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ADBI Working Paper Series

ECONOMIC INTEGRATION IN CENTRAL ASIA REGIONAL ECONOMIC COOPERATION MEMBER COUNTRIES: FINANCING ECONOMIC CORRIDORS AND SOVEREIGN BONDS MARKET

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Abstract

The nexus of the modes of financing, trade, and transport-related infrastructure, quantum of trade activities, and economic growth is the core area of this paper. It covers the impacts of regional economic integration of Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation (CAREC) member countries on their trade and GDP growth. Though several bilateral and multilateral agreements to boost mutual trade are considered as a measure of economic integration, in the absence of high-quality physical infrastructure of transport and logistic services the implementation of such agreements is not possible. So, the provision of good trade and transport-related logistic services has been taken as a key indicator of integration among the countries in the region. The role of the magnitudes and modes of financing in determining the provision of logistic services and transport-related infrastructure has also been covered in the study. The results emphasize the causal relations between trade and transport-related infrastructure and GDP growth. The most important conclusion is the identification of shortterm external borrowing as the most effective mode of financing. The study does not recommend long-term external borrowing or multilateral borrowing for the development of trade and transport-related infrastructure. The strong, significant, and robust impact of the share of short-term borrowing in total external debt on GDP growth, exports, and infrastructure development indicates the pressure on policy makers and economic managers to utilize resources effectively and efficiently. The global financial architecture should focus on the provision of short-term lending facilities to improve the efficiency of developing projects.

Keywords: Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation, CAREC, regional integration, transport infrastructure, short-term external debt, domestic credit to private sector

JEL Classification: F15, F34, R42

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1. INTRODUCTION

One of the desirable objectives of globalization and a free trade regime is reducing the global disparities in human welfare and development through the interaction of people in a free world. This theory favors the strong mutual dependency, participation, and relations among nations. Some experts have considered regional economic integration as an important way of transitioning from today's world to a world without extreme poverty, characterized by universal healthcare, education, water, and sanitation. There is one premise in this reasoning: that if integration is feasible, transaction costs will be reduced and economies of scale will emerge (Pozuelo-Monfort 2018).

Though the ultimate goal of a free trade regime is global participation, it also encourages regional integration. In this paradigm, regionalization can be considered an initiation of ultimate globalization. So it should not be seen as an alternative approach to globalization; it is a subset of globalization. It is widely believed that economic integration and mutual dependency on economic resources may diffuse political tensions and avert a cold war or warlike situation. The quantum of trade in goods and services (particularly health, education, tourism, and transportation) and cross-border mobilization of labor and capital lead to interactions among the people of participant countries.

Various models and stages of economic integration have been discussed and analyzed in economic literature. Bekeart (1995) analyzed the barriers to economic integration, while Yoshino, Morgan, and Rana (2018) and Li (2014) described economic integration in the context of contemporary globalization and the formation of a monetary union. Integration from the infrastructure development point of view has been described by Yoshino et al. (2018) and Mehar (2015).

Economic integration does not mean economic linkages among nations. In fact, economic integration is something more than economic linkages. In contrast to free trade, economic integration has been considered the second-best option for global trade where barriers to free trade cannot be removed for several political, economic, and social reasons. Various types of trade agreements construct a path for economic integration, but integration requires physical transfer of goods and services from one country to another. This implies that logistics and transport-related infrastructure are integral parts of economic integration. Table 1 explains the various stages of economic integration and indicates that the formation of preferential trading areas, free trade areas, customs economic and monetary unions are the earlier unions. and stages of a complete economic integration. This table is based on Balassa's (1967) theory of economic integration. According to this theory, the barriers to trade are reduced with increased economic integration, while free movement of economic factors across national borders generates demand for further integration, not only economically but also politically. Consequently, economic communities evolve into political unions over time.

No.	Degree of Integration	Scope of Integration
1	Preferential Trading Area (PTA)	A partial abolishment of custom tariffs on the inner borders of member states
2	Free Trade Area (FTA)	A full abolishment of custom tariffs on the inner borders of member states
3	Customs Union	Unified (common external) tariffs on the exterior borders of the union
4	Common Market	Inclusion of the movement of services, capital, and labor into an FTA
5	Economic Union	A combination of the customs union and a common market
6	Fiscal Union	Introducing a shared fiscal and budgetary policy
7	Monetary Union	Introducing a shared currency
8	Complete Economic Integration	Unification of economic policies (tax, social welfare benefits, etc.), reductions in the rest of the trade barriers, introduction of supranational bodies, and gradual moves towards the final stage, a "political union"

Table 1: Stages of Economic Integration

Source: Developed by the author based on Balassa (1967).

Various levels of economic integration have been experimented with in different parts of the world. The North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA), which belongs to the second stage (free trade), has presented a successful model of resource allocations. The European Union (EU) has adopted an advanced version of integration after passing through earlier stages. The eurozone has embraced a single currency (euro), which has eliminated the currency risk. There have been several integration attempts, including Mercosur in Latin America. Ecowas/Comesa/SADC ASEAN Asia. in in sub-Saharan Africa, and SAARC in South Asia. Some supranational institutions have played important roles in establishing economic integrations among countries that are undergoing severe political disputes. For instance, the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) played an important role in the implementation of the South Asian Free Trade Area (SAFTA). However, no significant enhancement in the mutual trade of South Asian countries has been observed because of the rapid growth in nontariff bearers (NTBs) in the trading between India and Pakistan. The most important institution that can play an important role in the economic integration of Asia and Europe is the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO). Currently this institution is emphasizing the construction of economic corridors to connect South Asia, Central Asia, the Middle East, and Europe. Almost the same role is being played in a different way by the Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation (CAREC) Program. The junctions of the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) and the Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation (CAREC) Program is shown in Table 2.

2. CAREC MEMBER COUNTRIES AND TRANSPORT-RELATED INFRASTRUCTURE

The economic history of Central and South Asia is largely associated with the connectivity of trade and natural and human resources among the peoples of Central and South Asian countries. The "Silk Route" and the "Grand Trunk Road" (famously known as the "GT Road" in Pakistan and India) have been providing the major source of this connectivity. The direction of trade and the mobility of human resources in Central Asian Republics were changed from South Asia to Eastern Europe during the Soviet regime. Now, visible signs of the revival of historical routes can be observed in the region. After a long period of economic disassociation among the countries in this region, the Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation (CAREC) Program introduced the concept

of "Economic Corridor Development" (ECD) in 2010, while the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) also introduced several projects aimed at enhancing economic relations among the countries in this region. The ratification of the Customs Convention on the International Transport of Goods under Cover of TIR Carnets (TIR Convention) by the ECO member countries, the white card scheme to make it easier for drivers to travel across the borders in ECO member countries, simplification of the visa process for traveling to ECO member countries, an ECO trade agreement to enhance the trade among the member countries, a visa sticker scheme for leading businessmen to allow them across the border without a visa, and the formation of the "ECO Trade and Development Bank" and the "ECO Insurance Company" are the steps that have been taken by the ECO to revive the historical relations among the Central and South Asian countries.

No.	Country	CAREC Member	ECO Member
1	Afghanistan	\checkmark	
2	Azerbaijan	\checkmark	\checkmark
3	PRC	\checkmark	
4	Georgia	\checkmark	
5	Iran		\checkmark
6	Kazakhstan	\checkmark	
7	Kyrgyz Rep.	\checkmark	\checkmark
8	Mongolia	\checkmark	
9	Pakistan	\checkmark	\checkmark
10	Tajikistan	\checkmark	\checkmark
11	Turkmenistan	\checkmark	
12	Turkey		\checkmark
13	Uzbekistan		

 Table 2: Intersection of CAREC and ECO

Source: Author's compilation.

