: the net tax on education is negative ($\Delta < 0$) and education is subsidized on a net basis. Moreover, SBTC exacerbates these upward distortions (Table 5). As education distortions become even more negative with SBTC, the tax rate should increase, *ceteris paribus*.

Wage decompression effects of income taxes $(\tilde{g}^L - \tilde{g}^H)\varepsilon_{GE}$. We begin with a discussion of how the difference in income-weighted welfare weights for the low- and the high-skilled, $\tilde{g}^L - \tilde{g}^H$, is affected by SBTC. First, SBTC raises income inequality between and within education groups. Second, SBTC affects the composition of education groups as more individuals become high-skilled. Since the highest low-skilled worker and the lowest high-skilled worker now have a lower ability, both \tilde{g}^L and \tilde{g}^H increase when keeping the schedule of welfare weights fixed. However, even for a fixed schedule of welfare weights the net impact on $\tilde{g}^L - \tilde{g}^H$ is not clear, as it is ambiguous whether \tilde{g}^L or \tilde{g}^H increases more. Third, the schedule of welfare weights changes. Welfare weights for individuals with higher ability or education decrease relative to welfare weights of the individuals with lower ability or education, so that $\tilde{g}^L - \tilde{g}^H$ increases.

Taking these effects together, the analytical impact of SBTC on $\tilde{g}^L - \tilde{g}^H$ is ambiguous, while the numerical impact is negative (Table 5). Although the average welfare weight of the low-skilled workers and the high-skilled workers both increase, this increase is found to be smaller for the low-skilled than for the high-skilled workers. Hence, the impact of larger inequality on welfare weights is offset by the change in the composition of high- and low-skilled workers and the impact of declining welfare weights due to larger inequality.

Next, we turn to the impact of SBTC on the general-equilibrium elasticity $\varepsilon_{GE} = \frac{\alpha(1-\alpha)\varsigma\delta}{\sigma + \varepsilon + \varsigma\delta(\beta - \alpha)}$. SBTC raises the income share α of high-skilled workers and reduces the measure of the inverse skill premium β . However, the analytical impact of SBTC on δ , and thus on ε_{GE} overall, is ambiguous. Numerically, SBTC increases ε_{GE} (Table 5). Hence, if SBTC becomes more important, the skill-premium responds more elastically to changes in policy. Since ε_{GE} increases relatively more than $\tilde{g}^L - \tilde{g}^H$ decreases, we find that wage-decompression effects of income taxes become more important with SBTC. *Ceteris paribus*, this calls for lower income taxes.

All effects combined. Whether the income tax rate rises or falls with SBTC depends on which effects dominate. The increase in distributional benefits as well as larger distortions of net subsidies on education call for an increase in the income tax, whereas

stronger wage-decompression effects are a force for lower income taxes. Numerically, we find that the first two effects dominate (Table 5). As a consequence, SBTC leads to a higher optimal income tax rate.

5.3.2 Comparative statics of the optimal subsidy rate

Distributional losses of education subsidies $\frac{s\pi}{(1-t)\bar{z}}\zeta$. SBTC affects the distributional characteristic of education ζ by changing the social welfare weights g_θ , and by lowering the threshold Θ as more individuals become high-skilled. Like before, the impact of SBTC on social welfare weights is ambiguous. In contrast, the decrease in Θ leads to a higher distributional characteristic ζ – ceteris paribus. Intuitively, as more individuals with lower welfare weights become high-skilled, the average welfare weight of high-skilled workers declines and it becomes more desirable to tax education on a net basis. General-equilibrium effects dampen the labor-supply and education responses by compressing wage differentials. Numerically, we find that SBTC raises the distributional benefits of taxing education ζ (Table 5). Hence, as the distributional losses of education subsidies increase, the subsidy rate should decrease with SBTC, ceteris paribus.

Education distortions of education subsidies $\frac{\Delta}{(1-t)\bar{z}}\Theta f(\Theta)\varepsilon_{\Theta,s}$. The distortions of taxes and subsidies on education only differ by a factor $\rho \equiv \frac{s}{(1-s)(1+\varepsilon)} > 0$, which captures the importance of education subsidies in the total direct costs of education (see also Table 1). This factor is not affected by SBTC. As a consequence, the direction in which SBTC affects distortions on skill formation is the same for taxes and subsidies. As we have argued above, we cannot analytically sign the effect. Numerically, the optimal net tax on education is negative, i.e., there is optimally a net subsidy on education so that there is overinvestment in education compared to the efficient level. Moreover, we find that SBTC exacerbates the distortions that result from overinvestment in education (Table 5). Hence, ceteris paribus, the optimal subsidy rate should decrease with SBTC.

Wage compression effects of education subsidies $\rho(\tilde{g}^L - \tilde{g}^H)\varepsilon_{GE}$. The wage compression effects of taxes and subsidies also differ only by factor ρ . It follows from our discussion of the wage compression effects of taxes that we cannot analytically sign the effect, while numerically we find an increase (see also Table 5). As the wage-compression effect of education subsidies becomes more important with SBTC, the optimal subsidy rate should increase, ceteris paribus.

Combined effect. While increased distributional losses and larger distortions due to overinvestment in education call for a lower subsidy rate, the increased importance of wage compression effects is a force for a higher subsidy rate. Numerically, we find that

the first two effects dominate (Table 5). As a consequence, the optimal subsidy rate falls with SBTC.

5.4 Robustness

We find numerically that the optimal tax rate increases with SBTC, while the optimal subsidy rate falls. We now investigate whether these findings are robust. If so, even though we cannot sign the impact of SBTC analytically, we can be confident that the impact of SBTC on optimal policy holds more generally. We study robustness with regard to different values of i) inequality aversion of the government, ii) the labor-supply elasticity, and iii) the subsidy elasticity of enrollment into higher education.³²

Inequality aversion. The baseline assumes an elasticity of inequality aversion of $\phi = 0.3$. Figure 3 in Appendix E presents robustness checks for two additional levels of inequality aversion: $\phi = 0.1$ and $\phi = 0.5$. Larger elasticities of inequality aversion correspond to higher tax and subsidy rates. Yet, the qualitative pattern is the same as in the baseline (represented by the solid black line): the tax rate increases with skill bias, while the subsidy rate falls.

Labor supply elasticity. We compute optimal policy for $\varepsilon = 0.1$ and $\varepsilon = 0.5$ and present the results alongside the baseline of $\varepsilon = 0.3$ in Figure 4 in Appendix E. As expected, optimal tax rates are higher, the lower is the labor supply elasticity. The optimal subsidy rate at $\varepsilon = 0.5$ is similar to the baseline, while it is higher at $\varepsilon = 0.1$. Again, the qualitative pattern of a rising tax and falling subsidy rate remains.

Subsidy elasticity of enrollment. Empirical estimates of changes in college enrollment in response to an 1000\$ increase in subsidies range from 3 to 5 percentage points (see Nielsen et al. (2010)). We convert these estimates into enrollment elasticities of 0.12 and 0.21, respectively, based on the procedure described in Appendix D. We target these elasticities when recalibrating our model (see Table 6 in Appendix E). The recalibrated models feature enrollment elasticities of 0.11 and 0.19, respectively, thus almost matching the targets. In the final step, we compute optimal policy and plot the results against the baseline model (solid black line) in Figure 5. Differences in enrollment elasticities hardly matter for optimal tax rates. In contrast, optimal subsidy rates are higher, the lower is

³²To study the effect of different labor supply elasticities and enrollment elasticities, we need to recalibrate our model. We present the calibration outcomes in Table 6 in Appendix E. In all calibrations, the change in the skill-premium and the share of high-skilled is kept at baseline values. All models thus capture SBTC in a comparable way. To study robustness with respect to inequality aversion, we do not need to recalibrate, since the corresponding parameter ϕ does not interact with the other model parameters and can thus be set independently.

the enrollment elasticity. Yet, we again find the same qualitative pattern of rising tax and falling subsidy rates.

6 Conclusion

This paper studies how optimal linear income tax and education policy should respond to skill-biased technical change (SBTC). To do so, we introduce intensive-margin labor supply and a discrete education choice into the canonical model of SBTC based on Katz and Murphy (1992) (see also Violante, 2008; Acemoglu and Autor, 2011). We start by deriving expressions for the optimal income tax and education subsidy for a given level of skill bias. The income tax and subsidy trade off direct distributional benefits and wage-compression effects of each policy against distortions of each policy on labor supply and education.

Then, we analyze skill-biased technical change (SBTC), which is shown to have theoretically ambiguous impacts on both optimal income taxes and education subsidies, since SBTC simultaneously changes i) distributional benefits, ii) distortions in education, and iii) wage-compression effects of both policy instruments. To analyze the importance of each channel, the model is calibrated to the US economy to quantify the impact of SBTC on optimal policy. SBTC is found to make the tax system more progressive, since the distributional benefits of higher income taxes rise more than the tax distortions on education and the wage-decompression effects of taxes. Moreover, education is subsidized on a net basis, and thus above its efficient level. Hence, the subsidy indeed exploits general-equilibrium effects for redistribution. However, SBTC lowers optimal education subsidies, since the distributional losses and the distortions of higher education subsidies increase more than the wage-compression effects of subsidies.

In line with Tinbergen (1975) and Dur and Teulings (2004), we find that general equilibrium effects do matter for the optimal design of tax and education policy. Moreover, our findings support the push for more progressive taxation in light of SBTC brought forward by Goldin and Katz (2010). However, Tinbergen and Goldin and Katz also advocate for raising education subsidies to win the race against technology and to compress the wage distribution. Our findings do not support this idea. The reason is that education subsidies not only compress wages, but also entail larger distributional losses and cause more over-investment in education as SBTC becomes more important. The latter are found to be quantitatively more important than the larger benefits of education subsidies in terms of wage compression.

In our model, education policy is only used for second-best reasons: the government cares about redistribution and does not have access to individualized lump-sum taxes. We abstract from other motives which might justify government involvement in education, such as positive externalities, information frictions, and credit constraints (Barr, 2004).

For these factors to change our conclusion, they would have to interact with SBTC. The analysis of such interactions is an interesting avenue for future research.

