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Research Report

Evolving global governance structures: Division of labour and co-operation between regional and global security arrangements

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SWP-Studie

Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik
Deutsches Institut für Internationale
Politik und Sicherheit

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Evolving Global Governance Structures

Division of Labour and Co-operation between
Regional and Global Security Arrangements

A Joint International Workshop by the
Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung and the
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik,
Ebenhausen, April 6–8, 2000

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**Evolving Global Governance Structures.
Division of Labour and Co-operation between
Regional and Global Security Arrangements.
International Workshop Ebenhausen, April 6-8, 2000**

Globalisation is leading to far-reaching structures of mutual dependency in the international system. In many areas, isolated national solutions are no longer feasible. This is true for such diverse fields as international peace and security, the protection of the environment as well as the international economy and the protection of human rights. Without global governance neither the common problems of mankind, nor a large number of national problems can be solved.

Endeavours to build an institutional and legal framework to manage globalisation in its different dimensions have begun. However, structures of global governance are still weak. Better global governance will not come about by itself. A sustained commitment of states as well as of non-state actors is needed.

A North-South Dialogue on global governance, jointly organised by the Friedrich Ebert Foundation (FEF) and the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP), is meant to support this effort. The two institutions have initiated a series of international conferences which will involve major research institutions in the field of international politics from countries of the South as well as the North.

The aim of the dialogue is to scrutinise concrete dimensions and problems of global governance. What has to be done to create workable global governance rules, regimes and organisations? How do existing rules and institutions in these different fields perform with regard to global governance? How can they be improved?

The first conference, on April 6-8, 2000 in Ebenhausen, Germany, addressed the security situation in the major regions of the world as well as the question how universal organisations, such as the UN, and regional organisations can work together to improve global governance in the field of peace and security.

This report summarises the contributions and discussions of the conference. We very much apologise for its delayed delivery, due to the move of SWP from Ebenhausen to Berlin.

Ernst Hildebrand Friedrich-Ebert-Foundation (FES)
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Executive Summary

Most of the world's armed conflicts are intrastate conflicts. These were not seen as a major immediate threat to national security by most participants, with the notable exceptions of the Middle East and South-west Asian regions. Most challenges to security in times of globalisation derive from sources different than traditional military threats.

In **Central and Latin America**, war is not a major concern at present. There is only one border-conflict simmering between Colombia and Venezuela. The most threatening developments are the rise of resource conflicts, new guerrilla movements and the explosion of large-scale organised criminal violence. Increasing state weakness is alarming and is reflected in the growing inefficiency of judicial systems, in the privatisation of police and security sectors, in the increase in small arms transfer, drug trafficking and in the rising number of paramilitary groups. Negative, uncontrolled effects of globalisation were discussed in more detail. Continuing population growth will exacerbate these effects.

In **Sub-Saharan Africa**, the only recent interstate war, between Eritrea and Ethiopia, has been stopped. The main concern is violent intrastate conflict and state fragmentation, in particular in East and Central Africa and also, increasingly, in West Africa. Human suffering is extreme as is the disruption of economic and social life. Massive streams of refugees have become an additional source of conflict, creating a vicious circle of decay. One positive aspect was noted in that weapons of mass destruction do not play a role in Sub-Saharan Africa, just as in Latin America.

The reasons why African states are particularly prone to internal violent conflicts were discussed at some length. The present state of political systems in Sub-Saharan Africa is marked by a fluctuation between a partly successful implementation of democratic elements, a marked persistence of authoritarianism and states breaking down into violent conflict. Participants agreed that Sub-Saharan Africa witnessing an exceptional phase of its history.

In the **Middle East**, security is still predominantly perceived to be related to traditional interstate conflicts over territorial claims. Perception of security as a zero-sum game is still prevalent in the region. This

perception is mainly due to the long history of the Arab-Israeli conflict. There are other conflicts smouldering in the region, such as interstate disputes over territories between Morocco and Algeria, Libya and Chad, Egypt and Sudan, Syria and Turkey, as well as ongoing intrastate conflicts in Algeria, Afghanistan, southern Sudan and Turkey. The continuing insecurity in these regions is *inter alia* reflected in a high concentration of military forces. In addition, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is of profound concern.

On the rise are terrorism, conflict over water, drug trafficking and other new types of threats. However, opinions differed with regard to the danger of conflict over water. Shortage of water is surely the most pressing environmental problem in the Middle East. But whether it will exacerbate existing tensions, or even create violent conflict, was controversial. Globalisation was assessed as a double-edged sword for the region. While globalisation generates more co-operation and thereby eases tensions, at the same time, it will strengthen rather than weaken the divergent socio-religious group identities.

Regarding **Asia**, the ongoing arms race which involves the buildup of nuclear capacities in two of the region's hot spots, was judged to be alarming by most of the participants. But there were some strong voices of dissent, in particular from the Indian side. Also participants from Korea pointed out that the regional arms buildup not only produces destabilising, but also stabilising effects – a situation similar to the relative stability brought about in Europe by the mutual deterrence in the past Cold War era.

Most of the internal conflicts in the region are caused by ethnic, religious or linguistic differences within states, similar to those in Africa. In the course of state and nation-building processes, the majority of governments strongly promoted centralisation and imposed a national identity on ethnic groups. This inevitably led to tensions or even open conflict linked to the ethnic, religious and linguistic identity of different groups.

Nevertheless, the overall regional security situation was characterised as a “stable instability” on the interstate level. Asia is a highly dynamic region, in particu-

lar with regard to the rapid economic development it has experienced even after its financial crisis. This development greatly exposes the region, especially Southeast Asia, to the effects of globalisation. Yet, despite globalisation, sovereignty and national prestige continue to determine the regional agenda.

In **Europe**, security is divided into different zones. Within the EU, stability prevails; major inter- as well as intrastate conflict is hardly imaginable. Developments within East and Southeast Europe and the Caucasus region, as well as within the Russian Federation show a different picture. The greatest menace to Europe's overall security is the scenario of an imploding and further fragmenting Russia. There is no lasting political solution of the Kosovo conflict in sight. The peace process in Bosnia remains fragile.

