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## ABSTRACT

## Trade-Offs? The Impact of WTO Accession on Intimate Partner Violence in Cambodia<sup>\*</sup>

We study the impact of trade-induced changes in labor market conditions on violence within the household. We exploit the local labor demand shocks generated by Cambodia's WTO accession to assess how changes in the employment of women relative to men affected the risk of intimate partner violence. We document that men indistricts facing larger tariff reductions experienced a significant decline in paid employment, whereas women in harder-hit districts increased their entry into the laborforce. These changes in employment patterns triggered backlash effects by increasing intimate partner violence, without changes in marriage, fertility, psychological distress, or household consumption.

JEL Classification:	F16, O15, J12, J16
Keywords:	trade, intimate partner violence, employment, marriage,
	fertility, consumption, Cambodia

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Many developing countries have experienced episodes of rapid trade liberalization over the past three decades. A growing body of empirical work shows that greater exposure to import competition adversely affects local labor market outcomes, particularly for workers initially employed in sectors with larger tariff reductions (Kovak 2013; Dix-Carneiro and Kovak 2019; Erten et al. 2019).<sup>1</sup> Recent evidence also indicates that these trade-induced job losses increase the incidence of violent crime by lowering the opportunity cost of criminal employment (Dell et al. 2019), reducing public goods provision, and increasing income inequality (Dix-Carneiro et al. 2018). Despite this work on generalized violence, as measured by homicide rates, and the evidence that trade-induced job losses vary by gender (Gaddis and Pieters 2017), no research has examined the violent consequences of trade liberalization within the household, the burden of which falls disproportionately on women.

This paper examines how trade-induced employment changes impact intimate partner violence in Cambodia. Following Topalova (2010), Dix-Carneiro and Kovak (2017, 2019), Erten et al. (2019), and Erten and Leight (2021), we exploit regional variation in import competition stemming from large-scale import tariff reductions to identify labor-demand shocks with heterogeneous effects on local economies across the country. In examining gender-specific effects of trade-induced labor demand shocks, our work is close in spirit to Gaddis and Pieters (2017), who document a narrowing of the gender gap in employment and participation rates in regions of Brazil that experienced larger tariff reductions, and Juhn et al. (2014), who observe that the new firms entering the export market in Mexico after NAFTA replaced male blue-collar workers with female workers as new technologies reduced the need for physically demanding skills. Our study complements the evidence from these episodes of trade liberalization in different contexts by assessing whether

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup>For comprehensive literature reviews on the effects of trade on labor market adjustment and inequality in developing countries, please see Goldberg and Pavcnik (2007), Harrison et al. (2011), and Pavcnik (2017).

regional differences in exposure to import competition across a large set of industries and districts in Cambodia differentially affected men's and women's employment and earnings outcomes. Distinct from much prior work, we analyze how these trade-induced employment changes affect the prevalence of intimate partner violence.

The effects of trade-induced employment changes on the risk of experiencing intimate partner violence are *a priori* ambiguous. On the one hand, narrowing the gender employment gap could increase the bargaining power of women, increase their outside options, and reduce their exposure to domestic violence (Aizer 2010; Anderberg et al. 2016). On the other hand, reducing the gender employment gap may increase male partners' incentives to use violence or threats of violence as an instrument to regain control over household decision-making, to extract financial resources from women whose relative earnings might have improved, or to force women to work longer hours (Eswaran and Malhotra 2011; Bobonis et al. 2013; Erten and Keskin 2018, 2021b). However, trade shocks may also widen the gender employment gap, which would result in the opposite effects through the same channels.

In this paper, we shed light on the effects of trade-induced employment changes on multiple dimensions of intimate partner violence by exploiting local labor demand shocks brought about by the Cambodian trade liberalization episode. In 2004, Cambodia became a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO), and in doing so, it implemented largescale unilateral trade liberalization that had heterogeneous effects on districts across the country. Using detailed industrial employment data from the 1998 Census, which are representative at the district level, we construct a measure of exposure to tariff reductions at the level of the local economy. In particular, we use the 1998 industry employment shares as weights to construct a time-varying weighted average of industry-level tariffs at the district level. This measure exploits a combination of variation in the industrial mix across districts together with variation in cross-industry tariff changes. We report two main results. First, men initially employed in districts facing larger tariff reductions experienced a significant decline in paid employment relative to those in districts facing smaller tariff reductions. In contrast, women employed in harder-hit districts increased their entry into the labor force relative to those in less exposed districts. More specifically, women who were previously outside the labor force began to contribute to family income by working additional hours in family-owned enterprises.

Second, we link trade-induced employment changes to the prevalence of intimate partner violence. Our results show that women in districts more exposed to trade liberalization experienced an increase in intimate partner violence in several dimensions. Exploring alternative mechanisms, we find no evidence of differential changes in marriage rates, fertility, psychological distress, or husbands' behavioral indicators in these districts. These findings are consistent with instrumental theories of violence, which predict the use of violence by men as an instrument for controlling household decision-making and/or appropriating resources from women in the form of money or time.

In addition, while we cannot completely rule out the income-stress-conflict nexus—i.e., the possibility that increased financial stress triggers violent behavior in the household, we also lack the evidence to support this potential channel. Although we estimate a decline in men's earnings without significant changes in women's earnings, we find no evidence of a decline in household consumption per capita. One possibility is that some of the unpaid work of women could have contributed to the production of some consumption items such as food, partially offsetting some of the decline in paid income through trade-induced job losses.<sup>2</sup>

Our finding of women's increased labor force participation differs from many previous

<sup>2</sup>Another possibility is that local prices decline in more exposed regions after trade liberalization, offsetting partially the decline in men's purchasing power. Moreover, it might be difficult to detect expenditure changes due to large recall bias in these types of surveys. Hence, these results should be interpreted with caution.

studies that have found either no significant differences by gender (McCaig and Pavcnik 2018; Erten et al. 2019; Dix-Carneiro and Kovak 2019) or greater employment losses among men than among women without evidence of an increase in women's employment (Gaddis and Pieters 2017; Autor et al. 2019). One notable exception is Anukriti and Kumler (2019), who find that in India, women's employment increased relative to men's employment for lower castes in districts more exposed to tariff declines, while the opposite effects were found for upper castes.

Apart from providing support for the view that trade-induced job losses among men coincide with an increase in female labor force participation, our analysis indicates that these trade shocks do not necessarily translate into empowerment within the household. In fact, neglecting such potentially large backlash effects from increased intimate partner violence may yield upward-biased estimates of the societal benefits accruing from trade liberalization.

### 1 The Context

#### 1.1 The Details of Cambodia's WTO Accession

After Cambodia gained its independence from France in 1953, the new government focused on building an industrial base by investing in infrastructure projects and building factories (Delvert 1963). These early attempts proved fruitful, increasing the number of small and medium-sized factories from 650 in 1965 to 3,700 in 1968 and increasing stateowned enterprises (SOEs) from 0 to 57 (Ear 1995). In 1969, Cambodia experimented with a brief period of sharp tariff cuts, which had detrimental effects on the survival of small and some medium-sized firms. This policy was reversed completely by the Khmer Rouge regime that came to power in 1975. This period witnessed one of the most devastating civil wars in world history.<sup>3</sup> The Khmer Rouge regime, which adopted a Maoist ideology, prohibited all international trade flows except those with a few allied communist countries. After the liberation of Cambodia from the Khmer Rouge regime, the new government aimed to eradicate hunger because the civil conflict had taken a large toll on the economy. The SOEs were subsidized to provide basic subsistence goods, and Cambodia received immediate food relief from Vietnam and Soviet-bloc countries. The state monopoly on foreign trade was abolished in 1987, allowing for active engagement of private firms in trade.

However, the important turning point in trade relations began in the post-conflict reconstruction period. Following the fall of the Soviet Union and the subsequent signing of the Paris Peace Accords in 1991, Cambodia began implementing economic reforms for rehabilitation and reconstruction (Thayer 1998). In 1993, the Kingdom of Cambodia was established, and the newly elected government sought to promote industrial development by engaging in international trade. In particular, the government recognized the potential of the textile industry in world markets and aimed to improve access to the world garment market. It also sought to improve the domestic investment climate by liberalizing goods and service trade. Finally, another goal of the government was to improve access to low cost drugs through the WTO Declaration on the easing of patents for the least developed countries (Siphana 2005).

The major trade policy change occurred with the accession of Cambodia to WTO on October 13, 2004. Cambodia became the first least developed country to join the WTO, along with Nepal. During this period, Cambodia reduced its import tariff bands from 12 to 4 and limited the tariffs on most imports to 0, 7, 15, or 35 percent. In the final accession

<sup>3</sup>The Cambodian civil war began in 1970, with one side supported by China and the other by the U.S., and it was part of the larger Cold War context in which Cambodia was somewhat divided initially between those supporting the Soviet-bloc/Chinese side and those supporting the U.S. side (Chhair and Ung 2016).

package, Cambodia applied an overall average 16.5 percent bound tariff rate (Siphana 2005). The average nominal tariffs fell from nearly 18 percent in 2001 to 8 percent in 2014 (Appendix Fig. A1). The Customs Reform and Modernization Program, implemented during the accession process, targeted the share of bound zero-rated tariff lines and was intended to harmonize tariff schedules by reducing the average tariff rates and the number of tariff categories.

We measure trade protection by the import tariff rates (including *ad valorem* equivalents) imposed by Cambodia. The tariff data are provided by the World Integrated Trade Solution–Trade Analysis Information System (WITS–TRAINS) database. We use the tariff rates reported at the 3-digit International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC) level. We match these detailed tariff data to the industry classification in the 1998 Cambodian Census by constructing a simple average of tariffs within industries using the concordance available in the industry documentation of the 1998 Census. Appendix Table A1 provides this concordance table showing the match between the Census industry categories and ISIC Revision 3 codes.

### 1.2 Exogeneity of Tariff Changes to Industry Performance

Our empirical analysis utilizes variation in tariff rates across industries and over time to estimate the causal effects of trade liberalization. This estimation strategy assumes that tariff changes are exogenous to the performance of industries subject to tariff cuts, as well as the districts of Cambodia where those industries were concentrated. If political economy considerations dominate such that policymakers were to impose smaller tariff cuts for better performing industries that lobby for such policies, these endogenous responses would render the exogeneity assumptions invalid.

In the context of Cambodian trade liberalization, the threats to identification resulting from the potential endogeneity of tariff cuts are limited for several reasons. First, the private sector played a limited role in affecting relative tariff declines because the main driver of liberalization policies was the post-conflict government, which was eager to demonstrate its willingness to open up and access world markets (Siphana 2005). Second, the differential tariff reductions across industries were primarily the outcome of Cambodia's WTO negotiations, during which the government committed to 4 categories of tariffs (0, 7, 15, and 35 percent), excluding the possibility of discretionary changes to the tariff structure. Following previous studies (Goldberg and Pavcnik 2005; Kovak 2013; Erten et al. 2019), we examine the relationship between initial tariff levels and subsequent tariff liberalizations at the industry level. Figure 1 shows that the industries with the highest tariff levels prior to liberalization experienced the greatest tariff reductions. The correlation between the pre-liberalization tariff rate and the change in the tariff rate is very high (-0.91). Moreover, in subsequent sections, we also provide evidence that districts exposed to different levels of tariff reduction during this time period do not demonstrate differential trends in employment outcomes observed prior to the trade liberalization episode.

In Appendix Figure A2, we examine whether the sectors that experienced the largest tariff declines disproportionately employed women or men, or alternatively unskilled or skilled workers. In Panel A, we plot the total reduction in tariffs between 2001 and 2014 observed by subsector relative to the pre-liberalization female share of employment observed in 1998. We observe a weak correlation of -0.26, and the regression coefficient is not significant at conventional levels. While sectors such as wearing apparel and other textiles had a high share of female employment and also experienced large tariff cuts, there are other sectors such as wood products and beverages where female share of employment is not that high even though these sectors also experienced large tariff declines.<sup>4</sup> Hence, while there is a weak correlation between sectoral tariff declines and female employment

<sup>4</sup>Notably, textiles had very high share of female employment while experiencing only modest declines in tariffs. Similarly, sectors such as batteries, rubber, vehicle accessories, grain mill products, and wood planting experienced modest tariff declines, while these sectors' female employment shares are rather low. share, it is difficult to conclude that the sectors that experienced the largest tariff declines disproportionately employed women. In Panel B, we plot the total reduction in tariffs between 2001 and 2014 observed by subsector relative to the pre-liberalization skilled share of employment observed in 1998.<sup>5</sup> The correlation coefficient is -0.003, and the regression coefficient is -0.005 and insignificant. Hence, we conclude that we do not observe a significant relationship between skill intensity and sectoral tariff changes in this time period.