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Appendix

A Derivation of elasticities

We define $\tilde{x} \equiv dx/x$ as the relative change in variable x , with the exception of $\tilde{t} \equiv dt/(1-t)$. First, we log-linearize the labor-supply equations to obtain:

$$\tilde{l}_\theta^H = \varepsilon(\tilde{w}^H - \tilde{t}), \quad (25)$$

$$\tilde{l}_\theta^L = \varepsilon(\tilde{w}^L - \tilde{t}). \quad (26)$$

Next, we linearize the cutoff ability Θ to find:

$$\tilde{\Theta} = \frac{1}{1 + \varepsilon + \psi} \left[(1 + \varepsilon) \tilde{t} - \frac{s}{1 - s} \tilde{s} - (1 + \varepsilon) \beta \tilde{w}_H - (1 + \varepsilon) (1 - \beta) \tilde{w}_L \right], \quad (27)$$

where we define

$$\beta \equiv \frac{w_H^{1+\varepsilon}}{w_H^{1+\varepsilon} - w_L^{1+\varepsilon}}. \quad (28)$$

Collecting terms, we obtain

$$\tilde{\Theta} = \frac{1 + \varepsilon}{1 + \varepsilon + \psi} \left[\tilde{t} - \frac{s}{(1 + \varepsilon)(1 - s)} \tilde{s} - \beta \tilde{w}_H - (1 - \beta) \tilde{w}_L \right]. \quad (29)$$

Define $\varsigma \equiv \frac{1+\varepsilon}{1+\varepsilon+\psi}$ and $\rho \equiv \frac{s}{(1+\varepsilon)(1-s)}$ to write

$$\tilde{\Theta} = \varsigma \tilde{t} - \varsigma \rho \tilde{s} - \varsigma \beta \tilde{w}_H - \varsigma (1 - \beta) \tilde{w}_L. \quad (30)$$

Next, we log-linearize the labor-market clearing conditions:

$$\tilde{H} = \varepsilon (\tilde{w}^H - \tilde{t}) - \delta_H \tilde{\Theta}, \quad \delta_H \equiv \frac{\Theta^2 l_\theta^H f(\Theta)}{H}, \quad (31)$$

$$\tilde{L} = \varepsilon (\tilde{w}^L - \tilde{t}) + \delta_L \tilde{\Theta}, \quad \delta_L \equiv \frac{\Theta^2 l_\theta^L f(\Theta)}{L}. \quad (32)$$

Finally, we log-linearize the wage equations using the homogeneity of degree zero of the marginal product equations (i.e., $Y_{LL}L = -Y_{LH}H$ and $Y_{HH}H = -Y_{HL}L$) to find

$$\tilde{w}^H = \frac{(1 - \alpha)}{\sigma} (\tilde{L} - \tilde{H}), \quad (33)$$

$$\tilde{w}^L = \frac{\alpha}{\sigma} (\tilde{H} - \tilde{L}), \quad (34)$$

$$\alpha \equiv \frac{HY_H(\cdot)}{Y(\cdot)}, \quad \frac{1}{\sigma} \equiv \frac{Y_{LH}(\cdot)Y(\cdot)}{Y_L(\cdot)Y_H(\cdot)}, \quad (35)$$

where α denotes the income share of the skilled worker in total output, and σ is the elasticity of substitution between low-skilled and high-skilled labor in production. We now have a system of seven linear equations (25), (26), (30), (31), (32), (33), and (34) in seven unknowns $\tilde{l}_\theta^H, \tilde{l}_\theta^L, \tilde{\Theta}, \tilde{H}, \tilde{L}, \tilde{w}^H, \tilde{w}^L$. First, rewrite (31) and (32) by subtracting them from each other

$$\tilde{H} - \tilde{L} = \varepsilon(\tilde{w}_H - \tilde{t}) - \delta_H \tilde{\Theta} - \varepsilon(\tilde{w}_L - \tilde{t}) + \delta_L \tilde{\Theta} = \varepsilon(\tilde{w}_H - \tilde{w}_L) - (\delta_H + \delta_L) \tilde{\Theta}. \quad (36)$$

Define $\delta \equiv \delta_H + \delta_L$ and substitute (30) to find

$$\begin{aligned} \tilde{H} - \tilde{L} &= \varepsilon(\tilde{w}_H - \tilde{w}_L) - \delta (\varsigma \tilde{t} - \varsigma \rho \tilde{s} - \varsigma \beta \tilde{w}_H - \varsigma (1 - \beta) \tilde{w}_L) \\ &= (\varepsilon + \varsigma \beta \delta) \tilde{w}_H + (-\varepsilon + \varsigma (1 - \beta) \delta) \tilde{w}_L - \delta \varsigma \tilde{t} + \delta \varsigma \rho \tilde{s}. \end{aligned} \quad (37)$$

Next, substitute \tilde{w}_H and \tilde{w}_L from (33) and (34) to obtain:

$$\begin{aligned} \tilde{H} - \tilde{L} &= - \left(\frac{\delta \varsigma \sigma}{\sigma + \varepsilon + \varsigma \delta (\beta - \alpha)} \right) \tilde{t} + \rho \left(\frac{\varsigma \delta \sigma}{\sigma + \varepsilon + \varsigma \delta (\beta - \alpha)} \right) \tilde{s} \\ &= \frac{\delta \varsigma \sigma}{\sigma + \varepsilon + \varsigma \delta (\beta - \alpha)} (-\tilde{t} + \rho \tilde{s}). \end{aligned} \quad (38)$$

Since, $\beta > 1$ and $\alpha < 1$ and all other terms in $\frac{\delta \varsigma \sigma}{\sigma + \varepsilon + \varsigma \delta (\beta - \alpha)}$ are positive, an increase in the tax rate reduces high-skilled labor input relative to low-skilled labor input, whereas an increase in the subsidy rate has the opposite effect. Substituting for $\tilde{H} - \tilde{L}$ in (33) and (34) yields:

$$\tilde{w}_H = \frac{(1 - \alpha) \delta \varsigma}{\sigma + \varepsilon + \varsigma \delta (\beta - \alpha)} (\tilde{t} - \rho \tilde{s}), \quad (39)$$

and

$$\tilde{w}_L = \frac{\alpha \delta \varsigma}{\sigma + \varepsilon + \varsigma \delta (\beta - \alpha)} (-\tilde{t} + \rho \tilde{s}). \quad (40)$$

Substituting these results into (30), (25) and (26) and rearranging yields:

$$\tilde{\Theta} = \varsigma \left(\frac{\sigma + \varepsilon}{\sigma + \varepsilon + \varsigma \delta (\beta - \alpha)} \right) \tilde{t} - \varsigma \left(\frac{\sigma + \varepsilon}{\sigma + \varepsilon + \varsigma \delta (\beta - \alpha)} \right) \rho \tilde{s}, \quad (41)$$

$$\tilde{l}_\theta^H = \varepsilon \left(\frac{\delta \varsigma (1 - \beta) - (\sigma + \varepsilon)}{\sigma + \varepsilon + \varsigma \delta (\beta - \alpha)} \tilde{t} - \frac{(1 - \alpha) \delta \varsigma}{\sigma + \varepsilon + \varsigma \delta (\beta - \alpha)} \rho \tilde{s} \right), \quad (42)$$

$$\tilde{l}_\theta^L = \varepsilon \left(-\frac{\sigma + \varepsilon + \varsigma \delta \beta}{\sigma + \varepsilon + \varsigma \delta (\beta - \alpha)} \tilde{t} + \frac{\alpha \delta \varsigma}{\sigma + \varepsilon + \varsigma \delta (\beta - \alpha)} \rho \tilde{s} \right). \quad (43)$$

We can now find explicit expressions for the tax elasticities by setting $\tilde{s} = 0$ and defining

$$\varepsilon_{\Theta,t} \equiv \frac{\partial \Theta}{\partial t} \frac{1-t}{\Theta} = \frac{\tilde{\Theta}}{\tilde{t}} = \varsigma \left(\frac{\sigma + \varepsilon}{\sigma + \varepsilon + \varsigma \delta (\beta - \alpha)} \right) > 0, \quad (44)$$

$$\varepsilon_{w^L,t} \equiv -\frac{\partial w^L}{\partial t} \frac{1-t}{w^L} = -\frac{\tilde{w}^L}{\tilde{t}} = \varsigma \left(\frac{\alpha \delta}{\sigma + \varepsilon + \varsigma \delta (\beta - \alpha)} \right) > 0, \quad (45)$$

$$\varepsilon_{w^H,t} \equiv -\frac{\partial w^H}{\partial t} \frac{1-t}{w^H} = -\frac{\tilde{w}^H}{\tilde{t}} = -\varsigma \left(\frac{(1-\alpha)\delta}{\sigma + \varepsilon + \varsigma \delta (\beta - \alpha)} \right) < 0. \quad (46)$$

$$\varepsilon_{l^L,t} \equiv -\frac{\partial l_\theta^L}{\partial t} \frac{1-t}{l_\theta^L} = -\frac{\tilde{l}}{\tilde{t}} = \varepsilon (1 + \varepsilon_{w^H,t}) = \varsigma \left(\frac{\sigma + \varepsilon + \delta \beta}{\sigma + \varepsilon + \varsigma \delta (\beta - \alpha)} \right) \varepsilon > 0, \quad (47)$$

$$\varepsilon_{l^H,t} \equiv -\frac{\partial l_\theta^H}{\partial t} \frac{1-t}{l_\theta^H} = -\frac{\tilde{h}}{\tilde{t}} = \varepsilon (1 + \varepsilon_{w^L,t}) = \varsigma \left(\frac{\sigma + \varepsilon + \delta (\beta - 1)}{\sigma + \varepsilon + \varsigma \delta (\beta - \alpha)} \right) \varepsilon > 0. \quad (48)$$

Similarly, we obtain the subsidy elasticities by setting $\tilde{t} = 0$ and defining

$$\varepsilon_{\Theta,s} \equiv -\frac{\partial \Theta}{\partial s} \frac{s}{\Theta} = -\frac{\tilde{\Theta}}{\tilde{s}} = \varsigma \left(\frac{\sigma + \varepsilon}{\sigma + \varepsilon + \varsigma \delta (\beta - \alpha)} \right) \rho > 0, \quad (49)$$

$$\varepsilon_{w^L,s} \equiv \frac{\partial w^L}{\partial s} \frac{s}{w^L} = \frac{\tilde{w}^L}{\tilde{s}} = \varsigma \left(\frac{\alpha \delta}{\sigma + \varepsilon + \varsigma \delta (\beta - \alpha)} \right) \rho > 0, \quad (50)$$

$$\varepsilon_{w^H,s} \equiv \frac{\partial w^H}{\partial s} \frac{s}{w^H} = \frac{\tilde{w}^H}{\tilde{s}} = -\varsigma \left(\frac{(1-\alpha)\delta}{\sigma + \varepsilon + \varsigma \delta (\beta - \alpha)} \right) \rho < 0, \quad (51)$$

$$\varepsilon_{l,s} \equiv \frac{\partial l_\theta^L}{\partial s} \frac{s}{l_\theta^L} = \frac{\tilde{l}}{\tilde{s}} = \varepsilon \varepsilon_{w^L,s} = \varsigma \left(\frac{\alpha \delta}{\sigma + \varepsilon + \varsigma \delta (\beta - \alpha)} \right) \varepsilon \rho > 0, \quad (52)$$

$$\varepsilon_{h,s} \equiv \frac{\partial l_\theta^H}{\partial s} \frac{s}{l_\theta^H} = \frac{\tilde{h}}{\tilde{s}} = \varepsilon \varepsilon_{w^H,s} = -\varsigma \left(\frac{(1-\alpha)\delta}{\sigma + \varepsilon + \varsigma \delta (\beta - \alpha)} \right) \varepsilon \rho < 0. \quad (53)$$