Several agreements on economic cooperation and trade facilitation have been signed in the present regime, while various bilateral and multilateral organizations are serving to boost the economic relations among the CAREC member countries. However, no significant enhancement in their mutual trade can be observed. In fact, in the absence of good trade and transport-related infrastructure, integration among the Central Asian economies is not possible. This prerequisite step for regional integration is recognized by the member countries and several works to develop the transport-related infrastructure in the member countries are in progress.

The China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) is one of the strategies to improve the regional connectivity for economic and business purposes. It is the main component of the development strategy initiated by the People's Republic of China (PRC), the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), formerly known as "One Belt One Road" (OBOR). The basic concept of the CPEC is to join Gwadar (an Arabian seaport in Pakistan) with Kashgar (Xinjiang province) in the west of the PRC. Other than the BRI, several corridors and trade enhancement projects are in progress in ECO member countries. The following are included in these corridors and projects: the Quadrilateral Agreement on Traffic in Transit (QATT), the Islamabad–Tehran–Istanbul (ITI) Train Network, the Trilateral Transit Trade Agreement (TTTA), the Pakistan–Uzbekistan Transit Trade Agreement, the Pakistan–Iran–Turkmenistan Commerce Cooperation (PITCC), the Afghanistan–

Pakistan–India–Bangladesh–Myanmar (APIBM) Corridor, the Pakistan–India–Nepal Integrated Network, the Central Asia and South Asia (CASA) – 1000 energy corridor, the Indus River Trade Corridor, the North–South Transnational Corridor (Kazakhstan–Turkmenistan–Iran railway link), the Iran–Pakistan–India Pipeline, the Turkmenistan–Afghanistan–Pakistan and India (TAPI) Pipeline, and the Trans-Iranian Canal. All these projects for efficient connectivity in transportation and energy reflect the direction of trade and mobilization of resources in the future (Mehar 2017).

The CPEC starts from the seaport city of Gwadar in Pakistan and runs all the way to the historic western Chinese city of Kashgar near the Tajikistan and Kyrgyz Republic borders. High-speed trains, adjacent major cities and economic zones, power plants, dry ports, water treatment facilities, the prospective oil and gas pipelines from Iran to the PRC, mineral deposit areas, the availability of cheap labor, big markets with growing demand, and good climatic conditions are the favorable factors for success of the CPEC. It is a common opinion that this project may provide connectivity to Central Asian landlocked countries. South Asia, Central Asia, and the Middle East may be connected by this project in a greater way (Mehar 2017).

Several other plans to connect the various countries in Asia and to provide connectivity between Europe and Asia are in progress or under active consideration. One of those big projects is the Trans-Asian Railway (TAR) project, which was initiated by the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (UNESCAP) to create an integrated freight railway network across Europe and Asia. However, it is important to note that the success of this global mega plan depends on the participation of ECO and CAREC member countries.

The deterioration in transport-related logistic services is the biggest barrier to economic integration, while it has been observed that the landlocked countries in Central Asia, Pakistan, and Afghanistan are far behind in the development of trade and transport-related infrastructure compared to other developing countries. We applied the availability of good "trade and transport-related infrastructure' as a proxy of regional integration. It is commonly observed that trade agreements and regional integrations do not get success in the absence of good transport infrastructure and logistics facilities (Mehar 2013). To establish a strong and sustainable economic integration, the participant countries have to improve their transport-related infrastructure.

It is notable that various agreements on regional integration have failed in various parts of world because of the lack of the required trade and transport-related infrastructure. One example of this is the SAFTA (South Asia Free Trade Area), which has failed to make significant improvement in the mutual trade of South Asian countries. Apart from political tensions, the lack of trade and transport-related infrastructure is the main reason for the failure of regional integration in South Asia.

It is quite obvious that compatibility in trade and transport-related infrastructure is required for integration among the countries in the region. The availability of a good and compatible transport and trade-related infrastructure in a country will support its economic integration with the other countries in the region. In the absence of a compatible infrastructure, there will be a requirement to develop the trade and transport-related infrastructure, which is a prerequisite of regional integration. This implies that the quality of the transport infrastructure in a country is an indicator of economic integration.

In the absence of compatible infrastructure, the participating countries will be interested in its development, upgrading, and modernization. The decision to finance the cost of infrastructure development will be determined by the incremental benefits to the participating countries after integration.

3. FINANCING OF TRANSPORT AND TRADE-RELATED INFRASTRUCTURE

One of the problematic areas in developing trade and transport-related infrastructure is the lack of fiscal resources. The financing for the development of transport-related infrastructure is the most important step in considering the benefits of economic integration. It is noteworthy that the development and modernization of physical infrastructure in developing countries during the bipolar regime was largely dependent on subsidized external debts and grants from rich industrialized countries. Such facilitations were based on political ideology and alliances with the big powers. Dependency theory and the "Domino Effect" model explain the sustainability of developmental works in the middle- and lower-middle-income countries in the bipolar regime. Hegemonic stability theory (Kindleberger 1970) has explained the role of leading states in the changes of capabilities of the world economy. The belief in these theories had encouraged the developing countries to depend on big powers for their development. Higher leveraged financing is one of the offshoots of such belief (Mehar 2018).

The Asian Development Bank has estimated that developing Asia will need to invest \$1.5 trillion per year in infrastructure through 2030 to maintain its economic growth momentum and tackle poverty. Total infrastructure financing as a share of gross domestic product (GDP) will need to increase from around 3.8% to 5.6% by 2020 worldwide (Yoshino, Helble, and Abidhadjaev 2018). But the drastic side of infrastructure financing in CAREC member countries is the overdependency on public-sector fiscal resources. Participation of the private sector in infrastructure financing is not common in these countries, while there is no active bonds market.

A worldwide comparison of infrastructure financing shows that debt was the most popular source of financing in 2017. The share of debt financing in infrastructure projects with private participation was 70%, divided between international and local (commercial) participants: 55% financed by international and 15% by local participants. Out of 55% of international debt financing, 30% belonged to DFIs, while 6% were multilateral and 24% bilateral (Inderst 2018). This detail is enough to understand the patterns of infrastructure financing by private sector. It is obvious that long-term debt is the main source of infrastructure financing, while the share of short-term financing is declining globally.

Several options for financing regional connectivity-related projects are available in the contemporary world. Public–private partnership (PPP), infrastructure sovereign bonds, equity participation, public funding, private-sector financing, institutional lending, and bilateral or multilateral borrowing are the possible options for financing transport infrastructure. However, the financing for such megaprojects to build transport and trade-related infrastructure is always associated with some macroeconomic implications. Repayment of debt and interest costs, an impact on the value of the local currency, increases in taxes to generate the funds for repayments, and possible effects on the value of the local currency if repayments are required in foreign currencies are the possible macroeconomic implications of debt financing for such megaprojects. The failure of fiscal policy to meet modern infrastructure requirements in various developing countries emphasizes the importance of the private sector for investment in infrastructure projects. In this study we analyzed the various options for financing transport-related infrastructure economic integration among countries. lt has been for hypothesized that a sovereign bonds market and long-term financing by private-sector organizations can finance the required investment in transport infrastructure for regional integration. It was also thought that financing should be generated through the public or private sectors of participant countries or other international investors. The use of sovereign bonds to finance the corridors' infrastructure may be one of the viable options, but the success of these multilateral global projects requires the participation of all beneficiaries. The issuance of sovereign bonds to finance global or regional projects should not be based on the guarantees of a single country's government. If the objective of the construction of economic corridors is to establish an economic integration, then the participating countries should consider the formation of a fiscal union. The issuance of sovereign bonds jointly by the participant countries of a fiscal union will minimize the political risks, which may reduce the cost of debt. Otherwise, the sizeable subscription of sovereign bonds at appropriate cost cannot be successful in countries where the private bonds market is inactive and its size is negligible.

