

Cheung, Lydia

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## The Upward Pricing Pressure Test for Merger Analysis: An Empirical Examination

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The Upward Pricing Pressure Test for Merger Analysis: An Empirical Examination

Lydia Cheung

2013/03

# The Upward Pricing Pressure Test for Merger Analysis: An Empirical Examination \*

## WORKING PAPER

Lydia Cheung

Auckland University of Technology †

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### Abstract

The Upward Pricing Pressure (UPP) test developed by antitrust economists Joseph Farrell and Carl Shapiro marks a new era in antitrust and provides an alternative to the traditional concentration-based tests in merger analysis. In addition to being free of market definition, the UPP’s appeal lies in its ease of use: one simple formula indicates whether a merging firm has an incentive to increase prices post-merger. This paper first establishes the theoretical relationship between the UPP and the standard structural merger simulation, namely, that the UPP is a “single-product merger simulation” that ignores the re-equilibration of all other endogenous variables except that product’s own price. To assess the consequence of this simplification, I compute “true” UPP values for a cross-section of airline markets using structurally estimated price elasticities, and confront them with the “gold standard” of a merger simulation. I examine the predictive accuracy of both the *sign* and *magnitude* of the UPP. I find that it gives wrong sign predictions to an average 10% of the observations, and its value has an average correlation of 0.92 with the structurally simulated price changes. However, since this test is meant to bypass a complicated demand estimation, I then use the example of a simple logit demand to illustrate the consequence of using inaccurate demand-side inputs in the UPP: the test will give a wrong sign prediction over a much larger range of cost synergies. Lastly, I discuss the pass-through conditions for Farrell and Shapiro’s proposition, demonstrate empirically that they are not innocuous, and show that their violation can lead to false positive results (type I errors) in the UPP.

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†Department of Economics, Faculty of Business, Auckland University of Technology.  
lydia.p.cheung@aut.ac.nz.

# 1 Introduction

The year 2010 marked a distinct shift in merger analysis from market concentration to price effects. In contrast to the traditional approach that relies on the increase in market shares, this new approach focuses on various price changes induced by the merger. As leaders in this paradigm shift, the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission recently released the new *Horizontal Merger Guidelines*, and the Competition Commission and the Office of Fair Trading in the U.K. revised their *Merger Assessment Guidelines*. Similar revisions are in progress in the European Union and New Zealand. These revisions have substantial impact on businesses and the antitrust community: the U.S. antitrust agencies received 1166 Hart-Scott-Rodino pre-merger notifications in the year 2010, each of which involved a transaction value of at least \$50 million.<sup>1</sup> Joseph Farrell of the FTC and Carl Shapiro of the DOJ directed this shift in merger analysis by their proposal of the Upward Pricing Pressure (UPP) test. It identifies a firm's incentive to raise prices post-merger by comparing its incentive to increase prices due to lost competition and the opposing incentive to decrease prices due to cost synergies. The UPP test has since generated great interest among antitrust practitioners and economists alike and has been incorporated into the two revised *Guidelines*. This paper is the first to examine the empirical performance of the UPP test. I compare the UPP's predictions against those from a standard structural merger simulation and explore potential challenges in its application, including the use of inaccurate diversion ratios and the violation of pass-through assumptions.

The UPP is designed to facilitate the antitrust community's shift away from the traditional merger analysis practice based primarily on market definition and market shares. In the previous (1992) edition of the *Horizontal Merger Guidelines*, for example, the stated procedure in analyzing a merger is to first define the boundary of the antitrust market, calculate the market shares of respective firms or brands, and finally, compute the increase in a market concentration index (such as the Herfindahl index (HHI) or the four-firm concentration ratio) caused by the merger. Thresholds are assigned to the index based on pre-merger number of firms and/or pre-merger market concentration. This approach based on market shares has a few problems. Firstly, consumer welfare can increase with concentration in some theoretical settings. Farrell and Shapiro (1990) give an example where consumer or total surplus is enhanced with an increase in market concentration: when production is shifted towards larger, more efficient firms. Secondly, it

<sup>1</sup>Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission (2010a)

is based on the old Structure-Conduct-Performance approach in I.O., which researchers have shown to be problematic. When market structure is potentially endogenous, one cannot easily establish a causal relationship from observed structure to performance. Thirdly, the choice of market boundary is often objective; any two differentiated products may arguably have some degree of substitutability for certain consumers. Yet, market definition has been seen as the core of the debate in some cases, for example *FTC vs. Whole Foods (2007)*. Whether the relevant antitrust market is the narrowly defined “premium natural and organic supermarkets” or, more broadly, “all supermarkets” affects the measurement of market shares drastically. In contrast to the traditional HHI test that is based on Cournot competition between homogeneous goods, the new UPP test is based on Bertrand theory that accommodates differentiated products, which is deemed more appropriate for most consumer products. Another purpose of the UPP is to serve as a fast, easy preliminary merger screen that identifies anticompetitive merger markets without heavy data requirement. The antitrust agencies in the U.S. are given 30 days to analyze a potential merger upon receiving its notification, with little data available before deciding whether to issue a second request. The UPP a fitting tool in these regards: firstly, only one simple inequality needs evaluated for each merging firm; secondly, it requires data on substitution patterns, prices, and marginal costs only. In bypassing a structural demand estimation, the UPP has the additional appeal of “transparency” and independence from demand functional form assumptions, eliminating the possibility of functional form mis-specification.

In this paper, I first establish the theoretical relationship between the UPP and the standard structural merger simulation: the UPP is a much-simplified merger simulation that allows only the price of *one* product to re-equilibrate, while holding all other endogenous prices, quantities, and elasticities constant at pre-merger levels. In other words, when the UPP uses “true” substitution patterns computed from estimated demand parameters, it differs from a merger simulation only because of the former’s non-reequilibration assumptions. I then use the set of overlapping routes in the America West–US Airways merger (2005) as an empirical laboratory to test the performance of the UPP against merger simulations. I demonstrate that when the UPP is used *in conjunction* with a structural demand estimation, the UPP produces accurate predictions, both in sign and magnitude. Thus the non-reequilibration assumptions inherent in the UPP in fact do not severely affect the sign or magnitude of its predictions. This means that the UPP can be used to substitute the computation of the post-merger equilibria (from the set of firms’ post-merger first order conditions).

Secondly, I explore the correlation between the *magnitude* of the UPP against the magnitude of the simulated price change, as the percentage of merger-induced cost reduction  $e$  changes. I show empirically that this correlation increases with cost synergy  $e$ . I explain this by decomposing the post-merger price change into two components, analyzing the severity of the approximation errors in both, and the change in relative importance between them as  $e$  increases. Overall, across the full range of values of  $e$  (from zero to 0.1) that I tested, the correlations between the magnitudes of the UPP and the simulated price changes are remarkably high; the magnitudes of these two variables are also similar in range. These observations should encourage the use of the magnitude of the UPP as an approximated price increase.

Thirdly, I investigate the performance of the UPP *without* accurate demand-side estimates, because Farrell and Shapiro do not originally intend the UPP to be used together with a structural demand estimation. Using simple logit substitution patterns (that do not require the estimation of a demand model) instead, I demonstrate that the test computed with imperfect demand-side inputs gives a wrong sign prediction over a much larger range of cost synergies  $e$ . This paper is the first to document this phenomenon, and my explanation relates the UPP to the literature on cost pass-through. I show that because pass-through is high and almost constant throughout the relevant range of costs, there always exists a problematic range of  $e$  where the UPP gives the wrong sign prediction. I also illustrate this relationship between demand inputs, cost synergy  $e$ , and sign prediction graphically.

Fourthly, I empirically show that the pass-through assumptions in Farrell and Shapiro's main proposition are not innocuous. I point out that these assumptions are equivalent to requiring the two merging products to be strategic complements post-merger. It has been theoretically proven that two differentiated products in a Bertrand model can potentially be strategic complements or substitutes, depending on both the firms' cost structures and the demand model used. In particular, in the case of constant marginal cost assumed by the UPP, both strategic relationships are possible. I demonstrate with my merger simulations that the violation of the strategic complement relationship increases the UPP's tendency to produce false positive results (type I errors). This is intuitive because, when two goods are strategic substitutes, an aggressive behavior (e.g. a price increase) from one good will lead to an opposite behavior (e.g. a price decrease) in the other. This pass-through assumption has so far received little attention in the discussion of the UPP. I also generalize Farrell and Shapiro's proposition to the case when the pre-merger market is larger than a duopoly, which leads to a larger set of pass-through

assumptions. I show empirically that the proposition’s conclusion may not hold when this expanded set of assumptions is not satisfied.

Lastly, I compare the predictions from the HHI (Herfindahl-Hirschman Index), the traditional approach based on market shares, against the new UPP and merger simulation. I first document that when the UPP and merger simulation use Farrell and Shapiro’s “default” 10% cost deduction, they flag few markets that are deemed anticompetitive by the HHI, using thresholds from either the 1992 or 2010 *Guidelines*. Despite their different conclusions, I show that the increase in HHI is nonetheless positively but moderately correlated with the former two predictions when they do not include a cost reduction, because the HHI has no inherent capacity to take into account changes in costs. In this sense, the UPP is a more flexible tool (that also requires more data inputs) than the HHI. This correlation between the UPP and HHI establishes a rough link between increases in concentration and prices.

This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature on the UPP. Section 3 lays down the Bertrand supply model, establishes the theoretical relationship between the UPP and merger simulation, and explains the relationship between the pass-through assumptions and the strategic relationship between the merging goods. Section 4 specifies the random coefficient structural demand model, introduces the dataset used, and presents the demand estimation results. Section 5 examines merger simulation results and compares it against prediction by the UPP, in both sign and magnitude. In particular, it investigates the case when the UPP uses imperfect demand-side inputs. It also tests the assumption behind Farrell and Shapiro’s proposition and shows the consequence when it fails. Section 6 explores the correlation between the UPP and the HHI. Section 7 concludes.

## 2 The UPP Literature

Researchers had used first order conditions to assess merger effects before the UPP was coined. Hausman, Leonard, and Zona (1994) estimate a multi-level demand system for beer and derive a formula for the post-merger price change in terms of marginal costs and the pre-merger price margins. Werden (1996) subsequently uses first order conditions to recover the cost synergy necessary to overcome the incentive to raise prices, given the diversion ratio and pre-merger price margins, without assuming any functional form of demand. His objective is very close to the spirit of the UPP: the computation of upward price incentives can be turned into an

exercise of finding the cutoff in cost reduction that just balances it. Shapiro (1996) identifies the diversion ratio and price margins as the key variables that determine the price effects from a merger. These earlier studies lay the foundation for the UPP.