The discussion then briefly addressed various measures, such as disarmament treaties, verification agreements and CBMs (confidence building measures), to stabilise the eastern region as a whole. Regarding this aspect, Europe is worried about the U.S.' plans to create a National Missile Defence, which could possibly unsettle present arms control and disarmament regimes. Integrating the new states into western structures, in particular, NATO, the EU and the Council of Europe is another important means of stabilisation. Membership, as well as the incentive of promised membership in EU and NATO, has helped and will help to prevent conflict. The problem with this strategy is that it does not reach some of those states which are most prone to conflicts, such as Albania, Georgia, etc.

Debate on Humanitarian Intervention

The war in Kosovo triggered a lively debate on the issues of sovereignty and the right of the international community to intervene in another state's internal affairs. Some held that humanitarian intervention is an inevitable consequence of the rising importance of human rights. Others pointed out the high degree of selectiveness which inevitably accompanies it. The inherent danger of "double standards" is a very troubling perspective, particularly for the less powerful countries of the South. Some felt that the creation of formalised standards for intervention could minimise this danger. A new definition of international security is needed.

A contentious question posed was which international bodies should be entrusted to authorise such

interventions. The role that regional organisations can play differs from region to region. Europe has an abundance of regional organisations. Their division of labour is still unclear and needs to be better defined. Asian states, however, anxiously guard their sovereignty and seem unwilling to give regional organisations the power to interfere in their internal affairs. This contrasts with Europe, Africa and the Americas, where most states are less reluctant to transfer limited parts of their sovereignty. In the final analysis, the UN was regarded by most participants as the proper and "primary" forum to provide legality for intervention, although the Security Council (SC) neither works well nor has a sufficiently representative composition.

Globalisation, the State and Civil Society

The discussion then dwelled on the question whether the existence of a "strong state", or its nonexistence, is an important variable for regional and international stability. What constitutes a strong state in view of the dynamics of globalisation? Opinions differed. Reliable criteria to assess the strength of a state are difficult to specify. Globalisation is exacerbating this uncertainty. Today, there is a much stronger demand on the ability of states to respond swiftly and adequately to changing domestic and international developments. Institutional efficiency seems to become more decisive for internal stability and global competitiveness than potent military and police forces. The dichotomy between "strong" and "weak" is misleading and should be replaced by "effective state".

The role of "civil society" was also judged to be ambiguous. Some felt that the effectiveness of a state was highly overestimated and suggested that carefully crafted state structures which reach to the very bottom of society could accomplish the same tasks better. Others disagreed. Civil society embraces some characteristics which state structures cannot accomplish. Its task is not only to transmit the needs of the population to state structures but also to pressure the latter to accommodate these needs. This, however, enhances the danger of critically undermining state structures, as can be seen in some parts of Africa. It was the prevailing view that civil society should therefore play only a complementary role to the state and not be its substitute.

The Security Situation in Central and Latin America

Low Expectation of Interstate Conflicts

At present, war is not a major concern in Latin America. There is one border-conflict simmering between Colombia and Venezuela. The other border conflicts have been resolved. One important reason given in the discussion for this positive development is the democratisation of Latin American countries. Another reason is the increasing co-operation in the economic and energy sectors on a bilateral as well as multilateral level, for example the integration of Latin American economies in MERCOSUR. Weapons of mass destruction as a relevant military and political factor in regional relations are absent.

Crisis of Public Order

The most threatening developments are the rise of resource conflicts, new guerrilla movements and the explosion of criminal violence. Two slightly different lines of discussion emerged that varied in the weight they put on the main reasons responsible for these developments. One line of discussion emphasised that these new conflicts are mainly a consequence of state weakness. Indicators such as the growing inefficiency of judicial systems, privatisation of police and security sectors, an increase in small arms transfer, drug trafficking and a rise in the number of paramilitary groups all call attention to these major problems of the nation-states' weakness and the crisis of public order along with it. There are several reasons for this development which were only touched upon briefly in the discussion. Negative, uncontrolled effects of globalisation obviously play a role. Various kinds of illicit ways of doing business are spreading, such as

- illegal migration traffic,
- small weapons trade,
- trans-national nuclear/toxic waste traffic,
- smuggling of endangered species,
- money laundering and
- cultivation and trafficking of narcotics.

The rise of these illegal activities undermines the stability of states in the region in several ways:

- Production and trafficking of drugs cause environ-

mental damage, such as deforestation and pollution.

- New businesses rely on violence. Turf wars between competing gangs as well as attacks on executive state representatives lead to increased social violence and the breakdown of public order.
- Governments are confronted with strong internal, illicit actors who compete with the state in carrying out some of its original functions. The drug war is increasingly being fought by military means, often with the support of U.S. military aid, which Latin American countries receive, thus shifting the internal power balance towards the military. A gradual militarisation of society is the consequence.
- It was pointed out that the relations between the Latin American countries and the U.S. have become increasingly difficult as the U.S. insist on the supply-countries' responsibility to prevent the cultivation of narcotics. Fears are increasing that the U.S., traditionally having a stake in the region, may directly intervene in Latin American countries to curb the drug traffic.

Basically, this first argument holds the weakness of Latin American states to be responsible for the current crisis of public order as it leaves space for illicit businesses to grow. The attempt of the protagonists of these businesses to take over some of the states' core functions intensifies the decline of its power.

The other line of argument equates globalisation with modern capitalism. It is supposed to structurally harm the countries at the economic periphery. The present international economic system features several characteristics with a strong impact on social developments¹:

- The power-relation between labour and capital means the dominance of the latter. The loss of

¹ Pran Chopra, a participant from India adds: "These are not defects of globalisation *per se*, which by itself is unavoidable and not bad, but of the kind of globalisation which is taking place. It has created a global cartel of the affluent of many countries, developed as well as developing. India is an example for the latter. They already had control of the economies of their countries. Now they control the global economy, to the detriment of the global majority, both in terms of countries and their populations.

labour-intensive production modes and international production chains that are easy to move lead to structural unemployment. High unemployment leads to the exclusion of citizens from markets (and influence).

- The free and rapid mobility of capital poses a threat to weak economies depending on this capital. In a moment of crisis it becomes highly volatile. The declining importance of measures taken by national governments to hinder this development is alarming.
- The stability of currency and the tightening of public budgets in order to maintain monetary stability reduce the scope of governments to act on social policy. This is especially dangerous at times when social exclusion is on the increase.

