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Abstract

Using a new survey and experimental data, we investigate how information on inequality and immigration affects preferences for redistribution in Italy. Our randomized treatments show that preferences for redistribution are generally inelastic to information. However, we find that provision of information on poverty statistics related to the native-immigrant composition of poverty reduces economic in-group bias by affecting exclusionary redistributive preferences. Respondents are less likely to support policies that exclude immigrants from access to the welfare state once they learn that immigrants are less represented among the poor and natives are not as poor as believed. We also find evidence of cultural in-group bias by investigating heterogeneous treatment effects on policy preferences across socio-demographic groups.

JEL-Codes: D910, D720, H230, H240, C830.

Keywords: inequality, immigration redistribution, perception, survey experiment.

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1 Introduction

Economic inequality has become a central topic within the global policy discourse. While it has been proposed that reducing inequality can spur economic growth and meet the demands for fairness and redistribution, particularly among the poor (OECD, 2021; Stiglitz, 2012), empirical studies have failed to find a causal relation between inequality and preferences for redistribution (Ashok et al., 2015; Kuziemko et al., 2015).

The lack of a clear causal relation has led scholars to question the standard assumption that people hold correct information about inequality when forming their preferences for redistribution. Several studies have shown, in fact, that individuals systematically misperceive inequality and these misperceptions are correlated with their redistributive preferences (Gimpelson and Treisman, 2018; Bussolo et al., 2019; Hauser and Norton, 2017). Despite this evidence, survey experiments implemented to correct misperceptions of inequality have provided inconclusive evidence: individuals only slightly change their preferences for redistribution once informed on the true level of inequality (Cruces et al., 2013; Kuziemko et al., 2015; Alesina et al., 2018; Karadja et al., 2017; Hoy et al., 2021; Fehr et al., 2022).

Several alternative theories have been examined to understand why individuals are not more inclined to support redistribution policies efforts despite being made aware of the increasing levels of economic inequality. Some studies have shown that beliefs in meritocracy contribute to the moral justification of inequality (Fehr and Vollmann, 2020), while others have provided evidence of trust in political institutions depressing preferences for redistribution (Kuziemko et al., 2015).

An increasingly popular and influential perspective among scholars is also that preferences for redistribution are negatively affected by immigration. This negative relationship has long been discussed in the literature and is often referred to as in-group bias hypothesis (Alesina and Giuliano, 2011; Alesina and Glaeser, 2004).¹ The latter comes in two versions: the economic in-group bias and cultural in-group bias. The economic in-group bias hypothesis claims that native taxpayers are less likely to support redistributive policies as the immigration rate increases because immigrants are perceived as a net fiscal burden (Razin et al., 2002; Luttmer, 2001). Natives believe that immigrants pay much less (in taxes) than what they receive (in benefits), which would make immigrants free riders of the welfare system. The cultural in-group bias hypothesis claims, instead, that natives are less willing to support redistributive policies because they have a distaste for sharing public goods with individuals coming from a culturally distant group (Luttmer, 2001; Alesina et al., 1999).² While the cultural channel has often been tested in the

¹For a review on the topic, see Elsner and Concannon (2020) and Cavaille and Van der Straeten (2022).

²In other similar studies, this channel is often referred as taste or anti-solidarity effect (Senik et al., 2009; Lee et al., 2006; Garand et al., 2017).

United States, less evidence is provided for Europe (Eger, 2010; Dahlberg et al., 2012).³

Scholars have often used the term welfare chauvinism to describe the economic and cultural in-group bias in preferences for redistribution. More specifically, a welfare chauvinist is someone who does not necessarily want to reduce the overall level of redistribution, but prefer to not grant immigrants the access to social benefits. The discussion on welfare chauvinism is getting particular attention in several European countries in light of the success of far-right and anti-immigrants political parties. In these countries, voters seem to support a stronger intervention of the State. However, they endorse a particular vision of the welfare system where policies are designed according to principles like nativism or equity/reciprocity rather than equality, solidarity and need (Burgoon and Rooduijn, 2021; Cavaille and Van der Straeten, 2022; Dahlberg et al., 2012; Elsner and Concannon, 2020; Alesina et al., 2021b).

Empirical studies on the two versions of the in-group bias hypothesis have provided mixed findings. They both seem to offer a plausible—although often weak—explanation for the preferences for redistribution, with the cultural bias being, among the two, the most important source of opposition to welfare expansion (Gilens, 1995; Garand et al., 2017; Sniderman et al., 2004; Citrin et al., 1997; Gründler and Köllner, 2020; Burgoon and Rooduijn, 2021; Senik et al., 2009; Dahlberg et al., 2012; Stichnoth, 2012).

The literature also suggests that attitudes towards immigrants and preferences for redistribution might be influenced more by perceptions of immigration than by the actual levels of immigration. Survey evidence shows, in fact, that natives are extremely pessimistic about immigration: they overestimate the share of immigrants in the population, believe that they are much more welfare-dependent and more culturally diverse than they actually are (Alesina et al., 2023; Grigorieff et al., 2020; Hopkins et al., 2019; Jørgensen and Osmundsen, 2022). Additionally, when using experiments to provide information on immigration, these studies yield different, often contradictory, findings. For instance, while Hopkins et al. (2019) show, in seven separate survey experiments over 11 years, that correcting misperceptions about the size of immigrant populations does not affect support for immigration, Grigorieff et al. (2020) find that providing information not only about the size but also about the characteristics of the immigrant population affects public support for immigration. Furthermore, a recent study on several countries by Alesina et al. (2023) shows that simply priming individuals on immigration lowers their support for redistribution, while information on actual share does not affect policy preferences. However, their experiment also shows that providing respondents with anecdotal evidence on hard-worker immigrants positively affects support for redistribution.

³An alternative and related strand of literature has also explored the hypothesis that immigration may be positively correlated to preferences for redistribution. This is known as the compensation hypothesis. Natives support redistribution because they want to be insured against the risk associated with globalization (Rodrik, 1998; Pastor and Veronesi, 2018).

Perceptions of inequality and immigration have generally been investigated separately when analysing the formation of policy preferences. Nevertheless, there are at least two reasons to account for the potential and complex interactions between the two perceptions, on the one hand, and preferences for redistribution, on the other hand. First, Western countries are experiencing both a growing level of inequality and immigration. Second, perceptions and public preferences might need to be analysed in a multidimensional framework. According to Alesina et al. (2020), people hold many perceptions (e.g., the share of immigrants, the share of national income going to the top 1%, or the top-income elasticity) that affect many policy views (e.g., top tax rate, level of government intervention, the number of immigrants allowed to enter in the country). Moreover, perceptions interact with each other and each policy view can be understood as a function of several or all perceptions, but policy views can also interact between them.⁴

Building on previous works (Magni, 2021; Martinangeli and Windsteiger, 2022), we conducted a survey experiment in Italy to investigate how redistributive policies, broadly defined, change when information on inequality interacts with information on immigration, following the economic and cultural in-group bias hypotheses we explained above. We examine the impact of our informational treatments on the updating of perceptions and the formation of policy preferences, but we also investigate how information affects other aspects that might contribute to the creation of individual policy preferences, namely feelings and opinions. Three reasons make Italy an interesting case study to study these topics. First, recent data have shown a strong rise in wealth inequality since the mid-1990s (Acciari et al., Forthcoming). Second, the rise of immigration in the last years has been accompanied by a substantial growth of anti-immigration parties (Guriev and Papaioannou, 2022; D’Alimonte, 2019). Third, as a consequence of the raise of the Five Star Movement, which has been one of the most electorally successful European populist parties,⁵ Italy introduced an extensive redistributive program in 2019.⁶

To investigate the impact of information on the formation of policy preferences, our survey experiment comprises a treatment part, with four different informational treatments, and a post-treatment part, with (i) questions to capture the multidimensional structure of individuals’ preferences for redistribution, (ii) questions to capture the respondents’ multiple perceptions on inequality and immigration, (iii) questions to capture

⁴The importance of multidimensionality and the consequences of ignoring it have been highlighted recently in a couple of empirical studies (Bavetta et al., 2019, 2020).

⁵The classification of the Five Star Movement as a populist party is unanimously accepted, although there is disagreement on its political position because of it results from a mix of left-libertarian and anti-immigrant stances (Mosca and Tronconi, 2019; Coticchia and Vignoli, 2020; Font et al., 2021).

⁶In 2019, the government led by Prime Minister Giuseppe Conte (leader of the Five Star Movement) introduced a basic income called “Citizenship Income” (*Reddito di cittadinanza*), which is a strict, mean-tested program for poor individuals who have been residing in Italy for the last 10 years and have an annual income less than 9,360 euros. On average, households entitled to receive the benefit get a monthly basic income of 540 euros. Recently, the “Citizenship Income” has been abolished by the actual Italian right-wing government.

their feelings and opinions about inequality and immigration (for a detailed description of the survey, see Section 2.2).

The survey treatment section, with four random informational treatments, aims to untangle the complex interactions between inequality and the two types of in-group biases related to immigration. In the first treatment (T1 - *inequality*), we provide information on wealth inequality. In the second treatment (T2 - *inequality + economic in-group bias*), we provide the same information contained in T1, but also statistics on the native-immigrant composition of poverty in Italy. In the third treatment (T3 - *inequality + cultural in-group bias*), information on inequality as in T1 is provided along with information on how cultural diversity of the Italian society increases with the number of immigrants from different religions and cultures. Finally, the last treatment includes all the information of the three treatments above (T4 - *inequality + economic in-group bias + cultural in-group bias*).

The post-treatment part of the survey is designed to capture the multidimensional structure of policy preferences. Our set of questions distinguishes between general preferences for redistribution, tax preferences on income and wealth, preferences for allocation of the public budget over different policies, support for cash benefits for the poor. We also consider two questions aimed at capturing what we will define as *exclusionary redistributive preferences*, namely support for a welfare state the access to which is permitted only to Italian citizens and denied to immigrants. In doing so, we elicit support for a cash benefit for Italians only and conditions for immigrants' access to the welfare state. Finally, we include questions to elicit perceptions of inequality and immigration on the specific dimensions targeted in the informational treatments, subjective feelings of economic status, of economic and cultural threat coming from immigration and opinions on the most important problems in the country.

Three important results emerge from our study. First, a correlation analysis based on the respondents in the control group—those who receive no information—shows that perceptions are quite distant from the reality, in particular those related to the wealth concentration in the bottom part of the distribution and the native-immigrant composition of poverty, with greater polarization found along the gender, the education and the political ideology dimensions. Second, when moving to the causal results, it turns out that the information we provided affects perceptions. The update of perceptions is not always perfect, with people sometimes disregarding the information provided, or updating perceptions that are not directly linked to the information provided. The data we collect also supports controversial indications that multiple information can be more effective in causing respondents to update their prior, as shown in other studies (Grigorieff et al., 2020). Third, information contained in the second treatment on the native-immigrant composition of poverty (the difference in their poverty incidence rate) affects the formation of exclusionary redistributive preferences (i.e., policies that grants access based

on a nationality). We find that such a result can be explained by perceptions updating: treated individuals update their perceptions on the native-immigrant composition of poverty. In other words, in the second treatment, respondents realize that the proportion of poor immigrants is smaller than previously assumed and that native residents are less significantly impacted by poverty than initially perceived and, consequently, reduce support for an exclusionary welfare state. We interpret such a reduction of the exclusionary policy preferences as evidence of an economic in-group bias among respondents. The analysis of heterogeneous treatment effects also indicates that, while political ideology may not account for differences between groups, the provision of information might lead to a reduced polarization in policy preferences among individuals with different levels of income and education, but to an increase in polarization in policy preferences among individuals with social preferences. Across these three dimensions, we also observe evidence of a potential cultural in-group bias that influences policy preferences regarding redistribution: rich individuals, more educated people and people endorsing meritocratic ideals are more likely to increase their support for exclusionary policy preferences once information on diversity is provided (T3).

The findings presented here enable us to connect our study with the literature investigating the causal role of information on inequality on preferences for redistribution (Hoy et al., 2021; Kuziemko et al., 2015; Fehr et al., 2022; Ciani et al., 2021). Additionally, we contribute to the literature investigating how individuals' attitudes and beliefs about immigration affect support for redistribution (Jørgensen and Osmundsen, 2022; Alesina et al., 2023; Naumann et al., 2018). More specifically, we add several original features to the existing literature on survey experiments on both inequality and immigration. For instance, the lack of treatment effects in Martinangeli and Windsteiger (2022), who provide information on immigration and poverty in Germany, could be explained by the authors' not considering exclusionary redistributive preferences among their outcome variables. The latter have proved to play a central role in understanding the current shape of redistributive policy preferences.⁷ Additionally, while Magni (2021) finds that information on inequality can increase support for policies that discriminate in access to welfare services based on native citizenship, we find that information on the native-immigrant composition of poverty might reduce the support for these policies. A second important difference between our study and Magni (2021) is the mechanism at work to explain the role of information on exclusionary policy preferences. While Magni (2021) finds that what matters is the perceived lack of economic opportunity and welfare deservingness, our findings suggest that it is the update of perceptions on specific facts that determines the formation of these preferences.⁸

⁷See, for example, Burgoon and Rooduijn (2021); Cavaille and Van der Straeten (2022); Dahlberg et al. (2012); Elsner and Concannon (2020); Alesina et al. (2021b).

⁸It is important to note that that our study differs from Magni (2021) in both treatments and design, which poses some limits in comparison. However, the comparison contributes to the related literature by

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Our data collection, survey construction, and experimental design are explained in detail in Section 2. Section 3 provides a correlation analysis based on the respondents in the control group, which serves as a baseline analysis in terms of perceptions and policy preferences. Section 4 discusses the findings of the experimental treatments of our study, and Section 5 analyses the presence of heterogeneous treatment effects. Finally, Section 6 provides some robustness tests, and Section 7 concludes and discusses the policy implications of our results.

2 The survey

2.1 Survey Data

The survey questionnaire, which is examined in detail in Section 2.2, was administered by YOUNGOV, an international research, data and analytics group, GDPR compliant.⁹ YOUNGOV emailed the link of the survey to their panels of respondents in Italy in November 2021.¹⁰ Only natives (non-immigrants) from 18 years of age were allowed to take the survey. We collected data on a sample of 3,521 individuals nationally representative along the gender, age, and region quota. They were randomly allocated to five groups, one control group and four treatment groups. Random assignment with equal probability to the four treatments yielded approximately a target sample size of 700 individuals per experimental condition.¹¹ Our study is pre-registered (RCT ID. AEARCTR-0008591) and has been approved by the Ethics Committee of the Autonomous University of Barcelona and the University of Florence.

Similar to other studies (e.g., Alesina et al. (2018, 2023)), we employed several methods to ensure the highest possible quality of answers. First, in the welcome page, respondents were warned that low quality responses would be flagged. We also attempted to make them feeling socially involved by emphasizing that we are non-partisan academic researchers and we are seeking to expand scientific knowledge and that their opinions matter to us. To this regard, we also highlighted that the success of our research depended on their degree of comprehension of the questions as much as their degree of sincerity of the answers. Second, we introduced a trap question, as suggested by Haaland et al. (2023), to identify respondents who were inattentive and sped up through the sur-

underlining the importance of understanding when information works and through which mechanism.

⁹GDPR (General Data Protection Regulation) is the Europe’s data privacy and security law.

¹⁰Respondents who decided to participate in the survey clicked on the link and were channeled to the questionnaire. Respondents were paid only if they fully completed the survey. They received incentives, in the form of “Points,” for participation. For most surveys, a respondent could earn between 25 and 120 Points (1,000 points = 10 euros) for completing a survey according to the survey length. Our survey implies earnings for 50 points.

¹¹According to Haaland et al. (2023), information provision experiments should have at least 80 percent power to detect a treatment effect of 15 percent of a standard deviation. This, in turn, requires a sample size of around 700 respondents per treatment.

veys. We explained to participants why researchers use these checks and asked them to select a specific answer to a simple question unrelated to the survey content.¹² In such a way, we were able to check whether or not respondents read questions carefully. People who did not answer correctly to this question were dropped out of the sample without completing the questionnaire. We also asked respondents whether they paid sufficient attention to their answers. Only 1% of the sample (38 individuals) declared to have not paid sufficient attention. We dropped them in the robustness analysis.

The characteristics of our sample are very close to those of the general population. Table 1 shows that the sample is almost perfectly representative along the targeted dimensions (age, gender, and region), but it is also close to the general population with respect to other relevant non-targeted characteristics. The only exceptions are civil status, education, and work status.¹³ The definition of the variables are contained in Appendix B. The full distribution of the survey duration is provided in the Appendix C (Figure C.1). Finally, we check the integrity of the randomization (Appendix C, Table C.1-C.4) by testing whether our groups are balanced across a full set of observables. We show that the randomization between treated and untreated respondents works and our samples are well balanced with very few exceptions. To correct for over- and under-sampling, we use probability weights in all our regressions.

2.2 *Structure of the survey*

All survey questions are available in Appendix A, in the same order presented to participants.¹⁴ The questionnaire has the following block structure:

Welcome page. The questionnaire opens with the Information Sheet and the Informed Consent. In this part, respondents are informed on their legal rights as participants and are asked to answer honestly and attentively to provide high-quality data.

Pre-treatment. In this block, we collect socio-demographic information on the participants (e.g., sex, age, education, job status). Moreover, we elicit respondents' political ideology (left-right), voting behaviors, fairness ideals (equality, equity, and need) and income among the others. Some of these variables will be used to assess whether the treatments have heterogeneous effects. In particular, following previous works we study whether individuals with different political ideology (right vs left, populist vs not populist), different income levels (rich vs poor), different levels of education (low and high educated) or different social preferences (people endorsing meritocratic ideals vs people

¹²The explanation we offer could mitigate concerns about negative emotional reactions to the use of attention checks on the part of participants.

¹³One concern could be that our sample represents only the online population. However, Grewenig et al. (2018) show that response differences between onliners and offliners disappear when controlling for background characteristics in the regression analysis.

¹⁴The YOUNGOV link to the questionnaire is available in provisional mode here.

Table 1: Comparison of the sample and the population: summary statistics.

| | Sample Statistics | Population statistics |
|------------|-------------------|-----------------------|
| Male | 0.48 | 0.48 |
| 18-24 y.o. | 0.08 | 0.08 |
| 25-34 y.o. | 0.13 | 0.12 |
| 35-44 y.o. | 0.16 | 0.15 |
| 45-54 y.o. | 0.19 | 0.19 |
| 55+ y.o. | 0.44 | 0.46 |
| married | 0.51 | 0.46 |
| working | 0.57 | 0.59 |
| unempl | 0.08 | 0.09 |
| degree | 0.26 | 0.20 |
| income | 1,791.74 | 1,861.58 |
| Northwest | 0.27 | 0.27 |
| Northeast | 0.19 | 0.20 |
| Center | 0.20 | 0.20 |
| South | 0.23 | 0.23 |
| Islands | 0.11 | 0.11 |

Notes: We used ISTAT and EUROSTAT data for the population statistics. The definition of the variables is contained in Appendix B.

who do not) react differently to information on inequality and immigration (Alesina et al., 2018, 2021b; Fehr et al., 2022; Gärtner et al., 2020).¹⁵

Informational treatments. Our four treatments are assigned randomly. The treated groups receive information through short animated videos.¹⁶

The first treatment is designed to affect perceptions of wealth inequality and contains information on the gap between poor and rich people (T1 - *inequality*). The treatment first claims that the poor are getting poorer and the rich are getting richer; second, it provides information on the share of wealth going to top 10% and bottom 50%. We use data provided by Acciari et al. (Forthcoming) who rely on the Italian national accounts balance sheets. To ensure that respondents do not think to other types of inequalities when provided with the above information, we provide a clarifying introductory text before the video. This text specifies that when we refer to wealth, we mean real estate assets, deposits, savings, stocks, and bonds. The video is available at the following link, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ypHcUpUPuGU>, while the entire text is reported below:

Text T1: *In Italy the poor are getting poorer and the rich are getting richer. Sorting*

¹⁵We purposefully placed our treatments after these questions. In this way, we can estimate heterogeneous treatment effects without having to worry that the treatment influences the responses, especially those on political orientation.

¹⁶Providing information in graphical form seems to be more effective than equivalent textual information (Nyhan and Reifler, 2019; Meyer et al., 1999; Zacks and Tversky, 1999; Brandts et al., 2022).

individuals living in Italy based on their wealth, from the poorest to the richest, the poorest 50 percent of the population saw their wealth reduced, from 12 to 3 percent of total wealth. The richest 10 percent of the population increased their wealth from 44 to 56 percent of total wealth.

The second treatment repeats the information on inequality contained in T1 but it adds information on the native-immigrant composition of poverty (T2 - *poverty*). In a short introductory text before the video, we clarify that we refer to regular immigrants, who legally live in the country but were born in another country.¹⁷ In particular, the video highlights an important trend regarding poverty in Italy, namely the growing presence of immigrants among the poor population. We then provide three statistics sourced from the Italian National Statistical Office: the share of immigrants among the poor, the incidence rate of poverty among the immigrant population and among the native population. The video is available at the following link, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eo9hAaJR5nI> and the entire text is provided below:

Text T2: In Italy, within the poor, we find an increasing number of immigrants. If we consider the absolute poor, that is, those who are unable to meet basic needs, 27 percent of the total are immigrants. Analyzing the incidence of poverty, while out of 100 Italians, 6 are poor, out of 100 immigrants, 30 are poor.

The third treatment provides information on inequality as in T1 but it adds information on the diversity of the immigrant population (T3 - *diversity*). The video claims that cultural diversity in Italy is growing, and to support this statement, we provide information on the country of origin and the religion of immigrants living in Italy. Data are taken from different sources (Italian National Statistical Office and ISMU Foundation). The video is available at the following link, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uxNz2UK1Hfo>, and it contains the following text:

Text of T3: In Italy, cultural diversity is growing. If we consider where the immigrants come from, 50 percent of them come from Africa, Asia, North and South America, the rest come from Europe. If we analyze religion, 80 percent of immigrants are Muslims, Orthodox Christians, Buddhists or of other religions, the rest are Catholics.

As above, before watching the video, we clarified that we referred to legal immigrants.

Finally, the fourth treatment combines all the above information, about inequality, the native-immigrant composition of poverty and the immigrants' cultural diversity (T4 - *all*).

Post-treatment To investigate the multidimensionality of policy preferences, we consider several outcome variables. We start by capturing general redistributive preferences with a question eliciting respondents' agreement with public policies that tax the rich

¹⁷As in Alesina et al. (2023), we prefer to focus on legal instead of illegal immigrants since the latter may pose additional challenges (e.g., laws on the entry) and it is a much more controversial and politicized issue.

and provide benefits to the poor. However, we then elicit more specific preferences for redistribution in the subsequent outcome variables. As for income tax preferences, we show respondents the income brackets and the relative tax rates in the Italian fiscal system and ask them if they believe these rates should decrease, remain the same, or increase. Concerning taxes on wealth, we ask them whether they agree or disagree with a set of proposals to reduce inequality by taxing the rich (a wealth and an estate tax).

In addition to the aforementioned preferences, we also gathered insights on public spending preferences. We asked respondents to allocate the total government budget across various sectors, including unemployment benefits, income support programs to poor people, defense, healthcare, among the others. The answers to this question allowed us to capture their desired distribution of public funds within these sectors.

To determine the type of support respondents would like to see implemented for those in poverty, we asked participants if they would be in favor of a cash benefit program similar to the Italian "Citizenship Income" for all poor individuals or just for poor Italian citizens. This allowed us to understand if people have exclusionary redistributive preferences, meaning whether they prefer a welfare state based on citizenship. We also asked about the circumstances under which immigrants should be eligible to access national welfare benefits (immediately, after one year, after obtaining citizenship, etc.)¹⁸

To conclude, we also included a behavioural measure asking participants about their willingness to donate to three charities with different objectives: (i) OXFAM (an organization fighting inequality); (ii) CARITAS (an organization supporting poor people living in Italy); (iii) ARCI (an organization supporting the cultural and social integration of immigrants in Italy). The money individuals are asked to donate to a charity comes from a lottery with five prizes of 100 euros each.

After the treatments, we include questions aimed at investigating which mechanisms might explain how information influences policy preferences. Beside perceptions, we also explore whether information impacts feelings and opinions. The reason why we do not limit ourselves to perceptions is because of the suggestive evidence that information may influence individuals' subjective experiences, emotional responses, and viewpoints on the matter (Kuziemko et al., 2015; Condon and Wichowsky, 2020; Rhodes-Purdy et al., 2021; Elçi, 2022). Since these mechanisms are not often explored in the literature of survey experiments with informational treatments, we aim at being very extensive in order to collect more evidence on other potential mechanisms.

We elicited perceptions of inequality and immigration by including seven questions corresponding to the information provided in the treatments. These questions are placed at the end of the questionnaire to avoid priming respondents on the topics we are in-

¹⁸We used a question from the European Social Survey (ESS) that allows us to discriminate between (i) unconditional stances towards immigrants' access to welfare benefits, (ii) conditionality based on welfare contributions, and (iii) conditionality based upon citizenship.

investigating. The first two questions are aimed at eliciting perceptions of inequality: we ask respondents about their beliefs on the share of the wealth owned by the top 10 and bottom 50 percent of the wealth distribution (these two pieces of information are included in T1). Then, we elicit three questions related to perceptions of the native-immigrant composition of poverty: the share of poor immigrants over the total population of poor people living in Italy, the incidence rate of poverty among immigrants (the proportion of poor immigrants on the total number of immigrants) and Italians (the proportion of poor Italians on the total number of Italians). Finally, we ask two questions to elicit perceptions on the diversity of immigrants, by asking respondents about their beliefs on the share of European and Catholic immigrants living in Italy. By comparing the control and the treated groups, we can assess whether individuals update their perceptions after the provision of the information.

Questions to capture feelings and opinions are also placed after the information treatments. We capture two types of feelings. First, we ask participants to position themselves on an economic scale ranging from 1 to 10, representing the distance between rich and poor people to capture if they feel poorer or richer after the information. Second, we include questions to analyse whether people feel threatened by immigrants. On the one hand, we ask respondents if immigrants are a burden to the country’s finances or if, instead, they contribute to them; on the other hand, we ask respondents if immigrants enrich or undermine the cultural life of the country in which they live.

Finally, we elicit people’s opinions on the importance of certain problems in the country. We propose a list of eight of them (e.g., ‘wealth difference between rich and poor’, ‘loss of traditional values’, ‘unconditional provision of public subsidies to the poor’) and the respondent must rank from the most important to the least important.

3 Results: Correlation analysis

In this section, we show the results of a correlation analysis based on the control group (i.e., individuals who did not receive any information). In doing so, we offer a baseline analysis in terms of perceptions and policy preferences.

3.1 Perceptions

Table 2 reports the value of the actual statistics, the average, standard deviation, and interquartile ranges of individuals’ perceptions. In general, misperceptions are quite striking, especially on certain statistics. On average, respondents tend to misjudge the proportion of wealth held by the top 10% and the bottom 50%, overestimating both of them. However, the degree of misperception is much higher at the bottom of the distribution. Similarly, respondents overestimate the number of immigrants among the

poor in Italy and the rate of poverty among immigrants and Italians. Nonetheless, they tend to be much more pessimistic about the rate of poverty among Italians. Finally, they also overestimate the share of no-European immigrants and underestimate the share of no-Catholic immigrants.

Table 2: Perceptions

| Perceptions | Actual | Mean | Sd | 25th | 75th |
|---|--------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| richshare (Share of wealth - top 10) | 56 | 64.48 | 21.21 | 51.00 | 80.00 |
| poorshare (Share of wealth - bottom 50) | 3 | 27.43 | 20.46 | 11.00 | 42.00 |
| poorimmshare (Immigrants share among the poor) | 27 | 44.66 | 22.63 | 25.00 | 62.00 |
| poorimminc (Poverty incidence among immigrants) | 30 | 44.30 | 25.18 | 24.00 | 64.00 |
| pooritainc (Poverty incidence among Italians) | 6 | 33.90 | 21.89 | 16.00 | 48.00 |
| immorigin (Share of no-European immigrants) | 50 | 64.26 | 21.31 | 49.00 | 82.00 |
| immreligion (Share of no-Catholic immigrants) | 80 | 71.15 | 20.34 | 55.00 | 88.00 |

Notes: The first column reports the perception under analysis, the second column the actual value of the corresponding statistic while the rest of columns report average, standard deviation and interquartile ranges of each perception based on the baseline control group ($N = 705$). The definition of the variables is contained in Appendix B.


While averages can be interesting, we consider the variability in perceptions at the individual level to be far more informative. To measure the level of accuracy of each respondent, we calculate the deviation of the individual perceptions from the actual values. This measure ranges from -100 to 100, with zero approximating no misperception, while positive (negative) deviations correspond to overestimation (underestimation). Figures 1-3 show the distribution of these deviations. When considering perceptions of inequality, a visual inspection of Figure 1 shows that individuals tend to both overestimate and underestimate the share of wealth held by rich people (top 10%) although they are more likely to overestimate it. When looking at the share of wealth held by the poor (bottom 50%) respondents tend to mostly overestimate it.