Ever since the release of the first draft of Farrell and Shapiro (2010) in 2008, the UPP has generated wide attention among antitrust practitioners and academic economists alike. Most notably, Jaffe and Weyl (2010) generalize the UPP formula to allow multi-product firms and non-Bertrand firm conduct, such as Cournot competition (Nash-in-quantities) and consistent conjectures, in response to a few early critiques of the test. However, the increased data requirement by these generalized formulas—sometimes the complete own- and cross-price elasticity matrix between *all* goods in the market—means that these generalized UPP’s are almost impossible to compute without a structural demand estimation. While these generalized formulas fill a gap in the theoretical research on the UPP, they deviate from Farrell and Shapiro’s intention of bypassing a demand model and limit the ease of computation relative to a full merger simulation.

Another group of researchers, such as Shapiro (2010) and Hausman, Moresi, and Rainey (2010), popularize the UPP test by deriving explicit formulas for an exemplary 2-firm, 2-product case, assuming simple linear and constant elasticity demands. Both study further simplify the UPP by assuming no cost synergies and call the resultant statistic the Gross Upward Pricing Pressure Index (GUPPI). A few researchers propose modifications to the original UPP such that it is closer to a full-blown merger simulation in various ways. For example, the original Farrell and Shapiro (2010) include a more complicated UPP formula that accounts for bilateral (instead of unilateral) sales diversion between the two merging goods. Schmalensee (2009) suggests including the cost synergies of both merging products in the UPP, instead of only the product whose price increase is under consideration. Simons and Coate (2010) advocate including a pass-through term to the UPP that is very similar in spirit to Jaffe and Weyl (2010)’s proposition.

Despite the wide interest on the UPP, empirical examination of the test has been extremely scarce. An early attempt by Walters (2007) highlights the difficulty in estimating diversion ratios (between supermarkets in the U.K.) without much consumption data, prior knowledge, or a structural demand model. He finds wide variance between estimated and surveyed diversion ratios. Varma (2009) is the first study that analyzes potential policy implications of the UPP. He



investigates whether the UPP will lead to more or less merger enforcement than the traditional test based on market concentrations and HHI. By simulating hypothetical markets, he concludes that the UPP test is likely to flag more markets as anticompetitive than the HHI test, under typical market definitions and adopting a 10% “default” cost reduction as Farrell and Shapiro suggest. Mergers that are most likely flagged under the UPP but not the HHI test are those where the merging products do not have large pre-merger market shares, but are nonetheless considered first and second choices by a group of consumers. It will be very instructive to repeat this study in the future but with actual UPP and HHI values used by the antitrust agencies, together with an assessment on welfare change on realized mergers.

### 3 Theoretical Comparison between UPP and Merger Simulation

In market  $t = 1, \dots, T$ , there are  $a = 1, \dots, A_t$  firms and a total of  $j = 1, \dots, J_t$  differentiated products. Denote the set of products produced by multi-product firm  $a$  by  $\mathcal{J}_{a,t} \subseteq J_t$ . Each market  $t$  has market size  $M_t$ , which is a measure of potential full consumption and is usually proportional to the relevant population size. When the equilibrium is modeled as Nash-in-prices, the profit function of firm  $a$  is given by

$$\Pi_a = M_t \sum_{j \in \mathcal{J}_a} (p_j - c_j) s_j(p) - C_j,$$

where  $s_j(p)$  is the endogenous market share of good  $j$ , and  $C_j$  is the fixed cost of producing good  $j$ . The marginal cost  $c_j$  is assumed to be constant for simplicity. The first order necessary condition that determines the equilibrium strategy  $p_j^*$  is

$$s_j(p) + \sum_{k \in \mathcal{J}_a} (p_k - c_k) \frac{\partial s_k(p)}{\partial p_j} = 0.$$

This set of  $J$  equations in  $J$  unknowns is often expressed in matrix notation as

$$s(p) + \Omega(p - c) = 0,$$

where  $\Omega$  is the  $J \times J$  matrix of partial derivatives, with each element

$$\Omega_{kj} = \begin{cases} \frac{\partial s_k(p)}{\partial p_j}, & \text{if } \exists a \text{ s.t. } k, j \in \mathcal{J}_a \\ 0, & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases}$$

This set of equations that completely defines the firms' behavior and market equilibrium can be inverted to back out structural variables, such as the (assumed constant) marginal costs, or manipulated to compute new equilibria under various counterfactuals. A merger simulation that investigates the *unilateral* pricing impact of a merger, where the new post-merger equilibrium is computed by changing the ownership structure in  $\Omega$ , is one of the many possible counterfactuals. Another counterfactual, likely combined with a merger simulation, is an investigation of pass-through, where the marginal costs are changed to see how much equilibrium prices respond. These counterfactuals are, essentially, comparative statics exercises.

Consider a merger of good  $j$  with good  $k$ , each produced by single-product firms for simplicity. (This analysis can easily generalize to multi-product firms, as Jaffe and Weyl (2010) demonstrate.) I now establish the theoretical relationship between the UPP and a structural merger simulation:  $UPP_j$  is a "single-product merger simulation" that solves for the change in product  $j$ 's post-merger price only, while ignoring the re-equilibration of all other endogenous variables, including all competitors' prices  $p_{-j} = \{p_l : l \neq j\}$ , own and competitors' quantities  $D_j(p), \forall j$ , and the partial derivatives  $\frac{\partial D_j(p)}{\partial p_j}$  and  $\frac{\partial D_{-j}(p)}{\partial p_j}$ . It also assumes that all competitors' costs  $c_{-j}$  are held constant at pre-merger levels.

This follows directly from our equilibrium definitions. Assume that the pre-merger equilibrium  $p^*$  and post-merger equilibrium  $p^{**}$  are Nash-in-prices. Good  $j$ 's pre- and post-merger equilibrium prices and market shares satisfy its pre- and post-merger first order conditions respectively:

$$(p_j^* - c_j) \left. \frac{\partial D_j(p)}{\partial p_j} \right|_{p^*} + D_j(p^*) = 0, \text{ and}$$

$$(p_j^{**} - (1 - e)c_j) \left. \frac{\partial D_j(p)}{\partial p_j} \right|_{p^{**}} + D_j(p^{**}) + (p_k^{**} - c_k) \left. \frac{\partial D_k(p)}{\partial p_j} \right|_{p^{**}} = 0,$$

where  $e$  is the percentage reduction to marginal cost  $c_j$  post-merger. Assume that  $p_j$  is the only endogenous variable that re-equilibrates. All other endogenous terms are held constant at pre-merger values:

1.  $D_j(p^*) = D_j(p^{**})$
2.  $p_k^* = p_k^{**}$
3.  $\left. \frac{\partial D_j(p)}{\partial p_j} \right|_{p^*} = \left. \frac{\partial D_j(p)}{\partial p_j} \right|_{p^{**}}$
4.  $\left. \frac{\partial D_k(p)}{\partial p_j} \right|_{p^*} = \left. \frac{\partial D_k(p)}{\partial p_j} \right|_{p^{**}}$

The difference between the pre- and post-merger first order conditions gives the UPP formula:

$$UPP_j = (p_k^* - c_k) \underbrace{\frac{\partial D_k(p)}{\partial p_j} \Big|_{p^*}}_{\text{diversion ratio } D_{jk}} \cdot \left( \left| \frac{\partial D_j(p)}{\partial p_j} \Big|_{p^*} \right| \right)^{-1} - e \cdot c_j$$

Thus if  $UPP_j > 0$ , then  $p_j^{**} > p_j^*$ .

Under general conditions, both the quantity  $D_j(p)$  and the derivatives  $\frac{\partial D_j(p)}{\partial p_j}$  and  $\frac{\partial D_k(p)}{\partial p_j}$  depend on the endogenous prices; they thus re-equilibrate with price during a merger simulation. When a demand model is assumed, some or all of these terms may adopt an explicit functional form. Farrell and Shapiro thus “free” the UPP from any demand functional form assumption by imposing that all terms except  $p_j$  do not re-equilibrate.<sup>2</sup> Compared with an equivalent merger simulation, the UPP sacrifices prediction accuracy for computational convenience and a smaller data requirement. Several researchers have suggested various ways to use the UPP stated above. The original Farrell and Shapiro (2010) advocate using the its *sign* only, instead of its magnitude, for merger prediction, because the UPP gives the *incentive* of price change. They also claim that predicting the sign of price change is more robust than predicting its magnitude. Pakes (2010) suggests using the *magnitude* of the UPP as a crude approximation to the simulated price change. Finally, Jaffe and Weyl (2010) use the UPP, together with its first derivative, to approximate the simulated price change in the same manner as the first step of Newton’s method. I will examine the predictive accuracy of all three interpretations of the UPP in the next section.

There are two main sources of approximation error in the (magnitude of the) UPP compared with its equivalent merger simulation, one in the first term of the UPP and one in its second term. Firstly, if one uses “true” diversion ratios from an estimated demand model in the UPP, the UPP only differs from a merger simulation in its non-reequilibration assumption. The magnitude of price re-equilibration among non-merging firms in Bertrand conduct is typically small; the merging partner’s price re-equilibration is small when its market share is large relative to the firm in question. However, the sign of this approximation error is often difficult to determine,

<sup>2</sup>As other ways to generalize the UPP test, many alternatives are possible on what variables to hold constant in good  $j$ ’s UPP test. For example, Schmalensee (2009) modifies Farrell and Shapiro’s UPP by including synergies for both  $c_j$  and  $c_k$ , as well as a corresponding diversion ratio from good  $k$  back to good  $j$ . This modification brings the UPP theoretically closer to a partial merger simulation, yet some of the aforementioned problem of non-reequilibration persists. Otherwise, all else equal, this modification leads to the UPP inequality to hold less frequently: a market is less likely to be flagged anti-competitive when the default cost synergy is applied symmetrically to both merging goods. Thus, this modification can potentially change the UPP prediction from a positive to a negative.

and depends largely on how the price of the merging partner’s good will react to an increase in own good’s price pre-merger. This, in turn, depends on the strategic relationship between the two goods. The UPP can produce both *false positive* and *false negative* outcomes, which my empirical results will demonstrate. Secondly, the UPP ignores a measurement of pass-through—the rate at which a reduction in one’s cost translates to a reduction of one’s price. Having no pass-through term in the second term of the UPP, it implicitly assumes a pass-through rate of one. As I demonstrate below, the Bertrand model often exhibits a very high pass-through rate close to one across a wide range of prices and costs. Thus, neither of these two sources of approximation error are severe. The primary source of error in an empirical implementation of the UPP is likely to be in the use of inaccurate diversion ratios.