The discussion led to a somewhat grim post-modern outlook.² Whether states are weak or not has become less important because the effectiveness of national governments is being reduced by the economy's internationalisation. Markets have already integrated internationally, and to regain influence, politics have to do the same. At present, the prevalence of the logic of markets over politics exposes a large number of individuals and society as a whole to challenges which neither is yet able to deal with. This results in exploding violence, especially in cities where developments are experienced more intensely. Rising population growth will exacerbate this tendency.

How to Deal with the Crisis of Public Order in Latin America

Although the two lines of argument put different weight on the reasons that are responsible for the deterioration of public order in a number of states, they both perceive international co-operation as a solution to their respective problems. The first school

² Tullo Vigevani, a participant from Brazil, adds: "I believe that the two lines of explanation are not antagonistic. On the one hand, the theory of the weakness of the Latin American State, shows - in opposition to some neo-liberal thesis - that the problems of this region are linked with the weakness of the instruments of the state. This becomes more and more evident because all big issues in these countries are linked with subjects of internal public order. International conflicts are not important. On the other hand, it is true at the same time that the problems of Latin American states result also from the kind of globalisation that is taking place. We need a strong state to break the logic of hegemony and the market of this kind of globalisation."

seeks to re-establish public order by strengthening state structures. Because Latin American states are probably unable to cope with this challenge by themselves, they will have to rely on the assistance of international organisations and foreign governments. This support can assume two forms, one being direct foreign assistance to strengthen the state in question and the other would be to weaken the illicit actors by establishing international regimes based on norms that reduce these actors' room for manoeuvring. According to the second argument, there is no point in strengthening individual state structures. Ways have to be found to extend the legitimisation of political action to entities larger than nation-states, for example the European Union. Another option would be to regain control of markets by strengthening and democratising international monetary institutions. Their task would be to control the free forces of capitalism and defend economically weak countries from their worst hardships.

Creation of International Institutions / Global Governance Structures

The discussion then focused on the need to strengthen international regimes and institutions as global governance structures. International regimes must be based on:

- principles of shared responsibility,
- equal representation and democratic decision-making to reflect contemporary hegemonic values and
- better representation of NGOs.

At present, there are many regimes concerned with environmental and social issues, but there is no international standard on rights and treatment of illegal/economic migrants. Furthermore, existing regimes are often not well designed and do not fulfill their tasks. To establish a functioning regime, parties first have to codify common norms and then comply with these norms.

Codifying norms is done best when driven by epistemic communities and NGOs. In the case of great normative contradictions, the combination of several issues can extend the room for bargaining. Compromises should reflect a reasonable balance. In the drug issue, for example the U.S. pushed through norms which only related to the supply side of the problem, leaving the demand side unaddressed. Several participants strongly demanded that the U.S.

should take much greater responsibility for getting its internal demand for drugs under control.

Effective monitoring and enforcement continue to be a fundamental problem for international regimes. Most regimes today leave the implementation of norms up to national governments, which often fail to take the necessary steps. Therefore, a wide gap exists between the creation of norms and their implementation. In Latin America, examples for all of the above-mentioned regime deficiencies can be found. In the case of illegal migrants, even the codification of norms seems impossible.

The Security Situation in Sub-Saharan Africa

Interstate War

At present, the only current interstate war being fought is between Eritrea and Ethiopia. There are several other latent interstate conflicts, but few have been active in the last couple of years. Most of them rise up around artificial borders dating back to the European colonisation of Africa.

Environmental and Resource Conflicts

Major environmental problems are evolving: increasing pollution (air quality), population growth, decreasing access to land and to water, endangered species etc. Desertification, water shortage or pollution might lead to future conflict. The climate change does have effects on the region, however, it will not necessarily lead to conflicts. Compliance to regimes, generally speaking, is not sufficient throughout the region. Tensions arise from the opposing interests of South Africa, on the one hand, which wants to impose standards in environmental issues, and on the other, those of less developed countries in Sub-Saharan Africa claiming their right to industrialisation and thus pollution.

Intrastate Conflict

Artificial colonial borders are also a reason for the rise of intrastate conflicts in East and Central Africa, the Sudan and other areas. These conflicts are of great concern because they cause serious instability within entire regions. The disruption of economic life as a consequence of internal conflicts leads to an intensification of material crises and social decay. This again results in the escalation and perpetuation of conflict, thus creating a vicious circle. Large streams of refugees have become an additional source of conflict. As seen, in particular, in the Great Lakes region and the DR of Congo, the intense interaction between intra- and interstate conflicts has become an enormous obstacle for conflict prevention and conflict solution.

The proliferation of small weapons has significantly

increased after the end of the East-West conflict, with the Eastern European states being major suppliers. Even though these weapons do not cause conflicts, their availability significantly raises the level of violence in the region. To end on a positive note it was pointed out that weapons of mass destruction do not play a role in Sub-Saharan Africa, just as in Latin America.

The reasons why African states are particularly prone to internal violent conflicts were discussed at some length. There is a cumulation of profound processes of transformation.

In Africa, “modernisation” and “development” combine with “tradition” in a unique way. Africa’s social, economic and cultural logic often mix in ways not easily perceptible to Western standards. This combination creates tensions and leads to disorder, which is the prevailing characteristic of several African societies. These difficulties cannot be solved by a simple recourse to Western concepts of modern society. Adequate African solutions have yet to be found.

Civil society in Sub-Saharan Africa is still weak. The African state inherited and has not yet overcome some aspects of the colonial state which prevent the emergence of civil society. The state-society relation, in general, is a clientelistic one. The state maintains many ties with different groups, but there is no scope for society as a whole to develop, for the different groups to bargain or ally with each other on certain questions. The economic structure of African states does not encourage private activity. A large part of African economies is dominated by rentier activities.

During the independence struggle, civil society developed as a comprehensive social movement against the colonial state, but after independence was reached, it was again suppressed by the newly emerged governments which continued to pursue clientelistic relations to society. The lack of bargaining space for social groups has reinforced the social separation of African societies along ethnic, local or language lines. Coherence of diverse interests of the different social groups could not develop. The same holds largely true for national identity and constitutes a formidable obstacle to the consolidation of democracy.

