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## Globalization and the transformation of the national political space: Six european countries compared

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
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# TranState Working Papers

GLOBALIZATION AND THE  
TRANSFORMATION OF THE  
NATIONAL POLITICAL SPACE:  
SIX EUROPEAN COUNTRIES  
COMPARED

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Staatlichkeit im Wandel • Transformations of the State  
Sonderforschungsbereich 597 • Collaborative Research Center 597



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## **Globalization and the Transformation of the National Political Space: Six European Countries compared**

### **ABSTRACT\***

In this paper, we present the basic ideas, the design and some key results of an ongoing research project on the transformation of the national political space in Western Europe. We start from the assumption that the current process of globalization or denationalization leads to the formation of a new structural conflict in Western European countries, opposing those who benefit from this process to those who tend to lose in the course of the events. The structural opposition between globalization ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ is expected to constitute potentials for the political mobilization within national political contexts. The political mobilization of these potentials, in turn, is expected to give rise to two intimately related dynamics: the transformation of the basic structure of the national political space and the strategic repositioning of the political parties within the transforming space. We present several hypotheses with regard to these two dynamics and test them empirically on the basis of newly collected data concerning the supply side of electoral politics from six Western European countries (Austria, Britain, France, Germany, the Netherlands and Switzerland). The results indicate that in all the countries, the new cleavage has been embedded into the existing two-dimensional national political spaces. In the process, the meaning of the original dimensions has been transformed. The configuration of the main parties has become triangular even in a country like France where it used to be bipolar.

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\* We would like to thank three anonymous reviewers for their comments and critique that have allowed us to improve our argument and to clarify the specificity of our results with regard to those of related research.

## **CONTENTS**

INTRODUCTION .....	1
A NEW STRUCTURAL CONFLICT BETWEEN ‘WINNERS AND LOSERS’ OF GLOBALIZATION.....	2
THE IMPACT OF THE NEW STRUCTURAL CONFLICT ON THE STRUCTURE OF THE POLITICAL SPACE .....	6
THE POSITIONING OF THE PARTIES WITHIN THE TRANSFORMED SPACE .....	9
RESEARCH DESIGN .....	14
RESULTS .....	21
DISCUSSION .....	31
REFERENCES .....	35
ABOUT THE AUTHORS.....	42
APPENDIX .....	43

## **Globalization and the Transformation of the National Political Space: Six European Countries compared**

### **INTRODUCTION**

The political consequences of globalization are manifold. On the one hand, this process leads to the establishment of new forms of political authority and of new channels of political representation at the supranational level and opens up new opportunities for transnational, international, and supranational mobilization (Della Porta 1999). On the other hand, the same processes have profound political implications at the national level. National politics are challenged both ‘from above’ – through new forms of international cooperation and a process of supranational integration – and ‘from below,’ at the regional and local level. While the political consequences of globalization have most often been studied at the supra- or transnational level (Zürn 1998; Held et al. 1999; Greven & Pauly 2000; Hall & Biersteker 2002; Grande & Pauly 2005), we shall focus on the effects of globalization on national politics. We assume that, paradoxically, the political reactions to economic and cultural globalization are bound to manifest themselves above all at the national level: given that the democratic political inclusion of citizens is still mainly a national affair, nation-states still constitute the major arenas for political mobilization (Zürn et al. 2000). Our study focuses on Western European countries, where ‘denationalization’ means, first of all, European integration. For the present argument, however, this aspect of the European context is not essential. Europeanization and European integration can also be seen as special cases of the more general phenomenon globalization (Schmidt 2003).

Zürn suggests to view the process of globalization as a process of ‘denationalization’ (Beisheim et al. 1999; Zürn 1998), i.e. as a process that leads to the lowering and ‘unbundling’ of national boundaries (Ruggie 1993). It is true that there are earlier examples of globalization, but there is plenty of evidence that this process has accelerated in the 1980s and 1990s. Following David Held and his collaborators (Held et al. 1999: 425), who have probably presented the most detailed and measured account of the phenomenon in question, we may argue that ‘in nearly all domains contemporary patterns of globalization have not only quantitatively surpassed those of earlier epochs, but have also displayed unparalleled qualitative differences – that is in terms of how globalization is organized and reproduced.’ If we put this process in a Rokkanian perspective (see Rokkan 2000), we may conceive of the contemporary opening up of boundaries as a new ‘critical juncture,’ which is likely to result in the formation of new structural cleavages, both within and between national contexts.

This is the starting point of a research project in which we are currently involved. In this paper, we shall discuss in more detail our expectations regarding the formation and



articulation of new political cleavages and present some first results with respect to the supply side of national politics. In the next section, we discuss how the process of denationalization is expected to lead to the formation of a new conflict, opposing ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ of the process of globalization. This conflict is expected to constitute potentials for processes of political mobilization within national political contexts. We shall then examine how these potentials can be articulated at the level of political parties. We are well aware that, in order to fully understand how new political cleavages may result from the process of denationalization, it is crucial to focus both on the transformations in the electorate (the demand side of electoral competition), and on the kind of strategies political parties adopt to position themselves with regard to these new potentials (the supply side of politics). In this paper, we shall only deal with the processes of transformation on the supply side. After the elaboration of our hypotheses concerning this kind of transformation, we shall present our research design and some key results for the six countries covered by our project.

### **A NEW STRUCTURAL CONFLICT BETWEEN ‘WINNERS AND LOSERS’ OF GLOBALIZATION**

Three assumptions guide our analysis:

- First, we consider that the consequences of globalization are not the same for all members of a national community. We expect them to give rise to new disparities, new oppositions and new forms of competition.
- Second, we assume that citizens perceive these differences between ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ of globalization, and that these categories are articulated by political parties.
- Third, we expect that these new oppositions are not aligned with, but crosscut the traditional structural and political cleavages.

The ‘losers’ of globalization are people whose life chances were traditionally protected by national boundaries. They perceive the weakening of these boundaries as a threat for their social status and their social security. Their life chances and action spaces are being reduced. The ‘winners,’ on the other hand, include people who benefit from the new opportunities resulting from globalization, and whose life chances are enhanced. The essential criterion for determining the impact of the opening up of national boundaries on individual life chances is whether or not someone possesses *exit options*. As Zygmunt Baumann (1998: 9) has observed, in the age of globalization *mobility* becomes the most powerful factor of social stratification. On the one hand, there are those who are mobile, because they control convertible resources allowing them to exit, and on the other hand there are those who remain locked-in, because they lack these resources.

