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## Wage Setting in Times of High and Low Inflation

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# Wage Setting in Times of High and Low Inflation\*

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## Abstract

The recent surge in inflation led many unions and firms to alter their bargaining and wage-setting policies. Using novel German firm-level survey data, we document the extent of state dependency of wage-setting behavior across firms and workers given high vs. low inflation environments. The granularity of our micro-level data also allows us to study heterogeneous patterns across sectors, firms, and workers. Embedding the empirical findings in a New Keynesian model with heterogeneous firms, we then analyze the implications of state-dependent wage-setting behavior for the transmission and propagation of shocks. Lastly, we discuss the interaction of state-dependent wage setting with firms' monopsony power and how these features impact monetary policy and the slope of the Phillips curve.

Keywords: State-dependent wage setting, New Keynesian model, heterogeneous firms, non-linear Phillips curve.

JEL codes: E24, E31, E50, E60.

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# 1 Introduction

Nominal rigidities play a crucial role in the transmission of monetary policy. In New Keynesian models, which have become the standard framework to discuss monetary policy, prices and wages are assumed to be sticky in the short run, thus giving rise to the non-neutrality of money. While the literature has long emphasized that price setting is state dependent (Kashyap, 1995; Nakamura and Steinsson, 2008; Alvarez et al., 2019; Gagnon, 2009), the state-dependency of wage setting has received comparatively little attention, even though wage stickiness has been found to be quantitatively more important than price stickiness (Amano et al. 2009).<sup>1</sup> The recent spike in global inflation rates provides an opportunity to study how and whether firms' wage decisions depend on the underlying rate of inflation. In particular, this paper analyzes whether wages are more flexible in high inflation periods and how the inflation elasticity of wage changes varies across industries, firms, and workers.

In most advanced countries, wages are set to a large extent through collective wage bargaining between labor unions and firms' representatives.<sup>2</sup> A key parameter in these negotiations is the length of the resulting wage agreement. The average length of collective bargaining agreements in Europe lies between one and three years (e.g., Du Caju et al. 2008, OECD, 2015). High inflation and high inflation uncertainty provide an incentive to both firms and unions to change wages more frequently. In Germany, for example, many unions responded to the spike in inflation by aiming for shorter agreements of, at most, 12 to 15 months (Zeit, 2022). As the chief negotiator of Germany's second-largest labor union put it, "No one can say with certainty today how inflation and the economic situation will develop in the coming months. With a term of one year, we can react to current developments as early as next spring."<sup>3</sup> Similarly, other industries, such as transportation, have lowered the duration of agreements from two years to one year.

Our paper has three parts. In the first part, we examine a set of supplementary questions about past and future wage-setting practices added to the November 2022 round of the ifo HR survey, a quarterly survey covering about 600 firms across all industries. By directly questioning the most important decision-makers in the wage and bargaining process - HR managers - this survey allows us to explore state-dependent wage setting *directly* at the firm level. Focusing on non-performance-based, ordinary wage adjustments, we aim to learn about the extent of wage adjustments (intensive margin) as well as the frequency

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<sup>1</sup>Fregert and Jonung (1999) and Sigurdsson and Sigurdardottir (2016) provide some evidence that the timing of wage adjustments depends on the inflation rate using data from Iceland and Sweden, respectively.

<sup>2</sup>Collective bargaining coverage is 50% in Germany, slightly above the 42% OECD avg. (Jäger et al., 2022).

<sup>3</sup>According to Ver.di negotiator Volker Nüsser in an interview (Verdi, 2022).

of adjustments (extensive margin) in high vs. low inflation environments. We contrast firms' wage-setting practices during two periods with significantly different inflation rates: the period of 2017-2019 with an average annual inflation rate of 1.6%; and the period of 2022-2024 with an average expected inflation rate of 6.5%.<sup>4</sup>

The survey allows us to consider several dimensions of heterogeneity in wage-setting practices, such as (i) heterogeneity across firms in terms of size, market power, and monopsony power in the labor market and (ii) heterogeneity along the job ladder comparing low vs. high-skilled workers. This differentiation makes it possible to ascertain the impact of inflation on real wages across the income distribution. To learn about the firms' wage setting in practice, we ask firms to rank the importance of a set of relevant factors such as the wage-setting of competitors in the labor market, the availability of workers, the dynamics of sales prices, the state of overall inflation and collective bargaining agreements. Similarly, we examine the factors that limit wage-setting practices. In line with theoretical literature, we distinguish between the importance of administrative costs, regulation, economic reasons, wages set outside of the firm, and others.

Our empirical results highlight that firms alter their wage-setting behavior during times of high inflation along the extensive and intensive margin. On average, the duration of pay agreements decreased from 14.2 months in the low-inflation period to 12.9 months in the high-inflation period. About 20% of firms expect to negotiate wages more frequently in times of high inflation. At the same time, firms also increase the size of wage adjustments per pay round. In times of low inflation, most firms adjust wages by 2-4%, while in times of high inflation, most firms increase wages by 4-6%. Further, there is significant heterogeneity across and within sectors. Across sectors, the average duration ranges from 10 to 16 months. The most significant duration shortening happens in the transport, mechanical engineering, chemical, textile, and trade sectors. At the same, we find higher wage growth in times of high inflation in those sectors. Similarly, there is a lot of variation within sectors. Larger firms tend to increase wages by less but more frequently. Lastly, at the firm level, both labor market and macroeconomic factors are key for wage decisions. Likewise, wage competition, the supply of skilled workers, collective agreements, inflation, and labor demand have been decisive for wage decisions.

The patterns emerging from our firm-level survey data are consistent with aggregate data on collective bargaining outcomes. Using newly compiled data on wage bargaining agreements in Germany between 1990 and 2023, we show that during times of high

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<sup>4</sup>Forecast of the Joint Economic Forecast Project Group on behalf of the Federal Ministry of Economics and Technology (Gemeinschaftsdiagnose) in Sept. 2022. We intentionally omit the peak years of the Covid pandemic because labor demand and supply and factors determining wages were quite different during that time.

inflation bargained wage hikes are 2.6 percentage points higher while the duration of bargaining agreements are 4 months shorter. Using panel regressions on our union-level data, we estimate an elasticity of (nominal) wage growth of about 0.8 and a semi-elasticity of contract duration of -0.8 months for each percentage point increase in inflation.

In the second part, we develop a simple model of state-dependent wage setting in times of high and low inflation in the spirit of Gagnon (2009) work on price-setting to shed light on the mechanism. The model rationalizes the key empirical predictions: a shorter duration and higher wage adjustment in times of high inflation vs. times of low inflation. We micro-found this with firms incurring fixed “menu costs” for resetting wages. As a result, the probability of wage changes is endogenous and depends on the inflation rate and uncertainty. We then show that a computationally simpler Calvo model with an exogenous probability of wage changes and time-varying parameters suffices to reconcile the empirical results, a similar point made by Auclert et al. (2022) on the price-setting side.

In the last part, we embed state-dependent wage setting in an otherwise standard New Keynesian model based on Erceg et al. (2000)’s New Keynesian model with sticky wages. We make wage-setting state-dependent by assuming that the probability of resetting the wage is an increasing function of the expected inflation rate. Firms are heterogeneous with respect to their labor market power which further impacts wage-setting decisions. To gauge the effect of state dependency on inflation dynamics, we contrast the propagation of expansionary shocks to aggregate demand under a state-dependent wage setting vs. a standard model with sticky wages. We also investigate potential interaction effects between labor market structure and state dependency through comparative statics across the model specifications.

**Related literature.** The empirical literature on the frequency and size of nominal wage changes is surprisingly thin and primarily based on U.S. data. For instance, Barattieri et al. (2014) find for the mid-nineties, a period with a 2.5% average inflation rate comparable to our low-inflation period, a probability of nominal wage change of 21-27% per quarter. This is equivalent to an expected duration of about one year, slightly lower than the average duration of 14 months in our firm-level data during the low-inflation period. Similar patterns were found in other developed economies. For example, using a firm-level survey from 17 European countries, Druant et al. (2012) find that firms adjust wages about every 15 months on average, close to our low-inflation period estimate. Similarly, Sigurdsson and Sigurdardottir (2016) document for Iceland that 90% of wage spells last one year or less using administrative data on monthly wages.

The question of state dependence in wage-setting practices has received even less

attention. Grigsby et al. (2021) use administrative job-level data from the U.S. covering 2008 to 2016. They find that base wage adjustments, excluding compensation elements such as bonuses, commission, and overtime pay, are almost always positive, with the highest probability of a wage change occurring 12 months after the last adjustment. In contrast, base wage cuts occurred predominantly during the Great Recession rather than in normal times. While they emphasize the dependence of wage setting on the business cycle (in particular, comovement with the unemployment rate), they are silent about the role of inflation. Sigurdsson and Sigurdardottir (2016) also address the question of state dependence, finding that the frequency of wage adjustments depends on both inflation and unemployment. However, they do not consider the impact of inflation on both size and frequency. In addition, our firm-level survey data allow a more granular look at wage-setting practices and their heterogeneity across firm sizes, industries, and the degree of market power in the labor market.

Our paper is also closely connected to the state-dependent price-setting literature. For instance, Gagnon (2009) document that firms adjust prices more frequently in times of high inflation. The monthly price change frequency rose from an average of 22% in 1994 to a high of 61.9% at peak inflation in Mexico. Kashyap (1995) provides similar evidence for the US in the 70s and 80s versus the period before and after. In a similar vein, Nakamura and Steinsson (2008) show that the frequency of price hikes covaries with inflation. Further, Alvarez et al. (2019) demonstrates that the elasticity of price change frequency to inflation is positive in Argentina. Our paper complements this evidence with findings on state-dependent wage-setting behavior.

Our estimates on the wage-setting side are qualitatively and quantitatively similar to the price-setting side. For example, Alvarez et al. (2019) and Konieczny and Skrzypacz (2005) find that a 1 p.p. increase in inflation increases the price-setting frequency by 0.25-0.4 p.p. For wage setting, we find smaller values with a 1 p.p. increase in inflation, increasing the wage-setting frequency by 0.14 p.p in the firm-level survey. In a similar fashion, Alvarez et al. (2019) estimate semi-elasticities of the frequency of price changes to inflation of roughly  $2/3$  during hyperinflation periods. On the wage-setting side, we document an even stronger semi-elasticity of roughly 2.

On the theoretical side, our paper contributes to the literature on modeling wage stickiness. Similar to the literature on menu costs on the pricing side (e.g., Danziger, 1999, Golosov and Lucas, 2007 and Gagnon, 2009), we model stickiness with firms facing fixed menu costs for adjustment. In contrast to the previous literature, our model assumes that firms face these costs for wage setting instead of price setting. As a counterpart to the price setting side in Auclert et al. (2022), we also emphasize for wage setting that a simpler

Calvo model, similar to Calvo (1983) and Erceg et al. (2000), with the respective calibration, does a great job getting aggregate dynamics and estimating the effect on the Phillips curve.

The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 describes the survey and data set. Section 3.1 presents novel facts on wage-setting behavior in times of high and low inflation. Section 4 first proposes a simple model of state-dependent wage setting and then discusses the dynamic effects of monetary shocks under various wage specifications. Details and additional results are available in the appendices.

## 2 Data Sources and Summary Statistics

### 2.1 Firm-level survey data

Our evidence comes from two novel datasets. First, we collected survey data on firms' wage-setting behavior by adding a module of questions to the ifo Institute's HR survey. The ifo Institute surveys around 600 HR managers in German HR departments every quarter about current HR policy topics. The main advantage of the ifo HR survey for our purposes is that it elicits information directly from the key decision makers at the firm in the wage bargaining process. The panel includes companies across all sectors of the economy, covering manufacturing, wholesale, retail, and services.<sup>5</sup> About half of the companies are classified as medium-sized (50-249 employees), one-third as small-sized with less than 50 employees, and 11% as large-sized with more than 500 employees, which is representative of the German corporate landscape. We supplemented the November 2022 (Q4/2022) survey round with questions on wage-setting practices in times of high and low inflation as well as additional questions on the main factors and frictions impacting the firms' wage setting decisions. More specifically, we elicit the following questions to assess the state dependency of wage adjustment along the extensive and intensive margin:

- *On average, how often (in months) did [does] your firm [plan to] adjust wages during 2017-2019 [2022-2024]? (excluding promotions, extraordinary wage changes, etc.)*  
*Every \_\_\_ months.*
- *On average, by how much (in percent) did [do] you [plan to] adjust wages per pay round during 2017-2019 [2022-2024]?*  
*<0, 0-2, 2-4, 4-6, 6-8, 8-10, >10%*

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<sup>5</sup>41% operate in services, 37% in manufacturing, 21% in trade, and the remaining share in construction.

Appendix A presents the complete survey instrument and a translation of the survey questions. The survey also asked to what extent firms plan to make use of one-time bonus payments (Inflationsausgleichsprämie). In addition, we leverage two supplementary questions on expected wage growth asked in Q4/2021 and Q4/2022 to show the consistency of our results. The survey further contains information on the firm’s narrow industry, firm size, and other characteristics. Table 1 provides some descriptive statistics on wage-setting behavior across low and high-inflation periods across all firms.