A.1 Elasticities with fixed Θ

Suppose Θ is fixed, and thus $\tilde{\Theta} = 0$. Then (31) and (32) simplify to

$$\tilde{H} = \varepsilon (\tilde{w}^H - \tilde{t}), \quad (54)$$

$$\tilde{L} = \varepsilon (\tilde{w}^L - \tilde{t}). \quad (55)$$

Substituting these results in (33) and (34) gives:

$$\tilde{w}^H - \tilde{w}^L = \frac{(1-\alpha)}{\sigma} (\tilde{L} - \tilde{H}) + \frac{\alpha}{\sigma} (\tilde{L} - \tilde{H}) = (\tilde{L} - \tilde{H}) \frac{1}{\sigma} = \varepsilon (\tilde{w}^L - \tilde{w}^H), \quad (56)$$

which holds only if $\tilde{w}^L - \tilde{w}^H = 0$. This implies $\tilde{w}^L = \tilde{w}^H$, and thus from (54) and (55), $\tilde{L} = \tilde{H}$, and thus $\tilde{w}^H = \tilde{w}^L = 0$. Hence if Θ is fixed, policy does not affect wages. A change \tilde{t} still affects labor supplies, but it does so symmetrically across skill groups. Hence, both s and t affect wages only via changing Θ .

B Optimal policy

Introducing η as the Lagrange multiplier on the government budget constraint, we can formulate the Lagrangian for maximizing social welfare as:

$$\begin{aligned} \max_{b,t,s} \mathcal{L} \equiv & \int_{\underline{\theta}}^{\Theta} \Psi(V_{\theta}^L) dF(\theta) + \int_{\Theta}^{\bar{\theta}} \Psi(V_{\theta}^H) dF(\theta) \\ & + \eta \left[\int_{\underline{\theta}}^{\Theta} tw^L \theta l_{\theta}^L dF(\theta) + \int_{\Theta}^{\bar{\theta}} (tw^H \theta l_{\theta}^H - s\pi\theta^{-\psi}) dF(\theta) - b - R \right], \end{aligned} \quad (57)$$

Define marginal social utility as

$$\Psi'_{\theta} \equiv \begin{cases} \Psi'(V_{\theta}^L) & \text{if } \theta < \Theta, \\ \Psi'(V_{\theta}^H) & \text{if } \theta \geq \Theta. \end{cases} \quad (58)$$

Necessary first-order conditions for an optimum are given by:

$$\frac{\partial \mathcal{L}}{\partial b} = \int_{\underline{\theta}}^{\Theta} \Psi'_{\theta} \frac{\partial V_{\theta}^L}{\partial b} dF(\theta) + \int_{\Theta}^{\bar{\theta}} \Psi'_{\theta} \frac{\partial V_{\theta}^H}{\partial b} dF(\theta) - \eta = 0, \quad (59)$$

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{\partial \mathcal{L}}{\partial t} = & \int_{\underline{\theta}}^{\Theta} \Psi'_{\theta} \frac{\partial V_{\theta}^L}{\partial t} dF(\theta) + \int_{\Theta}^{\bar{\theta}} \Psi'_{\theta} \frac{\partial V_{\theta}^H}{\partial t} dF(\theta) \\ & + \eta \left[\int_{\underline{\theta}}^{\Theta} w^L \theta l_{\theta}^L dF(\theta) + \int_{\Theta}^{\bar{\theta}} w^H \theta h dF(\theta) \right] \\ & + \eta \left[\int_{\underline{\theta}}^{\Theta} tw^L \theta \frac{\partial l_{\theta}^L}{\partial t} dF(\theta) + \int_{\Theta}^{\bar{\theta}} tw^H \theta \frac{\partial l_{\theta}^H}{\partial t} dF(\theta) \right] \\ & + \eta \left[\int_{\underline{\theta}}^{\Theta} t \frac{\partial w^L}{\partial t} \theta l_{\theta}^L dF(\theta) + \int_{\Theta}^{\bar{\theta}} t \frac{\partial w^H}{\partial t} \theta l_{\theta}^H dF(\theta) \right] \\ & + \underbrace{[\gamma_{\Theta}^L V_{\Theta}^L - \gamma_{\Theta}^H V_{\Theta}^H]}_{=0} f(\Theta) \frac{\partial \Theta}{\partial t} \\ & - \eta [tw^H \Theta l_{\Theta}^H - tw^L \Theta l_{\Theta}^L - s\pi\Theta^{-\psi}] f(\Theta) \frac{\partial \Theta}{\partial t} = 0, \end{aligned} \quad (60)$$

$$\begin{aligned}
\frac{\partial \mathcal{L}}{\partial s} = & \int_{\underline{\theta}}^{\Theta} \Psi' \frac{\partial V_{\theta}^L}{\partial s} dF(\theta) + \int_{\Theta}^{\bar{\theta}} \Psi' \frac{\partial V_{\theta}^H}{\partial s} dF(\theta) - \eta \pi \left[\int_{\Theta}^{\bar{\theta}} \theta^{-\psi} dF(\theta) \right] \\
& + \eta \left[\int_{\underline{\theta}}^{\Theta} t w^L \theta \frac{\partial l_{\theta}^L}{\partial s} dF(\theta) + \int_{\Theta}^{\bar{\theta}} t w^H \theta \frac{\partial l_{\theta}^H}{\partial s} dF(\theta) \right] \\
& + \eta \left[\int_{\underline{\theta}}^{\Theta} t \frac{\partial w^L}{\partial s} \theta l_{\theta}^L dF(\theta) + \int_{\Theta}^{\bar{\theta}} t \frac{\partial w^H}{\partial s} \theta l_{\theta}^H dF(\theta) \right] \\
& + \underbrace{[\gamma_{\Theta}^L V_{\Theta}^L - \gamma_{\Theta}^H V_{\Theta}^H]}_{=0} f(\Theta) \frac{\partial \Theta}{\partial s} - \eta [t w^H \Theta l_{\Theta}^H - t w^L \Theta l_{\Theta}^L - s \pi \Theta^{-\psi}] f(\Theta) \frac{\partial \Theta}{\partial s} = 0.
\end{aligned} \tag{61}$$

Note that $V_{\Theta}^L = V_{\Theta}^H$ because the marginal graduate Θ is indifferent between being high-skilled or low-skilled.

Next, use Roy's identity to derive that

$$\frac{\partial V_{\theta}^i}{\partial b} = 1, \tag{62}$$

$$\frac{\partial V_{\theta}^H}{\partial t} = -\theta w^H l_{\theta}^H + (1-t) \theta l_{\theta}^H \frac{\partial w^H}{\partial t}, \tag{63}$$

$$\frac{\partial V_{\theta}^L}{\partial t} = -\theta w^L l_{\theta}^L + (1-t) \theta l_{\theta}^L \frac{\partial w^L}{\partial t}, \tag{64}$$

$$\frac{\partial V_{\theta}^H}{\partial s} = \pi \theta^{-\psi} + (1-t) \theta l_{\theta}^H \frac{\partial w^H}{\partial s}, \tag{65}$$

$$\frac{\partial V_{\theta}^L}{\partial s} = (1-t) \theta l_{\theta}^L \frac{\partial w^L}{\partial s}. \tag{66}$$

Recall that the net tax wedge on skill formation is defined as $\Delta \equiv t w^H \Theta l_{\Theta}^H - t w^L \Theta l_{\Theta}^L - s \pi \Theta^{-\psi}$. We define $g_{\theta} \equiv \Psi'/\eta$ as the social welfare weight of individual θ , where g_{θ} gives the monetized value of providing this individual with an additional euro. Therefore, we can simplify the first-order conditions as:

$$\frac{\partial \mathcal{L}}{\partial b} = 0 : \int_{\underline{\theta}}^{\Theta} \frac{\Psi'}{\eta} dF(\theta) + \int_{\Theta}^{\bar{\theta}} \frac{\Psi'}{\eta} dF(\theta) = \int_{\underline{\theta}}^{\Theta} g_{\theta} dF(\theta) + \int_{\Theta}^{\bar{\theta}} g_{\theta} dF(\theta) = 1. \tag{67}$$

$$\begin{aligned}
\frac{\partial \mathcal{L}}{\partial t} &= \int_{\underline{\theta}}^{\Theta} \Psi' \left(-\theta w^L l_{\theta}^L + (1-t)\theta l_{\theta}^L \frac{\partial w^L}{\partial t} \right) dF(\theta) \\
&+ \int_{\Theta}^{\bar{\theta}} \Psi' \left(-\theta w^H l_{\theta}^H + (1-t)\theta l_{\theta}^H \frac{\partial w^H}{\partial t} \right) dF(\theta) \\
&+ \eta \left[\int_{\underline{\theta}}^{\Theta} w^L \theta l_{\theta}^L dF(\theta) + \int_{\Theta}^{\bar{\theta}} w^H \theta l_{\theta}^H dF(\theta) \right] \\
&+ \eta \left[\int_{\underline{\theta}}^{\Theta} t w^L \theta \frac{\partial l_{\theta}^L}{\partial t} dF(\theta) + \int_{\Theta}^{\bar{\theta}} t w^H \theta \frac{\partial l_{\theta}^H}{\partial t} dF(\theta) \right] \\
&+ \eta \left[\int_{\underline{\theta}}^{\Theta} t \frac{\partial w^L}{\partial t} \theta l_{\theta}^L dF(\theta) + \int_{\Theta}^{\bar{\theta}} t \frac{\partial w^H}{\partial t} \theta l_{\theta}^H dF(\theta) \right] - \eta \frac{\Delta}{1-t} \Theta f(\Theta) \frac{\partial \Theta}{\partial t} \frac{1-t}{\Theta} = 0,
\end{aligned} \tag{68}$$

$$\begin{aligned}
\frac{\partial \mathcal{L}}{\partial s} &= \int_{\underline{\theta}}^{\Theta} \Psi' \left((1-t)\theta l_{\theta}^L \frac{\partial w^L}{\partial s} \right) dF(\theta) + \int_{\Theta}^{\bar{\theta}} \Psi' \left(\pi \theta^{-\psi} + (1-t)\theta l_{\theta}^H \frac{\partial w^H}{\partial s} \right) dF(\theta) \\
&- \eta \left[\pi \int_{\Theta}^{\bar{\theta}} \theta^{-\psi} dF(\theta) \right] + \eta \left[\int_{\underline{\theta}}^{\Theta} t w^L \theta \frac{\partial l_{\theta}^L}{\partial s} dF(\theta) + \int_{\Theta}^{\bar{\theta}} t w^H \theta \frac{\partial l_{\theta}^H}{\partial s} dF(\theta) \right] \\
&+ \eta \left[\int_{\underline{\theta}}^{\Theta} t \frac{\partial w^L}{\partial s} \theta l_{\theta}^L dF(\theta) + \int_{\Theta}^{\bar{\theta}} t \frac{\partial w^H}{\partial s} \theta l_{\theta}^H dF(\theta) \right] - \eta \frac{\Delta}{s} \Theta f(\Theta) \frac{\partial \Theta}{\partial s} \frac{s}{\Theta} = 0.
\end{aligned} \tag{69}$$

We will simplify the first-order conditions for t and s in a number of steps.