Lately, the decline of state power has opened up some room for the growth of civil society, but it is not yet great enough to bring about sustained change. Other forces, like warlords, militias etc. seem to play a more dynamic role.

In sum, the past decade has brought about some changes in African political culture. Both an increase in political liberalisation, shifts to competitive elections, and albeit, a gradual development of civil society, of social and economic associations can be observed. This does not actually mean the dawn of democracy. But it shows that Africa is not a hopeless case, that there is an oscillation between democratic developments and authoritarian tendencies and that a progressive implementation of democratic values as cultural values must be continued.

Solutions to Conflicts in Sub-Saharan Africa – No Quick Fix

In sum, the present state of political systems in Sub-Saharan Africa is marked by a fluctuation between partly successful implementation of democratic elements, strong persistence of authoritarianism and states breaking down into violent conflict.

African people are hardly prepared to meet these challenges on their own and need assistance to resolve them. The question was discussed as to how this assistance should be defined. New forms have to be developed and implemented. The goal should be to replace war-making coalitions and to provide civil society actors with more room to perform constructive, non-violent participation.

However, as several participants pointed out, giving space to civil society is not a substitute for solid state-building on the basis of good governance and the rule of law. In this framework different kinds of non-state actors, churches, NGOs, businesses etc. will have to play a more prominent role. A better understanding of conflict prevention, in general, and of the comparative advantages of actors, of their reasons for and manner of interference needs to be developed. There are no quick fixes to Africa's problems. Sub-Saharan Africa is in an exceptional phase of its history.

The Security Situation in the Middle East

The On-going Arab-Israeli Conflict

The security situation in the Middle East is split. On the one hand, there is a peace process going on between Israel and its Arab neighbouring states, which is painfully slow and ambivalent. The goal of peace has become a very recent development in the Middle East and, despite peace-talks, it is far from being settled. There is still a high risk of war. On the other hand, changes in the parties' underlying perceptions of security are taking place and are improving the long term outlook for peace.

Most importantly, a settlement has been increasingly perceived as a win-win situation by the Israeli public. This was the view of some participants; others judged it as too optimistic. Hence, settlement proposals are being discussed in more rational terms, and achieve a balance between territorial, military and regional stability. This has resulted in progress, particularly on the bilateral level between Israel and some of the neighbouring Arab countries.

But this progress on a bilateral level is not enough to resolve the conflict, because there is also a truly regional dimension. The conflict is not only between Israel and some of its neighbours, it is also a conflict between Israel and the entire region.

Although bilateral peace accords are helpful in stabilising the Middle East. Yet, Israel still has to integrate itself into the region in an organic manner. Two obstacles are salient and were elaborated upon in the discussion.

First, Israel has to adopt an identity that will allow for its regional integration. This requires a domestic consensus on Israel's identity. At present, Israel's society is deeply torn by inner conflict. Diverse groups have very different ideas as to what constitutes Israel's identity. Some consider it a U.S. bridgehead and Western state, others want it to be the state of the Jews or a Middle East power. In the view of several participants, sorting these different ideas out domestically and integrating them into a common understanding of an identity which makes Israel acceptable as a truly Middle East actor, is a prerequisite for a comprehensive settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Second, if Israel adopts an identity as a Middle East

actor, the actual terms of its integration into the region will still have to be negotiated. At present, Israel is the supreme regional power in military as well as in economic terms. In the long run, as some participants argued, integration would require its willingness to give up this predominant role and to share military and political power with its Arab neighbours.

Further Sources of Conflict

The discussion then turned to other tensions smouldering in the Middle East. They include interstate disputes in territories between Morocco and Algeria, Libya and Chad, Egypt and Sudan, Syria and Turkey, as well as ongoing intrastate conflicts in Algeria, Afghanistan, southern Sudan, and Turkey.

The continuing insecurity in the region is *inter alia*, reflected by the high level of armament. Following the Gulf War in 1991, a significant arms build-up took place and, although it has decreased within the last few years, a high percentage of the states' GDP still goes into military spending. As a result, the Middle East, today, is one of the regions with the world's most sophisticated arms technology.

During the discussion, some of the participants accused Israel of triggering a new round in the arms race by pursuing an offensive missiles program. This program, in combination with the availability of other weapons of mass destruction, poses a major threat to regional stability. All the participants agreed that the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is of special concern to the region. The fact that Israel's nuclear program is not integrated into appropriate international regulations, adds to this concern. The unclear situation with regard to Iraq was also addressed as being very troublesome.

In sum, the situation in the Middle East is still distressing in terms of peace and stability. Perception of security as a zero-sum game is still prevalent. Regional dynamics are driven, to a large extent, by the pursuit of short-term national self-interest. Assuring national prestige via a strong military is still a widely spread practice. But, as indicated above, there are

some new developments taking place, which could possibly change perceptions within the region and lead to more peaceful co-operation in the long run.

Promising Beginnings of Co-operation

Terrorism, conflict over water, drug trafficking and other new types of threats to security are growing in the Middle East. While terrorism was clearly perceived as a major security risk by the participants, opinions differed with regard to water shortage. It surely is the most pressing environmental problem in the Middle East, but whether it will exacerbate existing tensions or even explode into violent conflict, was controversial. As these threats obviously cannot be successfully dealt with by single states, they may contribute to overcoming the narrow, nationalistic understanding of security, instead. Perception of security as a zero-sum game may change to a win-win understanding. Such a change of perception would reinforce the above-mentioned co-operative efforts already taking place in the region.

New players are becoming involved in the region. NATO and the EU are pursuing programs to bring together states of the region and to establish co-operative structures between them. NGOs are setting up processes of "track two diplomacy", and Norway has played a crucial role in mediating the Arab-Israeli conflict. On the environmental front, some countries in the Mediterranean and, since 1999, in the Gulf region as well, are joining efforts against pollution.

In the military field, the Gulf War in 1991 was a watershed when more than 40 nations joined forces to solve a local conflict. Since then, joint military exercises between some Arab and European countries and the U.S. have increased. Furthermore, participation of Arab units in peace-keeping operations has fostered co-operation between them and other troops and paved the way for a new understanding of the role of the military.