As with other first order approximations, the UPP’s deviation from a simulated result also depends on how “small” and local the change ( $p_j^{**} - p_j^*$ ) is. In a structural demand model, it also depends on the rate of change of its derivative around its pre-merger value. Since a full merger simulation (with no cost synergies) must lead to  $p_j^{**} > p_j^*$ , one can conclude that  $D_j(p^{**}) < D_j(p^*)$  with a downward-sloping demand curve, yet the relative magnitudes of  $\left. \frac{\partial D_j(p)}{\partial p_j} \right|_{p^*}$  and  $\left. \frac{\partial D_j(p)}{\partial p_j} \right|_{p^{**}}$  cannot be measured without a specification of the demand functional form. (If, for example, the demand curve is globally convex, as in the case of a constant elasticity demand, then one can conclude that  $\left. \frac{\partial D_j(p)}{\partial p_j} \right|_{p^{**}} > \left. \frac{\partial D_j(p)}{\partial p_j} \right|_{p^*}$ , both bearing negative signs.) The relative magnitudes of  $\left. \frac{\partial D_{-j}(p)}{\partial p_j} \right|_{p^*}$  and  $\left. \frac{\partial D_{-j}(p)}{\partial p_j} \right|_{p^{**}}$  are even more difficult to determine. It suffices to say that the smaller the change in price ( $p_j^{**} - p_j^*$ ), the more accurate is the UPP’s magnitude. Thus, the UPP performs best when the two merging firms do not have large market share pre-merger, or that the merging products are not the most similar in the market.

### 3.1 UPP and Pass-Through Assumptions

So far we have interpreted the UPP of a single merging firm in isolation from that of its merging partner. Interpreting UPP values of two merging firms separately can lead to inconclusive results, for example, when  $UPP_j > 0$  and  $UPP_k < 0$ . Notice that this does *not* imply simulated results of  $\Delta P_j^{sim} > 0$  and  $\Delta P_k^{sim} < 0$ , due to the respective non-reequilibrium assumptions discussed above. In particular, the result  $UPP_j > 0$  relies on the assumption  $\Delta P_k^{sim} = 0$ , while  $UPP_k > 0$  relies on the assumption  $\Delta P_j^{sim} = 0$ ; thus  $UPP_j > 0$  and  $UPP_k < 0$  are derived from *different* assumptions. Although  $UPP_j$  and  $UPP_k$  are always based on different assumptions no

matter their sign, a stronger result can be achieved when both are positive. Farrell and Shapiro (2010)'s Proposition 1 establishes the condition in a *duopoly-to-monopoly* merger where the post-merger equilibrium prices of *both* merging firms  $j$  and  $k$  will rise: when *both*  $UPP_j$  and  $UPP_k$  are positive. This conclusion requires non-negative post-merger pass-through assumptions of both own's cost and merging partner's cost among the two merging firms.<sup>3</sup> Specifically, for duopolists  $j$  and  $k$ , the proposition requires positive pass-through  $\frac{\partial p_j^{**}}{\partial c_j} > 0$  and  $\frac{\partial p_k^{**}}{\partial c_k} > 0$  for own costs, and non-negative pass-through  $\frac{\partial p_j^{**}}{\partial c_k} \geq 0$  and  $\frac{\partial p_k^{**}}{\partial c_j} \geq 0$  for merging partner's costs. Because differentiated product firms in Bertrand competition always choose price according to the inverse elasticity pricing rule, and the own-price elasticity at the profit-maximizing equilibrium is always elastic, positive price margins guarantee that the conditions of positive pass-through of own costs ( $\frac{\partial p_j^{**}}{\partial c_j} > 0$  and  $\frac{\partial p_k^{**}}{\partial c_k} > 0$ ) always hold.<sup>4</sup> However, assumptions on the pass-through of merging partner's costs are much less obvious.

As Weyl and Fabinger (2009) point out, one can in fact relate the above pass-through assumptions to the literature on strategic complements and substitutes first introduced by Bulow, Geanakoplos, and Klemperer (1985): they require the products of the two merging duopolists to *not* be strategic substitutes post-merger.<sup>5</sup> To the extent that post-merger pass-through may be very similar to pre-merger pass-through (Jaffe and Weyl (2010)), Bulow, Geanakoplos, and Klemperer (1985) also establish that the strategic relationship between two firms depends on both the marginal cost and the demand functional form: strategic complementarity is not guaranteed in all differentiated product Bertrand settings. In the simple case when marginal cost is constant, the strategic relationship between two goods depends on how own-price elasticity responds to merging partner's change in price, and both strategic complements and substitutes are possible. If costs are increasing in quantity, the two goods will be strategic complements; if costs are decreasing in quantity, they will be strategic substitutes. The researcher thus needs

<sup>3</sup>My terminology in this paper on various kinds of pass-through (merger, pre-merger, post-merger) follows that of Jaffe and Weyl (2010).

<sup>4</sup>Technically, this is true when all other prices—including prices of own firm's other products (in the case of multi-product firms) and prices of other firms' products—are held constant. When all prices are allowed to re-equilibrate, it is theoretically possible in Bertrand oligopoly that a good's own (post-merger) equilibrium price is decreasing in its own cost, when the re-equilibration of other prices causes its demand to be more elastic. I thank Thomas Holmes for this clarification. Empirically, this hardly affects the conclusions of my tests on pass-through assumptions.

<sup>5</sup>Given  $\frac{\partial p_j^{**}}{\partial c_j} > 0$ ,  $\frac{\partial p_k^{**}}{\partial c_k} > 0$ ,  $\frac{\partial p_j^{**}}{\partial c_k} \geq 0$ , and  $\frac{\partial p_k^{**}}{\partial c_j} \geq 0$ , for merging products  $j$  and  $k$ . Then  $\frac{\partial p_j^{**}}{\partial p_k^{**}} = \frac{\partial p_j^{**}}{\partial c_j} \left( \frac{\partial p_k^{**}}{\partial c_j} \right)^{-1} \geq 0$ , and  $\frac{\partial p_k^{**}}{\partial p_j^{**}} = \frac{\partial p_k^{**}}{\partial c_k} \left( \frac{\partial p_j^{**}}{\partial c_k} \right)^{-1} \geq 0$ . The two products are strategic substitutes if  $\frac{\partial p_j^{**}}{\partial p_k^{**}} < 0$  and  $\frac{\partial p_k^{**}}{\partial p_j^{**}} < 0$ . If the pass-through of merging partner's costs are strictly positive, then the merging products are strategic complements.

to test the pass-through assumptions empirically if he wishes to make joint predictions from the UPP values of both firms. However, even if the UPP of one of the merging firms is to be interpreted alone, deviation from the above pass-through assumptions still potentially affects the UPP. Empirically, it may lead the UPP to produce false positive results (type I errors) because the re-equilibration that is ignored by the UPP will cause the simulated post-merger price to decrease when the merging partner’s price increases.

Even more practically important is the case when a merger market consists of more than two firms pre-merger. For the same conclusion to Farrell and Shapiro (2010)’s Proposition 1 to hold, the own- and cross-product pass-through assumptions have to hold between *all* product-pairs in the market, including both merging and non-merging ones. In other words, satisfaction of the strategic complement assumption between the two merging products alone is not enough; all products in the market have to be strategic complements. In section 5.3, I test whether my sampled markets (all consisting of more than two firms pre-merger) satisfy these assumptions and the consequence it has on the joint interpretation of the UPP.

## 4 Demand

I use a discrete-type random coefficient nested logit model of demand, following Berry, Carnall, and Spiller (2006) (henceforth BCS) and Berry and Jia (2008). Each market is populated by agents indexed by  $i$ , each belonging to one of the customer types  $r$ . The conditional indirect utility of consumer  $i$  of type  $r$  choosing product  $j$  in market  $t$  is given by

$$u_{ijt} = x_{jt}\beta_r - \alpha_r p_{jt} + \xi_{jt} + \nu_{it}(\lambda) + \lambda \epsilon_{ijt},$$

where  $x_j$  is a  $K$ -dimensional vector of observable product characteristics,  $p_{jt}$  is the price of product  $j$  in market  $t$ ,  $\xi_j$  is an unobserved (by the econometrician) product characteristic,  $\nu_i$  is a random error that differentiates inside from outside goods,  $\lambda \in [0, 1]$  is the nested logit parameter, and  $\epsilon_{ijt}$  is an error term. The single nest used consists of all inside goods. In the discrete-choice differentiated product setting, each agent  $i$  chooses a single good  $j$  that gives her the highest utility. The utility from purchasing the outside good  $j = 0$  is normalized to zero. I follow BCS in choosing the number of types  $r = 2$ , representing leisure and business travelers. I henceforth denote the population weights of these two consumers types as  $\gamma$  and  $1 - \gamma$ . The

overall market share of product  $j$  in market  $t$  is then

$$s_{jt}(x_t, p_t, \xi_t) = \gamma s_{jt1} + (1 - \gamma) s_{jt2}, \text{ where}$$

$$s_{jtr}(x_t, p_t, \xi_t) = \frac{\exp(\frac{\delta_{jtr}}{\lambda}) D_{rt}^{\lambda-1}}{1 + D_{rt}^{\lambda}}, \forall r = 1, 2,$$

is the type-specific market share,  $\delta_{jtr} = x_{jt}\beta_r - \alpha_r p_{jt} + \xi_{jt}$  is the average utility of good  $j$  in market  $t$  to a customer of type  $r$ , and  $D_{rt} = \sum_{k=1}^J \exp(\frac{\delta_{ktr}}{\lambda})$  is the inclusive value, summed over all inside goods within the nest. By using types to model consumer heterogeneity, preferences for product characteristics are correlated. It is important to model this correlation because, for example, a business traveler who is not very price-sensitive is likely to have a stronger preference for direct flights and amenities at the airport as well. The BCS random coefficient model simplifies to a simple nested logit model when  $r = 1$ .

#### 4.1 Data

The merger between US Airways and America West was completed in 2005 after a short investigation by the DOJ. The antitrust agencies did not challenge this merger because the two airlines' route networks were complementary instead of overlapping: America West concentrated its operation in the western U.S., with hubs in Phoenix (PHX) and Las Vegas (LAX), while US Airways was active on the east coast, with hubs in Charlotte (CLT) and Philadelphia (PHL). US Airways entered Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection in 2002 and 2004, and its financial situation had prevented United Airlines to acquire it in 2001. America West's acquisition brought US Airways out of bankruptcy, and the resultant merged company retained the name of the acquired firm. After the merger of the two complementary route networks, the new US Airways became the fifth largest domestic carrier. The antitrust agencies believe that this merger is an example with credible cost synergies and consumer benefit (McDonald (2005)).