A comparison of the financial markets and monetary and fiscal policies of CAREC member countries suggests the synchronization of economic policies before launching the sovereign bonds to finance their joint infrastructure projects for their planned economic integration. The formation of a fiscal union ensures the synchronization of tax policies.

Comparison of the macroeconomic and financial markets of ECO and CAREC member countries reveals the limitations of monetary and fiscal policies in these countries. A bird's-eye view of the macroeconomic strength, composition of financial assets, debt burdens, and financial market development of these countries shows a big variation in the financial strength and development. The bonds markets in these countries are not comparable with the industrialized countries while macroeconomic and financial risk exposures reflect the risks associated with the sovereign bonds. The most important point is that there are only four countries (the PRC, Pakistan, Kazakhstan, and Turkey) where capital markets are performing. The capital markets in other CAREC member countries are either not performing or their size is negligible. The patterns of trade and financing in CAREC and ECO member countries are shown in Tables 3 to 6. These patterns show the diversification in the financial development and financing patterns among the countries in the region.

Indicator/Country	Pakistan	PRC	Kazakhstan	Turkey
Infrastructure Development Index	60	45	37	41
Financial Development Index	58	23	47	42
Bonds Market Development Index	30	24	35	40
Risk of Sovereign Debt Crisis	59	7	26	45
Local Currency Sovereign Rating	59	20	32	42
Foreign Currency Sovereign Rating	59	18	28	47

Table 3: Sovereign Risk and Market Strength: Ranking (Based on 62 Countries)

Source: World Economic Forum (2018).

Country/Region/Group	GDP Growth (%)	Exports (billion \$)	Transport and Trade-Related Logistic Index (1–5; 5 is best)	Investment in Transport Infrastructure with Private Participation (billion \$)
	2	007	,	(
Afghanistan	13.8		1.10	
Azerbaijan	25.0	22.4	2.00	
PRC	14.2	1,257.1	3.20	4.49
Georgia	12.6	3.2		0.06
Kazakhstan	8.9	51.8	1.86	0.03
Kyrgyz Republic	8.5	2.0	2.06	
Mongolia	10.2	2.5	1.92	
Pakistan	4.8	21.9	2.37	0.58
Tajikistan	7.8	1.7	2.00	
Turkmenistan	11.1			
Uzbekistan	9.9		2.00	
	For Cor	nparison		
Low-income countries	5.8	81.9	1.98	
Middle-income countries	8.5	4,339.6	2.30	27.88
High-income countries	2.6	12,981.3	3.41	
Europe and Central Asia*	7.7	820.8	2.24	
South Asia	7.3	290.9	2.07	4.51
European Union	3.1	6,755.0	3.34	
World	4.2	17,396.3	2.58	
	20	016		
Afghanistan	2.3	1.1	1.84	
Azerbaijan	-3.1	17.6		
PRC	6.7	2,197.9	3.75	3.47
Georgia	2.8	6.2	2.17	
Kazakhstan	1.1	43.6	2.76	
Kyrgyz Republic	4.3	2.4	1.96	
Mongolia	1.2	5.6	2.05	
Pakistan	5.5	26.8	2.70	
Tajikistan	6.9	0.9	2.13	
Turkmenistan	6.2		2.34	
Uzbekistan	7.8		2.45	
	For Cor	mparison		
Low-income countries	3.2	115.5	2.14	
Middle-income countries	4.3	5,978.0	2.46	21.25
High-income countries	1.7	14,777.1	3.54	
Europe and Central Asia*	1.5	841.6	2.41	
South Asia	7.7	519.4	2.45	2.62
European Union	2.0	7,279.6	3.56	
World	2.6	20.868.0	2.75	

Table 4: Trade and Infrastructure

Source: World Bank (2019).

Country/Region/Group	Domestic Credit to Private Sector (% of GDP)	Total Outstanding Debt (billion \$)	Public Sector Long-term Debt (billion \$)	Short-term Debt (% of Total Outstanding Debt)	Multilateral Debt (% of Total Outstanding Debt)
oounin yn cegion, oroup		(0111011 ¢) 2007	(billion ¢)	Debty	Debty
Afghanistan	6.8	2.0	1.9	1 07	40 49
Azerbaijan	14.4	3.9	2.3	28.99	24 60
PRC	105.7	373.5	86.9	54.54	7.83
Georgia	27.9	3.0	16	22.22	33.99
Kazakhstan	58.9	96.2	17	11.98	0 74
Kvravz Republic	64	2.9	19	11.09	44.39
Mongolia	41.6	1 7	1.5	3 34	54 22
Pakistan	27.8	42.0	36.9	5 30	47 56
Taiikistan	13.2	13	1 1	5 37	49.52
Turkmenistan	10.2	0.9	0.6	10.74	2 70
Lizbokiston		0.9	0.0	10.74	2.70
OZDERISIAN		4.7	3.2	4.20	19.40
Low income countries	12.6		62.1	12 / 2	47.46
Middlo-income countries	12.0 50.7	2014.0	1 178 0	13.43	47.40
High-income countries	1/8 5	3,014.9	1,170.0	23.01	10.50
Furone and Central Asia	140.0	 1 063 8	 277 4	 22.46	 4 37
South Asia	 42 5	289.0	144 5	14 27	28.81
European Union	112.0	200.0	111.0	11.27	20.01
World	127.9	••		••	
	12110	2016	••		
Afghanistan	3.6	2.4	1.9	8.48	40.74
Azerbaijan	32.9	15.0	11.0	9.73	30.45
PRC	156.8	1,415.8	162.7	56.60	2.34
Georgia	61.9	15.8	5.7	14.88	19.94
Kazakhstan	33.0	163.7	21.4	4.25	4.38
Kyrgyz Republic	20.6	7.9	3.6	4.43	17.20
Mongolia	56.9	25.7	5.1	10.06	4.68
Pakistan	16.5	72.2	51.6	9.87	34.77
Tajikistan	19.2	5.3	2.3	15.35	18.89
Turkmenistan		0.5	0.2	29.64	22.51
Uzbekistan		16.3	7.4	2.13	21.44
		For Comparis	son		
Low-income countries	20.7	139.9	109.1	8.19	40.84
Middle-income countries	99.2	6,295.0	2233.3	24.28	8.21
High-income countries	144.6				
Europe and Central Asia	54.1	1,527.8	470.9	14.31	6.05
South Asia	45.6	623.4	269.9	17.17	17.47
European Union	96.0				
World	128.2				

Table 5: Pattern	s of External	Debt Financing
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Source: World Bank (2019).

	Bonds Issued by Private Sector, Nonguaranteed	Bonds (Amount Disbursed) by Private Sector, Nonguaranteed	Bonds Issued by Public Sector, Guaranteed	Bonds (Amount Disbursed) by Public Sector, Guaranteed	Foreign Direct Investment (FDI)
Country/Region/Group	(billion \$)	(billion \$)	(billion \$)	(billion \$)	(billion ^{\$})
		2007			
Afghanistan	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	
Azerbaijan	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	5.0
PRC	0.0	0.7	0.0	1.5	-139.1
Georgia	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	-1.7
Kazakhstan	0.4	11.0	0.4	0.0	-8.0
Kyrgyz Republic	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	-0.2
Mongolia	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	-0.4
Pakistan	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.8	-5.5
Tajikistan	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	-0.4
Turkmenistan	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	
Uzbekistan	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	
		For Comparison			
Low-income Countries	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	
Middle-income Countries	16.6	59.6	40.5	64.4	
High-income Countries					
Europe and Central Asia	2.4	20.2	8.1	16.1	
South Asia	0.4	7.8	5.3	8.6	
European Union					
World					
		2016			
Afghanistan	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	-0.1
Azerbaijan	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.0	-1.9
PRC	0.0	27.6	6.9	9.5	41.7
Georgia	7.9	0.4	0.0	0.3	-1.2
Kazakhstan	0.10	1.0	0.0	0.0	-13.4
Kyrgyz Republic	1.5	0.0	0.0	0.0	-0.6
Mongolia	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.5	4.2
Pakistan	0.0	0.0	0.5	1.0	-2.4
Tajikistan	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	-0.2
Turkmenistan	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	
Uzbekistan	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	
		For Comparison			
Low-income Countries	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	
Middle-income Countries	53.7	76.2	56.9	119.8	
High-income Countries					
Europe and Central Asia	6.1	13.0	9.1	29.0	
South Asia	0.7	3.2	8.8	4.5	
European Union			••		
World					

Table 6: External Financing by	International Market Mechanism
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Source: World Bank (2019).