The Role of Globalisation

Finally, the discussion dealt with the double impact of globalisation on the region. With regard to the Arab-Israeli conflict, it seems to complicate even more the already mentioned need of consensus on Israel's identity. And, as in other regions, globalisation is expected to strengthen rather than weaken the

divergent socio-religious group identities. Some participants even feared that if this happens and Israel does not become integrated into the region during the next few years, it will further increase its dominant role in the region, thereby augmenting tensions. This option may be attractive for some in Israel, assuming that due to its modern economy, it is in a much better position than most of its neighbouring Arab countries to take advantage of the benefits of globalisation, such as Europe, the U.S., Japan and some Asian countries are.

The Security Situation in Asia

Asia is a highly dynamic region, in particular with regard to the rapid economic development it enjoys even after its financial crisis. This dynamic strongly exposes the region, especially Southeast Asia, to the effects of globalisation. Important changes are also going on in the political sphere. China's unstoppable rise as a major global actor is just one of these changes.

Yet, despite globalisation, sovereignty and national prestige continue to determine the regional agenda. A change of mind is coming about only gradually. The move to more regional co-operation, therefore, is only a recent development. Co-operation in the field of security is particularly difficult. The lack of workable multilateral security structures has to be considered as a concern for the entire international community. The ongoing arms race which involves the build-up of nuclear capacities in two of the region's interstate conflict hot spots was judged to be alarming by most of the participants. But there were some strong voices of dissent, particularly from the Indian side.

Interstate Conflict

According to one of the panellists, the conflict between India and Pakistan and the military clashes emerging there are misconceived and overly dramatised in Western public opinion. Rather than being large-scale wars, occasional and limited confrontations serve to satisfy nationalist feelings within both societies, despite strong escalatory rhetoric on both sides. The situation is under control because neither of the two states can wage an all-out war for a number of reasons. Personal ties among generals, many of them trained in the same foreign military academies, common religious and ethnic grounds and other interdependencies play a role as limiting factors. Nuclear weapons contribute further to stabilising the conflict by adding mutual deterrence as an additional constraint.

Several participants, although impressed by the vigour of arguments put forward by the panellist, strongly disagreed with this assessment. In their view, there is considerable potential for escalating the

conflict between India and Pakistan. In the view of these participants the nuclear tests conducted by India and Pakistan have increased the danger of escalation. The rather positive interpretation of nuclear weapons having a stabilising effect was criticised by other participants as being based too much on the assumption of rational behaviour under conditions of crisis. This, by no means, can be presupposed.

With regard to the conflict between South and North Korea, participants agreed that the danger of escalation is low at the moment. South Korea fears the collapse of North Korea, rather than a major attack. The latter's decision to go nuclear was considered by several participants as being of limited impact on the overall security situation because South Korea had already been vulnerable in military terms before.

There are more potential trouble spots in Asia which were touched on only briefly in the discussion. Nevertheless, the region's security situation was characterised as a "stable instability" on the interstate level.

Intrastate Conflict

Most of the internal conflicts in the region are caused by ethnic, religious or linguistic differences within states, similar to those in Africa. There is also a legacy of colonial borders, drawn without regard to local ethnic composition, but maintained after independence. In the course of state and nation building processes, most governments strongly promoted centralisation and imposed a national identity on ethnic groups. This inevitably led to tensions or even open conflict with regard to their ethnic, religious and linguistic identity.

Globalisation will aggravate these tensions. It entails a decrease authority by the nation state, while simultaneously strengthening smaller entities, like in particular ethnic and religious groups. They will have more leverage to search for greater autonomy or even independence.

States in Asia pursue diverse minority policies which have different impacts on their internal stability. Indonesia follows a policy of assimilation,

which tends to increase tensions, as witnessed in East Timor as well as in Aceh and other regions. Malaysia, in contrast, pursues a policy of support and integration, strengthening minorities, on the one hand, and assuring internal stability on the other. India also sets the example that the process of nation-building, in spite of great political and linguistic diversity, needs not be suppressive and centralist. It can allow for differences and the regionalisation of power, thereby reducing tensions.

These few examples demonstrate two important facts: First, states in Asia have a choice in pursuing different kinds of minority policies; second, whatever choice made will have a strong impact on internal stability and create the danger of violent conflict.

The discussion then dwelled on the question as to whether the existence of a "strong state" or a "weak state" is an important variable to stability. Yet, there was little agreement as to what constitutes a strong state. Reliable criteria to assess the strength of a state are difficult to specify. They may also change according to the concrete historical context. Asian states were strong in the Cold War context, with their strength based on large militaries, powerful police forces and effective secret services. The lack of a solid and popular institutional base was of limited importance.

With the end of the Cold War, this lack of a comprehensive institutional strength became apparent. The influence of globalisation has made this weakness even more apparent. There is a much greater demand on the ability of states to respond swiftly and adequately to changing domestic and international developments. Institutional strength has, therefore, become much more decisive for internal stability than mighty military and police forces.

With the strength of a state depending to a large degree on its domestic institutional structures, the term "strong state" is, therefore, misleading and should be replaced by "effective state". Participants felt that much more time would be needed to ascertain more in detail, which factors constitute an effective state in the area of globalisation, at the same time taking into account the specific conditions of Asia (or any other region in the world).³

³ Pran Chopra from India adds: "Many of the countries which became independent with the retreat of colonialism are plural societies and polities. They also account for the majority of the world's population. Therefore, pure majoritarianism among them, be it formally democratic or otherwise, could be as unjust as the external colonialism which

The need to look at the specifics of a regime also applies to the question of the role of civil society. Some participants felt that the role of civil society in supporting the effectiveness of a state was highly overestimated and suggested that carefully crafted state structures reaching to the very bottom of society could better accomplish the same tasks, for example Singapore. Others disagreed. Civil society possesses some characteristics which state structures cannot realise; its task is not only to transmit the needs of the population to state structures but also to pressure the latter to accommodate these needs. In case the state is not receptive, civil society and its organisations have the option to act on their own and to sideline state structures. This, however, entails the danger of critically undermining state structures, as can be seen in some parts of Africa. Some participants felt very strongly about this danger. To be sound, civil society should therefore play only a complementary role to the state and not be a substitute for some of its functions.

