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JOHN STUART MILL

George J. Stigler

Working Paper No. 50

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### John Stuart Mill

John Stuart Mill's Principles of Political Economy became the premier treatise on economics in the English language upon its appearance, and it held that position for at least forty years. It is almost accidental, indeed, that Mill's sovereignty did not begin even earlier than that of Queen Victoria: he had completed his brilliant Essays on Some Unsettled Questions in Political Economy as early as 1830, but they were not accepted for publication until 1844, by which time Mill's System of Logic had already established his position as a major philosopher.

He was forty-two years old when this treatise was completed. By that age he had been writing on economics, politics and philosophy for 24 years, beginning as the Wunderkind of utilitarianism when he was 18. This intense intellectual career was joined to a career in the East India Company, in which he had become a senior administrator by 1848. In both careers, he was following in the footsteps of his father and teacher, James Mill.

#### 1. The General System

Mill's Principles has often been described as a sophisticated restatement of the Ricardian system, and in the large this is a correct though woefully incomplete statement. Ricardo built his system on the following propositions:

1. Population grew in accordance with Malthus' principle literally understood: real wages were constant at a subsistence level.
2. Agriculture operated subject to diminishing returns, industry subject to constant or increasing returns to scale. Mill contends

this is "the most important proposition in political economy" (I, 212).

3. Prices were set under competition by the costs of production of goods.
4. The savings of the society came primarily from capitalists, and took the form primarily of a fund of goods and services from which wages were paid (the wages fund).

Hence as savings accumulated and population grew, the required food of the working class was raised with increasing costs. The aggregate rent of land rose during this process, and the rate of return to capital fell. Eventually these forces would lead to the appearance of a stationary state, in which the cost of food had reached so high a level as to reduce the return on capital to a point where new savings fell to zero.

Mill made several modifications in this argument, the chief of which was to govern the cost of goods by the sum of the interest and the wage cost of their production (Bk. III, Ch. 4), whereas Ricardo had used quantities of labor required in production as the approximate determinant of the values of goods. The faithfulness to Ricardo extends to the acceptance of the celebrated chapter on machinery (I, 110-13).

These points of broad agreement between Mill and Ricardo should not lead anyone to believe that the theory had the same spirit and thrust for the two men.

Four features of Mill's view of the economy give a distinctive and at points even an anachronistic air to his work.

The first peculiarity is the enormous weight that is placed upon the wages-fund, that is, the stock of goods that constitute the consumption of the laboring class. Mill is of course aware of fixed capital -- buildings,

roads, machinery and other longer-lived equipment -- but it seldom achieves an explicit or influential role in his theory.

Consider the famous fourth proposition on capital (I, 97): a demand for commodities is not a demand for labor; rather, the demand influences only the allocation of labor among industries. This argument is most clearly stated in the first edition, where its essence is simply this: labor is employed by the existing wages fund, -- all labor if wages are flexible, a suitably limited amount of labor if wages are not flexible. Then the composition of the demand for output by consumers influences only where the employed laborers will be occupied. Q.E.D. This argument becomes much diffused in later editions, possibly because of the implicit recognition of the fact that wage rates will vary across industries, so a shift of \$1 million of the wages-fund from agriculture to housing may entail a change in the number of employees if wage rates are fixed.

Or consider, at the other end of his treatise, Mill on national debt. He asserts that an increase in national debt is borne by the workers through a reduction in the wages-fund (II, 428), -- as if the wages-fund were the only source of capital available to the state.

Mill's deemphasis of durable capital is illustrated by his celebrated argument that nations recover very quickly from ruinous wars, which turns on the fact that capital depreciates rapidly. What invading armies destroy would soon have been destroyed by time (I, 93). The argument is mistaken: it is the knowledge and skills of the population that survive pillage by invaders and allow the rapid recovery from catastrophe.