Moving to perceptions of the native-immigrant composition of poverty (Figure 2), individuals tend to both overestimate and underestimate the share of immigrants among poor living in Italy (top panel) and the incidence of poverty among immigrants (mid panel), although most of them tend to overestimate these two statistics. On the contrary, respondents tend to overestimate the incidence of poverty among Italians (bottom panel).

Finally, with respect to perceptions on the cultural diversity of immigrants (Figure 3), the respondents tend to both under and overestimate the two statistics of interest. However, they mostly overestimate the no-European origins of the immigrants and underestimate the share of no-catholic immigrants.

A significant question in the literature on misperceptions is whether they are correlated with political ideology, income, or other relevant observable characteristics. This

Figure 1: Misperceptions on wealth inequality (top 10% and bottom 50%).



Notes: Distribution of misperceptions on the share of wealth held by the top 10% in the left panel and by the bottom 50% in the the right panel. Misperceptions are calculated as the difference between perceptions and actual values. Positive (negative) differences correspond to overestimation (underestimation). Baseline control group ($N = 705$).


information is crucial as it helps to determine whether there is polarization in perceptions across different social groups (Marino et al., 2023). While polarization may be beneficial to some degree, for example, by providing a diverse range of perspectives, it can also be problematic as it leads to conflicts and hinders individuals from finding solutions to relevant societal issues. (Heltzel and Laurin, 2020).

To inspect the presence of polarized perceptions, we plot the average perception by respondents' group with 95% confidence intervals (Figure 4-6). The groups are: male vs female; married vs not married; young respondents (18–45 years old) vs. older respondents (more than 45 years old); working individuals (part and full-time employees and self-employed) vs unemployed; highly educated (college and more) vs lowly educated; Southern Italian residents (including Islands) vs Center and Northern Italian residents; populist voters vs no-populist voters;¹⁹ meritocrats, namely those who believe that only effort should determine economic outcomes, vs no-meritocrats; those who distrust political institutions vs those who trust; right vs left respondents; finally, poor (first quartile of the income distribution) vs rich (last quartile of the income distribution).

Figure 4-6 show that groups tend to misperceive similarly, although there are consistent and systematic differences across some groups when we consider certain perceptions. For instance, Figure 4 shows that there is no polarization in the perceptions of wealth held by the top 10% (top panel), but perceptions on the share of wealth going to the


¹⁹We include a variable for populist voters because Italy's aggregate proportion of votes for populist parties has increased from 30% in the general election of 1994 to almost 70% in 2018. Additionally, being a voter of a populist party reflects a well-recognized combination of anti-institutional and anti-party sentiments in the Italian population (Vercesi, 2021). Incorporating this variable enables us to gain insights into whether these voters perceive reality with greater or lesser accuracy compared to other voters.

Figure 2: Misperceptions on the native-immigrant composition of poverty.



Notes: Distribution of misperceptions on the share of poor immigrant among poor in the top panel, on the incidence of poverty among immigrant in the mid panel, and on the incidence of poverty among Italians in the bottom panel. Misperceptions are calculated as the difference between perceptions and actual values. Positive (negative) differences correspond to overestimation (underestimation). Baseline control group ($N = 705$).

Figure 3: Misperceptions on the immigrants' cultural diversity.



Notes: Distribution of misperceptions of the share of immigrants coming from no-European countries (in the left panel), and of the share of no-Catholic immigrants (in the right panel). Misperceptions are calculated as the difference between perceptions and actual values. Positive (negative) differences correspond to overestimation (underestimation). Baseline control group ($N = 705$).


bottom 50% are polarized across gender, education, political preferences (both on the right-left political ideology scale and the populist-no-populist voter dichotomy). For instance, left-wing and non-populist respondents are more likely to correctly perceive the share of wealth going to the bottom 50% than right-wing and populist respondents.

Moving to polarization in perceptions on native-immigrant composition of poverty, Figure 5 shows that, while perceptions on the share of immigrants among the poor or the incidence of poverty among immigrants are not very polarized across groups, the same is not true for perceptions of the incidence of poverty among Italians. Females, individuals with lower levels of education, southern residents, populist voters, individuals with higher levels of distrust, right-wing voters, and poor people are all more inclined to misperceive the prevalence of poverty among Italians compared to their counterparts in the opposite group. Finally, we do not observe polarized perceptions on the cultural diversity of the immigrants.

To summarize, perceptions related to the share of wealth held by the bottom 50%, and the incidence rate of poverty among Italians seem to display the greatest level of polarization among the Italian population. Such conflict might explain the intense discussions among Italian politicians on the expansion and reduction of the “Citizenship Income” scheme and requirements to access this benefit.

To compare our results in quantitative terms with other studies investigating group differences in perceptions in politically relevant domains (Settele, 2022; Alesina et al., 2018; Haaland and Roth, 2020), we report a regression analysis of perceptions on gender, political ideology, income, being a populist voter and being highly educated in Appendix C (Tables C.6-C.11). While not all perceptions show ideological, educational, or gender

Figure 4: Polarization in perceptions on wealth inequality.




Notes: The figure shows the average perceptions of wealth in the top 10% (top panel) and in the bottom 50% (bottom panel) for different groups of respondents. The definition of the variables is contained in Appendix B. The Yes label refers to answers of the group in the vertical axis, the NO label refers to answers of the opposite group in the comparison. The shaded areas are 95 percent confidence intervals around the average response. Baseline control group ($N = 705$).

differences, when we do find some statistically significant differences, they range from about 20 to 44 percent of a standard deviation. These numbers reassure us of the validity of our findings since they are close to those reported by Settele (2022) in Table C.1 of her work.


To conclude, several key findings on perceptions emerge from the correlation analysis. First, respondents in the control group have widespread misperceptions, but some dimensions are more problematic than others (e.g., the share of wealth going to the bottom 50% or the incidence of poverty among Italians). Second, some individual characteristics are more likely than others to predict polarization, for instance, gender, education, and political preferences.

Figure 5: Polarization in perceptions on the native-immigrant composition of poverty.



Notes: The figure shows the average perceptions on the native-immigrant composition of poverty for different groups of respondents. In the top panel, the share of poor immigrants among poor; in the mid panel, the poverty incidence among immigrant; in the bottom panel, the poverty incidence among Italians. The definition of the variables is contained in Appendix B. The Yes label refers to answers of the group in the vertical axis, the NO label refers to answers of the opposite group in the comparison. The shaded areas are 95 percent confidence intervals around the average response. Baseline control group ($N = 705$).

Figure 6: Polarization in perceptions on the immigrants' cultural diversity.



Notes: The figure shows the average perceptions on the immigrants' cultural diversity for different groups of respondents. In the top panel, the share of no-European immigrants, in the bottom panel, the share of no-Catholic immigrants. The definition of the variables is contained in Appendix B. The Yes label refers to answers of the group in the vertical axis, the NO label refers to answers of the opposite group in the comparison. The shaded areas are 95 percent confidence intervals around the average response. Baseline control group ($N = 705$).

3.2 Policy Preferences

In this section, we investigate whether redistributive policy preferences correlate with perceptions and/or with personal characteristics. Table 3 presents the results and considers two families of outcomes variables that we will refer to as *Redistributive preferences* and *Exclusionary preferences*. The first includes general preferences for redistribution by taxing the rich and providing benefits to the poor (first column); preferences for a higher income tax rate for rich people (second column); preferences for a wealth tax (third column) and estate tax (fourth column); support for a cash benefit (basic income) to all poor (fifth column); preferences for more public spending on the poor (sixth column) or the unemployed (seventh column). The eighth column reports a summary index of the above seven indicators created by following the methodology proposed by Kling et al. (2007) and applied in other survey experiments (Alesina et al., 2018, 2023; Grigorieff et al., 2020). The index is a standardized and unweighted average of the z-scores of the outcomes variables from columns 1 through 7, where z-scores are obtained by subtracting the mean and dividing by the standard deviation of the control group. The second family, *Exclusionary preferences*, includes individuals' preferences for a cash benefit only for Italians (ninth column) and preferences to restrict immigrants from accessing welfare benefits (tenth column). The last column reports a summary index of *Exclusionary preferences*, created with the same methodology as above and by considering the outcomes variables from columns 9 through 10. All variables are standardized so that coefficients represent the effect size in terms of standard deviations away from the mean. Definitions of all these outcomes, as well as of all the variables, are reported in Appendix B.

The key result observed in Table 3 indicates that, in contrast to the findings in the literature on other countries (see Gimpelson and Treisman (2018) for a review), perceived inequality in our study does not exhibit a strong and consistent correlation with preferences for redistribution. Our results point to a more complex picture.

First, perceptions on the share of wealth going to top 10% and to the bottom 50% (richshare and poorshare in Table 3, respectively) are negatively correlated with preferences for social spending: more specifically, people who are more likely to believe that the top 10% and the bottom 50% of the distribution are richer are less likely to support spending on unemployment (column 7). While the negative correlation with perceptions on the share of wealth going to the bottom 50% is in line with political economy models based on self-interest - when inequality increases, support for the welfare state should increase - the negative correlation with perceptions of the share of wealth going to the top 10% goes against these predictions.

Table 3: Correlation between perceptions and policy preferences.

| | Redistributive Preferences | | | | | | | Exclusionary Preferences | | | |
|----------------|----------------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|--------------------|----------------------|--------------------------|---------------------|----------------------|-----------------------|
| | General Redistr. | Tax Rich | Wealth Tax | Estate Tax | Support Poor (all) | Spend Poor | Spend Unempl. | Summary Index Redistr. | Support Poor (It) | Exclusive Welfare | Summary Index Exclus. |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) | (10) | (11) |
| richshare | 0.075* (0.043) | 0.010 (0.019) | 0.033 (0.039) | 0.029 (0.040) | 0.020 (0.045) | -0.061 (0.043) | -0.131*** (0.044) | -0.004 (0.041) | 0.031 (0.044) | 0.032** (0.016) | 0.071* (0.038) |
| poorshare | 0.021 (0.045) | -0.055*** (0.021) | 0.023 (0.043) | 0.036 (0.044) | 0.020 (0.046) | -0.044 (0.048) | -0.090** (0.046) | -0.039 (0.043) | 0.025 (0.045) | 0.013 (0.019) | 0.037 (0.040) |
| poorimmshare | -0.002 (0.044) | 0.022 (0.022) | 0.016 (0.049) | 0.013 (0.049) | -0.102** (0.047) | 0.047 (0.046) | 0.085* (0.045) | 0.026 (0.046) | -0.047 (0.046) | 0.001 (0.019) | -0.030 (0.043) |
| poorimvinc | -0.043 (0.043) | -0.016 (0.021) | 0.052 (0.048) | -0.038 (0.047) | 0.140*** (0.045) | -0.060 (0.043) | -0.050 (0.041) | -0.009 (0.041) | 0.062 (0.045) | -0.033* (0.019) | -0.009 (0.044) |
| pooritainc | 0.142*** (0.049) | 0.038* (0.021) | -0.061 (0.052) | -0.040 (0.048) | 0.042 (0.051) | 0.002 (0.049) | 0.119** (0.048) | 0.075 (0.046) | 0.133*** (0.045) | 0.047** (0.020) | 0.163*** (0.045) |
| immorigindiv | 0.083 (0.051) | 0.049** (0.022) | 0.051 (0.047) | 0.054 (0.047) | -0.019 (0.054) | 0.001 (0.047) | 0.048 (0.047) | 0.084* (0.045) | 0.015 (0.047) | 0.000 (0.021) | 0.010 (0.046) |
| immreligiondiv | -0.073 (0.047) | -0.010 (0.023) | 0.020 (0.048) | -0.027 (0.047) | 0.036 (0.051) | 0.014 (0.048) | -0.028 (0.048) | -0.021 (0.044) | 0.103** (0.046) | 0.018 (0.019) | 0.097** (0.043) |
| male | 0.193*** (0.074) | 0.069* (0.037) | 0.209*** (0.077) | 0.229*** (0.075) | 0.088 (0.077) | -0.021 (0.082) | 0.033 (0.076) | 0.230*** (0.074) | 0.109 (0.076) | 0.051 (0.032) | 0.154** (0.072) |
| age1824 | -0.287 (0.193) | -0.328*** (0.098) | -0.545*** (0.178) | -0.391** (0.175) | -0.229 (0.206) | 0.027 (0.222) | -0.031 (0.221) | -0.562*** (0.194) | -0.111 (0.188) | -0.113 (0.074) | -0.251 (0.177) |
| age2534 | -0.136 (0.127) | -0.115* (0.063) | -0.345*** (0.130) | -0.205 (0.129) | -0.052 (0.130) | -0.154 (0.127) | -0.064 (0.132) | -0.314** (0.124) | 0.002 (0.122) | -0.029 (0.055) | -0.043 (0.116) |
| age3544 | -0.014 (0.116) | -0.032 (0.054) | -0.228** (0.108) | -0.146 (0.112) | -0.111 (0.110) | 0.021 (0.117) | -0.007 (0.121) | -0.145 (0.106) | -0.154 (0.116) | 0.045 (0.050) | -0.035 (0.113) |
| age4554 | -0.128 (0.108) | -0.074 (0.050) | -0.084 (0.106) | -0.125 (0.105) | -0.118 (0.105) | 0.007 (0.111) | -0.082 (0.107) | -0.180* (0.104) | 0.064 (0.104) | -0.048 (0.045) | -0.031 (0.098) |
| married | 0.118 (0.080) | 0.040 (0.038) | 0.080 (0.082) | 0.122 (0.080) | 0.031 (0.082) | -0.112 (0.086) | 0.032 (0.082) | 0.093 (0.079) | -0.003 (0.081) | -0.087** (0.035) | -0.136* (0.078) |
| highed | -0.120 (0.082) | 0.065 (0.040) | 0.056 (0.082) | -0.002 (0.082) | -0.056 (0.085) | -0.057 (0.084) | -0.161* (0.085) | -0.054 (0.080) | -0.193** (0.086) | -0.059* (0.033) | -0.223*** (0.079) |
| work | 0.065 (0.102) | 0.075 (0.046) | 0.125 (0.096) | 0.154 (0.097) | 0.156 (0.098) | -0.054 (0.102) | 0.055 (0.095) | 0.173* (0.093) | -0.097 (0.094) | -0.172*** (0.043) | -0.333*** (0.093) |
| unempl | 0.144 (0.152) | -0.008 (0.071) | 0.266* (0.139) | 0.092 (0.138) | 0.264* (0.153) | 0.054 (0.168) | 0.308* (0.160) | 0.293* (0.152) | 0.170 (0.134) | -0.077 (0.068) | -0.004 (0.131) |
| stud | 0.244 (0.208) | 0.182* (0.100) | 0.492** (0.200) | 0.301 (0.202) | 0.216 (0.213) | 0.129 (0.226) | 0.110 (0.224) | 0.492** (0.205) | -0.154 (0.215) | -0.275*** (0.080) | -0.531*** (0.197) |
| southall | 0.050 (0.079) | -0.032 (0.039) | -0.011 (0.079) | 0.008 (0.079) | 0.145* (0.077) | 0.152* (0.083) | 0.063 (0.081) | 0.090 (0.077) | 0.131 (0.080) | 0.013 (0.034) | 0.110 (0.073) |
| urbanc | -0.077 (0.093) | -0.101** (0.049) | -0.152 (0.105) | -0.060 (0.099) | -0.096 (0.101) | -0.168* (0.101) | 0.095 (0.099) | -0.176* (0.098) | -0.080 (0.102) | 0.030 (0.042) | -0.008 (0.096) |
| urbans | 0.052 (0.091) | 0.049 (0.043) | 0.042 (0.087) | 0.055 (0.093) | 0.113 (0.093) | -0.127 (0.098) | 0.082 (0.091) | 0.084 (0.085) | 0.158* (0.089) | -0.015 (0.039) | 0.084 (0.088) |
| rural | -0.009 (0.155) | -0.046 (0.067) | -0.101 (0.158) | -0.033 (0.142) | -0.052 (0.145) | 0.034 (0.150) | 0.200 (0.171) | -0.015 (0.144) | -0.047 (0.158) | -0.006 (0.070) | -0.041 (0.149) |
| right | -0.617*** (0.090) | -0.176*** (0.044) | -0.456*** (0.092) | -0.507*** (0.091) | -0.341*** (0.094) | -0.142 (0.091) | -0.266*** (0.092) | -0.709*** (0.087) | 0.322*** (0.089) | 0.184*** (0.040) | 0.503*** (0.085) |
| center | -0.363*** (0.097) | -0.114** (0.047) | -0.331*** (0.096) | -0.386*** (0.092) | -0.129 (0.093) | -0.117 (0.103) | -0.062 (0.099) | -0.427*** (0.095) | 0.128 (0.095) | 0.077* (0.040) | 0.205** (0.088) |
| distrust | -0.019 (0.075) | 0.023 (0.037) | -0.134* (0.075) | -0.246*** (0.074) | -0.189** (0.079) | -0.006 (0.080) | -0.053 (0.078) | -0.158** (0.073) | -0.046 (0.078) | 0.076** (0.033) | 0.086 (0.074) |
| meritocrat | -0.379*** (0.085) | -0.025 (0.042) | -0.014 (0.084) | -0.121 (0.084) | -0.245*** (0.088) | -0.092 (0.084) | -0.194** (0.082) | -0.288*** (0.080) | -0.141* (0.085) | -0.013 (0.037) | -0.117 (0.081) |
| .cons | 0.266** (0.113) | 0.664*** (0.056) | 0.180 (0.117) | 0.227** (0.115) | 0.141 (0.115) | 0.224* (0.129) | 0.080 (0.121) | 0.313*** (0.114) | -0.058 (0.119) | 0.316*** (0.052) | 0.048 (0.118) |

Baseline control group (N=705). The table reports estimates of separate regressions of the variable in the column on (standardized) perceptions (Kling et al., 2007) and controls. Regressions are with probability weights and robust standard errors. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.

A possible explanation of the negative correlation between perceptions of the share of wealth held by the top 10% and spending on unemployment could be related to beliefs of meritocracy (Mijs, 2021; Trump, 2020): the higher the level of inequality, the stronger the belief that differences are fair, the lower the support for vulnerable groups which are considered as undeserving (e.g., unemployed). To give more support to the above explanation, we find that perceptions of inequality on the top 10% (i.e., perceptions about the share of wealth going to the top 10%) are correlated positively with exclusionary preferences (column 10-11). Again, the finding may suggest that the higher the inequality gap from the top 10% that is perceived, the higher the probability that respondents express support for policies that exclude groups which are perceived as undeserving (e.g., immigrants) from accessing the welfare benefits. Third, and in line with theoretical expectations, perceptions of inequality on the bottom 50% (i.e., perceptions of the share of wealth held by the bottom 50%) are negatively correlated with preferences to introduce a higher income tax rate for rich people (column 2).

Unlike perceptions of inequality, perceptions of native-immigrant composition of poverty are strongly correlated with preferences for redistribution. Individuals who perceive a higher share of immigrants among the poor living in Italy (*poorimmshare* in Table 3) are less willing to support cash benefits for all poor, independent of their nationality (column 5). However, respondents who believe that the incidence of poverty among immigrants (*poorimminc* in Table 3) is higher are more likely to support these same policies. Finally, those who believe that the incidence rate of poverty among Italians (*pooritainc* in Table 3) is higher while supporting redistribution (column 1) and spending on unemployment benefits (column 7), are also more likely to prefer Italians as unique beneficiaries of the welfare state (column 9-11).

Finally, perceptions of cultural diversity also matter. Individuals who believe that immigrants are more likely to be non-European (*immorigindiv* in Table 3) are more likely to support higher tax rates for rich people (column 2). While we first hypothesized—in line with the literature (Alesina and Giuliano, 2011; Alesina and Glaeser, 2004; Luttmer, 2001)—that perceptions of cultural diversity would depress preferences for redistribution, the positive correlation between perceptions on the cultural origins of immigrants’ origins and redistributive preference in Italy seems to suggest different, but potentially related, explanations which would need further investigation to be tested. First, there might be a cultural in-group bias different from the one we hypothesized. Respondents might have a distaste for European immigrants (potentially for those coming from Eastern Europe) and be less willing to share public goods with them.²⁰ Second, some theories suggest that natives might ask for more redistribution to be compensated for the increasing

²⁰Some studies have shown that people may feel hostility toward some groups of immigrants but not others (Dennison and Geddes, 2018; Hainmueller and Hangartner, 2013). This explanation makes sense also in light of the rise of anti-EU populist political parties (Rodrik, 2020; Margalit, 2019).

globalization and competition in the labour market coming from immigrants (the so-called compensation hypothesis) (Finseraas, 2008; Burgoon et al., 2012; Naumann et al., 2018)). Since competition in the labour market, especially in some sectors of the European market, regards immigration from extra-EU countries, our findings can be interpreted within this context. Third, immigrants from non-European regions might be perceived as socio-economically disadvantaged and respondents may believe that implementing higher tax rates on the wealthy is a means to redistribute wealth and provide financial support for these immigrants.

To conclude, perceptions of increasing religious diversity are positively correlated with exclusionary welfare preferences (columns 9 and 11). These findings might indicate the existence of a cultural in-group bias as hypothesized rooted more in religion than in the country of origin.

Looking at other observable characteristics that seem to matter to explain redistributive policy preferences, we note that males are more likely to support redistribution policies (compared to female), in particular, if the welfare state is accessed only by Italians. Highly educated individuals are more likely to support an exclusionary welfare state (compared to lowly educated individuals). Right-wing respondents are less likely to favour redistribution policies and more likely to have exclusionary policy preferences (compared to left-wing respondents). Finally, meritocrats are also less likely to support redistribution policies (compared to non-meritocrats).

We also re-estimate regressions of Table 3 on a smaller sample to include controls for (i) being a populist voter and (ii) a rich voter.²¹ The results are reported in Tables C.12 and C.13 and show that populist voters are less likely to support redistributive preferences and have stronger exclusionary redistributive preferences than non-populist voters, while rich people are less likely to.

4 Results: Causal Evidence

In this section, we provide causal evidence by investigating whether the information treatments affect policy preferences, and the three potential mechanisms under scrutiny, namely perceptions, feelings, and opinions. To achieve this, we estimate the following equation:

$$Y_i = \beta_0 + \sum_{j=1}^4 \beta_j T_{ij} + \gamma X_i + \epsilon_i, \quad (1)$$

²¹Respondents are not obliged to report information on their voting behaviour and the income they earn. For such reason, we have smaller samples ($N = 567$ for the populist sample and $N = 511$ for the income sample).

where Y_i is the outcome of interest (e.g., policy preferences and our three potential mechanisms), T_{ij} is a dummy indicator for whether subject i was exposed to the information contained in treatment $j = 1, 2, 3, 4$; X_i is a vector of controls (e.g., the demographics), while ϵ_i is an individual-specific error term. For all the specifications, we use robust standard errors and apply probability weights. We are interested in the sign and the magnitude of β_j , for $j = 1, 2, 3, 4$, namely, the effect of the treatment on our outcomes variables.²²

4.1 *Treatment Effects on Policy Preferences*

We start by analyzing the role of the information on policy preferences.²³ Table 4 shows that information frequently fails to change policy preferences. While this is in line with most survey experiments with provision of information (Karadja et al., 2017; Fehr et al., 2022; Hoy et al., 2021; Alesina et al., 2018), we find that (i) the information provided in T1 reduces preferences for higher spending in unemployment benefits, and (ii) the information provided in T2 and T4 reduces exclusionary redistributive preferences. To adjust for multiple test hypothesis and check the robustness of our results, we follow the two-fold strategy proposed by Settele (2022) following Anderson (2008). On the one hand, the creation of summary indexes over families of outcomes (column 8 and 11) is in itself a way to test for multiple hypotheses. On the other hand, we apply the conservative method of family-wise error rate (FWER) control. We use the free step-down resampling methodology (Westfall et al., 1993) but we report also the Bonferroni-Holm and Sidak-Holm adjusted p-values. We adjust for multiple hypotheses for outcomes from column 1 to column 7, and from column 9 to column 10. We also adjust p-values for the summary indexes (column 8 and 11). As Table C.14 in Appendix C shows, only treatments effects on exclusionary redistributive preferences in T2 and T4 survive to multiple hypotheses testing. Therefore, we can conclude that respondents exposed to information on the native-immigrant composition of poverty tend to decrease their support for policies that favor Italians as unique beneficiaries of the basic income. The magnitudes are economically significant: respondents exposed to T2 and T4 are 0.12-0.15 standard deviations less likely to support these measures.

In the next Sections, we further analyse the above results by looking at potential mechanisms. This will allows us to better understand how information on the native-

²²In Section 5, we will investigate whether some specific groups respond differently to the information. To do so, we add to equation 1 an interaction between the treatment dummies and the variables corresponding to our groups of interest. We will also test the significance of the sum of the treatment effect and the interaction term to determine the treatment effect for the group of interest. To do so, we report the p-value of a F-test of the sum. If the p-value is statistically significant (typically below a predetermined threshold, such as 0.05), it suggests the existence of a treatment effect for the group of interest.

²³In the Appendix, Section D, we provide also evidence of the treatment effects on the propensity to donate.

Table 4: Treatment effects on policy preferences

| | Redistributive Preferences | | | | | | | Exclusionary Preferences | | | |
|----|----------------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|---------------------------|-------------------|----------------------|-------------------------------|--------------------------|---------------------------|-------------------------------|
| | General Redistr. (1) | Tax Rich (2) | Wealth Tax (3) | Estate Tax (4) | Support Poor (all) (5) | Spend Poor (6) | Spend Unempl. (7) | Summary Index Redistr. (8) | Support Poor (It) (9) | Exclusive Welfare (10) | Summary Index Exclus. (11) |
| T1 | 0.021 (0.052) | 0.019 (0.025) | 0.053 (0.051) | 0.039 (0.052) | 0.027 (0.054) | 0.068 (0.055) | -0.101** (0.051) | 0.038 (0.050) | 0.001 (0.053) | -0.020 (0.022) | -0.031 (0.051) |
| T2 | 0.002 (0.051) | -0.015 (0.025) | 0.044 (0.052) | 0.080 (0.051) | -0.028 (0.052) | 0.061 (0.054) | 0.008 (0.051) | 0.036 (0.051) | -0.151*** (0.053) | -0.013 (0.023) | -0.122** (0.051) |
| T3 | 0.008 (0.052) | 0.010 (0.025) | 0.037 (0.050) | -0.011 (0.050) | 0.081 (0.052) | 0.059 (0.054) | -0.066 (0.052) | 0.034 (0.050) | 0.034 (0.052) | 0.002 (0.023) | 0.027 (0.050) |
| T4 | 0.006 (0.052) | 0.008 (0.025) | -0.009 (0.051) | 0.015 (0.051) | 0.001 (0.052) | 0.077 (0.055) | -0.097* (0.052) | 0.002 (0.051) | -0.116** (0.053) | -0.037* (0.022) | -0.137*** (0.051) |
| N | 3521 | 3521 | 3521 | 3521 | 3521 | 3521 | 3521 | 3521 | 3521 | 3521 | 3521 |

The table reports the effects of the treatments on the variables in the columns. Outcome variables are described in the Appendix B. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Controls included in all regressions are: male, age brackets, married, highly educated, working, unemployed, student, living in the South, in a city, suburbs, and rural area. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. FWER-adjusted p-values are reported in Table C.14.

immigrants composition of poverty affects exclusionary preferences.

4.2 Mechanisms

To investigate the mechanisms through which information influences policy preferences, we examine perceptions updating and changes in feelings and opinions after the provision of the information.

4.2.1 Perceptions updating

Our primary focus is on the process of perception updating. When individuals are presented with information that contradicts their existing perceptions, several outcomes may occur. Firstly, individuals may update their perceptions in accordance with the new information (referred to as updating outcome 1). On the other hand, some individuals may choose to ignore the provided information and not revise their perceptions (referred to as updating outcome 2). Another possibility is that exposure to the information may lead to an unintended, counterproductive effect, causing individuals' perceptions to move in the opposite direction of the presented information (referred to as updating outcome 3). Lastly, individuals might update their perceptions, but the changes may not necessarily refer to the specific information provided, resulting in perceptions updated in dimensions that are different from those directly related to the information (referred to as updating outcome 4).

In our survey experiment, we have the opportunity to examine the presence of the four aforementioned outcomes. This is made possible through our approach of eliciting perceptions regarding the seven facts associated with the information presented in all treatments. Table 5 shows the impact of the four treatments on the seven perceptions. The first two columns correspond to perceptions of inequality associated with the infor-

mation given in all treatments. Columns 3-5 refer to information provided in T2 and T4 regarding the native-immigrant composition of poverty. Finally, the last two columns correspond to information on immigrants' cultural diversity provided in T3 and T4. The analysis in Table C.15, in Appendix C, checks if coefficients in Table 5 survive when we adjust for multiple hypothesis.