4. IMPACTS OF THE MODES OF FINANCING: ESTIMATION TECHNIQUES

In the light of all this background, we established a growth model in this study. It is proposed that the underlying objective of regional economic integrations is to accelerate the economic growth. Economic Growth (GROWTH) in this study indicates the annual growth in GDP. The model is based on three equations, which have been estimated through Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimators. In the first equation, it is hypothesized that GDP growth (GROWTH) depends on Exports (EXPRT\$), External Debt Financing (DBTTOT\$). Domestic Credit to Private Sector (DCPSGDP). and Shortterm External Debt (DBTSTTOT). Exports (EXPRT\$) have been taken in billion US dollars, Short-term Debt (DBTSTTOT) as percentage of total external debt, and Domestic Credit to Private Sector (DCPSGDP) as percentage of GDP. The second equation of the model explains the causal factors of exports (EXPRT\$). Foreign Direct Investment (FDI\$) in billion US dollars, Domestic Credit to Private Sector (DCPSGDP) as percentage of GDP, Share of Short-term Debt (DBTSTTOT) as percentage of total external debt, and Transport and Trade-Related Logistic Index (LGSTTRANS) have been taken as explanatory variables in determining the Exports (EXPRT\$) of a country. To measure the quality and capacity of transport infrastructure we applied the "Trade and Transport-Related Logistic Services Index" constructed by the World Bank (2019). This Index ranges from 1 to 5, with "1" indicating the lowest quality of transport and trade-related infrastructure in a country. The third equation in the model identifies determinants of the quality of trade and transport-related infrastructure (LGSTTRANS) in a country. Public-Sector Long-term Debt (DBTLTPB\$), Share of Multilateral Debt in Total External Debt (DBTMLTOT), Share of Short-term Debt in total External Debt (DBTSTTOT), and Domestic Credit to Private Sector (DCPSGDP) as percentage of GDP have been taken as determinants of the Quality of Trade and Transport-related Infrastructure (LGSTTRANS) in a country.

The simultaneity in the model is shown in Figure 1, which explains how regional economic integration is transformed into trade enhancement and GDP growth. Trade enhancement is measured by the Exports (EXPORTS), while the Quality of Trade and Transport-related Infrastructure (LGSTTRANS) has been taken as a proxy of regional integration.

Data for this analysis were extracted from the World Development Indicators data bank (World Bank 2019). The data consist of 219 countries for ten years (from 2007 to 2016). The last two years (2017 and 2018) could not be included in the model because of the unavailability of data on some indicators included in the analysis. It provides 2190 observations.

Through this pooled data we can analyze the impact of the regional integration policies (intervening variables) of participating governments. For this purpose, we need to introduce intervening variables in the model and establish a "difference in differences" (DID) analysis. However, it was observed that the explanatory variables included in our models represent almost the entire effect of the policy interventions. No dramatic changes over time were observed in the explained variables, which may indicate the effect of policy change over time. So we did not introduce the policy intervening variables in the model and applied OLS estimation techniques for all the models included in the study.

Although panel data were used to estimate the parameters, we applied the ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation technique. Country-specific effects were not observed in cross-country comparison, so we have not applied a fixed-effect model.



Figure 1: The Simultaneity in the Model Modes of Financing, Transport Infrastructure, and GDP Growth

Source: Author's depiction.

The robustness in estimated parameters has been checked by using alternative options, with some falsification tests also having been conducted. For this purpose, some control included regression variables have also been in the analysis. То explain GDP Growth (GROWTH) we included aggregate logistic index to measure the impact of all kinds of logistic infrastructure (LGSTALL), Trade to GDP ratio (TRADGDP), Export to GDP ratio (EXPRGDP), Share of Multilateral Debts in Total External Debt (DBTMLTOT), Foreign Direct Investment (FDI\$), Net Inflow of Foreign Direct Investment (FDIINF\$), and Business Losses due to Electric Outage (ELECLOS). In determining Exports, we have also tested the effects of Logistic Index for Tracking the Shipment (LGSTTRAK) and Logistic Index for Custom Services (LGSTCUS).

To explain the quality of trade and transport-related infrastructure (LGSTTRANS), which is a proxy of regional trade integration, we included External Log-term Debt to Private Sector (DBTLTPV\$), Amounts of Bonds Sanctioned to finance private-sector projects (BNDPN\$A), Amounts of Bonds Sanctioned to finance public-sector guaranteed projects (BNDPP\$A), Amounts of Bonds Disbursed to finance private-sector projects (BNDPN\$D), Amount of Bonds Disbursed to finance public-sector guaranteed projects (BNDPP\$D), Foreign Direct Investment (FDI\$), Investment in Transport Infrastructure under the Public-Private Partnership Program (ITRANSPPP), Investment in Transport Infrastructure with Private Partnership (ITRANSPP), Gross Domestic Product (GDP), GDP Growth (GROWTH), and Per Capita Income (PCI\$) as control variables.

The results of the regression analysis are presented in Tables 7, 8, and 9. These results quantify the impacts of the explanatory variables. The OLS results indicate the significance of parameters and overall goodness of fit in the equations. However, some results are surprising and against the common intuitive.