The second peculiarity of Mill's thought is his persistent belief in the imminence of the Malthusian spectre of subsistence wages for the mass of the laboring population. It is improbable that there was another

respectable economist in Britain who expressed equal fears as late as 1871 (the year of the last edition of the Principles revised by Mill). Mill sounds his fears first in the ominous conclusions of Book I, where the limitation of land, the fertility of people, and the law of diminishing returns spell a constant threat to a settled country. Again, the extravagant defense of peasant proprietors rests partly on their demonstrated ability to "discourage an improvident increase in their numbers" (I, 346). There are qualifications of the Malthusian threat even in 1848, as when we are told that it is chiefly the preventive check (fewer births) that is operative in Europe (I, 412), but these concessions are soon withdrawn (I, 448). Mill tells us that no subsidies to wages can hope to help the poor unless they learn to hold their numbers in check (I, 437-38). Labor monopolies are acceptable if they raise wages above the subsistence level (I, 473-74). Workers still treat an increase in wages "simply as convertible into food for a greater number of children" (II, 274). "Population almost everywhere treads close on the heels of agricultural improvement, and effaces its effects as fast as they are produced" (II, 276). Later additions take some cognizance of the rising standard of living in Britain, but these pessimistic passages continue to the end of his life.

The third unusual element of Mill's theory was the belief that capital accumulation was proceeding so rapidly that the interest rate was constantly within a "hand's breadth of the minimum" (II, 287). The risk-free interest rate, he believed, was about three percent: "a mere continuance of the present rate of increase of capital, if no circumstance occurred to counteract its effect, would suffice in a small number of years to reduce the rate of net profit to one percent" (II, 287-88). A highly elastic

supply of savings and an inelastic demand for investment created this state of affairs.

The consequences were radical. Foremost, in modern industrial societies the government should feel free to spend generously on "really valuable, though industrially unproductive, purposes" (II, 300). Vast enterprises, such as the industrial regeneration of Ireland, need not be postponed a day -- the utmost expenditure "would not in all probability deprive one labourer of employment, or diminish next year's production by one ell of cloth" (II, 300). The proposition also had less radical implications, such as that there was no real danger that investments in machinery would reduce the wages-fund. A society in which capital was limitless could surely begin to relegate ancient maxims of frugality and prudence to the history books.

A fourth characteristic is Mill's dislike for industrial society and his search for a more desirable outcome of economic progress. The long chapters of Book II (Chs. 6-10) are an extremely ex parte defense of peasant proprietors as models of economic efficiency and prudence, and even of civic and moral virtue. Even more romantic is the utopianism of the famous chapter on the "probable futurity of the labouring classes" (Book IV, Ch. 7), where Mill extolls the bright promise of cooperatives of workers. These are desperate attempts to escape from modern industrial society.

Finally, I must repeat my conviction, that the industrial economy which divides society absolutely into two portions, the payers of wages and the receivers of them, the first counted by thousands and the last by millions, is neither fit for, nor capable of, indefinite duration: and the possibility of changing this system for one of combination without

dependence, and unity of interest instead of organized hostility, depends altogether upon the future developments of the Partnership principle. [II, 459]

It was an easy step from Mill to the guild socialism of later Fabian socialists.

I suspect that Mill's emphasis upon the importance of the distinction between the laws of production and those of distribution is related to these views:

The laws and conditions of the production of wealth, partake of the character of physical truths. There is nothing optional, or arbitrary in them. Whatever mankind produce, must be produced in the modes, and under the conditions, imposed by the constitution of external things, and by the inherent properties of their own bodily and mental structure. Whether they like it or not, their productions will be limited by the amount of their previous accumulation, and, that being given, it will be proportional to their energy, their skill, the perfection of their machinery, and their judicious use of the advantages of combined labour. Whether they like it or not, a double quantity of labour will not raise, on the same land, a double quantity of food, unless some improvement takes place in the processes of cultivation. Whether they like it or not, the unproductive expenditure of individuals will pro tanto tend to impoverish the community, and only their productive expenditure will enrich it. The opinions, or the wishes, which may exist on these different matters, do not control the things themselves. ...



It is not so with the Distribution of Wealth. That is a matter of human institution, solely. The things once there, mankind, individually or collectively, can do with them as they like. They can place them at the disposal of whomsoever they please, and on whatever terms. Further, in the social state, in every state except total solitude, any disposal whatever of them can only take place by the general consent of society. Even what a person has produced by his individual toil, unaided by any one, he cannot keep unless it is by the will of society that he should. Not only can society take it from him, but individuals could and would take it from him, if society only remained passive; if it did not either interfere en masse, or employ and pay people for the purpose of interfering to prevent him from being disturbed in the possession. The distribution of wealth, therefore, depends on the laws and customs of society. [I, 239-40]

This distinction allowed Mill to adhere to the fundamental economic theories of the classical school without compelling him to share the full measure of laissez-faire sought by his father and Ricardo.