### 2 Methods

#### 2.1 Data

To capture labor market outcomes, we use the Cambodian Censuses conducted in 1998 and 2008 by the Cambodian National Institute of Statistics.<sup>6</sup> Throughout the analysis, local labor markets are defined as districts. Each district consists of a number of economically integrated contiguous neighborhoods with fairly similar productive and geographic features. We use the census data for two main purposes. First, by using the 1998 Census, we use information on employment status and industry of employment to calculate the industrial distribution of labor in each district. Because Cambodia began its trade liberalization as it joined the WTO in 2004, the 1998 Census data allow us to capture the pre-liberalization industrial composition at the district level. We restrict the sample to individuals aged 15–64 to focus on the working-age population. The industry classification in the census consists of 40 industries. Second, we use the 2008 Census to represent the post-liberalization period and combine it with the pre-liberalization 1998 Census to estimate the effects of trade liberalization on local labor market outcomes.

<sup>5</sup>Skilled workers are defined as those who completed secondary school or higher.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup>The Cambodian Census datasets are available for only these two years.

Panel A of Table 1 provides summary statistics for individuals aged 15–64 from the 1998 and 2008 Censuses. On average, men are more educated than women. Close to 60 percent of individuals are married. Approximately 79 percent of men are employed, while 74 percent of women are employed. A slightly higher share of women are unemployed than men; however, the incidence of not being in the labor force (NILF) is significantly higher among women (23 percent) compared to men (18 percent). Finally, while 16 percent of men are working in paid employed in unpaid work (46 percent), which includes working without compensation in a family farm or enterprise. In contrast, only 18 percent of men work as unpaid family workers. Self-employment is also common, as 45 percent of men and 20 percent of women work as self-employed workers.

As the census does not report wage information, we use four rounds of an annual household survey, the Cambodian Socioeconomic Survey (CSES), conducted in 1999, 2003, 2009, and 2014, to examine the effects of the WTO accession on wage changes and to conduct a placebo test for the employment effects.

Finally, we use three rounds of Cambodia's Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) conducted in 2000, 2005, and 2014. These are nationally representative household surveys that contain information on women's employment outcomes, their experience of domestic violence, demographics, marriage market outcomes, and other indicators. The surveys targeted women between 15 and 59 years old, and an additional domestic violence module was administered to one-third of the households.<sup>7</sup> One woman per household was randomly selected for the interviews. No one else was present in the room during the

<sup>7</sup>The DHS final reports indicate that one-third of households were randomly selected to be included in the domestic violence module (National Institute of Statistics of Cambodia 2015). In addition, they report that special weights were constructed to adjust for the selection of one woman per household and to ensure that the domestic violence sample was nationally representative. interviews, and the respondents were informed that their answers would be kept confidential to minimize reporting bias. The empirical analysis focuses on a balanced panel of 145 districts, for which data are available in every survey year of analysis.

Panel B of Table 1 presents summary statistics for major indicators of ever-married women using the DHS surveys. The DHS data include several binary variables on whether a woman experienced various forms of physical, sexual, or psychological violence from her intimate partner. We use the incidence of experiencing different forms of intimate partner violence over the past 12 months as the main outcome variables. For example, physical violence is an indicator variable that takes a value of one if the respondent reported experiencing one of the following violent acts from her partner in the last 12 months: slapping or throwing an object that would hurt; pushing, shoving, or pulling hair; hitting with the partner's fist or in a way that hurts; kicking, pushing on the ground, or beating; and choking or burning.<sup>8</sup> In addition, following Erten and Keskin (2018) and Anderson (2008), we show the robustness of our results constructing indices by averaging the z-scores of the underlying domestic violence indicators over the past 12 months.<sup>9</sup>

<sup>8</sup>Other measures are similarly defined. Injury is an indicator variable that takes a value of one if the respondent reported experiencing one of the following injuries because of violent behavior from her partner in the last 12 months: bruises, light injuries, and severe injuries due to violent acts by one's partner. Sexual violence is an indicator variable that takes a value of one if the respondent reported experiencing one of the following violent acts from her partner in the last 12 months: forced into unwanted sex or forced into other unwanted sexual acts. Psychological violence is an indicator variable that takes a value of one if the respondent reported experiencing one of the following acts from her partner in the last 12 months: insulting, humiliating, and scaring or threatening.

<sup>9</sup>We standardize each indicator and calculate the simple average of these z-scores to create indices. The physical violence index is constructed by averaging the z-scores of five indicators for the male partner: slapping or throwing an object that would hurt; pushing,

Higher values indicate higher levels of violence. Following a similar method, we create a decision-making index, which is the average of the z-scores from the following indicators: having decision-making power to decide her own healthcare, her own friends, or whether to make large household purchases.<sup>10</sup>

We observe that approximately 11 percent of women report experiencing physical violence over the last 12 months and 5 percent of them incurred injuries from such violence. Approximately 3 percent of women report experiencing sexual violence and 16 percent report experiencing psychological violence over the last 12 months. Compared to other low-income countries, the prevalence of intimate partner violence does not appear particularly high. The World Health Organization reports that the incidence of intimate partner violence in the last 12 months was highest among the least developed countries, with 22 percent of women experiencing physical and/or sexual violence from their partners (World Health Organization 2021). However, for low-and-middle income countries in the Western Pacific region (where Cambodia is located), the incidence is 8 percent. In contrast, in Cambodia, the same incidence of physical and/or sexual violence over the last 12 months for the most recent 2014 DHS data is 11 percent. Although Cambodia emerged shoving, or pulling hair; hitting with the partner's fist or in a way that hurts; kicking, pushing on the ground, or beating; and choking or burning. The injury index is the average of the z-scores from the following indicators: bruises, light injuries, and severe injuries due to violent acts by one's partner. The sexual violence index is the average of z-scores from the following indicators: forced into unwanted sex and forced into other unwanted sexual acts. The psychological violence index is the average of the z-scores

<sup>10</sup>We use this index instead of an indicator variable to capture the decision-making power of women because an indicator variable that takes a value of one when the respondent reports having power to make any of these decisions will have a mean of 99 percent in our context.

from the following indicators: insulting, humiliating, and scaring or threatening.

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from a very violent period of civil conflict, it does not seem to be an outlier in terms of intimate partner violence prevalence; it actually appears less violent compared to the least developed countries and only slightly more violent compared to low-and-middle income countries in its region.

#### 2.2 Identification

Following Cambodia's WTO accession, the level of import tariffs varied significantly across industries and over time. There was also substantial heterogeneity in the industrial composition of Cambodian districts prior to trade liberalization. Consequently, based on their initial industrial composition of employment at the time of the reform, some districts were more exposed to tariff declines than were others. Building on a large body of empirical work (Topalova 2010; Dix-Carneiro and Kovak 2019; Erten et al. 2019), our identification strategy relies on this relative exposure to isolate the causal effect of trade liberalization.

In particular, following Hasan et al. (2007), Kovak (2013), and Erten et al. (2019), our measure of regional exposure to trade liberalization for district *d* in year *t*,  $Tarif f_{dt}$ , is constructed by interacting the national ad valorem applied tariff rate faced by industry *i* in year *t*,  $Tarif f_{it}$  with the share of tradable employment in industry *i* and district *d* 

in 1998,  $Empshare_{id}^{1998}$ , as reported in the 1998 Census data.<sup>11,12</sup> This includes 40 traded industries represented in the dataset.

$$Tariff_{dt} = \sum_{i} Empshare_{id}^{1998} \times Tariff_{it}$$
(1)

In cases where we have two rounds of data, we use the following reduced-form specification to compare outcomes of interest for workers located in districts exposed to larger versus smaller tariff reductions:

$$y_{jdt} = \alpha + \beta Tarif f_{dt} + \theta X_{jdt} + \sigma z_{dt} + \mu_t + \gamma_d + \lambda \mu_t \Delta y_{d,pre} + \epsilon_{jdt}$$
(2)

where  $y_{jdt}$  denotes outcomes for individual j in district d in year t,  $Tarif f_{dt}$  is the dis-

<sup>11</sup>We follow Kovak (2013) in calculating the industry weights based on the traded sector because, as Kovak (2013) has shown, assigning a zero weight to non-tradable sector greatly overstates the labor market impact of trade liberalization by implicitly assuming no price changes in the non-tradable sector. Instead, as Kovak (2013) proposed, we exclude the non-tradable sector from the industry weights, implicitly assuming a proportional decline in non-tradable sector prices in the local labor market. However, we acknowledge that the measure proposed by Kovak also includes the cost share of labor in the calculation of industry weights; as we do not have this information for Cambodia, our measure is more in line with Hasan et al. (2007) and Erten et al. (2019).

<sup>12</sup>Because the earliest tariff data are available in 2001, we use these data when calculating district tariffs in 1998 and 2000. For other survey years, we use the tariff data for that year (e.g., for 2008 DHS, we use the tariff data available for that year). There are also a few years missing in the post-2001 period in the tariff data. In these cases, we take the average of tariffs one year before and one year after the missing year (e.g., for 2009 CSES, we take the average of tariffs in 2008 and 2010).

trict tariff in district *d* in year *t*,  $X_{jdt}$  is a vector of worker characteristics, including age, indicator variables for four educational categories (completed less than primary school, completed primary school, completed secondary school, and completed university), years of schooling, and an indicator for whether an individual lives in a rural area. To capture changes in external trade barriers that occurred during the WTO accession, we include  $z_{dt}$ , which is a weighted average of external tariff barriers faced by Cambodia's exports in key partner countries.<sup>13</sup> The specification also includes year fixed effects ( $\mu_t$ ), district fixed effects ( $\gamma_d$ ), and  $\Delta y_{d,pre}$  is the pre-liberalization change in the outcome from 1996 to 1999.<sup>14</sup> We cluster standard errors at the district level to account for serial correlation in outcomes within districts. The main parameter of interest is the coefficient on district tariffs, with a positive coefficient implying that a decrease in district tariffs is associated with a decline in the probability of the outcome tested.

In cases where we have more than two rounds of data, we modify equation (2) by replacing the pre-liberalization change in the outcome ( $\Delta y_{d,pre}$ ) with district-specific linear time trends ( $\delta_d t$ ) to better control for unobserved time trends specific to each district over time:

$$y_{jdt} = \alpha + \beta Tarif f_{dt} + \theta X_{jdt} + \sigma z_{dt} + \mu_t + \gamma_d + \delta_d t + \epsilon_{jdt}$$
(3)

where  $\delta_d t$  denotes district-specific linear time trends and all other variables are defined as in equation (2).

The inclusion of year fixed effects in equations (2) and (3) controls for any macroeco-

<sup>13</sup>Using import tariff data from the WITS–TRAINS database, we construct a weighted average of import tariffs that the top five export partners (i.e., the United States, Hong Kong, Germany, United Kingdom, and Singapore) imposed on Cambodian goods.

<sup>14</sup>We calculate these pre-liberalization changes in outcome variables using the 1996 and 1999 CSES data and interact them with a time dummy to control for potential unobserved pretrends in outcome variables. nomic shocks at the national level that coincide with trade liberalization. District fixed effects control for any time-invariant heterogeneity across districts. District-level linear trends account for changes in time trends specific to each district across years. Individual-level worker demographic characteristics control for differences in demographic composition across districts and over time that could influence outcomes and produce spurious correlations with district tariffs. Hence, this specification compares outcomes for individuals with the same observable characteristics who are exposed to different local trade shocks due to their initial regions of residence.