The scope of the structural changes induced by globalization is still a point of controversy. It is widely debated in political science and in sociology (see for example Al-brow 1996; Beck 1997, 1998a, 1998b or Goldthorpe 2002). For our purposes, we can identify three mechanisms which contribute to the formation of winners and losers of globalization. First among these is the increase in *economic competition*, which results from the globalization process. Over the last decades, a series of transformations in the American economy have resulted in a massive pressure towards deregulations in Western European countries, leading in turn to a dramatic erosion of protected property rights. Schwartz (2001: 44) suggests to interpret the impact of globalization as ‘the erosion of politically based property rights and their streams of income, and as reactions to that erosion.’ The individuals and the firms that are most directly affected by this erosion are those who worked in ‘sheltered’ sectors, i.e. sectors that were, since the 1930s, protected from market pressures through public regulation.<sup>1</sup> Those measures disconnected income streams (in the form of wages, employment, or profits) from the outcome of the market. In the context of globalization, Schwartz’s distinction between sectors sheltered from the market, on the one hand, and sectors exposed to the market, on the other, has much in common with the distinction between export-oriented firms and firms oriented towards the domestic market.<sup>2</sup> With the international pressure towards deregulation, the cleavage between these two sectors intensifies. Firms exposed to global market pressures try to impose market disciplines on traditionally sheltered sectors, so as to bring down their own costs of production and to remain competitive on the international market. Firms in sheltered sectors, by contrast, seek to defend their property rights. Workers in exposed sectors also have an interest in the lowering of production costs, as their jobs directly depend on the international competitiveness of their firm. Workers in sheltered sectors, by contrast, have the same interest in protectionist

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<sup>1</sup> Such measures include: ‘trade protection, minimum wages, centralized collective bargaining, product market regulation, zoning, the delegated control over markets to producer groups, and [...] formal welfare states’ (Schwartz 2001: 31).

<sup>2</sup> Schwartz emphasizes however the difference between the two classifications. Considering them as equivalent is misleading, he argues, because few commodities or services are not subject to international trade. Furthermore, he considers the stranded investments of the ‘sheltered’ sectors to be a central problem, which is different from the issue of the opportunity costs of the export-oriented sectors. For a similar argument, see Frieden (1991: 440): ‘The principal beneficiaries of the broad economic trends of the last two decades have been internationally oriented firms and the financial services industries; the principal losers have been nationally based industrial firms’; and Frieden and Rogowski (1996: 46): ‘... exogenous easing of trade will be associated with increased demands for liberalization from the relatively competitive, and with increased demands of protection from the relatively uncompetitive, groups.’

measures as their employers. Globalization thus leads to a *sectoral* cleavage, which cuts across the traditional class cleavage and tends to give rise to cross-class coalitions.

As a result of globalization, the increasing economic competition is, however, not only defined in sectoral, but also in *ethnic* terms – ethnic taken here in a large sense (including language and religious criteria). This is a consequence of the massive immigration into Western Europe of ethnic groups who are rather distinct from the European population on the one hand, and of the increasing opportunities for delocalizing jobs into distant, and ethnically distinct regions of the globe, on the other hand. Thus, the increasing economic competition is linked to a second mechanism – an increasing *cultural diversity* (Albrow 2001). In the immigration countries, then, ethnically different populations become symbols of potential threats to the collective identity and to the standard of living of the natives, resulting in *cultural competition*. Furthermore, the European welfare states have been granting some of their social rights and privileges – though no political rights – to the migrants (Soysal 1994: 130), which increases the perception of competition (for the same scarce resources) on the part of the native population. However, this potential economic and cultural threat may not necessarily be perceived and experienced in the same way by all members of a national community. In this respect, the individual level of education plays a key role. *Education* has a ‘liberalising’ effect, i.e. it induces a general shift in political value orientations toward cultural liberalism (cosmopolitanism, universalism). It contributes to cultural tolerance and openness; it provides the language skills which give access to other cultures. Individuals who are poorly educated are usually less tolerant and do not have the resources to communicate with foreigners or to understand other cultures in a more general sense (Lipset 1963; Grunberg & Schweisguth 1990: 54, 1997a: 155-59, 168; Quillian 1995; Sniderman et al. 2000: 84). Finally, higher education has also become an indispensable asset for one’s professional success. It provides the necessary specialized skills which are marketable inside and across the national boundaries, thus considerably increasing one’s exit options. It is certainly true that this development is less a consequence of globalization than of the process of deindustrialization and of technological change. But from the point of view of the affected groups, it is central to understand how they *perceive* their relative loss in life chances and to whom they attribute its causes.

A third mechanism related to the opening up of borders increases the *political competition* between nation-states, on the one hand, and supra- or international political actors, on the other. Most scholars agree, that as a consequence of globalization nation-states have lost part of their problem solving capacity. For example, the possibilities for an independent macro-economic policy have been drastically reduced because of the liberalization of the financial markets. This is obvious in the European context, where an autonomous monetary policy has no longer been possible since the creation of a

European central bank. These changes create winners and losers in specific ways, too. First of all, there may be material losers to the extent that the reduction of a state's autonomy may imply a reduction of the size of the public sector. But, more importantly, winners and losers also result from differences in their *identification with the national community*. Gorenburg (2000) has emphasized the importance of such identifications to understand support for nationalism. Individuals who possess a strong identification with their national community and who are attached to its exclusionary norms will perceive a weakening of the national political institutions as a loss. Conversely, citizens with universalist norms will perceive this weakening as a gain, if it implies a strengthening of supranational political institutions.<sup>3</sup> The attachment to national traditions, national languages, and religious values plays a prominent role here – as does the integration into transnational networks.<sup>4</sup>

To sum up, the likely winners of globalization include entrepreneurs and qualified employees in sectors open to international competition, as well as all cosmopolitan citizens. Losers of globalization, by contrast, include entrepreneurs and qualified employees in traditionally protected sectors, all unqualified employees, and citizens who strongly identify themselves with their national community. Following the realistic theory of group conflict, we consider that the threats perceived by the losers and their related attitudes do have a real basis. They are not simply illusions or rest on false consciousness. However, we assume that individuals do not perceive cultural and material threats as distinct phenomena<sup>5</sup>. As Martin Kohli (2000: 118) argues, identity and interests are mutually reinforcing factors of social integration.

The new groups of winners and losers of globalization constitute *political potentials*, which can be articulated by political organizations. However, given the heterogeneous composition of these groups, we cannot expect that the preferences formed as a function of this new antagonism will be closely aligned with the political divisions on which domestic politics have traditionally been based. This makes it difficult for established national political actors to organize these new potentials. In addition, the composition of the groups of winners and losers varies between national contexts, making it even more

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<sup>3</sup> For the distinction between norms of exclusion and universalist norms, see Hardin (1995: chapters 4 and following).

<sup>4</sup> Traditionally, integration into cosmopolitan networks was the preserve of a small elite. Today, however, the Jet Set is not the only group which is forming transnationally and which is developing identities that rival with territorially more circumscribed identities (Badie 1997: 453f.).

<sup>5</sup> Bobo (1999: 457): ‘... the melding of group identity, affect, and the interests in most real-world situations of racial stratification make the now conventional dichotomous opposition of ‘realistic group conflict versus prejudice’ empirically nonsensical.’

difficult to organize them at the supranational level, e.g. at the level of the European Union. This heterogeneity results in a twofold problem for the organization and articulation of political interests. First of all, it creates the already mentioned *political paradox of globalization*: due to their heterogeneity, the new political potentials created by this process are most likely to be articulated and dealt with at the level of the national political process. Moreover, it opens a ‘window of opportunity’ for the formation of new political parties and the restructuring of the national party systems.