B.1 Optimal income tax

Rewrite the first-order condition for t using the definitions for $z_{\theta}^L \equiv w^L \theta l_{\theta}^L$ and $z_{\theta}^H \equiv w^H \theta l_{\theta}^H$ to find:

$$\begin{aligned}
\frac{\partial \mathcal{L}}{\partial t} &= - \left[\int_{\underline{\theta}}^{\Theta} \Psi' z_{\theta}^L dF(\theta) + \int_{\Theta}^{\bar{\theta}} \Psi' z_{\theta}^H dF(\theta) \right] + \eta \left[\int_{\underline{\theta}}^{\Theta} z_{\theta}^L dF(\theta) + \int_{\Theta}^{\bar{\theta}} z_{\theta}^H dF(\theta) \right] \\
&+ \frac{t}{1-t} \eta \left[\int_{\underline{\theta}}^{\Theta} z_{\theta}^L \frac{\partial l_{\theta}^L}{\partial t} \frac{1-t}{l_{\theta}^L} dF(\theta) + \int_{\Theta}^{\bar{\theta}} z_{\theta}^H \frac{\partial l_{\theta}^H}{\partial t} \frac{1-t}{l_{\theta}^H} dF(\theta) \right] \\
&+ \int_{\underline{\theta}}^{\Theta} \left[\Psi' + \eta \frac{t}{1-t} \right] z_{\theta}^L \frac{\partial w^L}{\partial t} \frac{1-t}{w^L} dF(\theta) \\
&+ \int_{\Theta}^{\bar{\theta}} \left[\Psi' + \eta \frac{t}{1-t} \right] z_{\theta}^H \frac{\partial w^H}{\partial t} \frac{1-t}{w^H} dF(\theta) \\
&- \eta \frac{\Delta}{1-t} \Theta f(\Theta) \frac{\partial \Theta}{\partial t} \frac{1-t}{\Theta} = 0.
\end{aligned} \tag{70}$$

And, simplify the first-order condition for t using the definitions of elasticities:

$$\begin{aligned}
\frac{\partial \mathcal{L}}{\partial t} = & - \left[\int_{\underline{\theta}}^{\Theta} \Psi' z_{\theta}^L dF(\theta) + \int_{\Theta}^{\bar{\theta}} \Psi' z_{\theta}^H dF(\theta) \right] + \eta \left[\int_{\underline{\theta}}^{\Theta} z_{\theta}^L dF(\theta) + \int_{\Theta}^{\bar{\theta}} z_{\theta}^H dF(\theta) \right] \\
& - \frac{t}{1-t} \eta \left[\int_{\underline{\theta}}^{\Theta} z_{\theta}^L \varepsilon_{l,t} dF(\theta) + \int_{\Theta}^{\bar{\theta}} z_{\theta}^H \varepsilon_{h,t} dF(\theta) \right] \\
& - \int_{\underline{\theta}}^{\Theta} \left[\Psi' + \eta \frac{t}{1-t} \right] z_{\theta}^L \varepsilon_{w^L,t} dF(\theta) \\
& - \int_{\Theta}^{\bar{\theta}} \left[\Psi' + \eta \frac{t}{1-t} \right] z_{\theta}^H \varepsilon_{w^H,t} dF(\theta) - \eta \frac{\Delta}{1-t} \Theta f(\Theta) \varepsilon_{\Theta,t} = 0.
\end{aligned} \tag{71}$$

Important to note here is that all elasticities are independent of θ (they do depend on Θ , however). Hence, they can all be taken out of the integral signs. Next, we define average incomes of the low- and high-skilled

$$\bar{z}^L \equiv \int_{\underline{\theta}}^{\Theta} z_{\theta}^L dF(\theta), \quad \bar{z}^H \equiv \int_{\Theta}^{\bar{\theta}} z_{\theta}^H dF(\theta). \tag{72}$$

By dividing (71) by η and substituting for the definitions, we obtain

$$\begin{aligned}
& - \left[\int_{\underline{\theta}}^{\Theta} g_{\theta} z_{\theta}^L dF(\theta) + \int_{\Theta}^{\bar{\theta}} g_{\theta} z_{\theta}^H dF(\theta) \right] + \bar{z}^L + \bar{z}^H - \frac{t}{1-t} [\varepsilon_{l,t} \bar{z}^L + \varepsilon_{h,t} \bar{z}^H] \\
& - \varepsilon_{w^L,t} \int_{\underline{\theta}}^{\Theta} \left[g_{\theta} + \frac{t}{1-t} \right] z_{\theta}^L dF(\theta) - \varepsilon_{w^H,t} \int_{\Theta}^{\bar{\theta}} \left[g_{\theta} + \frac{t}{1-t} \right] z_{\theta}^H dF(\theta) \\
& - \frac{\Delta}{1-t} \Theta f(\Theta) \varepsilon_{\Theta,t} = 0.
\end{aligned} \tag{73}$$

Next, define the distributional characteristic of labor income as:

$$\xi \equiv 1 - \frac{\int_{\underline{\theta}}^{\Theta} g_{\theta} z_{\theta}^L dF(\theta) + \int_{\Theta}^{\bar{\theta}} g_{\theta} z_{\theta}^H dF(\theta)}{[\bar{z}^L + \bar{z}^H] \int_{\underline{\theta}}^{\bar{\theta}} g_{\theta} dF(\theta)}. \tag{74}$$

Note also that $\bar{z} = \bar{z}^L + \bar{z}^H$ and $w^L L = \bar{z}^L$ and $w^H H = \bar{z}^H$ so that we can write for the income shares:

$$\alpha = \frac{\bar{z}^H}{\bar{z}^L + \bar{z}^H}, \quad 1 - \alpha = \frac{\bar{z}^L}{\bar{z}^L + \bar{z}^H}. \tag{75}$$

Hence, the optimal income tax expression can be written as

$$\begin{aligned}
\xi = & \frac{t}{1-t} [(1-\alpha)(\varepsilon_{l,t} + \varepsilon_{w^L,t}) + \alpha(\varepsilon_{h,t} + \varepsilon_{w^H,t})] + \frac{\Delta}{1-t} \frac{\Theta f(\Theta)}{\bar{z}} \varepsilon_{\Theta,t} \\
& + \varepsilon_{w^L,t} \frac{\int_{\underline{\theta}}^{\Theta} g_{\theta} z_{\theta}^L dF(\theta)}{[\bar{z}^L + \bar{z}^H]} + \varepsilon_{w^H,t} \frac{\int_{\Theta}^{\bar{\theta}} g_{\theta} z_{\theta}^H dF(\theta)}{[\bar{z}^L + \bar{z}^H]}.
\end{aligned} \tag{76}$$

Substitute the income-weighted social welfare weights of each skill group:

$\tilde{g}^L \equiv \int_{\underline{\theta}}^{\Theta} g_{\theta} z_{\theta}^L dF(\theta) / \bar{z}^L$ and $\tilde{g}^H \equiv \int_{\Theta}^{\bar{\theta}} g_{\theta} z_{\theta}^H dF(\theta) / \bar{z}^H$ to find the optimal tax in the proposition:

$$\begin{aligned} & \frac{t}{1-t} [(1-\alpha)(\varepsilon_{l,t} + \varepsilon_{w^L,t}) + \alpha(\varepsilon_{h,t} + \varepsilon_{w^H,t})] + \frac{\Delta}{(1-t)} \frac{\Theta f(\Theta)}{\bar{z}} \varepsilon_{\Theta,t} \\ & = \xi - \varepsilon_{w^H,t} \alpha \tilde{g}^H - \varepsilon_{w^L,t} (1-\alpha) \tilde{g}^L. \end{aligned} \quad (77)$$

Finally, substitute for the elasticities from Appendix A to find:

$$\frac{t}{(1-t)} \varepsilon + \frac{\Delta}{(1-t)} \frac{\Theta f(\Theta)}{\bar{z}} \left(\frac{\sigma + \varepsilon}{\sigma + \varepsilon + \delta(\beta - \alpha)} \right) = \xi - \frac{(1-\alpha)\alpha\delta}{(\sigma + \varepsilon + \delta(\beta - \alpha))} (\tilde{g}^L - \tilde{g}^H). \quad (78)$$

B.2 Optimal education subsidy

Using similar steps as above we rewrite the optimal education subsidy using the definitions for $z_{\theta}^L \equiv w^L \theta l_{\theta}^L$ and $z_{\theta}^H \equiv w^H \theta l_{\theta}^H$ to find:

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{\partial \mathcal{L}}{\partial s} &= \int_{\underline{\theta}}^{\Theta} \Psi' \left(\frac{(1-t)}{s} z_{\theta}^L \frac{\partial w^L}{\partial s} \frac{s}{w^L} \right) dF(\theta) \\ &+ \int_{\Theta}^{\bar{\theta}} \Psi' \left(\pi \theta^{-\psi} + \frac{(1-t)}{s} z_{\theta}^H \frac{\partial w^H}{\partial s} \frac{s}{w^H} \right) dF(\theta) \\ &- \eta \left[\pi \int_{\Theta}^{\bar{\theta}} \theta^{-\psi} dF(\theta) \right] + \eta \left[\int_{\underline{\theta}}^{\Theta} \frac{t}{s} z_{\theta}^L \frac{\partial l_{\theta}^L}{\partial s} \frac{s}{l_{\theta}^L} dF(\theta) + \int_{\Theta}^{\bar{\theta}} \frac{t}{s} z_{\theta}^H \frac{\partial l_{\theta}^H}{\partial s} \frac{s}{l_{\theta}^H} dF(\theta) \right] \\ &+ \eta \left[\int_{\underline{\theta}}^{\Theta} \frac{t}{s} \frac{\partial w^L}{\partial s} \frac{s}{w^L} z_{\theta}^L dF(\theta) + \int_{\Theta}^{\bar{\theta}} \frac{t}{s} \frac{\partial w^H}{\partial s} \frac{s}{w^H} z_{\theta}^H dF(\theta) \right] - \eta \frac{\Delta}{s} \Theta f(\theta) \frac{\partial \Theta}{\partial s} \frac{s}{\Theta} = 0. \end{aligned} \quad (79)$$