## 3 Effects of Cambodia's WTO Accession

#### 3.1 Labor Market Outcomes

We begin by examining the effects of Cambodia's trade liberalization during its WTO accession on labor market outcomes. In Table 2, we report the results of estimating equation (2) for employment status outcomes in Panel A and employment type outcomes in Panel B. In each panel, we divide the sample by gender to examine gender-specific responses to the trade shock. In Panel A, we observe no evidence of a significant impact of trade liberalization on the probability of men's employment, unemployment, or not being in the labor force. Since total employment changes might mask underlying margins of adjustment by type of employment, Panel B reports results by type of employment. The positive and significant coefficient estimate in the first row of column (1) of Panel B indicates that male workers located in districts that faced greater reductions in import tariffs experienced larger declines in the probability of paid employment relative to those in districts exposed to smaller tariff reductions. The magnitude of the coefficient (0.013) implies that workers in a district exposed to a one standard deviation decline in tariff rates experienced a 0.04 percentage point decline in the probability of working for pay relative to workers in districts not exposed to any declines in tariffs. Columns (2) and (3)

indicate that men located in regions more exposed to import competition increased their self-employment, without experiencing significant changes in their unpaid employment. These results imply that in harder-hit districts, men's probability of working for pay declines, while their probability of self-employment increases, resulting in a null effect for total employment, compared to less affected districts.<sup>15</sup>

In the second row of Panel A in Table 2, we examine the impact of trade liberalization on women's labor market outcomes. In column (1), we observe that female workers located in districts that experienced larger declines in import tariffs experienced an increase in their probability of employment relative to women in districts exposed to smaller tariff reductions. The magnitude suggests an increase in the probability of employment of 0.1 percentage points for a district facing a one-standard deviation decline in tariff rates. Moreover, the estimates in columns (2) and (3) indicate that women in regions more exposed to import competition experienced a decline in their probability of not participating in the labor market and of being unemployed. The bottom section of Panel A shows that the differences between men and women are statistically significant for employment and not being in the labor force. Moreover, the estimates in Panel B indicate an imprecisely estimated increase in employment of women as unpaid family workers in family-owned enterprises.

These findings could suggest an added worker effect–a well-established pattern observed in studies of labor market adjustment (Lundberg 1985; Cullen and Gruber 2000; Stephens 2002; Gong 2010)–in which a reduction in the employment probability of men

<sup>15</sup>Note that the sum of coefficients in Panel B may not be equal to the coefficient of employment reported in column (1) of Panel A since the pre-liberalization change in the outcome variable differs for each regression in Panel B given the different outcomes being estimated. However, if this term is replaced by the pre-liberalization change in total employment, the sum of coefficients in Panel B is equal to the employment coefficient in column (1) of Panel A.

induces more women to participate in the labor market by actively seeking work and taking up new employment opportunities to compensate for the income loss experienced by their husbands.

The identification assumption for the main specification requires that the reduction in district tariffs in this period is orthogonal to other trends observed at the district level. This assumption would be violated if the reduction in tariffs were designed to protect districts with relatively weaker local economies ex ante. We previously mentioned that tariff liberalization during WTO accession was intended to harmonize tariffs such that industries with the highest tariff levels ex ante faced the largest declines in tariffs. In Appendix Table A2, we provide further evidence on pretrends using data from the 1999, 2003, 2009, and 2014 rounds of the CSES. In Panel A, focusing on the pre-accession period preceding the WTO accession in 2004, we find no evidence of a significant change in the probability of men's or women's employment.<sup>16</sup> In contrast, in the post-accession period, the estimates in Panel B reveal a significant increase in the probability of women's employment and no significant change in the probability of men's employment for districts that were more exposed to tariff declines, consistent with the results reported in Table 2.

In Appendix Table A3, we examine whether exposure to tariff reductions had a significant impact on the monthly earnings of men and women. In Panel A, relying on the sample of individuals who reported earning a monthly income, we find a significant decline in the monthly earnings of men, whereas we find no evidence of a significant impact on women's earnings. In Panel B, we impute wages using observed predetermined characteristics of workers, such as age, educational categories, marriage status, rural indicator, and gender (Rubin 1987; Schenker and Taylor 1996). We again observe significant declines in earnings only for men. This result is in line with the finding that men experience a significant

<sup>16</sup>In particular, we conduct a placebo check by assigning the same tariffs as in Table 2 to the pre-liberalization CSES data. That is, we assign the 1998 district tariff measure to the 1999 household survey and the 2008 district tariff measure to the 2003 household survey. decline in paid employment, while we find no evidence of such a change for women, as reported in Table 2.<sup>17</sup>

In Appendix Table A4, we further investigate whether exposure to tariff reductions had a significant effect on household consumption per capita. We construct a consistent measure of household expenditures across several categories over the last 12 months using the 1999, 2009, and 2014 rounds of the CSES data. In the first three columns of Appendix Table A4, we observe positive but imprecisely estimated coefficients for total consumption, food consumption, and non-food consumption. The remaining columns present estimates for different categories of non-food consumption, including clothing, domestic workers' salaries and furniture expenditures, personal care, personal effects, and medical expenditure categories, except for clothing expenditures, which has a positive coefficient that is marginally significant. Overall, we find weak evidence of effects of trade liberalization on household consumption measures in Cambodia. Although it is plausible that trade-induced financial stress triggers more violent behaviors from men towards their female partners, we do not find robust evidence to support this potential channel in this context.

Altogether, these findings indicate that men initially employed in districts that faced greater tariff reductions experienced a greater loss in paid employment. The paid employment loss among men and the associated decline in their earnings motivated women

<sup>17</sup>This change in earnings could be partly explained by the effects of increased international competition on taste-based discrimination; in particular, increased competition with foreign firms may put pressure on domestic firms to decrease gender pay differentials by reducing taste-based discrimination (Black and Brainerd 2004).

<sup>18</sup>Note that the time horizons over which consumption measures are reported do not always overlap with the time horizons over which domestic violence incidence is reported. Hence, these estimates should be interpreted with caution. to enter the labor market by working predominantly as unpaid family workers.

#### 3.2 Intimate Partner Violence Outcomes

The differential labor market effects of trade liberalization by gender that we documented in the previous section have *a priori* ambiguous effects on women's empowerment within the household. On the one hand, an increase in women's employment probability relative to her husband could improve her bargaining power within the household by increasing her access to resources and improving her outside options. Consequently, women's economic empowerment may result in a decline in their exposure to intimate partner violence (Aizer 2010; Hidrobo and Fernald 2013; Anderberg et al. 2016). On the other hand, the greater probability of a woman's employment relative to her partner may also increase the partner's incentives to use violence or threats of violence as an instrument to regain control over household decision-making, to extract financial resources from women whose relative earnings might have improved, or to force women to work longer hours (Bloch and Rao 2002; Bobonis et al. 2013; Erten and Keskin 2018, 2021a,b). Moreover, an increase in women's bargaining power through better employment opportunities may trigger backlash from their partners, who may prefer that their wives do not work (Field et al. 2021).

In columns (1) and (2) of Table 3, we estimate the effects of tariff reductions on women's probability of employment using the full DHS sample and the sample to which the domestic violence module was administered. The coefficient estimates are similar in magnitude, and they corroborate the results from the census in that women in harder-hit districts experienced an increase in their probability of employment relative to women in less affected districts.<sup>19</sup>

In the remaining columns of Table 3, we examine the effects of trade liberalization on

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>19</sup>We cannot examine the labor market outcomes for men because the DHS does not contain the corresponding employment questions for men.

the risk of experiencing intimate partner violence. In column (3), we find that women in more exposed districts faced increased physical violence from their partners. The magnitude suggests an increase in the probability of experiencing physical violence of 0.1 percentage points for a district facing a one-standard deviation decline in tariff rates.<sup>20</sup> The estimate in column (4) also indicates that these women experienced increases in the physical injuries they suffer from such violence, including bruises, broken bones, and other physical injuries, which is plausibly a more objective measure of physical violence. The remaining estimates show that women in harder-hit regions experienced increased sexual and psychological violence as well as reduced decision-making power. In Appendix Table A5, we show that these results are robust to using z-score indices to measure intimate partner violence.<sup>21</sup>

<sup>20</sup>Relatedly, the incidence of physical violence in an average district declined by 7.4 percentage points from 2000 to 2014. We estimate that the trade-induced increase in the incidence of physical violence for the mean district is 0.3 percentage points. This estimate implies that districts exposed to average tariff reduction experienced a 4 percent (0.3/7.4) slower decline in the incidence of physical violence.

<sup>21</sup>The results in Table 3 demonstrate that in more exposed districts women are more likely to work on average and women are more likely to experience intimate partner violence on average. To explore whether these are the same women, and whether violence is used as a tool to force women to work, we followed a straightforward exercise by creating new outcomes that are the interaction of the violence measures and indicators for being employed and not being employed. Since these are mutually exclusive, they sum to the total effect on the various violence measures and provide further insight into how working and intimate partner violence are related. Our findings indicate that the bulk of the estimated effects on intimate partner violence measures are driven by working women as the coefficients for the interaction of violence measures and being employed are highly significant and large, while the coefficients for the interaction of violence measures and not

Moreover, we explored whether exposure to tariff reductions generated heterogeneous effects by education and age. In Panel A of Appendix Table A6, we interact the district tariff measure with an indicator variable of lower education that takes a value of one if the respondent has less than the median years of schooling (which is 3 years), controlling for lower education and district tariff. We observe no evidence of significant heterogeneous treatment effects for women's employment, and only one indicator for intimate partner violence (injury) is marginally significant with a coefficient that is very close to null. We also find a small decline in decision-making power for this group. In Panel B, we interact the district tariff measure with an indicator variable of being younger than the median age of 30, controlling for being younger and district tariff. The interaction coefficients are all very close to zero, and only an indicator of intimate partner violence (sexual violence) is marginally significant. Hence, we conclude that there is not much evidence of significant heterogeneity in treatment effects by education or age in the Cambodian trade liberalization context.

To summarize, this evidence is consistent with instrumental theories of violence, which predict that an increase in women's relative employment opportunities creates incentives for men to use violence or other controlling behavior as an instrument for regaining control over household decision-making and/or appropriating women's income. In this case, such extraction could take the form of women's working hours, given the increase we observe in unpaid work of women in family enterprises. Because we estimate a similar impact on more objective measures of violence that reflect violence-related injuries, reporting bias is unlikely to explain our results in this context.

tariff reductions may have relocated to less affected districts. Such interregional migration could potentially affect our results, particularly if men and women are now physically separated while seeking new employment opportunities. Using the Census data, we test whether there is a significant difference in the probability of in-migration into harder-hit districts compared to less affected regions after trade liberalization began. Appendix Table A7 presents the results. In Panel A, we observe no evidence of a significant impact of trade liberalization on migrating into more affected districts. This result holds for the entire sample as well as for men and women. In Panel B, we find no evidence of a differential in-migration effect for less educated individuals compared to more educated individuals. In Panel C, we find that younger individuals have a lower probability of migrating into harder-hit districts compared to less affected regions. However, as shown in Appendix Table A6, we find no evidence of differential employment or domestic violence effects for the same age group using the DHS data. Hence, there is little reason to believe that differential migration could explain our results.

#### 3.3 Alternative Channels

Although our findings indicate a change in the risk of experiencing intimate partner violence that is largely driven by a trade-induced exogenous shock to labor markets, in this section, we explore other potential channels through which import competition could generate changes in the domestic violence experienced by women. First, as reported in a recent study by Autor et al. (2019), labor demand shocks driven by international competition may reduce the probability of marriage for young adults and change their fertility profiles, which can in turn affect intrahousehold dynamics. In Panel A of Table 4, we examine whether exposure to import competition had any significant impacts on women's marital status. The estimates reported in columns (1) and (2) show no evidence of a significant effect on the probability of being married or on the probability of being divorced, widowed, or separated. Similarly, in Panel B, we find no evidence that trade

liberalization had a significant impact on the probability of having children, the probability of having children under the age of five, the number of children in total, or the number of children under the age of five.<sup>22</sup>

Another plausible mechanism through which trade-induced employment changes could increase intimate partner violence is the deterioration of individuals' psychological wellbeing. For instance, losing a job can lead to significant distress in men, which may trigger angry outbursts, resulting in violent episodes. Using data from the 2003, 2009, and 2014 CSES, we investigate whether exposure to larger tariff reductions had a significant impact on the prevalence of psychological problems. Our findings presented in Panel C indicate no evidence of a significant change in psychological problems experienced by men or women.<sup>23</sup>

Finally, another concern is that the increased employment of women could lead to more interactions with men outside the home, which may in turn make their husbands upset and jealous. In Panel D, we examine whether exposure to import competition had a significant effect on husbands' behavioral indicators. The estimates in columns (1) and (2) in the second row of Table 4 show no evidence of a significant impact on the probability that the husband would become jealous when the respondent talked to other men or on the probability that the husband would accuse the respondent of unfaithfulness.