Table 5 (and also Table C.15) presents a nuanced perspective on the dynamics of individuals' perception updates when exposed to information. The findings highlight the complexity of the process, revealing various patterns and conditions under which people revise their perceptions. To start with, notice that, in most cases, people update their perceptions according to the information provided (updating outcome 1). For instance, respondents reduce their overestimates on the share of wealth going to the top 10% in all treatments and on the share of wealth going to the bottom 50% in T4; they reduce their misperceptions of poverty in T2 and T4, and they reduce their misperceptions about the religious belonging of immigrants in T3 and T4 and the share of no-European immigrants in T4.

However, our analysis also presents instances where individuals exhibit unwillingness to update their perceptions, even when presented with new information (updating outcome 2). Notably, respondents in treatments T1, T2, and T3 do not revise their perceptions regarding the share of wealth allocated to the bottom 50%. However, a notable shift in this perception occurs in the final treatment, as already mentioned. Furthermore, participants do not update their perceptions regarding the origins of immigrants in treatment T3, but they do so in treatment T4.

Sometimes, though not very often, respondents alter their beliefs without direct influence to the information given to them (outcome 4 update). This phenomenon can be observed in the second treatment, where participants changed their perception about the proportion of no-European immigrants, despite the fact that this information was only presented in treatments T3 and T4.

Lastly, our analysis does not reveal any evidence of respondents exhibiting a backfiring effect (updating outcome 3), wherein individuals update their perceptions in the opposite direction of the provided information. This finding supports the notion that backfire effects are more of a myth than a reality (Nyhan, 2020).

Considering the scope of our work, the analysis highlights the importance of information in reducing misperceptions. Additionally, it also reveals that reducing misperceptions sometimes affects policy preferences. Specifically, the findings indicate that as people correct their misperceptions regarding the native-immigrant composition of poverty, recognizing that immigrants constitute a smaller proportion of the poor population in Italy and experience a higher poverty rate, compared to Italians, their exclusionary preferences decrease, as observed in T2. This suggests that informed individuals are more likely to revise their policy stances based on a better understanding of reality.

Table 5: Treatment effects on perceptions.

| | Perceptions of Inequality | | Perceptions of Poverty | | | Perceptions of diversity | |
|----|-------------------------------|----------------------------------|---------------------------------------|--|--------------------------------------|--|--|
| | Share of Wealth Top 10 (1) | Share of Wealth Bottom 50 (2) | Share of Immigrants among poor (3) | Incidence of poverty Immigrants (4) | Incidence of poverty Italians (5) | Share of no-European Immigrants (6) | Share of no-Catholic Immigrants (7) |
| T1 | -0.153*** (0.053) | -0.090* (0.053) | -0.119** (0.055) | -0.071 (0.054) | -0.012 (0.052) | 0.086 (0.052) | 0.093* (0.052) |
| T2 | -0.194*** (0.052) | -0.096* (0.052) | -0.227*** (0.052) | -0.221*** (0.050) | -0.300*** (0.050) | 0.149*** (0.052) | 0.066 (0.052) |
| T3 | -0.160*** (0.051) | -0.135** (0.053) | -0.063 (0.052) | -0.059 (0.053) | -0.052 (0.050) | -0.044 (0.050) | 0.174*** (0.049) |
| T4 | -0.136*** (0.051) | -0.191*** (0.053) | -0.158*** (0.053) | -0.191*** (0.050) | -0.207*** (0.051) | -0.135*** (0.050) | 0.147*** (0.049) |
| N | 3521 | 3521 | 3521 | 3521 | 3521 | 3521 | 3521 |

The table reports the effects of the treatments on the variables in the columns. Outcome variables are described in the Appendix B. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Controls included in all regressions are: male, age brackets, married, highly educated, working, unemployed, student, living in the South, in a city, suburbs, and rural area. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. FWER-adjusted p-values are reported in Table C.15.

4.2.2 Feelings and opinions

As an additional feature of our work, in addition to examining perceptions, we also investigate how information impacts individuals' feelings and opinions. The underlying idea behind this additional investigation is that people may not always respond to new information purely through rational updates. They can react emotionally or alter their opinions on issues that influence policy-making beyond mere factual knowledge. Table 6 shows the treatment effects on these outcomes. In Table C.16, in Appendix C, we also adjust for multiple hypothesis testing.

To assess the impact of information on feelings, we ask participants to self-position themselves on a wealth scale ranging from 1 to 10, representing the distance between rich and poor people (column 1). This subjective measure of their economic status is crucial to understanding whether individuals react to the information by feeling poorer or richer. Second, we ask respondents whether immigrants are a threat to their country. In particular, we ask them whether immigrants are a burden for the country's finances or contribute to them and if immigrants enrich or undermine the cultural life of the country in which they live (columns 2 and 3). As for opinions, we ask them to rank the most important problems in Italy by listing several of them. In particular, we focus on how respondents rank in their country problems like limited education ("Problem: low education, column 4), inequality ("Problem: income difference" in column 5), threat to identity ("Problem: loss of identity" in column 6) and welfarism ("Problem: unconditional welfare" in column 7).

We find that people substantially feel poorer (0.209 standard deviations) after being exposed to the information on inequality in T1. Such finding is robust to multiple testing (Table C.16) and revealing of the fact that perceptions and feelings might tell different stories. Table 5 shows that respondents in T1 update downward their beliefs on the share of wealth held by the top 10%, and they do not update on the share of wealth held by

Table 6: Treatment effects on feelings and opinions.

| | Feelings | | | Opinions | | | |
|----|-------------------------------------|---------------------------------------|---------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|--|--|---|
| | Poor-rich Wealth Scale (1) | Migrants Economic Threat (2) | Migrants Cultural Threat (3) | Problem: Low Education (4) | Problem: Income Differences (5) | Problem: Loss of Identity (6) | Problem: Unconditional Welfare (7) |
| T1 | -0.209*** (0.054) | -0.012 (0.049) | -0.006 (0.048) | -0.063 (0.052) | 0.077 (0.052) | -0.039 (0.051) | 0.014 (0.052) |
| T2 | 0.025 (0.051) | -0.066 (0.049) | -0.080* (0.048) | -0.073 (0.052) | 0.139*** (0.052) | -0.042 (0.052) | 0.037 (0.051) |
| T3 | -0.195*** (0.052) | 0.049 (0.049) | -0.004 (0.047) | -0.071 (0.051) | 0.106** (0.053) | -0.012 (0.051) | 0.101* (0.052) |
| T4 | -0.085 (0.052) | -0.067 (0.048) | -0.059 (0.049) | -0.055 (0.052) | 0.178*** (0.051) | -0.035 (0.051) | 0.069 (0.052) |
| N | 3521 | 3521 | 3521 | 3521 | 3521 | 3521 | 3521 |

The table reports the effects of the treatments on the variables in the columns. Outcome variables are described in the Appendix B. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Controls included in all regressions are: male, age brackets, married, highly educated, working, unemployed, student, living in the South, in a city, suburbs, and rural area. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. FWER-adjusted p-values are reported in Table C.16.

the bottom 50%. In principle, such an update should make respondents feel richer. Our result thus suggests that information is not necessarily processed for its content in terms of hard facts (the share of wealth held by the rich and the poor) but for the general message it conveys, namely that the poor are becoming poorer as well as the rich are becoming richer. This might explain why people feel poorer despite the updating of beliefs should point to a different result.

Looking at other feelings and opinions, it emerges that T1 does not affect how people see immigrants in their countries nor the salience of the country's problems, in particular, it does not induce people to rank inequality (framed as the difference between rich and poor) as a higher-order problem concerning others. While our results do not resolve the puzzle found in other studies, namely that preferences for redistribution are inelastic to information on inequality (Hoy et al., 2021; Kuziemko et al., 2015; Fehr et al., 2022; Ciani et al., 2021), we show that information on inequality might induce people to feel poorer, but not even such mechanism make preferences for redistribution more elastic.

Moving to the other treatments, the only significant coefficient of T2 on column 5 (problem: income difference) is not robust to multiple testing (Table C.16), implying that T2 does not affect feelings and opinions. A consequence of this result is that the effect of the information contained in T2 on exclusionary preferences for redistribution is entirely driven by the update of perceptions. Going to T3, we find that people exposed to information on diversity are also more likely to feel poorer. Looking at the magnitude, information on diversity does not seem to matter since the size of the effect is almost identical to T1 (0.195 s.d.). We also find that information on diversity in T3 increases the salience of inequality (0.106 s.d.) and welfarism (0.10 s.d.), but these effects do not survive to multiple hypothesis testing.

Finally, the last treatment, T4, makes inequality salient (0.178 s.d.). We believe that this can be explained by the fact that now people also update the share of wealth going

to the bottom 50% and/or by the strengthening effect that multiple information plays.

5 Heterogeneous treatment effects

This section focuses on examining heterogeneous treatment effects. Existing literature frequently indicates that certain groups exhibit varying responses to information, particularly in the context of political ideology and income levels (Cruces et al., 2013; Settele, 2022; Alesina et al., 2018; Karadja et al., 2017; Fehr et al., 2022). For comparison purposes, we also explore whether political ideology (left vs right, and voting for a populist party or not), income (rich vs poor), education (highly educated vs not highly educated), and social preferences (meritocrats vs not meritocrats) can explain differences in the way people react to information and form their preferences. To do so, we report heterogeneous treatment effects on policy preferences, perceptions, feelings, and opinions. The heterogeneity analysis is gaining importance among scholars given the context of rising polarization in our society. Consequently, in the following sections, we investigate whether information can reduce or increase the distance between specific societal groups by looking at the heterogeneous effects (Marino et al., 2023). We report in all tables the coefficient of the treatment that measures the reaction of the omitted group (e.g., left-wing respondents) to the information, and the interaction between the treatment and the group of interest (e.g., right-wing respondents). However, we also report the p-value of the F-test of the sum of the coefficient of the treatment and the interaction term, which gives the reaction of the group of interest (e.g., right-wing respondents) to the information treatment.

5.1 *Political Ideology*

The literature has often observed heterogeneous treatment effects driven by political ideology (Karadja et al., 2017; Settele, 2022; Alesina et al., 2018, 2023). However, there are exceptions to this finding and several studies do not find any effect (Haaland and Roth, 2020; Fehr et al., 2020; Douenne and Fabre, 2022).

Table C.17 in Appendix C presents our treatment effect estimates on policy preferences for respondents identifying as right-wing and centrist, with left-wing respondents serving as the reference category. Our findings indicate that, overall, there is limited evidence of right-wing and left-wing people responding differently to the various treatments. We only find that people in the center change their preferences for an estate tax differently from people in the left of the political spectrum after the full set of information in T4 is provided. More specifically, T4 depolarize these two groups of people that close their gap in term of policy preferences.

Moving to Table C.18, we investigate potential heterogeneous effects in perception

updates but no significant patterns can be identified. Heterogeneities between right-wing and left-wing respondents are generally non-existent, except for a slight divergence in the update of perceptions concerning the distribution of wealth among the top 10% in T3. Interestingly, when exposed to information on inequality and diversity, we observe a decreased distance between the two political groups, implying that specific combination of information may contribute to decrease political polarization. While the mechanism underlying this finding is beyond the scope of our work and requires further investigation, one interpretation, consistent with the literature (for a review on the topic Marino et al. (2023)) is that specific information, like those containing statistics on immigration and diversity, might activate selective updating in certain groups. Finally, Table C.19 suggests that there are no substantial disparities in how right-wing and left-wing individuals react to information when it comes to their feelings and opinions.

We also explore another channel through which political ideology might play a role. Given that the left-right political divide might not entirely capture the full diversity of Italian political ideology, we look at heterogeneous effects between populist and non-populist voters. Tables C.20, C.21 and C.22 generally indicate limited heterogeneous effects between these groups. However, we find that our previous result in the update of perceptions on the share of wealth going to the top 10% in T3 is robust also when political ideology is defined differently: information on inequality and diversity decreases political polarization in perceptions of wealth concentration in the top of the distribution. However, in the case of populist voters, we also find that polarization is reduced in the case of perceptions on the share of wealth going to the bottom 50% in T1.

In summary, the above results show that there are no significant differences in the way in which groups different from their political ideology react to the information. However, an exception to this trend emerges when examining the impact of inequality and immigration information on perceptions of inequality. This suggests that combined information has the potential to mitigate societal polarization, especially regarding perceptions of objective realities, even though it may not significantly impact policy preferences.

5.2 *Income*

Heterogeneous effects has been also observed along the income dimension (e.g., Cruces et al. (2013); Karadja et al. (2017)). Table C.23 presents an analysis of heterogeneous treatment effects on policy preferences among respondents categorized as rich and middle-income respondents, with poor respondents as the baseline. We observe heterogeneous treatment effects of T2 and T3 (T2 and T4) on exclusionary preferences between rich and poor individuals (the middle-class and the poor individuals). Furthermore, the estimates suggest that in the Italian context, information concerning the native-immigrant composition of poverty and diversity has the potential to reduce polarization among re-

spondents. This results in a diminished gap in policy preferences in terms of support for an exclusionary welfare State, both between rich and poor individuals and between middle-class and poor individuals.

Looking at perceptions, we do not find evidence of any heterogeneous treatment effects (Table C.24). But, when looking at heterogeneous effects on feelings and opinions (Table C.25), we find that the information in T1 and in T3 (in T2 and T3) increases polarization between rich and poor (middle-class and poor individuals) in terms of how these groups position themselves in the wealth scale.

A noteworthy observation is that when examining the treatment effects in response to treatment T3 on exclusionary welfare preferences, we find evidence of the potential presence of cultural in-group bias that varies based on income levels. Specifically, when exposed to information on cultural diversity, rich individuals are more likely to increase their support for an exclusionary welfare state compared to poor people. Given that T3 also leads rich people to believe that welfarism is a very important problem (as shown by the F-test at the bottom of Table column 7 C.25), their increased support for a exclusionary welfare state may be an indication of their reluctance to share public resources with those who differ from them culturally.

In summary, our analysis reveals the presence of heterogeneous treatment effects along the income dimension in the context of Italian policy preferences formation. Additionally, we find that exposure to information on the native-immigrant composition of poverty and diversity can lead to depolarization along income lines, resulting in reduced distance in policy preferences among rich, middle-income, and poor individuals. Finally, we find evidence of cultural in-group bias among the rich respondents.

5.3 *Education*

We explore heterogeneous effects also by levels of education. Table C.26 shows that the treatments T2, T3 and T4 can have different effects among highly and not highly educated individuals. This findings also allow us to show that individuals with different levels of education, when exposed to these information, depolarize in their preferences for an exclusionary welfare state. We also find heterogeneous effects in education in preferences for redistribution in T3 when looking at support for higher income tax for rich people (column 2). Again, the treatment works by decreasing polarization.

Considering perceptions, heterogeneous treatment effects are only found on perceptions of the share of poor individuals in T3 (although this information is not provided in this treatment) (Table C.27). Finally, Table C.28 shows that heterogeneous treatment effects are found on loss of identity as a more important problem in Italy in T1 (column 6).

As with income, information on diversity in T3 reveals a potential cultural in-group

bias along the education dimension. Looking for mechanisms, we find here a different one with respect to rich people: more educated people are more likely to revise positively their perceptions on the share of no-Catholic immigrants (as shown by the F-test at the bottom of Table C.27 - column 7) and are more likely to feel poorer because of this information (as shown by the F-test at the bottom of Table C.28 - column 1).

To conclude, as with the income dimension, we find that information can decrease polarization in policy preferences on the education dimension. Additionally, we find that educated people, as rich people, may display a cultural in-group bias.

5.4 *Social preferences*

Finally, we also test heterogeneous treatment effects by social preferences rooted in beliefs regarding meritocracy (Mijs, 2021; Almås et al., 2020). Consequently, we examine whether individuals with strong social preferences favoring meritocracy respond differently to information compared to those who do not share such preferences. Table C.29 reports heterogeneous treatments effects on policy preferences.

Our study shows that meritocrats and non-meritocrats tend to diverge in their preferences for redistribution after being exposed to the information in T1 (to a lesser extent) and T3. However, we found no difference in treatment effects in perceptions (Table C.30). Finally, we find significant differences between the two groups in the way they feel threatened by immigrants after the exposure to the information. Meritocrats exhibit a greater sense of economic threat by immigrants in T1 and cultural threat in T3, as compared to non-meritocrats (Table C.31). These reactions in T3 suggest that people who hold meritocratic views may have also exhibit a cultural in-group bias but the underlying mechanisms appear once again distinct from those observed in the case of rich and educated individuals: feelings of threats seems to be the trigger of cultural in-group bias among meritocrats individuals.

In conclusion, our study reveals that heterogeneous treatment effects are also observed among individuals with strong social preferences favouring meritocracy. Differently from above, in this case we observe polarization in policy preference and a cultural in-group bias following the provision of information.

6 **Robustness analysis**

We test the robustness of our treatment effects on preferences for redistribution, perceptions and feelings by re-estimating Table 4 and 5 and 6 in four different ways.

First, we show that our results are unaffected by dropping observations we flagged as low quality. We drop 38 observations corresponding to those respondents who explicitly declared to have not paid sufficient attention to the survey and those who spent too little

or too much time on questions, namely those in the bottom 5% and top 5% of the survey time distribution. In sum, 383 observations are dropped. With this new restricted sample of 3138 individuals, we re-estimate Table 4, 5, and 6. Our findings from Table E.1, E.2, and E.3 demonstrate that the results of our study are robust: information on the native-immigrant composition of poverty matters to reduce exclusionary welfare preferences, and the mechanism at work is the reduction of misperceptions.

Second, we drop respondents who felt that the survey was biased (13 per cent of the sample). We again find that the effect of the information on the native-immigrant composition of poverty on exclusionary redistributive preferences is confirmed (Tables E.4, E.5 and E.6).

Third, we drop respondents with an extreme pattern of answers on a set of 28 questions as in Alesina et al. (2023), and we still find our main treatment effects (Tables E.7, E.8 and E.9).

To conclude, we re-estimate our coefficients without probability weights and still we find confirmation of our main results (Table E.10, E.11 and E.12).

More details on the Robustness analysis are reported in Appendix E.

7 Conclusions

We conducted a survey experiment in Italy to explore the impact of information on preferences for redistribution, including exclusionary preferences. More specifically, we provided participants with information on both wealth inequality and immigration. The latter refers, in our work, to information on the composition of poverty (native vs. immigrants) and on the cultural diversity of immigrants in terms of their country of origin and their religion. Our findings revealed substantial misperceptions among participants regarding both income inequality and immigration. Notably, misperceptions were more pronounced for statistics related to wealth concentration at the bottom of the income distribution and the poverty rate among Italians. Perceptions of these statistics are also highly polarized across social groups. We also observed that, on average, preferences for redistribution were quite inelastic to information. However, we did find an effect of information on exclusionary preferences: when participants are presented with information on the native-immigrant composition of poverty, they reduced their support for exclusionary preferences. More precisely, respondents reduced their support for a welfare state granting access only to Italians. Therefore, our study reveals the existence of an economic in-group bias driven by misperceptions on both the share of poor immigrants and the incidence of poverty among Italians. Finally, by exploring heterogeneous treatment effects, we find possible evidence of a cultural in-group bias by investigating heterogeneous treatment effects along the income, education and social preferences dimensions. This implies that the impact of information on attitudes may vary depending on individual

characteristics.

Our results require further discussion to provide a better understanding and possible avenues for future research. It is not clear, in fact, why people often do not update perceptions once new information is provided. We can rule out the possibility that people did not watch the videos, did not pay attention to them or distrusted the source of information. Since the perceptions that were not updated (e.g., the share of wealth held by the bottom 50%) are in the same videos as the updated perceptions (e.g., the share of wealth held by the top 10%), we tend to believe that respondents did watch the video, were paying attention to it and tended to trust the source. However, if respondents watched the videos, why did not they behave accordingly and update their perceptions? Here, we present several potential explanations, which are not necessarily mutually exclusive, for why respondents may ignore information or update their perceptions differently than expected.

First, consider the information about the share of wealth going to the bottom 50%. In this case, cognitive dissonance might be at work: individuals sometimes might disregard pieces of information which looks inconsistent with their internal beliefs and values to a great extent (Festinger, 1957). Several studies show that both advantaged and disadvantaged members of unequal societies are more likely to justify income differences and to adjust their descriptions of inequality as a form of self-protection (Jost et al., 2004; Trump and White, 2018; Dover, 2022).

Second, but closely related to cognitive dissonance, people might display directional instead of accuracy motivations when processing information. In other words, motivated reasoning may play an important role when deciding what information is used for updating (Flynn et al., 2017; Epley and Gilovich, 2016; Bénabou and Tirole, 2016): people tend to hold beliefs and opinions that are more conducive to their existing views, and to accept only those pieces of information that are consistent with their worldviews or with their shared social identities. Motivated reasoning can explain why systematic differences in misperceptions and preferences may be self-serving in nature (Deffains et al., 2016). For instance, Kraus et al. (2019) document how white Americans engage in motivated cognition to remain ignorant about racial economic inequality, in service of their prevailing narrative. Alesina et al. (2021a) find similar results but exacerbated by partisan gaps. As a theory, motivated reasoning might explain why people ignore the information on the share of wealth going to the bottom 50% but it might also help us understand why information on a factual reality (e.g., information on poverty) push people to change perceptions on other factual realities (e.g., the share of non-European immigrants in T2). Similar in spirit to motivated reasoning, there is also evidence that people are better at integrating desirable information into their beliefs than undesirable information (Eil and Rao, 2011; Lefebvre et al., 2017).

Overall, it seems that the most common pattern is that individuals selectively update

their perceptions based on the information provided, focusing on some aspects while disregarding others. Unfortunately, our design does not allow us to disentangle between the above explanations, which are all plausible.

Furthermore, the above explanations are hard to reconcile with the fact that people update all their perceptions in T4, namely, the treatment where all pieces of information are provided. To this regard, our study provides new evidence that giving people multiple information sources may have stronger effects and reduce selective updating. A similar finding emerges in Grigorieff et al. (2020) that, contrary to (Hopkins et al., 2019) who provide only information on the share of immigrant population residing in the US, show that by including information on several characteristics of the immigrant population respondents reduce misperceptions and increase public support for immigration. To add on this, the conceptual framework elaborated by Alesina et al. (2020) might be at work: when information is given, it enters a multidimensional space of perceptions and policy preferences and the way in which perceptions change depends on how learning occurs when people receive different pieces of information, which are weighted before the updating process. Since few studies have interacted more than one information (Martingali and Windsteiger, 2022; Di Tella and Rodrik, 2020), it is difficult to understand how people update multiple information. Our findings suggest that people make more sense of factual realities when provided with multiple information. While this was already shown in Grigorieff et al. (2020), to our knowledge, not much evidence to explain why this happens has been collected. Our study shows that this can be a fruitful avenue for future research.

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A Appendix - Questionnaire

Answer options are in parenthesis and in italic, separated by a semicolon.

A.1 Welcome Page

Project title

Political preferences in Italy

Researchers and institutions involved

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Maria Marino, Department of Applied Economics, Autonomous University of Barcelona

We are a group of researchers from the University of Florence and Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona.

Our goal is to analyze your political preferences.

No matter what your ideas are. By completing this questionnaire, you are contributing to our knowledge as a society. You might not agree with all the information provided, but you will have the opportunity to express your own views.

It is very important for the success of our research that you complete the entire survey, read the questions carefully, answer honestly. There is NO right or wrong answer.

Your participation in this study is voluntary and you can withdraw from the questionnaire at any time, or, if you have completed it, you can write to Yougov to request the deletion of your data.

Your name will never be recorded and you will be never be identified.

By participating in this survey, you are enrolled in a lottery with five prizes of 100 euros each. If you win, the prize will be paid out in the usual way.

This survey should take (on average) about 10 minutes to complete.

If you have any questions regarding this research, you can contact the principal investigators of this study:

Maria Marino, Department of Applied Economics, Autonomous University of Barcelona, e-mail: maria.marino@uab.cat

Riccardo Bruni, Department of Letters and Philosophy, DILEF, e-mail: riccardo.bruni@unifi.it

If you have any concerns, complaints or questions about this study or your rights as a research participant, you can contact:

The Department of Letters and Philosophy, DILEF, e-mail: segr-dip@lettere filosofia.unifi.it; tel: +39 055 2756200. Any critical issues, not otherwise resolvable, will be addressed to the Director of the Department.

The Data Protection Officer (DPO) of the Autonomous University of Barcelona by phone (+34 935812774) or by email (proteccio.dades@uab.cat).

I have read the information provided above.

I know that participation in the study is purely voluntary and data are anonymized.

I know I can withdraw from the survey at any time without consequences.

I was told how to ask for additional information and make a complaint.

(If you are 18 years old or older, you are an Italian citizen, agree with the statements above, and freely consent to participate in the study, please click on the I AGREE button to begin the survey.)

(I AGREE, I DISAGREE)

A.2 Pre-treatment Block

1. Which is your marital status? (*Single; Married; Living together with a partner; Legally separated or divorced; Widowed*)
2. Which region were you born? (*Abruzzo; Basilicata; Calabria; Campania; Emilia Romagna; Friuli Venezia Giulia; Lazio; Liguria; Lombardia; Marche; Molise; Piemonte; Puglia; Sardegna; Sicilia; Toscana; Trentino Alto Adige; Umbria; Valle d'Aosta; Veneto; I was born abroad*)
3. How would you define the place where you live? (*The center of a large city; The suburb of a large city; Farm/rural area; Small town/village*)
4. Which of the following categories best describes your highest educational level? (*Primary education; Upper secondary education; University degree; Master program or PhD program*)
5. What is your current employment status? (*Full-time employee; Part-time employee; Self-employed or small business owner; Unemployed and looking for work; Housewife; Student; Not currently working and not looking for work; Retiree*)
6. (If Full-time employee; Part-time employee; Self-employed or small business owner) Are you employed in one of the following sectors? Check the one that applies. If you have multiple jobs, check the one that describes your main occupation. (*Construction; Real estate activities; Business services; Finance and insurance; Trade and transport; Manufacturing, raw material extraction; public utilities; Information and communication; Culture, leisure and other services; Agriculture, forestry and fishing; Public administration; education; health and social work activities; other (specify)*)

7. (If Unemployed and looking for work; Not currently working and not looking for work; Retiree) Even if you are not currently working, what sector did your latest occupation fall under? Check the one that applies. (*Construction; Real estate activities; Business services; Finance and insurance; Trade and transport; Manufacturing, raw material extraction; public utilities; Information and communication; Culture, leisure and other services; Agriculture, forestry and fishing; Public administration; education; health and social work activities; other (specify)*)
- Before proceeding to the next set of questions, we want to ask for your feedback about the responses you provided so far. In your honest opinion, should we use your responses, or should we discard your responses since you did not devote your full attention to the questions so far? (Yes, I have devoted full attention to the questions so far and I think you should use my responses for your study; No, I have not devoted full attention to the questions so far and I think you should not use my responses for your study.)*
8. On a scale from 0 to 10, how much do you agree/disagree with these statements, where 0 corresponds to Disagree completely and 10 to Agree completely ? -A society is fair when income and wealth are equally distributed among all people. (*Disagree completely 0-10 Agree completely*) -A society is fair when hard-working people earn more than others. (*Disagree completely 0-10 Agree completely*) -A society is fair when it takes care of those who are poor and in need regardless of what they give back to society. (*Disagree completely 0-10 Agree completely*)
9. How much is approximately your monthly income after tax? We refer to the overall income from work or business, any other income such as rents, dividends and government transfers (unemployment allowance, citizenship income, etc.)? Remember that the survey is anonymized. (*Specify*) or *I prefer to not say*
10. In politics, people often talk about left and right. Where would you place your political preferences? (*Left; Center left; center; center right; right*)
11. Which political party did you vote for in the last general election (in 2018)? (*Partito Democratico; Civica Popolare Lorenzin; +Europa; Forza Italia; Lega Nord; Fratelli d'Italia; Movimento Cinque Stelle; Liberi e uguali; Potere al popolo (Rifondazione comunista); other (please indicate which party); I did not vote*)
12. Which political party today do you feel closest to? (*Partito Democratico; Italia Viva; +Europa; Azione; Forza Italia; Lega; Fratelli d'Italia; Movimento Cinque Stelle; Sinistra Italiana; other (please indicate which party); to no party*)
13. On a scale from 0 to 10, what is the degree of trust that you personally place in the following institutions, where 0 corresponds to an absolute lack of trust and 10

to full trust? - Parliament - Government - Political parties (*absolute lack of trust 0-10 full trust*)

14. In questionnaires like ours, sometimes there are subjects who do not carefully read the questions. This means that there are a lot of answers which compromise the results of research studies. To show that you read our questions carefully, please choose turquoise as your answer in the next question. What's your favorite color? (*Red; Yellow; Blue; Orange; Green; Viola; Turquoise; Black; White*)

[START RANDOMIZATION]

A.3 *Treatments Block*

A.3.1 *Treatment 1*

Recently some studies have been carried out that allow us to better understand our country. We summarize some of these results through short animated videos. In some videos, with wealth we refer to real estate assets, deposits, savings and stocks and bonds.