Simplify the first-order condition for s using the definitions of the subsidy elasticities:

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{\partial \mathcal{L}}{\partial s} &= \int_{\underline{\theta}}^{\Theta} \Psi' \left(\frac{(1-t)}{s} z_{\theta}^L \varepsilon_{w^L,s} \right) dF(\theta) + \int_{\Theta}^{\bar{\theta}} \Psi' \left(\pi \theta^{-\psi} + \frac{(1-t)}{s} z_{\theta}^H \varepsilon_{w^H,s} \right) dF(\theta) \\ &- \eta \pi \int_{\Theta}^{\bar{\theta}} \theta^{-\psi} dF(\theta) + \eta \left[\frac{t}{s} (\varepsilon_{l,s} + \varepsilon_{w^L,s}) \bar{z}^L + \frac{t}{s} (\varepsilon_{h,s} + \varepsilon_{w^H,s}) \bar{z}^H \right] \\ &+ \eta \frac{\Delta}{s} \Theta f(\theta) \varepsilon_{\Theta,s} = 0. \end{aligned} \quad (80)$$

All elasticities are independent from θ (they do depend on Θ). Hence, they can be taken out of the integral signs. After dividing by η and multiplication with $s/(1-t)$ we obtain:

$$\begin{aligned} & \varepsilon_{w^L,s} \int_{\underline{\theta}}^{\Theta} g_{\theta} z_{\theta}^L dF(\theta) + \varepsilon_{w^H,s} \int_{\Theta}^{\bar{\theta}} g_{\theta} z_{\theta}^H dF(\theta) - \frac{s}{1-t} \pi \int_{\Theta}^{\bar{\theta}} \theta^{-\psi} (1 - g_{\theta}) dF(\theta) \\ & + \frac{t}{1-t} \varepsilon_{l,s} \bar{z}^L + \frac{t}{1-t} \varepsilon_{h,s} \bar{z}^H + \frac{t}{1-t} \varepsilon_{w^L,s} \bar{z}^L + \frac{t}{1-t} \varepsilon_{w^H,s} \bar{z}^H + \frac{\Delta}{1-t} \Theta f(\theta) \varepsilon_{\Theta,s} = 0. \end{aligned} \quad (81)$$

Divide by \bar{z} , use $\tilde{g}^L \equiv \int_{\underline{\theta}}^{\Theta} g_{\theta} z_{\theta}^L dF(\theta) / \bar{z}^L$ and $\tilde{g}^H \equiv \int_{\Theta}^{\bar{\theta}} g_{\theta} z_{\theta}^H dF(\theta) / \bar{z}^H$ and the definition of α to write

$$\begin{aligned} & \varepsilon_{w^L,s} (1 - \alpha) \tilde{g}^L + \varepsilon_{w^H,s} \alpha \tilde{g}^H - \frac{1}{\bar{z}} \frac{s}{1-t} \pi \int_{\Theta}^{\bar{\theta}} \theta^{-\psi} (1 - g_{\theta}) dF(\theta) \\ & + \frac{t}{1-t} \varepsilon_{l,s} (1 - \alpha) + \frac{t}{1-t} \varepsilon_{h,s} \alpha + \frac{t}{1-t} \varepsilon_{w^L,s} (1 - \alpha) \\ & + \frac{t}{1-t} \varepsilon_{w^H,s} (\alpha) + \frac{1}{\bar{z}} \frac{\Delta}{1-t} \Theta f(\theta) \varepsilon_{\Theta,s} = 0. \end{aligned} \quad (82)$$

Collect terms and rewrite to arrive at:

$$\begin{aligned} & \varepsilon_{w^L,s} (1 - \alpha) \tilde{g}^L + \varepsilon_{w^H,s} \alpha \tilde{g}^H - \frac{1}{\bar{z}} \frac{s}{1-t} \pi \int_{\Theta}^{\bar{\theta}} \theta^{-\psi} (1 - g_{\theta}) dF(\theta) \\ & + \frac{t}{1-t} (1 - \alpha) (\varepsilon_{l,s} + \varepsilon_{w^L,s}) + \frac{t}{1-t} \alpha (\varepsilon_{h,s} + \varepsilon_{w^H,s}) + \frac{1}{\bar{z}} \frac{\Delta}{1-t} \Theta f(\theta) \varepsilon_{\Theta,s} = 0. \end{aligned} \quad (83)$$

Now, substitute the definitions of the elasticities from Appendix A to derive the following results:

$$\begin{aligned} & \left(\frac{\alpha \delta}{\sigma + \varepsilon + \delta(\beta - \alpha)} \right) \rho (1 - \alpha) \tilde{g}^L - \left(\frac{(1 - \alpha) \delta}{\sigma + \varepsilon + \delta(\beta - \alpha)} \right) \rho \alpha \tilde{g}^H \\ & = \left(\frac{\alpha (1 - \alpha) \delta}{\sigma + \varepsilon + \delta(\beta - \alpha)} \right) \rho (\tilde{g}^L - \tilde{g}^H), \end{aligned} \quad (84)$$

$$(1 - \alpha) (\varepsilon_{l,s} + \varepsilon_{w^L,s}) = (1 - \alpha) (1 + \varepsilon) \frac{\alpha \delta}{\sigma + \varepsilon + \delta(\beta - \alpha)} \rho, \quad (85)$$

$$\alpha (\varepsilon_{h,s} + \varepsilon_{w^H,s}) = -\alpha (1 + \varepsilon) \frac{(1 - \alpha) \delta}{\sigma + \varepsilon + \delta(\beta - \alpha)} \rho. \quad (86)$$

Thus, we find:

$$\frac{t}{1-t} (1 - \alpha) (\varepsilon_{l,s} + \varepsilon_{w^L,s}) + \frac{t}{1-t} \alpha (\varepsilon_{h,s} + \varepsilon_{w^H,s}) = 0. \quad (87)$$

The condition for the optimal subsidy (83), then simplifies to

$$\begin{aligned} & \left(\frac{\alpha (1 - \alpha) \delta}{\sigma + \varepsilon + \delta(\beta - \alpha)} \right) \rho (\tilde{g}^L - \tilde{g}^H) - \frac{1}{\bar{z}} \frac{s}{1-t} \pi \int_{\Theta}^{\bar{\theta}} \theta^{-\psi} (1 - g_{\theta}) dF(\theta) \\ & + \frac{1}{\bar{z}} \frac{\Delta}{1-t} \Theta f(\theta) \varepsilon_{\Theta,s} = 0. \end{aligned} \quad (88)$$

Substituting for $\varepsilon_{\Theta,s}$ from Appendix A then yields:

$$\begin{aligned} & \left(\frac{\alpha (1 - \alpha) \delta}{\sigma + \varepsilon + \delta(\beta - \alpha)} \right) \rho (\tilde{g}^L - \tilde{g}^H) - \frac{1}{\bar{z}} \frac{s}{1-t} \pi \int_{\Theta}^{\bar{\theta}} \theta^{-\psi} (1 - g_{\theta}) dF(\theta) \\ & + \frac{\Delta}{1-t} \frac{\Theta f(\theta)}{\bar{z}} \frac{\sigma + \varepsilon}{\sigma + \varepsilon + \delta(\beta - \alpha)} \rho = 0. \end{aligned} \quad (89)$$

Substitute $\varepsilon_{GE} \equiv (1 - \alpha)\varepsilon_{w^L,t} = -\alpha\varepsilon_{w^H,t} = \frac{\alpha(1-\alpha)\delta}{(\sigma+\varepsilon+\delta(\beta-\alpha))}$, and the distributional characteristic of the education subsidy ζ , to find the optimal subsidy in the proposition:

$$\frac{\Delta}{1-t} \frac{\Theta f(\theta)}{\bar{z}} \varepsilon_{\Theta,s} = \frac{1}{\bar{z}} \frac{s\pi}{1-t} \zeta - \rho(\tilde{g}^L - \tilde{g}^H) \varepsilon_{GE}. \quad (90)$$

C Data Appendix

Data on wages and educational attainment are taken from the Current Population Survey (CPS) Merged Outgoing Rotation Groups (MORG) as prepared by the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER).³³ The data cover the years from 1979 to 2016, where we focus on the period 1980 to 2016.

We use the same sample selection criteria as Acemoglu and Autor (2011). In particular, individuals are of age 16 to 64 and their usual weekly hours worked exceed 35. We obtain hourly wages by dividing weekly earnings by usual hours worked. We convert all wages into 2016 dollar values using the personal consumption expenditures chain-type price index.³⁴ The highest earnings in the CPS are top-coded. Top-coded earnings are therefore windsorized by multiplying them by 1.5. Like Acemoglu and Autor (2011), we exclude individuals who earn less than 50% of the 1982 minimum wage (\$3.35) converted to 2016-dollars. We also exclude self-employed individuals, as well as individuals whose occupation does not have an `occ1990dd` classification. We weight observations by CPS sample weights. We code education levels based on the highest grade attended (before 1992) and the highest grade completed (after 1992).

D Enrollment elasticity

Dynarski (2000) finds that \$1000 increase in financial aid raised college attendance rates in Georgia between 3.7 and 4.2 percentage points. Before the introduction of the scholarship, average tuition per student was \$1900. Based on data from the US Department of Education, Gumport et al. (1997) document that in 1992 government funding as a percentage of all funding for higher education in the US was around 40%, which we treat as the initial subsidy rate. We consider the tuition of \$1900 as the private cost of higher education, which equals 60% of the total cost of \$3167. A reduction of \$1000 corresponds to a change in the subsidy rate of 0.3 points. Using an initial college enrollment rate in Georgia of 0.32, and assuming an increase of 0.04 in the enrollment share due to the HOPE scholarship, we compute the relative change in enrollment as 0.04/0.32 and the relative change in the subsidy rate as 0.3/0.4. The resulting enrollment elasticity of the subsidy is then equal to 0.17.

³³See <http://www.nber.org/data/morg.html>.

³⁴We obtain the price index from <https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/DPCERG3A086NBEA>.