<sup>22</sup>We estimate these regressions using a sample of women who are in their childbearing ages for the entire period between 2004 and 2014. Specifically, women must be born in or before 1989 to be 15 or older in 2004; and they must be born in or after 1964 to be 50 or younger in 2014. We thank an anonymous referee for this point.

<sup>23</sup>To capture the incidence of psychological problems, we construct a dummy variable that takes a value of one if the respondent reported that he/she experienced psychological or emotional difficulties or had become extremely upset within the last month.

#### 3.4 Robustness

We estimate several alternative specifications to examine the robustness of our results. In Appendix Tables A8, A9, and A10, we use the log of the district tariff instead of the level as the explanatory variable. We find that the estimates are consistent in sign and magnitude. In the next set of results, we explore whether the estimates are robust to excluding industries that were outliers in terms of tariff declines. In particular, in Appendix Tables A11, A12, and A13, we reconstruct an alternative measure of district tariffs excluding industries that experienced the highest tariff declines; these industries include beverages, wood products, and other textiles. Similarly, in Appendix Tables A14, A15, and A16, we reconstruct another alternative measure of district tariffs excluding industries that experienced the lowest tariff declines, which include the printing, paper, publishing, and iron and steel industries. The results in both cases are consistent with our main findings. Finally, we calculate the district tariff measure excluding the five sectors that appear to deviate from the linear relationship between the initial tariff level and the size of the tariff reduction. These off-diagonal industries include petroleum products, furniture, other textiles, wood products, and radio transmitters. The results reported in Appendix Tables A17, A18, and A19 are consistent with our main findings.

Moreover, we conduct two robustness checks to examine the variation driving our shift-share design. First, in Appendix Table A20, we follow Goldsmith-Pinkham et al. (2020) to decompose our shift-share estimator for demonstrating the variation that the estimator is exploiting. Panel A presents the results for women's employment, and Panel B presents the results for physical violence using the baseline results in Table 3. In Panel A.I and B.I, we observe that the correlation between rotemberg weights ( $\alpha_k$ ) and tariff rates ( $g_k$ ) is fairly low. This finding is similar to the canonical setting of estimating the inverse elasticity of labor supply discussed by Goldsmith-Pinkham et al. (2020). In contrast, the elasticities have a higher correlation with the variation in industry shares across locations

 $(var(z_{lk}))$ . Panel A.II and Panel B.II show that the top five instruments account for over 85 percent (0.867/1.052) of the positive weight in the estimator. These top five instruments are manufacturing of wearing apparel, fishing, manufacture of furniture, manufacture of meat products, and farming of animals.<sup>24</sup> Furthermore, we visually inspect the dispersion in point estimates across instruments in Appendix Figure A3. This figure shows the heterogeneity in the instruments' estimates ( $\beta_k$ ) and the relationship to the first stage F-statistic. Panel A presents this relationship for women's employment, while Panel B presents this relationship for physical violence. We observe that there is not a great deal of dispersion in point estimates across instruments. In addition, the high-weight industries are all very close to the overall point estimate. We observe that while there are negative weights, these industries form a small share of the overall weight.

Second, as shown in Adao et al. (2019), the regression residuals in specifications involving shift-share designs are likely to be correlated across regions with similar initial sectoral composition. To address this potential problem, following Campante et al. (2019) and Dai et al. (2021), we construct an alternative clustering scheme by creating a similarity index capturing the degree of similarity in initial industry employment composition across districts. In particular, we calculate the similarity index for each district relative to all other districts in its initial employment share. We construct the similarity index as follows:

$$SimilarityIndex_{ab} = \sum_{i} minEmpshare_{ai}, Empshare_{bi}$$
(4)

<sup>24</sup>However, it should be noted that we have only 40 industries in the Cambodian Census data, which is considerably fewer than the approximately 400 industries that the examples used for demonstration in Goldsmith-Pinkham et al. (2020). A better comparison might examine the share of the top instrument in the total, which accounts for 54 percent of the positive weight in the estimator. The latter proportion is very similar to the share of top five instruments in positive weight for the China shock example in Goldsmith-Pinkham et al. (2020).

where  $Empshare_{ai}(Empshare_{bi})$  is the initial employment share of industry *i* in district a(b). The similarity index ranges from 0 to 1, with higher values indicating a more similar industry employment composition. Appendix Table A21 presents the results of our main regressions from Table 3 using alternative methods of clustering. In the first row, we replicate the same results as in Table 3 by clustering standard errors at the district level. In the second row, we estimate standard errors by two-way clustering at the district and the district with the highest similarity index. We observe that the estimates remain statistically significant under this alternative clustering scheme.

### 4 Conclusion

In this paper, we study the effects of Cambodia's WTO accession on the risk of intimate partner violence. Our findings indicate that men in districts more exposed to tariff reductions experienced a decline in paid employment, whereas women in these districts increased their entry into the labor force. Although previous studies have shown that trade-induced changes in labor market conditions in disproportionately affected regions leads to more violent street crime, they did not examine whether these trade shocks can also increase the prevalence of domestic violence. Indeed, our analysis shows that women suffer from an increased risk of intimate partner violence in response to such trade shocks.

Our findings have broader implications for the distributional consequences of trade policy. To the extent that exposure to trade shocks brings about changes in male-female employment gaps, these trade-induced employment changes are likely to have significant effects on intrahousehold bargaining dynamics. In many contexts where exposure to import competition resulted in greater job losses for men than women, such increases in the relative employment of women are likely to generate important changes in the prevalence of intimate partner violence.

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FIGURE 1: TARIFF REDUCTIONS AND PRE-LIBERALIZATION TARIFF RATES BY SECTOR

*Note:* This graph shows the total reduction in tariffs between 2001 and 2014 observed by subsector relative to the pre-liberalization tariff rate observed in 2001. Correlation: -0.912; regression coefficient: -0.780; standard error: 0.063; *t*: -12.35. Tariff data are obtained from the WITS–TRAINS database.

Panel A: Census data, individuals 15–64 years old						
	Men	Women	Difference			
	(1)	(2)	(3)			
	Mean (S.D.)	Mean (S.D.)	Est. (S.E.)			
Years of schooling	5.51 (3.69)	3.88 (3.55)	1.63*** (0.01)			
Completed less than primary school	0.50 (0.50)	0.69 (0.46)	-0.18***(0.00)			
Completed primary school	0.42 (0.49)	0.28 (0.45)	0.14*** (0.00)			
Completed secondary school	0.06 (0.24)	0.03 (0.17)	0.03*** (0.00)			
Completed university	0.02 (0.13)	0.01 (0.08)	0.01*** (0.00)			
Married	0.61 (0.49)	0.60 (0.49)	0.01*** (0.00)			
Employment	0.79 (0.41)	0.74 (0.44)	0.05*** (0.00)			
Unemployment	0.02 (0.15)	0.03 (0.17)	0.00*** (0.00)			
Not in labor force (NILF)	0.18 (0.39)	0.23 (0.42)	-0.04*** (0.00)			
Paid employment	0.16 (0.37)	0.08 (0.28)	0.08*** (0.00)			
Unpaid employment	0.18 (0.38)	0.46 (0.50)	-0.28*** (0.00)			
Self-employment	0.45 (0.50)	0.20 (0.40)	0.25*** (0.00)			
Observations	576,898	653,071	1,229,969			

TABLE 1: SUMMARY STATISTICS

Panel B: DHS ever-married sample, women 15–59 years old					
	Mean	S.D.	Obs.		
Women's employment	0.81	0.40	33,509		
Physical violence	0.11	0.32	7,776		
Injury	0.05	0.23	7,777		
Sexual violence	0.03	0.17	7,776		
Psychological violence	0.16	0.37	7,773		
Decision-making index	0.04	0.93	7,522		
Married	0.88	0.32	33,593		
Divorced, widowed, or separated	0.12	0.32	33,593		
Has children	0.92	0.27	33,593		
Has young children (under 5 years of age)	0.48	0.50	33,593		
Number of children	3.22	2.36	33,593		
Number of young children (under 5 years of age)	0.62	0.72	33,593		
Husband is jealous when respondent talks to other men	0.21	0.40	7,730		
Husband accuses respondent of unfaithfulness	0.12	0.33	7,740		

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*Notes:* The table presents the means, standard deviations, and the number of observations for demographics, labor market outcomes, women's empowerment, and husband's indicators. The sample in Panel A includes the working-age population of 15- to 64-year-old individuals from the 1998 and 2008 Cambodian Census. The sample in Panel B includes ever-married women from the 2000, 2005, and 2014 Demographic and Health Surveys of Cambodia.

Panel A: Employment Status Outcomes					
	Employment	Unemployment	NILF		
	(1)	(2)	(3)		
I. Men					
District tariff	-0.008	0.004	0.005		
	(0.007)	(0.003)	(0.006)		
Ν	576,898	576,898	576,898		
II. Women					
District tariff	-0.036***	0.008**	0.029***		
	(0.012)	(0.003)	(0.010)		
Ν	653,071	653,071	653,071		
III. Test of coefficien	it equality between wome	n and men			
<i>p</i> -value	0.009	0.112	0.021		

### TABLE 2: TRADE LIBERALIZATION AND LABOR MARKET OUTCOMES

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Panel B: Type of Employment Outcomes					
	Paid employment	Unpaid employment	Self-employment		
	(1)	(2)	(3)		
I. Men					
District tariff	0.013**	0.006	-0.028***		
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)		
Ν	576,898	576,898	576,898		
II. Women					
District tariff	-0.002	-0.024	0.005		
	(0.013)	(0.015)	(0.007)		
Ν	653,071	653,071	653,071		
III. Test of coefficie	ent equality between wom	en and men			
<i>p</i> -value	0.143	0.004	0.000		

TABLE 2: TRADE LIBERALIZATION AND LABOR MARKET OUTCOMES, CONT'D

*Notes:* Data are from the 1998 and 2008 Cambodian Census. In Panel A, the dependent variables are indicator variables for being employed, unemployed, and not in the labor force (NILF). In Panel B, the dependent variables are indicator variables for paid employment (i.e., working for pay), unpaid employment (i.e., working as an unpaid family worker), and self-employment (i.e., working as an own-account worker). The independent variable is the district tariff variable constructed using employment subsector weights as measured in 1998 and industry-specific tariffs over time. All specifications are estimated conditional on district fixed effects, year fixed effects, pre-liberalization change in the outcome variable, a weighted average of external tariff barriers faced on Cambodia's exports to key partner countries, and individual-level covariates, including age, indicator variables for four educational categories (completed less than primary school, completed primary school, completed secondary school, and completed university), years of schooling, and an indicator variable for living in a rural area. Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the district level.