The distinction, however, is surely mistaken. It is true that a society cannot exceed the known knowledge of physics or biology, for example, but it can certainly foster or retard the growth of such knowledge. A modern state makes a thousand interventions in the production processes of every large industry. Conversely, no society could survive if it set the compensation of workers in proportion to the reciprocal of their marginal productivity, so the most productive workers earned the least. Again, a society that taxes inheritances extremely heavily will encounter great problems in controlling gifts among living relatives. The production of

wealth and the distribution of wealth influence each other in innumerable ways, and each allows much but never unlimited scope for social control.

## 2. The Good Society and the Good Economy

These characteristics of Mill's thought go far to explain how he arrived at a markedly different view of the good society, and in particular the good economy, than Ricardo held. Ricardo believed that laissez-faire was the fundamental economic policy of the good society, and gave no reason to believe that he found the English society of 1825 to be unattractive.

Although Mill gave qualified verbal allegiance to laissez-faire as a general presumption in economic policy (Book V, Ch. 11), his own agenda of reform was sweeping.

1. Mill believed that although private ownership of land had once served important productive functions (I, 269), the present (1848) owners were primarily reaping socially created gains. He argued that the state should have the right to buy land at market prices. Later he argued that such a program would yield large revenues to the state, although he failed to explain why the market value of land does not already register expectations of future increases in rent. In due time he became the intellectual leader of the Land Tenure Reform Association.
2. He would put definite and not overly large limits upon the amount of wealth any person could receive in bequests.
3. In the present edition of the Principles, Mill discussed at length the promise of socialism and finally concluded that the case for a reformed capitalism was stronger (Book II, Ch. 1). Under the urging of his wife, in later editions he made significant

concessions to the socialists and increased the indictment of capitalism.<sup>1</sup>

4. Mill opposed a progressive personal income tax, not on principle but because its adequate enforcement would require excessively inquisitorial powers for the tax collector.

These changes from Ricardo altered the whole spirit of the Ricardian philosophy. Now the claims of laissez-faire were tentative and provisional, and major, even radical, changes in the functions of government might come readily with important changes in the circumstances of a society or in its ability to use government effectively.

Underlying this change in philosophy was an elitist attitude that found bourgeois society vulgar and repellent:

Government ought to set an example of rating all things at their true value, and riches, therefore, at the worth, for comfort or pleasure, of the things which they will buy: and ought not to sanction the vulgarity of prizing them for the pitiful vanity of being known to possess them, or the still more paltry shame of being suspected to be without them, the presiding motives of three-fourths of the expenditure of the middle classes. [II, 352-53]

[Revelation of individual incomes] would increase the presumption and arrogance of the vulgar rich, and their insolence towards those above them in mind and character, but below them in circumstances. [II, 375]

And yet this lucid, emotional man did not propose coercive changes in the social or economic systems (except for backward people!).

...impatient reformers, thinking it easier and shorter to get possession of the government than of the intellects and dispositions of the public, are under a constant temptation to stretch the province of government beyond due bounds. [II, 337]

Mill proposed to educate those intellects and dispositions, but he surely believed that this meant only the conversion of upper classes to his views.

### 3. Mill the Theoretician

For a long time -- perhaps from the 1870s until the 1950s -- Mill's reputation as an economist was in decline. The masterly exposition of another man's theoretical system was considered to be his main contribution, and that contribution surely falls in estimation even more rapidly than that of the man -- Ricardo -- who first constructed the theory.

In more recent times, the grave injustice of this verdict has become recognized increasingly more widely. One can make a most impressive list of his theoretical innovations, of which the following are important entries:<sup>2</sup>

#### i. Non-Competing Groups

So complete, indeed, has hitherto been the separation, so strongly marked the line of demarcation, between the different grades of labourers, as to be almost equivalent to an hereditary distinction of caste; each employment being chiefly recruited from the children of those already employed in it, or in employments of the same rank with it in social estimation, or from the children of persons who, if

originally on a lower rank, have succeeded in raising themselves by their exertions. [I, 462]

Smith's illustrious discussion of differences in wages was limited to differences consistent with full occupational mobility of the labor force in the long run. Mill made the first major advance beyond this theory by his recognition of the barriers to mobility erected by the costs of education.

ii. Joint Products

Mill clearly formulated the problem of joint production, i.e., production of two or more products in fixed proportions. He gave the complete and correct solution: the sum of the prices of the products must equal their joint cost, and the price of each product is determined by the equality in equilibrium of quantity supplied and quantity demanded (II, 105-06).

iii. Alternative Costs

Land is used for other purposes than agriculture, especially for residence; and when so used, yields a rent, determined by principles similar to those already laid down. The ground rent of a building, and the rent of a garden or park attached to it, will not be less than the rent which the same land would afford in agriculture....