Table 1: Descriptive statistics

	N	Mean	Std. dev.	p10	p25	p50	p75	p90
Duration (2017-2019)	529	14.18	5.71	12	12	12	12	24
Duration (2022-2024)	504	12.93	4.86	8	12	12	12	24
Adjustment (2017-2019)	529	3.44	1.07	2	3	3	4	5
Adjustment (2022-2024)	506	3.98	1.20	3	3	4	5	6
Relevance of wage competition	499	0.17	0.15	0	0	0.19	0.25	0.33
Relevance of labor supply	499	0.19	0.14	0	0.09	0.2	0.26	0.33
Relevance of inflation	499	0.15	0.17	0	0	0.13	0.21	0.32
Relevance of coll. bargaining	499	0.20	0.29	0	0	0.11	0.29	0.56
Relevance of sales prices	499	0.08	0.10	0	0	0.05	0.14	0.21
Relevance of labor demand	499	0.18	0.12	0	0.08	0.19	0.25	0.31
% of part-time workers <sup>6</sup>	428	0.16	0.15	0.02	0.05	0.10	0.22	0.36
% of temporary workers <sup>5</sup>	428	0.01	0.05	0	0	0	0	0.04
% of trainees <sup>5</sup>	428	0.05	0.05	0	0	0.03	0.07	0.12
Family business <sup>5</sup>	461	0.64	0.48	0	0	1	1	1
Number of employees <sup>5</sup>	433	253	855	17	33	74	195	411
% of minimum wage workers <sup>5</sup>	352	11.46	22.48	0	0	0	10	45
Payout % of one-time bonus	233	70.76	29.65	30	50	75	100	100

*Notes:* This table provides summary statistics for the duration of pay agreements (in months) and wage adjustment per pay round (in percent) during the periods 2017-2019 and 2022-2024, the relative relevance of labor market and macroeconomic factors for wage setting,<sup>7</sup> as well as additional summary statistics on the firms’ type, firm size, share of minimum wage workers, share of part-time workers, share of temporary workers, share of trainees, and payout ratio of one-time bonus payments.

<sup>5</sup>Structural factors were asked in earlier survey rounds: 2019, 2020, and 2021.

<sup>6</sup>Relative relevance reflects the firm-level importance of this factor and is calculated as the relevance of the respective factor over the sum of the relevance of all factors.



The mean duration of pay agreements during the low-inflation period (2017-2019) is 14.2 months compared to 12.9 months during the high-inflation period (2022-2024). The mean adjustment of pay agreements during the low-inflation period (2017-2019) corresponds to category 3 (2-4%). In contrast, the mean expected adjustment of pay rounds during the high-inflation period (2022-2024) corresponds to category 4 (4-6%), slightly below the expected annual inflation rate of 6.5%. Section 3.1 provides more systematic evidence on state dependency and heterogeneity of wage-setting behavior across time and space.

## 2.2 Union-level time series data

While our firm-level survey provides detailed data on firms' wage-setting decisions during two specific periods of time, it does not contain direct information on actual wage changes and their duration. We therefore ask whether the results of our HR survey data are consistent with actual wage bargaining outcomes in the recent past.

For that purpose, we collect evidence from labor unions and collective bargaining agreements over the last 20 years in Germany. The primary data source of the union data is the German Economic and Social Science Institute (Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliches Institut, henceforth WSI) which centrally documents collective bargaining agreements in a collective agreement archive (Tarifarchiv) and its accompanying annual report (Tarifpolitischer Jahresbericht). Based on this information, we compile data on the size and duration of wage adjustments for the largest industries in terms of union members. The eleven industries that are among the ones with the most union members are the metal industry (3,639,000), civil service (3,530,200), chemical industry (578,500), retail sector (573,500), main construction industry (425,100), private transport and traffic industry (179,800), insurance sector (169,600), Deutsche Post AG (160,000), Deutsche Bahn AG (134,000), Volkswagen (100,100) and iron and steel industry (87,800). Table 13 in Appendix B.4 provides for each union summary statistics about the time during which the data is available, as well as the number of contracts, median duration, and median adjustment.

Where applicable, we identify different regions of responsibility within each union and treat them as unique identifiers. These include West/East Germany for most unions, the federal government, municipalities, and federal states for the civil service, and Brandenburg and North Rhine-Westphalia for the retail sector. The summary statistics by union and region are in Table 14 in Appendix B.4.

Since the availability of most of the contracts in the WSI starts in 1994, we supplement

the data with news articles about the duration and wage adjustment for most of the identifiers, at least until 1990.<sup>8</sup> We attain the most comprehensive data for the metal as well as iron and steel industry, for which the earliest entry includes 1956.<sup>9</sup>

In general, the data on labor unions includes 554 contracts in 11 industries with 25 unique regions. The median duration of a contract is 18 months, and the median adjustment is 3.0% (see Table 13 in Appendix B.4). Our main sample starts in 1990 to ensure the availability of most union data and to prevent dependence on the metal- as well as iron and steel industry, which have a longer time period compared to other industries.

Compared to the ifo HR survey, we define the cutoff between high- and low-inflation environments to be an annual inflation rate of 3%, as defined by the Deutsche Bundesbank.<sup>10</sup> Hence, the high inflation environments in our main sample are the boom after the German reunification (1991 – 1993, with inflation rates of more than 3.5%) and the post-COVID inflation due to delivery bottlenecks, energy price shocks and high demand of the private sector (2021 – 2023, with (expected) inflation rates between 3.1 and 6.9%).<sup>11</sup>

### **3 Empirical Facts about Wage Setting in Times of High and Low Inflation**

#### **3.1 Evidence from firm-level survey**

This section establishes a set of novel facts on firms' wage-setting behavior in times of high versus low inflation. At the firm level, we compare the intensive and extensive margin of wage adjustment during the years 2017-2019, with an underlying average annual inflation rate of 1.6%, to the period of 2022-2024, with an underlying average expected inflation rate of 6.5%.<sup>12</sup> The firm-level survey data also allows us to analyze potential heterogeneity across sectors and along the firm size distribution.

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<sup>8</sup>The main source for the news articles is the `wiso-net.de` database, which mainly covers economic, sociological, and psychological literature.

<sup>9</sup>The IG Metall Landau provides the data until 1956 for the metal- and iron and steel industry.


<sup>10</sup>Figure 18 in Appendix B.5 plots annual inflation in Germany over the time period from 1955 to 2023.

<sup>11</sup>Table 16 in Appendix B.6 and Figures 24 to 21 in Appendix B.6 provide robustness for different inflation thresholds.

<sup>12</sup>The reference to average inflation for 2017-2019 and expected average inflation for 2022-2024 is consistent with the information set that firms have at the point of the survey in November 2022. The forecast is based on the Joint Economic Forecast Project Group forecast on behalf of the Federal Ministry of Economics and Technology (Gemeinschaftsdiagnose) in September 2022.

**Fact 1: The duration of pay agreements shortens during times of high inflation.** The duration of pay agreements is shorter on average in times of high inflation. Panel (a) of Figure 1 compares the frequency distributions of the duration of pay agreements for the 2017-2019 and 2022-2024 periods, respectively. On average, firms plan to reset wages every 12.9 months in times of high inflation compared to every 14.2 months in times of low inflation.<sup>13</sup>

Figure 1: Wage-setting behavior in times of high and low inflation



*Notes:* This figure shows the duration of pay agreements (extensive margin) and the wage adjustment in percent (intensive margin) during the periods 2017-2019 and 2022-2024.

While most firms change wages at an annual frequency and plan to continue doing so (57%), about 20% expect shorter durations of pay agreements. Looking closer, about 10% of firms in our sample expect to switch from 24 to 12 months and 12 to 6 months duration, and a further 5% expect to switch from 18 to 12 months duration, as shown in Table 2. These results are in line with Sigurdsson and Sigurdardottir (2016), though quantitatively larger. According to them, a 5 p.p. increase in the cumulative inflation rate is associated with a decrease in duration from 8.26 months to 7.94 months, implying a semi-elasticity of 0.06 months per p.p. of inflation. In our data, the implied elasticity is 0.26 months per p.p.

<sup>13</sup>The difference is significant at a 1% level.

Table 2: Frequency distribution of duration in times of high and low inflation

		Duration 2022-2024					
		1-6	7-12	13-18	19-24	>24	Total
Duration 2017-2019	1-6	3.17	1.19	0.00	0.00	0.00	4.37
	7-12	5.56	62.90	1.39	1.98	0.00	71.83
	13-18	0.40	4.96	3.77	0.60	0.00	9.72
	19-24	0.00	4.37	0.40	6.55	0.20	11.51
	>24	0.20	0.60	0.40	0.79	0.60	2.58
	Total	9.33	74.01	5.95	9.92	0.79	100.00

*Notes:* This table shows the frequency distribution of the duration of pay agreements (in months) during the periods 2017-2019 (rows) and 2022-2024 (columns) clustered by duration bins.

**Fact 2: The size of wage adjustments increases during times of high inflation.** In times of high inflation, most firms plan to adjust nominal wages by more per pay round. We observe a rightward shift in the entire distribution of firms' wage adjustment in the high-inflation period, as shown in Panel (b) of Figure 1.<sup>14</sup> About 47% of firms plan to increase the wage adjustment, while 40% plan to keep the wage adjustment the same. In 2017-2019, the mass of firms adjusted wages by 2-4%. That mass moved rightward to 4-6% in 2022-2024.

About 20% of firms in our sample plan to increase wages adjustment from 2-4% to 4-6% per pay round in 2022-2024, as shown in Table 3. A further 6% of firms plan to increase wages adjustment from 2-4% to 6-8% per pay round and another 4% from 4-6% to 6-8%. Also, about 5% of firms adjusted wages previously marginally by 0-2% increase adjustment to 2-4%. The table also shows that only 28% of firms try to keep real wages constant in times of high inflation, while the others adjust by less than 6% in 2022-2024. This ratio is much higher in times of low inflation, where only 13% of firms offer less than a 2% increase in wages per pay round.

We combine survey answers on the duration and size of wage adjustments to calculate approximate annualized wage changes. Since the answers on the size of pay adjustments are given in bins, we use the central value of each bin for these calculations.<sup>15</sup> The annualized wage change is calculated as the product of the annual frequency of wage adjustments and the size of the adjustment per pay round. We find a mean annualized

<sup>14</sup>The difference in mean wage adjustments is significant at a 1% level

<sup>15</sup>We set a value of -1% for the lowest bin (< 0) and 11% for the highest bin, but these values do not much affect our results due to the small number of answers in these bins.

wage growth of 3.8% (median of 3%) in times of low inflation and 5.3% (median of 5%) in times of high inflation. Given that expected inflation rose from 1.6% to 6.5%, this implies a drop in annualized real wage growth from 2.2% to -1.2%.

These results point toward an incomplete pass-through of inflation to wages. The implied elasticity of nominal wages with respect to inflation is about 0.3.<sup>16</sup> As we will show below, this is broadly consistent with aggregate data from collective bargaining outcomes in Germany.

Table 3: Frequency distribution of adjustment in times of high and low inflation

		Adjustment in % 2022-2024							Total
		<0%	0-2%	2-4%	4-6%	6-8%	8-10%	>10%	
Adjustment in % 2017-2019	<0%	0.20	0.20	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.39
	0-2%	0.00	2.94	4.71	3.14	0.78	0.39	0.20	12.16
	2-4%	0.39	2.55	22.16	20.00	6.08	2.35	0.78	54.31
	4-6%	0.20	0.20	2.75	9.22	4.31	1.57	0.78	19.02
	6-8%	0.00	0.00	0.98	1.96	2.94	1.37	0.00	7.25
	8-10%	0.00	0.20	0.20	0.59	0.98	2.35	0.59	4.90
	>10%	0.20	0.00	0.20	0.00	0.20	0.00	1.37	1.96
	Total	0.98	6.08	30.98	34.90	15.29	8.04	3.73	100.00

*Notes:* This table shows the frequency distribution of pay adjustments per pay round (in percent) during the periods 2017-2019 (rows) and 2022-2024 (columns).

Consistent with observing higher annualized wages, we find a negative correlation between the *change* in the average duration of pay agreements and the *change* in wage growth (Figure 15 in Appendix B.1), implying that firms in those industries exhibiting a shortening duration also increased wages (along the intensive margin). Second, many industries are located in the upper left corner with a lower duration of pay agreements and a higher percent adjustment, implying a more rapid wage growth path per employee.

**Fact 3: Large firms change wages more frequently, but average wage adjustments are smaller.** The duration of pay agreements tends to be shorter for large firms. Table 4 points toward the fact that large firms (measured in terms of employees) reset wages more frequently, controlling for industry fixed effects, such as (labor) demand and supply

<sup>16</sup>To obtain the implied elasticity, we regress the annualized wage changes on the (expected) level of inflation for the two periods.

factors.<sup>17</sup> A doubling of the workforce suggests a reduction of approximately 0.7 and 0.44 months in the duration of pay agreements in times of low and high inflation, respectively.<sup>18</sup> Heterogeneity along the firm size distribution could result from large firms assessing costs and wages more often and more systematically, having more resources and better technology available, or other strategic reasons (e.g., limiting uncertainty and forecast errors).

There are also large differences in wage growth per pay round along the firm size distribution. Large firms increase wages by less than small firms. While 40% of large firms plan to increase wages by 2-4%, only 25% of small firms plan to do so (Figure 12 in Appendix B). Similarly, less than 2% of large firms plan to increase wages by more than 8%, while almost 20% of small firms plan to do so. Table 4 presents further evidence based on regressions for wage adjustment in percent on firm size, controlling for industry fixed effects. A doubling of the workforce suggests an approx. 0.2 p.p. lower wage growth in times of low inflation. The results point towards a potential role of large firms' monopsony power in depressing wages and wage growth.

Table 4: Extensive and intensive margin by firm size

	$D_{low}$	$D_{high}$	$\Delta D$	$\%_{low}$	$\%_{high}$	$\Delta\%$
log(employees)	-0.70*** (0.24)	-0.44** (0.21)	0.25 (0.21)	-0.10** (0.044)	-0.050 (0.051)	0.056 (0.053)
Constant	17.2*** (0.99)	14.8*** (0.87)	-2.17** (0.87)	3.82*** (0.18)	4.14*** (0.21)	0.29 (0.22)
Observations	405	386	386	408	390	390
$R^2$	0.109	0.143	0.072	0.124	0.129	0.063
Sector FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

*Notes:* This table shows the regression results for the duration of pay agreements,  $D$ , and the wage adjustment in percent, during the periods 2017-2019, *low*, and 2022-2024, *high*, as well as change between both periods,  $\Delta$ , on the log of employees controlling for sector fixed effects. Standard errors are in parentheses. \*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ .

Overall, there remains substantial variation in the duration of pay agreements and wage adjustment, both within as well as across industries.<sup>19</sup> Table 5 quantifies the within-

<sup>17</sup>Figure 10 in Appendix B.1 presents similar evidence comparing the average duration and adjustment by firm size.

<sup>18</sup>Tables 11 and 10 in Appendix B.2 deliver robustness checks using different sets of controls. Table 12 in Appendix B.2 shows the results on the intensive margin for individual years 2022 and 2023.

<sup>19</sup>According to the Federal Statistical Office Germany, an industry at the WZ-2008 level consists of 88 divisions. Our dataset represents 62 out of the 88 divisions.

industry and cross-industry standard deviation: during times of low and high inflation, the standard deviation within industries is about three times as large as across industries.<sup>20</sup> This makes the point that industry-specific aspects as to whether workers are part of collective bargaining agreements or types of workers only explain a very small proportion of differences. Instead, the timing of wage renegotiation is much more firm-specific, with part of it is explained by firm size.

Table 5: Variation within and across industries

	$D_{low}$	$D_{high}$	$\%_{low}$	$\%_{high}$
Within	5.91	5.09	0.99	1.08
Across	1.38	1.42	0.32	0.37

*Notes:* This table presents within-industry and cross-industry standard deviation of the duration of pay agreements,  $D$ , and the wage adjustment,  $\%$ , during the periods 2017-2019, *low*, and 2022-2024, *high*.

**Fact 4: Labor market factors as well as macroeconomic factors are important for wage decisions.** Likewise, labor market factors (such as wage competition and the availability of skilled workers), collective agreements, and general economic factors (such as inflation and labor demand) have been decisive for wage decisions, as shown in Table 1. The relative importance of negotiated wages is highest at 20%. Surprisingly, and in contrast to the extensive literature focusing on wage-price-spirals, we find low importance for the dynamics of (own) sales prices.<sup>21</sup>

Table 6 shows how the intensive and extensive margin of wage adjustment is affected by labor market and macroeconomic factors. Inflation is a relevant factor for the extent of adjustment, particularly during times of high inflation, as seen in the last two columns of Table 6. Firms that attribute a lot of attention to inflation adjust wages on average more, controlling for narrowly defended industries.

<sup>20</sup>Figure 14 in Appendix B.1 illustrates that the shortest average duration of pay agreements in 2017-2019 is 10 months in the health sector, followed by the food and transportation sectors. In contrast, the longest duration of 16 months is other services and information and communication firms. Wage growth per pay round is the highest value in the finance and insurance sector and other services, as well as arts, entertainment, and leisure sectors (Figure 14 in Appendix B).

<sup>21</sup>Blanchard (1986) documents that high demand puts pressure on wages and markups in flexible price environments. Recent policy papers, including Suthaharan and Bleakley (2022), Boissay et al. (2022) and Koester et al. (2021), find that tight labor markets, the balance of bargaining power between workers and firms, wage stickiness, the prevalence and design of wage indexation schemes, the level of competition and pricing power among firms, as well as inflation expectations could influence the emergence of wage-price spirals.

Table 6: Extensive and intensive margin and factors

	$D_{low}$	$D_{high}$	$\Delta D$	$\%_{low}$	$\%_{high}$	$\Delta\%$
Wage competition	-0.00021 (0.088)	-0.071 (0.078)	-0.10 (0.071)	0.040** (0.017)	0.0074 (0.019)	-0.031* (0.019)
Labor supply	0.054 (0.11)	-0.0073 (0.098)	-0.048 (0.089)	-0.0041 (0.021)	0.029 (0.023)	0.035 (0.024)
Inflation	-0.032 (0.090)	0.013 (0.080)	0.035 (0.073)	-0.0039 (0.017)	0.042** (0.019)	0.048** (0.019)
Sales prices	-0.044 (0.10)	-0.038 (0.092)	0.017 (0.084)	0.034* (0.020)	-0.020 (0.022)	-0.049** (0.023)
Labor demand	-0.12 (0.11)	0.0094 (0.098)	0.094 (0.089)	-0.015 (0.021)	0.0063 (0.024)	0.021 (0.024)
Constant	14.7*** (0.57)	13.3*** (0.52)	-0.98** (0.47)	3.28*** (0.11)	3.66*** (0.12)	0.34*** (0.13)
Observations	483	462	461	485	467	467
$R^2$	0.093	0.108	0.090	0.134	0.151	0.105
Sector FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

*Notes:* This table shows the regression results for the duration of pay agreements,  $D$ , and the wage adjustment in percent during the periods 2017-2019, *low*, and 2022-2024, *high*, as well as change between both periods,  $\Delta$ , on different macroeconomic and labor market factors controlling for sector fixed effects. Standard errors are in parentheses. \*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ .

### 3.2 Evidence from unions-level data


Are these results consistent with aggregate data on collective bargaining outcomes in Germany over the past two decades? Here we rely on our newly compiled union-level data set. The analysis confirms the firm-level survey results and demonstrates a clear pattern of larger wage hikes and shorter durations during periods of higher inflation.

Figure 2 shows how the extensive and intensive margin of collective bargaining agreements change in times of high and low inflation, similar to Figure 1 in the context of the ifo HR survey. Panel (a) of Figure 2 displays that the duration of pay agreements is generally shorter in times of high inflation. In concrete figures, the median duration decreases from 20 months in times of low inflation to 16 months in times of high inflation – a decrease



of 20%. The frequency distribution of the duration also shifts to the left when inflation is higher than 3%: More contracts are 8 or 12 months long, while relatively fewer contracts are 24 or more months long. In contrast, most long-duration contracts (24 to 30 months) fall in the low inflation regime.

Figure 2: Wage-setting behavior of labor unions in times of low and high inflation



Notes: This figure shows the duration of pay agreements (extensive margin) and the wage adjustment in percent (intensive margin) for collective bargaining agreements during 1990 - 2023, split into low (< 3%) and high (> 3%) inflation periods. The dotted vertical lines show the median for each inflation environment. Due to visibility, Panel (b) omits two outliers, 35% (46.37%), in periods of low (high) inflation.

Compared to Panel (a) of Figure 1 of the ifo HR survey, labor union contracts generally have a longer duration in times of both low and high inflation (13 vs. 16 months and 14 vs. 20 months), but their difference is also by a magnitude larger (1 compared to 4 months). Additionally, the concentration of contracts is different: While roughly 57% of the contracts in the ifo HR survey have an annual frequency, only 14% of the labor union contracts are annual. Similarly, the tails of the distribution are fatter in the case of labor union contracts.

Wage adjustments are higher in times of high inflation. The median increases from 2.8% in times of low inflation to 5.3% in times of high inflation, corresponding to an almost two-fold increase. Panel (b) of Figure 2 reveals a clear right shift in the distribution in times of high inflation: Most wage adjustments in high inflation regimes are between 5 to 10%, while most wage adjustments in low inflation regimes are between 2 to 5%.<sup>22</sup> However, in real terms, wage growth is not significantly different from zero between different inflation regimes (p-value: 0.715). The median real wage increase is 0.21% in

<sup>22</sup>Note that wage adjustments of more than 15% exclusively stem from the region in East Germany in order to catch up to the West German wage level. These do not alter the result since the median is largely unaffected by outliers, and Figure 23 in Appendix B.6 shows that the result remains robust using only one region per union, i.e., discard – among others – the East German regions.

times of high- and 1.45% in times of low inflation. The observation that the difference in wage growth vanishes once adjusting for real terms is in line with the ifo HR survey.

In a nutshell, labor union contracts are 4 months shorter and have a 2.6 percentage points higher wage increase in times of high inflation, measured by the median based on the main sample from 1990 – 2023. It is important to stress that all prior analyses are not sensitive to the definition of the inflation cutoff (2, 2.5 or 3.5%), the time period, or the regions within a union (See Figures 24 to 23 in Appendix B.6).

We additionally perform regression analyses to quantify the relationship between inflation, duration, and wage adjustments. Our interest lies in the sensitivity of contract duration and wage increases per pay round to the underlying inflation rate, which can also be interpreted as a semi-elasticity. Based on the preceding reasoning and analysis, our expectations about the coefficient on inflation are that  $\beta < 0$  when we analyze duration since collective agreements tend to be shorter when inflation is higher and  $\beta > 0$  when we consider wage increases due to an upward pressure of higher inflation on wages.

Table 7 shows the results for the duration and wage increase as dependent variables side by side. The sign of  $\beta$  is in line with our expectations: Quantitatively, the results suggest that a 5 percentage point increase in the inflation rate leads to a 1.7 to 4.4 months shorter duration and a 3.4 to 4.1 percentage points higher nominal wage adjustment, depending on the specification. This is broadly in line with the firm-level evidence. In general, The main result is also not sensitive to changes in the time period or multiple regions per union (see Table 18 in Appendix B.7). Hence, both duration and wage increases have the expected sign and relation to inflation.<sup>23</sup>

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<sup>23</sup>Appendix B.8 discusses the importance of preceding, contemporaneous, and subsequent inflation for the duration and wage adjustments of union contracts favoring a backward-looking wage-setting behavior.

Table 7: Inflation, duration, and wage adjustments in labor union contracts

	Duration (in Months)			Wage Increase (in Percent)		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Inflation	−0.870*** (0.266)	−0.754*** (0.265)	−0.348 (0.237)	0.816*** (0.122)	0.773*** (0.122)	0.688*** (0.119)
Year			0.352*** (0.031)			−0.091*** (0.016)
Constant	21.158*** (0.615)	18.031*** (1.586)	−687.764*** (62.496)	1.850*** (0.280)	1.847** (0.720)	184.436*** (31.344)
Union-region FE		X	X		X	X
Observations	493	493	493	485	485	485
R <sup>2</sup>	0.021	0.094	0.289	0.085	0.155	0.213
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.019	0.046	0.249	0.083	0.109	0.168

*Notes:* This table shows the regression results for the duration, and the wage increase of labor union contracts. Panels 1 and 4 give the pooled OLS results without any controls, the specifications in panels 2 and 5 add union-region fixed effects, and panels 3 and 6 additionally add a linear trend for the year of the contract. Standard errors are in parentheses. \*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ .

## 4 Models of State-Dependent Wage Setting

After having established empirical facts about wage setting, we now ask what are the consequences of state-dependent wage setting at the macro level. For this purpose, we use the insights gained from our empirical section to calibrate a variety of structural macroeconomic models to study the implications of state-dependent wage setting for inflation and wage dynamics as well as for monetary policy. We first demonstrate that a fully micro-founded menu-cost model can rationalize the facts on wage setting both at the extensive and intensive margin. We then argue that a computationally simpler Calvo-type model with time-varying wage adjustment probability performs as well as the menu-cost model. Lastly, we build a New Keynesian model in which the (exogenous) probability of wage changes depends inversely on the expected inflation rate to study the importance of state-dependent wage setting on the effects of monetary policy and the shape of the Phillips curve.

### 4.1 Modeling wage stickiness: menu-cost vs. Calvo-type models

We develop a simple model of state-dependent wage setting in times of low and high inflation. The model rationalizes the key predictions of the empirical section: a shorter

duration and higher wage adjustment in times of high inflation compared to times of low inflation. We micro-found this with firms occurring fixed “menu costs” for resetting wages. In this framework, the probability of wage changes is *endogenous* and depends on the inflation rate and uncertainty. This is analogous to the menu cost models of price stickiness developed by Danziger (1999), Golosov and Lucas (2007), and Gagnon (2009). We then ask whether a computationally simpler Calvo model with an *exogenous* probability of wage changes, following the approach of Calvo (1983) and Erceg et al. (2000), can deliver similar results and, if so, under which conditions? We find that a corresponding calibration delivers close results and justifies using a Calvo model with *time-varying* parameters in the quantitative model.<sup>24</sup>

The economy is comprised of three types of agents. First, an infinitely lived representative household consumes a single homogeneous final good and provides a bundle of differentiated labor services to firms. Second, goods are produced by a continuum of firms. Each firm has monopsony power in the labor market, is subject to idiosyncratic technology shocks, and sells its output in a perfectly competitive goods market. Third, a monetary authority sets an exogenous money growth rate.

**Households.** A representative household derives utility from consumption  $C_t$  and disutility from labor  $L_t$ . It maximizes the expected lifetime utility,

$$\max_{\{C_t, L_t\}} \mathbb{E}_0 \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t [\log C_t - \psi L_t], \quad (1)$$

subject to a sequence of period budget constraints:

$$P_t C_t = \widetilde{W}_t L_t + P_t \Pi_t, \quad (2)$$

where  $P_t$  is the price level,  $\widetilde{W}_t$  is the nominal wage index and  $\Pi_t$  are aggregate real profits of firms. In addition, households face a “cash in advance” constraint limiting this period’s consumption spending to acquired money holdings:

$$P_t C_t = M_t. \quad (3)$$

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<sup>24</sup>A model with constant parameters, however, fails to generate state-dependency along the extensive margin.

Solving the household's maximization problem yields the following first-order conditions:

$$C_t = \frac{1}{\psi} \frac{\tilde{W}_t}{P_t}, \quad (4a)$$

$$\tilde{W}_t = \psi M_t. \quad (4b)$$

These first-order conditions imply that the dynamics of the nominal variables (price level and nominal wages) are pinned down by the path of  $M_t$ . This provides a simple way to model our two inflation regimes. In particular, we assume that the growth of  $M_t$  fluctuates around a trend  $\mu$ :

$$\ln(M_t) = \mu + \ln(M_{t-1}) + \epsilon_t^\mu, \quad \epsilon_t^\mu \sim \mathcal{N}(0, \sigma_\mu^2), \quad (5)$$

where  $\sigma_\mu^2$  measures the volatility of the money growth shock  $\epsilon_t^\mu$ . For the subsequent analysis, the trend money growth rate  $\mu$  is of key interest and differs across low and high-inflation regimes.