T1 (link to video)

Text of T1: *In Italy the poor are getting poorer and the rich are getting richer. We sort individuals living in Italy based on their wealth, from the poorest to the richest. The poorest 50 percent of the population saw their wealth reduced, from 12 to 3 percent of total wealth. The richest 10 percent of the population increased their wealth from 44 to 56 percent of total wealth.*

A.3.2 *Treatment 2*

Recently some studies have been carried out that allow us to better understand our country. We summarize some of these results through short animated videos. In some videos, with wealth we refer to real estate assets, deposits, savings and stocks and bonds. By immigrants we mean those people who were not born in Italy, but moved here legally at some point in their life and are currently residing here. We only consider regular immigrants, NOT irregular ones.

(random order)

T1 (link to video) Text of T1: *As Above*

T2 (link to video) Text of T2: *In Italy, within the poor, we find an ever-increasing number of immigrants. If we consider the absolute poor, that is, those who are unable to meet basic needs, 27 percent of the total are immigrants. If we then analyze*

the incidence of poverty, while out of 100 Italians, 6 are affected by poverty, out of 100 immigrants, 30 are affected by it.

A.3.3 Treatment 3

Recently some studies have been carried out that allow us to better understand our country. We summarize some of these results through short animated videos. In some videos, with wealth we refer to real estate assets, deposits, savings and stocks and bonds. By immigrants we mean those people who were not born in Italy, but moved here legally at some point in their life and are currently residing here. We only consider regular immigrants, NOT irregular ones.

(random order)

T1 (link to video) Text of T1: *As Above*

T3 (link to video) Text of T3: *In Italy, cultural diversity is growing. If we consider where the immigrants come from, 50 percent of them come from Africa, Asia, North and South America, the rest come from Europe. If we then analyze religion, 80 percent of immigrants are Muslims, Orthodox Christians, Buddhists or of other religions, the rest are Catholics.*

A.3.4 Treatment 4

Recently some studies have been carried out that allow us to better understand our country. We summarize some of these results through short animated videos. In some videos, with wealth we refer to real estate assets, deposits, savings and stocks and bonds. By immigrants we mean those people who were not born in Italy, but moved here legally at some point in their life and are currently residing here. We only consider regular immigrants, NOT irregular ones.

(random order)

T1 (link to video)

T2 (link to video)

T3 (link to video)

Text of T1, T2, T3: *As Above*

[END RANDOMIZATION]

A.4 Post-treatment block

A.4.1 Mechanisms 1 - Feelings and opinions


15. In our society there are groups which are rich and groups which are poor. Below is a scale that runs from the rich to the poor. Where would you put yourself on this scale? With wealth we refer to real estate assets, deposits, savings and stocks and bonds. *(bottom 1-10 top scale)*
16. Below we list some of the most important problems that Italy has to face today. Which do you think are the most important? Rank them from most important to least important. *(poor investment in school and university; climate change; differences between rich and poor; corruption; loss of traditional cultural values; unconditional provision of public subsidies to the poor; bureaucracy; sexism)*

A.4.2 Outcome Variables - Self-reported policy preferences

In the next questions, we will ask you your opinion on how government raises and spends money on various policies. Remember that there are no right or wrong answer. We only want to know your opinion.

To what extent do you agree with the following statements?

17. How much do you agree/disagree that the government should increase taxes on the rich and spend more on benefits for the poor. *(Disagree completely 0-10 Agree completely)*
18. As you probably know, income tax rates in Italy are paid on the respective income brackets. The Figure shows the tax rates with the relative income brackets. For each of them, tell if you would decrease, leave as it is or increased.



| Reddito imponibile | ALIUOTA | TAX PREFERENCE |
|--------------------|---------|---|
| 8.000-15.000 | 23 | <i>[Decreased/Left as is/Increased]</i> |
| 15.001-28.000 | 27 | <i>[Decreased/Left as is/Increased]</i> |
| 28.001-55.000 | 38 | <i>[Decreased/Left as is/Increased]</i> |
| 55.001-75.000 | 41 | <i>[Decreased/Left as is/Increased]</i> |
| beyond 75.000 | 43 | <i>[Decreased/Left as is/Increased]</i> |

(random order of the next two questions)

19. Apart from income taxes, the public budget can be increased by taxing the wealth (properties, estate and assets). A recent proposal aims at taxing wealth above 50 million euros with a tax rate of 2%. How much do you agree/disagree with this proposal? (*Disagree completely 0-10 Agree completely*)

20. Apart from income taxes, the public budget can be increased by imposing a tax on the transfer of wealth from a deceased person to his or her heirs. A recent proposal aims at increasing the actual rate up to 20% for wealth above 5 millions (top 1% percent of the population). How much do you agree/disagree with this proposal? (*Disagree completely 0-10 Agree completely*)

21. Once raised, taxes can be used to finance public spending. Suppose that you are the person deciding on the Italian public spending for the next year. You can choose how you want to divide the budget (in percent) between the following 7 categories: Please enter the percent of the budget you would assign to each spending category (the total must sum to 100).
 - 1) Defense and National Security (e.g., costs of the Defense department and the costs of supporting security operations in foreign countries, maintain public order in the national territory)
 - 2) Public Infrastructure (e.g., transport infrastructure like roads, bridges and airports, and water infrastructure)
 - 3) Spending on Schooling and Higher Education
 - 4) Old-age pensions and disability pensions, which provide economic support to the elderly and disabled
 - 5) Support for the unemployed
 - 6) Support to poor people (for example subsidies to meet food and health costs and the payment of bill)
 - 7) Public Spending on Health

(Slider with continuous percentage choices 0%-100% for each of the above categories)

22. How much do you agree or disagree with the following government policies? (Providing to Italian citizens living in absolute poverty an income support of 540 Euro per month for food, health and bills-related expenses ?) (Providing to people residing in Italy and living in absolute poverty an income support of 540 Euro per month for food, health and bills-related expenses ?) (*Disagree completely 0-10 Agree completely*)

(The following question include a randomization within the 5 groups)

23. Here are 3 (4) things that may upset people. We want you to indicate how many of these upset you. We are not interested in which ones, only in how many of them.

Pay excise taxes on petrol.

Football players earning tens of millions.

That we have to pay a broadcasting license fee.

(That immigrants automatically receive the same welfare benefits as Italians).

24. In your opinion, when should immigrants be granted the right to social benefits / services in Italy? (*Immediately on arrival; after living in Italy for a year, whether or not they have worked; Only after they have worked and paid taxes for at least a year; once they have become a Italian citizen; they should never get the same rights*)

A.4.3 Outcome Variables - Donation

25. By participating in our survey, you could be drawn as the winner of one of five prizes of 100 euros each. We would like to know if, in case you won, you would be willing to donate part or all of your 100 euros to a good cause. Below you will find 3 charities. You can enter how many euros of your winning you would like to donate to each of them. If you are one of the winners, you will be paid, in addition to the normal fee for participating in the survey, 100 euros minus the amount you donated to charity. We will pay the desired donation amount directly to the charity of your choice. Enter how much of your 100 euros you want to donate to each charity: 1) OXFAM (charity fighting against the difference of wealth between the rich and the poor) 2) CARITAS (charity supporting poor people living in Italy, both Italians and immigrants) 3) ARCI (charity supporting the cultural and social integration of immigrants in Italy). (*slider 0-100 for each charity*)

A.4.4 Mechanisms 2 - Immigrants as threat

26. Would you say that Italy's cultural life is generally undermined or enriched by people coming to live in Italy from other countries? (*Italy's cultural life is undermined 0 - 10 Italy's cultural life is enriched*)

27. Would you say that immigrants are generally a burden on our country's finances or that they contribute to them? *Immigrants are a burden on country's finances 0-10*
Immigrants contribute to the country's finances

A.4.5 Mechanisms 2 - Posterior beliefs

[START RANDOMIZATION] (Control group) Finally, we will ask you a series of questions to find out the information you have on some issues concerning our country.

(Treated grouped T1, T2, T3, T4) Finally, we will ask you a series of questions to find out the information you have on some issues concerning our country. To some of them, you should already know the answer. [END RANDOMIZATION]

Consider the total wealth of Italians, that is, real estate assets, deposits, savings and stocks and bonds. Then sort the individuals living in Italy according to their wealth, from poorest to richest so that we can consider 10 percent of the richest and 50 percent of the poorest.

28. According to your best estimate, which is the percentage of wealth that the richest 10% of the population owns today? *(slider 0-100)*
29. According to your best estimate, which is the percentage of wealth that the poorest 50% of the population owns today? *(slider 0-100)*
- Now think about regular immigrants, that is, those who were not born in Italy, but who moved here legally and currently reside there.
30. According to your best estimate, what is the percentage of immigrants out of the total of the absolute poor in Italy, that is, those who are unable to meet basic needs (food, clothing, housing)? *(slider 0-100)*
31. According to your best estimate, out of 100 immigrants, how many are absolute poor ? *(slider 0-100)*
32. According to your best estimate, out of 100 Italians, how many are absolute poor? *(slider 0-100)*
33. According to your best estimate, which percentage of the immigrants out of the total of the immigrants come from Europe? *(slider 0-100)*
34. According to your best estimate, which percentage of the immigrants out of the total of the immigrants is catholic? *(slider 0-100)*
35. According to your best estimate, what was the purpose of this study? *(open space)*

36. Do you feel that this survey was biased? (*yes; no; I do not know*)

B Appendix - Variables definition

Respondents' Characteristics

male: dummy if the respondent is male

age1824: dummy if the respondent's age is between 18 and 24 y.o.

age2534: dummy if the respondent's age is between 25 and 34 y.o.

age3544: dummy if the respondent's age is between 35 and 44 y.o.

age4555: dummy if the respondent's age is between 45 and 55 y.o.

age55more: dummy if the respondent's age is above 55 y.o.

poor: dummy if the respondent's monthly net income is below the 50th percentile of the income distribution in the country

rich: dummy if the respondent's monthly net income is above the 90th percentile of the income distribution in the country

Northwest: dummy if the respondent lives in the North-West of Italy

Northeast: dummy if the respondent lives in the North-East of Italy

Center: dummy if the respondent lives in the Center of Italy (Sicily and Sardinia)

Island: dummy if the respondent lives in the Islands of Italy (Sicily and Sardinia)

southall: dummy if the respondent lives in the South including the Islands (Sicily and Sardinia)

married: dummy if the respondent is married

degree: dummy if the respondent has college degree

postdegree: dummy if the respondent has a Master degree or Ph.D.

highed: dummy if the respondent has college degree or a higher level of education

working: dummy if the respondent works as employee (both part and full time) or self-employee

unemploy: dummy if the respondent is unemployed

student: dummy if the respondent is a student *urbanc*: dummy if the respondent lives in the center of a big city

urbans: dummy if the respondent lives in the suburb of a big city

rural: dummy if the respondent lives in a rural area

left: dummy if the respondent's self-positioning on the ideological scale is left or center-left

right: dummy if the respondent's self-positioning on the ideological scale is right or center-right

populist: dummy if the respondent says he/she voted one of the following political parties: Lega, M5s, Fratelli d'Italia e Forza Italia.

meritocrat: dummy if the respondent both agrees that society is fair when people who

work more have higher pays (>7) and does not agree that society is fair when income and wealth are equally distributed (<7)

distrust: dummy if the respondent declares that his/her degree of trust in Parliament, Government and political parties is below 3

Mechanisms variables

richshare: Respondent's belief on the share of the wealth hold by top 10 (share)

poorshare: Respondent's belief on the share of the wealth hold by bottom 50 (share)

poorimmshare: Respondent's belief on the share of poor immigrants among poor living in Italy (share)

poorimminc: Respondent's belief on the share of poor immigrants among immigrants (incidence of poverty among immigrants) (share)

pooritainc: Respondent's belief on the share of poor Italians among Italians (incidence of poverty among Italians) (share)

immorigindiv: Respondent's belief on the share of no-European immigrants (share)

immreligiondiv: Respondent's belief on the share of no-Catholic immigrants (share)

Poor-rich wealth scale: Respondent's belief, on a scale from 1 to 10, on his/her position

on a wealth scale from poor to rich *Migrants Economic Threat*: Respondent's belief, on a scale from 0 to 10, that immigrants are a burden for the economy of Italy

Migrants Cultural Threat: Respondent's belief, on a scale from 0 to 10, that immigrants are a threat for the culture of Italy

Problem: Income difference: Respondent's ranking, on a scale from 1 to 8, that income differences between rich and poor is the most important problem in Italy

Problem: Loss of identity: Respondent's ranking, on a scale from 1 to 8, that the loss of traditional cultural values is the most important problem in Italy

Problem: Unconditional welfare: Respondent's ranking, on a scale from 1 to 8, that the unconditional welfare to poor is the most important problem in Italy

Outcome variables

General Redistr.: Respondent's support, on a scale from 0 to 10, for redistributive policies (increasing tax to rich and give support to poor)

Tax Rich: Dummy if the respondent agrees that the tax rate of rich people should be increased

Wealth Tax: Respondent's support, on a scale from 0 to 10, that a wealth tax should be increased

Estate Tax: Respondent's support, on a scale from 0 to 10, that a estate tax should be increased

Support Poor (all): Respondent's support, on a scale from 0 to 10, for a monetary benefit of 540 Euro per month for food, health and bills-related expenses for all poor

Spend. Poor: Respondent's belief on the share of current government budget that should be allocated to poor

Spend. Unempl.: Respondent's belief on the share of current government budget that

should be allocated to unemployed people ²⁴

Summary Index Redistr.: Respondent's score of a general index of redistribution over the variables *General Redistr.*, *Tax Rich*, *Wealth Tax*, *Estate Tax*, *Support Poor (all)*, *Spend. Poor*, *Spend. Unempl.* following the methodology in Kling et al. (2007)

Support Poor (It): Respondent's support, on a scale from 0 to 10, for a monetary benefit of 540 Euro per month for food, health and bills-related expenses for Italian poor only

Exclusive: Dummy if the respondent agrees that immigrants should never access the welfare or access only if they have the Italian citizenship.²⁵

Summary Index Exclus.: Respondent's score of a general index of exclusionary redistributive preferences over the variables *Support Poor (It)* and *Exclusive* following the methodology in Kling et al. (2007)

Oxfam: Respondent's share of donation to Oxfam, a charity working against differences between poor and rich

Caritas: Respondent's share of donation to Caritas, a charity working to help poor people living in Italy


Arci: Respondent's share of donation to Arci, a charity working for the cultural integration of immigrants in Italy

²⁴We only consider preferences for spending in education, poor and unemployment to capture redistributive preferences as in Alesina et al. (2018), but we also ask respondents how they would allocate the budget on defence, infrastructure, pensions, and health.

²⁵The original question asks individual if they think that immigrants should be granted social benefits immediately on arrival; after living in Italy for a year, whether or not they have worked; Only after they have worked and paid taxes for at least a year; once they have become a Italian citizen; they should never get the same rights.

C Appendix - Figures and Tables

Figure C.1: Distribution of Total Time Spent on the Survey.



Notes: The figure shows the distribution of the total time respondents spent on the survey (bottom and top 5% are removed).

Table C.1: Randomization Balance Control-T1.

| | n | Control mean | sd | n | T1 mean | sd | Diff |
|-----------|-----|-----------------|------|-----|------------|------|--------|
| male | 705 | 0.49 | 0.50 | 701 | 0.48 | 0.50 | -0.009 |
| age1824 | 705 | 0.07 | 0.26 | 701 | 0.07 | 0.26 | -0.001 |
| age2534 | 705 | 0.13 | 0.34 | 701 | 0.13 | 0.34 | 0.004 |
| age3544 | 705 | 0.16 | 0.37 | 701 | 0.16 | 0.37 | -0.003 |
| age4554 | 705 | 0.19 | 0.40 | 701 | 0.20 | 0.40 | 0.005 |
| age55more | 705 | 0.44 | 0.50 | 701 | 0.43 | 0.50 | -0.005 |
| married | 705 | 0.49 | 0.50 | 701 | 0.48 | 0.50 | -0.004 |
| work | 705 | 0.58 | 0.49 | 701 | 0.56 | 0.50 | -0.022 |
| unempl | 705 | 0.10 | 0.30 | 701 | 0.08 | 0.27 | -0.018 |
| highed | 705 | 0.32 | 0.47 | 701 | 0.36 | 0.48 | 0.032 |
| rich | 511 | 0.21 | 0.40 | 499 | 0.21 | 0.41 | 0.009 |
| poor | 511 | 0.31 | 0.46 | 499 | 0.27 | 0.44 | -0.043 |
| left | 705 | 0.43 | 0.50 | 701 | 0.46 | 0.50 | 0.024 |
| right | 705 | 0.32 | 0.47 | 701 | 0.31 | 0.46 | -0.014 |
| Northwest | 705 | 0.27 | 0.44 | 701 | 0.28 | 0.45 | 0.013 |
| Northeast | 705 | 0.20 | 0.40 | 701 | 0.19 | 0.39 | -0.006 |
| Center | 705 | 0.19 | 0.39 | 701 | 0.20 | 0.40 | 0.007 |
| South | 705 | 0.23 | 0.42 | 701 | 0.22 | 0.42 | -0.007 |
| Islands | 705 | 0.11 | 0.32 | 701 | 0.11 | 0.31 | -0.006 |

The Diff column is the coefficient of a simple regression of treatment status on the variable in the first column with robust standard errors.
 * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

Table C.2: Randomization Balance Control-T2.

| | n | Control mean | sd | n | T2 mean | sd | Diff |
|-----------|-----|-----------------|------|-----|------------|------|---------|
| male | 705 | 0.49 | 0.50 | 703 | 0.48 | 0.50 | -0.004 |
| age1824 | 705 | 0.07 | 0.26 | 703 | 0.07 | 0.26 | -0.003 |
| age2534 | 705 | 0.13 | 0.34 | 703 | 0.13 | 0.33 | -0.002 |
| age3544 | 705 | 0.16 | 0.37 | 703 | 0.17 | 0.37 | 0.003 |
| age4554 | 705 | 0.19 | 0.40 | 703 | 0.20 | 0.40 | 0.002 |
| age55more | 705 | 0.44 | 0.50 | 703 | 0.44 | 0.50 | -0.000 |
| married | 705 | 0.49 | 0.50 | 703 | 0.51 | 0.50 | 0.026 |
| work | 705 | 0.58 | 0.49 | 703 | 0.58 | 0.49 | 0.002 |
| unempl | 705 | 0.10 | 0.30 | 703 | 0.07 | 0.26 | -0.027* |
| highed | 705 | 0.32 | 0.47 | 703 | 0.34 | 0.47 | 0.012 |
| rich | 511 | 0.21 | 0.40 | 531 | 0.22 | 0.41 | 0.013 |
| poor | 511 | 0.31 | 0.46 | 531 | 0.30 | 0.46 | -0.014 |
| left | 705 | 0.43 | 0.50 | 703 | 0.41 | 0.49 | -0.019 |
| right | 705 | 0.32 | 0.47 | 703 | 0.34 | 0.47 | 0.017 |
| Northwest | 705 | 0.27 | 0.44 | 703 | 0.27 | 0.44 | -0.001 |
| Northeast | 705 | 0.20 | 0.40 | 703 | 0.19 | 0.39 | -0.007 |
| Center | 705 | 0.19 | 0.39 | 703 | 0.21 | 0.41 | 0.015 |
| South | 705 | 0.23 | 0.42 | 703 | 0.22 | 0.42 | -0.008 |
| Islands | 705 | 0.11 | 0.32 | 703 | 0.11 | 0.32 | 0.000 |

The Diff column is the coefficient of a simple regression of treatment status on the variable in the first column with robust standard errors.
 * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

Table C.3: Randomization Balance Control-T3.

| | n | Control mean | sd | n | T3 mean | sd | Diff |
|-----------|-----|-----------------|------|-----|------------|------|--------|
| male | 705 | 0.49 | 0.50 | 711 | 0.48 | 0.50 | -0.006 |
| age1824 | 705 | 0.07 | 0.26 | 711 | 0.08 | 0.27 | 0.004 |
| age2534 | 705 | 0.13 | 0.34 | 711 | 0.13 | 0.34 | 0.000 |
| age3544 | 705 | 0.16 | 0.37 | 711 | 0.17 | 0.37 | 0.003 |
| age4554 | 705 | 0.19 | 0.40 | 711 | 0.20 | 0.40 | 0.001 |
| age55more | 705 | 0.44 | 0.50 | 711 | 0.43 | 0.50 | -0.008 |
| married | 705 | 0.49 | 0.50 | 711 | 0.52 | 0.50 | 0.032 |
| work | 705 | 0.58 | 0.49 | 711 | 0.57 | 0.50 | -0.012 |
| unempl | 705 | 0.10 | 0.30 | 711 | 0.09 | 0.28 | -0.011 |
| highed | 705 | 0.32 | 0.47 | 711 | 0.33 | 0.47 | 0.011 |
| rich | 511 | 0.21 | 0.40 | 499 | 0.20 | 0.40 | -0.003 |
| poor | 511 | 0.31 | 0.46 | 499 | 0.31 | 0.46 | -0.001 |
| left | 705 | 0.43 | 0.50 | 711 | 0.44 | 0.50 | 0.003 |
| right | 705 | 0.32 | 0.47 | 711 | 0.33 | 0.47 | 0.010 |
| Northwest | 705 | 0.27 | 0.44 | 711 | 0.27 | 0.45 | 0.005 |
| Northeast | 705 | 0.20 | 0.40 | 711 | 0.19 | 0.39 | -0.009 |
| Center | 705 | 0.19 | 0.39 | 711 | 0.20 | 0.40 | 0.004 |
| South | 705 | 0.23 | 0.42 | 711 | 0.23 | 0.42 | -0.002 |
| Islands | 705 | 0.11 | 0.32 | 711 | 0.11 | 0.32 | 0.002 |

The Diff column is the coefficient of a simple regression of treatment status on the variable in the first column with robust standard errors.
 * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

Table C.4: Randomization Balance Control-T4.

| | Control | | | T4 | | | Diff |
|-----------|---------|------|------|-----|------|------|----------|
| | n | mean | sd | n | mean | sd | |
| male | 705 | 0.49 | 0.50 | 701 | 0.49 | 0.50 | -0.002 |
| age1824 | 705 | 0.07 | 0.26 | 701 | 0.08 | 0.28 | 0.009 |
| age2534 | 705 | 0.13 | 0.34 | 701 | 0.13 | 0.34 | 0.001 |
| age3544 | 705 | 0.16 | 0.37 | 701 | 0.16 | 0.37 | -0.000 |
| age4554 | 705 | 0.19 | 0.40 | 701 | 0.18 | 0.39 | -0.010 |
| age55more | 705 | 0.44 | 0.50 | 701 | 0.44 | 0.50 | 0.001 |
| married | 705 | 0.49 | 0.50 | 701 | 0.55 | 0.50 | 0.060** |
| work | 705 | 0.58 | 0.49 | 701 | 0.56 | 0.50 | -0.015 |
| unempl | 705 | 0.10 | 0.30 | 701 | 0.06 | 0.24 | -0.037** |
| highed | 705 | 0.32 | 0.47 | 701 | 0.34 | 0.47 | 0.013 |
| rich | 511 | 0.21 | 0.40 | 528 | 0.18 | 0.38 | -0.026 |
| poor | 511 | 0.31 | 0.46 | 528 | 0.31 | 0.46 | -0.002 |
| left | 705 | 0.43 | 0.50 | 701 | 0.45 | 0.50 | 0.020 |
| right | 705 | 0.32 | 0.47 | 701 | 0.32 | 0.47 | -0.001 |
| Northwest | 705 | 0.27 | 0.44 | 701 | 0.27 | 0.44 | 0.004 |
| Northeast | 705 | 0.20 | 0.40 | 701 | 0.19 | 0.39 | -0.007 |
| Center | 705 | 0.19 | 0.39 | 701 | 0.20 | 0.40 | 0.008 |
| South | 705 | 0.23 | 0.42 | 701 | 0.23 | 0.42 | 0.001 |
| Islands | 705 | 0.11 | 0.32 | 701 | 0.11 | 0.31 | -0.006 |

The Diff column is the coefficient of a simple regression of treatment status on the variable in the first column with robust standard errors. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

Table C.5: Correlates of richshare (share of wealth - top 10).

| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
|----------|-----------------|-----------------|-------------------|------------------|-----------------|-----------------|
| male | 0.07 (0.08) | | | | | 0.06 (0.10) |
| highed | | -0.03 (0.08) | | | | -0.07 (0.11) |
| right | | | -0.20** (0.09) | | | -0.19 (0.14) |
| center | | | -0.20** (0.10) | | | -0.02 (0.14) |
| populist | | | | -0.16* (0.08) | | -0.14 (0.12) |
| rich | | | | | -0.03 (0.12) | 0.02 (0.14) |
| middle | | | | | 0.01 (0.11) | 0.08 (0.12) |
| _cons | -0.03 (0.05) | 0.01 (0.05) | 0.11** (0.06) | 0.10 (0.06) | 0.01 (0.09) | 0.10 (0.14) |
| N | 705 | 705 | 705 | 567 | 511 | 431 |

Baseline control group. The outcome variable - richshare (share of wealth - top 10) - is standardized (Kling et al., 2007). Regressions are with probability weights and robust standard errors. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

Table C.6: Correlates of poorshare (share of wealth - bottom 50).

| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
|----------|--------------------|-------------------|--------------------|--------------------|-----------------|-------------------|
| male | -0.25*** (0.07) | | | | | -0.20** (0.10) |
| highed | | -0.18** (0.08) | | | | -0.14 (0.10) |
| right | | | 0.23*** (0.09) | | | 0.06 (0.14) |
| center | | | 0.35*** (0.09) | | | 0.29* (0.15) |
| populist | | | | 0.40*** (0.08) | | 0.36*** (0.12) |
| rich | | | | | -0.14 (0.13) | -0.05 (0.14) |
| middle | | | | | -0.02 (0.11) | 0.01 (0.12) |
| _cons | 0.12** (0.05) | 0.06 (0.05) | -0.16*** (0.05) | -0.26*** (0.06) | 0.00 (0.08) | -0.18 (0.13) |
| <i>N</i> | 705 | 705 | 705 | 567 | 511 | 431 |

Baseline control group. The outcome variable - poorshare (share of wealth - bottom 50) - is standardized (Kling et al., 2007). Regressions are with probability weights and robust standard errors. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.

Table C.7: Correlates of poorimmshare (immigrants share among the poor).

| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
|----------|-----------------|-------------------|------------------|-----------------|-----------------|------------------|
| male | -0.10 (0.08) | | | | | 0.02 (0.10) |
| highed | | -0.16** (0.08) | | | | -0.00 (0.11) |
| right | | | 0.11 (0.09) | | | 0.18 (0.13) |
| center | | | 0.23** (0.09) | | | 0.34** (0.14) |
| populist | | | | 0.05 (0.09) | | -0.08 (0.12) |
| rich | | | | | 0.04 (0.12) | -0.02 (0.14) |
| middle | | | | | 0.10 (0.10) | 0.12 (0.11) |
| _cons | 0.05 (0.05) | 0.05 (0.05) | -0.09* (0.06) | -0.04 (0.07) | -0.09 (0.08) | -0.16 (0.13) |
| <i>N</i> | 705 | 705 | 705 | 567 | 511 | 431 |

Baseline control group. The outcome variable - poorimmshare (immigrants share among the poor) - is standardized (Kling et al., 2007). Regressions are with probability weights and robust standard errors. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.

Table C.8: Correlates of poorimminc (poverty incidence among immigrants).

| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
|----------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|
| male | -0.01 (0.08) | | | | | 0.03 (0.10) |
| highed | | -0.01 (0.08) | | | | 0.01 (0.11) |
| right | | | -0.09 (0.09) | | | -0.12 (0.13) |
| center | | | 0.13 (0.09) | | | 0.12 (0.14) |
| populist | | | | -0.01 (0.09) | | 0.10 (0.12) |
| rich | | | | | -0.04 (0.12) | -0.06 (0.14) |
| middle | | | | | 0.02 (0.10) | 0.02 (0.12) |
| _cons | 0.01 (0.05) | 0.01 (0.05) | -0.00 (0.06) | 0.01 (0.07) | -0.02 (0.08) | -0.08 (0.13) |
| <i>N</i> | 705 | 705 | 705 | 567 | 511 | 431 |

Baseline control group. The outcome variable - poorimminc (poverty incidence among immigrants) - is standardized (Kling et al., 2007). Regressions are with probability weights and robust standard errors. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.