We thus suggest that, paradoxically, the lowering and unbundling of national boundaries render them more salient. As they are weakened and reassessed, their political importance increases. More specifically, the destructuring of national boundaries leads to a ‘sectorialization’ and an ‘ethnicization’ of politics (Badie 1997), i.e. to an increased salience of differences between sectors of the economy and of cultural differences, respectively, as criteria for the distribution of resources, identity formation, and political mobilization. As far as the ethnicization of politics is concerned, the theory of ethnic competition holds that majority groups will react to the rise of new threats with *exclusionary measures* (Olzak 1992). At a general level, we would expect losers of the globalization process to seek to protect themselves through protectionist measures and through an emphasis on national independence. Winners, by contrast, who benefit from the increased competition, should support the opening up of the national boundaries and the process of international integration. We shall refer here to this antagonism between winners and losers of globalization as a conflict between *integration* and *demarcation*.<sup>6</sup>

### **THE IMPACT OF THE NEW STRUCTURAL CONFLICT ON THE STRUCTURE OF THE POLITICAL SPACE**

These arguments and hypotheses present a general framework for understanding recent developments in the structure of political competition and in electoral alignments in Western democracies. They set a research agenda of which we can empirically analyze here only some aspects. In the following sections, we shall focus on the *political articulation* of the integration-demarcation cleavage by political parties and formulate a series of hypotheses. To this end, we first need to clarify two interdependent aspects of the same phenomenon: the transformation of the basic structure of the political space and the positioning of the parties within this space. These two dynamics are linked to each other, given that, on the one hand, the issues which structure the space are articulated by the individual parties, and that, on the other hand, individual parties are positioning themselves strategically with regard to the structural potentials available for political articulation. As a consequence of strategies used in electoral competition, and partially as a reaction to social change, parties change their positions within a space, whose di-

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<sup>6</sup> Bartolini (2000) refers to it as a conflict between integration and independence.

mensions may change as well<sup>7</sup>. It is only for expository purposes that we separate the two sides of the same coin.

As far as the *transformation of the basic structure* is concerned, it is first of all useful to specify the new structural conflict according to the aspects concerned: we should distinguish between an *economic* dimension and a *cultural* dimension of the integration/demarcation divide<sup>8</sup>. With respect to both dimensions, we can distinguish between an open, integrationist position, and a defensive, protectionist one. In the economic domain, a neoliberal free trade position is opposed to a position in favour of protecting the national markets. In the cultural domain, a universalist, multiculturalist or cosmopolitan position is opposing a position in favour of protecting the national culture and citizenship in its civic, political, and social sense. The orientations on the two dimensions need not necessarily coincide. One could also further specify the notion of integration by distinguishing between the removal of boundaries and other obstacles to free and undistorted international competition – purely *negative* integration in Scharpf's (1999: 45) terminology – and a process of reconstruction of a system of regulation at the supranational or international level – a process that Scharpf calls *positive* integration.

Next, we should discuss how the two dimensions of the presumed new structural conflict are expected to relate to the existing structure of cleavages in Western European politics. According to Rokkan (2000), four classic cleavages have structured the European political space – the center/periphery, religious, rural/urban, and owner/worker cleavages. This set essentially boils down to two dimensions: a cultural (religion) and a social-economic one (class) (Kriesi 1994: 230-234). Class conflicts were omnipresent in Western Europe and structured politics around social-economic policy – the regulation of the market and the construction of social protection by the state. The left essentially fought for social protection and market regulation, while the right defended the free reign of market forces. Religious conflicts prevailed between Catholics and Protestants in religiously mixed countries, and between the believing Catholics and the secularized in Catholic countries. In the Protestant North-West, Protestant dissidents contributed to religious conflicts. After World War II, these traditional cleavages have lost much of their traditional structuring capacity for politics as a result of secularization, value change, rising levels of education, improved standards of living, and sectoral change (tertiarization) (Dalton et al. 1984; Franklin et al. 1992; Inglehart 1990; Kriesi 1993). In their place, new structuring conflicts have developed since the late sixties, which have

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<sup>7</sup> Van der Brug (1999: 151, 2001: 119f.) has already pointed out the interdependence between these two dynamics.

<sup>8</sup> Our distinction of these two aspects of the purported new conflict follows Lipset (1963), who used to distinguish between socio-economic and cultural conservatism and liberalism respectively (see also Middendorp 1978; Grunberg & Schweisguth 1990).

been variously labeled as expressions of a ‘new politics’ (Franklin 1992; Müller-Rommel 1984, 1985, 1990), a ‘new value’ (Inglehart 1977, 1985, 1990, 1997) or ‘new class’ (Evans 1999; Kriesi 1998; Manza & Brooks 1999; Lachat 2004; Oesch 2004) cleavage. The ‘cultural revolution’ of the late sixties gave birth to a series of so called ‘new social movements’ which mobilized in the name of universalist values – human rights, emancipation of women, solidarity with the poor of the world, protection of the environment. Their vision was one of cultural liberalism and social justice/protection. These were essentially movements of the left, which often found close allies in the established parties of the left and, in due course, spawned a new set of parties – the New Left and Green parties. Their concerns reinvigorated the traditional class cleavage and reinforced the left’s position on the social-economic dimension. In addition, they contributed to the transformation of the cultural dimension from a dimension mainly defined in terms of religious concerns to one opposing culturally liberal or libertarian concerns, on the one side, and the defence of traditional (authoritarian) values and institutions (including traditional Christian religion, traditional forms of the family, and a strong army), on the other. Kitschelt (1994, 1995) has perhaps most forcefully conceptualized the effect of this transformation on the structuration of the political space.

It is crucial that the mobilization of the new social movements did not add any fundamentally new dimension to the political space, but transformed the meaning of the two already existing ones. The political space remained two-dimensional, defined by a social-economic and a cultural dimension. What changed was the meaning of the conflicts associated with these two dimensions. In a similar vein, we can now hypothesize that the new demarcation/integration conflict will be embedded into the two-dimensional basic structure that emerged under the impact of the mobilization by the new social movements, transforming it once again. This is our *embedding hypothesis*. On the social-economic dimension, the new conflict can be expected to reinforce the classic opposition between a pro-state and a pro-market position while giving it a new meaning. The pro-state position is likely to become more defensive and more protectionist, while the pro-market position is likely to become more assertive in favor of the enhancement of national competitiveness on world markets. At the same time, the increasing sectoralization of concerns may drive a wedge between former allies on the pro-market side. On the cultural dimension, we expect enhanced opposition to the cultural liberalism of the new social movements as a result of the ethnicization of politics: the defense of tradition is expected to increasingly take on an ethnic or nationalist character. Furthermore, new issues should be integrated into the cultural dimension. Central among these are the issues of European integration and of immigration, which correspond to the new political and cultural forms of competition linked with globalization. The demarcation pole of the new cultural cleavage should be characterised by an oppo-


sition to the process of European integration and by restrictive positions with regard to immigration.

Instead of the new conflict becoming embedded into the already existing conflict dimensions, one might, alternatively, expect it to transform the national political space by adding one or even two new dimensions to the two already existing ones. The main reason, why we do not think that this is going to happen has to do with the adaptive capacity of the already existing parties. The mainstream parties take up the new preferences, identities, values and interests, and interpret and articulate them in their own specific ways (Schattschneider 1960; Mair 1983, 1993: 130; Laver 1989). We suggest that established parties are repositioning and realigning themselves as a result of the rising new conflict. Accordingly, the increasing volatility in the Western European elections cannot only be interpreted, as is usually done, as the result of increasing issue-voting on the part of the electorate, but also as a result of this repositioning and realigning of established parties.