**Firms.** A continuum of firms of mass one indexed by  $z \in [0, 1]$ . Each firm operates under perfect competition in the product market, but has monopsony power in the labor market. The firm runs a linear production function using labor as the only input factor:

$$y_t = a_t l_t, \quad (6)$$

where  $y_t$  is output,  $a_t$  is productivity and  $l_t$  is labor input of the firm at time  $t$ . The firm faces an iso-elastic labor supply curve (derived from a CES aggregate):

$$l_t = \left( \frac{w_t}{W_t} \right)^\epsilon L_t, \quad (7)$$

where  $w_t$  is the individual firm's real wage,  $W_t = \tilde{W}_t/P_t$  is the index of real wages and  $L_t$  is aggregate employment.  $\epsilon$  reflects the wage elasticity of labor supply. The index of real wages is given by:

$$W_t = \left( \int_0^1 w_t(z)^{1+\epsilon} dz \right)^{1/(1+\epsilon)} \quad (8)$$

and aggregate employment is given by:

$$L_t = \left( \int_0^1 l_t(z)^{(1+\epsilon)/\epsilon} dz \right)^{\epsilon/(1+\epsilon)}. \quad (9)$$

At each point in time, the firm's real profit is:

$$\pi_t = y_t - w_t l_t = (a_t - w_t) \left( \frac{w_t}{W_t} \right)^\epsilon L_t. \quad (10)$$

The firm maximizes the present value of future profits discounted by the constant discount factor  $\beta$ .

The firm's productivity evolves according to the autoregressive process:

$$\ln(a_t) = \rho_a \ln(a_{t-1}) + \epsilon_t^a, \quad \epsilon_t^a \sim \mathcal{N}(0, \sigma_a^2), \quad (11)$$

where  $\rho_a$  measures the persistence and  $\sigma_a$  the volatility of productivity shocks.

#### 4.1.1 A Menu Cost Model

**Timing and Equilibrium.** At the beginning of each period, each firm takes an independent draw from the productivity shock distribution and learns about the state of the aggregated objects: aggregate real wages  $W_t$  and employment  $L_t$ . The firm then decides whether to keep the existing wage,  $w_t$ , or reset it to a new optimal level  $w_t^*$ . Resetting the wage is subject to a fixed cost  $\gamma$  expressed in units of labor. Thus the total cost of changing the wage is  $\gamma w_t$ . The firm then hires according to labor supply, given the set wage. Finally, the goods market clears.

In order to state the firm's problem recursive form, we define two value functions. The value of *changing* the wage  $V_c$  and the value of *not changing*  $V_{nc}$ . Let  $V$  be the value of the firm given productivity  $a(z)$  and given the current wage  $w(z)$ , which is the maximum of the value of changing and not changing the wage:

$$V(a_t, w_t) = \max[V_c(a_t, w_t), V_{nc}(a_t, w_t)]. \quad (12)$$

The values of changing or not changing the wage are given by the following two Bellman equations:

$$V_{nc}(a_t, w_t) = (a_t - w_t) \left( \frac{w_t}{W_t} \right)^\epsilon L_t + \beta \mathbb{E}_t[V(a_{t+1}, w_t)] \quad (13a)$$

$$V_c(a_t, w_t) = \max_{w_t^*} [V_{nc}(a_t, w_t) - \gamma w_t]. \quad (13b)$$

Clearly, the firm resets its wage whenever:

$$V_c(a_t, w_t) - V_{nc}(a_t, w_t) \geq \gamma w_t. \quad (14)$$

Note that the right-hand side of this inequality is an increasing function of the current wage. Thus, firms currently paying high wages face higher costs of resetting the wage.

**Solution and Calibration.** We solve the model by value function iteration on a grid of real wages and productivity values.<sup>25</sup> The algorithm is as follows: (i) we start with initial guesses for the value functions  $V_{nc}$  and  $V_c$  and aggregate objects  $W_t$  and  $L_t$ ; (ii) we solve the firm's problem by iterating on the value functions (13a) and (13b) for given  $W_t$  and  $L_t$  until convergence; (iii) we then simulate a long time series of individual wages and compute new candidates for  $W_t$  and  $L_t$  using equations (8) and (9); and (iv) we iterate over steps (i)-(ii) until  $W_t$  and  $L_t$  converge.

We calibrate the model to match the average frequency, duration, and size of wage changes found in our data. We set the discount factor  $\beta$  to  $0.96^{1/12}$  and the elasticity of labor supply  $\epsilon$  to 7 following Gagnon (2009). The parameters of the money growth process are chosen to match the periods of low and high inflation in our data. For the idiosyncratic productivity shock,  $\rho_a = 0.8$  and  $\sigma_a = 0.0325$  yield the closest match between the model and the data. The cost of resetting the wage is set to  $\gamma = 0.056$ . Table 20 summarizes the calibrated parameters. We simulate data for 500 firms for 500 periods each, and both calibration settings aligned with empirical results.

Table 8 presents the summary statistics for the model simulations of the menu cost model and Calvo model, outlined in Section 4.1.3, next to the survey data results from the ifo HR survey. In the low inflation regime, the duration of wage agreements is 14 months in both models, closely matching the data. Similarly, in the high inflation regime, the duration of wage agreements is lower, with 12 and 13 months in the models similar to the data. The adjustment per pay round (conditional on adjustment) is smaller for the low inflation regime both in the simulated model data and in the data.

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<sup>25</sup>We use 150 grid points for the real wage and 30 nodes for productivity. We approximate the AR(1) process for productivity using the method of Farmer and Toda (2017).

Table 8: Summary statistics of wage changes

	Menu cost model	Calvo model	Data
<b>Low inflation regime:</b>			
Annual inflation rate	0.020	0.020	0.020
Frequency of wage change (per month)	0.069	0.070	0.070
Duration of wage agreements (in months)	14.469	14.183	14.180
Size of wage change (percent)	2.45	2.43	3.000
<b>High inflation regime:</b>			
Annual inflation rate	0.068	0.069	0.070
Frequency of wage change (per month)	0.085	0.079	0.080
Duration of wage agreements (in months)	11.722	12.690	12.930
Size of wage change (percent)	6.73	7.92	5.000

Notes: Summary statistics based on model simulations (500 firms for 500 periods) and survey data from the ifo HR survey November 2022 with roughly 600 participating firms.

#### 4.1.2 Results.


We next shed light on the mechanism of the simple model and implications of the menu costs friction highlighting a couple of results and findings.

**The probability of wage adjustment increases in times of high inflation.** Panels (a) and (b) of Figure 3 present the probability of adjustment of future wages as a function of the productivity draw and current wage for the low and high inflation regimes. The probability of adjustment is high whenever there is a significant mismatch between the productivity draw and the current wage, i.e., the current wage is too high or low, given the productivity draw. In other words, any points far off the diagonal. In contrast, for any points on the diagonal, that is, productivity draw and current wage are similar, there is close to zero probability of adjusting the future wage. We can call this henceforth inaction area.

Comparing Panels (a) and (b) shows that the probability of wage change is higher in the high-inflation regime or, put differently, the inaction area is smaller in the high-inflation regime. In times of slightly higher and lower productivity draws, many more firms decide to adjust wages. Hence, introducing menu costs on wage setting leads to an *endogenous* wage-setting probability that depends not only on firm-specific productivity draws and initial positions but also on the aggregate inflation rate.




Figure 3: Probability of wage change



Notes: Conditional probability to change future wage depending on the current wage (x-axis) and productivity draw (y-axis).

**The duration of pay agreements shortens during times of high inflation.** Panel (a) of Figure 4 presents the analogous model results for Panel (a) of Figure 1. The duration of pay agreements shortens during periods of high inflation. There is a left shift in the duration in times of high inflation. On average, the duration decreases from 14 to 11 months. Again, we see that the duration is *endogenous* and varies with the level of the inflation rate.

Figure 4: Wage-setting behavior in times of low and high inflation (Menu cost model)



Notes: This figure shows the duration of pay agreements (extensive margin) and the wage adjustment in % (intensive margin) for the simulated data (500 firms for 500 periods) varying the mean inflation rate,  $\mu$ . The blue shaded bars reflect the low inflation period, with  $\mu$  set to 2%, and the red shaded bars reflect the high inflation period, with  $\mu$  set to 6.8%.


**The size of wage adjustments increases during times of high inflation.** Panel (b) of Figure 4 resembles the analogous model results for Panel (b) of Figure 1. The size of wage adjustments per pay round increases during periods of high inflation. There is a right shift in times of high inflation. On average, the size of wage adjustments increases from 2.5 to 6.8 percent. Again, we see that the size of wage adjustments is *endogenous* and varies with the level of the inflation rate.

**Duration is shorter for larger firms.** Focusing next on the cross-section, the model features a negative relationship between the number of employees and duration in line with the data. Figure 5 visualizes the negative relationship. Firms with high employment exhibit a lower average duration. In other words, those firms reset their wages more frequently. The underlying mechanism is that it is more costly for them to deviate from the optimal wage, and fixed reset costs are relatively lower.

### 4.1.3 A Calvo-Type Model

We now compare and contrast the menu cost model to a model in which firms draw the opportunity to reset wages from an exogenous distribution similar to the Calvo model of price setting.

Figure 5: Relation between duration of wage agreement and employment



*Notes:* This scatter plot contrasts the duration of wage agreement and size of employment for the simulated data varying the mean inflation rate,  $\mu$ . The blue, cross markers reflect the low inflation period, with  $\mu$  set to 2%, and the red, dotted markers reflect the high inflation period, with  $\mu$  set to 6.8%.

**Timing and Equilibrium.** In each period, the firm draws its productivity shock, observes the aggregate objects  $W_t$  and  $N_t$ , and learns whether it can change its wage or not. The probability of changing the wage is equal to  $1 - \theta$  and constant across time and firms. We note that the expected duration of a wage change is  $1/(1 - \theta)$ .

As before, we need to keep track of the two value functions (13a) and (13b). In contrast to the menu-cost model, the value function is a weighted average of the value of no change and the value of change:

$$V(a_t, w_t) = \theta V_{nc}(a_t, w_t) + (1 - \theta) V_c(a_t, w_t). \quad (15)$$


**Solution and Calibration.** We use the same approach to solve the Calvo-type model as before. We iterate over the value function and ensure aggregate objects are consistent with firms' optimization.

The setup of the Calvo-type model allows us to directly calibrate the probability of wage change to the average duration of wage changes observed in the data. Since the probability of wage changes is exogenous in this model, the only way to match the facts about wage setting in times of low and high inflation is to choose different  $\theta$ 's in the two regimes. We thus set  $\theta = 0.9286$  in the low inflation regime and  $\theta = 0.9167$  in the high inflation regime.

Panel (a) of Figure 6 presents the analogous model results for Panel (a) of Figure 1. Similar to the menu cost model results, we see that the duration of pay agreements shortens

during periods of high inflation. There is a left shift in times of high inflation. Likewise, Panel (b) resembles a larger size of adjustment in times of high inflation. There is a right shift of the wage adjustment in % in times of high inflation. Thus, we can conclude that the Calvo model with time-varying coefficients does a good job of reconciling the empirical facts, complementing Auclert et al. (2022)'s work on price setting.

Figure 6: Wage-setting behavior in times of low and high inflation (Calvo model)



*Notes:* This figure shows the duration of pay agreements (extensive margin) and the wage adjustment in % (intensive margin) for the simulated data (500 firms for 500 periods) varying the mean inflation rate,  $\mu$ . The blue shaded bars reflect the low inflation period, with  $\mu$  set to 2%, and the red shaded bars reflect the high inflation period, with  $\mu$  set to 6.8%.

## 4.2 A New Keynesian model with state-dependent wage setting

We now turn to a more complex model, which features both price and wage stickiness. This model is an adapted version of the standard New Keynesian model with Calvo pricing (see, e.g., Calvo 1983, Erceg et al. 2000), where we introduce state-dependent wage setting. We use this model to discuss the dynamic effects of monetary shocks under various wage specifications. We defer to Appendix D for the full model description.