Environmental Risks

New conflicts in Asia may also arise from environmental degradation. There are plenty of environmental problems in the region, many of which have border-crossing impact, such as acid wind and rain, scarcity of public resources (water) and nuclear dumping. These problems clearly have the potential to create serious interstate fractions.

The present level of environmental co-operation in the region to contain these dangers is quite low, although some positive examples can be found. The low level of co-operation is *inter alia* due to the above mentioned importance attached to sovereignty and non-interference. Public awareness of environmental risks is also still meager, as in many other developing countries. Moreover, most Asian states are currently preoccupied with redressing the consequences of the past financial crisis, emphasising economic instead of environmental development.

The prospects for more co-operation in the field of

they overthrew. At the same time, the majority also has its legitimate claims in a democracy. The answer to this dilemma lies in democracy combined with decentralisation and devolution of power. This combination cannot be imposed from without, and must never be tempted. It must grow from within. But better education, from within and from without, about successes and failures can help."

environment were judged to be modest. China, for instance, persistently regards the national level as best suited to resolve environmental problems. Co-operation is seen as a last resort and is, therefore, exceptional. A further obstacle to region-wide co-operation arises from the fact that Japan, both scientifically and financially, is taking a strong lead in seeking solutions for regional environmental problems. This is not only perceived by other states as an end in itself but also as a way of Japan expanding its dominating role in the region.

Despite these obstacles, most participants expected environmental co-operation to develop slowly but surely in the region. For the *near* future, it will be restricted to agreeing on (or extending) bilateral co-operation schemes between states on specific issues. When it comes to multilateral, international agreements, most states will resent binding international norms and continue to prefer voluntary agreements, on a case-by-case basis.

The outlook is much better in the economic sector. Co-operation has improved and is gaining steadily in importance. Although suspicion towards any regime that undermines national sovereignty will continue to be a limiting factor, the existing structures may partly be taken advantage of to promote and facilitate environmental co-operation. The prospects for future economic co-operation also seem to be slightly better due to the need to focus on economic improvement. Some participants even expected that in the long run, widening economic and environmental co-operation will help to stabilise the region and contain conflicts.

The Security Situation in Europe

Security in Europe

Security in Europe is divided into several zones. Within the EU, stability prevails, major inter- as well as intrastate conflict is hardly imaginable due to advanced economic and political integration. Developments in East and Southeast Europe and the Caucasus region, as well as within the Russian Federation reveal a different picture. The profound processes of transformation going on in these states sustain the danger of rising tension, possibly leading to mostly internal conflicts. In particular, the scenario of an imploding and further fragmentation of Russia represents a growing menace to Europe's overall security. It is not yet clear what impact the war in Chechnya will have on Russia's stability, but it has already demonstrated how little impact EU policy has on Russia. The conflict continues to irritate the dialogue between the two sides.

Attempts to improve the security situation outside the EU basically take two directions:

Firstly, to stabilise the Eastern region as a whole, including Russia, various measures, such as disarmament treaties, verification agreements and CBMs are being pursued. Consequently, Europe is worried about the U.S.' plans to create a National Missile Defence, which contain risks to unsettle present arms control and disarmament regimes.

Secondly, there are efforts to stabilise the integration of the new states into Western structures, in particular, NATO, the EU and the Council of Europe. By including new members into its structures and offering close co-operation with other states, the EU is providing valuable assistance to the transition process, as well as creating an atmosphere of stability and an outlook for prosperity. Membership, as well as the incentive of promised membership to the EU and the UN, helps to prevent conflict. The problem with this strategy is that it hardly reaches any of those states which are most prone to conflicts, such as Albania, Georgia, etc.

NATO's war against Serbia is still controversial with regard to its legality, its methods and its effectiveness. It has also shown Europe's dramatic dependence on U.S. military capabilities, structures and technology.

Due to the Kosovo war, European states have realised that they will have to take their defence and security co-operation into their own hands, to a much greater extent, as well as strengthen their capabilities. Efforts to create a true European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) have been enhanced. Still, for the time being, ESDI is, for the most part, on paper.

Politically, there is no solution in sight for the Kosovo conflict. Concerning the ethnic composition of its population, the Western European vision of setting an example of non-ethnic statehood in the region clearly does not match the desire of the Kosovo Albanians for complete secession from Yugoslavia. Autonomy, as prescribed in the mandate for the international peace operations in the Kosovo, led by KFOR and UNMIK, is not what the Kosovo Albanians want. Full independence, however, is deeply resented by most European states as it might set a problematic precedent for other minorities in Southeastern Europe. More violence in Southeastern Europe and other parts of Europe would be the result.

Therefore, Kosovo will be a difficult test for successful peace-building by the UN and KFOR. The Kosovo, as well as Bosnia and Herzegovina will tie down Europe and the U.S. in the Balkan for some time to come. The inevitable consequence will be that this immense involvement will keep them from becoming more seriously involved in the conflicts of other regions, in particular, southern Africa.

Debate on Humanitarian Intervention

The war in Kosovo triggered a lively debate on the issues of sovereignty of states and the right of the international community to intervene in other state's internal affairs. Some held that the rising importance of humanitarian intervention is an inevitable consequence of the rising importance of human rights. Others pointed out the problematic high degree of selectiveness which goes hand-in-hand with the present praxis of humanitarian intervention. The non-intervention in Chechnya was cited as just one example. In terms of *realpolitik*, a decision on a case-by-case basis will bring with it the inherent danger of

double standards is a troubling perspective. To prevent the consolidation of such double standards, the creation of formalised standards for intervention was suggested. Yet, as some pointed out, such comprehensive and generally applicable standards would raise several problems due to the diversity of situations calling for humanitarian intervention. All decisions on intervention have to take into consideration a number of non-formalised, political criteria which resist being put into a list of formalised criteria.

Another argument against formalised standards for humanitarian intervention suggested that the whole notion of “humanitarian intervention” may be misleading. The underlying reasons for the intervention in Kosovo were not humanitarian, but political. This was, at least, the view of some of the participants, Europeans as well as non-Europeans. Several governments of NATO members feared that without intervention the stability of the Balkan would deteriorate further, there would be more refugees flooding countries such as Austria, Italy and Germany. Also, NATO’s credibility as a guarantor of European security would be at risk.