Table C.9: Correlates of pooritainc (poverty incidence among Italians).

| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
|----------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|-------------------|
| male | -0.33*** (0.07) | | | | | -0.22** (0.09) |
| highed | | -0.23*** (0.08) | | | | 0.01 (0.09) |
| right | | | 0.37*** (0.08) | | | 0.25** (0.11) |
| center | | | 0.44*** (0.10) | | | 0.32** (0.13) |
| populist | | | | 0.40*** (0.08) | | 0.23** (0.10) |
| rich | | | | | -0.34*** (0.12) | -0.28** (0.13) |
| middle | | | | | -0.24** (0.10) | -0.17 (0.11) |
| _cons | 0.16*** (0.06) | 0.07 (0.05) | -0.22*** (0.05) | -0.30*** (0.06) | 0.10 (0.08) | -0.16 (0.13) |
| <i>N</i> | 705 | 705 | 705 | 567 | 511 | 431 |

Baseline control group. The outcome variable - pooritainc (poverty incidence among Italians) - is standardized (Kling et al., 2007). Regressions are with probability weights and robust standard errors. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.

Table C.10: Correlates of immorigindiv (share of no-European immigrants).

| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
|----------|------------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|
| male | 0.19** (0.07) | | | | | 0.07 (0.10) |
| highed | | -0.08 (0.08) | | | | -0.13 (0.11) |
| right | | | 0.13 (0.09) | | | 0.14 (0.13) |
| center | | | -0.02 (0.09) | | | 0.04 (0.13) |
| populist | | | | -0.01 (0.09) | | -0.08 (0.11) |
| rich | | | | | -0.03 (0.12) | -0.03 (0.14) |
| middle | | | | | -0.05 (0.10) | -0.05 (0.12) |
| _cons | -0.09* (0.05) | 0.02 (0.05) | -0.04 (0.06) | 0.03 (0.07) | 0.08 (0.08) | 0.11 (0.14) |
| <i>N</i> | 705 | 705 | 705 | 567 | 511 | 431 |

Baseline control group. The outcome variable - immorigindiv (share of no-European immigrants) - is standardized (Kling et al., 2007). Regressions are with probability weights and robust standard errors. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.

Table C.11: Correlates of immreligiondiv (share of no-Catholic immigrants).

| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
|----------|-----------------|-----------------|------------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|
| male | -0.00 (0.08) | | | | | -0.10 (0.10) |
| highed | | -0.11 (0.08) | | | | -0.04 (0.11) |
| right | | | 0.17** (0.08) | | | 0.18 (0.12) |
| center | | | -0.06 (0.10) | | | -0.00 (0.14) |
| populist | | | | 0.14 (0.09) | | 0.04 (0.12) |
| rich | | | | | 0.04 (0.12) | 0.07 (0.14) |
| middle | | | | | -0.06 (0.10) | -0.03 (0.11) |
| _cons | 0.00 (0.05) | 0.03 (0.05) | -0.04 (0.06) | -0.07 (0.07) | 0.06 (0.07) | 0.02 (0.12) |
| <i>N</i> | 705 | 705 | 705 | 567 | 511 | 431 |

Baseline control group. The outcome variable - immreligiondiv (share of no-Catholic immigrants) - is standardized (Kling et al., 2007). Regressions are with probability weights and robust standard errors. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.

Table C.12: Correlation between perceptions and policy preferences - POPULIST SAMPLE.

| | Redistributive Preferences | | | | | | | Exclusionary Preferences | | | |
|----------------|----------------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|---------------------|-------------------|---------------------|--------------------------|---------------------|---------------------|-----------------------|
| | General Redistr. | Tax Rich | Wealth Tax | Estate Tax | Support Poor (all) | Spend Poor | Spend Unempl. | Summary Index Redistr. | Support Poor (It) | Exclusive Welfare | Summary Index Exclus. |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) | (10) | (11) |
| richshare | 0.092* (0.049) | 0.006 (0.022) | 0.057 (0.045) | 0.056 (0.047) | 0.056 (0.052) | -0.043 (0.048) | -0.112** (0.050) | 0.031 (0.050) | 0.039 (0.048) | 0.025 (0.018) | 0.065 (0.042) |
| poorshare | 0.031 (0.052) | -0.060*** (0.023) | 0.030 (0.050) | 0.052 (0.053) | 0.044 (0.053) | -0.021 (0.052) | -0.100** (0.049) | -0.024 (0.052) | 0.030 (0.048) | 0.006 (0.021) | 0.029 (0.046) |
| poorimmshare | -0.018 (0.048) | 0.011 (0.024) | 0.008 (0.054) | -0.014 (0.055) | -0.104* (0.054) | 0.017 (0.049) | 0.101** (0.049) | 0.004 (0.052) | -0.032 (0.051) | 0.005 (0.022) | -0.014 (0.049) |
| poorimminc | -0.025 (0.047) | -0.012 (0.023) | 0.037 (0.056) | -0.025 (0.055) | 0.139*** (0.050) | -0.066 (0.047) | -0.044 (0.045) | -0.002 (0.048) | 0.066 (0.051) | -0.027 (0.021) | 0.003 (0.051) |
| pooritainc | 0.135*** (0.052) | 0.035 (0.023) | -0.092* (0.055) | -0.089* (0.053) | 0.026 (0.054) | 0.022 (0.054) | 0.084* (0.049) | 0.042 (0.051) | 0.104** (0.049) | 0.060*** (0.023) | 0.163*** (0.051) |
| immorigindiv | 0.098* (0.057) | 0.051** (0.024) | 0.055 (0.052) | 0.063 (0.053) | 0.006 (0.060) | 0.019 (0.050) | 0.025 (0.048) | 0.098* (0.052) | 0.019 (0.054) | 0.011 (0.024) | 0.030 (0.054) |
| immreligiondiv | -0.098* (0.053) | -0.024 (0.025) | -0.008 (0.055) | -0.052 (0.054) | 0.017 (0.059) | 0.003 (0.054) | -0.058 (0.052) | -0.065 (0.051) | 0.091* (0.052) | 0.011 (0.022) | 0.080 (0.051) |
| populist | -0.324*** (0.089) | -0.072 (0.045) | -0.282*** (0.091) | -0.281*** (0.092) | -0.126 (0.088) | -0.097 (0.089) | -0.011 (0.090) | -0.335*** (0.092) | 0.399*** (0.092) | 0.110*** (0.038) | 0.442*** (0.089) |
| _cons | 0.067 (0.127) | 0.656*** (0.062) | 0.076 (0.138) | 0.043 (0.131) | -0.119 (0.136) | 0.255* (0.133) | -0.098 (0.128) | 0.073 (0.134) | -0.273** (0.130) | 0.366*** (0.058) | -0.020 (0.126) |

Baseline control group (N=567). The table reports estimates of separate regressions of the variable in the column on the relative (standardized) perception (Kling et al., 2007). Regressions are with probability weights and robust standard errors. Controls included in all regressions are: being male, age brackets, married, left-wing, highly educated, working, unemployed, student, living in a city, suburb or rural area, and living in the South or Islands. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.

Table C.13: Correlation between perceptions and policy preferences - INCOME SAMPLE.

| | Redistributive Preferences | | | | | | | Exclusionary Preferences | | | |
|----------------|----------------------------|----------------------|--------------------|--------------------|----------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------------|----------------------|---------------------|-----------------------|
| | General Redistr. | Tax Rich | Wealth Tax | Estate Tax | Support Poor (all) | Spend Poor | Spend Unempl. | Summary Index Redistr. | Support Poor (It) | Exclusive Welfare | Summary Index Exclus. |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) | (10) | (11) |
| richshare | 0.098* (0.058) | -0.018 (0.022) | 0.053 (0.050) | 0.074 (0.053) | 0.038 (0.049) | -0.084* (0.050) | -0.094* (0.052) | 0.013 (0.056) | 0.029 (0.051) | 0.012 (0.019) | 0.039 (0.048) |
| poorshare | -0.005 (0.059) | -0.081*** (0.025) | 0.030 (0.054) | 0.044 (0.055) | 0.045 (0.052) | -0.011 (0.055) | -0.037 (0.056) | -0.026 (0.058) | 0.040 (0.051) | 0.020 (0.023) | 0.058 (0.051) |
| poorimmshare | -0.008 (0.053) | 0.032 (0.026) | 0.020 (0.057) | 0.017 (0.060) | -0.147*** (0.054) | 0.068 (0.053) | 0.094* (0.054) | 0.029 (0.057) | -0.029 (0.055) | 0.002 (0.024) | -0.017 (0.054) |
| poorimminc | -0.040 (0.051) | -0.019 (0.024) | 0.016 (0.058) | -0.044 (0.059) | 0.114** (0.050) | -0.049 (0.048) | -0.061 (0.048) | -0.027 (0.051) | 0.010 (0.052) | -0.029 (0.024) | -0.039 (0.053) |
| pooritainc | 0.048 (0.054) | 0.023 (0.024) | -0.113* (0.062) | -0.109* (0.058) | -0.007 (0.056) | 0.012 (0.058) | 0.109* (0.057) | -0.003 (0.056) | 0.196*** (0.051) | 0.052** (0.024) | 0.214*** (0.055) |
| immorigindiv | 0.040 (0.059) | 0.052* (0.027) | 0.040 (0.061) | 0.071 (0.060) | -0.070 (0.064) | 0.018 (0.058) | 0.026 (0.054) | 0.061 (0.062) | 0.019 (0.060) | -0.007 (0.026) | 0.002 (0.060) |
| immreligiondiv | -0.082 (0.062) | -0.038 (0.026) | -0.018 (0.063) | -0.060 (0.060) | -0.003 (0.064) | -0.019 (0.059) | 0.019 (0.056) | -0.064 (0.061) | 0.075 (0.058) | 0.036 (0.024) | 0.106* (0.056) |
| rich | -0.245* (0.143) | -0.007 (0.069) | -0.130 (0.146) | 0.056 (0.142) | -0.263* (0.137) | 0.022 (0.147) | -0.066 (0.150) | -0.168 (0.143) | -0.306** (0.127) | -0.087 (0.061) | -0.343** (0.134) |
| middle | -0.098 (0.116) | -0.046 (0.054) | -0.073 (0.110) | -0.008 (0.113) | -0.259** (0.109) | 0.110 (0.116) | -0.023 (0.119) | -0.117 (0.112) | -0.347*** (0.105) | -0.021 (0.052) | -0.269** (0.115) |
| _cons | -0.059 (0.133) | 0.673*** (0.064) | -0.023 (0.137) | -0.170 (0.139) | -0.016 (0.139) | 0.124 (0.142) | -0.039 (0.135) | -0.024 (0.136) | 0.319** (0.135) | 0.383*** (0.065) | 0.408*** (0.148) |

Baseline control group (N=511). The table reports estimates of separate regressions of the variable in the column on the relative (standardized) perception (Kling et al., 2007). Regressions are with probability weights and robust standard errors. Controls included in all regressions are: being male, age brackets, married, left-wing, highly educated, working, unemployed, student, living in a city, suburb or rural area, and living in the South or Islands. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.

Table C.14: Robustness of main treatment effects of Table 4 to FWER control.

| Outcomes | T | coef | stderr | p | pwyong | pbonf | psidak |
|------------------------|----|--------|--------|-------|--------|-------|--------|
| General Redistr. | T1 | 0.021 | 0.052 | 0.681 | 1.000 | 1.000 | 1.000 |
| Tax Rich | T1 | 0.019 | 0.025 | 0.450 | 1.000 | 1.000 | 1.000 |
| Wealth Tax | T1 | 0.053 | 0.051 | 0.300 | 0.995 | 1.000 | 0.999 |
| Estate Tax | T1 | 0.039 | 0.052 | 0.449 | 1.000 | 1.000 | 1.000 |
| Support Poor (all) | T1 | 0.027 | 0.054 | 0.622 | 1.000 | 1.000 | 1.000 |
| Spend Poor | T1 | 0.068 | 0.055 | 0.218 | 0.987 | 1.000 | 0.996 |
| Spend. Unempl. | T1 | -0.101 | 0.051 | 0.047 | 0.652 | 1.000 | 0.738 |
| Summary Index Redistr. | T1 | 0.038 | 0.050 | 0.448 | 0.841 | 1.000 | 0.907 |
| Support Poor (It) | T1 | 0.001 | 0.053 | 0.980 | 0.993 | 1.000 | 0.994 |
| Exclusive Welfare | T1 | -0.020 | 0.022 | 0.362 | 0.854 | 1.000 | 0.894 |
| Summary Index Exclus. | T1 | -0.031 | 0.051 | 0.543 | 0.775 | 1.000 | 0.791 |
| General Redistr. | T2 | 0.002 | 0.051 | 0.963 | 1.000 | 1.000 | 1.000 |
| Tax Rich | T2 | -0.015 | 0.025 | 0.543 | 1.000 | 1.000 | 1.000 |
| Wealth Tax | T2 | 0.044 | 0.052 | 0.393 | 1.000 | 1.000 | 1.000 |
| Estate Tax | T2 | 0.080 | 0.051 | 0.114 | 0.907 | 1.000 | 0.957 |
| Support Poor (all) | T2 | -0.028 | 0.052 | 0.587 | 1.000 | 1.000 | 1.000 |
| Spend Poor | T2 | 0.061 | 0.054 | 0.258 | 0.991 | 1.000 | 0.998 |
| Spend. Unempl. | T2 | 0.008 | 0.051 | 0.869 | 1.000 | 1.000 | 1.000 |
| Summary Index Redistr. | T2 | 0.036 | 0.051 | 0.484 | 0.841 | 1.000 | 0.907 |
| Support Poor (It) | T2 | -0.151 | 0.053 | 0.004 | 0.039 | 0.033 | 0.033 |
| Exclusive Welfare | T2 | -0.013 | 0.023 | 0.566 | 0.935 | 1.000 | 0.942 |
| Summary Index Exclus. | T2 | -0.122 | 0.051 | 0.016 | 0.039 | 0.047 | 0.047 |
| General Redistr. | T3 | 0.008 | 0.052 | 0.880 | 1.000 | 1.000 | 1.000 |
| Tax Rich | T3 | 0.010 | 0.025 | 0.691 | 1.000 | 1.000 | 1.000 |
| Wealth Tax | T3 | 0.037 | 0.050 | 0.463 | 1.000 | 1.000 | 1.000 |
| Estate Tax | T3 | -0.011 | 0.050 | 0.826 | 1.000 | 1.000 | 1.000 |
| Support Poor (all) | T3 | 0.081 | 0.052 | 0.119 | 0.914 | 1.000 | 0.957 |
| Spend Poor | T3 | 0.059 | 0.054 | 0.274 | 0.993 | 1.000 | 0.998 |
| Spend. Unempl. | T3 | -0.066 | 0.052 | 0.211 | 0.986 | 1.000 | 0.996 |
| Summary Index Redistr. | T3 | 0.034 | 0.050 | 0.502 | 0.841 | 1.000 | 0.907 |
| Support Poor (It) | T3 | 0.034 | 0.052 | 0.509 | 0.935 | 1.000 | 0.942 |
| Exclusive Welfare | T3 | 0.002 | 0.023 | 0.924 | 0.993 | 1.000 | 0.994 |
| Summary Index Exclus. | T3 | 0.027 | 0.050 | 0.592 | 0.775 | 1.000 | 0.791 |
| General Redistr. | T4 | 0.006 | 0.052 | 0.915 | 1.000 | 1.000 | 1.000 |
| Tax Rich | T4 | 0.008 | 0.025 | 0.739 | 1.000 | 1.000 | 1.000 |
| Wealth Tax | T4 | -0.009 | 0.052 | 0.862 | 1.000 | 1.000 | 1.000 |
| Estate Tax | T4 | 0.015 | 0.051 | 0.766 | 1.000 | 1.000 | 1.000 |
| Support Poor (all) | T4 | 0.001 | 0.052 | 0.990 | 1.000 | 1.000 | 1.000 |
| Spend Poor | T4 | 0.077 | 0.055 | 0.167 | 0.969 | 1.000 | 0.987 |
| Spend. Unempl. | T4 | -0.097 | 0.052 | 0.060 | 0.712 | 1.000 | 0.810 |
| Summary Index Redistr. | T4 | 0.002 | 0.051 | 0.962 | 0.963 | 1.000 | 0.962 |
| Support Poor (It) | T4 | -0.116 | 0.053 | 0.027 | 0.162 | 0.189 | 0.174 |
| Exclusive Welfare | T4 | -0.037 | 0.022 | 0.090 | 0.406 | 0.542 | 0.433 |
| Summary Index Exclus. | T4 | -0.137 | 0.051 | 0.007 | 0.029 | 0.027 | 0.027 |

Notes: We report the coefficients (coef), standard errors (stderr), and p-values (p) of Table 4, but we also show Westfall-Young stepdown (pwyong), Bonferroni-Holm (pbonf), and Sidak-Holm (psidak) adjusted p-values for families of outcomes to adjust for multiple treatments and multiple outcomes.

Table C.15: Robustness of main treatment effects of Table 5 to FWER control.

| Outcomes | T | coef | stderr | p | pwyoung | pbonf | psidak |
|----------------|----|--------|--------|-------|---------|-------|--------|
| richshare | T1 | -0.153 | 0.053 | 0.004 | 0.015 | 0.019 | 0.019 |
| poorshare | T1 | -0.090 | 0.053 | 0.086 | 0.120 | 0.131 | 0.126 |
| poorimmshare | T1 | -0.119 | 0.055 | 0.030 | 0.155 | 0.178 | 0.165 |
| poorimminc | T1 | -0.071 | 0.054 | 0.193 | 0.617 | 0.964 | 0.657 |
| pooritainc | T1 | -0.012 | 0.052 | 0.818 | 0.811 | 0.964 | 0.818 |
| immorigindiv | T1 | 0.086 | 0.052 | 0.100 | 0.250 | 0.301 | 0.272 |
| immreligiondiv | T1 | 0.093 | 0.052 | 0.074 | 0.224 | 0.294 | 0.263 |
| richshare | T2 | -0.194 | 0.052 | 0.000 | 0.001 | 0.002 | 0.002 |
| poorshare | T2 | -0.096 | 0.052 | 0.065 | 0.120 | 0.131 | 0.126 |
| poorimmshare | T2 | -0.227 | 0.052 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| poorimminc | T2 | -0.221 | 0.050 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| pooritainc | T2 | -0.300 | 0.050 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| immorigindiv | T2 | 0.149 | 0.052 | 0.004 | 0.019 | 0.024 | 0.024 |
| immorigindiv | T2 | 0.066 | 0.052 | 0.206 | 0.359 | 0.412 | 0.370 |
| richshare | T3 | -0.160 | 0.051 | 0.002 | 0.009 | 0.010 | 0.010 |
| poorshare | T3 | -0.135 | 0.053 | 0.010 | 0.035 | 0.031 | 0.030 |
| poorimmshare | T3 | -0.063 | 0.052 | 0.233 | 0.621 | 0.964 | 0.657 |
| poorimminc | T3 | -0.059 | 0.053 | 0.266 | 0.621 | 0.964 | 0.657 |
| pooritainc | T3 | -0.052 | 0.050 | 0.294 | 0.621 | 0.964 | 0.657 |
| immorigindiv | T3 | -0.044 | 0.050 | 0.378 | 0.387 | 0.412 | 0.378 |
| immreligiondiv | T3 | 0.174 | 0.049 | 0.000 | 0.002 | 0.003 | 0.003 |
| richshare | T4 | -0.136 | 0.051 | 0.008 | 0.033 | 0.031 | 0.030 |
| poorshare | T4 | -0.191 | 0.053 | 0.000 | 0.002 | 0.002 | 0.002 |
| poorimmshare | T4 | -0.158 | 0.053 | 0.003 | 0.014 | 0.019 | 0.019 |
| poorimminc | T4 | -0.191 | 0.050 | 0.000 | 0.001 | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| pooritainc | T4 | -0.207 | 0.051 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| immorigindiv | T4 | -0.135 | 0.050 | 0.006 | 0.024 | 0.032 | 0.031 |
| immreligiondiv | T4 | 0.147 | 0.049 | 0.003 | 0.019 | 0.020 | 0.020 |

Notes: We report the coefficients (coef), standard errors (stderr), and p-values (p) of Table 5, but we also show Westfall-Young stepdown (pwyoung), Bonferroni-Holm (pbonf), and Sidak-Holm (psidak) adjusted p-values for families of outcomes to adjust for multiple treatments and multiple outcomes.

Table C.16: Robustness of main treatment effects of Table 6 to FWER control.

| Outcomes | T | coef | stderr | p | pwyoung | pbonf | psidak |
|--------------|----|--------|--------|-------|---------|-------|--------|
| wealthscale | T1 | -0.209 | 0.054 | 0.000 | 0.001 | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| econworries | T1 | -0.012 | 0.049 | 0.812 | 0.992 | 1.000 | 0.993 |
| cultuworries | T1 | -0.006 | 0.048 | 0.906 | 0.994 | 1.000 | 0.993 |
| lowIeduc | T1 | -0.063 | 0.052 | 0.228 | 0.833 | 1.000 | 0.874 |
| inequality | T1 | 0.077 | 0.052 | 0.144 | 0.785 | 1.000 | 0.845 |
| lossidentity | T1 | -0.039 | 0.051 | 0.441 | 0.939 | 1.000 | 0.961 |
| welfarism | T1 | 0.014 | 0.052 | 0.792 | 0.960 | 1.000 | 0.961 |
| wealthscale | T2 | 0.025 | 0.051 | 0.628 | 0.967 | 1.000 | 0.981 |
| econworries | T2 | -0.066 | 0.049 | 0.177 | 0.683 | 1.000 | 0.767 |
| cultuworries | T2 | -0.080 | 0.048 | 0.096 | 0.500 | 0.963 | 0.637 |
| lowIeduc | T2 | -0.073 | 0.052 | 0.158 | 0.790 | 1.000 | 0.850 |
| inequality | T2 | 0.139 | 0.052 | 0.007 | 0.103 | 0.110 | 0.104 |
| lossidentity | T2 | -0.042 | 0.052 | 0.419 | 0.939 | 1.000 | 0.961 |
| welfarism | T2 | 0.037 | 0.051 | 0.469 | 0.939 | 1.000 | 0.961 |
| wealthscale | T3 | -0.195 | 0.052 | 0.000 | 0.001 | 0.002 | 0.002 |
| econworries | T3 | 0.049 | 0.049 | 0.323 | 0.803 | 1.000 | 0.858 |
| cultuworries | T3 | -0.004 | 0.047 | 0.931 | 0.994 | 1.000 | 0.993 |
| lowIeduc | T3 | -0.071 | 0.051 | 0.163 | 0.790 | 1.000 | 0.850 |
| inequality | T3 | 0.106 | 0.053 | 0.046 | 0.437 | 0.644 | 0.483 |
| lossidentity | T3 | -0.012 | 0.051 | 0.811 | 0.960 | 1.000 | 0.961 |
| welfarism | T3 | 0.101 | 0.052 | 0.050 | 0.439 | 0.651 | 0.487 |
| wealthscale | T4 | -0.085 | 0.052 | 0.104 | 0.519 | 0.963 | 0.637 |
| econworries | T4 | -0.067 | 0.048 | 0.166 | 0.683 | 1.000 | 0.767 |
| cultuworries | T4 | -0.059 | 0.049 | 0.228 | 0.717 | 1.000 | 0.788 |
| lowIeduc | T4 | -0.055 | 0.052 | 0.288 | 0.870 | 1.000 | 0.907 |
| inequality | T4 | 0.178 | 0.051 | 0.001 | 0.011 | 0.008 | 0.008 |
| lossidentity | T4 | -0.035 | 0.051 | 0.494 | 0.939 | 1.000 | 0.961 |
| welfarism | T4 | 0.069 | 0.052 | 0.183 | 0.790 | 1.000 | 0.850 |

Notes: We report the coefficients (coef), standard errors (stderr), and p-values (p) of Table 6, but we also show Westfall-Young stepdown (pwyoung), Bonferroni-Holm (pbonf), and Sidak-Holm (psidak) adjusted p-values for families of outcomes to adjust for multiple treatments and multiple outcomes.

Table C.17: Heterogeneous treatment effects on policy preferences - POLITICAL IDEOL-
OGY.

| | Redistributive Preferences | | | | | | | Exclusionary Preferences | | | |
|------------------------|----------------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|-----------------------|--------------------|---------------------|------------------------------|----------------------|----------------------|-----------------------------|
| | General Redistr. | Tax Rich | Wealth Tax | Estate Tax | Support Poor (all) | Spend Poor | Spend Unempl. | Summary Index Redistr. | Support Poor (It) | Exclusive Welfare | Summary Index Exclus. |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) | (10) | (11) |
| T1 | -0.010 (0.068) | 0.031 (0.035) | -0.027 (0.069) | -0.034 (0.072) | 0.034 (0.074) | 0.085 (0.081) | -0.139* (0.075) | -0.007 (0.069) | 0.037 (0.084) | -0.010 (0.029) | 0.010 (0.076) |
| T2 | -0.046 (0.067) | -0.021 (0.037) | -0.034 (0.072) | -0.005 (0.074) | 0.045 (0.075) | 0.079 (0.079) | -0.017 (0.075) | -0.006 (0.071) | -0.146* (0.086) | -0.005 (0.030) | -0.107 (0.079) |
| T3 | -0.051 (0.069) | -0.011 (0.036) | 0.009 (0.068) | -0.031 (0.071) | 0.123* (0.072) | 0.102 (0.081) | -0.123 (0.077) | 0.002 (0.071) | 0.098 (0.084) | -0.003 (0.030) | 0.063 (0.076) |
| T4 | -0.002 (0.067) | -0.015 (0.036) | -0.106 (0.072) | -0.074 (0.071) | 0.058 (0.073) | 0.115 (0.079) | -0.112 (0.074) | -0.040 (0.070) | -0.198** (0.085) | -0.029 (0.028) | -0.179** (0.077) |
| T1Xright | 0.055 (0.123) | -0.007 (0.059) | 0.138 (0.123) | 0.116 (0.123) | 0.011 (0.129) | -0.071 (0.126) | -0.013 (0.114) | 0.059 (0.119) | -0.112 (0.121) | -0.035 (0.054) | -0.129 (0.119) |
| T2Xright | 0.101 (0.121) | -0.024 (0.059) | 0.138 (0.122) | 0.085 (0.121) | -0.117 (0.125) | -0.103 (0.124) | 0.074 (0.115) | 0.034 (0.122) | -0.043 (0.121) | -0.023 (0.054) | -0.065 (0.119) |
| T3Xright | 0.044 (0.124) | 0.059 (0.058) | 0.017 (0.120) | -0.068 (0.119) | -0.026 (0.124) | -0.116 (0.123) | 0.126 (0.118) | 0.026 (0.120) | -0.186 (0.121) | 0.006 (0.054) | -0.117 (0.117) |
| T4Xright | -0.048 (0.123) | 0.027 (0.059) | 0.157 (0.123) | 0.045 (0.120) | -0.108 (0.125) | -0.163 (0.126) | 0.081 (0.118) | 0.005 (0.121) | 0.169 (0.121) | -0.034 (0.053) | 0.063 (0.119) |
| right | -0.601*** (0.086) | -0.187*** (0.042) | -0.526*** (0.087) | -0.551*** (0.086) | -0.386*** (0.090) | -0.163* (0.087) | -0.187** (0.087) | -0.737*** (0.083) | 0.371*** (0.084) | 0.217*** (0.038) | 0.588*** (0.083) |
| T1Xcenter | 0.054 (0.132) | -0.043 (0.064) | 0.151 (0.127) | 0.147 (0.130) | -0.041 (0.134) | 0.023 (0.143) | 0.176 (0.137) | 0.111 (0.128) | -0.003 (0.134) | -0.000 (0.056) | -0.002 (0.126) |
| T2Xcenter | 0.060 (0.129) | 0.058 (0.064) | 0.136 (0.127) | 0.233* (0.125) | -0.140 (0.127) | 0.063 (0.140) | 0.004 (0.134) | 0.125 (0.125) | 0.040 (0.134) | -0.001 (0.056) | 0.026 (0.126) |
| T3Xcenter | 0.190 (0.128) | 0.003 (0.064) | 0.095 (0.122) | 0.177 (0.126) | -0.141 (0.129) | -0.024 (0.142) | 0.068 (0.140) | 0.098 (0.126) | -0.011 (0.131) | 0.012 (0.056) | 0.011 (0.126) |
| T4Xcenter | 0.095 (0.134) | 0.064 (0.064) | 0.194 (0.131) | 0.316** (0.127) | -0.094 (0.129) | 0.061 (0.149) | -0.052 (0.136) | 0.172 (0.128) | 0.116 (0.134) | 0.011 (0.055) | 0.096 (0.127) |
| center | -0.333*** (0.093) | -0.128*** (0.045) | -0.386*** (0.091) | -0.439*** (0.091) | -0.141 (0.091) | -0.139 (0.098) | -0.007 (0.097) | -0.450*** (0.091) | 0.183* (0.094) | 0.088** (0.039) | 0.261*** (0.088) |
| p-value [T1+T1×right] | 0.657 | 0.610 | 0.276 | 0.407 | 0.667 | 0.880 | 0.078 | 0.598 | 0.392 | 0.334 | 0.190 |
| p-value [T2+T2×right] | 0.657 | 0.326 | 0.296 | 0.397 | 0.469 | 0.799 | 0.514 | 0.779 | 0.027 | 0.522 | 0.054 |
| p-value [T3+T3×right] | 0.941 | 0.286 | 0.799 | 0.299 | 0.335 | 0.878 | 0.972 | 0.775 | 0.318 | 0.950 | 0.535 |
| p-value [T4+T4×right] | 0.632 | 0.791 | 0.607 | 0.769 | 0.625 | 0.625 | 0.730 | 0.727 | 0.740 | 0.160 | 0.198 |
| p-value [T1+T1×center] | 0.697 | 0.822 | 0.247 | 0.293 | 0.949 | 0.358 | 0.750 | 0.334 | 0.742 | 0.840 | 0.934 |
| p-value [T2+T2×center] | 0.697 | 0.481 | 0.335 | 0.023 | 0.350 | 0.222 | 0.909 | 0.248 | 0.301 | 0.899 | 0.410 |
| p-value [T3+T3×center] | 0.196 | 0.885 | 0.306 | 0.158 | 0.866 | 0.500 | 0.635 | 0.340 | 0.389 | 0.841 | 0.458 |
| p-value [T4+T4×center] | 0.422 | 0.356 | 0.418 | 0.020 | 0.738 | 0.162 | 0.149 | 0.217 | 0.433 | 0.704 | 0.409 |
| N | 3521 | 3521 | 3521 | 3521 | 3521 | 3521 | 3521 | 3521 | 3521 | 3521 | 3521 |

Notes: The table reports the effects of the treatments on the variables in the columns. Outcome variables are described in the Appendix B and are standardized (Kling et al., 2007). Regressions are with probability weights and robust standard errors in parentheses. Controls included in all regressions are: being male, age brackets, married, working, highly educated and living in the South and Island. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.