The primary dataset used is the DB1B by BTS RITA (Bureau of Transportation Statistics, Research and Innovative Technology Administration). This is a ten percent sample of all itineraries enplaned every quarter. Appendix A details my itinerary selection criteria, aggregation process to the airline-market level, and the definitions of the characteristics variables I constructed. I used the eight pre-merger quarters, from 2003Q3 to 2005Q2, for demand estimation. Secondly, I obtain the annual population of each MSA (metropolitan statistical area) from the U.S. Census. The market size of each city-pair is then given by the geometric mean of

Table 1: SUMMARY STATISTICS OF KEY VARIABLES

Complete dataset ( $N = 124852$ )	Mean	Std	Min	Max
Itinerary fare (2003\$)	346.08	109.08	53.95	1406.16
Passengers (count)	154.27	308.59	10	4527
Direct flight (%)	27.85	42.81	0	100
Distance (miles; passenger-weighted)	3089.88	1718.58	134	11872
Passenger share at origin airport (%)	13.71	14.62	0.019	94.65
Passenger share at destination airport (%)	13.38	14.55	0.0060	94.65
Market share $s_j$	$5.8e^{-5}$	$1.30e^{-4}$	$6.46e^{-7}$	0.0062
Market size $M$	3060724	2053482	221160	$1.55e^7$

*Note:* An observation is an airline–origin airport–destination airport–quarter tuple. A route is defined as an origin airport–destination airport pair. A market is defined as an origin MSA–destination MSA pair. Thus, a market contains multiple routes when a MSA contains multiple airports. Eight pre-merger quarters are used, from 2003Q3 to 2005Q2, in the complete dataset.

the populations of the origin and destination MSA’s. Thirdly, I obtain the monthly consumer price index for urban consumers’ transportation (not seasonally adjusted) from the BLS (Bureau of Labor Statistics). I then use this CPI to adjust all itinerary fares to my base year of 2003 (January) dollars. Table 1 presents summary statistics of key variables in my dataset.

## 4.2 Demand estimation results

Table 2 shows estimates of the BCS random coefficient demand model. (See appendix C for estimation procedure and model identification.) Estimates of a simple nested logit model is also included for comparison; the similarity between the nested logit model’s coefficients and those for the dominant customer type (type I) in the BCS model validates the BCS estimates. All coefficients bear the expected signs, reasonable magnitudes, and are statistically significant. For example, to quantify the coefficient’s magnitudes using results from the first customer type, an increase in the percentage of direct flights of an airline on a route by 10% will increase the average quality of the product by 0.17, which is equivalent to a decrease in airfare by \$22.05. An increase of 500 miles during the flight corresponds to a decrease in price of \$13.55. In the simplifying assumption that passenger share at the origin airport (a proxy for an airline’s “airport presence” and level of customer service at check-in) is exogenous, an increase in the passenger share at origin airport of an airline on a route by 10% will increase the average quality of the product by 0.179, which is equivalent to a decrease in airfare by \$23.22.<sup>6</sup>

<sup>6</sup>Airline passenger shares at origin and destination airports are, of course, endogenous in reality. These passenger shares are all but statistics of endogenous market shares of all routes that involve these airports and belong to the airline in question. However, the assumption of exogeneity may not be too severe because my demand model treats each route-market as independent. Since an airport-presence variable depends on the market share



Table 2: DEMAND ESTIMATES

	Nested logit <sup>a</sup>	BCS nested logit <sup>b</sup>	
		Type I	Type II
Itinerary fare <sup>c</sup>	-0.00499 (7.452e <sup>-4</sup> )	-0.00771 (1.752e <sup>-4</sup> )	-0.00117 (6.88e <sup>-5</sup> )
Direct flight	0.0145 (3.98e <sup>-4</sup> )	0.0171 (4.255e <sup>-4</sup> )	0.0954 (7.65e <sup>-5</sup> )
Distance	1.24e <sup>-4</sup> (2.46e <sup>-5</sup> )	2.098e <sup>-4</sup> (1.5e <sup>-5</sup> )	-0.0170 (4.674e <sup>-4</sup> )
Psngr. share at origin airport	0.0118 (9.697e <sup>-4</sup> )	0.0179 (0.00141)	0.0527 (5.97e <sup>-5</sup> )
Psngr. share at destination airport	0.00519 (8.264e <sup>-4</sup> )	0.00952 (0.00108)	0.00877 (4.07e <sup>-5</sup> )
constant	-8.573 (0.169)	-8.570 (9.49e <sup>-5</sup> )	-8.573 (5.27e <sup>-5</sup> )
Nested logit parameter ( $\lambda$ )	0.534 (0.00964)	0.604 (0.00176)	
Percentage in population ( $\gamma$ )	-	0.961 (8.49e <sup>-5</sup> )	0.039 (8.49e <sup>-5</sup> )
$N$	5207	5207	
Average own-price elasticity	-2.767	-3.822	-0.580
Average cross-price elasticity	0.180	0.210	0.032

*Note:* Standard errors are reported in parentheses.

<sup>a</sup> The dependent variable is  $\ln(s_{jt}) - \ln(s_0)$ . All variables are statistically significant at the 1% level.

<sup>b</sup> Standard errors for the BCS demand parameters are computed using bootstrap.

<sup>c</sup> A Hausman instrument of prices is used to control for the endogenous itinerary fare. This instrument is defined by the simple average of itinerary fares, in 2003 dollars per mile, over all *other* observations in the same market. The unit of dollar *per mile* is used when constructing the Hausman instrument to allow for fair comparison between itinerary fares of different route lengths. Appendix A shows the first stage regression results of the endogenous variable on the exogenous and instrumental variables.

The last two columns show the two customer types have distinct preferences. Since type 2 consumers have a much lower price sensitivity than type 1 consumers, one can consider type 1 consumers as leisure travelers and type 2 consumers are business travelers. This categorization is reasonable given the estimated value of  $\gamma$ , which gives the percentage of leisure travelers in the population as 96%. Other coefficients also show that business travelers have a much stronger preference for direct flights and the airline's presence in the origin airport, which favors the use of frequent flier plans and serves as a proxy for customer service at check-in. Not surprisingly, neither customer type value the airline's presence at the destination airport much, as both customer types have similarly low coefficients. Almost all coefficients for both consumer types bear the same sign as the simple nested logit estimates. A reasonable exception is the "distance"

of *all* routes that involve that airport, the effect of *one* route's market share on the variable may be minimal.

variable for the business travelers to bear a negative sign.

## 5 Results

### 5.1 UPP and Merger Simulation

In this section, I compare the UPP’s predictions against their structurally simulated price changes. Using the price elasticities implied by the BCS random coefficient demand estimates, I first back out the pre-merger marginal cost of each good using the firms’ pre-merger first order conditions. With these marginal costs, I conduct a series of merger simulations for each market to obtain simulated post-merger prices. In particular, I consider a range of cost synergies  $e$  between zero and 0.1 to obtain both positive and negative simulated price changes, for the same set of markets. In each set of simulation, the same cost synergy value  $e$  is applied to the marginal costs of both America West and US Airways. This setup enables me to test whether the UPP creates any false positive (type I error) or false negative (type II error) predictions. For each airline-market observation, I also use the (pre-merger) own- and cross-price elasticities implied by the estimated demand model, and changes in marginal costs to compute a corresponding UPP value. It is important to emphasize that each UPP value I compute in this manner corresponds to a structural merger simulation in the *closest* possible way: namely, that the diversion ratio used in the UPP is the “true” one implied by the estimated structural demand model, and cost synergy  $e$  used in the UPP is identical to that in the merger simulation. Thus, the only source of deviation of the UPP from the simulated price change comes from the UPP’s theoretical simplification in non-reequilibrium. The use of estimated price elasticities is, of course, not the only way to compute the diversion ratio in the UPP; in fact, Farrell and Shapiro originally intend their merger screen to bypass a structural demand estimation so to be quick to use. Using diversion ratios other than the “true” one will most likely lead the UPP to deviate further from its corresponding merger simulation result than my findings below. The consequence of this deviation is impossible to summarize because the manner in which practitioners will estimate the diversion ratio non-structurally will be case-specific. However, I do consider logit diversion ratios below that do not require demand estimation, and test how well this “practical” model emulate the BCS outcomes.

First I assess the UPP’s prediction on the *sign* of post-merger price change, for both America West and US Airways in my set of overlapping route markets. Table 3 tabulates the UPP’s sign

Table 3: TABULATION OF SIGN PREDICTIONS BY THE UPP

cost synergy $e$	<i>UPP:</i>				
	<i>Simulated price change:</i>	positive	negative	positive	negative
		positive	negative	negative	positive
0		256	0	0	0
0.02		117	122	6	11
0.04		78	145	26	6
0.06		47	181	24	4
0.08		32	201	22	1
0.1		17	219	19	1

*No. of observations  $N = 256$  for all scenarios.*

The four categories of UPP predictions are, in order: true positive, true negative, false positive (type I error), and false negative (type II error).

predictions against the sign of the corresponding simulated price changes. As cost synergy  $e$  increases, more simulated price changes switch from positive to negative as expected, as the incentive to decrease price due to lowered cost dominates the incentive to increase price due to lost competition. In this set of markets and simulations, the UPP predicts the correct sign of simulated price change at least 87% of the time. Among the observations with wrong sign predictions, there are usually more false positives (type I errors) than false negatives (type II errors) in my markets.

Figure 1 is a scatter plot that shows how the UPP and the structurally simulated price change transition from positive to negative values as the cost synergy  $e$  increases from 0 to 0.1. For each airline-market-level observation, all six pairs of UPP and simulated values, each pair generated with a different level of cost synergy  $e$ , are included. Every two consecutive points within each airline-market observation are connected with a straight line. Points in the upper-left quadrant represents false positive results (type I errors), while points in the lower-right quadrant are false negatives (type II errors). A striking observation is that the overall line of each airline-market observation, each consisting of six connected points, itself resembles a straight line very much. This is evidence that the ratio between the rate at which own-cost reduction is passed through to the UPP, and the rate at which the same cost reduction is passed through to the simulated price, is almost constant across the values of cost synergy  $e$  considered. More importantly, the slopes of these lines are all very close to one. In other words, the UPP is remarkably accurate in approximating the own-cost pass-through rate of a structural merger simulation, independent of the particular magnitude of the cost reduction used. The consequence of this observation in relation to the UPP’s *sign* prediction is that for each airline-market observation  $j$ , there exists necessarily a range of values of cost synergy  $e$  where the UPP will give a wrong sign prediction, as




Figure 1: Scatter plot between the UPP and corresponding structurally simulated price changes, showing transition from positive to negative regions as the cost synergy  $e$  increases from 0 to 0.1. For each airline-market observation, all six pairs of values, each pair generated with a different level of cost synergy  $e$ , are included, and each pair of consecutive points is connected with a straight line. Only a subset of airline-market observations are plotted above to avoid over-crowding.