#### **THE POSITIONING OF THE PARTIES WITHIN THE TRANSFORMED SPACE**

Assuming the validity of our embedding hypothesis, we can now discuss our hypotheses regarding the positions taken by political parties in this transformed political space. The different combinations of positions on the two dimensions represent the range of possible interpretative packages or ideological master-frames which are available to political entrepreneurs for the articulation of the new structural antagonism in the context of already existing political divisions. Figure 1 offers a schematic representation of the expected positions of the major groups of parties: we distinguish between three traditional party families of which we find representatives in all Western European countries – the social-democrats, the liberals and the conservatives (often represented by Christian-democrats) – as well as two groups of more recent competitors: the New Left and green parties, on the one hand, and the populist right, on the other. This figure presents a map of the parties' possible positions, which we discuss in more detail in the following paragraphs. The exact locations of parties in different countries are likely to vary, as they depend not only on the common trends linked with globalization, but also on the parties' strategic decisions and on specific contextual factors (which we shall not discuss here). This figure can be considered as a general summary of our hypotheses regarding the transformed structure of the political space and parties' positions within this space.



**Figure 1:** Expected positioning of party families with respect to the new cleavage

Typically *mainstream political parties* have so far taken a rather undifferentiated position with respect to the new cleavage. They seem to be uncertain about it, because (a) they are internally divided with regard to the question of integration, (b) they are divided as Euro-families as a result of their variable insertion into national party configurations, and (c) they are not in a position to form a strong alliance between different sectoral and cultural interests. Broadly speaking, whether on the left or on the right, they tend to view the process of economic denationalization both as inevitable and beneficial for the maintenance of their established positions. Thus, analyzing the main party families – the Socialists, Liberals and Christian Democrats – at the EU level, Hix (1999) has noted that, between 1976 and 1994, all three gradually converged on moderately pro-Integration positions. The findings of Hooghe et al. (2002) and van der Eijk and Franklin (2004) about the general preference regarding European integration of mainstream parties support this point. As a first hypothesis, we would suggest that, in Western Europe, (a) mainstream parties will generally tend to formulate a winners’ programme, i.e. a programme in favour of further economic and cultural integration, but that (b) mainstream parties on the left will attempt to combine the economic integration with the preservation of the social protection by the welfare state, while mainstream parties on the right will tend to reduce the role of the state in every respect.

There are, however, variations of this general theme. On the left, mainstream parties face the dilemma that market integration in Europe (and more globally) poses a threat to their national social achievements. Depending on their capacity to defend these achievements at the national level, mainstream left parties may vary with regard to the extent to which they endorse economic integration (Marks and Wilson 2000; Hooghe and Marks 2001). Accordingly, their positions are likely to vary mostly along the economic dimension of the political space. We may distinguish between a ‘classical left’

position that sticks to the statist attitude and the position of the Third Way, formulated by the British Labour Party and later also discussed in other countries – especially in Germany, which constitutes a novel attempt to come to terms with the problems posed by the new dividing line: Third Way politics takes globalization seriously, adopts a positive attitude towards it, and seeks to combine a neoliberal endorsement of free trade with a core concern with social justice (Giddens 1998: 64ff.). For the architects of the Third Way, taking globalization seriously also requires steps in the direction of ‘positive integration,’ in the form of global economic governance, global ecological management, regulation of corporate power, control of warfare and fostering of transnational democracy (Giddens 2000: 122-162). In the transformed political space, compared to the location of the traditional left, parties of the Third Way should be more favourable to further integration, on both the economic and cultural dimensions.

On the right, conservatives also face a dilemma – a dilemma that is precisely the opposite of the one faced by mainstream parties of the left (Marks and Wilson 2000; Hooghe and Marks 2001): economically they tend to endorse liberalization, but socially and culturally they tend to be nationalists and opposed to the opening up of the borders. Accordingly, their positions are likely to vary especially along the cultural dimension. Depending on the threat posed by integration to the national identity, the conservatives will be more or less opposed to integration. Given the British fear of losing the national identity and culture, a fear that is largely absent in countries such as Germany or Spain (Diez Medrano 2004), it is, for example, not surprising that the British Conservatives are much more eurosceptic than the German or Spanish ones.<sup>9</sup> Compared to the other two main political families, at first sight the opening up of the borders seems to constitute less of a challenge for the liberal family. Classical liberalism was both economically and socio-culturally liberal, i.e. supported the free market and social and cultural openness and tolerance. At closer inspection, however, we can find that European liberalism has been characterized by a strong ambivalence regarding the left-right dimension. As a consequence, we can distinguish various variants within the liberal party family (Smith 1988). Most important is the distinction between ‘liberal-radicalism’ and ‘liberal conservatism.’ Whereas the former (e.g. the Dutch D66) have been left-of-centre on economic issues, the latter (e.g. the Dutch VVD) have been emphasizing economic freedom and market liberalization and tended to be right-of-centre. Faced with the opening of the borders, liberal-conservatives are distinguished by the fact that they

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<sup>9</sup> In this context, Christian-democratic parties stand out because they are confronted with both dilemmas at the same time. Traditionally, they have been (moderate) supporters of the welfare state and the strongest advocates of European integration (Marks and Wilson 2000: 451-454). Hence, in a transformed political space they need to re-define their position on both dimensions.

tend to put the accent on market liberalization, i.e. on the negative integration with respect to the economy, while they oppose supranational political integration (Marks and Wilson 2000: 448-450).

On the basis of these empirical observations, we can expect two possible developments. The first development is an intensification of political conflicts within mainstream political parties as a consequence of their attempts to redefine their ideological profiles. In some cases, these conflicts have been successfully resolved by transforming the party's profile, Britain's New Labour and the Austrian FPÖ being two of the most significant cases. Mostly, however, the mainstream political parties are still characterized by their indecision and their tendency to moderately opt for the winners' side. For these cases, we suggest a second general hypothesis: In countries, in which these parties dominate, we face an *increasing political fragmentation* (Zürn 2001) with the strengthening of peripheral political actors, who tend to adopt a 'losers' programme.' Peripheral actors on the right are expected to be *culturally* more protectionist, and peripheral actors on the left to be *socially and economically* more protectionist than their respective mainstream counterparts. The positioning of the parties with regard to Europe may serve as an illustration of this hypothesis: analyzing the *Euroscepticism* of political parties in different European countries, Taggart (1998) found that it is the more peripheral parties (on both sides of the political spectrum), rather than parties more central to their party systems, which are most likely to use Euroscepticism as a mobilizing issue. The 'inverted U curve' characterizing the shape of the relationship between left-right position and support for European integration has been confirmed by several studies (Hooghe et al. 2002; van der Eijk & Franklin 2004): parties of both the radical left and the populist right are most opposed to European integration. Furthermore, Hooghe et al. (2002: 977) add the insight that the positioning of a party on the cultural dimension 'exerts a strong, consistent, and, it must be said, largely overlooked effect on party positioning on European issues: independently of a party's positioning on the (social-economic) left-right dimension, 'traditional-authoritarian-nationalist' parties are much more likely to be eurosceptical than 'green-alternative-libertarian' parties.