Table C.18: Heterogeneous treatment effects on perceptions - POLITICAL IDEOLOGY.

| | Perceptions of Inequality | | Perceptions of Poverty | | | Perceptions of diversity | |
|------------------------|-------------------------------|----------------------------------|---------------------------------------|---|---|--|--|
| | Share of Wealth Top 10 (1) | Share of Wealth Bottom 50 (2) | Share of Immigrants among poor (3) | Incidence of poverty of Immigrants (4) | Incidence of poverty of Italians (5) | Share of no-European Immigrants (6) | Share of no-Catholic Immigrants (7) |
| T1 | -0.266*** (0.079) | 0.007 (0.079) | -0.114 (0.080) | -0.009 (0.080) | 0.089 (0.073) | 0.037 (0.078) | 0.032 (0.078) |
| T2 | -0.297*** (0.080) | -0.137* (0.077) | -0.184** (0.077) | -0.269*** (0.073) | -0.280*** (0.069) | 0.226*** (0.078) | 0.125 (0.077) |
| T3 | -0.289*** (0.078) | -0.132* (0.078) | 0.026 (0.079) | -0.030 (0.078) | -0.002 (0.071) | -0.113 (0.073) | 0.164** (0.074) |
| T4 | -0.246*** (0.075) | -0.182** (0.076) | -0.079 (0.077) | -0.176** (0.074) | -0.153** (0.072) | -0.205*** (0.073) | 0.176** (0.071) |
| T1Xright | 0.155 (0.123) | -0.236* (0.120) | -0.000 (0.128) | -0.017 (0.128) | -0.184 (0.121) | 0.101 (0.123) | 0.118 (0.119) |
| T2Xright | 0.177 (0.120) | 0.079 (0.121) | -0.007 (0.120) | 0.155 (0.118) | -0.035 (0.114) | -0.181 (0.121) | -0.100 (0.119) |
| T3Xright | 0.244** (0.117) | -0.020 (0.122) | -0.091 (0.124) | 0.029 (0.124) | -0.050 (0.117) | 0.036 (0.115) | -0.001 (0.110) |
| T4Xright | 0.218* (0.119) | 0.046 (0.123) | -0.108 (0.125) | 0.068 (0.117) | -0.087 (0.115) | 0.150 (0.117) | -0.077 (0.112) |
| right | -0.209** (0.087) | 0.195** (0.087) | 0.107 (0.090) | -0.089 (0.088) | 0.338*** (0.083) | 0.114 (0.088) | 0.158* (0.085) |
| T1Xcenter | 0.263* (0.135) | -0.100 (0.137) | -0.012 (0.139) | -0.241* (0.137) | -0.180 (0.138) | 0.072 (0.132) | 0.104 (0.135) |
| T2Xcenter | 0.189 (0.135) | 0.056 (0.133) | -0.169 (0.131) | -0.017 (0.127) | -0.038 (0.134) | -0.059 (0.131) | -0.103 (0.136) |
| T3Xcenter | 0.203 (0.129) | 0.015 (0.135) | -0.247* (0.130) | -0.158 (0.134) | -0.145 (0.127) | 0.248** (0.126) | 0.046 (0.129) |
| T4Xcenter | 0.162 (0.132) | -0.105 (0.135) | -0.191 (0.132) | -0.157 (0.126) | -0.107 (0.138) | 0.090 (0.125) | -0.018 (0.130) |
| center | -0.177* (0.096) | 0.299*** (0.093) | 0.227** (0.094) | 0.125 (0.095) | 0.360*** (0.095) | -0.026 (0.094) | -0.046 (0.098) |
| p-value [T1+T1×right] | 0.237 | 0.011 | 0.254 | 0.798 | 0.322 | 0.144 | 0.090 |
| p-value [T2+T2×right] | 0.179 | 0.531 | 0.038 | 0.211 | 0.000 | 0.626 | 0.785 |
| p-value [T3+T3×right] | 0.616 | 0.106 | 0.495 | 0.989 | 0.574 | 0.384 | 0.047 |
| p-value [T4+T4×right] | 0.759 | 0.158 | 0.056 | 0.236 | 0.008 | 0.543 | 0.253 |
| p-value [T1+T1×center] | 0.979 | 0.405 | 0.268 | 0.025 | 0.435 | 0.304 | 0.217 |
| p-value [T2+T2×center] | 0.321 | 0.458 | 0.001 | 0.006 | 0.005 | 0.111 | 0.843 |
| p-value [T3+T3×center] | 0.407 | 0.291 | 0.032 | 0.082 | 0.163 | 0.189 | 0.048 |
| p-value [T4+T4×center] | 0.436 | 0.010 | 0.012 | 0.001 | 0.028 | 0.260 | 0.145 |
| N | 3521 | 3521 | 3521 | 3521 | 3521 | 3521 | 3521 |

Notes: The table reports the effects of the treatments on the variables in the columns. Outcome variables are described in the Appendix B and are standardized (Kling et al., 2007). Regressions are with probability weights and robust standard errors in parentheses. Controls included in all regressions are: being male, age brackets, married, working, highly educated and living in the South and Island. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.

Table C.19: Heterogeneous Treatment effects on feelings and opinions - POLITICAL IDEOLOGY.

| | Feelings | | | Opinions | | | |
|------------------------|-------------------------------------|---------------------------------------|---------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|--|--|---|
| | Poor-rich Wealth Scale (1) | Migrants Economic Threat (2) | Migrants Cultural Threat (3) | Problem: Low Education (4) | Problem: Income Differences (5) | Problem: Loss of Identity (6) | Problem: Unconditional Welfare (7) |
| T1 | -0.196** (0.079) | 0.049 (0.069) | 0.014 (0.068) | 0.060 (0.074) | 0.099 (0.076) | 0.058 (0.070) | -0.083 (0.074) |
| T2 | 0.070 (0.079) | 0.052 (0.072) | -0.027 (0.070) | -0.028 (0.079) | 0.210*** (0.076) | 0.063 (0.073) | -0.053 (0.077) |
| T3 | -0.130* (0.076) | 0.066 (0.070) | -0.073 (0.069) | -0.007 (0.076) | 0.136* (0.077) | -0.013 (0.071) | 0.068 (0.076) |
| T4 | -0.084 (0.077) | -0.028 (0.068) | -0.081 (0.070) | 0.010 (0.076) | 0.223*** (0.074) | -0.022 (0.071) | 0.009 (0.074) |
| T1Xright | -0.038 (0.124) | -0.079 (0.116) | -0.058 (0.117) | -0.221* (0.119) | 0.039 (0.125) | -0.168 (0.118) | 0.149 (0.121) |
| T2Xright | -0.070 (0.117) | -0.207* (0.118) | -0.093 (0.115) | -0.074 (0.120) | -0.128 (0.123) | -0.139 (0.120) | 0.150 (0.119) |
| T3Xright | -0.187 (0.119) | -0.073 (0.116) | 0.108 (0.113) | -0.137 (0.116) | 0.036 (0.125) | 0.006 (0.119) | 0.005 (0.118) |
| T4Xright | -0.056 (0.118) | 0.010 (0.116) | 0.093 (0.116) | -0.107 (0.120) | -0.076 (0.121) | 0.060 (0.119) | 0.129 (0.120) |
| right | 0.042 (0.083) | 0.878*** (0.083) | 0.827*** (0.085) | -0.116 (0.084) | -0.382*** (0.088) | 0.618*** (0.084) | 0.284*** (0.086) |
| T1Xcenter | -0.001 (0.140) | -0.145 (0.122) | -0.007 (0.116) | -0.224 (0.137) | -0.141 (0.131) | -0.183 (0.129) | 0.208 (0.131) |
| T2Xcenter | -0.091 (0.132) | -0.199* (0.117) | -0.082 (0.115) | -0.092 (0.135) | -0.114 (0.128) | -0.238* (0.131) | 0.165 (0.131) |
| T3Xcenter | -0.012 (0.134) | 0.030 (0.123) | 0.141 (0.117) | -0.075 (0.133) | -0.175 (0.135) | -0.001 (0.131) | 0.134 (0.133) |
| T4Xcenter | 0.077 (0.138) | -0.179 (0.120) | -0.036 (0.120) | -0.130 (0.135) | -0.083 (0.128) | -0.134 (0.134) | 0.072 (0.135) |
| center | -0.064 (0.097) | 0.537*** (0.086) | 0.466*** (0.084) | -0.152 (0.100) | -0.095 (0.091) | 0.450*** (0.091) | 0.096 (0.095) |
| p-value [T1+T1×right] | 0.014 | 0.747 | 0.645 | 0.083 | 0.163 | 0.249 | 0.496 |
| p-value [T2+T2×right] | 0.998 | 0.094 | 0.187 | 0.259 | 0.398 | 0.425 | 0.281 |
| p-value [T3+T3×right] | 0.001 | 0.948 | 0.689 | 0.096 | 0.081 | 0.945 | 0.424 |
| p-value [T4+T5×right] | 0.121 | 0.845 | 0.895 | 0.294 | 0.124 | 0.692 | 0.147 |
| p-value [T1+T1×center] | 0.087 | 0.336 | 0.941 | 0.155 | 0.691 | 0.249 | 0.249 |
| p-value [T2+T2×center] | 0.842 | 0.112 | 0.228 | 0.275 | 0.351 | 0.106 | 0.287 |
| p-value [T3+T3×center] | 0.195 | 0.334 | 0.466 | 0.451 | 0.723 | 0.897 | 0.066 |
| p-value [T4+T4×center] | 0.951 | 0.037 | 0.234 | 0.283 | 0.178 | 0.169 | 0.474 |
| N | 3521 | 3521 | 3521 | 3521 | 3521 | 3521 | 3521 |

Notes: The table reports the effects of the treatments on the variables in the columns. Outcome variables are described in the Appendix B and are standardized (Kling et al., 2007). Regressions are with probability weights and robust standard errors in parentheses. Controls included in all regressions are: being male, age brackets, married, working, highly educated and living in the South and Island. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.

Table C.20: Heterogeneous Treatment effects on policy preferences - POPULIST.

| | Redistributive Preferences | | | | | | | Exclusionary Preferences | | | |
|--------------------------|----------------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|--------------------|-------------------|-------------------|--------------------------|---------------------|---------------------|-----------------------|
| | General Redistr. | Tax Rich | Wealth Tax | Estate Tax | Support Poor (all) | Spend Poor | Spend Unempl. | Summary Index Redistr. | Support Poor (It) | Exclusive Welfare | Summary Index Exclus. |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) | (10) | (11) |
| T1 | 0.018 (0.084) | 0.014 (0.043) | 0.004 (0.085) | 0.140 (0.085) | 0.052 (0.093) | 0.135 (0.098) | -0.130 (0.087) | 0.065 (0.088) | 0.057 (0.100) | -0.009 (0.035) | 0.025 (0.092) |
| T2 | -0.111 (0.084) | -0.014 (0.044) | -0.082 (0.087) | 0.001 (0.090) | -0.018 (0.091) | 0.004 (0.095) | 0.014 (0.087) | -0.058 (0.087) | -0.121 (0.100) | -0.017 (0.035) | -0.108 (0.092) |
| T3 | -0.053 (0.087) | 0.014 (0.045) | -0.013 (0.086) | 0.019 (0.089) | 0.141 (0.093) | 0.066 (0.100) | -0.006 (0.092) | 0.048 (0.091) | 0.102 (0.102) | -0.020 (0.035) | 0.038 (0.093) |
| T4 | 0.051 (0.082) | -0.005 (0.044) | -0.051 (0.089) | 0.056 (0.087) | 0.139 (0.091) | 0.103 (0.098) | -0.021 (0.088) | 0.070 (0.089) | -0.203** (0.101) | -0.063* (0.033) | -0.236*** (0.089) |
| T1Xpopulist | 0.058 (0.117) | 0.036 (0.057) | 0.136 (0.115) | -0.143 (0.116) | 0.025 (0.122) | -0.143 (0.125) | 0.046 (0.114) | 0.014 (0.118) | -0.063 (0.123) | -0.038 (0.050) | -0.102 (0.117) |
| T2Xpopulist | 0.187 (0.117) | -0.004 (0.058) | 0.230* (0.118) | 0.155 (0.118) | 0.006 (0.120) | 0.136 (0.123) | 0.023 (0.114) | 0.192 (0.120) | -0.010 (0.124) | -0.017 (0.050) | -0.033 (0.119) |
| T3Xpopulist | 0.144 (0.118) | 0.003 (0.057) | 0.136 (0.115) | -0.032 (0.118) | -0.031 (0.121) | -0.051 (0.125) | -0.074 (0.119) | 0.026 (0.120) | -0.048 (0.123) | -0.001 (0.050) | -0.034 (0.118) |
| T4Xpopulist | -0.011 (0.115) | 0.023 (0.057) | 0.151 (0.118) | -0.012 (0.115) | -0.169 (0.119) | -0.058 (0.125) | -0.083 (0.115) | -0.036 (0.118) | 0.187 (0.123) | 0.023 (0.048) | 0.163 (0.116) |
| populist | -0.304*** (0.081) | -0.105*** (0.041) | -0.367*** (0.083) | -0.328*** (0.084) | -0.147* (0.085) | -0.089 (0.084) | 0.027 (0.085) | -0.375*** (0.083) | 0.452*** (0.084) | 0.151*** (0.036) | 0.541*** (0.083) |
| p-value [T1+T1×populist] | 0.339 | 0.172 | 0.069 | 0.962 | 0.339 | 0.917 | 0.259 | 0.309 | 0.936 | 0.178 | 0.287 |
| p-value [T2+T2×populist] | 0.339 | 0.634 | 0.062 | 0.042 | 0.879 | 0.072 | 0.616 | 0.102 | 0.073 | 0.341 | 0.061 |
| p-value [T3+T3×populist] | 0.257 | 0.628 | 0.103 | 0.868 | 0.155 | 0.843 | 0.284 | 0.338 | 0.442 | 0.544 | 0.956 |
| p-value [T4+T4×populist] | 0.626 | 0.625 | 0.195 | 0.565 | 0.691 | 0.562 | 0.162 | 0.655 | 0.818 | 0.246 | 0.319 |
| N | 2791 | 2791 | 2791 | 2791 | 2791 | 2791 | 2791 | 2791 | 2791 | 2791 | 2791 |

Notes: The table reports the effects of the treatments on the variables in the columns. Outcome variables are described in the Appendix B and are standardized (Kling et al., 2007). Regressions are with probability weights and robust standard errors in parentheses. Controls included in all regressions are: being male, age brackets, married, working, highly educated and living in the South and Island. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.

Table C.21: Heterogeneous Treatment effects on perceptions - POPULIST.

| | Perceptions of Inequality | | Perceptions of Poverty | | | Perceptions of diversity | |
|--------------------------|-------------------------------|----------------------------------|---------------------------------------|--|--------------------------------------|--|--|
| | Share of Wealth Top 10 (1) | Share of Wealth Bottom 50 (2) | Share of Immigrants among poor (3) | Incidence of poverty Immigrants (4) | Incidence of poverty Italians (5) | Share of no-European Immigrants (6) | Share of no-Catholic Immigrants (7) |
| T1 | -0.263*** (0.092) | 0.083 (0.092) | -0.153 (0.097) | -0.072 (0.097) | 0.095 (0.086) | -0.070 (0.095) | -0.028 (0.098) |
| T2 | -0.280*** (0.089) | 0.041 (0.092) | -0.186** (0.094) | -0.313*** (0.087) | -0.199** (0.083) | 0.094 (0.092) | 0.015 (0.097) |
| T3 | -0.350*** (0.092) | -0.110 (0.088) | -0.015 (0.096) | -0.041 (0.098) | 0.022 (0.084) | -0.083 (0.089) | 0.243*** (0.088) |
| T4 | -0.214** (0.086) | -0.053 (0.091) | -0.100 (0.096) | -0.257*** (0.090) | -0.123 (0.087) | -0.297*** (0.086) | 0.149 (0.091) |
| T1Xpopulist | 0.224* (0.120) | -0.305** (0.119) | 0.052 (0.126) | 0.021 (0.124) | -0.166 (0.115) | 0.201* (0.121) | 0.150 (0.121) |
| T2Xpopulist | 0.179 (0.117) | -0.211* (0.120) | -0.037 (0.120) | 0.141 (0.115) | -0.115 (0.112) | 0.070 (0.119) | 0.090 (0.122) |
| T3Xpopulist | 0.296** (0.118) | -0.065 (0.118) | -0.103 (0.123) | -0.081 (0.124) | -0.100 (0.113) | 0.019 (0.114) | -0.113 (0.112) |
| T4Xpopulist | 0.144 (0.114) | -0.222* (0.119) | -0.091 (0.122) | 0.088 (0.114) | -0.084 (0.114) | 0.173 (0.113) | -0.034 (0.113) |
| populist | -0.183** (0.085) | 0.342*** (0.082) | 0.044 (0.088) | -0.007 (0.088) | 0.356*** (0.080) | -0.021 (0.086) | 0.134 (0.087) |
| p-value [T+T1×populist] | 0.602 | 0.004 | 0.201 | 0.506 | 0.355 | 0.081 | 0.084 |
| p-value [T2+T2×populist] | 0.185 | 0.026 | 0.003 | 0.020 | 0.000 | 0.028 | 0.151 |
| p-value [T3+T3×populist] | 0.464 | 0.028 | 0.116 | 0.106 | 0.295 | 0.380 | 0.060 |
| p-value [T4+T4×populist] | 0.349 | 0.000 | 0.012 | 0.018 | 0.005 | 0.086 | 0.092 |
| N | 2791 | 2791 | 2791 | 2791 | 2791 | 2791 | 2791 |

Notes: The table reports the effects of the treatments on the variables in the columns. Outcome variables are described in the Appendix B and are standardized (Kling et al., 2007). Regressions are with probability weights and robust standard errors in parentheses. Controls included in all regressions are: being male, age brackets, married, working, highly educated and living in the South and Island. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.

Table C.22: Heterogeneous treatment effects on feelings and opinions - POPULIST.

| | Feelings | | | Opinions | | | |
|--------------------------|------------------------------|--------------------------------|--------------------------------|------------------------------|-----------------------------------|---------------------------------|--------------------------------------|
| | Poor-rich Wealth Scale | Migrants Economic Threat | Migrants Cultural Threat | Problem: Low Education | Problem: Income Differences | Problem: Loss of Identity | Problem: Unconditional Welfare |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) |
| T1 | -0.246*** (0.088) | 0.090 (0.082) | 0.053 (0.079) | 0.077 (0.089) | 0.063 (0.094) | 0.034 (0.089) | -0.031 (0.080) |
| T2 | 0.063 (0.083) | -0.072 (0.075) | -0.015 (0.079) | -0.028 (0.090) | 0.086 (0.093) | -0.105 (0.085) | 0.108 (0.086) |
| T3 | -0.103 (0.088) | 0.099 (0.082) | 0.011 (0.082) | 0.064 (0.091) | 0.078 (0.095) | -0.146 (0.089) | 0.174** (0.083) |
| T4 | 0.009 (0.087) | -0.028 (0.076) | -0.010 (0.080) | 0.015 (0.092) | 0.261*** (0.088) | -0.034 (0.088) | 0.026 (0.083) |
| T1Xpopulist | 0.001 (0.119) | -0.187* (0.112) | -0.124 (0.109) | -0.122 (0.117) | 0.062 (0.122) | -0.156 (0.118) | -0.035 (0.113) |
| T2Xpopulist | -0.074 (0.113) | -0.007 (0.107) | -0.124 (0.109) | -0.030 (0.118) | 0.120 (0.121) | 0.070 (0.116) | -0.166 (0.116) |
| T3Xpopulist | -0.090 (0.116) | -0.119 (0.112) | -0.060 (0.109) | -0.125 (0.117) | 0.043 (0.123) | 0.128 (0.118) | -0.138 (0.114) |
| T4Xpopulist | -0.169 (0.115) | -0.084 (0.108) | -0.118 (0.109) | -0.051 (0.118) | -0.043 (0.116) | -0.037 (0.117) | 0.009 (0.114) |
| populist | -0.051 (0.080) | 0.730*** (0.076) | 0.790*** (0.078) | -0.165** (0.083) | -0.253*** (0.085) | 0.477*** (0.083) | 0.363*** (0.081) |
| p-value [T1+T1×populist] | 0.002 | 0.198 | 0.340 | 0.542 | 0.106 | 0.109 | 0.406 |
| p-value [T2+T2×populist] | 0.882 | 0.300 | 0.062 | 0.443 | 0.009 | 0.660 | 0.455 |
| p-value [T3+T3×populist] | 0.011 | 0.800 | 0.489 | 0.404 | 0.122 | 0.809 | 0.647 |
| p-value [T4+T4×populist] | 0.036 | 0.144 | 0.088 | 0.629 | 0.004 | 0.363 | 0.647 |
| N | 2791 | 2791 | 2791 | 2791 | 2791 | 2791 | 2791 |

Notes: The table reports the effects of the treatments on the variables in the columns. Outcome variables are described in the Appendix B and are standardized (Kling et al., 2007). Regressions are with probability weights and robust standard errors in parentheses. Controls included in all regressions are: being male, age brackets, married, working, highly educated and living in the South and Island. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.

Table C.23: Heterogeneous treatment effects on policy preferences - INCOME.

| | Redistributive Preferences | | | | | | | Exclusionary Preferences | | | |
|------------------------|----------------------------|--------------------|-------------------|-------------------|--------------------|-------------------|-------------------|--------------------------|----------------------|---------------------|-----------------------|
| | General Redistr. | Tax Rich | Wealth Tax | Estate Tax | Support Poor (all) | Spend Poor | Spend Unempl. | Summary Index Redistr. | Support Poor (It) | Exclusive Welfare | Summary Index Exclus. |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) | (10) | (11) |
| T1 | 0.195* (0.113) | 0.055 (0.055) | 0.168 (0.108) | 0.150 (0.115) | -0.038 (0.121) | 0.152 (0.128) | 0.009 (0.122) | 0.197 (0.120) | -0.135 (0.119) | -0.060 (0.051) | -0.184 (0.115) |
| T2 | 0.073 (0.114) | -0.091* (0.054) | 0.039 (0.108) | 0.057 (0.112) | -0.062 (0.107) | 0.148 (0.123) | 0.010 (0.113) | 0.020 (0.115) | -0.379*** (0.117) | -0.037 (0.049) | -0.316*** (0.115) |
| T3 | 0.056 (0.114) | -0.000 (0.053) | 0.059 (0.109) | 0.102 (0.112) | 0.094 (0.110) | 0.110 (0.120) | -0.171 (0.117) | 0.066 (0.116) | -0.061 (0.113) | -0.073 (0.049) | -0.154 (0.109) |
| T4 | 0.039 (0.116) | -0.063 (0.053) | -0.179 (0.112) | 0.015 (0.109) | -0.046 (0.111) | 0.192 (0.124) | -0.110 (0.112) | -0.058 (0.119) | -0.263** (0.115) | -0.115** (0.047) | -0.356*** (0.110) |
| T1Xrich | -0.187 (0.179) | -0.128 (0.085) | -0.279 (0.177) | -0.183 (0.173) | 0.081 (0.182) | -0.200 (0.183) | -0.207 (0.172) | -0.326* (0.179) | 0.064 (0.180) | 0.126* (0.075) | 0.238 (0.171) |
| T2Xrich | -0.119 (0.180) | -0.012 (0.084) | -0.057 (0.174) | -0.191 (0.170) | -0.078 (0.170) | -0.116 (0.176) | -0.061 (0.162) | -0.170 (0.179) | 0.269 (0.172) | 0.116 (0.074) | 0.362** (0.170) |
| T3Xrich | -0.040 (0.178) | -0.068 (0.084) | 0.007 (0.172) | -0.172 (0.170) | -0.004 (0.172) | -0.167 (0.182) | 0.082 (0.170) | -0.114 (0.180) | 0.037 (0.178) | 0.207*** (0.077) | 0.346** (0.175) |
| T4Xrich | 0.087 (0.184) | 0.026 (0.085) | 0.283 (0.176) | -0.080 (0.175) | 0.126 (0.175) | -0.212 (0.186) | 0.082 (0.169) | 0.089 (0.184) | 0.126 (0.184) | 0.136* (0.072) | 0.296* (0.174) |
| rich | -0.164 (0.129) | 0.029 (0.060) | -0.019 (0.128) | 0.180 (0.122) | -0.156 (0.124) | -0.017 (0.132) | -0.049 (0.128) | -0.044 (0.126) | -0.299** (0.123) | -0.127** (0.053) | -0.400*** (0.123) |
| T1Xmiddle | -0.106 (0.144) | -0.014 (0.069) | -0.071 (0.137) | -0.144 (0.147) | 0.128 (0.151) | -0.151 (0.155) | -0.141 (0.145) | -0.135 (0.147) | 0.264* (0.149) | 0.032 (0.063) | 0.229 (0.144) |
| T2Xmiddle | -0.092 (0.144) | 0.136** (0.068) | 0.007 (0.138) | 0.076 (0.143) | 0.020 (0.140) | -0.112 (0.150) | 0.069 (0.140) | 0.066 (0.144) | 0.321** (0.148) | 0.027 (0.062) | 0.260* (0.144) |
| T3Xmiddle | -0.023 (0.146) | 0.012 (0.068) | -0.094 (0.138) | -0.221 (0.144) | -0.077 (0.143) | -0.033 (0.148) | 0.114 (0.145) | -0.082 (0.146) | 0.183 (0.145) | 0.067 (0.062) | 0.228 (0.138) |
| T4Xmiddle | -0.019 (0.146) | 0.082 (0.068) | 0.133 (0.142) | 0.022 (0.139) | 0.052 (0.140) | -0.184 (0.151) | 0.006 (0.139) | 0.047 (0.146) | 0.288** (0.145) | 0.106* (0.060) | 0.359** (0.141) |
| middle | -0.036 (0.105) | 0.000 (0.049) | -0.009 (0.100) | 0.105 (0.104) | -0.167 (0.103) | 0.084 (0.105) | -0.019 (0.106) | -0.011 (0.105) | -0.342*** (0.103) | -0.055 (0.046) | -0.318*** (0.105) |
| p-value [T1+T1×rich] | 0.954 | 0.257 | 0.426 | 0.803 | 0.754 | 0.709 | 0.102 | 0.330 | 0.600 | 0.238 | 0.672 |
| p-value [T2+T2×rich] | 0.954 | 0.108 | 0.894 | 0.294 | 0.292 | 0.802 | 0.662 | 0.276 | 0.377 | 0.154 | 0.708 |
| p-value [T3+T3×rich] | 0.903 | 0.290 | 0.620 | 0.585 | 0.492 | 0.678 | 0.470 | 0.724 | 0.860 | 0.022 | 0.158 |
| p-value [T4+T4×rich] | 0.376 | 0.572 | 0.441 | 0.635 | 0.558 | 0.881 | 0.829 | 0.822 | 0.345 | 0.702 | 0.655 |
| p-value [T1+T1×center] | 0.317 | 0.320 | 0.256 | 0.948 | 0.323 | 0.999 | 0.097 | 0.468 | 0.150 | 0.455 | 0.610 |
| p-value [T2+T2×center] | 0.317 | 0.277 | 0.595 | 0.131 | 0.641 | 0.671 | 0.342 | 0.327 | 0.522 | 0.781 | 0.524 |
| p-value [T3+T3×center] | 0.721 | 0.791 | 0.678 | 0.189 | 0.846 | 0.369 | 0.499 | 0.858 | 0.183 | 0.883 | 0.391 |
| p-value [T4+T4×center] | 0.815 | 0.660 | 0.599 | 0.664 | 0.948 | 0.933 | 0.208 | 0.900 | 0.776 | 0.809 | 0.971 |
| N | 2568 | 2568 | 2568 | 2568 | 2568 | 2568 | 2568 | 2568 | 2568 | 2568 | 2568 |

Notes: The table reports the effects of the treatments on the variables in the columns. Outcome variables are described in the Appendix B and are standardized (Kling et al., 2007). Regressions are with probability weights and robust standard errors in parentheses. Controls included in all regressions are: being male, age brackets, married, working, highly educated and living in the South and Island. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.