But when land capable of yielding rent in agriculture, is applied to some other purpose, the rent which it would have yielded is an element in the cost of production of the commodity which it is employed to produce. [I, 563, 567]

This was a frank and clear recognition of the fact that rent is a cost of production even from the social viewpoint when land has alternative uses. Marshall was unwilling to depart thus far from Ricardian theory.

iv. The Economics of the Firm

Mill's chapter (Book I, Ch. IX), "Of production on a large, and production on a small scale," is the first systematic discussion of the economies of scale of the firm to be found in a general economic treatise. Mill was the first economist to notice that one can deduce information on the costs of firms of different sizes from their varying fortunes through time (I, 161).

v. Supply and Demand

Mill introduced into English economics the concept of demand as a schedule or function, and hence was able to state the "law of supply and demand" clearly and with substantial accuracy:

Demand and supply, the quantity demanded and the quantity supplied, will be made equal. If unequal at any moment, competition equalizes them, and the manner in which this is done is by an adjustment of the value. If the demand increases, the value rises; if the demand diminishes, the value falls: again, if the supply falls off, the value rises; and falls if the supply is increased.

...the value which a commodity will bring in any market is no other than the value which, in that market, gives a demand just sufficient to carry off the existing or expected supply. [I, 529-30]

This is, to be sure, very obvious once announced, but its explicit development was a highly useful addition to the Ricardian economics. Later Mill was to use the apparatus very competently in dealing with Thornton's absurd objections to the "law."<sup>3</sup> (I do not assert that Mill's discussion was superior to all earlier discussion; Cournot in particular was more precise.)

vi. Say's Law

Mill's discussion of the limitations to the proposition that there cannot be an overproduction of all commodities was penetrating as well as original:

This argument [that "there can never be a want of buyers for all commodities"] is evidently founded on the supposition of a state of barter; and, on that supposition, it is perfectly incontestable....

If, however, we suppose that money is used, these propositions cease to be exactly true.... Interchange by means of money is therefore, as has been often observed, ultimately nothing but barter. But there is this difference -- that in the case of barter, the selling and the buying are simultaneously confounded in one operation; you sell what you have, and buy what you want, by one indivisible act, and you cannot do the one without doing the other. Now the effect of the employment of money, and even the utility of it, is, that it enables this one act of interchange to be divided into two separate acts or operations; one of which may be performed now, and the other a year hence, or whenever it shall be most convenient.<sup>4</sup>

It follows that at a given time people may wish to hasten sales and to postpone purchases, and this is then a period of "general excess."

In order to render the argument for the impossibility of an excess of all commodities applicable to the case in which a circulating medium is employed, money must itself be considered as a commodity. It must undoubtedly be admitted that there cannot be an excess of all other commodities, and an excess of money at the same time. [loc.cit., p. 71]

Say's law therefore is not inconsistent with the existence of periods of general excess and general deficiency, which arise out of the "unreasonable hopes and unreasonable fears [which] alternately rule with tyrannical sway over the minds of a majority of the mercantile public" (loc. cit., p. 68). Is this essay, written about 1830, the work of an unoriginal mind?

#### vii. The Compensation Principle

Mill was perhaps the first economist to announce the compensation principle, which asserts that the direct payments to a class benefited by legislation could be less than the cost including deadweight losses of an indirect subsidy such as a tariff:

Having proved the Corn Laws to be injurious to all the rest of the community, and beneficial to the landlord alone, we might here close our remarks....

...if whatever is lost by the consumer and by the capitalist were gained by the landlord; there might be robbery, but there would not be waste....The evil of the Corn Laws admits not even of this



alleviation: they occasion in all cases an absolute loss, greatly exceeding the gain which can be derived from them by the receivers of rent....

The consumer is taxed, not only to give a higher rent to the landlord, but to indemnify the farmer for producing, at a great expense, that corn which might be obtained from abroad at a comparatively small one....