long as the first term of the  $UPP_j$ ,  $D_{jk}(p_k - c_k)$ , deviates from the corresponding simulated price increase (when  $e = 0$ ). Graphically, if one is to pick a point in the first quadrant that does not lie on the 45-degree line, and to extend a 45-degree line from this point to the lower-left quadrant (to trace the UPP and simulated price predictions as  $e$  increases), some part of this line must lie in either the upper-left or lower-right quadrant. It can be seen from the graph that this range of cost synergy  $e$  that produces a wrong sign prediction can be large, for some observations. (The distance between any two consecutive points on the graph represent a 2% change in cost.) The size of this problematic range of  $e$  depends on how far the first term of the  $UPP_j$ ,  $D_{jk}(p_k - c_k)$ , deviates from the simulated price increase (when  $e = 0$ ). This in turn depends on two factors: firstly, the quality of the diversion ratio used to compute the UPP in comparison to the actual substitution patterns; secondly, the severity of the UPP's non-reequilibration assumption in each market. It suffices to emphasize that the UPP will produce a wrong sign prediction at *some* values of cost synergy  $e$ . Figure 1 also suggests that an airline-market observation is unlikely to give both false positive and false negative predictions, but only either one, as  $e$  changes. This is because a 45-degree straight line cannot pass through both the upper-left and lower-right

Table 4: AVERAGE SIMULATED PRICE CHANGE AND UPP UNDER SIX VALUES OF COST SYNERGY  $e$

cost synergy $e$	Mean simulated price change	Mean UPP	Corr.	Mean abs. difference
0	\$7.79	10.24	0.8985	3.5409
0.02	\$3.10	5.13	0.9053	3.4157
0.04	-\$1.58	0.022	0.9127	3.3430
0.06	-\$6.26	-5.09	0.9202	3.3145
0.08	-\$10.92	-10.20	0.9275	3.3287
0.1	-\$15.59	-15.31	0.9344	3.3686

*No. of observations  $N = 256$  for all scenarios.*

quadrants.

I now turn to the *magnitudes* of the UPP as an approximation to the magnitudes of simulated price increases. The summary statistics in table 4 show that their averages are remarkably close. As the cost synergy  $e$  increases from zero to 0.1, both the mean simulated price change and the mean UPP decrease expectedly. In my set of markets, the magnitudes of the UPP show a slight tendency to over-predict the price increase (or under-predict the price decrease). Despite this slight difference in overall magnitudes, the correlation between these two variables are consistently high. This high correlation implies that the UPP is informative in flagging the markets with largest potential price increase among a cross-section of markets, although each UPP value may not be directly translated into a price change.

A second interesting observation is that the correlation between the UPP and simulated price change increases as the cost synergy  $e$  increases. This in fact relates to the UPP's remarkable accuracy in approximating the own-cost pass-through rate of a structural merger simulation, as mentioned above. Specifically, the UPP has two sources of approximation errors relative to a simulated price change, that correspond to the two terms in the UPP: firstly, that the UPP approximates the increase in price due to loss in competition by ignoring the re-equilibration of all other endogenous variables, except its own price; secondly, that the UPP approximates the decrease in price due to cost reduction by assuming an own-cost pass-through rate of one. As the analysis of figure 1 above explains, the second source of approximation error is very small and is independent of the size of cost synergy  $e$ . Then, as  $e$  increases, the fall in price due to cost reduction increases, and the UPP's approximation error from the first source (non-re-equilibration) decreases in proportion to the overall price change, thus giving the increasing correlation between the UPP and simulated price change with  $e$ . To further investigate their relationship, I regress the UPP on its corresponding simulated price change, for each cost synergy

Table 5: REGRESSION OF THE UPP ON SIMULATED PRICE INCREASE

cost synergy $e$	coeff. $b$	const.	$R^2$
0	1.208 (0.037)	0.827 (0.415)	0.8074 –
0.02	1.221 (0.036)	1.343 (0.310)	0.8196 –
0.04	1.229 (0.035)	1.963 (0.287)	0.8330 –
0.06	1.232 (0.033)	2.620 (0.344)	0.8467 –
0.08	1.231 (0.031)	3.252 (0.434)	0.8603 –
0.1	1.227 (0.029)	3.813 (0.528)	0.8732 –

*No. of observations  $N = 256$  for all scenarios.*  
Standard errors are presented in parenthesis.

value  $e$ . Table 5 shows these regression results. Both the coefficient and the constant term are statistically significant for all values of  $e$ . The increase in  $R^2$  with cost synergy  $e$  echoes the result above where the correlation between these two variables increases with  $e$ .

Lastly, to ascertain that the (average) slope of the lines in figure 1 is close to one, I approximate the post-merger pass-through rate using consecutive values of simulated prices as cost reduces successively with synergy  $e$ . Since these pass-through rates are estimated using post-merger equilibria (each with a different cost synergy value  $e$ ), the pass-through rates I obtain are post-merger pass-through. Although, as Jaffe and Weyl (2010) clarify, that the post-merger pass-through rate is theoretically different from the merger pass-through rate, the two can be similar empirically. The approximations in table 6 are indeed very close to one, and almost stay constant throughout the range of cost synergy  $e$  considered. This is coherent with the observation that lines in figure 1 have slopes close to one.

This approximation of the merger pass-through can then be used to translate pricing pressure to an actual change in price. Jaffe and Weyl (2010)’s Theorem 1 establishes that the magnitude of simulated price change can be approximated by the UPP multiplied by the merger pass-through rate. The approximated price change  $\Delta P$  generated this way thus has two sources of approximation errors: firstly, that the first term of the UPP (with “true” diversion ratios) approximates the increase in price due to loss in competition by ignoring the re-equilibration of all other endogenous variables, except its own price; secondly, that the pass-through rate at

Table 6: APPROXIMATED POST-MERGER PASS-THROUGH

cost synergy $e$	Mean approx. post-merger pass-through <sup>a</sup>	Mean abs. difference <sup>b</sup>
0	–	–
0.02	0.9167	2.9409
0.04	0.9151	2.9207
0.06	0.9136	2.9174
0.08	0.9122	2.9253
0.1	0.9108	2.9376

*No. of observations  $N = 254$  for all scenarios.*

<sup>a</sup> For example, post-merger pass-through at  $e = 0.02$  is approximated by  $\frac{P_{j,00}^{sim} - P_{j,02}^{sim}}{0.02 \times c_j}$ , where  $P_{j,00}^{sim}$  is the simulated post-merger price for good  $j$  when  $e = 0$ , and  $P_{j,02}^{sim}$  is the simulated post-merger price for good  $j$  when  $e = 0.02$ , for each airline-market observation.

<sup>b</sup> This is the mean absolute difference between the approximated price change computed according to Jaffe and Weyl (2010)’s Theorem 1, and the simulated price change. The former is, in turn, computed by multiplying the UPP by the approximated post-merger pass-through in the second column.

the post-merger equilibrium does not equal that at the pre-merger equilibrium, or the overall merger pass-through. All pass-through rates are functions of the curvature of demand; in most commonly used functional forms of smooth demand functions, the change in curvature increases with distance traveled. Thus, it is possible that the second source of approximation error increases when the simulated price is far away from the pre-merger price, either because of no cost synergy (thus simulated price is above pre-merger price) or a large cost synergy (thus simulated price is far below the pre-merger price). The very small changes in pass-through values in table 6 indicates that this source of approximation error is minimal. Indeed, a comparison between the last column of table 6 and the last column of table 4 shows that the approximated price change computed using Jaffe and Weyl (2010)’s Theorem 1 (that uses a pass-through rate) has a smaller mean absolute difference from the structurally simulated price change, than one without. This discussion on pass-through again points to the importance of having good diversion ratio estimates, as all other sources of approximation error in the UPP are relatively insignificant.

## 5.2 UPP without demand estimation

The UPP values I have considered so far are by definition as close to the respective simulated price changes as possible, because the diversion ratios used in the UPP are “true” values computed from the own- and cross-price elasticities of the estimated structural demand system. This is, of course, not the only way to estimate diversion ratios, and certainly not one that Farrell




Figure 2: Scatter plot between the UPP (computed using diversion ratios from logit elasticities) and structurally simulated price changes (using BCS demand), showing transition from positive to negative regions as the cost synergy  $e$  increases from 0 to 0.1. For each airline-market observation, all six pairs of values, each pair generated with a different level of cost synergy  $e$ , are included, and each pair of consecutive points is connected with a straight line. Only a subset of airline-market observations are plotted above to avoid over-crowding; the same subset is used as in figure 1.

and Shapiro (2010) advocate, due to its time and data requirement. Here I derive diversion ratios using the much simpler logit demand model.<sup>7</sup> It does not require any estimation because substitution patterns are simply given by observed market shares, due to its IIA (Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives) property. Thus, logit diversion ratios do not require any more data than what the UPP already demands.<sup>8</sup>

Figure 2 is a scatter plot similar to figure 1, except the UPP used is computed from logit diversion ratios. For each airline-market level observation, the graph traces the pair of values as cost synergy  $e$  increases from zero to 0.1 successively. Figure 2's striking difference from figure

<sup>7</sup>Specifically, this is a logit demand model defined *without* the outside good  $j = 0$ . This is appropriate for my definition of the market size  $M$ , which is the geometric mean of the populations of the origin and destination metropolitan areas. This results in a very large share of the outside good (i.e. percentage of people not flying); in fact it is always larger than 0.99. Using observed market shares  $s_j, \forall j \geq 1$  only will avoid the strong bias in substitution towards the outside good, giving a diversion ratio between inside goods close to zero. This approach is also reasonable in the general case because sometimes the total market size  $M$  is difficult to measure, and is only required for a structural demand estimation.

<sup>8</sup>Farrell and Shapiro have suggested using logit diversion ratios in an interview. See "Roundtable Interview with Joseph Farrell and Carl Shapiro," [http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/antitrust\\_source/Feb10\\_FarrShapRT2\\_25f.authcheckdam.pdf](http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/antitrust_source/Feb10_FarrShapRT2_25f.authcheckdam.pdf), p.4.