Table C.24: Heterogeneous treatment effects on perceptions - INCOME.

| | Perceptions of Inequality | | Perceptions of Poverty | | | Perceptions of diversity | |
|------------------------|-------------------------------------|--|---|--|--|--|--|
| | Share of Wealth Top 10 (1) | Share of Wealth Bottom 50 (2) | Share of Immigrants among poor (3) | Incidence of poverty Immigrants (4) | Incidence of poverty Italians (5) | Share of no-European Immigrants (6) | Share of no-Catholic Immigrants (7) |
| T1 | -0.104 (0.119) | -0.098 (0.119) | -0.081 (0.122) | -0.061 (0.121) | -0.067 (0.121) | 0.099 (0.113) | -0.010 (0.116) |
| T2 | -0.204* (0.114) | -0.128 (0.117) | -0.100 (0.110) | -0.186* (0.110) | -0.226** (0.111) | 0.132 (0.108) | 0.081 (0.106) |
| T3 | -0.093 (0.114) | -0.130 (0.117) | -0.014 (0.111) | -0.126 (0.110) | -0.043 (0.115) | -0.072 (0.109) | 0.211** (0.098) |
| T4 | -0.192* (0.113) | -0.149 (0.119) | -0.135 (0.112) | -0.177* (0.104) | -0.192* (0.116) | -0.180 (0.111) | 0.088 (0.104) |
| T1Xrich | 0.050 (0.172) | 0.055 (0.178) | 0.036 (0.189) | 0.181 (0.182) | 0.081 (0.177) | -0.081 (0.174) | -0.078 (0.173) |
| T2Xrich | -0.008 (0.170) | -0.006 (0.174) | -0.120 (0.173) | -0.118 (0.165) | -0.083 (0.163) | 0.208 (0.167) | -0.104 (0.167) |
| T3Xrich | -0.012 (0.169) | -0.054 (0.178) | -0.106 (0.175) | 0.090 (0.175) | 0.019 (0.172) | 0.025 (0.169) | -0.017 (0.157) |
| T4Xrich | 0.229 (0.169) | -0.004 (0.178) | 0.120 (0.179) | 0.037 (0.164) | 0.019 (0.172) | 0.085 (0.165) | 0.035 (0.159) |
| rich | -0.075 (0.127) | -0.186 (0.129) | -0.046 (0.129) | -0.043 (0.127) | -0.350*** (0.125) | 0.020 (0.130) | 0.120 (0.124) |
| T1Xmiddle | -0.019 (0.149) | -0.061 (0.148) | -0.130 (0.152) | -0.098 (0.151) | 0.189 (0.148) | -0.130 (0.143) | 0.150 (0.145) |
| T2Xmiddle | 0.025 (0.143) | 0.068 (0.145) | -0.121 (0.139) | 0.011 (0.139) | 0.003 (0.139) | -0.116 (0.139) | -0.065 (0.138) |
| T3Xmiddle | -0.018 (0.141) | -0.032 (0.148) | 0.040 (0.143) | 0.117 (0.143) | 0.118 (0.141) | -0.018 (0.138) | -0.064 (0.129) |
| T4Xmiddle | 0.066 (0.141) | -0.082 (0.147) | -0.086 (0.141) | -0.058 (0.134) | 0.055 (0.141) | 0.004 (0.137) | 0.107 (0.133) |
| middle | 0.000 (0.108) | -0.112 (0.107) | 0.046 (0.104) | 0.024 (0.104) | -0.280*** (0.103) | -0.000 (0.106) | 0.024 (0.103) |
| p-value [T1+T1×rich] | 0.665 | 0.746 | 0.755 | 0.380 | 0.916 | 0.895 | 0.489 |
| p-value [T2+T2×rich] | 0.091 | 0.299 | 0.101 | 0.013 | 0.009 | 0.007 | 0.863 |
| p-value [T3+T3×rich] | 0.399 | 0.168 | 0.374 | 0.789 | 0.849 | 0.716 | 0.113 |
| p-value [T4+T4×rich] | 0.766 | 0.248 | 0.916 | 0.267 | 0.173 | 0.439 | 0.307 |
| p-value [T1+T1×center] | 0.171 | 0.069 | 0.020 | 0.081 | 0.154 | 0.719 | 0.108 |
| p-value [T2+T2×center] | 0.038 | 0.488 | 0.009 | 0.036 | 0.007 | 0.860 | 0.851 |
| p-value [T3+T3×center] | 0.186 | 0.073 | 0.778 | 0.917 | 0.366 | 0.279 | 0.082 |
| p-value [T4+T4×center] | 0.140 | 0.008 | 0.010 | 0.005 | 0.086 | 0.028 | 0.018 |
| N | 2568 | 2568 | 2568 | 2568 | 2568 | 2568 | 2568 |

Notes: The table reports the effects of the treatments on the variables in the columns. Outcome variables are described in the Appendix B and are standardized (Kling et al., 2007). Regressions are with probability weights and robust standard errors in parentheses. Controls included in all regressions are: being male, age brackets, married, working, highly educated and living in the South and Island. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.

Table C.25: Heterogeneous treatment effects on feelings and opinions - INCOME.

| | Feelings | | | Opinions | | | |
|------------------------|------------------------------|--------------------------------|--------------------------------|------------------------------|-----------------------------------|---------------------------------|--------------------------------------|
| | Poor-rich Wealth Scale | Migrants Economic Threat | Migrants Cultural Threat | Problem: Low Education | Problem: Income Differences | Problem: Loss of Identity | Problem: Unconditional Welfare |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) |
| T1 | -0.408*** (0.126) | -0.111 (0.121) | -0.015 (0.114) | -0.012 (0.107) | 0.100 (0.116) | 0.041 (0.117) | 0.165 (0.124) |
| T2 | -0.203* (0.116) | -0.014 (0.120) | -0.075 (0.110) | 0.036 (0.111) | 0.176 (0.110) | -0.051 (0.110) | 0.193 (0.118) |
| T3 | -0.413*** (0.110) | -0.002 (0.121) | 0.012 (0.113) | 0.037 (0.107) | 0.071 (0.117) | 0.026 (0.110) | 0.157 (0.117) |
| T4 | -0.240** (0.116) | -0.137 (0.116) | -0.042 (0.111) | 0.090 (0.108) | 0.115 (0.106) | 0.074 (0.115) | 0.116 (0.113) |
| T1Xrich | 0.352** (0.170) | 0.009 (0.180) | -0.161 (0.172) | 0.222 (0.166) | 0.058 (0.181) | -0.221 (0.185) | -0.051 (0.174) |
| T2Xrich | 0.177 (0.158) | -0.041 (0.178) | 0.029 (0.171) | 0.004 (0.170) | 0.043 (0.172) | 0.158 (0.181) | 0.002 (0.168) |
| T3Xrich | 0.414*** (0.159) | -0.150 (0.186) | -0.090 (0.178) | -0.028 (0.170) | 0.128 (0.184) | -0.093 (0.184) | 0.165 (0.173) |
| T4Xrich | 0.226 (0.161) | 0.175 (0.189) | 0.068 (0.181) | -0.037 (0.179) | 0.153 (0.172) | -0.136 (0.189) | 0.100 (0.173) |
| rich | 0.755*** (0.119) | 0.057 (0.134) | 0.047 (0.130) | 0.171 (0.125) | -0.255** (0.128) | 0.075 (0.133) | -0.257** (0.122) |
| T1Xmiddle | 0.225 (0.150) | 0.136 (0.150) | 0.103 (0.144) | -0.243* (0.140) | -0.031 (0.146) | -0.117 (0.146) | -0.188 (0.150) |
| T2Xmiddle | 0.369*** (0.139) | -0.055 (0.148) | 0.040 (0.140) | -0.239* (0.142) | -0.134 (0.143) | -0.034 (0.142) | -0.207 (0.145) |
| T3Xmiddle | 0.293** (0.133) | 0.114 (0.150) | 0.058 (0.142) | -0.303** (0.139) | 0.039 (0.149) | -0.113 (0.145) | -0.047 (0.145) |
| T4Xmiddle | 0.214 (0.138) | 0.116 (0.145) | 0.017 (0.143) | -0.270* (0.138) | 0.115 (0.138) | -0.235 (0.143) | -0.080 (0.141) |
| middle | 0.257** (0.101) | -0.043 (0.110) | -0.009 (0.106) | 0.265*** (0.102) | -0.075 (0.104) | 0.085 (0.104) | 0.001 (0.105) |
| p-value [T1+T1×rich] | 0.625 | 0.446 | 0.169 | 0.098 | 0.254 | 0.207 | 0.347 |
| p-value [T2+T2×rich] | 0.807 | 0.675 | 0.722 | 0.755 | 0.097 | 0.453 | 0.105 |
| p-value [T3+T3×rich] | 0.994 | 0.281 | 0.573 | 0.946 | 0.161 | 0.651 | 0.012 |
| p-value [T4+T5×rich] | 0.903 | 0.800 | 0.851 | 0.712 | 0.048 | 0.681 | 0.098 |
| p-value [T1+T1×center] | 0.023 | 0.777 | 0.318 | 0.005 | 0.440 | 0.383 | 0.788 |
| p-value [T2+T2×center] | 0.028 | 0.418 | 0.690 | 0.023 | 0.647 | 0.345 | 0.877 |
| p-value [T3+T3×center] | 0.110 | 0.208 | 0.417 | 0.003 | 0.235 | 0.350 | 0.200 |
| p-value [T4+T5×center] | 0.735 | 0.808 | 0.787 | 0.036 | 0.010 | 0.062 | 0.677 |
| N | 2568 | 2568 | 2568 | 2568 | 2568 | 2568 | 2568 |

Notes: The table reports the effects of the treatments on the variables in the columns. Outcome variables are described in the Appendix B and are standardized (Kling et al., 2007). Regressions are with probability weights and robust standard errors in parentheses. Controls included in all regressions are: being male, age brackets, married, working, highly educated and living in the South and Island. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.

Table C.26: Heterogeneous treatment effects on policy preferences - EDUCATION.

| | Redistributive Preferences | | | | | | | Exclusionary Preferences | | | |
|------------------------|----------------------------|---------------------|--------------------|-------------------|--------------------|-------------------|--------------------|--------------------------|----------------------|----------------------|-----------------------|
| | General Redistr. | Tax Rich | Wealth Tax | Estate Tax | Support Poor (all) | Spend Poor | Spend Unempl. | Summary Index Redistr. | Support Poor (It) | Exclusive Welfare | Summary Index Exclus. |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) | (10) | (11) |
| T1 | 0.063 (0.065) | 0.036 (0.032) | 0.075 (0.065) | 0.043 (0.066) | 0.071 (0.068) | 0.121* (0.071) | -0.086 (0.065) | 0.095 (0.065) | 0.002 (0.064) | -0.051* (0.029) | -0.077 (0.064) |
| T2 | 0.039 (0.063) | 0.011 (0.032) | 0.085 (0.065) | 0.085 (0.065) | 0.035 (0.064) | 0.085 (0.067) | -0.016 (0.064) | 0.089 (0.065) | -0.104* (0.063) | -0.040 (0.029) | -0.133** (0.063) |
| T3 | 0.032 (0.064) | 0.050 (0.031) | 0.097 (0.063) | 0.026 (0.064) | 0.118* (0.065) | 0.060 (0.067) | -0.112* (0.065) | 0.085 (0.063) | -0.027 (0.063) | -0.020 (0.029) | -0.050 (0.064) |
| T4 | 0.058 (0.066) | 0.033 (0.031) | 0.060 (0.066) | 0.057 (0.065) | 0.042 (0.065) | 0.113 (0.070) | -0.099 (0.064) | 0.078 (0.066) | -0.106* (0.064) | -0.077*** (0.028) | -0.191*** (0.064) |
| T1Xhighed | -0.104 (0.113) | -0.046 (0.053) | -0.052 (0.109) | 0.005 (0.111) | -0.116 (0.114) | -0.144 (0.112) | -0.036 (0.105) | -0.143 (0.110) | -0.018 (0.115) | 0.084* (0.046) | 0.117 (0.109) |
| T2Xhighed | -0.146 (0.114) | -0.092* (0.054) | -0.153 (0.112) | -0.047 (0.110) | -0.218* (0.113) | -0.089 (0.113) | 0.068 (0.106) | -0.204* (0.116) | -0.118 (0.117) | 0.096** (0.047) | 0.068 (0.112) |
| T3Xhighed | -0.082 (0.116) | -0.124** (0.053) | -0.187* (0.109) | -0.118 (0.111) | -0.117 (0.111) | -0.008 (0.114) | 0.135 (0.110) | -0.166 (0.115) | 0.185 (0.114) | 0.072 (0.047) | 0.238** (0.107) |
| T4Xhighed | -0.143 (0.115) | -0.068 (0.054) | -0.193* (0.111) | -0.111 (0.110) | -0.113 (0.112) | -0.102 (0.115) | 0.005 (0.107) | -0.210* (0.113) | -0.044 (0.117) | 0.115** (0.046) | 0.148 (0.112) |
| highed | -0.021 (0.081) | 0.100*** (0.038) | 0.149* (0.079) | 0.111 (0.079) | 0.038 (0.080) | -0.048 (0.078) | -0.129 (0.079) | 0.081 (0.079) | -0.291*** (0.082) | -0.117*** (0.033) | -0.379*** (0.078) |
| p-value [T1+T1×highed] | 0.660 | 0.817 | 0.792 | 0.589 | 0.622 | 0.783 | 0.139 | 0.593 | 0.871 | 0.359 | 0.647 |
| p-value [T2+T2×highed] | 0.660 | 0.065 | 0.459 | 0.665 | 0.049 | 0.967 | 0.539 | 0.230 | 0.025 | 0.132 | 0.479 |
| p-value [T3+T3×highed] | 0.602 | 0.091 | 0.312 | 0.308 | 0.995 | 0.569 | 0.798 | 0.400 | 0.095 | 0.158 | 0.030 |
| p-value [T4+T4×highed] | 0.365 | 0.419 | 0.137 | 0.544 | 0.437 | 0.907 | 0.274 | 0.150 | 0.124 | 0.298 | 0.642 |
| N | 3521 | 3521 | 3521 | 3521 | 3521 | 3521 | 3521 | 3521 | 3521 | 3521 | 3521 |

Notes: The table reports the effects of the treatments on the variables in the columns. Outcome variables are described in the Appendix B and are standardized (Kling et al., 2007). Regressions are with probability weights and robust standard errors in parentheses. Controls included in all regressions are: being male, age brackets, married, working, highly educated and living in the South and Island. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.

Table C.27: Heterogeneous treatment effects on perceptions - EDUCATION.

| | Perceptions of Inequality | | Perceptions of Poverty | | | Perceptions of diversity | |
|------------------------|-------------------------------------|--|---|--|--|--|--|
| | Share of Wealth Top 10 (1) | Share of Wealth Bottom 50 (2) | Share of Immigrants among poor (3) | Incidence of poverty Immigrants (4) | Incidence of poverty Italians (5) | Share of no-European Immigrants (6) | Share of no-Catholic Immigrants (7) |
| T1 | -0.213*** (0.067) | -0.081 (0.065) | -0.168** (0.067) | -0.083 (0.067) | 0.021 (0.067) | 0.151** (0.064) | 0.106 (0.065) |
| T2 | -0.184*** (0.065) | -0.068 (0.066) | -0.228*** (0.063) | -0.188*** (0.063) | -0.300*** (0.063) | 0.128** (0.064) | 0.084 (0.064) |
| T3 | -0.153** (0.063) | -0.142** (0.066) | -0.153** (0.064) | -0.116* (0.065) | -0.056 (0.063) | -0.052 (0.061) | 0.154** (0.060) |
| T4 | -0.144** (0.063) | -0.212*** (0.066) | -0.215*** (0.065) | -0.184*** (0.062) | -0.196*** (0.065) | -0.142** (0.063) | 0.161*** (0.060) |
| T1Xhighed | 0.171 (0.109) | -0.039 (0.111) | 0.145 (0.116) | 0.038 (0.114) | -0.111 (0.108) | -0.191* (0.111) | -0.041 (0.109) |
| T2Xhighed | -0.031 (0.111) | -0.073 (0.109) | 0.012 (0.109) | -0.100 (0.105) | 0.016 (0.108) | 0.070 (0.108) | -0.047 (0.112) |
| T3Xhighed | -0.021 (0.108) | 0.014 (0.111) | 0.272** (0.112) | 0.169 (0.112) | 0.005 (0.106) | 0.029 (0.105) | 0.068 (0.103) |
| T4Xhighed | 0.024 (0.108) | 0.046 (0.110) | 0.166 (0.111) | -0.021 (0.104) | -0.048 (0.107) | 0.018 (0.103) | -0.041 (0.104) |
| highed | -0.017 (0.081) | -0.208*** (0.078) | -0.170** (0.082) | -0.017 (0.081) | -0.203*** (0.076) | -0.053 (0.079) | -0.056 (0.080) |
| p-value [T1+T1×highed] | 0.631 | 0.179 | 0.805 | 0.618 | 0.289 | 0.666 | 0.464 |
| p-value [T2+T2×highed] | 0.016 | 0.107 | 0.015 | 0.001 | 0.001 | 0.022 | 0.686 |
| p-value [T3+T3×highed] | 0.047 | 0.149 | 0.194 | 0.563 | 0.552 | 0.781 | 0.008 |
| p-value [T4+T4×highed] | 0.172 | 0.059 | 0.589 | 0.014 | 0.004 | 0.126 | 0.162 |
| N | 3521 | 3521 | 3521 | 3521 | 3521 | 3521 | 3521 |

Notes: The table reports the effects of the treatments on the variables in the columns. Outcome variables are described in the Appendix B and are standardized (Kling et al., 2007). Regressions are with probability weights and robust standard errors in parentheses. Controls included in all regressions are: being male, age brackets, married, working, highly educated and living in the South and Island. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.

Table C.28: Heterogeneous treatment effects on feelings and opinions - EDUCATION.

| | Feelings | | | Opinions | | | |
|------------------------|-------------------------------------|---------------------------------------|---------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|--|--|---|
| | Poor-rich Wealth Scale (1) | Migrants Economic Threat (2) | Migrants Cultural Threat (3) | Problem: Low Education (4) | Problem: Income Differences (5) | Problem: Loss of Identity (6) | Problem: Unconditional Welfare (7) |
| T1 | -0.257*** (0.068) | -0.065 (0.064) | -0.037 (0.063) | -0.033 (0.065) | 0.076 (0.066) | -0.122* (0.064) | 0.005 (0.067) |
| T2 | -0.020 (0.064) | -0.104 (0.064) | -0.073 (0.064) | -0.085 (0.065) | 0.150** (0.065) | -0.059 (0.065) | -0.010 (0.065) |
| T3 | -0.133** (0.064) | 0.049 (0.064) | 0.018 (0.063) | -0.042 (0.063) | 0.133** (0.065) | -0.048 (0.065) | 0.101 (0.066) |
| T4 | -0.102 (0.065) | -0.101 (0.065) | -0.088 (0.066) | -0.088 (0.065) | 0.200*** (0.064) | -0.060 (0.065) | 0.032 (0.066) |
| T1Xhighed | 0.141 (0.112) | 0.123 (0.111) | 0.052 (0.108) | -0.071 (0.109) | 0.016 (0.113) | 0.217** (0.110) | 0.014 (0.106) |
| T2Xhighed | 0.132 (0.107) | 0.164 (0.110) | 0.031 (0.106) | 0.021 (0.109) | -0.057 (0.113) | 0.088 (0.112) | 0.164 (0.108) |
| T3Xhighed | -0.182* (0.109) | 0.008 (0.112) | -0.059 (0.109) | -0.081 (0.107) | -0.087 (0.116) | 0.114 (0.113) | 0.004 (0.105) |
| T4Xhighed | 0.055 (0.108) | 0.077 (0.110) | 0.059 (0.109) | 0.115 (0.109) | -0.054 (0.111) | 0.055 (0.114) | 0.098 (0.107) |
| highed | 0.341*** (0.077) | -0.275*** (0.078) | -0.272*** (0.078) | 0.250*** (0.078) | -0.027 (0.081) | -0.167** (0.079) | -0.220*** (0.075) |
| p-value [T1+T1×highed] | 0.190 | 0.520 | 0.859 | 0.233 | 0.314 | 0.289 | 0.817 |
| p-value [T2+T2×highed] | 0.189 | 0.505 | 0.621 | 0.465 | 0.314 | 0.751 | 0.075 |
| p-value [T3+T3×highed] | 0.000 | 0.533 | 0.644 | 0.156 | 0.630 | 0.478 | 0.198 |
| p-value [T4+T4×highed] | 0.588 | 0.783 | 0.736 | 0.758 | 0.110 | 0.956 | 0.120 |
| N | 3521 | 3521 | 3521 | 3521 | 3521 | 3521 | 3521 |

Notes: The table reports the effects of the treatments on the variables in the columns. Outcome variables are described in the Appendix B and are standardized (Kling et al., 2007). Regressions are with probability weights and robust standard errors in parentheses. Controls included in all regressions are: being male, age brackets, married, working, highly educated and living in the South and Island. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.

Table C.29: Heterogeneous treatment effects on policy preferences - MERITOCRATS.

| | Redistributive Preferences | | | | | | | Exclusionary Preferences | | | |
|----------------------------|----------------------------|---------------------|--------------------|--------------------|----------------------|-------------------|----------------------|--------------------------|---------------------|---------------------|-----------------------|
| | General Redistr. | Tax Rich | Wealth Tax | Estate Tax | Support Poor (all) | Spend Poor | Spend Unempl. | Summary Index Redistr. | Support Poor (It) | Exclusive Welfare | Summary Index Exclus. |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) | (10) | (11) |
| T1 | 0.039 (0.058) | 0.054* (0.029) | 0.108* (0.059) | 0.086 (0.060) | 0.031 (0.061) | 0.085 (0.065) | -0.143** (0.060) | 0.084 (0.059) | -0.027 (0.061) | -0.034 (0.026) | -0.071 (0.060) |
| T2 | 0.037 (0.057) | 0.008 (0.030) | 0.056 (0.061) | 0.096 (0.060) | 0.026 (0.060) | 0.111* (0.066) | -0.007 (0.062) | 0.088 (0.059) | -0.134** (0.063) | -0.005 (0.027) | -0.100 (0.063) |
| T3 | 0.094 (0.058) | 0.034 (0.029) | 0.096 (0.059) | 0.030 (0.060) | 0.118** (0.059) | 0.087 (0.064) | -0.078 (0.062) | 0.110* (0.059) | 0.049 (0.061) | -0.022 (0.026) | -0.001 (0.060) |
| T4 | 0.038 (0.060) | 0.021 (0.029) | 0.017 (0.062) | 0.034 (0.060) | 0.027 (0.060) | 0.098 (0.066) | -0.095 (0.061) | 0.042 (0.060) | -0.148** (0.063) | -0.060** (0.026) | -0.193*** (0.062) |
| T1Xmeritocrat | -0.123 (0.134) | -0.155** (0.061) | -0.229* (0.129) | -0.208 (0.128) | -0.043 (0.133) | -0.084 (0.122) | 0.154 (0.113) | -0.225* (0.127) | 0.079 (0.123) | 0.049 (0.055) | 0.129 (0.119) |
| T2Xmeritocrat | -0.101 (0.125) | -0.089 (0.058) | -0.066 (0.121) | -0.066 (0.120) | -0.175 (0.121) | -0.175 (0.113) | 0.078 (0.107) | -0.181 (0.126) | -0.012 (0.116) | -0.012 (0.051) | -0.027 (0.112) |
| T3Xmeritocrat | -0.320** (0.126) | -0.090 (0.059) | -0.224* (0.119) | -0.158 (0.120) | -0.131 (0.124) | -0.106 (0.120) | 0.050 (0.114) | -0.283** (0.122) | -0.047 (0.121) | 0.096* (0.054) | 0.116 (0.118) |
| T4Xmeritocrat | -0.115 (0.125) | -0.041 (0.060) | -0.084 (0.123) | -0.056 (0.120) | -0.090 (0.123) | -0.077 (0.122) | -0.013 (0.110) | -0.136 (0.124) | 0.108 (0.120) | 0.082 (0.053) | 0.200* (0.118) |
| meritocrat | -0.427*** (0.087) | -0.020 (0.042) | -0.030 (0.086) | -0.152* (0.085) | -0.291*** (0.087) | -0.103 (0.082) | -0.242*** (0.080) | -0.339*** (0.085) | -0.155* (0.083) | -0.008 (0.037) | -0.117 (0.081) |
| p-value [T1+T1Xmeritocrat] | 0.488 | 0.063 | 0.296 | 0.276 | 0.918 | 0.989 | 0.908 | 0.211 | 0.629 | 0.764 | 0.577 |
| p-value [T2+T2Xmeritocrat] | 0.488 | 0.108 | 0.922 | 0.773 | 0.154 | 0.491 | 0.416 | 0.402 | 0.131 | 0.685 | 0.174 |
| p-value [T3+T3Xmeritocrat] | 0.044 | 0.270 | 0.213 | 0.218 | 0.899 | 0.850 | 0.763 | 0.104 | 0.987 | 0.114 | 0.255 |
| p-value [T4+T4Xmeritocrat] | 0.481 | 0.701 | 0.534 | 0.833 | 0.555 | 0.835 | 0.238 | 0.387 | 0.688 | 0.631 | 0.947 |
| N | 3521 | 3521 | 3521 | 3521 | 3521 | 3521 | 3521 | 3521 | 3521 | 3521 | 3521 |

Notes: The table reports the effects of the treatments on the variables in the columns. Outcome variables are described in the Appendix B and are standardized (Kling et al., 2007). Regressions are with probability weights and robust standard errors in parentheses. Controls included in all regressions are: being male, age brackets, married, working, highly educated and living in the South and Island. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.