### 4.2.1 Wage-setting dynamics

We will focus here on the dynamics of wage setting within a New Keynesian model with Calvo-type wage setting as in Erceg et al. (2000). In this model, wages are unchanged with probability  $\theta_t^w$  and reset with probability  $1 - \theta_t^w$ . The key innovation relative to the literature is that the wage-resetting probability is a function of the expected rate of inflation and, thus, an endogenous object. Specifically, we use the altered linex function to characterize

this state dependency:

$$(1 - \theta_t^w) = \frac{\kappa}{2} (\mathbb{E}_t \pi_{t+1})^2 + \frac{1}{\psi^2} (\exp(\psi (\mathbb{E}_t \pi_{t+1})) - \psi^w \mathbb{E}_t \pi_{t+1} - 1) + (1 - \theta_{ss}^w). \quad (16)$$

Since the wage-resetting probability is now endogenous, so is the expected duration of wage changes. Let us denote the expected duration of wage changes at time  $t$  by  $d_t^w$ . It is given by

$$d_t = \mathbb{E}_t [(1 - \theta_t^w) + \theta_t^w (1 - \theta_{t+1}^w) 2 + \theta_t^w \theta_{t+1}^w (1 - \theta_{t+2}^w) 3 + \dots], \quad (17)$$

As we show in Appendix D, we can write  $d_t$  recursively as follows:

$$d_t = (1 - \theta_t^w) + 2\theta_t^w \mathbb{E}_t d_{t+1} - \theta_t^w \mathbb{E}_t \theta_{t+1}^w d_{t+2} \quad (18)$$

In a zero-inflation steady state, we obtain the familiar formula for the expected duration:

$$\begin{aligned} d_{ss} &= (1 - \theta_{ss}^w) + 2\theta_{ss}^w d_{ss} - (\theta_{ss}^w)^2 d_{ss} \\ &= \frac{1}{1 - \theta_{ss}^w} \end{aligned}$$

Let us denote the optimal reset wage by  $W_t^\#$ . From the first-order condition of the wage setting problem, we get:

$$W_t^\# = \frac{\epsilon^w}{(1 - \epsilon^w)} \frac{\mathbb{E}_t \sum_{j=0}^{\infty} \theta_{t+j}^w \Lambda_{t,t+j} m r s_{t+j} W_{t+j}^{\epsilon^w} L_{t+j}^d}{\mathbb{E}_t \sum_{j=0}^{\infty} \theta_{t+j}^w \Lambda_{t,t+j} W_{t+j}^{\epsilon^w} P_{t+j}^{-1} L_{t+j}^d} \quad (19)$$

#### 4.2.2 Key equations

The key equations of the model are a version of the standard dynamic IS curve (20) and Phillips curve (21), a wage setting equation (22), a rule for monetary policy (23) plus an endogenous Calvo wage-setting probability depending positively on the inflation rate (24). For expositional convenience, we present here the log-linearized equations, but we should emphasize that the subsequent analysis uses the non-linear model solved via 3rd-order perturbation. Denoting the output gap by  $\tilde{y}_t$ , inflation by  $\tilde{\pi}_t$ , real wages by  $\tilde{w}_t$ , and the nominal interest rate by  $\tilde{r}_t$  (all in deviations from their respective steady-state values), we have:

$$\tilde{y}_t = -\frac{1}{\sigma} (\tilde{r}_t - \mathbb{E}_t \tilde{\pi}_{t+1}) + \mathbb{E}_t \tilde{y}_{t+1} \quad (20)$$

$$\tilde{\pi}_t = \gamma^p(\theta_{ss}^w, \pi_{ss}) \tilde{w}_t + \beta \mathbb{E}_t \tilde{\pi}_{t+1} \quad (21)$$


$$\tilde{w}_t - \tilde{w}_{t-1} = \gamma^w(\theta_{ss}^w, \pi_{ss}) [(\chi + \sigma) \tilde{y}_t - \tilde{w}_t] + \beta (\mathbb{E}_t \tilde{w}_{t+1} - \tilde{w}_t + \mathbb{E}_t \tilde{\pi}_{t+1}) - \tilde{\pi}_t \quad (22)$$

$$\tilde{r}_t = \rho^r \tilde{r}_{t-1} + (1 - \rho^r) \rho^\pi \tilde{\pi}_t + s_r \epsilon_t^r \quad (23)$$

$$(1 - \theta_t^w) = \frac{\kappa^w}{2} (\mathbb{E}_t \pi_{t+1})^2 + \frac{1}{(\psi^w)^2} (\exp(\psi^w (\mathbb{E}_t \pi_{t+1})) - \psi^w \mathbb{E}_t \pi_{t+1} - 1) + (1 - \theta_{ss}^w) \quad (24)$$

Equation (24) governs the evolution of the wage-setting probability, where  $\kappa^w$  and  $\psi^w$  reflect shape parameters calibrated to match the evidence presented in the empirical part of the paper. The parameters  $\gamma^p$  and  $\gamma^w$  are functions of the trend inflation rate  $\pi_{ss}$  as well as the steady-state wage resetting probability  $\theta_{ss}^w$ . The key difference to the standard model is that the wage reset probability  $(1 - \theta_t^w)$  follows an altered linex function capturing the convexity of adjustment frequency in times of high inflation but less so in times of deflation. Altered linex functions are a convenient way to model asymmetries and have been used in other areas of macroeconomics, e.g., to model downward wage rigidity. Figure 7 depicts the shape of the endogenous Calvo wage-setting frequency function.

Figure 7: Wage-setting frequency and inflation rate



Notes: This figure plots the wage-setting probability,  $(1 - \theta_t^w)$ , against the inflation rate,  $\pi_t$ .

The endogenous Calvo wage-setting probability directly alters wage inflation and therefore also price setting dynamics. As  $(1 - \theta_t^w)$  increases with the underlying level of the inflation rate, wages and prices become more flexible in an environment with high inflation. We can see this link more clearly by combining both equations:

$$\tilde{\pi}_t = \frac{\gamma^p \gamma_t^w}{\gamma_t^w + \gamma^p} (\chi + \sigma) \tilde{y}_t + \beta \mathbb{E}_t \tilde{\pi}_{t+1} - \frac{\gamma^p}{\gamma_t^w + \gamma^p} [\mathbb{E}_t \tilde{w}_{t+1} - \tilde{w}_{t-1} + (1 - \beta - \gamma^p) \tilde{w}_t] \quad (25)$$

Equation (25) illustrates a close link between price and wage inflation, or respectively a wage-price spiral. The price and wage adjustment frequencies,  $\theta^p$  and  $\theta_t^w$ , directly alter inflation dynamics via  $\gamma^p$  and  $\gamma_t^w$ . In other words, less sticky wages also accelerate the inflation rate.

### 4.2.3 Results

We study the dynamic behavior of our model under low and high-inflation environments, respectively. As before, we model these environments by a change in the *trend inflation* rate. We focus on expansionary monetary policy shocks to understand the differential impact of high inflation on price and wage setting.<sup>26</sup> We solve the model using 3<sup>rd</sup> order perturbation to take into account the non-linearities in our model.

In all our model simulations, we use the calibration summarized in Table 9. The parameters of the household's utility function, and monetary policy shock are standard. The Calvo probability of price adjustment is set to  $1 - 0.75$  implying an expected duration of prices of 4 quarters. The probability of wage adjustment is endogenous in our model and fluctuates around the steady-state value of  $1 - 0.9$ .


Table 9: Calibration for New Keynesian Model with state-dependent wage setting

Parameter	Description	Value
$\beta$	Discount factor	0.99
$\sigma$	Elast. of intertemporal substitution	1
$\epsilon^p$	Price elasticity of demand for goods	7
$\epsilon^w$	Wage elasticity of labor supply	7
$\chi$	Frisch elasticity of labor supply	1
$\psi$	Disutility of labor supply	0.7347
$\theta^p$	1 – Prob. of price change	0.75
$\theta_{ss}^w$	1 – Prob. of wage change in steady state	0.9
$\rho_R$	Persistence of monetary policy shock	0.8
$\sigma_R$	Standard dev. of monetary policy shock	0.0025
$\rho_\pi$	Taylor rule parameter on inflation	1.5

<sup>26</sup>The model features asymmetry implying that the results for negative shocks are not necessarily the mirror image.

Higher trend inflation affects monetary transmission in two ways: (i) directly creating a steady-state distortion and (ii) indirectly by affecting the probability of resetting wages. As shown in Figure 7, the probability of resetting wages increases with the underlying inflation rate. Hence, wages become more flexible in times of high inflation. This also affects prices and output dynamics. Figure 8 presents the transmission of monetary policy for different levels of trend inflation.

Figure 8: Impulse responses to a monetary shock: different levels of trend inflation



*Notes:* This figure plots the impulse response functions of output, inflation, wage, labor demand, the probability of wage changes, and the interest rate to a one standard deviation expansionary monetary shock for different levels of trend inflation.


As the results above show, an expansionary monetary shock causes the probability of wage adjustments  $1 - \theta^w$  to rise on impact both in the high- and low- inflation environment. Higher trend inflation is associated with an amplified response of inflation and nominal wage growth but a more attenuated response of output and employment. Intuitively, if inflation causes firms to reset wages more often, the economy becomes more similar to a flexible-price economy in which monetary shocks only affect nominal variables.

Again, the effect of higher trend inflation is two-fold. On the one hand, changing the steady-state inflation rate changes the dynamic behavior of the model in and of itself, as shown by Ascari and Sbordone (2014), leading to a more attenuated effect of inflation and amplified effect of output in times of high inflation and reduce the effectiveness of monetary policy. On the other hand, making wage-setting dependent on the inflation rate counteracts this effect and increases the effectiveness of monetary policy.



As is to be expected, we find that a lower degree of stickiness leads to a larger effect on prices while output contracts less. Sticky wages and prices create hump-shaped response of price and wage dispersion. As Figure 9 shows, this leads to a flattening of the Phillips curve.

Figure 9: Phillips curve



*Notes:* Simulated data for output and inflation for different levels of trend inflation. Data expressed in terms of deviations from the steady-state level (unconditional mean).

## 5 Conclusion

This paper studies state-dependent wage setting using firm-level survey data from Germany. We find that firms alter their wage-setting behavior during times of high inflation. In particular, we find that the expected size of wage adjustments increases from 2-4% to 4-6% per pay round while the expected duration of wage adjustments decreases by about 1.5 months on average when inflation rises from 2% to 7%. Exploiting the granularity of our data, we find that larger firms tend to increase wages by less but more frequently. Regarding the key factors influencing wage setting at the firm level, both labor market conditions and macroeconomic factors are important.

In the second part of our paper, we embed the empirical findings into structural macroeconomic models to study the implications of state-dependent wage-setting for the transmission of aggregate demand shocks. We argue that a Calvo-type model in which the probability of wage changes is exogenous from the firm's point of view behaves similarly

to a model in which firms choose whether to change wages endogenously (a menu cost model). The key is to make the exogenous probability of wage changes dependent on the expected inflation rate. We embed this idea into a more fully fledged New Keynesian model and show that state-dependent wage setting increases the impact of monetary policy on nominal variables but dampens the impact on real variables. We also demonstrate that state dependency leads to a steeper Phillips curve.

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# A Survey Instrument

**Sonderfragen: Lohnsetzung**

- 1) In welchem zeitlichen Abstand (in Monaten) wurden in Ihrem Unternehmen in den Jahren 2017-2019 die Mitarbeiterlöhne durchschnittlich angepasst? (exklusive Beförderungen, außerordentliche Gehaltsänderungen, etc.)

Alle \_\_\_\_\_ Monate

- 2) Um wie viel Prozent wurden die Mitarbeiterlöhne bei einer Lohnanpassung in den Jahren 2017-2019 im Durchschnitt verändert?

< 0%    0-2%    2-4%    4-6%    6-8%    8-10%    >10%

- 3) Wie wichtig waren die folgenden Faktoren für die vergangenen Lohnentscheidungen in Ihrem Unternehmen Bitte tragen Sie einen Wert von 0 (= gar keine Bedeutung) bis 10 (= sehr hohe Bedeutung) ein.

- \_\_\_ Lohnwettbewerb von Konkurrenten
- \_\_\_ Erwartetes Arbeitskräfteangebot/Angebot von Fachkräften
- \_\_\_ Orientierung an der Inflationsrate
- \_\_\_ Anpassung durch Tarifvertrag
- \_\_\_ Veränderung der Verkaufspreise
- \_\_\_ Veränderung der Nachfrage nach Arbeitskräften
- \_\_\_ Sonstiges: \_\_\_\_\_

- 4) Auswirkungen einer hohen Inflation auf Lohnverhandlungen

- a) In welchem zeitlichen Abstand (in Monaten) wurden bzw. werden in Ihrem Unternehmen in den Jahren 2022-2024 die Mitarbeiterlöhne durchschnittlich angepasst? (exklusive Beförderungen, außerordentliche Gehaltsänderungen, etc.)

Alle \_\_\_\_\_ Monate

- b) Um wie viel Prozent wurden bzw. werden die Mitarbeiterlöhne bei einer Lohnanpassung in den Jahren 2022-2024 im Durchschnitt verändert?

< 0%    0-2%    2-4%    4-6%    6-8%    8-10%    >10%

- 5) Welche Faktoren schränken Ihr Unternehmen in der Lohnsetzung ein? (Mehrfachnennung möglich)

- administrativer Aufwand
- Regulierung
- Lohnsetzung liegt nicht beim Unternehmen
- wirtschaftliche Faktoren/Existenzbedrohung
- Sonstiges: \_\_\_\_\_

- 6) Inwieweit variiert die Lohnanpassung in Ihrem Unternehmen nach Beschäftigungsgruppen im Vergleich zum Durchschnitt der drei Beschäftigungsgruppen?

- Zeitlicher Abstand der Anpassung (häufiger, gleich, weniger häufig)
- Höhe der Anpassung der Mitarbeiterlöhne in % (höher, gleich, niedriger)

	Zeitlicher Abstand der Anpassung			Höhe der Anpassung in %		
	häufiger	gleich	weniger häufig	höher	gleich	niedriger
Ungelernte Beschäftigte	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Fachkräfte ohne Leitungsposition	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Führungskräfte	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

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 Fax: (089) 9224-1463, E-Mail: PL-Umfrage@ifo.de

### Supplementary questions: wage setting (English translation)

A.1.: On average, how often (in months) did your firm adjust wages during 2017-2019? (excluding promotions, extraordinary wage changes, etc.) Every \_\_\_ months.

A.2.: On average, by how much (in percent) did you adjust wages during 2017-2019? <0, 0-2, 2-4, 4-6, 6-8, 8-10, >10%

A.3.: How important were the following factors for past wage decisions? Enter a value from 0 (= no importance) to 10 (= very high importance).

- Wage competition by other firms
- Expected labor supply/supply of skilled workers
- Focus on the inflation rate
- Adjustment due to a collective agreement
- Changes in sales prices
- Changes in labor demand
- Other factors:

A.4a/b.: Impact of high inflation on wage-setting practices at your firm

- On average, how often (in months) does your firm plan to adjust wages during 2022-2024? (excluding promotions, extraordinary wage changes, etc.) Every \_\_\_ months.
- On average, by how much (in percent) do you plan to adjust wages during 2022-2024? <0, 0-2, 2-4, 4-6, 6-8, 8-10, >10%

A.5.: What factors limit wage-setting practices at your firm? (Multiple answers possible)

- Administrative burden
- Regulation
- Wage decision outside of the firm
- Economic reasons/ threat to firm's existence
- Other factors:

A.6.: Do wage-setting practices vary at your firm by occupation group relative to the average?