Table 6: Calibration for robustness checks

Param.	Description	Robustness: Labor supply elast.		Robustness: Enrollment. elast.	
ε	Labor supply elast.	0.1	0.5	0.3	0.3
A_{2016}	Skill-bias 2016	2.80	2.98	2.89	2.89
b	Tax intercept	2391.03	1304.84	1148.87	2229.46
R	Gvt. revenue	2618.99	1417.94	1235.53	2475.36
π	Cost of educ.: avg. cost (in thsd.)	163.50	163.51	163.5	163.50
ψ	Cost of educ: elasticity	4.89	5.78	6.44	4.62
\tilde{A}	Productivity parameter	5760.20	357.24	842.30	1421.53
ω	Share parameter	0.46	0.41	0.45	0.42
	Skill premium in 1980	3.46	3.48	3.29	3.67
	Skill premium in 2016	4.31	4.32	4.09	4.56
	Skill premium: relative change	0.24	0.24	0.24	0.24
	Share of high-skilled in 1980	0.24	0.24	0.24	0.24
	Share of high-skilled in 2016	0.47	0.47	0.47	0.47
	Subsidy elast. of enrollment	0.16	0.16	0.11	0.19

E Robustness




Figure 3: Optimal policy with SBTC - Robustness w.r.t. inequality aversion ϕ
Note: Skill bias A on the horizontal axis. The solid black line corresponds to the baseline calibration.




Figure 4: Optimal policy with SBTC - Robustness w.r.t. labor supply elast. ϵ
Note: Skill bias A on the horizontal axis. The solid black line corresponds to the baseline calibration.




Figure 5: Optimal policy with SBTC - Robustness w.r.t. enrollment elasticity
Note: Skill bias A on the horizontal axis. The solid black line corresponds to the baseline calibration.

F Comparative statics

To obtain the analytical comparative statics for the optimal tax rate, we totally differentiate the first-order condition (21) while keeping the subsidy rate s fixed and allowing the transfer b to adjust in response to changing A and t via the government budget constraint (12) (once s and t are set, b is residually determined). Similarly, we obtain the analytical comparative statics for the optimal subsidy rate by totally differentiating the first-order condition (22) with respect to A and s while keeping the income tax rate t fixed and allowing the transfer b to adjust in response to changes in A and s via the government budget constraint (12).

We note that in our model, optimal taxes and subsidies are jointly optimized. In contrast, we obtain the comparative statics for t by holding s fixed, and vice versa. This approach simplifies the comparative statics. To ensure that fixing either the subsidy rate or the tax rate does not qualitatively change how optimal policy responds to SBTC, we

plot in Figure 6 the optimal tax rate while fixing the subsidy rate, and the optimal subsidy rate while fixing the tax rate. Comparing this with Figure 2 reveals that the direction in which SBTC impacts the optimal tax or subsidy rate is the same, irrespective of whether we optimize over both policies or keep one fixed. However, the magnitude by which policy changes with SBTC is affected.




Figure 6: Optimal policy under SBTC with a constant subsidy rate or tax rate

Note: Skill bias A on the horizontal axis. The respective values of s and t , are fixed at their optimum values at $A = 1$ as displayed in Figure 2.

F.1 Effect on optimal tax rate

Totally differentiating (21) while keeping the optimal subsidy s fixed and rearranging leads to

$$\frac{dt}{dA} = \frac{\frac{\partial \xi}{\partial A} - \frac{\partial}{\partial A} \left(\frac{\Delta}{(1-t)\bar{z}} f(\Theta) \Theta \varepsilon_{\Theta,t} \right) - \frac{\partial}{\partial A} ((\tilde{g}^L - \tilde{g}^H) \varepsilon_{GE})}{\frac{1}{(1-t)^2} \varepsilon - \frac{\partial \xi}{\partial t} + \frac{\partial}{\partial t} \left(\frac{\Delta}{(1-t)\bar{z}} f(\Theta) \Theta \varepsilon_{\Theta,t} \right) + \frac{\partial}{\partial t} ((\tilde{g}^L - \tilde{g}^H) \varepsilon_{GE})}. \quad (91)$$

We argue in Appendix G below that the denominator in (91) is positive. To determine the sign of dt/dA we can therefore focus on the numerator. The optimal tax rate increases with SBTC if the distributional benefits of income taxation increase more than tax-distortions and wage-compression effects taken together.

Distributional benefits of income taxes ξ . Recall that ξ is minus the normalized covariance between income and social welfare weights. By raising the ratio of wage rates w^H/w^L , SBTC directly affects gross incomes. However, incomes are affected indirectly via changes in labor supply. The direct effect increases the income gap between skill-groups. Moreover, since labor supply increases more strongly with the wage rate the higher an individual's ability, income inequality within skill-groups also increases. To see

this, use (4) to write income as

$$z_\theta^j = l_\theta^j w^j \theta = [(1-t)w^j \theta]^\varepsilon w^j \theta = (w^j \theta)^{1+\varepsilon} (1-t)^\varepsilon. \quad (92)$$

An increase in w^j thus has a stronger effect on income z_θ^j the higher is θ . Both the increase of between- and within-group inequality contribute to an increase in ξ .

At the same time, SBTC affects social welfare weights. Consumption, and thus utility, of the high-skilled increase more than for the low-skilled. Whether, as a result, social welfare weights decline more or less steeply with θ depends on the curvature of the social welfare function. Since a strictly concave social welfare function is steeper at low θ and flatter at high θ , the same increase in utility changes social marginal utility more at low θ and less at high θ . There are thus counteracting effects: at high θ , a larger change in utility goes along with social welfare weights being less responsive to such a change, while the opposite is true at low θ . The effect of SBTC on social welfare weights is therefore ambiguous. As a consequence, $\partial \xi / \partial A$ cannot be unambiguously signed.

Education distortions of income taxes $\frac{\Delta}{(1-t)\bar{z}} f(\Theta) \Theta \varepsilon_{\Theta,t}$. To analyze the partial impact of SBTC on the tax distortions of education, write

$$\begin{aligned} & \frac{\partial}{\partial A} \left(\frac{\Delta}{(1-t)\bar{z}} f(\Theta) \Theta \varepsilon_{\Theta,t} \right) \\ &= \frac{1}{1-t} \left[\frac{\partial(\Delta/\bar{z})}{\partial A} f(\Theta) \Theta \varepsilon_{\Theta,t} + \frac{\partial f(\Theta) \Theta}{\partial A} \frac{\Delta}{\bar{z}} \varepsilon_{\Theta,t} + \frac{\partial \varepsilon_{\Theta,t}}{\partial A} \frac{\Delta}{\bar{z}} f(\Theta) \Theta \right]. \end{aligned} \quad (93)$$

The sign of $\frac{\partial(\Delta/\bar{z})}{\partial A}$ is ambiguous. On the one hand, SBTC raises the income gap between the marginally high-skilled and the marginally low-skilled, which raises Δ – ceteris paribus. On the other hand, the costs of higher education for the marginal graduate $p(\Theta)$ (weakly) increase, since Θ falls. If the subsidy rate is positive, education subsidies for the marginal graduate (weakly) increase which lowers Δ . If in contrast $s < 0$, the net tax Δ unambiguously increases with SBTC. However, SBTC also raises \bar{z} . If aggregate income increases relatively more than Δ , Δ/\bar{z} falls nevertheless.

The sign of $\frac{\partial f(\Theta) \Theta}{\partial A}$ is again ambiguous. SBTC lowers Θ , but if $f'(\Theta) < 0$, the density increases as Θ falls, making the overall impact ambiguous. If in contrast, $f'(\Theta) > 0$, SBTC unambiguously decreases $f(\Theta) \Theta$.

Finally, consider $\partial \varepsilon_{\Theta,t} / \partial A$. We have that $\partial \alpha / \partial A > 0$ and $\partial \beta / \partial A < 0$.³⁵ Moreover, we cannot sign the impact of SBTC on δ . Hence, it is unclear whether SBTC raises or lowers $\varepsilon_{\Theta,t}$. Overall, we conclude that whether tax-distortions on education increase or decrease with SBTC is theoretically ambiguous.

³⁵To verify this, write $\alpha = (\frac{H}{L} \frac{w^H}{w^L}) / (\frac{H}{L} \frac{w^H}{w^L} + 1)$. SBTC increases $\frac{H}{L} \frac{w^H}{w^L}$, and thus the numerator increases relatively more than the denominator. Write $\beta = (w^H/w^L)^{1+\varepsilon} / ((w^H/w^L)^{1+\varepsilon} - 1)$, where now the numerator increases relatively less with SBTC than the denominator.

Wage decomposition effects of income taxes $(\tilde{g}^L - \tilde{g}^H)\varepsilon_{GE}$. How does SBTC affect wage decomposition effects? First, we focus on the effect on the income-weighted social welfare weights \tilde{g}^L and \tilde{g}^H defined in (19). An increase in A changes these terms via three channels: by affecting incomes, by affecting social welfare weights, and by affecting Θ . We discuss them in turn.

SBTC increases incomes for both low- and high-skilled (though the high-skilled benefit more). Moreover, according to (92), an increase in the wage rate w^j raises income more the higher is θ . As a result, in \tilde{g}^L and \tilde{g}^H the income weight z_θ^j increases for all g_θ , but more so the higher is θ . After normalizing by aggregate income per skill-group, within skill-groups, g_θ at low θ are weighted relatively less, whereas g_θ at high θ are weighted relatively more. Since social welfare weights are declining in θ , the impact on \tilde{g}^L and \tilde{g}^H is ambiguous. Add to this that the impact of SBTC on the social welfare weights themselves is ambiguous, as has already been discussed.

Finally, consider the effect of SBTC lowering Θ . As the marginal individual becomes high-skilled, both the numerator and the denominator of \tilde{g}^L decrease. However, if $g_\Theta < \tilde{g}^L$, the numerator decreases relatively less than the denominator – and \tilde{g}^L increases.³⁶ In contrast, the lowering of Θ increases both the numerator and denominator of \tilde{g}^H . If $g_\Theta > \tilde{g}^H$, the numerator increases relatively more, and \tilde{g}^H rises with SBTC. Numerically, we find $\tilde{g}^L > g_\Theta > \tilde{g}^H$. Via lowering Θ , SBTC thus contributes to an increase in both \tilde{g}^L and \tilde{g}^H . The overall effect on \tilde{g}^L and \tilde{g}^H , and thus on $(\tilde{g}^L - \tilde{g}^H)$, is theoretically ambiguous.