The radical left's opposition to the opening up of the borders is mainly an opposition to economic liberalization and to the threat it poses to the left's achievement at the national level. The populist right's opposition to the opening up of the borders is first of all an opposition to the social and cultural forms of competition and the threat they pose to national identity. The main characteristics of the populist right are its *xenophobia* or even racism, expressed in a fervent opposition to the presence of immigrants in Western Europe, and its *populist appeal* to the widespread resentment against the mainstream parties and the dominant political elites. Right-wing populists are clearly protectionist on the cultural dimension. At the same time, it is populist in its instrumentalization of

sentiments of anxiety and disenchantment as well as in its appeal to the ‘common man’ and his allegedly superior common sense. It builds on the losers’ fears with regard to the removal of national borders, and on their strong belief in simple and ready-made solutions. This ‘national-populism’ constitutes the common characteristic of all organizations of the Western European populist right. As Betz (2003) observes, its position on immigration is increasingly becoming part of a larger programme, which poses a fundamental challenge to liberal democracies. He now describes this programme as a ‘combination of differential nativism and comprehensive protectionism.’ In an earlier assessment (Betz 1993), he had still identified *neoliberal economic elements* in the programmes of the populist right. Similarly, Kitschelt (1995) had pointed out that not all right-wing populist parties shared this element, but had insisted that the most successful ones among them did at the time. According to Kitschelt, the combination of cultural protectionism and economic neoliberalism constituted the ‘winning formula’ allowing these parties to forge electoral coalitions appealing both to their declining middle-class clientele and to the losers from the unskilled working class. This position corresponds to the lower right region of *Figure 1*, where it is labeled as New Radical Right. More recently, also Kitschelt (2001: 435) noted that some populist right parties have moderated their neoliberal appeals and started to focus more on the themes of a reactive nationalism and of ethnocentrism.

We consider those parties that most successfully appeal to the interests and fears of the ‘losers’ of globalization to be the driving force of the current transformation of the Western European party systems. In most countries, it is these parties of the populist right (Decker 2004) who have been able to formulate a highly attractive ideological package for the ‘losers’ of economic transformations and cultural diversity. Following Hooghe and Marks (2004) and Diez Medrano (2004), who show the key importance of fears about national identities for eurosceptic attitudes in the general public, we suggest that such fears are generally more important for the mobilization of the ‘losers’ than the defense of their economic interests. This could explain why the populist right’s appeal to the ‘losers’ is more convincing than that of the radical left. Moreover, the mobilization of the ‘losers’ is particularly consequential, because, in contrast to the ‘winners,’ the ‘losers’ typically do not have individual exit-options at their disposal. To improve their situation, they depend on collective mobilization.

While the new social movements of the sixties and seventies have above all transformed the left, the mobilization by the populist right constitutes a major challenge for the established parties of the right as well as of the left (Kriesi 1999). One of its effects is the transformation of established liberal or conservative parties, who adopt the essential elements of cultural protection of the populist right’s programme in order to appeal to the ‘losers’ and essentially become part of the family of the populist right. The Aus-

trian FPÖ and the Swiss SVP illustrate this point. In both cases, an established party of the right radicalized and adopted a programme including strong national-populist elements. The mutation to a populist party can either be the result of the transformation of a formerly liberal-conservative party such as the FPÖ, or of a formerly conservative party such as the Swiss SVP.

We assume that the new conflict creates comparable political potentials in all Western European democracies. The way these potentials are articulated by the parties in a given country depends, however, on country-specific factors. For our purposes here, these contextual factors are not central since we are mainly interested in the similarities of the transformations in the different countries. Given that we consider the right-wing populist parties to be the driving force of these transformations, we suggest that one should pay special attention to those factors that influence the strength of this particular type of party. These factors include national political institutions (electoral systems in particular and type of democracy more generally<sup>10</sup>), the general strategic dynamics of the established parties (convergence vs. polarization<sup>11</sup>), their alliance strategies with respect to the populist right in particular (stigmatization vs. cooperation<sup>12</sup>) and the specific characteristics of right-wing populist parties themselves (the charisma of their leader and their organizational capacity<sup>13</sup>) as well as the breadth of their appeal, i.e. the degree to which the voters perceive them as normal parties, which, in turn, enables them to mobilize beyond the core constituency of radical right-wing voters.<sup>14</sup> The challenge of a successful right-wing populist party is likely to reinforce the relative importance of the cultural dimension with regard to the economic one, and it is likely to move the center of gravity of partisan competition in the direction of cultural (but not necessarily economic) demarcation/protection.

## **RESEARCH DESIGN**

In order to analyse the impact of globalization on the national political space, we study *six Western European countries*: Germany, France, Britain, Switzerland, Austria, and the Netherlands. These countries are very similar in many respects, but present some

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<sup>10</sup> For electoral systems, see van der Brug, Fennema and Tillie (forthcoming), Carter (2002), Golder (2003), Ignazi (2003: 183), Jackman and Volpert (1996), Swank and Betz (2003), Veugeleers and Magnan (forthcoming); for the type of democracy – consensus or majoritarian democracy, see Kitschelt (1995), Plasser and Ulram (2000), Billiet (1998: 189), Billiet and Swyngedouw (1999: 168).

<sup>11</sup> See: Abedi (2002), Hainsworth (1992), Ignazi (1992, 2003: 207-212), Kitschelt (1995), Kriesi (1999), Mair (1995), Sauger (2004), van der Brug et al. (forthcoming), Veugelers and Magnan (forthcoming).

<sup>12</sup> See: Kriesi (1999), Mayer and Perrineau (1989: 345), Schain (1987: 239f.), Luther (2003), Henisch (2003).

<sup>13</sup> See van der Brug (2003), Husbands (1998), Lubbers et al. (2002).

<sup>14</sup> For recent empirical evidence for this last thesis, see van der Brug et al. (forthcoming).

systematic contextual variations. Note in particular that Austria, France, the Netherlands and Switzerland, but not Britain and Germany have experienced the forceful mobilization of a right-wing populist party. Our comparative analysis focuses on *national elections*. We consider these still to be the crucibles for the structuring of national political contexts.<sup>15</sup> We shall analyse three elections of the 1990s and early 2000s and, for each country, we add one electoral contest from the 1970s as a point of reference from a period before the national politics were undergoing the presumed restructuring effect of globalization. We include several elections of the nineties in our analysis, because we assume, in line with a renewed realignment-theory (Martin 2000), that a structural transformation of the national political context may occur across a series of critical elections over an extended period of time. For the analysis of the supply side of electoral competition, which will be the focus of our attention here, we assume that the macro-historical structural change linked to globalization is articulated by the issue-specific positions taken by the parties during the electoral campaigns and by the salience they attribute to the different issues. We also consider that the most appropriate way to analyze the positioning of parties and the way in which they deal with the new issues linked with globalization is to focus on the political debate during electoral campaigns, as reflected by the mass media. While we focus here only on the supply side of electoral competition, the restructuring of party systems involves changes in both parties' positions and voters' alignments. Beyond this paper, we seek in the broader framework of our research project to analyze both aspects jointly. To this end, we need to consider the content of the campaign as voters may receive it – hence our focus on the mass media. Furthermore, we consider both the saliency with which parties address certain issues and the positions (pro or contra) they take. While extensive research based on party manifestos has shown that parties tend to avoid direct confrontation and that they differ from each other mainly through the selective emphasis of their priorities (see Budge 2001 for a review), we also know that new issues usually do not have a valence character, and that direct confrontation – i.e. parties advocating diverging positions on political issues – is much more pronounced in the media and during electoral campaigns than in party programmes (Budge & Farlie 1983: 281). The voters, too, see the parties mainly in confrontational terms. Furthermore, if we want to relate the parties' preferences to those of the voters, we need to measure them in a comparable way. And, in most election studies, the voters' issue preferences are assessed in terms of position or direction, rather than in terms of their salience (Pellikaan et al. 2003).