→ Frequency of adjustment (more often, same, less often)


→ Extent of adjustment in percent (more often, same, less often)

- Unskilled workers
- Skilled workers without executive position
- Executives

# B Empirical Appendix


## B.1 Heterogeneity in wage-setting behavior across firm size and sectors

Figure 10: Extensive margin by size: 2017-2019 vs. 2022-2024




Notes: Average duration of pay agreements by firm size in terms of employees. Four buckets: Below 50, 50-249, 250-499, and above 500 employees.

Figure 11: Extensive margin by sector: 2017-2019 vs. 2022-2024




Notes: Average duration of pay agreements by sector by time period (2017-2019 vs. 2022-2024).

Figure 12: Intensive margin by size: 2017-2019 vs. 2022-2024



Notes: Histogram of average wage growth by firm size. Four buckets: Below 49, 50-249, 250-499, and above 500 employees.


Figure 13: Intensive margin by sector: 2017-2019 vs. 2022-2024



Notes: Histogram of average wage growth by sector.




Figure 14: Average duration of pay agreements and wage growth by industry: 2017-2019 vs. 2022-2024



Notes: Average duration of pay agreements and wage growth by industry for the periods 2017-2019 and 2022-2024.

Figure 15: Average changes in wage growth and duration by industry: 2017-2019 vs. 2022-2024



Notes: Changes in average duration of pay agreements and wage growth by industry between 2017-2019 and 2022-2024.

## B.2 Additional regression results wage-setting behavior and firm size

Table 10: Extensive margin and firm size: robustness checks

	2017-2019				2022-2024			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
log(employees)	-0.54*** (0.19)	-0.69*** (0.21)	-0.70*** (0.24)	-0.68*** (0.24)	-0.30* (0.17)	-0.41** (0.19)	-0.44** (0.21)	-0.078 (0.25)
Observations	423	421	405	394	403	400	386	301
$R^2$	0.018	0.091	0.109	0.121	0.007	0.098	0.143	0.153
1-Digit Sector FE		✓				✓		
2-Digit Sector FE			✓	✓			✓	✓
Add. Controls				✓				✓

*Notes:* This table shows the regression results for the duration of pay agreements in the periods 2017-2019 and 2022-2024 on firm size with different sets of controls: no controls, 1-Digit sector fixed effects, 2-Digit sector fixed effects, 2-Digit sector fixed effects and controlling for the share of part-time workers, share of temporary workers, share of trainees, and a dummy for family business. Standard errors are in parentheses. \*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ .

Table 11: Intensive margin and size: robustness checks

	2017-2019				2022-2024			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
log(employees)	-0.13*** (0.037)	-0.098** (0.041)	-0.10** (0.044)	-0.083* (0.045)	-0.075* (0.043)	-0.049 (0.048)	-0.050 (0.051)	-0.032 (0.054)
Observations	427	425	408	397	407	404	390	380
$R^2$	0.028	0.114	0.124	0.165	0.007	0.083	0.129	0.135
1-Digit Sector FE		✓				✓		
2-Digit Sector FE			✓	✓			✓	✓
Add. Controls				✓				✓

Notes: This table shows the regression results for wage adjustment in percent in the periods 2017-2019 and 2022-2024 on firm size with different sets of controls: no controls, 1-Digit sector fixed effects, 2-Digit sector fixed effects, 2-Digit sector fixed effects and controlling for the share of part-time workers, share of temporary workers, share of trainees, and a dummy for family business. Standard errors are in parentheses. \*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ .


Table 12: Expected wage adjustment in 2022 and 2023 conditional on adjustment

	2022				2023			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
log(employees)	-0.56*** (0.14)	-0.42*** (0.15)	-0.45** (0.17)	-0.49*** (0.19)	-0.34*** (0.12)	-0.33** (0.14)	-0.25* (0.15)	-0.28* (0.15)
Observations	243	239	225	220	326	322	309	302
$R^2$	0.065	0.206	0.266	0.290	0.024	0.069	0.125	0.130
1-Digit Sector FE		✓				✓		
2-Digit Sector FE			✓	✓			✓	✓
Add. Controls				✓				✓

Notes: This table shows the regression results for expected wage adjustment in percent in the periods 2022 and 2023 on firm size with different sets of controls: no controls, 1-Digit sector fixed effects, 2-Digit sector fixed effects, 2-Digit sector fixed effects and controlling for the share of part-time workers, share of temporary workers, share of trainees, and a dummy for family business. Standard errors are in parentheses. \*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ .


### B.3 Heterogeneity across workers

Figure 16: Duration: profiles across workers



Notes: Wage duration paths across groups of workers: unskilled workers, skilled workers without executive position, and executives. *Flat* refers to same duration across workers, *U-Shape* to shorter duration for unskilled workers and executives, *Inverse U-Shape* to longer duration for unskilled workers and executives, *Increase* to shorter duration for executives, and *Decrease* to shorter duration for low-skilled workers.

Figure 17: Wage growth: profiles across workers



Notes: Wage growth paths across groups of workers: unskilled workers, skilled workers without executive position, and executives. *Flat* refers to same wage adjustment across workers, *U-Shape* to lower wage adjustment for unskilled workers and executives, *Inverse U-Shape* to higher wage adjustment for unskilled workers and executives, *Increase* to lower wage adjustment for executives, and *Decrease* to lower wage adjustment for low-skilled workers.

## B.4 Summary statistics by unions

Table 13: Summary statistics by union

	Union	Size (year)	Availability	Number of contracts	Median Duration	Median Adjustment
1	Metal industry	3,639,000 (2022)	1956 - 2022	68	18	4.0
2	Civil service	3,530,200 (2023) <sup>27</sup>	1990 - 2023	115	24	2.6
3	Chemical industry	578,500 (2022)	1990 - 2022	52	14	3.3
4	Retail sector	573,500 (2021)	1989 - 2021	44	24	3.0
5	Main construction industry	425,100 (2021)	1988 - 2021	58	22	3.0
6	Private transport and traffic industry	179,800 (2022) <sup>25</sup>	1994 - 2022	21	24	2.8
7	Insurance sector	169,600 (2022)	1990 - 2022	42	18	3.0
8	Deutsche Post AG	160,000 (2023)	1987 - 2023	21	24	3.0
9	Deutsche Bahn AG	134,000 (2021)	1987 - 2021	40	20	2.5
10	Volkswagen AG	100,100 (2022)	1987 - 2022	23	19	3.4
11	Iron and steel industry	87,000 (2022)	1958 - 2022	70	16	3.7
$\Sigma / \bar{x}$				554	18	3.0

*Notes:* This table presents summary statistics derived from the labor union data. The data comprises eleven distinct unions. The “size” column provides the number of union members for the most recent year, presented within parentheses. The “availability” column specifies the time duration during which the data captures collective agreements, along with the corresponding number of contracts recorded, as well as the median duration and median wage adjustment for each union. The last row presents the number of contracts in the data, as well as the median duration and median wage adjustment in the full data.

<sup>25</sup>Part of the data about the union size stems from 2021; specifically, for the civil service (region West and East at the state level) and for the private transport and traffic industry (region North Rhine-Westphalia).

Table 14: Summary statistics by union and region

	Union	Region	Size (year)	Availability	#	D	A
1	Metal industry	West	3,639,000 (2022)	1956 - 2022	48	15	4.3
		East		1990 - 2022	20	21	3.0
2	Civil service	West, federal and local level	2,385,200 (2023)	1990 - 2023	20	24	2.7
		East, federal and local level		1990 - 2023	20	24	2.7
		West, state level (excluding Hesse)	1,100,000 (2021)	1990 - 2021	19	24	2.6
		East, state level (excluding Berlin)		1990 - 2021	19	24	2.6
		Berlin, state level		1990 - 2021	18	24	2.5
		Hesse, state level		1990 - 2021	19	24	2.4
3	Chemical industry	West	578,500 (2022)	1990 - 2022	26	14	3.0
		East		1990 - 2022	26	14	3.6
4	Retail sector	North Rhine-Westphalia	510,300 (2021)	1989 - 2021	21	24	3.0
		Brandenburg		63,200 (2021)	1990 - 2021	23	14
5	Main construction industry	West	425,100 (2021)	1988 - 2021	23	14	3.0
		East (excluding Berlin)		1990 - 2021	22	14	3.0
		Berlin		1999 - 2021	13	24	2.9
6	Private transport and traffic industry	North Rhine-Westphalia	176,500 (2021)	1994 - 2021	16	24	2.8
		Brandenburg		3,300 (2022)	2013 - 2022	5	25
7	Insurance sector	West	169,600 (2022)	1990 - 2022	21	18	2.8
		East		1991 - 2022	21	18	3.0
8	Deutsche Post AG		160,000 (2023)	1987 - 2023	21	24	3.0
9	Deutsche Bahn AG	West	134,000 (2021)	1987 - 2021	21	19	3.0
		East		1990 - 2021	19	22	2.5
10	Volkswagen AG		100,100 (2022)	1987 - 2022	23	19	3.4
11	Iron and steel industry	West	87,800 (2022)	1958 - 2022	49	15	4.0
		East		1991 - 2022	21	17	3.4
					554	18	3.0

*Notes:* This table presents summary statistics derived from the union data. The data comprises eleven distinct unions, each potentially encompassing various regions. The “size” column provides the number of union members for the most recent year, presented within parentheses, and encompasses multiple regions in certain instances. The “availability” column specifies the time duration during which the data captures collective agreements, along with the corresponding number of contracts recorded (column “#”), as well as the median duration (column “D”) and median wage adjustment (column “A”) within each union-region. The last row presents the number of contracts in the data, as well as the median duration and median wage adjustment in the full data.

Table 15: Descriptive statistics for union data

	N	Median	Std. dev.	Min	p25	p75	Max
<i>Panel A: Sample 1990 - 2023</i>							
Duration	496	19	7.50	3	13	24	59
Adjustment	488	3	3.51	0	2	3.52	46.37
Duration ( $\pi < 3\%$ )	406	20	7.51	3	13	24	59
Duration ( $\pi > 3\%$ )	90	16	7.24	7	12	24	43
Adjustment ( $\pi < 3\%$ )	404	2.80	2.43	0	2	3.23	35
Adjustment ( $\pi > 3\%$ )	84	5.30	6.07	0	3	6	46.37
Duration ( $\pi < 2\%$ )	328	22	7.53	3	14	24	59
Duration ( $\pi > 2\%$ )	168	16	7.06	3	12	24	44
Adjustment ( $\pi < 2\%$ )	328	2.80	1.24	0	2	3.20	15.50
Adjustment ( $\pi > 2\%$ )	160	3.55	5.57	0	2.40	5.80	46.37
Duration ( $\pi < 2.5\%$ )	358	22	7.32	3	14	24	59
Duration ( $\pi > 2.5\%$ )	138	14.50	7.22	3	12	22.50	44
Adjustment ( $\pi < 2.5\%$ )	358	2.80	1.22	0	2	3.20	15.50
Adjustment ( $\pi > 2.5\%$ )	130	4.15	6.10	0	2.30	6	46.37
Duration ( $\pi < 3.5\%$ )	423	20	7.50	3	14	24	59
Duration ( $\pi > 3.5\%$ )	73	14	6.59	7	12	18	43
Adjustment ( $\pi < 3.5\%$ )	421	2.80	2.40	0	2	3.20	35
Adjustment ( $\pi > 3.5\%$ )	67	5.50	6.42	0	3.58	6.50	46.37
<i>Panel B: Sample 1956 - 2023</i>							
Duration	554	18	7.49	3	13	24	59
Adjustment	546	3	3.51	0	2.10	3.89	46.37
Duration ( $\pi < 3\%$ )	438	19.50	7.52	3	13	24	59
Duration ( $\pi > 3\%$ )	116	14	6.91	7	12	21.50	43
Adjustment ( $\pi < 3\%$ )	436	3	2.47	0	2	3.40	35
Adjustment ( $\pi > 3\%$ )	110	5.40	5.50	0	3	6.50	46.37
<i>Panel C: Sample 1990 - 2023; one identifier per industry</i>							
Duration	231	18	6.59	3	13	24	44
Adjustment	231	3	1.45	0	2	3.60	7
Duration ( $\pi < 3\%$ )	191	19	6.56	3	13	24	44
Duration ( $\pi > 3\%$ )	40	14.50	6.40	7	12	23.25	33
Adjustment ( $\pi < 3\%$ )	191	3	1.12	0	2	3.40	6.50
Adjustment ( $\pi > 3\%$ )	40	5.15	2.02	0	3	6	7

Notes: This table provides summary statistics for the duration of pay agreements (in months) and wage adjustment per contract (in percent). Panel A shows the main sample (1990 – 2023), Panel B refers to the full sample (1956 – 2023), and Panel C restricts the main sample (1990 – 2023) to one region (the largest) per union.