Next, we turn to the impact of SBTC on ε_{GE} . Whether skill bias increases or decreases ε_{GE} depends on its impact on α , β and δ . Moreover, we have $\partial\alpha/\partial A > 0$, and $\partial\beta/\partial A < 0$ and the sign of $\partial\delta/\partial A$ is ambiguous, prohibiting us to clearly sign the effect on ε_{GE} . We conclude that the theoretical impact of SBTC on wage decomposition effects is ambiguous.

Combined effect. Since we cannot sign the effect of SBTC on the different determinants of the optimal tax rate, the theoretical effect of SBTC on the optimal tax rate is ambiguous.

³⁶To see this, note that sign of the impact of A on \tilde{g}^L via Θ is given by $\text{sgn}[\partial\Theta/\partial A g_\Theta z_\Theta^L f(\Theta)\bar{z}^L - \partial\Theta/\partial A z_\Theta^L f(\Theta) \int_\Theta^\Theta g_\theta z_\theta^L f(\Theta)d\theta] = \text{sgn}(\tilde{g}^L - g_\Theta)$, where we use $\partial\Theta/\partial A < 0$. The derivations for the effect on \tilde{g}^H are analogous.

F.2 Effect on optimal subsidy rate

Totally differentiating (22), while keeping t fixed, leads to

$$\frac{ds}{dA} = \frac{-\frac{\pi}{(1-t)}s\frac{\partial}{\partial A}\left(\frac{\zeta}{\bar{z}}\right) + \frac{\partial}{\partial A}\left(\frac{\Delta}{(1-t)\bar{z}}\Theta f(\Theta)\varepsilon_{\Theta,s}\right) + \rho\frac{\partial}{\partial A}\left((\tilde{g}^L - \tilde{g}^H)\varepsilon_{GE}\right)}{\frac{\pi}{(1-t)}\left(\frac{\zeta}{\bar{z}} + \frac{\partial}{\partial s}\left(\frac{\zeta}{\bar{z}}\right)s\right) - \frac{\partial}{\partial s}\left(\frac{\Delta}{(1-t)\bar{z}}\Theta f(\Theta)\varepsilon_{\Theta,s}\right) - \frac{\partial}{\partial s}\left(\rho(\tilde{g}^L - \tilde{g}^H)\varepsilon_{GE}\right)}. \quad (94)$$

As we argue in Appendix G, the denominator of (94) is positive. To determine the sign of ds/dA we can therefore focus on the numerator.

Distributional losses of education subsidies $\frac{s\pi}{(1-t)\bar{z}}\zeta$. For given s and t , only ζ/\bar{z} is affected by SBTC. To analyze the sign of $\partial\zeta/\partial A$, write

$$\frac{\partial\zeta}{\partial A} = -\int_{\Theta}^{\theta} \theta^{-\psi} \frac{\partial g_{\theta}}{\partial A} dF(\Theta) - \frac{\partial\Theta}{\partial A} \Theta^{-\psi} (1 - g_{\Theta}) f(\Theta). \quad (95)$$

SBTC thus affects ζ via two channels: by changing the social welfare weights g_{θ} , and by lowering the threshold Θ . We have already argued that the impact of SBTC on social welfare weights is ambiguous. The drop in Θ corresponds to more individuals becoming high-skilled. If the social welfare weight attached to the newly high-skilled is lower than one, as one would expect, ζ increases. Intuitively, as more individuals with lower-than-average social welfare weights become high-skilled, it becomes more beneficial to raise revenue from the high-skilled by taxing education. In addition, SBTC unambiguously increases \bar{z} , and with $\partial\zeta/\partial A > 0$ the theoretical impact on ζ/\bar{z} is unclear.

Education distortions of education subsidies $\frac{\Delta}{(1-t)\bar{z}}\Theta f(\Theta)\varepsilon_{\Theta,s}$. Turning to the distortions of education, note that the tax-distortions and subsidy-distortions of education only differ by a factor ρ . Since ρ is not affected by A , the effect of SBTC on the subsidy-distortions of education is ρ times the impact of SBTC on the tax-distortions of education, which – as argued above – is theoretically ambiguous.

Wage-compression effects education subsidies $\rho(\tilde{g}^L - \tilde{g}^H)\varepsilon_{GE}$. We have already discussed the effect of an increase in skill bias on wage-compression effects when analyzing the response of the optimal tax rate given by (91) – all that differs, is that now the effect is multiplied by ρ , which is unaffected by A . As a consequence, the impact of SBTC on wage-compression effects is ambiguous.

Combined effect. Since we cannot sign the effect of SBTC on the different determinants of the optimal subsidy rate, the theoretical effect of SBTC on the optimal subsidy rate is ambiguous.

G Comparative statics: Denominators

In this Section, we discuss the impact of an increase in skill bias on the denominators in (91) and (94). Combining analytical and numerical insights, we argue that in both cases, the denominator is positive.

G.1 Denominator of (91)

Distributional benefits of income taxes ξ . An increase in t affects gross incomes and social welfare weights. Gross incomes fall as higher taxes distort labor supply downwards. Since this distortion is larger for individuals with high ability, the income distribution becomes compressed, which contributes to a drop in ξ . Social welfare weights change for two reasons. First, a drop in gross income directly lowers consumption of each individual, thereby lowering utility. Second, the increased tax revenue is redistributed lump sum, increasing everyone's utility. Individuals of low ability on net gain utility relative to individuals of high ability. This leads to a decrease of social welfare weights at the bottom and an increase at the top. In other words, social welfare weights become flatter. With incomes that are more equal, and social welfare weights declining less steeply, the benefits of redistributing with the income tax decline, that is $\partial\xi/\partial t < 0$. This is also confirmed by our numerical results in Table 8.

Education distortions of income taxes $\frac{\Delta}{(1-t)\bar{z}}f(\Theta)\Theta\varepsilon_{\Theta,t}$. The term $\frac{\partial(\Delta/\bar{z})}{\partial t}$ is likely to be positive. For given incomes z_{Θ}^H and z_{Θ}^L , a higher tax rate leads to a larger increase in tax revenue if the marginal individual becomes high-skilled, contributing to an increase of Δ . Still, a change in the tax rate lowers incomes, as it distorts labor supply downwards, and more so for the high-skilled than the low-skilled workers, partly counteracting the increase in tax revenue.³⁷ Moreover, by increasing Θ , expenditures on education subsidies are affected. If education is subsidized ($s > 0$), expenditures on education subsidies fall, since $p(\Theta)$ (weakly) decreases in Θ , thereby contributing to an increase in Δ . In contrast, if education is taxed ($s < 0$), revenue from the education tax falls, which lowers Δ – ceteris paribus. Still, we expect an increase in Δ unless the latter effect is very strong. In addition, \bar{z} decreases with t due to labor-supply distortions, and we thus also expect Δ/\bar{z} to increase with t . Numerically, we confirm that both Δ and Δ/\bar{z} increase with t (Table 8). The impact of a higher tax on $\Theta f(\Theta)$ is less clear. While Θ increases, $f(\Theta)$ may increase or decrease, depending on the shape of the density and the location of Θ . In our simulations, we find a decrease in $f(\Theta)$. Numerically, $\Theta f(\Theta)$ falls with t whereas there is no impact on $\varepsilon_{\Theta,t} = \varsigma$. Overall, distortions on education rise as t becomes larger.

³⁷It is unlikely that, at the optimum, an increase in the tax rate leads to lower tax revenue from the marginal graduate. For that to be the case, the optimal tax rate would have to maximize revenue from the marginal graduate.

Wage decompression effects of income taxes $(\tilde{g}^L - \tilde{g}^H)\varepsilon_{GE}$. Finally, consider the effect of t on wage-decompression effects. First, focus on the terms \tilde{g}^L and \tilde{g}^H . Due to distorting labor supply, incomes z_θ^j are depressed, and more so the higher is θ . After normalizing by aggregate incomes per skill-group, social welfare weights g_θ at low θ receive relatively more weight, whereas the income weighting for social welfare weights at high θ decreases. Since social welfare weights are decreasing in θ – and thus in income – \tilde{g}^L and \tilde{g}^H increase, ceteris paribus. However, so far, we have not taken into account the change in social welfare weights themselves and the increase in Θ . With higher taxes, and thus more redistribution, we expect g_θ to flatten, which ceteris paribus lowers \tilde{g}^L and increases \tilde{g}^H . Finally, for given incomes and social welfare weights, the increase in Θ leads to lower \tilde{g}^L if $g_\Theta < \tilde{g}^L$ and to lower \tilde{g}^H if $g_\Theta < \tilde{g}^H$. Due to decreasing g_θ , we expect $\tilde{g}^H < g_\Theta < \tilde{g}^L$, and thus – ceteris paribus – an decrease in \tilde{g}^L and an increase in \tilde{g}^H . Numerically, we indeed find that \tilde{g}^L falls, while \tilde{g}^H increases. As a consequence, $\tilde{g}^L - \tilde{g}^H$ declines. The impact of t on ε_{GE} works again via α , β , and δ . While higher taxes decrease α , they increase β via general-equilibrium effects. Still, the impact on δ remains ambiguous, making the theoretical impact on ε_{GE} , and on general-equilibrium effects overall, ambiguous as well. Numerically, we find an increase in ε_{GE} . However, the drop in $(\tilde{g}^L - \tilde{g}^H)$ dominates, such that general-equilibrium effects become less important as t increases.

Combined effect. Quantitatively, the decline in wage decompression effects is small compared to the drop in ξ and the increase in education distortions. As a consequence, the denominator in (91) is positive.

G.2 Denominator of (94)

Distributional losses of education subsidies $\frac{s\pi}{(1-t)\bar{z}}\zeta$. An increase in s affects ζ via its impact on social welfare weights, as well as by lowering Θ :

$$\frac{\partial \zeta}{\partial s} = - \int_{\Theta}^{\theta} \theta^{-\psi} \frac{\partial g_\theta}{\partial s} dF(\Theta) - \frac{\partial \Theta}{\partial s} \Theta^{-\psi} (1 - g_\Theta) f(\Theta). \quad (96)$$

The first term is expected to be positive. The second term is positive if $g_\Theta < 1$, that is, if the social welfare weight attached to the marginally high-skilled is below one, as we would expect as well. In this case, raising the subsidy distributes income from low-skilled to high-skilled individuals – thereby increasing the benefits of taxing – rather than subsidizing – education. Numerically, we find $g_\Theta < 1$, and consequently $\partial \zeta / \partial s > 0$ (Table 7). The impact of s on \bar{z} works via raising H/L due to lowering Θ , and depends on the specific production function. For example, if the high-skilled contribute more to output than the low-skilled, output can increase with the subsidy rate. Table 7 reports that \bar{z}

increases in s . However, the relative increase in ζ is larger, so that ζ/\bar{z} rises with the subsidy rate.