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<sup>15</sup> National elections are more appropriate than European elections, as the latter are mostly second-order national elections (Van der Eijk & Franklin 1996).

The obvious disadvantage of this methodological choice is that we cannot rely on already existing data, but have to produce our own data. In order to identify the salience of the campaign issues for the various parties and their issue-specific positions we rely on a content analysis of the editorial part of major daily newspapers. For each country we chose a quality paper and a tabloid.<sup>16</sup> For each one of the four electoral campaigns that we analyze per country, all the articles related to the electoral contest or to politics in general have been selected in both newspapers for the last two months before Election Day. For the articles selected the headlines, the ‘lead’ and the first paragraph were coded *sentence by sentence* using a method developed by Kleinnijenhuis and his collaborators (see Kleinnijenhuis et al. 1997; Kleinnijenhuis & Pennings 2001). This method is designed to code every relationship between ‘political objects’ (i.e. either between two political actors or between a political actor and a political issue) appearing in the text. For the present purposes, we are only interested in relationships between political actors, on the one hand, and political issues on the other. Each sentence is reduced to its most basic structure (the so called ‘core sentence’) indicating only its subject (political actor) and its object (issue) as well as the direction of the relationship between the two. The direction is quantified using a scale ranging from -1 to +1 (with three intermediary positions).

*Political actors* were coded according to their party membership. For the present analysis, we have regrouped them into a limited number of categories or analyzed just the most important parties respectively, from three in Britain to eight in France. These parties or groups of parties are the following ones:

- Austria: Greens, Social-democrats (SPÖ), Liberals (Liberales Forum), Christian-Democrats (ÖVP), Populist right (FPÖ).
- Britain: Social-democrats (Labour), Liberals (Liberal Democrats), Conservatives.
- France: Radical Left (PCF, Trotskyist parties), Greens, Social-democrats (PSF), the MRG,<sup>17</sup> Conservatives (RPR), Liberals (UDF)<sup>18</sup>, Populist right (FN).
- Germany: Radical Left (PDS), Greens, Social-democrats (SPD), Liberals (FDP), Christian-democrats (CDU/CSU).

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<sup>16</sup> The selected newspapers were *Die Presse* and *Kronenzeitung* in Austria, *The Times* and *The Sun* in Britain, *Le Monde* and *Le Parisien* in France, *Süddeutsche Zeitung* and *Bild* in Germany, *NRC Handelsblad* and *Algemeen Dagblad* in the Netherlands, and *Neue Zürcher Zeitung* and *Blick* in Switzerland.

<sup>17</sup> It is difficult to classify the MRG (Mouvement des Radicaux de Gauche) into one of the major party families. It is rather left-of-centre and was one of the three ‘pillars’ of the left-wing opposition in the 1970s (with the PCF and the PSF). But it cannot simply be subsumed into the Social-Democratic party family.

<sup>18</sup> The UDF has both a liberal and a christian-democratic component.

- Netherlands: Greens, Social-democrats (PvdA), Christian-democrats (CDA), Liberals (D66, VVD), Populist right (LPF).
- Switzerland: Greens, Social-democrats (SP), Christian-democrats (CVP and other minor centre parties), Liberals (FDP and LPS), Populist right (SVP and small parties of the New Radical Right).

We cannot, however, consider all parties in all elections. As a matter of fact, some of them were not present during the whole period that we analyse. The *Lijst Pim Fortuyn*, for example, was only present in the 2002 Dutch election. Smaller parties must sometimes also be excluded, when we do not have enough information on their issue positions.<sup>19</sup>

For the *political issues*, we used a detailed coding schema, distinguishing between 200 or more categories (depending on the country). For the analysis, we have regrouped them into a limited number of broader categories. The regrouping into more encompassing categories is important for both theoretical and technical reasons. From a *theoretical* perspective, the specific issues raised during a campaign vary from one election to the other as a result of the policy attention cycle, which in turn depends on the development of the policy-making process in the various political subsystems of a given polity (see also van der Brug 1999, 2001). Issues may come up on the electoral agenda as a result of internal dynamics in certain political subsystems or as a result of external shocks – catastrophes (such as September 11 in 2001, the flood in Eastern Germany 2002, or the war in Kosovo in 1999) or economic crises. Although the specific issues raised during a given campaign are, therefore, somewhat unpredictable, they still refer to only a limited set of basic structural conflicts, which they articulate in variable ways. The theoretical challenge is to regroup the variable set of specific issues into a limited, but exhaustive set of basic categories capable of capturing the underlying dimensions of conflict. Technically, we also need a limited set of categories so as to have enough cases per category for all elections covered. It is important to keep in mind that the results of the analysis crucially depend on this seemingly technical operation of regrouping the issues. For our purposes, we propose the following 12 categories:

- *Welfare*: Expansion of the welfare state and defence against welfare state retrenchment. Tax reforms that have redistributive effects, employment programs, health care programs. Valence issues such as ‘against unemployment’ or ‘against recession’ were dropped if there was no specification of whether the goal was to be achieved by state intervention or by deregulation.
- *Budget*: Budgetary rigor, reduction of the state deficit, cut on expenditures, reduction of taxes that have no effects on redistribution.

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<sup>19</sup> In each election, we consider only parties for which at least thirty issue positions were coded.



- *Economic liberalism (ecolib)*: Support for deregulation, for more competition, and for privatisation. Opposition to market regulation, provided that the proposed measures do not have an impact on state expenditure – this is the distinguishing criterion from the Welfare-category. Opposition to economic protectionism in agriculture and other sectors.
- *Cultural liberalism (cultlib)*: Support for the goals of the new social movements, with the exception of the environmental movement: Peace, solidarity with the third world, gender equality, human rights. Support for cultural diversity, international cooperation (except for the European Union and Nato), support for the United Nations. Opposition to racism, support for the right to abortion and euthanasia. Opposition to patriotism, to calls for national solidarity, the defence of tradition and of national sovereignty, and to traditional moral values, support for a liberal drugs policy.
- *Europe*: Support for European integration – including enlargement – or for EU-membership in the cases of Switzerland and Austria.
- *Culture*: Support for education, culture, and scientific research.
- *Immigration*: Support for a tough immigration and integration policy, and for the restriction of the number of foreigners.
- *Army*: Support for the army (including Nato), for a strong national defence and for nuclear weapons.
- *Security*: Support for more law and order, fight against criminality and political corruption.
- *Environment (eco)*: support for environmental protection, opposition to atomic energy.
- *Institutional reform (iref)*: Support for various institutional reforms such as the extension of direct democratic rights, modifications in the structure of the political system, federalism and decentralization, calls for the efficiency of government and public administration, New Public Management.
- *Infrastructure (infra)*: Support for the improvement of the infrastructure (roads, railways, etc.).