We seriously propose, therefore, as a great improvement on the present system, that this indirect tax should be commuted for a direct one; which, if it still gave an undue advantage to the landlords, would, at least, give them this advantage at a smaller cost to the public: or that the landlords should make an estimate of their probable losses from the repeal of the Corn Laws, and found upon it a claim to compensation. [Collected Works of John Stuart Mill, IV, 50, 51, 52]

#### viii. The Theory of Reciprocal Demand

The classical theory of comparative costs is strictly a supply-side analysis of the benefits of national specialization in the production of goods. The exchange ratio between two goods (say cloth produced in Britain and wine produced in Portugal) must lie between the ratios of the costs of producing the two commodities in each country, but Ricardo gave no explanation for where the exchange ratio would settle between these limits. Mill provided the theory of reciprocal demand to supply this explanation.<sup>5</sup>

Is this not a truly magisterial performance? Yet it is not even an exhaustive list: one could add a number of subjects where Mill carried the analysis farther than any predecessor. As just one example, he recognized

the effect of the expectation of inflation upon nominal interest rates, an insight commonly credited to Irving Fisher.<sup>6</sup>

Of course Mill did not succeed in all of his efforts. A minor example is the extension of the theory of productive labor to that of productive consumption. Productive consumption is defined as that part of the laborer's consumption that is necessary to maintain his productive capacity (I, 65-66). This required regimen of the worker is viewed as biologically or culturally determined, and thus wholly ignores the incentive requirements of the worker.

A major example was to come many years later. Mill's friend and fellow worker in the East India Company, William Thornton, launched an attack upon the wages-fund doctrine in his book, On Labour (1869). The wages-fund doctrine had been Mill's theory of the short-run aggregate demand for labor, and it rested upon an empirical assumption: the capital (consisting of consumables) which supports the labor of a country is a relatively fixed quantity over short periods of time. Hence in the short run, the average wage rate (AWR) of workers will be defined as

$$AWR = \frac{\text{Wages-Fund}}{\text{Number of Workers Employed}}$$

We have already encountered the use of this theory to defend the proposition that the demand for commodities is not a demand for labor. It obviously has many other applications, some of which Mill gives in a chapter "Of Popular Remedies for Low Wages" (Book II, Ch. 12).

Thornton's criticism was essentially that the wages-fund is not fixed, but it took the form of a denunciation of the "law of supply and demand."<sup>7</sup> The market for labor was presented as the leading case of highly inelastic demand and supply, and a substantial scope was allowed to arbitrary power in the setting of wages. Thornton's work was not of good analytical quality,

and aside from its historical role as a trigger, it would long since have fallen into oblivion.

Mill correctly analyzed the peculiarities of Thornton's cases in his reply, but then went on to accept the view that a combination of short-run supply and demand curves each with zero elasticity was appropriate to the labor markets:

Does the employer require more labour, or do fresh employers of labour make their appearance, merely because it can be bought cheaper? Assuredly, no. Consumers desire more of an article, or fresh consumers are called forth, when the price has fallen: but the employer does not buy labour for the pleasure of consuming it; he buys it that he may profit by its productive powers, and he buys as much labour and no more as suffices to produce the quantity of his goods which he thinks he can sell to advantage. A fall of wages does not necessarily make him expect a larger sale for his commodity, nor, therefore, does it necessarily increase his demand for labour. [Collected Works, V, 644]

Mill earned an hour in purgatory with this passage, because lower wages make for lower costs and larger sales of the product, and hence for more employment -- this is a conclusion which is essentially exceptionless.

Mill generalizes the argument: he denies that there is a "fixed amount which, and neither more or less than which, is destined to be paid in wages" (ibid.). He now acknowledges that the laborer competes with the capitalist's expenditures or savings, so the maximum amount that labor could wring from an employer is "not only [his] capital but the whole of what can possibly be retrenched from his personal expenditure" (Collected Works, V,

645). And so, within a few lines, we reach the conclusion that the doctrine that "trade combinations can raise wages" must be shifted from the list of errors to that of truths of political economy. The powerful union could advance the full length of the employer's wife's pearls.

The recantation does not convince us. One may raise a formal objection that unless the union had a ubiquitous jurisdiction, the capital could move outside its reach, and then consumers, not capitalists, would pay the higher wages, a point which Mill himself later elaborates (Collected Works, V, 658, 661-62). The basic complaint which Mill invites, however, is that his recantation did not face the significant version of the theory which asserted only the approximate constancy of the wages-fund. Nor did Mill provide a substitute theory. The recantation must be attributed to non-analytical considerations, perhaps an attempt to construct a stronger defense of labor unions or a wish to enlarge the role of the state in assisting the laborer.