Table C.30: Heterogeneous treatment effects on perceptions - MERITOCRATS.

| | Perceptions of Inequality | | Perceptions of Poverty | | | Perceptions of diversity | |
|----------------------------|-------------------------------|----------------------------------|---------------------------------------|--|--------------------------------------|--|--|
| | Share of Wealth Top 10 (1) | Share of Wealth Bottom 50 (2) | Share of Immigrants among poor (3) | Incidence of poverty Immigrants (4) | Incidence of poverty Italians (5) | Share of no-European Immigrants (6) | Share of no-Catholic Immigrants (7) |
| T1 | -0.137** (0.060) | -0.104* (0.061) | -0.132** (0.062) | -0.089 (0.062) | -0.023 (0.061) | 0.105* (0.061) | 0.113* (0.060) |
| T2 | -0.197*** (0.061) | -0.098 (0.062) | -0.201*** (0.060) | -0.190*** (0.059) | -0.252*** (0.061) | 0.145** (0.061) | 0.063 (0.061) |
| T3 | -0.129** (0.058) | -0.146** (0.063) | -0.086 (0.061) | -0.074 (0.061) | -0.058 (0.060) | -0.039 (0.058) | 0.181*** (0.056) |
| T4 | -0.106* (0.058) | -0.203*** (0.062) | -0.168*** (0.061) | -0.222*** (0.058) | -0.186*** (0.061) | -0.147** (0.058) | 0.139** (0.057) |
| T1Xmeritocrat | -0.075 (0.126) | 0.026 (0.122) | 0.032 (0.132) | 0.066 (0.129) | -0.014 (0.121) | -0.069 (0.119) | -0.075 (0.122) |
| T2Xmeritocrat | 0.009 (0.119) | 0.035 (0.117) | -0.070 (0.116) | -0.093 (0.112) | -0.113 (0.107) | -0.000 (0.113) | -0.001 (0.118) |
| T3Xmeritocrat | -0.116 (0.119) | 0.036 (0.118) | 0.091 (0.120) | 0.058 (0.122) | 0.025 (0.111) | -0.020 (0.110) | -0.023 (0.112) |
| T4Xmeritocrat | -0.118 (0.120) | 0.024 (0.120) | 0.029 (0.121) | 0.120 (0.115) | -0.107 (0.111) | 0.043 (0.113) | 0.036 (0.111) |
| meritocrat | -0.012 (0.089) | -0.108 (0.085) | -0.110 (0.086) | -0.123 (0.085) | -0.229*** (0.079) | 0.154* (0.084) | 0.140 (0.088) |
| p-value [T1+T1×meritocrat] | 0.057 | 0.459 | 0.391 | 0.833 | 0.724 | 0.722 | 0.717 |
| p-value [T2+T2×meritocrat] | 0.067 | 0.525 | 0.006 | 0.003 | 0.000 | 0.127 | 0.538 |
| p-value [T3+T3×meritocrat] | 0.018 | 0.270 | 0.965 | 0.884 | 0.724 | 0.529 | 0.102 |
| p-value [T4+T4×meritocrat] | 0.032 | 0.079 | 0.181 | 0.309 | 0.001 | 0.290 | 0.066 |
| N | 3521 | 3521 | 3521 | 3521 | 3521 | 3521 | 3521 |

Notes: The table reports the effects of the treatments on the variables in the columns. Outcome variables are described in the Appendix B and are standardized (Kling et al., 2007). Regressions are with probability weights and robust standard errors in parentheses. Controls included in all regressions are: being male, age brackets, married, working, highly educated and living in the South and Island. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.

Table C.31: Heterogeneous treatment effects on feelings and opinions - MERITOCRATS.

| | Feelings | | | Opinions | | | |
|----------------------------|------------------------------|--------------------------------|--------------------------------|------------------------------|-----------------------------------|---------------------------------|--------------------------------------|
| | Poor-rich Wealth Scale | Migrants Economic Threat | Migrants Cultural Threat | Problem: Low Education | Problem: Income Differences | Problem: Loss of Identity | Problem: Unconditional Welfare |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) |
| T1 | -0.200*** (0.062) | -0.081 (0.059) | -0.044 (0.059) | -0.081 (0.060) | 0.035 (0.059) | -0.051 (0.059) | -0.010 (0.061) |
| T2 | 0.003 (0.060) | -0.050 (0.061) | -0.117* (0.060) | -0.114* (0.061) | 0.166*** (0.060) | -0.065 (0.061) | -0.006 (0.062) |
| T3 | -0.195*** (0.060) | -0.010 (0.060) | -0.063 (0.060) | -0.070 (0.059) | 0.112* (0.061) | -0.043 (0.061) | 0.062 (0.061) |
| T4 | -0.116* (0.061) | -0.112* (0.060) | -0.096 (0.061) | -0.065 (0.060) | 0.202*** (0.058) | -0.045 (0.061) | 0.025 (0.061) |
| T1Xmeritocrat | -0.033 (0.125) | 0.286** (0.129) | 0.137 (0.123) | 0.122 (0.124) | 0.127 (0.125) | 0.024 (0.127) | 0.075 (0.121) |
| T2Xmeritocrat | 0.066 (0.115) | -0.016 (0.117) | 0.168 (0.112) | 0.110 (0.117) | -0.052 (0.118) | 0.109 (0.124) | 0.176 (0.113) |
| T3Xmeritocrat | 0.001 (0.119) | 0.227* (0.122) | 0.227** (0.116) | -0.002 (0.117) | -0.009 (0.122) | 0.119 (0.124) | 0.153 (0.116) |
| T4Xmeritocrat | 0.127 (0.117) | 0.148 (0.121) | 0.112 (0.117) | 0.062 (0.121) | -0.087 (0.118) | 0.012 (0.125) | 0.158 (0.118) |
| meritocrat | 0.035 (0.083) | 0.118 (0.087) | 0.113 (0.084) | 0.093 (0.086) | -0.501*** (0.086) | 0.065 (0.088) | -0.043 (0.081) |
| p-value [T1+T1×meritocrat] | 0.030 | 0.072 | 0.386 | 0.703 | 0.140 | 0.813 | 0.534 |
| p-value [T2+T2×meritocrat] | 0.478 | 0.504 | 0.586 | 0.965 | 0.261 | 0.684 | 0.072 |
| p-value [T3+T3×meritocrat] | 0.060 | 0.041 | 0.097 | 0.474 | 0.328 | 0.482 | 0.029 |
| p-value [T4+T4×meritocrat] | 0.909 | 0.732 | 0.870 | 0.978 | 0.262 | 0.762 | 0.071 |
| N | 3521 | 3521 | 3521 | 3521 | 3521 | 3521 | 3521 |

Notes: The table reports the effects of the treatments on the variables in the columns. Outcome variables are described in the Appendix B and are standardized (Kling et al., 2007). Regressions are with probability weights and robust standard errors in parentheses. Controls included in all regressions are: being male, age brackets, married, working, highly educated and living in the South and Island. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.

D Donations

The literature on information treatment on preferences for redistribution often provides evidence that causal results are not mere cheap talk but translate in some behavioural outcomes. We provide here evidence of the treatment effects on preferences for donation. We asked individuals to donate part of a prize they might eventually receive through a lottery, to three charities according to their aim: 1) Oxfam (organization fighting against inequality); 2) Caritas (organization supporting poor people living in Italy); 3) Arci (organization supporting the cultural and social integration of immigrants in Italy).

We find that information does not change preferences for donation as we can see in Table D.1.

Although we could not find evidence of treatment effects on donation, we believe this aligns with our primary findings that information has limited impact on redistributive preferences. It's worth noting that recent research by Mollerstrom (2021) highlights that individual preferences for voluntary giving don't perfectly mirror collective preferences for redistribution. This suggests that donation preferences may not serve as a flawless behavioural indicator of redistribution preferences. In fact, our results consistently show correlations between preferences for redistribution and donation outcomes of less than 20%. This seems to suggest that future research aiming to link stated preferences with behavioural outcomes should consider alternative indicators beyond donations.

Table D.1: Treatment effects on donations.

| | Oxfam | Caritas | Arci |
|----------|------------------|-------------------|-------------------|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) |
| T1 | 0.049 (0.056) | -0.041 (0.052) | -0.043 (0.052) |
| T2 | 0.007 (0.052) | 0.047 (0.053) | -0.020 (0.049) |
| T3 | 0.075 (0.055) | -0.035 (0.051) | -0.017 (0.050) |
| T4 | 0.051 (0.055) | 0.042 (0.052) | -0.051 (0.048) |
| <i>N</i> | 3521 | 3521 | 3521 |

Notes: The table reports the effects of the treatments on the variables in the columns. Outcome variables are described in the Appendix B and are standardized (Kling et al., 2007). Regressions are with probability weights and robust standard errors in parentheses. Controls included in all regressions are: being male, left-wing, young, married, working, highly educated and living in the South and Island. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

E Robustness

E.1 Full sample - Robustness test

Tables E.1, E.2, and E.3 replicate results in Table 4, 5, and 6, using a reduced sample where observations flagged as low quality are dropped. The results suggest that our findings are not driven by the potential difference in quality in the observations.

Table E.1: Treatment effects on policy preferences - RESTRICTED SAMPLE.

| | Redistributive Preferences | | | | | | | Exclusionary Preferences | | | |
|----------|----------------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|--------------------|------------------|-------------------|--------------------------|----------------------|-------------------|-----------------------|
| | General Redistr. | Tax Rich | Wealth Tax | Estate Tax | Support Poor (all) | Spend Poor | Spend Unempl. | Summary Index Redistr. | Support Poor (It) | Exclusive Welfare | Summary Index Exclus. |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) | (10) | (11) |
| T1 | 0.022 (0.055) | 0.024 (0.026) | 0.041 (0.054) | 0.029 (0.055) | 0.018 (0.057) | 0.020 (0.058) | -0.072 (0.055) | 0.028 (0.053) | -0.014 (0.056) | -0.039 (0.024) | -0.068 (0.053) |
| T2 | -0.010 (0.055) | -0.020 (0.027) | 0.024 (0.055) | 0.082 (0.054) | -0.056 (0.056) | 0.048 (0.058) | 0.046 (0.055) | 0.024 (0.055) | -0.152*** (0.056) | -0.014 (0.024) | -0.122** (0.054) |
| T3 | -0.006 (0.056) | 0.004 (0.026) | 0.016 (0.054) | -0.023 (0.054) | 0.066 (0.056) | 0.070 (0.058) | -0.016 (0.057) | 0.030 (0.054) | 0.013 (0.056) | -0.004 (0.024) | 0.002 (0.053) |
| T4 | -0.029 (0.055) | -0.001 (0.026) | -0.026 (0.055) | -0.008 (0.053) | -0.038 (0.055) | 0.069 (0.060) | -0.068 (0.056) | -0.027 (0.054) | -0.126** (0.056) | -0.037 (0.024) | -0.139*** (0.053) |
| <i>N</i> | 3138 | 3138 | 3138 | 3138 | 3138 | 3138 | 3138 | 3138 | 3138 | 3138 | 3138 |

See notes to Table 4. Flagged respondents are excluded from the estimation sample. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table E.2: Treatment effects on perceptions - RESTRICTED SAMPLE.

| | Perceptions of Inequality | | Perceptions of Poverty | | | Perceptions of diversity | |
|----------|---------------------------|---------------------------|--------------------------------|---------------------------------|-------------------------------|---------------------------------|---------------------------------|
| | Share of Wealth Top 10 | Share of Wealth Bottom 50 | Share of Immigrants among poor | Incidence of poverty Immigrants | Incidence of poverty Italians | Share of no-European Immigrants | Share of no-Catholic Immigrants |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) |
| T1 | -0.179*** (0.056) | -0.069 (0.056) | -0.083 (0.058) | -0.059 (0.057) | 0.018 (0.056) | 0.031 (0.056) | 0.105* (0.055) |
| T2 | -0.236*** (0.056) | -0.031 (0.057) | -0.178*** (0.055) | -0.204*** (0.053) | -0.241*** (0.054) | 0.110** (0.055) | 0.056 (0.056) |
| T3 | -0.176*** (0.054) | -0.087 (0.057) | -0.034 (0.056) | -0.066 (0.056) | -0.009 (0.055) | -0.101* (0.053) | 0.172*** (0.052) |
| T4 | -0.173*** (0.055) | -0.156*** (0.057) | -0.123** (0.056) | -0.173*** (0.053) | -0.161*** (0.055) | -0.212*** (0.053) | 0.134*** (0.052) |
| <i>N</i> | 3138 | 3138 | 3138 | 3138 | 3138 | 3138 | 3138 |

See notes to Table 5. Flagged respondents are excluded from the estimation sample. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

E.2 Sample excluding respondents who think the survey was biased - Robustness test

As a second robustness check, we drop from the full sample respondents who felt that the survey was biased and we re-estimate the main tables accordingly. At the end of the

Table E.3: Treatment effects on feelings and opinions - RESTRICTED SAMPLE.

| | Feelings | | | Opinions | | | |
|----|-------------------------------------|---------------------------------------|---------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|--|--|---|
| | Poor-rich Wealth Scale (1) | Migrants Economic Threat (2) | Migrants Cultural Threat (3) | Problem: Low Education (4) | Problem: Income Differences (5) | Problem: Loss of Identity (6) | Problem: Unconditional Welfare (7) |
| T1 | -0.163*** (0.057) | -0.016 (0.056) | -0.024 (0.055) | -0.048 (0.056) | 0.054 (0.056) | -0.035 (0.055) | 0.037 (0.056) |
| T2 | 0.061 (0.054) | -0.019 (0.056) | -0.041 (0.054) | -0.089 (0.055) | 0.091 (0.056) | 0.001 (0.057) | 0.079 (0.056) |
| T3 | -0.180*** (0.055) | 0.067 (0.057) | 0.013 (0.055) | -0.087 (0.054) | 0.087 (0.058) | 0.004 (0.057) | 0.150*** (0.056) |
| T4 | -0.047 (0.055) | -0.056 (0.055) | -0.060 (0.055) | -0.066 (0.055) | 0.155*** (0.056) | -0.043 (0.057) | 0.109* (0.056) |
| N | 3138 | 3138 | 3138 | 3138 | 3138 | 3138 | 3138 |

See notes to Table 6. Flagged respondents are now excluded from the estimation sample. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.

survey we asked respondents whether they thought that our survey was biased. These respondents account for 12.87% of our sample. The treatment effects estimated in this restricted sample are slightly weaker but still significant. Results are in Table E.4, E.5, and E.6.

Table E.4: Treatment effects on policy preferences - NO-BIAS SAMPLE.

| | Redistributive Preferences | | | | | | | Exclusionary Preferences | | | |
|----|----------------------------|--------------------|----------------------|----------------------|------------------------------|----------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------------------|-----------------------------|------------------------------|-------------------------------------|
| | General Redistr. (1) | Tax Rich (2) | Wealth Tax (3) | Estate Tax (4) | Support Poor (all) (5) | Spend Poor (6) | Spend Unempl. (7) | Summary Index Redistr. (8) | Support Poor (It) (9) | Exclusive Welfare (10) | Summary Index Exclus. (11) |
| T1 | 0.034 (0.054) | 0.032 (0.027) | 0.076 (0.054) | 0.032 (0.054) | 0.054 (0.057) | 0.067 (0.059) | -0.112** (0.055) | 0.057 (0.053) | 0.061 (0.057) | -0.025 (0.024) | 0.002 (0.054) |
| T2 | -0.001 (0.054) | -0.016 (0.027) | 0.046 (0.055) | 0.075 (0.053) | 0.009 (0.055) | 0.021 (0.058) | 0.006 (0.055) | 0.032 (0.054) | -0.119** (0.057) | -0.017 (0.024) | -0.108** (0.054) |
| T3 | 0.039 (0.054) | 0.010 (0.027) | 0.040 (0.053) | -0.046 (0.053) | 0.113** (0.054) | 0.044 (0.058) | -0.052 (0.056) | 0.042 (0.053) | 0.052 (0.056) | -0.005 (0.024) | 0.028 (0.054) |
| T4 | 0.057 (0.054) | 0.008 (0.027) | 0.010 (0.056) | 0.005 (0.054) | 0.030 (0.055) | 0.064 (0.060) | -0.101* (0.055) | 0.021 (0.054) | -0.086 (0.057) | -0.047** (0.023) | -0.132** (0.054) |
| N | 3068 | 3068 | 3068 | 3068 | 3068 | 3068 | 3068 | 3068 | 3068 | 3068 | 3068 |

See notes to Table 4. Respondents who think the survey was biased are now excluded from the estimation sample. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.

Table E.5: Treatment effects on perceptions - NO-BIAS SAMPLE.

| | Perceptions of Inequality | | Perceptions of Poverty | | Perceptions of diversity | | |
|----------|-------------------------------------|--|---|--|--|--|--|
| | Share of Wealth Top 10 (1) | Share of Wealth Bottom 50 (2) | Share of Immigrants among poor (3) | Incidence of poverty Immigrants (4) | Incidence of poverty Italians (5) | Share of no-European Immigrants (6) | Share of no-Catholic Immigrants (7) |
| T1 | -0.175*** (0.057) | -0.045 (0.057) | -0.152*** (0.058) | -0.077 (0.058) | 0.016 (0.056) | 0.060 (0.056) | 0.078 (0.055) |
| T2 | -0.228*** (0.057) | -0.107* (0.056) | -0.236*** (0.055) | -0.240*** (0.054) | -0.293*** (0.054) | 0.170*** (0.055) | 0.086 (0.055) |
| T3 | -0.148*** (0.054) | -0.139** (0.056) | -0.065 (0.056) | -0.082 (0.056) | -0.045 (0.053) | -0.041 (0.053) | 0.198*** (0.051) |
| T4 | -0.144*** (0.055) | -0.191*** (0.057) | -0.173*** (0.056) | -0.196*** (0.053) | -0.191*** (0.055) | -0.149*** (0.053) | 0.157*** (0.052) |
| <i>N</i> | 3068 | 3068 | 3068 | 3068 | 3068 | 3068 | 3068 |

See notes to Table 5. Respondents who think the survey was biased are now excluded from the estimation sample. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table E.6: Treatment effects on feelings and opinions - NO-BIAS SAMPLE.

| | Feelings | | | Opinions | | | |
|----------|-------------------------------------|---------------------------------------|---------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|--|--|---|
| | Poor-rich Wealth Scale (1) | Migrants Economic Threat (2) | Migrants Cultural Threat (3) | Problem: Low Education (4) | Problem: Income Differences (5) | Problem: Loss of Identity (6) | Problem: Unconditional Welfare (7) |
| T1 | -0.251*** (0.056) | -0.004 (0.055) | -0.008 (0.054) | -0.036 (0.056) | 0.084 (0.057) | -0.051 (0.056) | 0.014 (0.055) |
| T2 | 0.000 (0.054) | -0.057 (0.054) | -0.050 (0.053) | -0.053 (0.056) | 0.106* (0.056) | -0.063 (0.057) | 0.049 (0.056) |
| T3 | -0.215*** (0.054) | 0.053 (0.055) | -0.002 (0.053) | -0.060 (0.055) | 0.135** (0.057) | -0.034 (0.056) | 0.119** (0.055) |
| T4 | -0.104* (0.055) | -0.075 (0.055) | -0.069 (0.055) | -0.051 (0.056) | 0.172*** (0.056) | -0.081 (0.056) | 0.075 (0.056) |
| <i>N</i> | 3068 | 3068 | 3068 | 3068 | 3068 | 3068 | 3068 |

See notes to Table 6. Respondents who think the survey was biased are now excluded from the estimation sample. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

E.3 Sample excluding extreme patterns - Robustness test

Similar to Alesina et al. (2023), we also compute the share of respondents who gave extreme answers, namely the first and the last option, on 28 questions. We then drop respondents whose answers lie at least half the time in one of the two extremes (1.11% of the sample) and we re-estimate the main results reported in Table E.7, E.8, and E.9.

Table E.7: Treatment effects on policy preferences - NO-EXTREME ANSWER SAMPLE.

| | Redistributive Preferences | | | | | | Exclusionary Preferences | | | | |
|----|----------------------------|-------------------|------------------|-------------------|--------------------|------------------|--------------------------|------------------------|----------------------|--------------------|-----------------------|
| | General Redistr. | Tax Rich | Wealth Tax | Estate Tax | Support Poor (all) | Spend Poor | Spend Unempl. | Summary Index Redistr. | Support Poor (It) | Exclusive Welfare | Summary Index Exclus. |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) | (10) | (11) |
| T1 | 0.020 (0.052) | 0.018 (0.025) | 0.056 (0.052) | 0.036 (0.052) | 0.015 (0.055) | 0.086 (0.056) | -0.092* (0.051) | 0.041 (0.051) | -0.002 (0.053) | -0.028 (0.023) | -0.044 (0.051) |
| T2 | -0.004 (0.052) | -0.016 (0.025) | 0.048 (0.052) | 0.086* (0.051) | -0.040 (0.053) | 0.058 (0.054) | 0.022 (0.051) | 0.036 (0.052) | -0.155*** (0.053) | -0.017 (0.023) | -0.131** (0.051) |
| T3 | 0.003 (0.052) | 0.007 (0.025) | 0.040 (0.050) | -0.007 (0.051) | 0.077 (0.053) | 0.068 (0.055) | -0.064 (0.053) | 0.034 (0.051) | 0.042 (0.053) | -0.002 (0.023) | 0.025 (0.050) |
| T4 | 0.004 (0.052) | 0.009 (0.025) | 0.000 (0.053) | 0.022 (0.051) | -0.009 (0.053) | 0.080 (0.056) | -0.081 (0.052) | 0.009 (0.051) | -0.112** (0.053) | -0.037* (0.022) | -0.133*** (0.051) |
| N | 3456 | 3456 | 3456 | 3456 | 3456 | 3456 | 3456 | 3456 | 3456 | 3456 | 3456 |

See notes to Table 4. Respondents with extreme patterns are now excluded from the estimation sample. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.

Table E.8: Treatment effects on perceptions - NO-EXTREME ANSWER SAMPLE.

| | Perceptions of Inequality | | Perceptions of Poverty | | | Perceptions of diversity | |
|----|---------------------------|---------------------------|--------------------------------|---------------------------------|-------------------------------|---------------------------------|---------------------------------|
| | Share of Wealth Top 10 | Share of Wealth Bottom 50 | Share of Immigrants among poor | Incidence of poverty Immigrants | Incidence of poverty Italians | Share of no-European Immigrants | Share of no-Catholic Immigrants |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) |
| T1 | -0.161*** (0.053) | -0.105** (0.053) | -0.142*** (0.055) | -0.094* (0.055) | -0.043 (0.053) | 0.085 (0.053) | 0.110** (0.052) |
| T2 | -0.196*** (0.053) | -0.095* (0.053) | -0.226*** (0.052) | -0.223*** (0.051) | -0.305*** (0.051) | 0.152*** (0.052) | 0.082 (0.053) |
| T3 | -0.162*** (0.052) | -0.135** (0.054) | -0.057 (0.053) | -0.062 (0.054) | -0.052 (0.051) | -0.052 (0.050) | 0.184*** (0.049) |
| T4 | -0.143*** (0.052) | -0.199*** (0.054) | -0.164*** (0.054) | -0.199*** (0.051) | -0.216*** (0.052) | -0.139*** (0.051) | 0.167*** (0.050) |
| N | 3456 | 3456 | 3456 | 3456 | 3456 | 3456 | 3456 |

See notes to Table 5. Respondents with extreme patterns are now excluded from the estimation sample. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.

Table E.9: Treatment effects on feelings and opinions - NO-EXTREME ANSWER SAMPLE.

| | Feelings | | | Opinions | | | |
|----|-------------------------------------|---------------------------------------|---------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|--|--|---|
| | Poor-rich Wealth Scale (1) | Migrants Economic Threat (2) | Migrants Cultural Threat (3) | Problem: Low Education (4) | Problem: Income Differences (5) | Problem: Loss of Identity (6) | Problem: Unconditional Welfare (7) |
| T1 | -0.200*** (0.054) | -0.026 (0.053) | -0.009 (0.052) | -0.056 (0.053) | 0.083 (0.054) | -0.050 (0.053) | 0.001 (0.053) |
| T2 | 0.038 (0.051) | -0.046 (0.053) | -0.059 (0.051) | -0.074 (0.053) | 0.137** (0.053) | -0.027 (0.054) | 0.042 (0.053) |
| T3 | -0.184*** (0.053) | 0.059 (0.053) | 0.006 (0.052) | -0.060 (0.051) | 0.105* (0.055) | -0.005 (0.053) | 0.107** (0.052) |
| T4 | -0.078 (0.053) | -0.065 (0.053) | -0.057 (0.053) | -0.047 (0.053) | 0.192*** (0.053) | -0.038 (0.054) | 0.070 (0.053) |
| N | 3456 | 3456 | 3456 | 3456 | 3456 | 3456 | 3456 |

See notes to Table 6. Respondents with extreme patterns are now excluded from the estimation sample. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.

E.4 Main results unweighted - Robustness test

We finally investigate the role of probability weights that we have employed in the main analysis to correct for over and under sampling. Estimating our main results without probability weights leaves them literally unaffected (Table E.10, E.11, and E.12).

Table E.10: Treatment effects on policy preferences without probability weights.

| | Redistributive Preferences | | | | | | | Exclusionary Preferences | | | |
|----|----------------------------|--------------------|----------------------|----------------------|------------------------------|----------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------------------|-----------------------------|------------------------------|-------------------------------------|
| | General Redistr. (1) | Tax Rich (2) | Wealth Tax (3) | Estate Tax (4) | Support Poor (all) (5) | Spend Poor (6) | Spend Unempl. (7) | Summary Index Redistr. (8) | Support Poor (It) (9) | Exclusive Welfare (10) | Summary Index Exclus. (11) |
| T1 | 0.021 (0.052) | 0.019 (0.025) | 0.053 (0.051) | 0.039 (0.052) | 0.027 (0.054) | 0.068 (0.055) | -0.101** (0.051) | 0.038 (0.050) | 0.001 (0.053) | -0.020 (0.022) | -0.031 (0.051) |
| T2 | 0.002 (0.051) | -0.015 (0.025) | 0.044 (0.052) | 0.080 (0.051) | -0.028 (0.052) | 0.061 (0.054) | 0.008 (0.051) | 0.036 (0.051) | -0.151*** (0.053) | -0.013 (0.023) | -0.122** (0.051) |
| T3 | 0.008 (0.052) | 0.010 (0.025) | 0.037 (0.050) | -0.011 (0.050) | 0.081 (0.052) | 0.059 (0.054) | -0.066 (0.052) | 0.034 (0.050) | 0.034 (0.052) | 0.002 (0.023) | 0.027 (0.050) |
| T4 | 0.006 (0.052) | 0.008 (0.025) | -0.009 (0.052) | 0.015 (0.051) | 0.001 (0.052) | 0.077 (0.055) | -0.097* (0.052) | 0.002 (0.051) | -0.116** (0.053) | -0.037* (0.022) | -0.137*** (0.051) |
| N | 3521 | 3521 | 3521 | 3521 | 3521 | 3521 | 3521 | 3521 | 3521 | 3521 | 3521 |

See notes to Table 4. Regression without probability weights. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.

Table E.11: Treatment effects on perceptions without probability weights.

| | Perceptions of Inequality | | Perceptions of Poverty | | Perceptions of diversity | | |
|----|-------------------------------|----------------------------------|---------------------------------------|--|--------------------------------------|--|--|
| | Share of Wealth Top 10 (1) | Share of Wealth Bottom 50 (2) | Share of Immigrants among poor (3) | Incidence of poverty Immigrants (4) | Incidence of poverty Italians (5) | Share of no-European Immigrants (6) | Share of no-Catholic Immigrants (7) |
| T1 | -0.153*** (0.053) | -0.094* (0.053) | -0.120** (0.055) | -0.070 (0.054) | -0.017 (0.053) | 0.084 (0.052) | 0.092* (0.052) |
| T2 | -0.194*** (0.052) | -0.092* (0.052) | -0.225*** (0.052) | -0.222*** (0.050) | -0.294*** (0.051) | 0.151*** (0.052) | 0.068 (0.052) |
| T3 | -0.160*** (0.051) | -0.137*** (0.053) | -0.063 (0.052) | -0.060 (0.053) | -0.054 (0.051) | -0.043 (0.050) | 0.177*** (0.049) |
| T4 | -0.136*** (0.051) | -0.197*** (0.053) | -0.161*** (0.053) | -0.191*** (0.050) | -0.212*** (0.052) | -0.136*** (0.050) | 0.148*** (0.049) |
| N | 3521 | 3521 | 3521 | 3521 | 3521 | 3521 | 3521 |

See notes to Table 5. Regression without probability weights. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.

Table E.12: Treatment effects on feelings and opinions without probability weights.

| | Feelings | | | Opinions | | | |
|----|-------------------------------|---------------------------------|---------------------------------|-------------------------------|------------------------------------|----------------------------------|---------------------------------------|
| | Poor-rich Wealth Scale (1) | Migrants Economic Threat (2) | Migrants Cultural Threat (3) | Problem: Low Education (4) | Problem: Income Differences (5) | Problem: Loss of Identity (6) | Problem: Unconditional Welfare (7) |
| T1 | -0.208*** (0.054) | -0.024 (0.052) | -0.019 (0.051) | -0.058 (0.052) | 0.083 (0.053) | -0.048 (0.052) | 0.008 (0.052) |
| T2 | 0.024 (0.051) | -0.050 (0.052) | -0.063 (0.051) | -0.078 (0.052) | 0.131** (0.053) | -0.030 (0.053) | 0.044 (0.052) |
| T3 | -0.194*** (0.052) | 0.051 (0.053) | -0.002 (0.051) | -0.069 (0.051) | 0.105* (0.054) | -0.011 (0.053) | 0.102** (0.052) |
| T4 | -0.084 (0.052) | -0.076 (0.052) | -0.068 (0.053) | -0.050 (0.052) | 0.182*** (0.052) | -0.042 (0.053) | 0.065 (0.052) |
| N | 3521 | 3521 | 3521 | 3521 | 3521 | 3521 | 3521 |

See notes to Table 6. Regression without probability weights. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.