Yet, there was agreement on one basic point, that of whether one is in favour of humanitarian intervention or not. Certain types of violent internal conflict have become a threat to regional and international peace and security and, therefore, have to be internationally addressed. A new definition of international security is needed which recognises internal conflict as a possible threat to international peace and security. The question is which international bodies should be entrusted with the decision to intervene, with possible actors being the UN, regional organisations and “coalitions of the willing”.

The international body deciding on interventions should fulfill two principle requirements:

- In case of a humanitarian emergency, they must be able to reach a decision quickly and act accordingly.
- To lend legitimacy to the decision, it must reflect the will of as great a number of countries as possible.

All of the actors mentioned above have shortcomings in regard to these principles. The UN and its Security Council (SC) are often very slow to act. The Permanent Members often refuse to take action and authorise intervention or peace operations when the respective case is outside their sphere of interest. As for regional organisations and “coalitions of the willing”, an intervention would not be backed by a majority of states. In both cases, the driving momen-

tum of an intervention would be in the interests of a limited number of states which somehow have a stake in the conflict at hand. The option of “coalitions of the willing” acting without permission from the UN was unanimously rejected by the participants, the precedent set by NATO in Serbia was regretted.

The role that regional organisations can play differs from region to region. Europe has an abundance of regional organisations. Their division of labour is still unclear and needs to be better defined. Contrary thereto, Asia and its states anxiously guard their sovereignty and seem unwilling to give regional organisations the power to interfere in their internal affairs. This contrasts with Europe, Africa and the Americas, where most states feel comfortable with passing defined and limited parts of their sovereignty to regional organisations, allowing them to intervene under certain circumstances.

The UN, in the final analysis, was regarded by most of the participants as the proper and ‘primary’ forum to provide legitimacy to interventions, although at present, the SC neither works well, nor does its decisions represent a majority of states. Due to lack of time, the discussion only briefly focused on how to reform the UN, including the Security Council.

The Environmental Situation

Comparing the border-crossing environmental issues in Europe to the South, the discussion revealed a major difference due to the dense population and high level of industrialisation in Europe. Yet, although border-crossing environmental pollution is serious, violent conflict as a consequence of these problems is hardly imaginable. There are enough instruments available to settle these conflicts with the established negotiation patterns and integration. On the other hand, several border-crossing environmental issues in the South are limited in number but potentially violent. Taken within the context of other socio-economic problems, environmental problems provide a potential for conflict, such as water conflicts in Africa, the Middle East and on the Indian sub-continent. There is a serious deficiency of conflict management instruments in most regions outside Europe for the following reasons:

- *poverty* impairs possibilities for generous compromises with neighbouring countries, and also limits the options to compensate for the paucity of resources through highly efficient use of said ones;

- *a lack of networking* which is due to the inadequacy and ineffectiveness of international environmental agreements and an insufficient list of priorities;
- *incompetent governance* which leads to shortcomings of the following three stages: firstly, the recognition of the necessity of fair environmental rules which meet both sustainable quality of life requirements as well as economic development; secondly, a legal structure including international agreements that embody these rules and thirdly, the ability to effectively enforce this legal structure.

One panellist summarised the four requirements to reconcile economy and ecology:

1. The *polluter-pays-principle*: This affixes production costs directly to the producer which is necessary to set up a real price calculation. This, in turn, would initiate the right market signal by internalising the scarcity not only of capital and labour but also of environmental resources, instead of externalising the costs to society in general; it would be indiscriminate without such pricing. Also, a demand would be created that does not take into account the limiting factor of the environment.
2. *All scarce goods* must have a price, otherwise the goods will be squandered. This applies particularly to water for irrigation, and to energy for the heating of homes.
3. If the power constellation is asymmetrical as in the case of upstream and downstream countries, upstream countries have to understand that co-operative solutions are still beneficial. The one-sided pursuit of one's own is inefficient in the long run. It prevents participation in the benefits of open and integrated markets.
4. If an international or global resource, such as lakes, oceans or the atmosphere, is being used or polluted, the property rights have to be clarified. If there is no obvious criteria to attribute to property, the equal-per-capita principle with regard to the costs is the most convincing one. The often still applied "grandfathering" principle which says that those who polluted most in the past have also the right to pollute most in the future, is unacceptable. The continuing application of this principle might create a major North-South conflict in the future, for instance, in the context of a global climate policy.

The discussion then concentrated on the question as to how to improve the global application of these principles. It became quite clear that more progress has to be made concerning the first three principles

mainly in the South. Considering the fourth principle, it is particularly the North that has to depart from its preference of the grandfathering principle. There was an obvious failure to understand this issue even among those participating in the negotiating process. More effort has to be made to improve the intellectual standard of international environmental policy.

Another topic concerning the general impact of globalisation was discussed, namely the question as to whether globalisation, as such, favours industrial countries, providing a distinct disadvantage to poorer developing countries. Developed countries can adjust much faster to emerging sectors, such as information technology. While it appears that the gap is widening between poor and rich countries it is obvious, on the other hand, that globalisation is opening up vast opportunities to any country which exploits its comparative advantages in global competition. The ability to establish competitive structures, however, is a question of governance. It requires the convincing of one's own society to adjust to changed rules of competition, internally as well as externally. However, this is a difficult task in many countries where ethnic, religious or national diversity and traditions clash with the need for "modernisation".

Abbreviations

CBM	Confidence Building Measures
ESDI	European Security and Defence Identity
EU	European Union
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
KFOR	Kosovo Force
NGO	Nongovernmental Organisation
SC	(UN) Security Council
UNMIK	United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo

Agenda
Evolving Global Governance Structures
Task-sharing, Division of Labour and Co-operation
between Regional and Global Security Arrangements

A Joint International Workshop by the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung and the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, Ebenhausen, April 6–8, 2000

Thursday, 6 April

14.00–14.45 **Introduction: Evolving Global Governance Structures:
A Project of North-South-Networking among Scientific Institutions**
Winrich Kühne, SWP, and Ernst Hillebrand, FES

Part I

The Shape of Things to come

Dominant Security and Stability Concerns in the Next Decade

Major challenges to security and stability in the next decades may come not from interstate conflicts, but from “new” security issues related to developments in the economic, social and ecological arenas. Globalisation and the uneven distribution of its costs and benefits may result in the “fragmentation” of existing societies. “Identity conflicts” over religion, ethnicity and culture may become more and more widespread, resulting in the disintegration of existing states and societies. At the same time, the proliferation of arms of mass destruction gives interstate conflict a new and potentially dramatic dimension. The first part of the conference will pertain to the major security threats – old and new – in each of the world regions.