1 demonstrates the grave consequence when the diversion ratios used deviate significantly from the true values. Graphically, if the first point (when cost synergy  $e = 0$ ) of each airline-market observation is located far from the 45-degree line, a much longer portion of the extension of this line will lie in either the top-left or bottom-right quadrant. Consequently, UPP values computed using these imperfect diversion ratios will give wrong sign predictions for a much larger range of cost synergy  $e$ . This result is not idiosyncratic to the specific airline markets or merger analyzed; it is general to all applications when the UPP tries to approximate a Bertrand merger simulation result with imperfect diversion ratios. For this set of observations, the range of problematic  $e$  includes Farrell and Shapiro’s “default” 0.1 for many observations in figure 2, as many lines’ last points (when  $e = 0.1$ ) are located in the top-left quadrant, giving false positive predictions. This serves as a caution against Farrell and Shapiro’s belief that the prediction of the *sign* of price change is inherently more robust than *magnitude* predictions (Farrell and Shapiro (2010), p.19). Either type of predictions require good diversion ratios in order to emulate a structural merger simulation well.<sup>9</sup>

As Pakes (2010) points out, Farrell and Shapiro’s suggestion in obtaining diversion ratios from company documents and consumer surveys are not immune to problems. The most difficult aspect is to identify the preferences of the *marginal* consumer as opposed to the average consumer: the diversion ratio captures the switching pattern of the *next* consumer lost upon an infinitesimal increase in price. Another potential method to measure the diversion ratio  $\frac{\partial s_j}{\partial s_k}$  is a regression of one good’s quantity on another, assuming that the quantities of these goods are observed repeatedly, either across time or across markets. A naïve implementation of this regression is unlikely to capture the substitution pattern either because of endogeneity of these two quantities and the likely high correlation between them, even with adequate use of fixed effects and control variables, such as costs. It is an instructive exercise in the future to evaluate the performance of these alternative methods to estimate the diversion ratio against a structurally estimated one in analyzed mergers.

<sup>9</sup>The correlation between the UPP (computed using logit diversion ratios) and simulated price changes (from structural model with BCS demand) is still high, and is similar to values in table 4. Thus the *relative* magnitudes of the UPP are still informative. (This strong correlation is largely due to the fact that both logit and BCS demands belong to the same family of discrete choice models. The same correlation may not be achieved if one uses other means to estimate diversion ratios, such as business documents, consumer surveys, or regression on quantities.) However, the mean values (or levels) of the UPP and simulated price changes differ greatly, unlike the case in table 4. The UPP with logit diversion ratios over-predicts the post-merger price increase because logit demand exaggerates substitution between the merging products. This can also be seen in figure 2, in that most of the first points of the lines (when cost synergy  $e = 0$ ) lie above the 45-degree line in the first quadrant.

### 5.3 Testing Pass-Through Assumptions

As mentioned in section 3.1, pass-through assumptions on own and merging partner’s costs imposed by Farrell and Shapiro’s Proposition 1 do not always hold theoretically, and their violation may affect the accuracy of the UPP, interpreted either individually or jointly between merging firms. Here I show that the strategic complement assumption is not empirically innocuous either. To test the post-merger pass-through assumptions on own and merging partner’s costs, I impose a 10% increase in marginal cost on *one* of the merging partners at a time and simulate the resultant post-merger equilibrium. This set of equilibrium prices is then compared against the standard set of post-merger equilibrium prices where there is no change in costs. If equilibrium price  $p_j^{**}$  weakly increases with marginal cost  $c_k$  and vice versa for  $p_k^{**}$  and  $c_j$ , the two merging goods satisfy the pass-through assumptions. Furthermore, if  $p_j^{**}$  strictly increases with  $c_k$  and vice versa, the two merging products are strategic complements post-merger. Among my sampled markets, none satisfy the requirement of non-negative post-merger pass-through of merging partner’s costs. Because the post-merger pass-through rate is not observable from pre-merger data, I consider the alternative of using the pre-merger pass-through rate, computed in an analogous manner but with pre-merger equilibrium prices  $p_j^*$  and  $p_k^*$ . These two pass-through rates always agree in sign and are very similar in magnitude. Thus my markets satisfy neither pre-merger pass-through nor post-merger pass-through requirements. As a consequence of the BCS model’s violation of these assumptions, some UPP values that are calculated from “true” elasticities from the BCS model give false positive predictions, as table 3 shows. It is worth noting that this resultant prevalence of false positives in the UPP is in contradiction with Farrell and Shapiro’s remark that the UPP otherwise normally has a tendency to produce false negatives (Farrell and Shapiro (2010), p.13). When all of its post-merger pass-through assumptions are satisfied, the UPP has a tendency to *under*-predict increase in price because it ignores a feedback when sales of the merging partner’s good is diverted back to the own good.

I complete the comparison between pass-through rates by computing the merger pass-through rate for my markets and comparing it against the pre-merger and post-merger rates. The merger pass-through rate is computed by comparing the post-merger equilibrium prices  $p_j^{**}$  and  $p_k^{**}$ , under a 10% increase in marginal cost on *one* of the merging partners at a time, against the pre-merger equilibrium prices  $p_j^*$  and  $p_k^*$ , under original marginal costs. Because the increase in price generated in this manner is necessarily larger than the increases in the previous two

computations (due to the inclusion of the merger effect), merger pass-through conditions are easier to satisfy than pre-merger or post-merger conditions. Among my sampled markets, 84 out of 128 satisfy the requirement of non-negative merger pass-through of own and merging partner’s costs, which makes for a more meaningful comparison within my sample. Figure 3 plots the scatter between the simulated price change and the “true” UPP when cost synergy  $e = 0.04$  (chosen such that there are both positive and negative price changes). There is a definitive pattern where points from markets that violate the merger pass-through conditions are concentrated on the upper-left half of the cluster, thus more likely to be found in the graph’s upper-left quadrant (even as cost synergy  $e$  changes), resulting in a false positive prediction from the UPP. In fact, the majority of the points in the upper-left quadrant are from markets that do not satisfy the merger pass-through conditions.<sup>10</sup>

Now I turn to the joint interpretation of the UPP’s for both merging products in relation to pass-through. Section 3.1 generalizes Farrell and Shapiro’s Proposition 1 to the practical case when the pre-merger market is larger than a duopoly. For its conclusion to continue to hold, then, the cross-product pass-through between *all* products in the market (both merging and non-merging ones) have to be non-negative. All of my 128 markets are larger than a duopoly pre-merger. From the same set of simulation test results above, none of them satisfy this more demanding set of requirements (although 84 of them have non-negative merger pass-through between the two merging products). Table 7 tabulates the number of markets that have positive UPP values for both merging firms, and among them, those that have positive simulated price changes for both merging firms. It shows that strategic complementarity (defined by positive merger pass-through) between *only* the two merging firms is not sufficient for the proposition’s conclusion to hold: joint positive values do not always lead to joint positive simulated price

<sup>10</sup>Here I also replicate table 3, reporting the tabulation between the two groups of markets (those that satisfy or violate pass-through between merging partners) separately. The same pattern as figure 3 is observed for all values of cost synergy  $e$ : markets violating merger pass-through conditions show a larger percentage of false positive results among observations with wrong sign predictions.

cost synergy $e$	$UPP :$ $\Delta P^{sim} :$	Markets satisfying pass-through				Markets violating pass-through			
		pos.	neg.	pos.	neg.	pos.	neg.	pos.	neg.
0		84	0	0	0	172	0	0	0
0.02		70	6	1	7	47	116	5	4
0.04		49	19	10	6	29	126	16	0
0.06		30	42	8	4	17	139	16	0
0.08		19	50	14	1	13	151	8	0
0.1		11	64	9	0	6	156	10	0




Figure 3: Scatter plot between the UPP and corresponding structurally simulated price changes, when cost synergy  $e = 0.04$ . The conditions considered here are merger pass-through between the two merging products only.

changes. This is because prices of non-merging firms re-equilibrate during a merger simulation; in the case of strategic substitutes, they decrease in response to the merging firms' increase in prices. This, in turn, causes the merging firms' prices to increase *less* after full re-equilibration. The non-zero tabulations in the last column of table 7 also show that the aforementioned pass-through conditions are sufficient but not necessary.

#### 5.4 UPP's Deviation from Simulated Price Increase

One way to improve on a price prediction is to estimate its deviation from the “gold standard” as well, since this deviation may not be random. As emphasized above, the difference between the magnitudes of the UPP and the simulated price change (when cost synergy  $e$  is zero), other than the merger pass-through rate established by Jaffe and Weyl (2010), is attributed to non-reequilibration. In this section, I explore whether this approximation error due to non-reequilibration is related to product characteristics. I conduct an OLS regression of the magnitude difference between computed UPP and simulated price change on the four observed product attributes and the recovered unobserved product characteristic ( $\xi_j$ ). By comparing the significant levels of the regressors, I can assess whether some product characteristics cause more

Table 7: TEST OF FARRELL AND SHAPIRO’S PROPOSITION 1 ON NON-DUOPOLY PRE-MERGER MARKETS

cost synergy $e$	Markets satisfying merger pass-through between AW and US only <sup>a</sup>	
	$(UPP_{HP} > 0, UPP_{US} > 0)$	$(UPP_{HP} > 0, UPP_{US} > 0)$ and $(\Delta P_{HP}^{sim} > 0, \Delta P_{US}^{sim} > 0)$
0	42	42
0.02	29	28
0.04	18	10
0.06	1	0
0.08	0	0
0.1	0	0

<sup>a</sup> None of these markets satisfy the full set of pass-through assumptions between *all* (merging and non-merging) products in the market.

re-equilibration than others. Table 8 shows two sets of regression results, where the first includes only observable characteristics, and the second includes the recovered unobservable  $\xi_j$  as well. Thus the first regression may be more suggestive if the practitioner wishes to bypass a demand estimation. The  $R^2$  values from the two regressions are similar, both below 0.2, indicating that the overall explanatory power of these characteristics on the UPP’s deviation is not high. Both regressions conclude that itinerary fare and airline presence in the origin airport are the most statistically significant. Both of their coefficients are positive, meaning that both itinerary fare and airline presence at the origin airport are correlated with the UPP’s *under*-prediction of price increase. In other words, the re-equilibration (from both the merging partner and non-merging firms) that is ignored by the UPP will lead the simulated price to increase further (or decrease less) than the UPP indicates, and this re-equilibration is positively correlated with the itinerary fare and airline presence at the origin airport. This is reasonable because these two are the most important attributes that determine product similarity. Lastly, the unobservable  $\xi_j$  is positive and significant in the second regression. This is confirmation that unobserved quality has important impact on consumer choice.