	TAB	le 3: Trade Liber	alization a	nd Intimat	e Partner V	IOLENCE	
	Women's	Women's	Physical		Sexual	Psychological	Decision-making
	employment	employment	violence	Injury	violence	violence	index
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(9)	(2)
District tariff	-0.057***	-0.041*	-0.035**	-0.015*	-0.017**	-0.060***	0.119**
	(0.015)	(0.024)	(0.016)	(600.0)	(0.008)	(0.021)	(0.055)
Ν	33,476	7,748	7,745	7,747	7,745	7,742	7,496
<i>Notes:</i> Data are fi	tom the 2000, 200	)5, and 2014 Cam	bodia DHS.	Dependent	variables in	clude an indicator	r variable for whether
the respondent is	employed; indic	ator variables tha	at take a valı	ie of one if	the respond	ent experienced p	hysical violence, was
physically injurec	l, experienced sev	kual violence, or e	xperienced <sub>1</sub>	osychologic	al violence;	and a z-score inde	x for having decision-
making power.	In all specificatic	ons, the independ	dent variable	e is the dis	trict tariff va	ariable constructe	d using employment
subsector weight	s as measured in	1998 and indust	y-specific ta	riffs over ti	me. All spec	cifications are esti	mated conditional on
district fixed effe	cts, year fixed eff	ects, district-spec	ific linear ti	me trends,	a weighted a	average of externe	al tariff barriers faced
on Cambodia's e	xports to key par	ther countries, a	nd individu	al-level cov	ariates, inclu	ıding age, indicat	or variables for three
educational cate $\xi$	cories (completed	l primary school	, completed	secondary	school, and	completed higher	r education), years of

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schooling, indicator variables for literacy level, and an indicator variable for living in a rural area. Robust standard errors in

parentheses are clustered at the district level.

	Panel A: Women's marital status		Panel B: Fertility outcomes			
		Divorced				Number of
		widowed	Has	Has young	Number of	young
	Married	separated	children	children	children	children
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
District tariff	-0.021	0.015	0.005	-0.057	-0.003	-0.065
	(0.021)	(0.022)	(0.021)	(0.037)	(0.091)	(0.043)
Ν	7,771	7,771	5,882	5,882	5,882	5,882

### TABLE 4: ALTERNATIVE CHANNELS

	Panel C:	Psychological problems	Panel D: Husband's behavior	
			Husband is jealous	Husband accuses
			when respondent	respondent of
	Men	Women	talks to other men	unfaithfulness
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
District tariff	-0.001	0.001	-0.007	-0.005
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.037)	(0.024)
Ν	47,171	52,985	7,722	7,732

Notes: Data are from the 2000, 2005, and 2014 Cambodia DHS for all panels except Panel C, where the data are from the 2003, 2009, and 2014 CSES. Dependent variables in Panel A are indicator variables for whether the respondent is married or whether she is divorced, widowed, separated. Dependent variables in Panel B are indicator variables for whether the respondent has children, whether the respondent has children under the age of 5, the number of children the respondent has, and the number of children under the age of 5 that the respondent has. Dependent variables in Panel C are indicator variables for whether the respondent reports that he/she experienced psychological or emotional difficulties or has become extremely upset within the last month. Dependent variables in Panels D are indicator variables for whether the respondent's husband is jealous when the respondent talks to other men and whether the respondent's husband accuses the respondent of unfaithfulness. All panels report reduced-form regression results using the district tariff variable as an explanatory variable. All specifications are estimated conditional on district fixed effects, year fixed effects, district-specific linear time trends, a weighted average of external tariff barriers faced on Cambodia's exports to key partner countries, and individuallevel covariates, including age, indicator variables for three educational categories (completed primary school, completed secondary school, and completed higher education), years of schooling, indicator variables for literacy level, and an indicator variable for living in a rural area. Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the district level.

# FOR ONLINE PUBLICATION

## Appendix A Additional Tables





*Note:* This graph plots the unweighted average of nominal tariff rates over time for Cambodia. The average is constructed at the 3-digit industrial classification level. Tariff data are obtained from the WITS–TRAINS database.

Figure A2: Tariff Reductions and Pre-Liberalization Female Share and Skill Share of Employment by Sector



female share of employment observed in 1998 in Panel A and relative to the pre-liberalization skilled share of employment observed in 1998 in Panel B. In Panel A, correlation: -0.264; regression coefficient: -0.089; standard error: 0.059; *t*: -1.50. In Panel B, correlation: -0.003; regression coefficient: -0.005; standard error: 0.312; *t*: -0.02.





Panel A: Women's employment

*Note:* This figure plots the relationship between each instruments'  $\beta_k$ , first-stage F-statistics and the Rotemberg weights. Each point is a separate instrument's estimate (industry share). The outcome variable is the probability of women's employment in Panel A and is the probability of experiencing physical violence in Panel B. The figure plots the estimated  $\beta_k$  for each instrument on the y-axis and the estimated first-stage F-statistic on the x-axis. The size of the points are scaled by the magnitude of the Rotemberg weights, with the circles denoting positive weights and the diamonds denoting negative weights. The horizontal dashed line is plotted at the value of the overall  $\beta_{hat}$  estimated at the district level. The figure excludes instruments with first-stage F-statistics below 5.

TABLE A1: CONCORDANCE BETWEEN ISIC REVISION 3 AND CAMBODIAN CENSUS INDUSTRY CATE-GORIES

ISIC Revision 3 code	Cambodian Census Industry
011	Growing crops; market gardening; horticulture
012	Livestock farming
013	Growing crops combined with livestock farming (mixed farming)
014	Agricultural and animal husbandry service activities, except veterinary activities
020	Forestry, logging and related service activities
050	Fishing, operation of fish hatcheries and fish farms; service activities incidental to fishing
141	Quarrying of stone, sand and clay
142	Mining and quarrying not elsewhere classified
151	Production, processing and preservation of meat, fish, fruit, vegetables, oils and fats
153	Manufacture of grain mill products, starches and starch products, and prepared animal feeds
154	Manufacture of other food products
155	Manufacture of beverages
160	Manufacture of tobacco products
171	Spinning, weaving and finishing of textiles
172	Manufacture of other textiles
181	Manufacture of wearing apparel, except fur apparel
191	Tanning and dressing of leather; manufacture of luggage, handbags, saddlery and harness
192	Manufacture of footwear
201	Sawmilling and planing of wood
202	Manufacture of products of wood, cork, straw and plaiting materials
210	Manufacture of paper and paper products
221	Publishing
222	Printing and service activities related to printing
232	Manufacture of refined petroleum products
242	Manufacture of other chemical products
251	Manufacture of rubber products
261	Manufacture of glass and glass products
269	Manufacture of non-metallic mineral products not elsewhere classified
271	Manufacture of basic iron and steel
281	Manufacture of structural metal products, tanks, reservoirs and steam generators
289	Manufacture of other fabricated metal products; service activities to producers of fabricated metal products
292	Manufacture of special purpose machinery
314	Manufacture of accumulators, primary cells and primary batteries
315	Manufacture of electric lamps
322	Manufacture of television and radio transmitters and apparatus for line telephony and line telegraphy
323	Manufacture of television and radio receivers and associated consumer goods
343	Manufacture of parts and accessories for motor vehicles and their engines
359	Manufacture of transport equipment not elsewhere classified
361	Manufacture of furniture
369	Manufacture not elsewhere classified

*Notes:* Data are from the 1998 and 2008 Cambodian Census. Dependent variables are indicator variables for paid employment (i.e., working for pay), unpaid employment (i.e., working as an unpaid family worker), and self-employment (i.e., working as an ownaccount worker). In all specifications, the independent variable is the district tariff variable constructed using employment subsector weights as measured in 1998 and industry-specific tariffs over time. All specifications are estimated conditional on district fixed effects, year fixed effects, pre-liberalization change in the outcome variable, a weighted average of external tariff barriers faced on Cambodia's exports to key partner countries, and individual-level covariates, including age, indicator variables for four educational categories (completed less than primary school, completed primary school, completed secondary school, and completed university), years of schooling, and an indicator variable for living in a rural area. Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the district level.

	Panel A: 1999-2003 (Pre-accession)		Panel B: 2009-2014 (Post-accession)		
	Men's	Women's	Men's	Women's	
	employment	employment	employment	employment	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	
District tariff	-0.007	-0.026	-0.006	-0.013***	
	(0.014)	(0.018)	(0.004)	(0.003)	
Ν	22,986	26,225	29,585	33,065	

#### TABLE A2: PRETREND TESTS

*Notes:* Data are from the 1999, 2003, 2009, and 2014 CSES. The dependent variables are an indicator variable for whether the male respondent is employed and an indicator variable for whether the female respondent is employed. Panel A covers the pre-WTO accession period prior to 2004, and Panel B covers the post-WTO accession period after 2004. All specifications are estimated conditional on district fixed effects, year fixed effects, pre-liberalization change in the outcome variable, a weighted average of external tariff barriers faced on Cambodia's exports to key partner countries, and individual-level covariates, including age, indicator variables for four educational categories (completed less than primary school, completed primary school, completed secondary school, and completed university), years of schooling, and an indicator variable for living in a rural area. Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the district level.

	Panel A: Reported wages sample		Panel B: Full sample – imputed wages		
	Men's earnings	Women's earnings	Men's earnings	Women's earnings	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	
District tariff	0.055***	-0.002	0.035**	-0.002	
	(0.019)	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.014)	
Ν	16,967	12,178	48,077	48,459	

#### TABLE A3: TRADE LIBERALIZATION AND LOG MONTHLY EARNINGS

*Notes:* Data are from the 1999, 2003, 2009, and 2014 CSES. The dependent variables are the log monthly earnings reported by men and women. In Panel A, we use the sample of individuals who reported their wages, and in Panel B, we impute the wages of employed individuals who did not report their wages. In all specifications, the independent variable is the district tariff variable constructed using employment subsector weights as measured in 1998 and industry-specific tariffs over time. All specifications are estimated conditional on district fixed effects, year fixed effects, district-specific linear time trends, a weighted average of external tariff barriers faced on Cambodia's exports to key partner countries, and individual-level covariates, including age, indicator variables for four educational categories (completed less than primary school, completed primary school, completed secondary school, and completed university), years of schooling, and indicator variables for being illiterate and living in a rural area. Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the district level.

					Subcatego	ories of non-foo	d consumption:	
	Total (1)	Food (2)	Non-food (3)	Clothing (4)	Domestic (5)	Personal care (6)	Personal effects (7)	Medical (8)
District tariff	0.040 (0.064)	0.051 (0.061)	0.040 (0.122)	0.328* (0.171)	0.460 (0.296)	0.047 (0.118)	-0.728 (0.553)	-0.163 (0.540)
Ν	24,874	24,875	24,874	24,874	24,874	24,874	24,874	24,874

TABLE A4: TRADE LIBERALIZATION AND HOUSEHOLD CONSUMPTION PER CAPITA

*Notes:* Data are from the 1999, 2009, and 2014 CSES. The dependent variables are the log household consumption per capita for different expenditure categories over the last 12 months. The outcome variables are total consumption in column 1, food consumption in column 2, non-food consumption in column 3, clothing consumption in column 4, domestic workers' salaries and furniture expenditures in column 5, personal care expenditures (e.g., soap, toothpaste, razor, sanitary napkins, haircut, manicure, and electric goods for personal care) in column 6, personal effects expenditures (e.g., costume/gold jewelry, handbags, wallets, wristwatch, clocks, umbrella) in column 7, and medical expenditures (e.g., doctors' fees, other medical services, hospital charges, other medical supplies) in column 8. In all specifications, the independent variable is the district tariff variable constructed using employment subsector weights as measured in 1998 and industry-specific tariffs over time. All specifications are estimated conditional on district fixed effects, year fixed effects, district-specific linear time trends, and a weighted average of external tariff barriers faced on Cambodia's exports to key partner countries. All specifications also control for household head-level covariates, including age, indicator variables for four educational categories (completed less than primary school, completed primary school, completed secondary school, and completed university), years of schooling, and indicator variables for being illiterate and living in a rural area. Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the district level.