14.45–16.15 **Session I:
Environmental and Resource Conflict**
Environmental and resource conflicts will become more widespread in the future. They tend to have inner-societal as well as trans-border dimensions. A new area of conflict may evolve with the question of trans-border pollution and environmental hazards. A global dimension is added when questions of global concern (bio-diversity, global warming, ozone-layer depletion) are taken into account. The session is aimed at describing the major dimensions of potential resource and environmental conflicts in the respective regions.

Latin America: *Guadalupe González*, Mexico
Sub-Saharan Africa: *Zondi Maziza*, South Africa
Asia: *Sook-Jong Lee*, Korea
Middle East/North Africa: *Kadry Said*, Egypt
Europe: *Friedemann Müller*, SWP
Discussion

Agenda
Evolving Global Governance Structures
Task-sharing, Division of Labour and Co-operation
between Regional and Global Security Arrangements

16.45–18.30

Session II:

Conventional Military Conflict (Interstate War) And Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction

Given the potentially antagonistic character of interests between states and societies, the existence of interstate war continues to pose a serious threat to peace and stability in all parts of the world. The session will analyse the major regional risks of interstate conflict and the potential of further proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Some questions to be discussed:

What are the major risks of interstate conflict in the region?

What are the trends in armament and the proliferation of arms of mass destruction?

How could the proliferation of arms of mass destruction alter the patterns of interstate conflict in the region?

Latin America: *Tullo Vigevani*, Brazil

Sub-Saharan Africa: *Garth Le Pere*, South Africa

Asia: *Bharat Karnad*, India; *Kim Chang-Su*, Korea

Middle East/North Africa: *Kadry Said*, Egypt

Europe: *Winrich Kühne*, SWP

Discussion

Friday, 7 April

08.30

Transfer from Landhotel Huber to the SWP

09.00–10.00

Session III:

Conflict over Governance, Human and Minority Rights, Democratisation, Identity (ethnicity, religion) and Social Conflict

As globalisation unfolds, its implications threaten the social and economic cohesion of entire states and societies. States lose parts of their control and problem-solving capacities. Deepening “fragmentation” inside existing states along socio-economic, cultural, ethnic and religious line could be one of the consequences of this development, potentially breaking up existing states. A new era of “micro-identities” with severe consequences for existing nation-states may evolve.

What tendencies towards civil strife exist?

What are the consequences of globalisation and the uneven social distribution of its economic costs and benefits?

Is there a trend towards fragmentation and a growing sense of sub-national identities?

Will ethnicity and religious heterogeneity threaten the cohesion of existing states?

Agenda
Evolving Global Governance Structures
Task-sharing, Division of Labour and Co-operation
between Regional and Global Security Arrangements

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Middle East/North Africa: *Ahmed Ibrahim Mahmoud*, Egypt; *Yoram Meital*,
Israel
Europe: *Stefan Mair*, SWP
Discussion

Part II
How to Deal with Non-Conventional Conflict?
Instruments, Aims and the Task-Sharing of
Global and Regional Institutions

Given the growing interdependency of the world, conflict-resolution will more than ever become a complex task, involving national, regional and global arrangements. Non-conventional conflicts will be particularly difficult to steer, as their resolution may necessitate an outside intervention in internal conflicts. Difficult questions of international law and sovereignty are involved. On the other hand, the task to keep the potentially disruptive effects of globalisation at bay will constitute the very essence of any future global governance system.

Some questions related to these problems: What kind of regional and global security arrangements are feasible? How could the task-sharing between regional and global institutions in view of a global security architecture be arranged? What steps of institutionalising them are imaginable?

What role can multinational institutions like the WTO, World Bank, UN-Organisations play in the resolution of future non-conventional conflicts? And what responsibility do they have in creating these conflicts? What new kind of regional and global organisations/institutions would be necessary to come to grips with the “new” security questions related to resources and environment?

14.00–15.00 **Session IV:**

Environmental and Resource Conflict

What role do arbitration and mediation play in resolving such conflicts; what role can international regimes play? Are regional schemes of resource- and pollution-management feasible? How should internal conflicts concerning scarce resources be dealt with?

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Discussion

Agenda
Evolving Global Governance Structures
Task-sharing, Division of Labour and Co-operation
between Regional and Global Security Arrangements

Saturday, 8 April

09.00–10.30

Session V:

**Conflict over Governance, Human and Minority Rights,
Democratisation, Identity (ethnicity, religion) and Social Conflict**

The possible proliferation of intrastate conflicts raises serious questions on how the international community should deal with this kind of conflict. There is a growing sense of consent that large-scale human rights violations in themselves could legitimate external interventions and interference in intrastate conflicts. Yet, there is no discernible consent about the legal and political base of such interference. What consent there ever was, has been put into question by the Kosovo conflict and the Western military intervention in absence of an UN-mandate. So how could acceptable intervention mechanisms in the face of massive internal strife be shaped? What role could be assigned to regional organisations? How must UN-mechanisms be reformed to reconcile the principle of national sovereignty with the overarching goals of peace, development and respect for the basic rights of peoples and individuals? What role could non-state actors possibly play in such conflict resolution mechanisms?

Latin America: *Tullo Vigevani*, Brazil

Sub-Saharan Africa: *Garth Le Pere*, South Africa

Asia: *Ooi Giok Ling*, Singapore

Middle East/North Africa: *Kadry Said*, Egypt

Europe: *Cord Meier-Klodt*, Germany

Discussion

12.00–13.00

Concluding discussion:

Evolving Global Patterns – Whither National Sovereignty?

The conflict in Kosovo has shown the limits of the existing scheme of international intervention in internal conflicts. In the name of Human Rights, the traditional understanding of national sovereignty has been put into question by NATO. What kind of regional and global institutions involving what kind of decision-taking-processes may be fit to reconcile the principles of national self-determination, international law and the necessities of conflict prevention and -management in an interdependent world?

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Ebenhausen, April 6–8, 2000

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