Table 16: Alternative measures of adjustment


	N	Median	Std. dev.	Min	p25	p75	Max
<i>Panel A: Baseline Adjustment</i>							
Baseline Adjustment	489	3	3.51	0	2	3.50	46.37
Baseline Duration	497	19	7.31	3	13	24	59
Adjustment ( $\pi < 3\%$ )	405	2.80	2.43	0	2	3.20	35
Adjustment ( $\pi > 3\%$ )	84	5.30	6.10	0	3	6	46.37
<i>Panel B: Real Wage</i>							
Real Wage	489	1.40	3.38	-6.89	0.44	2.11	42.75
Real Wage ( $\pi < 3\%$ )	405	1.45	2.37	-1.94	0.66	2.07	32.47
Real Wage ( $\pi > 3\%$ )	84	0.21	6.32	-6.89	-0.70	2.38	42.75
<i>Panel C: Annualized Adjustment</i>							
Annualized Adjustment	489	1.68	5.94	0	1.24	2.74	90
Annualized Adjustment ( $\pi < 3\%$ )	405	1.60	5.78	0	1.20	2.48	90
Annualized Adjustment ( $\pi > 3\%$ )	84	3.84	6.23	0	1.61	6.50	46.37
<i>Panel D: Total Adjustment</i>							
Total Adjustment	489	4	4.33	0	2.90	5.40	46.37
Total Adjustment ( $\pi < 3\%$ )	405	3.80	3.19	0	2.80	5	41.52
Total Adjustment ( $\pi > 3\%$ )	84	5.80	7.32	0	3.64	6.62	46.37
<i>Panel E: Weighted Adjustment</i>							
Weighted Adjustment	489	3	3.89	0	2.06	3.94	46.37
Weighted Adjustment ( $\pi < 3\%$ )	405	2.83	2.87	0	2	3.58	35
Weighted Adjustment ( $\pi > 3\%$ )	84	5.03	6.52	0	3	6	46.37
<i>Panel F: Other measures</i>							
Adjustment	489	3	3.51	0	2	3.50	46.37
Adjustment Duration	489	15	6.36	0	12	21	59
Increase 1	216	2.20	1.64	0.60	1.80	2.60	20.69
Increase 1 Duration	216	10	3.89	3	7	12	25
Increase 2	32	1.40	1.41	0.40	1	1.98	7.30
Increase 2 Duration	32	7	2.66	1	6	9	12

*Notes:* This table provides summary statistics for alternative measures of adjustment. Panel A shows the baseline adjustment, Panel B the real wage (i.e. the difference between baseline adjustment and inflation), Panel C the annualized adjustment (i.e. the baseline adjustment is normalized to a duration of 12 months), Panel D the total adjustment (i.e. the sum of baseline adjustment, increase 1 and increase 2), Panel E the weighted adjustment (i.e. the sum of baseline adjustment, increase 1 and increase 2, weighted by its duration), and Panel F other measures (in order to calculate Panels D and E).



### B.5 Inflation over time


Figure 18: Inflation over time (1955 - 2024)



Notes: This figure plots inflation during the period 1955 - 2024, with data from the “Deutsche Bundesbank”. The values indicated with a star (2023 and 2024) are a forecast as of June 2023. The vertical dashed line (green) shows the year 1990, after which most of the union data is available; the horizontal dashed line (purple) signifies an inflation rate of 3%, which distinguishes low- and high inflation environments.


## B.6 Empirical wage setting behavior of labor unions

Figure 19: Wage setting behavior of labor unions in times of low ( $< 2\%$ ) and high ( $> 2\%$ ) inflation




*Notes:* This figure shows the duration of pay agreements (extensive margin) and the wage adjustment in percent (intensive margin) for collective bargaining agreements during the period 1990 - 2023, split into environments of low inflation ( $< 2\%$ ) in blue and high inflation ( $> 2\%$ ) in red. The dotted vertical lines show the median duration and adjustment for each inflation environment. Due to visibility, Panel (b) omits two very high wage adjustments – they amount to 35% (46.37 %) and fall in periods of low (high) inflation.

Figure 20: Wage setting behavior of labor unions in times of low ( $< 2.5\%$ ) and high ( $> 2.5\%$ ) inflation




*Notes:* This figure shows the duration of pay agreements (extensive margin) and the wage adjustment in percent (intensive margin) for collective bargaining agreements during the period 1990 - 2023, split into environments of low inflation ( $< 2.5\%$ ) in blue and high inflation ( $> 2.5\%$ ) in red. The dotted vertical lines show the median duration and adjustment for each inflation environment. Due to visibility, Panel (b) omits two very high wage adjustments – they amount to 35% (46.37 %) and fall in periods of low (high) inflation.

Figure 21: Wage setting behavior of labor unions in times of low ( $< 3.5\%$ ) and high ( $> 3.5\%$ ) inflation




Notes: This figure shows the duration of pay agreements (extensive margin) and the wage adjustment in percent (intensive margin) for collective bargaining agreements during the period 1990 - 2023, split into environments of low inflation ( $< 3.5\%$ ) in blue and high inflation ( $> 3.5\%$ ) in red. The dotted vertical lines show the median duration and adjustment for each inflation environment. Due to visibility, Panel (b) omits two very high wage adjustments – they amount to 35% (46.37 %) and fall in periods of low (high) inflation.

Figure 22: Wage setting behavior of labor unions in times of low ( $< 3\%$ ) and high ( $> 3\%$ ) inflation, full sample




Notes: This figure shows the duration of pay agreements (extensive margin) and the wage adjustment in percent (intensive margin) for collective bargaining agreements during the period 1956 - 2023, split into environments of low inflation ( $< 3\%$ ) in blue and high inflation ( $> 3\%$ ) in red. The dotted vertical lines show the median duration and adjustment for each inflation environment. Due to visibility, Panel (b) omits two very high wage adjustments – they amount to 35% (46.37 %) and fall in periods of low (high) inflation.

Figure 23: Wage setting behavior of labor unions in times of low (< 3%) and high (> 3%) inflation, single identifier



Notes: This figure shows the duration of pay agreements (extensive margin) and the wage adjustment in percent (intensive margin) for collective bargaining agreements during the period 1990 - 2023, split in times of low inflation (< 3%) in blue and high inflation (> 3%) in red. The dotted vertical lines show the median duration and adjustment for each inflation environment. The data includes only one region (the largest) per union.

Figure 24: Real wage and annualized wage of labor unions in times of low (< 3%) and high (> 3%) inflation



Notes: This figure shows the real wage and annualized wage, split into environments of low inflation (< 3%) in blue and high inflation (> 3%) in red. The dotted vertical lines show the median adjustment for each inflation environment. Due to visibility, Panel (a) omits two very high real wage adjustments (they amount to 32.5% (42.8 %) and fall in periods of low (high) inflation) and Panel (b) omits five very high annualized wage adjustments (they amount to 90%, 70% and 27.8% (24.9 and 46.4 %) and fall in periods of low (high) inflation).

## B.7 Regression analysis of inflation, duration, and wage adjustments in labor union contracts

Table 17: Inflation, duration, and wage adjustments in labor union contracts for different samples

	Duration (in Months)			Wage Increase (in Percent)		
	Baseline	1956 – 2023	one region per union	Baseline	1956 – 2023	one region per union
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Inflation	–0.754*** (0.265)	–0.855*** (0.225)	–0.612* (0.333)	0.773*** (0.122)	0.748*** (0.103)	0.462*** (0.069)
Constant	18.031*** (1.586)	18.472*** (1.202)	17.750*** (1.465)	1.847** (0.720)	2.650*** (0.547)	2.461*** (0.303)
Union-region FE	X	X	X	X	X	X
Observations	493	551	230	485	543	230
R <sup>2</sup>	0.094	0.115	0.099	0.155	0.176	0.194
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.046	0.073	0.053	0.109	0.136	0.154

*Notes:* This table shows the regression results for the duration (in months, panels 1 to 3), and the wage increase (in percent, panels 4 to 6) of labor union contracts. Panels 1 and 4 give the baseline pooled OLS results with union-region fixed effects for the main sample (years 1990 to 2023, multiple regions per union), panels 2 and 5 focus on the full sample from 1956 to 2023 (the contracts from 1956 to 1989 almost exclusively stem from the metal- as well as iron and steel industry), and panels 3 and 6 restrict the baseline sample to the biggest region within a union. Standard errors are in parentheses. \*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ .

Table 18: Inflation, duration, and wage adjustments in labor union contracts for different samples

	Duration (in Months)			Wage Increase (in Percent)		
	Baseline	1956 – 2023	one region per union	Baseline	1956 – 2023	one region per union
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Inflation > 3 percent	–5.378* (2.875)	–2.892 (2.468)	–7.816** (3.688)	6.264*** (1.331)	4.691*** (1.142)	2.760*** (0.768)
Inflation	–0.868 (0.542)	–0.839* (0.494)	–0.520 (0.693)	0.768*** (0.249)	0.660*** (0.226)	0.532*** (0.144)
Inflation:Inflation > 3 percent	1.303 (0.836)	0.586 (0.714)	1.621 (1.051)	–1.320*** (0.384)	–0.866*** (0.328)	–0.633*** (0.219)
Constant	18.216*** (1.671)	18.441*** (1.306)	17.705*** (1.662)	1.787** (0.764)	2.741*** (0.597)	2.343*** (0.346)
Observations	497	555	232	489	547	232
R <sup>2</sup>	0.106	0.122	0.119	0.193	0.203	0.233
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.054	0.077	0.067	0.146	0.162	0.187

*Notes:* This table shows the regression results for the duration (in months, panels 1 to 3), and the wage increase (in percent, panels 4 to 6) of labor union contracts. Panels 1 and 4 give the baseline pooled OLS results with union-region fixed effects for the main sample (years 1990 to 2023, multiple regions per union), panels 2 and 5 focus on the full sample from 1956 to 2023 (the contracts from 1956 to 1989 almost exclusively stem from the metal- as well as iron and steel industry), and panels 3 and 6 restrict the baseline sample to the biggest region within a union. Standard errors are in parentheses. \* p<0.10, \*\* p<0.05, \*\*\* p<0.01.

## B.8 Backward-looking vs. forward-looking wage-setting behavior

This subsection studies backward-looking vs. forward-looking wage-setting behavior. In particular, we focus on the relation between preceding, contemporaneous, and subsequent inflation and duration and wage adjustments in labor union contracts.<sup>28</sup> Figure 25 shows that the pairwise correlation between each inflation measure and the duration and wage increase point towards a similar direction: Inflation in  $t$ ,  $t - 1$ , and  $t + 1$  correlate negatively with duration and positively with wage increases. This is partly driven by the fact that inflation across two subsequent years is strongly positively correlated. Thus, inflation is relatively sticky over one year but less so over two years.

Figure 25: Correlations between inflation (leads and lags) and wage setting



Notes: This figure shows correlations between inflation in  $t$ ,  $t - 1$ , and  $t + 1$ , as well as duration and wage increase of labor union contracts. Different shades of blue (red) indicate a positive (negative) correlation between each variables.

To investigate whether wage-setting is forward-looking or backward-looking and account for the multicollinearity in inflation over time, Table 19 investigates the importance of the inflation rate in  $t - 1$ ,  $t$ , and  $t + 1$  for the duration and wage increase of collective

<sup>28</sup>Due to data constraints, we assume that the collective bargaining parties perfectly anticipate the realized inflation rate in  $t + 1$ . For instance, the panel about inflation expectations from the Deutsche Bundesbank for Germany starts in April 2019.

bargaining contracts in a regression. We will first consider the inflation rates in  $t - 1$ ,  $t$  and  $t + 1$  individually before we jointly estimate them on the outcomes. The effect of inflation in the *preceding* year on duration and wage increases is the strongest in both the individual and joint estimation, pointing towards a backward-looking behavior of unions. For instance, increasing inflation in  $t - 1$  by one percentage point relates to a 2.4 months shorter contract and a 1 percentage point higher wage increase, respectively. This effect is similar for contemporaneous and subsequent inflation but an order of magnitude smaller. Jointly estimating inflation in the preceding, contemporaneous, and subsequent years shows that inflation in the preceding period is quantitatively the most important predictor of both the duration and wage increase. While inflation in  $t + 1$  still points toward the expected direction in both specifications, contemporaneous inflation plays no role for the wage increase and points toward the opposite direction for the duration.

Table 19: Regressions of duration and wage increase on inflation in  $t - 1$ ,  $t$ , and  $t + 1$

	Duration (in Months)				Wage Increase (in Percent)			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Inflation	-0.754*** (0.265)			2.231*** (0.492)	0.773*** (0.122)			0.009 (0.235)
Inflation $t - 1$		-2.365*** (0.320)		-3.674*** (0.440)		1.016*** (0.154)		0.914*** (0.212)
Inflation $t + 1$			-0.549** (0.228)	-1.501*** (0.344)			0.509*** (0.106)	0.408** (0.165)
Constant	18.031*** (1.586)	20.836*** (1.543)	17.661*** (1.572)	21.866*** (1.554)	1.847** (0.720)	1.530** (0.732)	2.335*** (0.724)	0.864 (0.743)
Union-region FE	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Observations	493	493	493	493	485	485	485	485
R <sup>2</sup>	0.094	0.175	0.090	0.213	0.155	0.160	0.124	0.188
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.046	0.131	0.041	0.167	0.109	0.114	0.077	0.140

*Notes:* This table shows the regression results for the duration (in months, panels 1 to 4), and the wage increase (in percent, panels 5 to 8) of labor union contracts. Panels 1 and 4 give the baseline pooled OLS results with union-region fixed effects, panels 2 and 6 (3 and 7) use inflation in the preceding (subsequent) year as the main predictor, and panels 4 and 8 simultaneously include the preceding, contemporaneous and subsequent inflation rate as predictors. Standard errors are in parentheses. \*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ .

The literature is divided on whether wage setting refers more to backward-looking or forward-looking inflation. An examination of UK earnings patterns spanning from 1967 to 1987 conducted by Moghadam and Wren-Lewis (1994) is inconclusive whether wage setting predominantly pertains to backward-looking or forward-looking inflation. However, there is a slight inclination towards supporting the forward-looking structural model based on the available evidence. Turning to the United States, Jordà et al. (2022)



underscore the significance of inflation expectations within the current high-inflation environment arguing that inflation expectations now occupy a more prominent position in shaping wage-setting dynamics compared to previous periods. Although our context is Germany, the latter observation aligns well with our finding. Table 19 shows that past inflation is the most important factor for duration and wage increases among past, contemporaneous and future inflation. However, inflation expectations in the future might become more relevant starting with 2021. Yet, this effect might not be visible since the years 2021-2023 only constitute a fraction of our main data (1990-2023).