Decision-making	0.119**
index	(0.055)
(7)	7,496
Psychological	-0.136**
violence index	(0.055)
(6)	7,743
Sexual violence	-0.076*
index	(0.039)
(5)	7,746
Injury	-0.056
index	(0.044)
(4)	7,747
Physical violence	-0.091*
index	(0.050)
(3)	7,747
Women's	-0.041*
employment	(0.024)
(2)	7,748
Women's	-0.057***
employment	(0.015)
(1)	33,476
	District tariff N

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indicator variables for three educational categories (completed primary school, completed secondary school, and higher school), years of schooling, indicator variables for literacy level, and an indicator variable for living in a rural area. Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the district level. Notes: Data are from the 2000, 2005, and 2014 Cambodia DHS. Dependent variables include an indicator variable for whether the respondent is employed and z-score indices constructed by simple averages of indicator variables representing physical violence, physical injury, sexual violence, psychological violence, and decision-making. In all specifications, the independent variable is the district tariff variable constructed using employment subsector weights as measured in 1998 and industry-specific tariffs over time. All specifications are estimated conditional on district fixed effects, year fixed effects, district-specific linear time trends, a weighted average of external tariff barriers faced on Cambodia's exports to key partner countries, and individual-level covariates, including age,

T	ABLE A6: HET	erogeneous E	ffects by E	DUCATIO	n and Agi	m	
	Women's	Women's	Physical		Sexual	Psychological	Decision-making
	employment (1)	employment (2)	violence (3)	Injury (4)	violence (5)	violence (6)	index (7)
Panel A: Heterogeneous effects b	y education						
District tariff × Lower education	0.000	0.000	0.000	-0.003*	-0.001	0.001	0.016**
	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.008)
District tariff	-0.057***	-0.040	-0.034**	-0.015*	-0.017**	-0.058***	$0.114^{**}$
	(0.015)	(0.024)	(0.016)	(600.0)	(0.008)	(0.021)	(0.056)
Ζ	33,476	7,748	7,745	7,747	7,745	7,742	7,496
Panel B: Heterogeneous effects b	y age						
District tariff × Younger	0.000	0.002	0.001	-0.002	-0.002*	0.000	-0.010
1	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.010)
District tariff	-0.057***	-0.042	-0.035**	-0.014	-0.016**	-0.058***	$0.128^{**}$
	(0.015)	(0.025)	(0.017)	(0.00)	(0.008)	(0.020)	(0.054)
Z	33,476	7,748	7,745	7,747	7,745	7,742	7,496
<i>Notes</i> : Data are from the 2000, 2005	5, and 2014 Ca	mbodia DHS. I	n Panel A.	we intera	ct the distr	ict tariff measur	e with an indicator
variable of lower education that tal	kes a value of e	one if the respo	ondent has	less than	median ye	ears of schooling	g (which is 3 years),
controlling for lower education and	d district tariff	. In Panel B, w	ve interact 1	the distric	ct tariff me	asure with an i	ndicator variable of
being younger than the median age	of 30, controlli	ing for being yc	bunger and	district ta	uriff. Deper	ndent variables i	nclude an indicator
variable for whether the responden violence, was physically injured, ex	tt is empioyea; perienced sext	indicator varia ial violence, or	bies unat tal experience	ke a valut d psvchol	o eical viol	ence: and a z-sco	xperienced physical ore index for having
decision-making power. In all spec	ifications, the	independent va	ariable is th	ne district	o tariff varie	ible constructed	using employment
subsector weights as measured in 19	998 and indust	ry-specific tarif	fs over time	e. All spe	cifications a	are estimated co	nditional on district
fixed effects, year fixed effects, distr	ict-specific line	ear time trends,	, a weighted	d average	of external	tariff barriers fa	aced on Cambodia's
exports to key partner countries, ar (completed primary school comple	id individual-l sted secondary	evel covariates, school and co	, including mnleted hi	age, ındıc oher edıı	cation) ves	ars of schooling	ucational categories indicator variables
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for literacy level, and an indicator variable for living in a rural area. Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the

district level.

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	All (1)	Men (2)	Women (3)
Panel A: Migration outcomes			
District tariff	0.016	0.014	0.017
	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.014)
Ν	1,229,969	576,898	653,071
Panel B: Migration outcomes by educa	ation		
District tariff × Lower education	0.001	0.001	0.000
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
District tariff	0.015	0.014	0.016
	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.014)
Ν	1,229,969	576,898	653,071
Panel C: Migration outcomes by age			
District tariff × Younger	0.009***	0.006***	0.011***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
District tariff	0.012	0.012	0.011
	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.014)
Ν	1,229,969	576,898	653,071

#### TABLE A7: TRADE LIBERALIZATION AND MIGRATION

*Notes:* Data are from the 1998 and 2008 Cambodian Census. The dependent variable is an indicator variable that takes a value of one if the respondent migrated within the last five years. In Panel A, the independent variable is the district tariff variable constructed using employment subsector weights as measured in 1998 and industry-specific tariffs over time. In Panel B, we interact the district tariff measure with an indicator variable of lower education that takes a value of one if the respondent has less than three years of schooling, controlling for lower education and district tariff. In Panel C, we interact the district tariff measure with an indicator variable of being younger than the median age of 30, controlling for being younger and district tariff. All specifications are estimated conditional on district fixed effects, year fixed effects, pre-liberalization change in the outcome variable, a weighted average of external tariff barriers faced on Cambodia's exports to key partner countries, and individual-level covariates, including age, indicator variables for four educational categories (completed less than primary school, completed primary school, completed secondary school, and completed university), years of schooling, and an indicator variable for living in a rural area. Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the district level.

Panel A: Employment Status Outcomes					
	Employment	Unemployment	NILF		
	(1)	(2)	(3)		
I. Men					
Log district tariff	-0.346	0.151	0.212		
	(0.320)	(0.133)	(0.290)		
Ν	576,898	576,898	576,898		
II. Women					
Log district tariff	-1.384***	0.187	1.210***		
0	(0.454)	(0.157)	(0.377)		
Ν	653,071	653,071	653,071		
III. Test of coefficient equ	uality between women and me	п			
<i>p</i> -value	0.001	0.766	0.001		
Panel B: Type of Emp	loyment Outcomes				
	Paid employment	Unpaid employment	Self-employment		
	(1)	(2)	(3)		
I. Men					
T 11 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1	0.00.00	0.075			
Log district tariff	0.604**	0.075	-0.997***		
Log district tariff	(0.283)	(0.246)	-0.997*** (0.310)		
N	0.604** (0.283) 576,898	0.073 (0.246) 576,898	-0.997*** (0.310) 576,898		
N II. Women	0.604** (0.283) 576,898	(0.246) 576,898	-0.997*** (0.310) 576,898		
N II. Women Log district tariff	0.604** (0.283) 576,898 -0.225	-0.788	-0.997*** (0.310) 576,898 0.456		
Log district tariff N <i>II. Women</i> Log district tariff	0.604** (0.283) 576,898 -0.225 (0.503)	-0.788 (0.632)	-0.997*** (0.310) 576,898 0.456 (0.301)		
N II. Women Log district tariff N	0.604** (0.283) 576,898 -0.225 (0.503) 653,071	-0.788 (0.632) 653,071	-0.997*** (0.310) 576,898 0.456 (0.301) 653,071		
Log district tariff N II. Women Log district tariff N III. Test of coefficient ear	0.604** (0.283) 576,898 -0.225 (0.503) 653,071 vality between women and me.	-0.788 (0.632) 653,071	-0.997*** (0.310) 576,898 0.456 (0.301) 653,071		

TABLE A8: TRADE LIBERALIZATION AND LABOR MARKET OUTCOMES: USING THE LOG OF THE DISTRICT TARIFF

*Notes:* Data are from the 1998 and 2008 Cambodian Census. The explanatory variable is the log of the district tariff variable constructed using employment subsector weights as measured in 1998 and industry-specific tariffs over time. In Panel A, the dependent variables are indicator variables for being employed, unemployed, and not in the labor force (NILF). In Panel B, the dependent variables are indicator variables for paid employment (i.e., working as an unpaid family worker), and self-employment (i.e., working as an own-account worker). All specifications are estimated conditional on district fixed effects, year fixed effects, preliberalization change in the outcome variable, a weighted average of external tariff barriers faced on Cambodia's exports to key partner countries, and individual-level covariates, including age, indicator variables for four educational categories (completed less than primary school, completed primary school, completed secondary school, and completed university), years of schooling, and an indicator variable for living in a rural area. Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the district level.

	Women's employment (1)	Women's employment (2)	Physical violence (3)	Injury (4)	Sexual violence (5)	Psychological violence (6)	Decision-making index (7)
District tariff	-0.696*** (0.162)	-0.500* (0.293)	-0.426*** (0.158)	-0.206* (0.107)	-0.241** (0.120)	-0.713*** (0.216)	1.403** (0.550)
Z	33,476	7,748	7,745	7,747	7,745	7,742	7,496

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sexual violence, or experienced psychological violence; and a z-score index for having decision-making power. In all specifications, the Notes: Data are from the 2000, 2005, and 2014 Cambodia DHS. Dependent variables include an indicator variable for whether the respondent is employed; indicator variables that take a value of one if the respondent experienced physical violence, was physically injured, experienced independent variable is the log of the district tariff variable constructed using employment subsector weights as measured in 1998 and industry-specific tariffs over time. All specifications are estimated conditional on district fixed effects, year fixed effects, district-specific linear including age, indicator variables for three educational categories (completed primary school, completed secondary school, and completed time trends, a weighted average of external tariff barriers faced on Cambodia's exports to key partner countries, and individual-level covariates, higher education), years of schooling, indicator variables for literacy level, and an indicator variable for living in a rural area. Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the district level.

	Panel A: W	'omen's marital status		Panel B: Fertility o	utcomes	
	Married (1)	Divorced widowed separated (2)	Has children (3)	Has young children (4)	Number of children (5)	Number of young children (6)
District tariff	-0.233 (0.207) 7,771	0.223 (0.211) 7,771	0.072 (0.229) 5,882	-0.577 (0.419) 5,882	0.093 (0.961) 5,882	-0.645 (0.510) 5,882

#### TABLE A10: Alternative Channels: Using the Log of the District Tariff

	Panel C: Ps	ychological problems	Panel D: Husba	nd's behavior
	Men (1)	Women (2)	Husband is jealous when respondent talks to other men (3)	Husband accuses respondent of unfaithfulness (4)
District tariff	-0.012	0.008	-0.072	-0.118
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.392)	(0.238)
Ν	47,171	52,985	7,722	7,732

*Notes:* Data are from the 2000, 2005, and 2014 Cambodia DHS for all panels except Panel C, where the data are from the 2003, 2009, and 2014 CSES. Dependent variables in Panel A are indicator variables for whether the respondent is married or whether she is divorced, widowed, separated. Dependent variables in Panel B are indicator variables for whether the respondent has children, whether the respondent has children under the age of 5, the number of children the respondent has, and the number of children under the age of 5 that the respondent has. Dependent variables in Panel C are indicator variables for whether the respondent reports that he/she experienced psychological or emotional difficulties or has become extremely upset within the last month. Dependent variables in Panels D are indicator variables for whether the respondent of unfaithfulness. All panels report reduced-form regression results using the log of the district tariff variable as an explanatory variable. All specifications are estimated conditional on district fixed effects, year fixed effects, district-specific linear time trends, a weighted average of external tariff barriers faced on Cambodia's exports to key partner countries, and individual-level covariates, including age, indicator variables for three educational categories (completed primary school, completed secondary school, and completed higher education), years of schooling, indicator variables for literacy level, and an indicator variable for living in a rural area. Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the district level.