The first three categories refer to the traditional *economic opposition between state and market*, i.e. to the class-based opposition between left and right. On this dimension, the left tends to defend the welfare state while the right tends to support economic liberalism and budgetary rigor.<sup>20</sup> More recently, Third Way approaches have come to blur the distinctions, as has the recognition on both sides of the traditional divide that structural

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<sup>20</sup> Economic protectionism is part of the economic liberalism category (with opposing sign), since there were only few core sentences defending this goal.

budgetary deficits cannot be sustained forever. The next six categories all refer to the *cultural dimension*. We first distinguish between three categories defending a universalistic, cosmopolitan point of view: support for cultural liberalism, European integration and education, culture and research. Next, we add three categories for the opposing point of view: support for a tough immigration policy, law and order and a strong army. A tough immigration policy is the closest we get to the notion of national protection. There are three additional categories – environmental protection, promotion of institutional reform and support for infrastructural projects. The second of these is somewhat heterogeneous, as it may relate to very different types of reforms. While environmental protection has come to be assimilated to the class-based left-right divide in some countries, we do not assume here a priori that it is part of this traditional divide. It is an empirical question how strongly ecological and economic concerns are associated.

All categories are formulated in such a way that they have a clear *direction*. For example, the relationship with the category ‘Europe’ of a party supporting the admission of Switzerland to the EU takes a positive value (+1). Or, if a party advocates an increase in the state’s expenditures, its relationship with the category ‘budget’ will be negative (-1). This kind of data offer valuable information on two central aspects of the supply side of electoral competition: the *positions* of political parties regarding the various political issues, and the *salience* of these issues for a given political party. The position of an actor on a category of issues is computed by averaging over all core sentences which contain a relationship between this actor and any of the issues belonging to this category.<sup>21</sup> The salience of a category of issues refers to the relative frequency with which a given political party takes a position on this category. It is important to understand that both aspects are relevant for an adequate description of the political space. Parties do not only differ from one another with respect to the positions they advocate, but also with respect to the priorities they set. It is also important to note that the salience of issues and parties can be computed in different ways. Here, party-issue relationships are weighted by the number of statements of a given party in a given campaign and by the relative importance of the corresponding issue category for the party in question. This means that, for a given campaign, large parties and key campaign issues determine the configuration of the political space more heavily than marginal parties or secondary issues. Each electoral campaign, however, is given the same weight, even if the amount of media coverage varies from one campaign to the other.

On the basis of these data, it is possible to construct a graphical representation of the positions of parties and issues in a low-dimensional space, using the method of Multi-

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<sup>21</sup> The positions of the parties on the different categories of issues and the corresponding saliences can be found in the appendix, in tables A1 to A12.

dimensional Scaling (MDS). MDS is a very flexible method that allows for the graphic representation of similarities or dissimilarities between pairs of objects (Borg & Groenen 1997; Cox & Cox 2001; Kruskal & Wish 1978)<sup>22</sup>. In our case, the issue positions of parties give us information on the ‘similarity’ or ‘distance’ between a group of parties and a group of issues. If a party from the Left, for example, strongly supports an expansion of the welfare state, we would expect the distance between this party and the category ‘welfare’ to be small. If we represent the parties and issues in a common space, this party and the category ‘welfare’ should be located close to each other. The unfolding technique, the MDS-procedure which we use here, indeed, allows for the joint representation of parties and issues in a common space<sup>23</sup>.

Furthermore, a variant of MDS, called Weighted Metric Multidimensional Scaling (WMMDS), allows to account simultaneously for the *similarities* between pairs of objects (parties and issues, in our case) and for the *salience* of these relationships.<sup>24</sup> This means that, when representing our data in a low-dimensional space, the distances corresponding to salient relationships between parties and issues will be more accurate than the less salient ones. Distortions of ‘real’ distances are unavoidable. But with WMMDS, these distortions will be smaller for more salient relationships, resulting in a more accurate representation of the relative positions of parties and issues.

Relying on MDS has an additional advantage which is crucial for our argument. With this method, we do not have to make any *a priori* assumption about the structure of the political space. Most analyses of parties’ positions start from theoretically defined dimensions (Gabel & Hix 2002; Hix 1999; Hooghe et al. 2002; Klingemann et al. 1994; Pellikaan et al. 2003; Pennings and Keman 2003; van der Eijk & Franklin 2004). Here, by contrast, we want to test our hypotheses regarding both the dimensionality of the political space and the nature of these dimensions. The structure of the political space that we estimate with MDS is not influenced by any assumption we could make on how the categories of issues should be related to one another.

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<sup>22</sup> Another method that has been used extensively to extract policy positions from manifesto data is factor analysis (Budge et al. 1987; Laver & Budge 1992; Cole 2005). However, as van der Brug (1999: 120) has argued, factor analysis is not a valid method to analyse this type of data (proximity data just as our own). Psychometricians have repeatedly demonstrated that the use of factor analysis on proximity data is prone to give deceptive results.

<sup>23</sup> Van de Brug (1999, 2001) uses another MDS-procedure that does not allow for the joint representation of parties and issues in a common space, which renders the interpretation of the results much more difficult.

<sup>24</sup> Weighted Metric Multidimensional Scaling can be estimated using the algorithm Proxscal, which is implemented in SPSS.

## RESULTS

Before examining the results of our MDS analyses, it is useful to present a few general observations regarding the major political actors in these six countries and the issues which have dominated the different electoral campaigns. Changes over time in the strength of the political parties do not necessarily result from a change in the cleavage structure. But as we have argued above, the *emergence of new players* on the electoral scene or a *radical transformation of some established parties* constitute first symptoms of the expected transformation of the cleavage structure. The emergence of Green parties during the 1980s is a trend that characterises all countries considered here – with the exception of Britain. In the most recent elections, Green parties received a share of vote ranging from five per cent in the Netherlands to ten per cent in Austria. They clearly do not belong to the major parties. But their influence on the structure of party systems may nevertheless be important. As they stand in direct competition with socialist parties, the latter may change their position on some issues in order not to lose part of their electorate.

While most countries are characterised by an important change on the left, not all countries have seen the emergence of important new actors of the populist right. As indicated above, among the countries considered here, there are four such cases: the *Front National* (FN) in France and the *Lijst Pim Fortuyn* (LPF) in the Netherlands, the *Swiss People's Party* (SVP) and the *Austrian Freedom Party* (FPÖ). The FN is probably the most successful new party of the populist right. While its leader, Jean-Marie Le Pen was already a candidate in the 1974 presidential election, the FN became an important force in French politics only in the 1980s. He received about 15 per cent of votes in the first round of the 1988 and 1995 elections. And in 2002, he even succeeded in beating the socialist Jospin and getting into the second round of the election. While the FN is clearly authoritarian on cultural issues, its profile on economic issues is less clear-cut. It is rather favourable to economic liberalism, but it also defends the welfare state – though immigrants should be excluded from its benefits.