	Option I Option II		on II	II Option III		
Variable	Coefficient	T-statistics	Coefficient	T-statistics	Coefficient	T-statistics
CONSTANT	6.291	3.92	4.209	10.05	4.613	15.99
DBTSTTOT	0.050	3.13	0.015	1.33	0.010	0.95
DBTTOT\$						
DCPSGDP	-0.022	-3.14		-5.94	-0.028	-6.05
EXPRT\$						
DBTMLTOT	0.011	1.36	0.008	1.33		
LGSTALL	-0.823	-1.398				
FDI\$	-2.770E-11	-2.78	-3.707E-11	-4.65	-3.626E-11	-4.56
TRADGDP	0.005	1.06				
EXPRGDP			0.012	1.63	0.010	1.40
Adjusted R ²	0.0	613	0.0	422	0.04	414
F-statistics	5.	71	10	.06	12	.07
	Optio	on IV	Opti	on V	Optio	on VI
Variable	Coefficient	T-statistics	Coefficient	T-statistics	Coefficient	T-statistics
CONSTANT	4.418	17.46	4.357	15.43	4.711	24.20
DBTSTTOT			0.031	3.22	0.027	2.80
DBIIOI\$						
DCPSGDP	-0.025	-8.39	-0.018	-4.09	-0.024	-5.55
EXPRI\$					4.761E-13	3.77
DBIMLIOI						
	4 4545 44	2.40				
	-1.151E-11	-2.49				
	0.011	2 4 2	0.003	0.40		
Adjusted P ²	0.011	2.43	0.003	1/1	0.0	202
F-statistics	27	48	0.0	51	13.04	
1 310103	27.48		6.51		Option IX	
	Ontic	on VII	Ontic	on VIII	Ontio	on IX
Variable	Optic Coefficient	on VII T-statistics	Optic Coefficient	on VIII T-statistics	Optio Coefficient	on IX T-statistics
Variable CONSTANT	Optic Coefficient 4.874	on VII T-statistics 24.94	Optic Coefficient 4.701	T-statistics 24.15	Optio Coefficient 4.289	on IX T-statistics 33.45
Variable CONSTANT DBTSTTOT	Optic Coefficient 4.874 0.018	T-statistics 24.94 1.91	Optic Coefficient 4.701 0.026	T-statistics 24.15 2.75	Optio Coefficient 4.289	T-statistics 33.45
Variable CONSTANT DBTSTTOT DBTTOT\$	Optio Coefficient 4.874 0.018 -3.480E-12	T-statistics 24.94 1.91 -5.04	Optic Coefficient 4.701 0.026	24.15 2.75	Optio Coefficient 4.289 -9.465E-12	T-statistics 33.45 -4.29
Variable CONSTANT DBTSTTOT DBTTOT\$ DCPSGDP	Optic Coefficient 4.874 0.018 -3.480E-12 -0.025	T-statistics 24.94 1.91 -5.04 -5.80	Optic Coefficient 4.701 0.026 -0.023	n VIII <u>T-statistics</u> 24.15 2.75 -5.47	Optic Coefficient 4.289 -9.465E-12	T-statistics 33.45 -4.29
Variable CONSTANT DBTSTTOT DBTTOT\$ DCPSGDP EXPRT\$	Optic Coefficient 4.874 0.018 -3.480E-12 -0.025 3.346E-12	T-statistics 24.94 1.91 -5.04 -5.80 5.74	Optic Coefficient 4.701 0.026 -0.023 -8.886E-13	n VIII T-statistics 24.15 2.75 -5.47 -1.07	Optic Coefficient 4.289 -9.465E-12 6.443E-12	T-statistics 33.45 -4.29 3.79
Variable CONSTANT DBTSTTOT DBTTOT\$ DCPSGDP EXPRT\$ DBTMLTOT	Optic Coefficient 4.874 0.018 -3.480E-12 -0.025 3.346E-12	T-statistics 24.94 1.91 -5.04 -5.80 5.74	Optic Coefficient 4.701 0.026 -0.023 -8.886E-13	n VIII <u>T-statistics</u> 24.15 2.75 −5.47 −1.07	Optic Coefficient 4.289 -9.465E-12 6.443E-12	T-statistics 33.45 -4.29 3.79
Variable CONSTANT DBTSTTOT DBTTOT\$ DCPSGDP EXPRT\$ DBTMLTOT LGSTALL	Optic Coefficient 4.874 0.018 -3.480E-12 -0.025 3.346E-12	T-statistics 24.94 1.91 -5.04 -5.80 5.74	Optic Coefficient 4.701 0.026 -0.023 -8.886E-13	T-statistics 24.15 2.75 -5.47 -1.07	Optic Coefficient 4.289 -9.465E-12 6.443E-12	T-statistics 33.45 -4.29 3.79
Variable CONSTANT DBTSTTOT DBTTOT\$ DCPSGDP EXPRT\$ DBTMLTOT LGSTALL FDI\$	Optic Coefficient 4.874 0.018 -3.480E-12 -0.025 3.346E-12	T-statistics 24.94 1.91 -5.04 -5.80 5.74	Optic Coefficient 4.701 0.026 -0.023 -8.886E-13	Jun VIII T-statistics 24.15 2.75 -5.47 -1.07	Optic Coefficient 4.289 -9.465E-12 6.443E-12 -1.709E-11	T-statistics 33.45 -4.29 3.79
Variable CONSTANT DBTSTTOT DBTTOT\$ DCPSGDP EXPRT\$ DBTMLTOT LGSTALL FDI\$ FDIINF\$	Optic Coefficient 4.874 0.018 -3.480E-12 -0.025 3.346E-12	T-statistics 24.94 1.91 -5.04 -5.80 5.74	Optic Coefficient 4.701 0.026 -0.023 -8.886E-13 1.335E-11	T-statistics 24.15 2.75 -5.47 -1.07 1.66	Optic Coefficient 4.289 -9.465E-12 6.443E-12 -1.709E-11	T-statistics 33.45 -4.29 3.79
Variable CONSTANT DBTSTTOT DBTTOT\$ DCPSGDP EXPRT\$ DBTMLTOT LGSTALL FDI\$ FDIINF\$ ELECLOS	Optic Coefficient 4.874 0.018 -3.480E-12 -0.025 3.346E-12	T-statistics 24.94 1.91 -5.04 -5.80 5.74	Optic Coefficient 4.701 0.026 -0.023 -8.886E-13 1.335E-11	T-statistics 24.15 2.75 -5.47 -1.07 1.66	Optic Coefficient 4.289 -9.465E-12 6.443E-12 -1.709E-11	T-statistics 33.45 -4.29 3.79 -1.44
Variable CONSTANT DBTSTTOT DBTTOT\$ DCPSGDP EXPRT\$ DBTMLTOT LGSTALL FDI\$ FDIINF\$ ELECLOS Adjusted R ²	Optic Coefficient 4.874 0.018 -3.480E-12 -0.025 3.346E-12 0.00	T-statistics 24.94 1.91 -5.04 -5.80 5.74	Optic Coefficient 4.701 0.026 -0.023 -8.886E-13 1.335E-11 0.0	n VIII T-statistics 24.15 2.75 -5.47 -1.07 1.66 310	Optic Coefficient 4.289 -9.465E-12 6.443E-12 -1.709E-11 0.00	T-statistics 33.45 -4.29 3.79 -1.44
Variable CONSTANT DBTSTTOT DBTTOT\$ DCPSGDP EXPRT\$ DBTMLTOT LGSTALL FDI\$ FDIINF\$ ELECLOS Adjusted R ² F-statistics	Optic Coefficient 4.874 0.018 -3.480E-12 -0.025 3.346E-12 0.00 16.	T-statistics 24.94 1.91 -5.04 -5.80 5.74	Optic Coefficient 4.701 0.026 -0.023 -8.886E-13 1.335E-11 0.0 10	n VIII T-statistics 24.15 2.75 -5.47 -1.07 1.66 310 .49	Optic Coefficient 4.289 -9.465E-12 6.443E-12 -1.709E-11 0.00 9.1	T-statistics 33.45 -4.29 3.79 -1.44 234 65 05
Variable CONSTANT DBTSTTOT DBTTOT\$ DCPSGDP EXPRT\$ DBTMLTOT LGSTALL FDI\$ FDIINF\$ ELECLOS Adjusted R ² F-statistics	Optic Coefficient 4.874 0.018 -3.480E-12 -0.025 3.346E-12 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.05	T-statistics 24.94 1.91 -5.04 -5.80 5.74 490 34 on X	Optic Coefficient 4.701 0.026 -0.023 -8.886E-13 1.335E-11 0.0 10 Optic	n VIII T-statistics 24.15 2.75 -5.47 -1.07 1.66 310 .49 on XI T-statistics	Optic Coefficient 4.289 -9.465E-12 6.443E-12 -1.709E-11 0.00 9.1 Optic	T-statistics 33.45 -4.29 3.79 -1.44 234 65 Dn XII
Variable CONSTANT DBTSTTOT DBTTOT\$ DCPSGDP EXPRT\$ DBTMLTOT LGSTALL FDI\$ FDIINF\$ ELECLOS Adjusted R ² F-statistics Variable CONSTANT	Optic Coefficient 4.874 0.018 -3.480E-12 -0.025 3.346E-12 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.05	T-statistics 24.94 1.91 -5.04 -5.80 5.74 490 34 on X T-statistics 27.37	Optic Coefficient 4.701 0.026 -0.023 -8.886E-13 1.335E-11 0.0 10 Optic Coefficient 5.138	n VIII T-statistics 24.15 2.75 -5.47 -1.07 1.66 310 .49 on XI T-statistics 26.25	Optic Coefficient 4.289 -9.465E-12 6.443E-12 -1.709E-11 0.00 9.1 Optic Coefficient 5.245	T-statistics 33.45 -4.29 3.79 -1.44 234 65 on XII T-statistics 13.23
Variable CONSTANT DBTSTTOT DBTTOT\$ DCPSGDP EXPRT\$ DBTMLTOT LGSTALL FDI\$ FDIINF\$ ELECLOS Adjusted R ² F-statistics Variable CONSTANT DBTSTTOT	Optic Coefficient 4.874 0.018 -3.480E-12 -0.025 3.346E-12 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.05	T-statistics 24.94 1.91 -5.04 -5.80 5.74 490 34 on X 27.37	Optic Coefficient 4.701 0.026 -0.023 -8.886E-13 1.335E-11 0.0 10 Optic Coefficient 5.138	n VIII T-statistics 24.15 2.75 -5.47 -1.07 1.66 310 .49 on XI T-statistics 26.25	Optic Coefficient 4.289 9.465E-12 6.443E-12 -1.709E-11 0.00 9.1 Optic Coefficient 5.245 0.032	T-statistics 33.45 -4.29 3.79 -1.44 234 65 on XII T-statistics 2.34 2.34 2.34 2.34 2.34 2.34 2.34 2.34 3.79 2.34 2.34 3.79 2.46