	Employment	Unemployment	NILF
	(1)	(2)	(3)
I. Men			
District tariff alt.	-0.010	0.004	0.007
	(0.007)	(0.003)	(0.007)
Ν	576,898	576,898	576,898
II. Women			
District tariff alt.	-0.040***	0.009***	0.031***
	(0.012)	(0.003)	(0.010)
Ν	653,071	653,071	653,071
III Test of coefficient ea	ualitu hetzveen zvomen and me	ท	
n-value		0.043	0.020
p varae	0.000	010 10	0.010
Panel B: Type of Emp	ployment Outcomes		
Panel B: Type of Emp	ployment Outcomes Paid employment	Unpaid employment	Self-employmen
Panel B: Type of Emp	Ployment Outcomes Paid employment (1)	Unpaid employment (2)	Self-employmen (3)
Panel B: Type of Emp	Ployment Outcomes Paid employment (1)	Unpaid employment (2)	Self-employmen (3)
Panel B: Type of Emp I. Men District tariff alt.	Ployment Outcomes Paid employment (1) 0.015**	Unpaid employment (2) 0.003	Self-employmen (3) -0.029***
Panel B: Type of Emp I. Men District tariff alt.	Ployment Outcomes Paid employment (1) 0.015** (0.006)	Unpaid employment (2) 0.003 (0.007)	Self-employmen (3) -0.029*** (0.006)
Panel B: Type of Emp I. Men District tariff alt. N	Ployment Outcomes Paid employment (1) 0.015** (0.006) 576,898	Unpaid employment (2) 0.003 (0.007) 576,898	Self-employmen (3) -0.029*** (0.006) 576,898
Panel B: Type of Emp I. Men District tariff alt. N II. Women	Paid employment (1) 0.015** (0.006) 576,898	Unpaid employment (2) 0.003 (0.007) 576,898	Self-employmen (3) -0.029*** (0.006) 576,898
Panel B: Type of Emp I. Men District tariff alt. N II. Women District tariff alt.	Ployment Outcomes Paid employment (1) 0.015** (0.006) 576,898 -0.004	Unpaid employment (2) 0.003 (0.007) 576,898 -0.029*	Self-employmen (3) -0.029*** (0.006) 576,898 0.005
Panel B: Type of Emp I. Men District tariff alt. N II. Women District tariff alt.	Ployment Outcomes Paid employment (1) 0.015** (0.006) 576,898 -0.004 (0.013)	Unpaid employment (2) 0.003 (0.007) 576,898 -0.029* (0.016)	Self-employmen (3) -0.029*** (0.006) 576,898 0.005 (0.008)
Panel B: Type of Emp I. Men District tariff alt. N II. Women District tariff alt. N	Paid employment (1) 0.015** (0.006) 576,898 -0.004 (0.013) 653,071	Unpaid employment (2) 0.003 (0.007) 576,898 -0.029* (0.016) 653,071	Self-employmen (3) -0.029*** (0.006) 576,898 0.005 (0.008) 653,071
Panel B: Type of Emp I. Men District tariff alt. N II. Women District tariff alt. N III. Test of coefficient ea	Ployment Outcomes Paid employment (1) 0.015** (0.006) 576,898 -0.004 (0.013) 653,071 vality between women and me	Unpaid employment (2) 0.003 (0.007) 576,898 -0.029* (0.016) 653,071	Self-employmen (3) -0.029*** (0.006) 576,898 0.005 (0.008) 653,071

TABLE A11: TRADE LIBERALIZATION AND LABOR MARKET OUTCOMES: RECONSTRUCTING THE DISTRICT TARIFF EXCLUDING INDUSTRIES WITH THE HIGHEST TARIFF DECLINES

*Notes:* Data are from the 1998 and 2008 Cambodian Census. The explanatory variable is an alternative measure of the district tariff that is re-constructed to exclude industries that exhibited the highest tariff declines, which include beverages, wood products, and other textiles. In Panel A, the dependent variables are indicator variables for being employed, unemployed, and not in the labor force (NILF). In Panel B, the dependent variables are indicator variables are indicator variables for paid employment (i.e., working for pay), unpaid employment (i.e., working as an unpaid family worker), and self-employment (i.e., working as an own-account worker). All specifications are estimated conditional on district fixed effects, year fixed effects, pre-liberalization change in the outcome variable, a weighted average of external tariff barriers faced on Cambodia's exports to key partner countries, and individual-level covariates, including age, indicator variables for four educational categories (completed less than primary school, completed primary school, completed secondary school, and completed university), years of schooling, and an indicator variable for living in a rural area. Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the district level.

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	Women's employment	Women's emplovment	Physical violence	Iniurv	Sexual violence	Psychological violence	Decision-making index
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(9)	(2)
District tariff alt.	-0.060***	-0.042	-0.036**	-0.016*	-0.018**	-0.062***	$0.123^{**}$
	(0.015)	(0.025)	(0.016)	(600.0)	(0.008)	(0.021)	(0.056)
Z	33,476	7,748	7,745	7,747	7,745	7,742	7,496

Notes: Data are from the 2000, 2005, and 2014 Cambodia DHS. Dependent variables include an indicator variable for whether the respondent is employed; indicator variables that take a value of one if the respondent experienced physical violence, was physically injured, experienced sexual violence, or experienced psychological violence; and a z-score index for having decision-making power. In all specifications, the independent variable is an alternative district tariff measure that is reconstructed to exclude industries with the highest tariff declines (including beverages, wood products, and other textiles). All specifications are estimated conditional on district fixed effects, year fixed effects, district-specific linear time trends, a weighted average of external tariff barriers faced on Cambodia's exports to key partner countries, and individual-level covariates, including age, indicator variables for three educational categories (completed primary school, completed secondary school, and completed higher education), years of schooling, indicator variables for literacy level, and an indicator variable for living in a rural area. Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the district level.

TABLE A13: Alternative Channels: Reconstructing the District Tariff Excluding Industries with the Highest Tariff Declines

	Panel A: Wo	omen's marital status		Panel B: Fertility o	utcomes	
	Married (1)	Divorced widowed separated (2)	Has children (3)	Has young children (4)	Number of children (5)	Number of young children (6)
District tariff	-0.022 (0.021)	0.016 (0.022)	0.005 (0.021)	-0.057 (0.039)	0.000 (0.093)	-0.065 (0.045)
Ν	7,771	7,771	5,882	5,882	5,882	5,882
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Men (1)	Women (2)	Husband is jealous when respondent talks to other men (3)	Husband accuses respondent of unfaithfulness (4)
0.001	-0.001	-0.007	-0.006
(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.038)	(0.025)
47,171	52,985	7,722	7,732
	Men (1) 0.001 (0.003) 47,171	Men (1)Women (2)0.001-0.001 (0.003)(0.003)(0.003) 52,985	Men (1)         Women (2)         when respondent talks to other men (3)           0.001         -0.001         -0.007           (0.003)         (0.003)         (0.038)           47,171         52,985         7,722

Notes: Data are from the 2000, 2005, and 2014 Cambodia DHS for all panels except Panel C, where the data are from the 2003, 2009, and 2014 CSES. The explanatory variable is an alternative measure of the district tariff that is re-constructed to exclude industries that exhibited highest tariff declines, which include beverages, wood products, and other textiles. Dependent variables in Panel A are indicator variables for whether the respondent is married or whether she is divorced, widowed, separated. Dependent variables in Panel B are indicator variables for whether the respondent has children, whether the respondent has children under the age of 5, the number of children the respondent has, and the number of children under the age of 5 that the respondent has. Dependent variables in Panel C are indicator variables for whether the respondent reports that he/she experienced psychological or emotional difficulties or has become extremely upset within the last month. Dependent variables in Panels D are indicator variables for whether the respondent's husband is jealous when the respondent talks to other men and whether the respondent's husband accuses the respondent of unfaithfulness. All specifications are estimated conditional on district fixed effects, year fixed effects, district-specific linear time trends, a weighted average of external tariff barriers faced on Cambodia's exports to key partner countries, and individual-level covariates, including age, indicator variables for three educational categories (completed primary school, completed secondary school, and completed higher education), years of schooling, indicator variables for the literacy level, and an indicator variable for living in a rural area. Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the district level.

	Employment	Unemployment	NILF
	(1)	(2)	(3)
I. Men			
District tariff alt.	-0.008	0.004	0.005
	(0.007)	(0.003)	(0.006)
Ν	576,898	576,898	576,898
II. Women			
District tariff alt.	-0.036***	0.008**	0.029***
	(0.012)	(0.003)	(0.010)
Ν	653,071	653,071	653,071
III Test of coefficient ea	ualitu hetween women and me	m	
n-value	0 009	0 113	0.022
Panel B: Type of Emp	ployment Outcomes		
	Paid employment	Unpaid amployment	
	i alu employment	onpaid employment	Self-employmen
	(1)	(2)	Self-employmen (3)
I. Men	(1)	(2)	Self-employmen (3)
<i>I. Men</i> District tariff alt.	(1) 0.013**	(2) 0.006	Self-employmen (3) -0.028***
<i>I. Men</i> District tariff alt.	0.013** (0.006)	0.006 (0.006)	Self-employmen (3) -0.028*** (0.006)
<i>I. Men</i> District tariff alt. N	0.013** (0.006) 576,898	0.006 (0.006) 576,898	Self-employmen (3) -0.028*** (0.006) 576,898
I. Men District tariff alt. N II. Women	0.013** (0.006) 576,898	0.006 (0.006) 576,898	Self-employmen (3) -0.028*** (0.006) 576,898
<i>I. Men</i> District tariff alt. N <i>II. Women</i> District tariff alt.	0.013** (0.006) 576,898 -0.002	0.006 (0.006) 576,898 -0.024	Self-employmen (3) -0.028*** (0.006) 576,898 0.005
<i>I. Men</i> District tariff alt. N <i>II. Women</i> District tariff alt.	(1) 0.013** (0.006) 576,898 -0.002 (0.013)	0.006 (0.006) 576,898 -0.024 (0.014)	Self-employmen (3) -0.028*** (0.006) 576,898 0.005 (0.007)
I. Men District tariff alt. N II. Women District tariff alt. N	0.013** (0.006) 576,898 -0.002 (0.013) 653,071	0.006 (0.006) 576,898 -0.024 (0.014) 653,071	Self-employmen (3) -0.028*** (0.006) 576,898 0.005 (0.007) 653,071
I. Men District tariff alt. N II. Women District tariff alt. N III. Test of coefficient ea	(1) 0.013** (0.006) 576,898 -0.002 (0.013) 653,071 uality between women and me	0.006 (0.006) 576,898 -0.024 (0.014) 653,071	Self-employmen (3) -0.028*** (0.006) 576,898 0.005 (0.007) 653,071

TABLE A14: TRADE LIBERALIZATION AND LABOR MARKET OUTCOMES: RECONSTRUCTING THE DISTRICT TARIFF EXCLUDING INDUSTRIES WITH THE LOWEST TARIFF DECLINES

*Notes:* Data are from the 1998 and 2008 Cambodian Census. The explanatory variable is an alternative measure of the district tariff that is re-constructed to exclude industries that exhibited the lowest tariff declines, which include the printing, paper, publishing, and iron and steel industries. In Panel A, the dependent variables are indicator variables for being employed, unemployed, and not in the labor force (NILF). In Panel B, the dependent variables are indicator variables for paid employment (i.e., working for pay), unpaid employment (i.e., working as an unpaid family worker), and self-employment (i.e., working as an own-account worker). All specifications are estimated conditional on district fixed effects, year fixed effects, pre-liberalization change in the outcome variable, a weighted average of external tariff barriers faced on Cambodia's exports to key partner countries, and individual-level covariates, including age, indicator variables for four educational categories (completed less than primary school, completed primary school, completed secondary school, and completed university), years of schooling, and an indicator variable for living in a rural area. Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the district level.