There was a fundamental scientific irresponsibility in Mill's behavior towards the wages-fund doctrine. He capitulated to a debating point without having explored its consequences for the general theory, and without providing any coherent theory to replace the abandoned portion. It is no doubt admirably honest to acknowledge error openly and quickly, but error is as elusive as truth -- in fact, error implies the existence of truth -- and Mill did his science no service by his acceptance of Thornton's "truth," which now serves as a compendium of analytical fallacies. Mill was a great man and a superb theoretician, but he was not a wise man.

#### 4. The Reception

The great success of the Principles owed most to the excellence of Mill's analyses and exposition. No other Englishman between Ricardo and Marshall provided so complete an exposition of the theory of economics. To this paramount virtue several lesser traits may be added.

A first is the remarkable fairmindedness in Mill's dealings with others. On the division of labor he incorporated important contributions of Babbage and lesser ones of Wakefield (Book I, Ch. 8). On saving he devoted a chapter to John Rae (Book I, Ch. 11). Mill had an extraordinary capacity to understand and report sympathetically the opinions of others.

A second trait was the presentation of a program of economic reform so varied that most readers could find appealing proposals. A political conservative would appreciate Mill's defense of peasant proprietors, his denunciation of various wage nostrums and his early, skeptical attitude toward labor unions. A socialist would be attracted to the criticisms of contemporary capitalism, which were mild in this first edition but were soon revised to include astonishing statements such as:

The worst and most unjust arrangement that could be made of these points [apportionment of work to the strength and capacity of individuals], under a system aiming at equality, would be so far short of the inequality and injustice with which labour (not to speak of remuneration) is now apportioned, as scarcely to be worth counting in the comparison. [Collected Works, II, 207]

Indeed, Mill carried this argument to such extremes as surely to raise large doubts of the validity of his chapters on wages and competition. He follows the above statement with the following flight of rhetoric:

...if the institution of private property necessarily carried with it as a consequence, that the produce of labour should be apportioned as we now see it, almost in an inverse ratio to the labour -- the largest portions to those who have never worked at all, the next largest to those whose work is almost nominal, and so in a descending scale, the remuneration dwindling as the work grows harder and more disagreeable, until the most fatiguing and exhausting bodily labour cannot count with certainty on being able to earn even the necessaries of life; if this or Communism were the alternative, all the difficulties, great or small, of Communism would be but as dust in the balance. [Collected Works, II, 207]

Yet he continued to reproduce and support Adam Smith's famous five grounds for differences in wages of different occupations (Bk. II, Ch. 14), which were all cost-based differences which would prevail under competition.

Neil de Marchi has argued persuasively that Mill's romantic aspirations and his iconoclastic treatment of capitalism served to disarm much of the popular criticism of political economy that had flourished in the Ricardian period.<sup>8</sup> Mill combined this conquest of the non-economists with that of the rising young economists (such as Bagehot, Newmarch and Fawcett), to establish a generation of dominance over English economics. This link to the future was cemented by Alfred Marshall, whose work in economics began with the translation of Mill's version of the classical economics into mathematics.

William Stanley Jevons was the outstanding exception to this general approval of Mill's treatise. Jevons' theory of utility could be and eventually was joined to the classical theory by others (above all, Marshall), but proponents of new theories do not wish merely to have them joined to existing knowledge: they wish the science to be reconstructed on the basis of their work.

The splendid edition of Mill's works that is nearing completion at the University of Toronto is a manifestation, and also a reinforcement, of the rehabilitation of Mill's reputation in the past thirty years. Mill's Principles is a major work in the history of economics, and the first edition presents it in its most attractive form.

## Footnotes

1. See F. A. Hayek, John Stuart Mill and Harriet Taylor (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1951).
2. The first six entries are reproduced from my essay, "The Nature and Role of Originality in Economics," reprinted in Essays in the History of Economics.
3. "Thornton on Labour and Its Claims," in Collected Works, Vol. 5.
4. Essays on Some Unsettled Questions of Political Economy (London, John W. Parker, 1844), pp. 69-70.
5. See Essay I in Essays on Some Unsettled Questions, and Principles (Bk. III, Ch. 18).
6. See the Principles, Collected Works, II, 656.
7. The following passages are reproduced from my review of volumes IV and V of Mill's Collected Works, reprinted in The Economist as Preacher.
8. "The Success of Mill's Principles," History of Political Economy, VI (1974), 119-57.