Variable CONSTANT DBTSTTOT DBTTOT\$ DCPSGDP EXPRT\$ DBTMLTOT LGSTALL FDI\$ FDIINF\$ ELECLOS Adjusted R ² F-statistics Variable CONSTANT DBTSTTOT DBTSTTOT DBTSTTOT	Optic Coefficient 4.874 0.018 -3.480E-12 -0.025 3.346E-12 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05	T-statistics 24.94 1.91 -5.04 -5.80 5.74 490 34 on X 27.37 -5.45	Optic Coefficient 4.701 0.026 -0.023 -8.886E-13 1.335E-11 0.0 10 0ptic Coefficient 5.138 -8.424E-12	n VIII T-statistics 24.15 2.75 -5.47 -1.07 1.66 310 .49 on XI T-statistics 26.25 -3.86	Option Coefficient 4.289 -9.465E-12 6.443E-12 -1.709E-11 0.00 9.1 Option 0.01 9.1 0.02 9.1 0.032 -3.743E-12	T-statistics 33.45 -4.29 3.79 -1.44 234 65 on XII T-statistics 13.23 2.46 -4 25
Variable CONSTANT DBTSTTOT DBTTOT\$ DCPSGDP EXPRT\$ DBTMLTOT LGSTALL FDI\$ FDIINF\$ ELECLOS Adjusted R ² F-statistics Variable CONSTANT DBTSTTOT DBTTOT\$ DCPSGDP	Optic Coefficient 4.874 0.018 -3.480E-12 -0.025 3.346E-12 0.04 0.05 3.346E-12 0.04 0.05 3.346E-12 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.07 -3.709E-12 -0.022	T-statistics 24.94 1.91 -5.04 -5.80 5.74 490 34 on X 27.37 -5.45 -5.47	Optic Coefficient 4.701 0.026 -0.023 -8.886E-13 1.335E-11 0.0 10 00 00 00 5.138 -8.424E-12 -0.027	n VIII T-statistics 24.15 2.75 -5.47 -1.07 1.66 310 .49 on XI T-statistics 26.25 -3.86 -6.06	Optio Coefficient 4.289 -9.465E-12 6.443E-12 -1.709E-11 0.02 9.1 Optio Coefficient 5.245 0.032 -3.743E-12 -0.025	T-statistics 33.45 -4.29 3.79 -1.44 234 65 on XII T-statistics 13.23 2.46 -4.25 -4.33
Variable CONSTANT DBTSTTOT DBTTOT\$ DCPSGDP EXPRT\$ DBTMLTOT LGSTALL FDI\$ FDIINF\$ ELECLOS Adjusted R ² F-statistics Variable CONSTANT DBTSTTOT DBTTOT\$ DCPSGDP EXPRT\$	Optic Coefficient 4.874 0.018 -3.480E-12 -0.025 3.346E-12 0.00 16. Opti Coefficient 5.007 -3.709E-12 -0.022 3.578E-12	T-statistics 24.94 1.91 -5.04 -5.80 5.74 490 34 on X 27.37 -5.45 -5.47 6.27	Optic Coefficient 4.701 0.026 -0.023 -8.886E-13 1.335E-11 0.0 10 Optic Coefficient 5.138 -8.424E-12 -0.027 7.489E-12	Jun VIII T-statistics 24.15 2.75 -5.47 -1.07 1.66 310 .49 on XI T-statistics 26.25 -3.86 -6.06 4.59	Option Coefficient 4.289 -9.465E-12 6.443E-12 -1.709E-11 0.00 9.1 Option 0.01 9.1 0.02 9.1 0.032 -3.743E-12 -0.025 3.300E-12	T-statistics 33.45 -4.29 3.79 -1.44 234 65 on XII T-statistics 13.23 2.46 -4.25 -4.33 4.68
Variable CONSTANT DBTSTTOT DBTTOT\$ DCPSGDP EXPRT\$ DBTMLTOT LGSTALL FDI\$ FDIINF\$ ELECLOS Adjusted R ² F-statistics Variable CONSTANT DBTSTTOT DBTSTTOT DCPSGDP EXPRT\$ DBTMLTOT	Optic Coefficient 4.874 0.018 -3.480E-12 -0.025 3.346E-12 0.00 16. Opti Coefficient 5.007 -3.709E-12 -0.022 3.578E-12	T-statistics 24.94 1.91 -5.04 -5.80 5.74 490 34 on X 27.37 -5.45 -5.47 6.27	Optic Coefficient 4.701 0.026 -0.023 -8.886E-13 1.335E-11 0.0 10 00 10 Optic 5.138 -8.424E-12 -0.027 7.489E-12	Jun VIII T-statistics 24.15 2.75 -5.47 -1.07 1.66 310 .49 on XI T-statistics 26.25 -3.86 -6.06 4.59	Option Coefficient 4.289 -9.465E-12 6.443E-12 -1.709E-11 0.00 9.1 Option 0.01 9.1 0.02 9.1 0.032 -3.743E-12 -0.025 3.300E-12	T-statistics 33.45 -4.29 3.79 -1.44 234 65 on XII T-statistics 13.23 2.46 -4.25 -4.33 4.68
Variable CONSTANT DBTSTTOT DBTTOT\$ DCPSGDP EXPRT\$ DBTMLTOT LGSTALL FDI\$ FDIINF\$ ELECLOS Adjusted R ² F-statistics Variable CONSTANT DBTSTTOT DBTSTTOT DCPSGDP EXPRT\$ DBTMLTOT LGSTALL	Optic Coefficient 4.874 0.018 -3.480E-12 -0.025 3.346E-12 0.0/ 0.0/ 16 Optic 0.07 -3.709E-12 -0.022 3.578E-12	T-statistics 24.94 1.91 -5.04 -5.80 5.74 490 34 on X T-statistics 27.37 -5.45 -5.47 6.27	Optic Coefficient 4.701 0.026 -0.023 -8.886E-13 1.335E-11 0.0 10 00 10 Optic 5.138 -8.424E-12 -0.027 7.489E-12	Jun VIII T-statistics 24.15 2.75 -5.47 -1.07 1.66 310 .49 on XI T-statistics 26.25 -3.86 -6.06 4.59	Option Coefficient 4.289 -9.465E-12 6.443E-12 -1.709E-11 0.00 9.1 Option 0.01 9.1 0.02 9.1 0.02 9.1 0.032 -3.743E-12 -0.025 3.300E-12	T-statistics 33.45 -4.29 3.79 -1.44 234 65 on XII T-statistics 13.23 2.46 -4.25 -4.33 4.68
Variable CONSTANT DBTSTTOT DBTTOT\$ DCPSGDP EXPRT\$ DBTMLTOT LGSTALL FDI\$ FDIINF\$ ELECLOS Adjusted R ² F-statistics Variable CONSTANT DBTSTTOT DBTSTTOT DBTTOT\$ DCPSGDP EXPRT\$ DBTMLTOT LGSTALL FDI\$	Optic Coefficient 4.874 0.018 -3.480E-12 -0.025 3.346E-12 0.00 16 Optic 0.07 -3.709E-12 -0.022 3.578E-12	T-statistics 24.94 1.91 -5.04 -5.80 5.74 490 34 on X T-statistics 27.37 -5.45 -5.47 6.27	Optic Coefficient 4.701 0.026 -0.023 -8.886E-13 1.335E-11 0.0 10 00 10 Optic 5.138 -8.424E-12 -0.027 7.489E-12 -1.421E-11	n VIII T-statistics 24.15 2.75 -5.47 -1.07 1.66 310 .49 on XI T-statistics 26.25 -3.86 -6.06 4.59 -1.20	Option Coefficient 4.289 -9.465E-12 6.443E-12 -1.709E-11 0.00 9.1 Option 0.01 9.1 0.02 9.1 0.032 -3.743E-12 -0.025 3.300E-12	T-statistics 33.45 -4.29 3.79 -1.44 234 65 on XII T-statistics 13.23 2.46 -4.25 -4.33 4.68
Variable CONSTANT DBTSTTOT DBTTOT\$ DCPSGDP EXPRT\$ DBTMLTOT LGSTALL FDI\$ FDIINF\$ ELECLOS Adjusted R ² F-statistics Variable CONSTANT DBTSTTOT DBTSTTOT DBTTOT\$ DCPSGDP EXPRT\$ DBTMLTOT LGSTALL FDI\$ FDIINF\$	Optic Coefficient 4.874 0.018 -3.480E-12 -0.025 3.346E-12 0.0/ 16 Optic 0.07 -3.709E-12 -0.022 3.578E-12	T-statistics 24.94 1.91 -5.04 -5.80 5.74 490 34 on X T-statistics 27.37 -5.45 -5.47 6.27	Optic Coefficient 4.701 0.026 -0.023 -8.886E-13 1.335E-11 0.0 10 00 10 Optic Coefficient 5.138 -8.424E-12 -0.027 7.489E-12 -1.421E-11	Jun VIII T-statistics 24.15 2.75 -5.47 -1.07 1.66 310 .49 on XI T-statistics 26.25 -3.86 -6.06 4.59 -1.20	Option Coefficient 4.289 -9.465E-12 6.443E-12 -1.709E-11 0.00 9.1 Option 0.01 9.1 0.02 9.1 0.032 -3.743E-12 -0.025 3.300E-12	T-statistics 33.45 -4.29 3.79 -1.44 234 65 on XII T-statistics 13.23 2.46 -4.25 -4.33 4.68
Variable CONSTANT DBTSTTOT DBTTOT\$ DCPSGDP EXPRT\$ DBTMLTOT LGSTALL FDI\$ FDIINF\$ ELECLOS Adjusted R ² F-statistics Variable CONSTANT DBTSTTOT DBTSTTOT DBTTOT\$ DCPSGDP EXPRT\$ DBTMLTOT LGSTALL FDI\$ FDIINF\$ ELECLOS	Optic Coefficient 4.874 0.018 -3.480E-12 -0.025 3.346E-12 0.00 16 Optic 0.07 -3.709E-12 -0.022 3.578E-12	T-statistics 24.94 1.91 -5.04 -5.80 5.74 490 34 on X 27.37 -5.45 -5.47 6.27	Optic Coefficient 4.701 0.026 -0.023 -8.886E-13 1.335E-11 0.0 10 0ptic Coefficient 5.138 -8.424E-12 -0.027 7.489E-12 -1.421E-11	Junit T-statistics 24.15 2.75 2.75 -5.47 -1.07 1.66 310 .49 on XI T-statistics 26.25 -3.86 -6.06 4.59 -1.20 -1.20	Option Coefficient 4.289 -9.465E-12 6.443E-12 -1.709E-11 0.00 9.1 0.01 9.1 0.02 9.1 0.032 -3.743E-12 -0.025 3.300E-12	T-statistics 33.45 -4.29 3.79 -1.44 234 65 on XII T-statistics 13.23 2.46 -4.25 -4.33 4.68
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Table 7: Determinants of GrowthDependent Variable: GDPGROW