## 6 UPP and HHI

As a preliminary merger screen that is easily computed with small data requirement, the UPP is intended as an alternative to the traditional approach based on market shares and changes in the HHI (Herfindahl-Hirschman Index), which is equally easy to compute and small in data input. In this traditional approach, the post-merger HHI is computed using pre-merger market shares,

Table 8: UPP DEVIATION REGRESSION ESTIMATES

Itinerary fare	0.0260 (0.0069)	0.0238 (0.0069)
Direct flight	-0.0064 (0.0155)	0.0020 (0.0156)
Distance	0.0010 (0.0006)	0.0016 (0.00006)
Psngr. share at origin airport	0.1156 (0.0412)	0.1177 (0.0407)
Psngr. share at destination airport	0.0809 (0.0460)	0.0840 (0.0454)
Unobservable $\xi_j$	-	0.09892 (0.3709)
constant	-18.1558 (3.6313)	-20.3851 (3.6838)
$R^2$	0.1478	0.1715
$N$	256	256

*Note:* Standard errors are reported in parentheses.  
The dependent variable in both regressions is  $(\Delta P_j^{sim} - UPP_j)$ ,  
where  $\Delta P_j^{sim}$  is the simulated price increase of product  $j$ .

assuming that market shares do not change post-merger. Thresholds on this increase are then chosen relative to the pre-merger HHI; these thresholds had also been revised in the new 2010 *Guidelines*. Here, I first explore whether the UPP and merger simulation will flag the same set of markets as the HHI. Specifically, I tabulate the number of markets flagged by both the 1992 and 2010 HHI thresholds, and the number of markets flagged by the UPP and merger simulation among them. I use Farrell and Shapiro’s “default” 10% cost reduction when computing the UPP and simulated price increases; they flag a market as anticompetitive when either (or both) of the merging firm’s value is positive. Table 9 shows that the UPP and merger simulation are flagging only a small portion of the markets that are flagged by the HHI. In particular, they fail to flag any of the markets that are deemed “moderately concentrated” in either year’s HHI standard. This suggests that one may need to adjust the “default” cost reduction for each merger; a smaller value will lead to more agreement between the three screens in this case. Note that this result is opposite to Varma (2009), who suggests that UPP is a tighter screen than the HHI from his simulations. This is possibly due to the “narrow” definition of airline-route markets. Most consumer products will have many more competitors than the number of airlines in a route, which leads to lower HHI values.

I also compare the HHI’s correlations with the UPP and simulated price changes respectively. Because the HHI is inherently unable to take into account the change in post-merger marginal

Table 9: TABULATION OF MARKETS ACCORDING TO HHI THRESHOLDS

Using 1992 thresholds:	Total no.	Markets where	
	of markets	$UPP_{AW} > 0$ or $UPP_{US} > 0$	$\Delta P_{AW}^{sim} > 0$ or $\Delta P_{US}^{sim} > 0$
$HHI_{pre} < 1000$	0	0	0
$1000 \leq HHI_{pre} \leq 1800$ and $\Delta HHI > 100$	5	0	0
$HHI_{pre} > 1800$ and $\Delta HHI > 50$	105	36	18
Using 2010 thresholds:	Total no.	Markets where	
	of markets	$UPP_{AW} > 0$ or $UPP_{US} > 0$	$\Delta P_{AW}^{sim} > 0$ or $\Delta P_{US}^{sim} > 0$
$HHI_{pre} < 1500$	1	0	0
$1500 \leq HHI_{pre} \leq 2500$ and $\Delta HHI > 100$	37	0	0
$HHI_{pre} > 2500$ and $\Delta HHI > 100$	66	36	18

*No. of market-level observations is 128 for all scenarios.*

$HHI_{pre}$  denotes pre-merger HHI.  $\Delta HHI$  denotes increase in HHI.  $UPP_j$  values are computed with the “default” 10% reduction in cost to both merging firms.  $j = AW$  denotes America West;  $j = US$  denotes US Airways.  $\Delta P_j^{sim}$  denotes the structurally simulated price increase of firm  $j$ , computed with the “default” 10% reduction in cost to both merging firms.

costs, I compare it against merger simulations and UPP values that are computed with *no* cost synergies ( $e = 0$ ). Furthermore, to conduct the comparison on the market-level (since the HHI is by definition a market-level variable, while the UPP is an airline-market level variable), I compute the sums of the UPP values and simulated price changes from America West and US Airways in each market. In other words, I first compute the pre- and post-merger HHI, assuming that the post-merger market shares of all non-merging goods stay constant at the pre-merger levels. I then compare the increase in HHI against the *total* price increase across the two merging firms in the same market as predicted by a merger simulation and the UPP.

Table 10 shows the correlation matrix between the three market-level variables: increase in HHI, market-sum of UPP’s for both America West and US Airways, and market-sum of simulated price increases for the two merging firms. Naturally, the UPP results have a stronger correlation with the sum of simulated price increases than the HHI, because the UPP is in fact a simplified merger simulation. The increase in HHI is positively but moderately correlated with the (market-sums of) UPP and simulated price increases, confirming that increase in concentration is correlated with increase in price. The same word of caution applies as before, that the UPP values are computed from “true” diversion ratios and therefore gives the best prediction possible short of a full-blown merger simulation. When one wishes to compute the UPP without a structural demand estimation, in the spirit of Farrell and Shapiro, the deviation between the

Table 10: CORRELATION BETWEEN INCREASE IN HHI, SUM OF UPP’S,  
AND SUM OF SIMULATED PRICE INCREASES

corr.	$(\Delta P_{AW}^{sim} + \Delta P_{US}^{sim})$	$(UPP_{AW} + UPP_{US})$	$\Delta HHI$
$(\Delta P_{AW}^{sim} + \Delta P_{US}^{sim})$	1	–	–
$(UPP_{AW} + UPP_{US})$	0.8985	1	–
$\Delta HHI$	0.6053	0.5135	1

*No. of market-level observations is 128 for all scenarios.*

$\Delta P_j^{sim}$  denotes the structurally simulated price increase of firm  $j$ .  $j = AW$  denotes America West;  $j = US$  denotes US Airways.

UPP and a merger simulation result will widen. The correlation between HHI and these two variables will likely be lower than the values shown.

## 7 Conclusion

The invention and popularization of the Upward Pricing Pressure test marks a new era in the practice of antitrust when the traditional approach based on market definition and concentration is widely deemed problematic. Farrell and Shapiro’s UPP test has appeal in being easy to compute, low in data requirement, and free of market definition. This paper first establishes the close theoretical link between the UPP and the standard structural merger simulation with Bertrand firm conduct and differentiated products. I show that the UPP is a much simplified merger simulation that ignores the re-equilibration of all other merging products’ endogenous prices and quantities. Using the structural merger simulation as the “gold standard”, I demonstrate that the UPP performs well in both sign and magnitude predictions when it uses the “true” diversion ratios implied by the estimated demand model. Thus, the UPP is not a bad substitution for the last step of merger simulation, namely the computation of the new equilibrium from the set of post-merger first order conditions. However, practitioners may not have access to these “true” diversion ratios because the UPP is originally intended to be an easy test that does not require a demand estimation. I therefore use the example of a simple logit demand to illustrate the consequence of using inaccurate diversion ratios in the UPP: the test will give a wrong sign prediction over a much larger range of cost synergies than before. This phenomenon is due to the almost equal pass-through rates between the UPP and a merger simulation, which are largely constant in the relevant range of costs. This finding is general to all merger analysis and is not idiosyncratic to the airline markets or the particular airline merger. The most severe source of approximation error in the UPP therefore comes in the use of inaccurate diversion ratios.



I also direct attention to the pass-through assumptions in Farrell and Shapiro (2010)'s proposition, which has so far received little attention. It assumes that the post-merger equilibrium prices of both merging products have positive pass-through in its own cost, and non-negative pass-through in its merging partner's cost. I point out that these conditions are equivalent to requiring the merging goods to be strategic complements post-merger. It has been demonstrated theoretically that this assumption is not innocuous even in the familiar context of the Bertrand model. I empirically show that when the merging products are strategic substitutes instead of complements, the UPP produces false positive results (type I errors). Furthermore, when the pre-merger market is larger than a duopoly, a much larger set of pass-through assumptions is required, and I show that their violation may lead the joint prediction of the UPP to fail. Lastly, I compare the UPP with the traditional HHI test, using both the 1992 and 2010 thresholds, and conclude that the HHI is a more severe test in both cases.

This study of the UPP is inherently limited because I do not have information on the actual mergers analyzed by the antitrust agencies and their UPP values used. In particular, accuracy of the diversion ratio used has the largest impact on the performance of the UPP. This paper mostly uses the "true" diversion ratio derived from the estimated demand model, which gives the best possible prediction in the UPP against my gold standard. The real test of this merger screen is, admittedly, not on its best possible value, but the value that is actually used by practitioners. It will be instructive to repeat this study in the future when the UPP has been applied broadly. More research is also needed on improving the accuracy in alternative estimation methods of the diversion ratio. Researchers should investigate the best available control variables (or alternative econometric techniques) that identify the substitution pattern of the marginal consumer in a regression between quantities, since quantities data is likely available in most cases. This regression outcome can then be compared against a customer survey result in a merger where the latter is available as well.

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## Appendix A Data and variable construction

The DB1B (Airline Origin and Destination Survey) dataset is publicly available from BTS RITA (Bureau of Transportation Statistics, Research and Innovative Technology Administration). It is a ten percent random sample of airline tickets from reporting airlines, collected by the Office of Airline Information. The dataset is in quarterly frequency and is available on three levels of aggregation: coupon, market, and ticket. For each itinerary, I obtain the itinerary fare from the ticket dataset, the destination from the market dataset, and the fare class information from the coupon dataset.

I use itineraries of eight pre-merger quarters, from 2003Q3 to 2005Q2, for my demand estimation. I select itineraries by the following criteria: I keep itineraries between a list of 75 major airports as defined by Benkard, Bodoh-Creed, and Lazarev (2009) in their Appendix A. I keep roundtrip tickets that involve at most one change of flight between its origin and destination airports. I drop itineraries whose dollar credibility indicator (provided by the ticket dataset) is negative. I drop itineraries with fare equal to or less than US\$10 or with number of passengers larger than 100. I drop itineraries that involves *any* leg that is not in the economy class, where the fare class is defined by the airline.<sup>11</sup> I then aggregate the dataset of itineraries into the airline–origin airport–destination airport–quarter level. Finally, I drop any airline–origin airport–destination airport–quarter tuple with less than ten total passengers.

A smaller subset of the sample is used to estimate the BCS random coefficient model due to computational time. This subset consists of observations from a 50% sample of markets where either America West or US Airways operate in the 2005Q2 quarter. A comparison of the simple nested logit estimates generated from the complete dataset and this subset in table 11 indicates that this subset is a representative sample.

## Appendix B First stage regression results

A Hausman instrument of prices is used to control for the endogenous itinerary fare. This instrument is defined by the simple average of itinerary fares, in 2003 dollars per mile, over all *other* observations in the same market. The unit of dollar *per mile* is used when constructing the Hausman instrument to allow for fair comparison between itinerary fares of different route lengths. I show in table 12 that the Hausman instrument has explanatory power on itinerary fare by the first stage regression in 2SLS, which regresses the endogenous variable (itinerary fare) on the set of exogenous and instrumental variables. All coefficients are statistically significant.

## Appendix C Demand Estimation and Identification

My estimation procedure follows that of Nevo (2000) closely. One simplification is that there is no need for numeric integration over my random coefficients, because their discrete bimodal distribution yields an exact functional form. As a second modification, I follow Berry and Jia (2008) in using a contraction map over  $\xi_{jt}$  instead of  $\delta_{jtr}$ , since the latter would involve one

<sup>11</sup>Southwest Airlines, JetBlue Airways, and Sun Country Airlines code all their itineraries as “First Class” in the coupon dataset. I override their definition and assume all their tickets to be economy.