Education distortions of education subsidies $\frac{\Delta}{(1-t)\bar{z}}\Theta f(\Theta)\varepsilon_{\Theta,s}$. Next, we analyze the impact on the distortions of education:

$$\begin{aligned} & \frac{\partial}{\partial s} \left(\frac{\Delta}{(1-t)\bar{z}} f(\Theta) \Theta \varepsilon_{\Theta,s} \right) \\ &= \frac{1}{1-t} \left[\frac{\partial(\Delta/\bar{z})}{\partial s} f(\Theta) \Theta \varepsilon_{\Theta,t} + \frac{\partial f(\Theta) \Theta}{\partial s} \frac{\Delta}{\bar{z}} \varepsilon_{\Theta,t} + \frac{\partial \varepsilon_{\Theta,t}}{\partial s} \frac{\Delta}{\bar{z}} f(\Theta) \Theta \right]. \end{aligned} \quad (97)$$

First, consider the effect of s on Δ . Using $z_\theta^j = (w^j \theta)^{1+\varepsilon} (1-t)^\varepsilon$, we arrive at

$$\frac{\partial \Delta}{\partial s} = -p(\Theta) + (1+\varepsilon) \frac{\partial \Theta}{\partial s} \Theta^\varepsilon t(1-t)(w^H - w^L) - s p'(\Theta) \frac{\partial \Theta}{\partial s} < 0 \quad (98)$$

$-p(\Theta)$ is the direct effect of a lower Θ on subsidy expenditures, which lowers Δ . In addition, an increase in s has indirect effects on Δ . Due to the lower Θ , the income differential between the marginally high- and low-skilled decreases. Moreover, expenditures on education subsidies increase further, since $-p(\Theta)$ (weakly) increases as Θ falls. This adds to the drop in Δ . Numerically, we confirm $\partial \Delta / \partial s < 0$ (Table 7). Moreover, since \bar{z} increases, we see a drop in Δ/\bar{z} .

As with the tax rate, the impact of the subsidy on $\Theta f(\Theta)$ is theoretically ambiguous. Θ decreases, whereas the impact on $f(\Theta)$ depends on the density. Numerically, we find that the increase in $f(\Theta)$ more than compensates the drop in Θ , so that $\Theta f(\Theta)$ increases. Finally, how does the elasticity $\varepsilon_{\Theta,s}$ respond to an increase in s ? Note that with exogenous wages, $\varepsilon_{\Theta,s} = \varsigma \rho$, with $\rho = \frac{s}{(1-s)(1+\varepsilon)}$. Since ς is not affected by s , and $\partial \rho / \partial s > 0$, $\varepsilon_{\Theta,s}$ increases with s . Still the overall impact on education distortions is theoretically ambiguous. Numerically, we find that education distortions decrease with s .

Wage-compression effects education subsidies $\rho(\tilde{g}^L - \tilde{g}^H)\varepsilon_{GE}$. Finally, we turn to the impact of s on wage-compression effects. A higher subsidy affects the income-weighted social welfare weights \tilde{g}^L and \tilde{g}^H via three channels: by changing the social welfare weights, by changing incomes, and by lowering Θ . A higher subsidy redistributes from the low-skilled to the high-skilled. The direct consequence is that consumption rises most for the marginally high-skilled individual (who faces the highest cost of higher education). Larger utility leads to a decline of social welfare weights for the high-skilled around Θ , due to the concavity of the social welfare function. In addition, the subsidy also affects consumption – and thus utility and social welfare weights – by changing incomes: as Θ falls, H/L increases and the wage differential w^H/w^L is compressed. These general-equilibrium effects raise consumption of the low-skilled workers, while they decrease consumption of the high-skilled workers. For the low-skilled workers, the increase in w^L

runs against the direct loss in consumption due to the higher subsidy. As a consequence, welfare weights for the low-skilled increase less than if there were no general-equilibrium effects on wages. The decrease in w^H partly offsets the gains of the high-skilled workers due to the larger subsidy. Moreover, the high-skilled workers with the highest ability benefited less from the larger subsidy, since they have low direct costs of higher-education. The same individuals experience the largest drop in consumption due to the decreased wage w^H . As a result, we expect social welfare weights to increase at high θ . Hence, taking all effects together, we expect an increase in \tilde{g}^L , whereas the effect on \tilde{g}^H is unclear. The income weighting of the welfare weights suggests that the lower social welfare weights at the top compensate for the decrease around Θ , hence \tilde{g}^H might increase as well. However, the income weights are also affected. As w^H falls, the income distribution among the high-skilled is compressed, and more so at the top. This raises \tilde{g}^H , since social welfare weights decline, and social welfare weights for workers with lower ability θ now receive relatively more weight. In contrast, among the low-skilled income dispersion increases with w^L , which raises g_θ at higher θ . This contributes to a drop in \tilde{g}^L . Finally, the drop in Θ affects \tilde{g}^L and \tilde{g}^H in the same way as SBTC, i.e., \tilde{g}^L and \tilde{g}^H increase if $\tilde{g}^L > g_\Theta > \tilde{g}^H$, which we find to be satisfied numerically. Overall, we find that the higher subsidy raises both \tilde{g}^L and \tilde{g}^H , and since the increase in \tilde{g}^H is more pronounced, $\tilde{g}^L - \tilde{g}^H$ decreases. The impact on the general-equilibrium elasticity ε_{GE} is theoretically ambiguous, since we cannot sign $\partial\delta/\partial s$. Numerically, we find that ε_{GE} decreases with s . Finally, the general-equilibrium term also changes with ρ , which increases in s . Numerically, we find this effect to dominate, such that $\rho(\tilde{g}^L - \tilde{g}^H)\varepsilon_{GE}$ becomes larger as s increases.

Combined effect. If the positive impact on wage-compression effects is large, the denominator of (94) might become negative. However, we find quantitatively that distortions on education decrease by more than the increase in wage-compression effects, and hence, the denominator is positive (compare the respective terms in Table 7).

Table 7: Ceteris paribus impact of changing s

	Initial Value	Change
Policy Variables		
b	1959.07	-136.57
s	0.60	0.30
t	0.37	0.00
SBTC Variables		
A	1.00	0.00
Θ	2.30	-0.21
w^L	563.72	23.74
w^H	634.45	-14.21
α^\dagger	63.16	2.78
$(1 - F(\Theta))^\dagger$	25.00	5.16
Distributional benefits of the income tax and education tax		
ξ^\dagger	17.85	-0.86
ζ^\ddagger	0.89	0.45
ζ/\bar{z}^*	0.08	0.04
Tax-distortions of skill-formation and decomposition		
$\frac{\Delta}{(1-t)\bar{z}} f(\Theta) \Theta \varepsilon_{\Theta,t}^\dagger$	-0.46	-1.08
Δ	-567.78	-2059.23
\bar{z}	10729.99	57.44
Δ/\bar{z}^\dagger	-5.29	-19.06
$f(\Theta)^\dagger$	21.85	7.06
Θ	2.30	-0.21
$f(\Theta)\Theta^\dagger$	50.30	10.32
$\varepsilon_{\Theta,t}^\dagger$	10.84	-4.29
β	7.02	7.65
δ	2.07	0.25
$\delta(\beta - \alpha)$	13.24	19.32
Subsidy-distortions of skill-formation and decomposition		
$\frac{\Delta}{(1-t)\bar{z}} f(\Theta) \Theta \varepsilon_{\Theta,s}^\dagger$	-0.53	-10.09
$\varepsilon_{\Theta,s}^\dagger$	12.49	32.72
ρ	1.15	5.75
Wage (de)compression effects and decomposition		
$(\tilde{g}^L - \tilde{g}^H) \varepsilon_{GE}^\ddagger$	57.08	-21.03
$\rho(\tilde{g}^L - \tilde{g}^H) \varepsilon_{GE}^\ddagger$	65.78	182.94
$\tilde{g}^{L\dagger}$	104.22	1.03
$\tilde{g}^{H\dagger}$	69.27	2.24
$(\tilde{g}^L - \tilde{g}^H)^\dagger$	34.95	-1.21
ε_{GE}^\dagger	1.63	-0.57
$g\Theta$	0.94	0.02

Note: † Table entries have been multiplied by 100. ‡ Table entries have been multiplied by 1e+04. * Table entries have been multiplied by 1e+07.

Table 8: Ceteris paribus impact of changing t

	Initial Value	Change
Policy Variables		
b	1959.07	427.44
s	0.60	0.00
t	0.37	0.05
SBTC Variables		
A	1.00	0.00
Θ	2.30	0.02
w^L	563.72	-2.08
w^H	634.45	1.38
α^\dagger	63.16	-0.26
$(1 - F(\Theta))^\dagger$	25.00	-0.45
Distributional benefits of the income tax and education tax		
ξ^\dagger	17.85	-0.96
ζ^\ddagger	0.89	-0.14
ζ/\bar{z}^*	0.08	-0.01
Tax-distortions of skill-formation and decomposition		
$\frac{\Delta}{(1-t)\bar{z}} f(\Theta) \Theta \varepsilon_{\Theta,t}^\dagger$	-0.46	0.09
Δ	-567.78	159.45
\bar{z}	10729.99	-270.94
Δ/\bar{z}^\dagger	-5.29	1.39
$f(\Theta)^\dagger$	21.85	-0.59
Θ	2.30	0.02
$f(\Theta)\Theta^\dagger$	50.30	-0.91
$\varepsilon_{\Theta,t}^\dagger$	10.84	0.28
β	7.02	-0.31
δ	2.07	-0.02
$\delta(\beta - \alpha)$	13.24	-0.76
Subsidy-distortions of skill-formation and decomposition		
$\frac{\Delta}{(1-t)\bar{z}} f(\Theta) \Theta \varepsilon_{\Theta,s}^\dagger$	-0.53	0.10
$\varepsilon_{\Theta,s}^\dagger$	12.49	0.33
ρ	1.15	0.00
Wage (de)compression effects and decomposition		
$(\tilde{g}^L - \tilde{g}^H) \varepsilon_{GE}^\ddagger$	57.08	-1.93
$\rho(\tilde{g}^L - \tilde{g}^H) \varepsilon_{GE}^\ddagger$	65.78	-2.22
$\tilde{g}^{L\dagger}$	104.22	-0.27
$\tilde{g}^{H\dagger}$	69.27	1.55
$(\tilde{g}^L - \tilde{g}^H)^\dagger$	34.95	-1.81
ε_{GE}^\dagger	1.63	0.03
$g\Theta$	0.94	0.01

Note: † Table entries have been multiplied by 100. ‡ Table entries have been multiplied by 1e+04. * Table entries have been multiplied by 1e+07.