Source: Author's Estimations.

	Option I Option II		Opti	on III		
Variable	Coefficient	T-statistics	Coefficient	T-statistics	Coefficient	T-statistics
CONSTANT	-5.944E11	-5.67	-5.480E11	-5.60	-6.489E11	-6.56
DBTSTTOT						
DCPSGDP	7.805E8	1.37	8.179E8	1.43	7.126E8	1.25
LGSTTRANS	3.105E11	3.33	3.648E11	4.44	2.153E11	3.07
FDI\$	4.922	8.19	4.904	8.16	4.908	8.16
LGSTTRAK	9.024E10	1.23			6.651E10	0.93
LGSTCUS	-1.446E11	-1.55	-1.206E11	-1.32		
Adjusted R ²	0.2	476	0.2471		0.2462	
F-statistics	47	.11	58.46		58.16	
	Opti	on IV	Option V		Option VI	
Variable	Coefficient	T-statistics	Coefficient	T-statistics	Coefficient	T-statistics
CONSTANT	-6.474E11	-7.47	-2.484E11	-5.74	-2.063E11	-4.52
DBTSTTOT			3.644E9	5.71	3.162E9	4.77
DCPSGDP					8.467E8	2.87
LGSTTRANS	3.450E11	3.95	9.741E10	5.07	6.844E10	3.19
FDI\$	4.943	8.36	-7.224	-16.52	-7.207	-16.78
LGSTTRAK	9.383E10	1.32				
LGSTCUS	-1.472E11	-1.65				
Adjusted R ²	0.2	470	0.5	651	0.5882	
F-statistics	60	.61	202.81		16 ⁻	1.74

Table 8: Determinants of ExportsDependent Variable: EXPORTS\$

Source: Author's Estimations.

Table 9: Determinants of Trade and Transport Related InfrastructureDependent Variable: LGSTTRANS

	Option I		Option II		Option III	
Variable	Coefficient	T-statistics	Coefficient	T-statistics	Coefficient	T-statistics
CONSTANT	2.154	20.04	2.327	22.37	2.518	26.72
DBTSTTOT	0.014	4.31	0.013	3.94	0.013	4.67
DBTMLTOT	-0.002	-0.76	-0.006	-1.90	-0.012	-3.81
DBTLTPB\$	3.680E-12	2.34				
DCPSGDP						
DBTLTPV\$	3.136E-13	0.41				
BNDPN\$D	7.435E-12	1.11	1.229E-11	1.90	3.887E-13	0.08
BNDPP\$D	-1.126E-11	-1.24	7.788E-12	1.50	-3.391E-12	-1.02
FDI\$	-2.914E-13	-0.21	-7.005E-13	-0.48		
ITRANSPPP	3.958E-12	0.49	1.498E-11	1.96	2.308E-12	0.44
ITRANSPP						
BNDPN\$A						
BNDPP\$A						
Adjusted R ²	0.6	011	0.5	342	0.3	331
F-statistics	14	.94	15	.12	10	.90