Table 11: SIMPLE NESTED LOGIT DEMAND ESTIMATES

	Complete dataset	BCS subset
Itinerary fare <sup>a</sup>	-0.00498 (1.021e <sup>-4</sup> )	-0.00499 (7.452e <sup>-4</sup> )
Direct flight	0.0150 (8.18e <sup>-5</sup> )	0.0145 (3.98e <sup>-4</sup> )
Distance	1.938e <sup>-4</sup> (4.25e <sup>-6</sup> )	1.24e <sup>-4</sup> (2.46e <sup>-5</sup> )
Psngr. share at origin airport	0.0119 (1.783e <sup>-4</sup> )	0.0118 (9.697e <sup>-4</sup> )
Psngr. share at destination airport	0.00463 (1.675e <sup>-4</sup> )	0.00519 (8.264e <sup>-4</sup> )
constant	-9.017 (0.0257)	-8.573 (0.169)
Nested logit parameter ( $\lambda$ )	0.493 (0.00213)	0.534 (0.00964)
First stage $R^2$	0.3160	0.3258
$N$	124852	5207
Average own-price elasticity	-3.108	-2.767
Average cross-price elasticity	0.384	0.180

*Note:* Standard errors are reported in parentheses. The dependent variable is  $\ln(s_{jt}) - \ln(s_0)$ . All variables are statistically significant at the 1% level.

<sup>a</sup> A Hausman instrument of prices is used to control for the endogenous itinerary fare by two stage least squares (2SLS). This instrument is defined by the simple average of itinerary fares, in 2003 dollars per mile, over all *other* observations in the same market. The unit of dollar *per mile* is used when constructing the Hausman instrument to allow for fair comparison between itinerary fares of different route lengths. Appendix B shows the first stage regression results of the endogenous variable on the exogenous and instrumental variables.

more variable  $\gamma$ , thus complicating the minimization routine. This is because  $\xi_{jt}$  is common across types, while  $\delta_{jtr}$  is not. Once the demand unobservables  $\xi_{jt}$  are recovered, they are interacted with the exogenous and instrumental variables to form the GMM objective function. The parameters  $(\alpha_r, \beta_r, \gamma, \lambda)_{r=1,2}$  are then estimated by a Nelder-Mead simplex search routine.

To address the issue of price endogeneity, I compute a Hausman instrument for prices, which is defined as the passenger-weighted average fare over competing products in each market. The average fare is computed in dollar-per-mile for a fair comparison between itinerary fares from routes of different lengths. I treat all other airline-route characteristics as exogenously given. Thus, my set of instrumental variables thus consists of the Hausman instrument on price and all exogenous product characteristics. The exogeneity assumption is admittedly a crude for the airport presence variables, since airport presence is computed from the total number of passengers on routes involving that airport, and the number of passengers on each of these routes is given by the endogenous market shares. One justification for this exogeneity assumption on airport presence is that the (endogenous) market shares of *other* routes involving the airport of interest is arguably unaffected by the endogenous prices and market shares of the *current* route of interest. Lastly, I have chosen not to use an instrument in the style of Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995), which is defined as the average fare (or other product characteristics) over

Table 12: FIRST STAGE REGRESSIONS OF DEMAND ESTIMATES

	Complete dataset	BCS subset <sup>a</sup>
Hausman instrument on price	280.024 (3.038)	185.93 (13.098)
Direct flight	0.352 (0.00707)	0.293 (0.0293)
Distance	0.0431 ( $1.667e^{-4}$ )	0.0351 ( $7.538e^{-4}$ )
Psngr. share at origin airport	0.499 (0.0181)	0.596 (0.0786)
Psngr. share at destination airport	0.513 (0.0185)	0.570 (0.0777)
constant	169.794 (1.184)	176.643 (4.984)
$\ln(s_{j N})^b$	13.378 (0.180)	9.196 (0.705)
First stage $R^2$	0.378	0.326
$N$	124852	5207

*Note:* Standard errors are reported in parentheses.

<sup>a</sup> A smaller subset of the sample is used to estimate the BCS random coefficient model due to computational time. This subset consists of observations from a 50% sample of markets where either America West or US Airways operate in the 2005Q2 quarter. A comparison of the simple nested logit estimates generated from the complete dataset and this subset indicates that this subset is a representative sample.

<sup>b</sup> The log of market share, conditional on being in the nest ( $N$ ) of “inside” goods, is used to recover the nested logit parameter  $\lambda$  in the 2SLS nested logit regressions.

all other products produced by the same firm in other markets. The BLP instrument is more appropriate in a case where markets are defined by geographic boundaries, and where a firm operates in most (if not all) of these geographic boundaries, such as the markets for ready-to-eat cereals. Since the total number of routes is large and an airline’s presence among these routes is extremely varied, a BLP instrument computed for the airline industry will critically depend on each airline’s portfolio of routes, each of which has its own unique competitive characteristics. This variable is unlikely to be a good indication of the cost of the particular route of interest.

Here I provide an intuitive argument on the identification of the random coefficient model, which includes the nested logit parameter  $\lambda$ , the type-specific taste coefficients  $(\alpha_r, \beta_r)_{r=1,2}$ , and the mixture variable  $\gamma$  that gives the population percentage of type I consumers.. Firstly,  $\lambda$  is identified from the variation in the aggregate share of all “inside” goods as the number of products changes between markets.  $\lambda$  is bounded between 0 and 1. In the first extreme where  $\lambda = 0$ , the aggregate share of all inside goods  $\frac{D_t^\lambda}{1+D_t^\lambda}$  reduces to a constant even when the number of inside goods varies. In the second extreme where  $\lambda = 1$ , the nested logit model simplifies to the simple logit model, where market share is given by the ratio  $\exp(\delta_j)$  and the inclusive value  $(1 + \sum_k \exp(\delta_k))$ , and the inclusive value certainly depends on the total number of available products. In a simple case where all products have the same  $\delta_j = \delta$ , the aggregate market share of all inside goods will be  $\frac{J \exp(\delta)}{1+J \exp(\delta)}$ , where  $J$  is the total number of inside goods. Secondly, the type-specific taste coefficients are identified from the substitution patterns as the portfolio of

Table 13: AVERAGE UNOBSERVED PRODUCT CHARACTERISTIC ( $\xi_j$ ) FOR MAJOR AIRLINES FROM THE ESTIMATED BCS MODEL

Airline	Mean	Psngr-weighted mean	Min	Max	$N$
Delta (DL)	0.0484	0.615	-2.434	2.374	651
American (AA)	-0.909	0.575	-2.540	2.069	570
Northwest (NW)	-0.0502	0.639	-3.535	1.902	538
US Airways (US)	-0.112	0.312	-6.952	2.597	527
United (UA)	0.410	1.026	-1.840	2.607	519
Southwest (WN)	-0.446	-0.178	-2.699	1.589	518
America West (HP)	0.279	0.770	-2.078	2.742	478
Continental (CO)	0.204	1.634	-1.636	3.566	299
AirTran (FL)	-0.0364	0.257	-1.770	2.182	209
Frontier (F9)	0.0491	0.746	-1.774	2.166	196
Atlantic Coast (DH)	-0.000607	-0.270	-1.982	2.274	129
<i>All</i>	-0.00674	0.549	-6.952	3.566	5207

*Note:* The unobserved product characteristic  $\xi_j$  is allowed to vary across airlines and routes, but is held constant at merger simulation.

products varies across markets. The overall cross-price elasticity between two products is given by a convex combination, weighted by  $\gamma$  and  $(1-\gamma)$ , of the cross-price elasticity of each customer type, which in turn are functions of  $(\alpha_r, \beta_r)$  for each type  $r$ . The parameters  $(\alpha_r, \beta_r)_{r=1,2}$  and  $\gamma$  are then chosen such that the convex combination of elasticities is closest to the substitution pattern observed in the data.

## Appendix D Recovered unobserved product characteristic

The unobserved product characteristic ( $\xi_j$ ) is recovered for each product during the estimation of the BCS random coefficient demand model using a contraction map. It is then interacted with instrumental variables to form moment conditions for the estimation of BCS demand parameters. Table 13 summarizes the recovered product characteristic  $\xi_j$  for major airlines. It accounts for many unobserved attributes, such as ticket restrictions, departure and arrival times, and flight frequencies. A value of  $\xi_j$  is recovered for each airline-route-quarter observation. The table includes both a simple mean across all routes and a passenger-weighted mean for comparison. While an airline may have stronger incentive to improve its “quality” on its major routes where most of its customers travel, only a weak correlation of 0.328 is observed in this sample between  $\xi_j$  and number of passengers. The positive correlation between the two nonetheless explains the mostly positive values among the weighted averages. United, Continental, and America West rank the highest in both columns, while Southwest ranks the lowest in both. Among our two merging airlines, America West has a higher average than US Airways in both columns. To put the magnitudes of  $\xi_j$  in perspective, according to the price coefficients for the BCS model estimated above, an increase in  $\xi_j$  of magnitude 1 is equivalent to a decrease in price of \$129.70 for the type 1 consumer and \$854.70 for the type 2 consumer. Thus, the average magnitudes in table 13 are within reasonable range.

Table 14: REGRESSIONS OF THE RECOVERED UNOBSERVED PRODUCT CHARACTERISTIC ( $\xi_j$ )

	(1)	(2)
Hausman instrument on price	0.161 (0.161)	–
Direct flight	$-06.21e^{-5}$ ( $3.446e^{-4}$ )	–
Distance	$4.79e^{-6}$ ( $9.28e^{-6}$ )	–
Passenger-share at origin airport	$5.273e^{-4}$ ( $9.383e^{-4}$ )	–
Passenger-share at destination airport	$2.459e^{-4}$ ( $9.471e^{-4}$ )	–
Itinerary fare	–	0.00433 ( $1.271e^{-4}$ )
constant	$-0.0578$ (0.0541)	$-1.377$ (0.0415)
$N$	5207	5207
$R^2$	0.0003	0.183

*Note:* Standard errors are reported in parentheses.

I also show in table 14 with two simple OLS regressions that the recovered  $\xi_j$  variable is indeed independent to all the instrumental variables used, but is predictably, positively correlated with itinerary fare. This can be seen from the regression results that none of the variables of regression (1) is statistically significant, while that of regression (2) is. Lastly, I show in figure 4 that the distribution of  $\xi_j$  is visibly very close to normal, with a mean of  $-0.00674$  and a standard deviation of  $0.834$ . It also has a roughly bell-shaped distribution over observations for each airline.






Figure 4: Histogram showing the distribution of the recovered unobserved product characteristic ( $\xi_j$ ) with a best-fitted normal density.