## C Modeling Wage Stickiness: Details

Table 20: Calibration of model parameters

Parameter	Description	Value
$\beta$	Discount factor of household	$0.96^{1/12}$
$\epsilon$	Elasticity of labor supply	7
$\gamma$	Menu cost of resetting wage	0.056
$\rho_a$	Persistence of productivity shock	0.8
$\sigma_a$	Standard deviation of productivity shock	0.0325
$\sigma_\mu$	Standard deviation of monetary shock	0.0032

## D New Keynesian Model: Details

### Households

There is a continuum of homogeneous households maximizing their flow utility:

$$U(C_t, L_t) = \frac{C_t^{1-\sigma}}{1-\sigma} - \psi \frac{L_t^{1+\chi}}{1+\chi}$$

with  $C_t$  reflecting the consumption and  $L_t$  labor supply of the household.  $\sigma$  captures the intertemporal elasticity of substitution and  $\chi$  the inverse Frisch elasticity of labor supply. The household discounts the flow utility by discount factor  $\beta$ . The households budget constraint in nominal terms is:

$$P_t C_t + B_t \leq MRS_t L_t + R_{t-1} B_{t-1} + Div_t, \quad (26)$$

requiring that expenditures on consumption and savings,  $B_t$ , cannot exceed the sum of labor income,  $MRS_t L_t$ , interest return on last period's savings,  $R_{t-1} B_{t-1}$ , and distributed dividends,  $Div_t$ .

Solving the household's maximization problem yields the following first-order conditions:

$$\psi L_t^\chi = C_t^{-\sigma} mrs_t \quad (27)$$

$$1 = R_t \mathbb{E}_t \Lambda_{t,t+1} \Pi_{t+1}^{-1} \quad (28)$$

$$\Lambda_{t,t+1} = \beta \left( \frac{C_{t+1}}{C_t} \right)^{-\sigma}, \quad (29)$$

where the lower case variables reflect real terms.

### Production

The goods production process is split into three sectors: a representative wholesale firm, retail firms, and a final goods firm. We start by describing the production model blocks backward along the supply chain.

**Final goods firm.** The competitive final goods firm combines differentiated input goods,  $Y_t(f)$ , from the wholesale firms, bundles and repackages them into a homogeneous final good sold to the households, where the different varieties are denoted by  $f$ . The final goods firm's technology is:

$$Y_t = \left[ \int_0^1 Y_t(f)^{\frac{\epsilon_p - 1}{\epsilon_p}} df \right]^{\frac{\epsilon_p}{\epsilon_p - 1}}$$

where  $\epsilon_p$  reflects the elasticity of substitution across intermediate inputs. The final goods firms first-order condition in real terms is:

$$Y(f)_t = \left( \frac{P_t(f)}{P_t} \right)^{-\epsilon_p} Y_t$$

$$P_t^{1-\epsilon_p} = \int_0^1 P_t(f)^{1-\epsilon_p} df$$

**Retail firms.** The retail firms buy differentiated wholesale goods from the wholesale firm at price,  $P_t^w$ , and transform them into a final good and sell it to a competitive final goods at price,  $P_t(f)$ , taking into account the demand function of the final goods firm:

$$DIV_t^r(f) = P_t(f) \left( \frac{P_t(f)}{P_t} \right)^{-\epsilon_p} Y_t - P_t^w \left( \frac{P_t(f)}{P_t} \right)^{-\epsilon_p} Y_t$$

Retailers face a nominal rigidity and can only adjust their price with a probability of  $(1 - \theta^p)$ . This makes their price decision problem dynamic, accounting for the fact that the price might remain effective for multiple periods. The retailers' maximization problem is to maximize future real dividends discounted by the stochastic discount factor,  $\Lambda_{t,t+1}$ :

$$\max_{P_t(f)} = \mathbb{E}_t \sum_{j=0}^{\infty} \theta^{p,j} \Lambda_{t,t+j} \{ P_t(f)^{1-\epsilon_p} P_{t+j}^{\epsilon_p - 1} Y_{t+j} - P_{t+j}^w P_t(f)^{-\epsilon_p} P_{t+j}^{\epsilon_p - 1} Y_{t+j} \} \quad (30)$$

The first-order condition is:

$$(1 - \epsilon^p) P_t(f)^{-\epsilon^p} \mathbb{E}_t \sum_{j=0}^{\infty} \theta^{p,j} \Lambda_{t,t+j} P_{t+j}^{\epsilon^p - 1} Y_{t+j} + \epsilon^p P_t(f)^{-\epsilon^p - 1} \mathbb{E}_t \sum_{j=0}^{\infty} \theta^{p,j} \Lambda_{t,t+j} P_{t+j}^w P_{t+j}^{\epsilon^p - 1} Y_{t+j} = 0 \quad (31)$$

The optimal reset price,  $P_t^\#$ , is independent of  $f$  allowing us to simplify the equation to:

$$P_t^\# = \frac{\epsilon^p}{(1 - \epsilon^p)} \frac{\mathbb{E}_t \sum_{j=0}^{\infty} \theta^{p,j} \Lambda_{t,t+j} P_{t+j}^w P_{t+j}^{\epsilon^p - 1} Y_{t+j}}{\mathbb{E}_t \sum_{j=0}^{\infty} \theta^{p,j} \Lambda_{t,t+j} P_{t+j}^{\epsilon^p - 1} Y_{t+j}} \quad (32)$$

This can be simplified and expressed recursively:

$$P_t^\# = \frac{\epsilon^p}{(1 - \epsilon^p)} \frac{X_{1,t}}{X_{2,t}}$$

$$X_{1,t} = P_t^w P_t^{\epsilon^p - 1} Y_t + \theta^p \Lambda_{t,t+j} X_{1,t+1}$$

$$X_{2,t} = P_t^{\epsilon^p - 1} Y_t + \theta^p \Lambda_{t,t+j} X_{2,t+1}$$

In real terms, divided by the price level,<sup>29</sup> this expression becomes:

$$x_{1,t} = p_t^w Y_t + \theta^p \mathbb{E}_t \Lambda_{t,t+1} \Pi_{t+1}^{\epsilon^p} x_{1,t+1} \quad (33)$$

$$x_{2,t} = Y_t + \theta^p \mathbb{E}_t \Lambda_{t,t+1} \Pi_{t+1}^{\epsilon^p - 1} x_{2,t+1} \quad (34)$$

$$\Pi_t^\# = \frac{\epsilon^p}{(1 - \epsilon^p)} \frac{x_{1,t}}{x_{2,t}} \quad (35)$$

**Wholesale firm.** The representative wholesale firm hires labor from the labor packer to produce output,  $Y_t^w$ , and sells it to the retail firms at price,  $P_t^w$ , where the superscript  $w$  stands for wholesale. The production function of the firm is linear:

$$Y_t^w = A L_t^d \quad (36)$$

The representative wholesale firm maximizes dividends subject to the production function and taking wages and prices as given:

$$DIV_t^w = P_t^w Y_t^w - W_t L_t^d$$

The wholesale firms first-order condition in real terms is:

$$w_t = A p_t^w \quad (37)$$

## Labor Markets

Assume that workers belong to labor packers (or unions) and provide a differentiated product. There are a continuum of labor unions indexed by  $l \in [0, 1]$ . Similar to the production side, we describe the model parts in a backward order.

**Labor packers.** The labor packers bundle union labor into a final labor input using a CES technology, where  $\epsilon^w$  determines the degree of worker substitutability:

$$L_t^d = \left[ \int_0^1 L_t^d(l) \frac{\epsilon^w - 1}{\epsilon^w} dl \right]^{\frac{\epsilon^w}{\epsilon^w - 1}}$$

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<sup>29</sup>  $x_{1,t}$  and  $x_{2,t}$  are defined as  $x_{1,t} = \frac{X_{1,t}}{P_t^{\epsilon^p}}$  and  $x_{2,t} = \frac{X_{2,t}}{P_t^{\epsilon^p - 1}}$

Profit maximization of the labor packers yields a demand curve for each union's labor and an aggregate wage index:

$$L_t^d(l) = \left( \frac{W_t(l)}{W_t} \right)^{-\epsilon^w} L_t^d$$

$$W_t^{1-\epsilon^w} = \int_0^1 W_t(l)^{1-\epsilon^w} dl$$

**Unions.** Unions repackage differentiated labor from the households for resale to the labor packer. The unions maximize profits subject to the labor packer's demand function, expressed in real terms:

$$\pi_t^u(l) = W_t(l) \left( \frac{W_t(l)}{W_t} \right)^{-\epsilon^w} P_t^{-1} L_t^d - mrs_t \left( \frac{W_t(l)}{W_t} \right)^{-\epsilon^w} L_t^d,$$

where  $mrs_t$  reflects the worker's marginal rate of substitution between labor and consumption.

The unions face a nominal rigidity and can only adjust their wage with a probability of  $(1 - \theta_t^w)$ . This makes their wage decision problem dynamic, accounting for the fact that the wage might remain effective for multiple periods. The unions' maximization problem is to maximize future real dividends discounted by the stochastic discount factor,  $\Lambda_{t,t+1}$ :

$$\max_{W_t(l)} \mathbb{E}_t \sum_{j=0}^{\infty} \theta^{w,j} \Lambda_{t,t+j} \{ W_t(l)^{1-\epsilon^w} W_{t+j}^{\epsilon^w} P_{t+j}^{-1} L_{t+j}^d - mrs_{t+j} W_t(l)^{-\epsilon^w} W_{t+j}^{\epsilon^w} L_{t+j}^d \}$$

The first-order condition is:

$$(1-\epsilon^w) W_t(l)^{-\epsilon^w} \mathbb{E}_t \sum_{j=0}^{\infty} \theta^{w,j} \Lambda_{t,t+j} W_{t+j}^{\epsilon^w} P_{t+j}^{-1} L_{t+j}^d + \epsilon^w W_t(l)^{-\epsilon^w - 1} \mathbb{E}_t \sum_{j=0}^{\infty} \theta^{w,j} \Lambda_{t,t+j} mrs_{t+j} W_{t+j}^{\epsilon^w} L_{t+j}^d = 0$$

The reset wage,  $W_t^\#$  is independent of  $l$  and can be rewritten as:

$$W_t^\# = \frac{\epsilon^w}{(1 - \epsilon^w)} \frac{\mathbb{E}_t \sum_{j=0}^{\infty} \theta^{w,j} \Lambda_{t,t+j} mrs_{t+j} W_{t+j}^{\epsilon^w} L_{t+j}^d}{\mathbb{E}_t \sum_{j=0}^{\infty} \theta^{w,j} \Lambda_{t,t+j} W_{t+j}^{\epsilon^w} P_{t+j}^{-1} L_{t+j}^d}$$

The reset wage depends positively on expected inflation, that is, higher inflation expectations increase the reset wage.

Rewritten recursively and expressed in real terms this becomes:

$$w_t^\# = \frac{\epsilon^w}{(1 - \epsilon^w)} \frac{f_{1,t}}{f_{2,t}} \quad (38)$$

$$f_{1,t} = mrs_t w_t^{\epsilon^w} L_t^d + \theta_t^w \mathbb{E}_t \Lambda_{t,t+1} \Pi_{t+1}^{\epsilon^w} f_{1,t+1} \quad (39)$$

$$f_{2,t} = w_t^{\epsilon^w} L_t^d + \theta_t^w \mathbb{E}_t \Lambda_{t,t+1} \Pi_{t+1}^{\epsilon^w - 1} f_{2,t+1} \quad (40)$$

The expected duration of a wage change conditional of information at time  $t$  is given by

$$d_t = \mathbb{E}_t [(1 - \theta_t^w) + \theta_t^w (1 - \theta_{t+1}^w) 2 + \theta_t^w \theta_{t+1}^w (1 - \theta_{t+2}^w) 3 + \dots] \quad (41)$$

Expected duration one period ahead is then given by

$$\mathbb{E}_t d_{t+1} = \mathbb{E}_t [(1 - \theta_{t+1}^w) + \theta_{t+1}^w (1 - \theta_{t+2}^w) 2 + \theta_{t+1}^w \theta_{t+2}^w (1 - \theta_{t+3}^w) 3 + \dots] \quad (42)$$

Let us define the auxiliary variable  $\zeta_t$  as follows:

$$\begin{aligned} \zeta_t &\equiv d_t - \theta_t^w \mathbb{E}_t d_{t+1} \\ &= \mathbb{E}_t [(1 - \theta_t^w) + \theta_t^w (1 - \theta_{t+1}^w) + \theta_t^w \theta_{t+1}^w (1 - \theta_{t+2}^w) + \dots] \\ &= (1 - \theta_t^w) + \theta_t^w \mathbb{E}_t \zeta_{t+1} \end{aligned}$$

Now re-insert the definition of  $\zeta_t$  in the last equation and use the law of iterated expectations, i.e.,  $\mathbb{E}_t \mathbb{E}_{t+1} d_{t+j} = \mathbb{E}_t d_{t+j}$ :

$$d_t - \theta_t^w \mathbb{E}_t d_{t+1} = (1 - \theta_t^w) + \theta_t^w \mathbb{E}_t (d_{t+1} - \theta_{t+1}^w d_{t+2})$$

Rearranging this expression leads to

$$d_t = (1 - \theta_t^w) + 2\theta_t^w \mathbb{E}_t d_{t+1} - \theta_t^w \theta_{t+1}^w \mathbb{E}_t d_{t+2},$$

which is the equation (18) shown in the main text.

## Monetary Policy

The central bank sets gross interest rate,  $R$ , according to a standard Taylor rule:

$$\log R_t = (1 - \rho^r) \log R + \log \rho^r R_{t-1} + (1 - \rho^r) \rho^\pi (\log \Pi_t - \log \Pi) + s_r \epsilon_t^r \quad (42)$$

where  $\rho^r$  determines the persistence of the interest rate, and  $\rho^\pi$  governs the response to inflation net of steady-state inflation,  $\Pi$ .