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	Women's	Women's	Physical		Sexual	Psychological	Decision-making
	employment	employment	violence	Injury	violence	violence	index
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(2)	(9)	(2)
District tariff alt.	-0.057***	-0.041*	-0.036**	-0.015*	-0.017**	-0.060***	0.119**
	(0.015)	(0.025)	(0.016)	(600.0)	(0.008)	(0.021)	(0.055)
Z	33,476	7,748	7,745	7,747	7,745	7,742	7,496

Notes: Data are from the 2000, 2005, and 2014 Cambodia DHS. Dependent variables include an indicator variable for whether the respondent is employed; indicator variables that take a value of one if the respondent experienced physical violence, was physically injured, experienced sexual violence, or experienced psychological violence; and a z-score index for having decision-making power. In all specifications, the independent variable is an alternative district tariff measure that is reconstructed to exclude industries with the lowest tariff declines (including the printing, paper, publishing, and iron and steel industries). All specifications are estimated conditional on district fixed effects, year fixed effects, districtcompleted higher education), years of schooling, indicator variables for literacy level, and an indicator variable for living in a rural area. Robust specific linear time trends, a weighted average of external tariff barriers faced on Cambodia's exports to key partner countries, and individuallevel covariates, including age, indicator variables for three educational categories (completed primary school, completed secondary school, and standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the district level. TABLE A16: Alternative Channels: Reconstructing District Tariff Excluding Industries with the Lowest Tariff Declines

	Panel A: We	omen's marital status		Panel B: Fertility o	utcomes	
	Married (1)	Divorced widowed separated (2)	Has children (3)	Has young children (4)	Number of children (5)	Number of young children (6)
District tariff	-0.021 (0.021)	0.015 (0.022)	0.005 (0.021)	-0.057 (0.037)	-0.004 (0.091)	-0.065 (0.043)
Ν	7,771	7,771	5,882	5,882	5,882	5,882

	Panel C: Ps	ychological problems	Panel D: Husba	nd's behavior
	Men (1)	Women (2)	Husband is jealous when respondent talks to other men (3)	Husband accuses respondent of unfaithfulness (4)
District tariff	-0.001	0.000	-0.007	-0.005
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.037)	(0.024)
Ν	47,171	52,985	7,722	7,732

Notes: Data are from the 2000, 2005, and 2014 Cambodia DHS for all panels except Panel C, where the data are from the 2003, 2009, and 2014 CSES. The explanatory variable is an alternative measure of the district tariff that is re-constructed to exclude industries that exhibited the lowest tariff declines, which include the printing, paper, publishing, and iron and steel industries. Dependent variables in Panel A are indicator variables for whether the respondent is married or whether she is divorced, widowed, separated. Dependent variables in Panel B are indicator variables for whether the respondent has children, whether the respondent has children under the age of 5, the number of children the respondent has, and the number of children under the age of 5 that the respondent has. Dependent variables in Panel C are indicator variables for whether the respondent reports that he/she experienced psychological or emotional difficulties or has become extremely upset within the last month. Dependent variables in Panels D are indicator variables for whether the respondent's husband is jealous when the respondent talks to other men and whether the respondent's husband accuses the respondent of unfaithfulness. All specifications are estimated conditional on district fixed effects, year fixed effects, district-specific linear time trends, a weighted average of external tariff barriers faced on Cambodia's exports to key partner countries, and individual-level covariates, including age, indicator variables for three educational categories (completed primary school, completed secondary school, and completed higher education), years of schooling, indicator variables for literacy level, and an indicator variable for living in a rural area. Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the district level.

TABLE A17:	Trade	LIBERALIZATION	AND	Labor	Market	OUTCOMES:	Reconstructing	THE
DISTRICT TAF	RIFF EXCI	luding Off-Diag	GONAJ	L Indus	<b>FRIES</b>			

Panel A: Employmen	it Status Outcomes		
	Employment	Unemployment	NILF
	(1)	(2)	(3)
I. Men			
District tariff alt.	-0.011	0.003	0.008
	(0.007)	(0.003)	(0.007)
Ν	576,898	576,898	576,898
II. Women			
District tariff alt.	-0.041***	0.008***	0.033***
	(0.011)	(0.003)	(0.010)
Ν	653,071	653,071	653,071
III. Test of coefficient eq	uality between women and m	211	
<i>p</i> -value	0.005	0.070	0.014
Panel B: Type of Emp	oloyment Outcomes		
	Paid employment	Unpaid employment	Self-employment
	(1)	(2)	(3)
I. Men			
District tariff alt.	0.015**	0.003	-0.030***
	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.006)
Ν	576,898	576,898	576,898
II. Women			
District tariff alt.	-0.005	-0.029*	0.004
	(0.014)	(0.016)	(0.008)
Ν	653,071	653,071	653,071
III Test of coefficient ea	ualitu hetzpeen zoomen and m	211	

*Notes:* Data are from the 1998 and 2008 Cambodian Census. The explanatory variable is an alternative measure of the district tariff that is re-constructed to exclude industries that appear to be "off the diagonal ", which include the petroleum products, furniture, other textiles, wood products, and radio transmitters industries. In Panel A, the dependent variables are indicator variables for being employed, unemployed, and not in the labor force (NILF). In Panel B, the dependent variables are indicator variables for paid employment (i.e., working for pay), unpaid employment (i.e., working as an unpaid family worker), and self-employment (i.e., working as an own-account worker). All specifications are estimated conditional on district fixed effects, year fixed effects, preliberalization change in the outcome variable, a weighted average of external tariff barriers faced on Cambodia's exports to key partner countries, and individual-level covariates, including age, indicator variables for four educational categories (completed less than primary school, completed primary school, completed secondary school, and completed university), years of schooling, and an indicator variable for living in a rural area. Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the district level.

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TABLE A18:	INDUSTRIES

	Women's	Women's	Physical		Sexual	Psychological	Decision-making
	employment	employment	violence	Injury	violence	violence	index
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(9)	(2)
District tariff alt.	-0.061***	-0.040	-0.039**	-0.017*	-0.018**	-0.065***	$0.137^{**}$
	(0.015)	(0.026)	(0.016)	(600.0)	(6000)	(0.020)	(0.053)
Ν	33,476	7,748	7,745	7,747	7,745	7,742	7,496

Notes: Data are from the 2000, 2005, and 2014 Cambodia DHS. Dependent variables include an indicator variable for whether the respondent is variable is an alternative district tariff measure that is reconstructed to exclude industries that appear to be "off the diagonal" (including the district fixed effects, year fixed effects, district-specific linear time trends, a weighted average of external tariff barriers faced on Cambodia's exports employed; indicator variables that take a value of one if the respondent experienced physical violence, was physically injured, experienced sexual violence, or experienced psychological violence; and a z-score index for having decision-making power. In all specifications, the independent petroleum products, furniture, other textiles, wood products, and radio transmitters industries). All specifications are estimated conditional on school, completed secondary school, and completed higher education), years of schooling, indicator variables for literacy level, and an indicator to key partner countries, and individual-level covariates, including age, indicator variables for three educational categories (completed primary variable for living in a rural area. Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the district level.

	Panel A: W	omen's marital status	P	Panel B: Fertility ou	tcomes	
	Married (1)	Divorced widowed separated (2)	Has children (3)	Has young children (4)	Number of children (5)	Number of young children (6)
District tariff	-0.023	0.018	0.004	-0.063	-0.011	-0.072
	(0.021)	(0.022)	(0.021)	(0.038)	(0.096)	(0.044)
Ν	7,771	7,771	5,882	5,882	5,882	5,882
	Panel C: Ps	sychological problems	Panel D: Husba	and's behavior		
			Husband is jealous when respondent	Husband accuses respondent of		
	Men	Women	talks to other men	unfaithfulness		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)		
District tariff	-0.001	0.000	-0.010	-0.010	_	
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.040)	(0.025)		
Ν	47,171	52,985	7,722	7,732		

TABLE A19: Alternative Channels: Reconstructing the District Tariff Excluding Off-Diagonal Industries

Notes: Data are from the 2000, 2005, and 2014 Cambodia DHS for all panels except Panel C, where the data are from the 2003, 2009, and 2014 CSES. The explanatory variable is an alternative measure of the district tariff that is re-constructed to exclude industries that appear as "off-diagonal", which include the petroleum products, furniture, other textiles, wood products, and radio transmitters industries. Dependent variables in Panel A are indicator variables for whether the respondent is married or whether she is divorced, widowed, separated. Dependent variables in Panel B are indicator variables for whether the respondent has children, whether the respondent has children under the age of 5, the number of children the respondent has, and the number of children under the age of 5 that the respondent has. Dependent variables in Panel C are indicator variables for whether the respondent reports that he/she experienced psychological or emotional difficulties or has become extremely upset within the last month. Dependent variables in Panels D are indicator variables for whether the respondent's husband is jealous when the respondent talks to other men and whether the respondent's husband accuses the respondent of unfaithfulness. All specifications are estimated conditional on district fixed effects, year fixed effects, district-specific linear time trends, a weighted average of external tariff barriers faced on Cambodia's exports to key partner countries, and individual-level covariates, including age, indicator variables for three educational categories (completed primary school, completed secondary school, and completed higher education), years of schooling, indicator variables for literacy level, and an indicator variable for living in a rural area. Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the district level.

Panel A: Women's employment					
I. Correlations					
	$\alpha_k$	$g_k$	$\beta_k$	$F_k$	$Var(z_k)$
$\alpha_k$	1				
$g_k$	-0.067	1			
$\beta_k$	-0.034	-0.215	1		
$F_k$	0.741	-0.015	-0.107	1	_
$Var(z_k)$	0.454	0.040	-0.021	0.821	1
II. Top five Rotemberg weight ind	ustries		\$		
	$\tilde{\alpha}_k$	$g_k$	$\beta_k$	95 % CI	
Manufacture of wearing apparel	0.542	14.223	-0.070	(-0.10,0.00)	
Fishing	0.151	17.411	-0.153	(-0.40,0.00)	
Manufacture of furniture	0.072	51.346	-0.119	(-0.40,0.00)	
Manufacture of meat products	0.060	35.833	-0.071	(-0.10,0.10)	
Farming of animals	0.042	40.409	-0.169	(-1.40,0.00)	
Panel B: Physical violence					
I. Correlations					
	$\alpha_k$	$g_k$	$\beta_k$	$F_k$	$\operatorname{Var}(z_k)$
$\alpha_k$	1				
<i>g</i> <sub>k</sub>	-0.067	1			
$\beta_k$	0.047	0.266	1	1	
$F_k$	0.741	-0.015	0.109	1	1
$\operatorname{Var}(z_k)$	0.454	0.040	0.016	0.821	1
II. Top live Kotemberg weight ind	â	~	â		
	$\alpha_k$	8k	Pk	95 % CI	
Manufacture of wearing apparel	0.542	14.223	-0.030	(-0.10,0.00)	
Fishing	0.151	17.411	-0.007	(-0.10,0.10)	
Manufacture of furniture	0.072	51.346	-0.003	(-0.10,0.10)	
Manufacture of meat products	0.060	35.833	-0.004	(-0.10,0.00)	
		///////////////////////////////////////			
Farming of animals	0.042	40.409	0.034	(-0.20,0.30)	

#### TABLE A20: SUMMARY OF ROTEMBERG WEIGHTS

*Notes:* This table reports statistics about the Rotemberg weights. Panels AI and BI report correlations between the weights ( $\alpha_k$ ), the national component of growth ( $g_k$ ), the just-identified coefficient estimates ( $\beta_k$ ), the first-stage F-statistics ( $F_k$ ), and variation in industry shares across locations ( $var(z_k)$ ). Panels AII and BII report the top five industries according to the Rotemberg weights. The  $g_k$  is the industry tariff rate,  $\beta_k$  is the coefficient from the just-identified regression, and the 95 percent confidence interval is the weak instrument robust confidence interval over a range from –10 to 10.

	Women's employment (1)	Women's employment (2)	Physical violence (3)	Injury (4)	Sexual violence (5)	Psychological violence (6)	Decision-making index (7)
District tariff	-0.057***	-0.041*	-0.035**	-0.015*	-0.017**	-0.060***	0.119**
SE Clusters District	(0.015)	(0.024)	(0.016)	(0000)	(0.008)	(0.021)	(0.055)
District and district with highest SI	(0.014)	(0.024)	(0.017)	(0.00)	(0.008)	(0.023)	(0.054)
Z	33,476	7,748	7,745	7,747	7,745	7,742	7,496
<i>Notes</i> : This table reports regression resul is our baseline results in Table 3. "Distric	ts of equation (3) u	using alternative m 1 highest SI″ two-w	lethods of clust vay clusters the	tering. "Distr e standard er	ict" clusters th ror by district	le standard error at and the district wit	the district level, which the highest similarity
indev Standard errors in narentheses I	Data are from the	2000 2005 and 20	114 Cambodia	DHS Denen	dent variahlee	include an indicate	w wantaha for whather

Table A21: Trade Liberalization and Intimate Partner Violence using Alternative Standard Errors

conditional on district fixed effects, year fixed effects, district-specific linear time trends, a weighted average of external tariff barriers faced on Cambodia's exports to key partner countries, and individual-level covariates, including age, indicator variables for three educational categories (completed primary school, completed sexual violence, or experienced psychological violence; and a z-score index for having decision-making power. In all specifications, the independent variable is the the respondent is employed; indicator variables that take a value of one if the respondent experienced physical violence, was physically injured, experienced district tariff variable constructed using employment subsector weights as measured in 1998 and industry-specific tariffs over time. All specifications are estimated secondary school, and completed higher education), years of schooling, indicator variables for literacy level, and an indicator variable for living in a rural area. ii. N