continued on next page

Table 9 continued

	Option IV		Option V		Option VI	
Variable	Coefficient	T-statistics	Coefficient	T-statistics	Coefficient	T-statistics
CONSTANT	2.503	27.17	2.329	62.03	2.505	27.11
DBTSTTOT	0.013	4.69	0.009	6.55	0.013	4.86
DBTMLTOT	-0.011	-3.66	-0.004	-5.45	-0.011	-3.58
DBTLTPB\$						
DCPSGDP						
DBTLTPV\$						
BNDPN\$D	3.877E-13	0.08	4.376E-12	1.34		
BNDPP\$D	-3.310E-12	-1.00	-2.622E-12	-1.25		
FDI\$						
ITRANSPPP						
ITRANSPP	2.436E-12	0.47			-1.013E-12	-0.23
BNDPN\$A					4.406E-12	0.64
BNDPP\$A					-8.976E-12	-1.52
Adjusted R ²	0.3181		0.1952		0.3201	
F-statistics	10.61		35.38		10.68	
	Option VII		Option VIII		Option IX	
Variable	Coefficient	T-statistics	Coefficient	T-statistics	Coefficient	T-statistics
CONSTANT	2.325	62.46	2.163	95.13	2.087	19.25
DBTSTTOT	0.009	6.70	0.012	9.46	0.011	3.12
DBTMLTOT	-0.004	-5.48			-0.003	-0.95
DBTLTPB\$					2.626E-12	3.48
DCPSGDP					0.003	2.09
DBTLTPV\$					1.372E-12	1.82
BNDPN\$D			1.344E-12	1.14		
FDI\$					-1.033E-13	-0.08
ITRANSPP					-6.3768E-13	-0.09
BNDPN\$A						
BNDPP\$A						
GDP					-4.487E-14	-1.28
GROWTH					-0.008	-0.65
PCI\$					3.087E-5	2.71
Adjusted R ²	0.1961		0.1555		0.6642	
F-statistics	69.88		52.85		19.53	
	Option X		Option XI		Option XII	
Variable	Coefficient	T-statistics	Coefficient	T-statistics	Coefficient	T-statistics
CONSTANT	2.184	18.29	1.970	17.23	2.324	61.86
DBTSTTOT	0.011	2.96	0.009	2.96	0.009	6.84
DBTMLTOT	-0.003	-0.93	-0.001	-0.19	-0.004	-5.38
DBTLTPB\$	2.527E-12	3.26	2.389E-12	3.27		
DCPSGDP	0.003	1.68	0.003	2.16		
DBTLTPV\$	8.189E-13	1.31	5.215E-13	0.87		
BNDPN\$D						
FDI\$	2.924E-13	0.23	2.498E-13	0.21		
ITRANSPP	1.085E-12	0.15	5.916E-13	0.09		
BNDPN\$A					5.218E-12	1.04
BNDPP\$A					-3.713E-12	-0.93
GDP						
GROWTH						
PCI\$						
Adjusted R ²	0.6551		0.6903		0.1941	
F-statistics	18.53		21.85		35.16	

Source: Author's Estimations.

5. CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS

The conclusion can be drawn that a country's exports are a significant determinant of its GDP growth, while the share of short-term debt in total external debt also affects GDP growth positively. The negative impact of domestic credit to the private sector on GDP growth is against the common intuitive. However, its positive effect on exports indicates that domestic credit to the private sector may positively affect GDP indirectly. The simultaneity in the model describes the positive effect of trade and transport-related logistic infrastructure on exports while exports lead to GDP growth. Exports have a positive association with GDP growth while domestic debt to the private sector improves the level of exports from a country.

Other than domestic credit to the private sector, the most important significant determinant of "Exports" is the "Trade and Transport-Related Logistic Conditions," which are an indicator of the regional connectivity. It is notable that the indices of "Trade and Transport-Related Logistic Infrastructure" are much lower in CAREC member countries (except for the PRC), which indicates the demand for investment in transport-related infrastructure for the success of regional integration.

Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) was a significant determinant of "Exports," however the presence of "External Debt" falsifies the impact of FDI on Exports. It is the external financing that supports the exports from a country. The role of FDI and short-term external debts is significant but reflects some complicated relations. FDI significantly contributes to the enhancement of exports, which is a result of global economic linkages. Multinational companies and foreign investors establish their businesses and production units in countries where comparative advantages are available. The surplus domestic production enhances the exportability. However, in the presence of short-term external borrowing, the impact of FDI on exports becomes negative.

However, "External Debt" affects GDP growth negatively. This may be because of the burden of interest payments on the national exchequer, which reduces the fiscal space. In the presence of higher debt liability and interest payments, national governments cannot provide the funds for public-sector development programs, which affects the rate of GDP growth.

The results indicate that the share of short-term debt in total external debts affects the quality of trade and transport-related logistic infrastructure positively. The effects of short-term debts are robust and significant. The effect of external long-term debt to the public sector is also positive, which indicates that utilization of public-sector external long-term debt plays an important role in the improvement of trade and transport-related infrastructure. The effects of domestic credit to the private sector in the determination of logistic infrastructure is also positive. Surprisingly, no significant impact of multilateral external loans on trade-related infrastructure has been proved. Sovereign bonds, private-sector bonds for long-term financing, private-sector long-term debts, and foreign direct investment (FDI) have not been recognized as significant determinants of trade and transport-related logistic infrastructure, which indicates that long-term external financing to the private sector does not have a significant role in the determination of trade-related infrastructure or economic corridors.

The role of sovereign bonds is also insignificant, though it seems counterintuitive. The empirical results indicate that sovereign bonds are not a feasible option for transport infrastructure to integrate the economies in a region. The higher share of short-term borrowing in external debts and long-term public-sector debts have been identified as good options for growth and development, while the role of expansion in the domestic credit to the private sector is also important.

The significant negative impact of domestic credit to the private sector on GDP growth and its insignificant role in the determination of exports invites the rethinking of financial policies. Transport-related logistic infrastructure has proved to be an important factor in export enhancement. Its support for trade-related activities is quite obvious. These findings concern the core area of this study. The development of trade and transportrelated infrastructure is the main component of economic integration policies. This component of economic integration becomes more important in the presence of some landlocked countries in the region. The export-led growth model is confirmed in this study by equations (1) and (2).

The results emphasize the causal relations between trade and transport-related infrastructure and GDP growth. It has been shown in earlier sections that there are no significant changes in the trade and transport-related infrastructure in CAREC member countries during the period included in this analysis. The transport-related infrastructure has been identified as the weakest area in these countries. The region is far behind the developed countries in the world. The weakest infrastructure explores the causes of "less integration" in the region. To achieve the benefits of integration mere trade agreements and regulatory works are not enough. Here the development of trade and transport-related infrastructure is the most important area as it can provide linkages of seven landlocked countries with the Arabian Sea. Their mutual linkages may provide a bigger market for export enhancement and GDP growth.

These results provide important insights. The most important conclusion is the identification of short-term external borrowing as the most effective mode of financing. The results show the significant and robust effects of short-term external borrowing on growth and development. The study does not recommend long-term external borrowing or multilateral borrowing for the development of trade and transport-related infrastructure. The strong, significant, and robust impact of the share of short-term borrowing in total external debt on GDP growth, exports, and infrastructure development indicates the pressure on policy makers and economic managers for effective and efficient utilization of resources. In the presence of short-term loans, the managers have to show their success in the short term. They cannot transfer the burden of repayments and their policies to forthcoming governments. In fact, short-term borrowing is not a source of financing for long-term development; it is a part of operational activities.

This requires the attention of policy makers. A global change in the lending and investment policies of industrialized countries and lending institutions is required. Providing lending facilities to governments and public-sector organizations is a modus operandi for the development of financing by international financial institutions (IFIs). In this way, the risk of failure is transferred to the governments of developing countries, which usually enhances indirect taxes for payment of interest and repayment of these loans. Unfortunately, the history of public finance in various developing countries shows the misuse of external borrowing for politically motivated and popular projects. It is quite obvious that this is a bias mechanism against lower-middle-class people in developing countries. The global financial architecture should focus on the provision of short-term lending facilities to improve the efficiency of developing projects.

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