The Swiss SVP and the Austrian FPÖ are both transformed former mainstream parties – the SVP previously a conservative party, the FPÖ previously a liberal-conservative one. Both changed their profile radically, putting a much stronger emphasis on cultural issues. This change brought them remarkable electoral success. While the FPÖ's share of the vote in national elections was only about five to six per cent in the 1970s and early 1980s, it increased up to 27 per cent in the 1999 election, as large a share as that of the Christian-Democratic ÖVP, and close to the result of the Social-democrats (33 per cent). This success, however, was followed by a downturn in the


2002 election, when Jörg Haider's party<sup>25</sup> only received 10 per cent of the vote. In Switzerland, the success of the SVP has been just as impressive: traditionally the smallest of the four governing parties, with no more than 12 per cent of votes in the 1970s and 1980s, it has continuously increased its share of the vote throughout the 1990s. In the 2003 election of the National Council, it even became the first party, with almost 27 per cent of the votes.

In Britain and Germany, changes on the right-hand side of the political spectrum were less pronounced. Recently, parties of the radical or populist right have had some success in German regional and local elections, but they are not, for the moment at least, represented in the Bundestag. In the United Kingdom, right-wing populist or nationalist parties, like the British National Party, remain marginal.

We can also look for symptoms of the new cleavage by considering the *salience* of different categories of issues. As we explained above, three of our twelve issue categories correspond to the traditional left-right divide, while six are characteristic of the cultural divide. In *Figure 2*, we present the development of the salience of these two groups of issues. The figure shows a general trend: over the last decades, economic issues have lost in salience in all countries except Germany. In the 1970s, they were more important than cultural issues in Austria, Britain, and in France, while they were of roughly the same importance in Germany, Switzerland, and the Netherlands. By the year 2000, France remains the only case where economic issues still are clearly dominant. This points to the expected increase in importance of the new cultural dimension. The German exception conforms to expectations insofar as right-wing populist parties did not have any electoral success in this country. The British result is unexpected, however: in Great Britain, the cultural dimension became more important, *although* right-wing populist parties did not have any electoral success. This can be explained by the fact that the British Conservative Party has been among the most nationalist in Europe and was deeply divided on the issue of European integration since the 1990s.

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<sup>25</sup> Jörg Haider stepped down as party leader in 2000 but he is still its most prominent exponent.

**Figure 2:** Saliency of economic and cultural issues

We are, of course, mainly interested in the *configuration of the partisan space* and in its transformation from the seventies to the end of the nineties. Accordingly, we have performed two MDS analyses for each country – one for the election of the 1970s and another one for the three most recent ballots. The number of ‘objects’ to be positioned varies between these elections, since we have excluded from the analysis categories with a low degree of salience. Moreover, as we have already indicated, we consider only parties or groups of parties for whom we have a minimum number of observations.<sup>26</sup> To allow us to capture changes in the parties’ positions, we have computed the distances between parties and issues separately for each election. The resulting configurations are presented in *Figures 3 to 8*.

The configurations resulting from an MDS analysis can only be interpreted with respect to the distances between the objects. The orientation of a configuration is arbitrary, which implies that it can be freely rotated. To facilitate the comparison of these configurations, we have rotated them in such a way that the issues ‘welfare’ and ‘economic liberalism’ lie on a horizontal line, with ‘welfare’ and ‘economic liberalism’ positioned on the left and on the right respectively. We have also drawn two orthogonal axes, which cross at the mid-point of the interval separating ‘welfare’ from ‘economic liberalism’. These axes are not a product of the WMMDS analysis itself; they were simply added to facilitate the interpretation of the results. The configurations were also rescaled so that the range of distances between parties and issues is similar to the range of the original distances.<sup>27</sup> Finally, we have also connected the points of the three major


<sup>26</sup> In each election, we have included only parties with at least 30 observations. The only exception to this rule is the case of the Liberal Democrats. As it is an important party, we have included it in all elections – even if we had less than 30 observations in 2001. Categories of issues with less than three per cent of observations in one analysis were also disregarded.

<sup>27</sup> The rescaling procedure is necessary, because the absolute values of the original distances are transformed when

parties in each election. On the basis of these triangles, it is easier to follow the evolution of the parties' positions.

In each case, we found a *two-dimensional solution* to be appropriate. On the horizontal dimension, in all six countries, there is a sharp opposition between support for the welfare state and support for economic liberalism. The distance between the two corresponding points is often among the largest ones. This indicates that, in all the countries compared, the traditional economic conflict remains very salient. The vertical dimension can be interpreted as a cultural opposition in each and every country. The nature of this opposition varies slightly between countries, but by the 1990s, the cultural conflict is typically expressed by the strong opposition between support for cultural liberalism, on the one hand, and support for a more restrictive immigration policy, on the other. While the political space of these six countries was already characterized by the two dimensions in the 1970s, we should note that the cultural dimension was, in part at least, based on different issues. We shall see how the national configurations have been transformed by considering them in more detail.

**Figure 3: Germany**



performing a *weighted* MDS. This procedure does not affect the relative distances between the points in a given configuration, but it makes possible a comparison of the absolute distances between two configurations. The re-scaling was performed by setting the weighted average distance between parties and issues in the final configuration equal to the same average in the original data (with distances being weighted by their corresponding salience).

Figure 4: Austria




Figure 5: Switzerland




Figure 6: Netherlands






Figure 7: France





Figure 8: Britain



We start by examining the case of *Germany* (Figure 3). The two-dimensional structure is clearly visible, both in 1976 and in the 1990s. In the seventies, the cultural dimension is marked by the strong opposition between support for cultural liberalism, on the one hand, and support for a strong army and a restrictive budgetary policy, on the other. The poles of this vertical dimension are almost equidistant to ‘welfare’ and ‘economic liberalism’. This shows that the two main conflicts that structure the political space were hardly related to each other. The three main parties – Social-Democrats, Liberals, and Christian-Democrats – take distinct positions that form a triangular structure as has already been pointed out by Pappi (1984). The SPD is located in the upper left-hand corner, supporting cultural liberalism and defending the welfare state rather than economic

liberalism. The SPD also favours environmental protection but opposes budgetary rigor and a reinforcement of the army. The FDP, in turn, supports both cultural and economic liberalism, but is more distant from environmental protection. The CDU/CSU, finally, is also closer to economic liberalism than to a strong welfare state. It distinguishes itself from the other parties, however, with respect to cultural liberalism. The Union parties represent the conservative pole of the cultural dimension.

In the more recent elections, we find that the political space is structured by the same two dimensions. In line with our expectations, however, the character of the cultural dimension has changed. Immigration has now become a salient issue, and it is the one most distant from cultural liberalism. Support for the army, for budgetary rigor, culture and environmental protection, have become more consensual issues, which is reflected in their more central location in the configuration. Although the CDU/CSU has changed its position several times, it still occupies the same place, while the FDP and especially the SPD have moved to a more centrally located position by the nineties. They have above all moderated their position on the cultural dimension. As a consequence, the distances between the three main parties have become smaller. As suggested by the convergence hypothesis (see references in note 12), the convergence of the major parties has been compensated by the emergence of new parties. The Greens and the PDS are located in the upper left corner – close to the former location of the Social-Democrats. They defend the welfare state, favour cultural liberalism, and are very distant from a restrictive immigration policy. No new right-wing populist party has succeeded in establishing itself as a competitor of the CDU/CSU, however, although the potential for such a party exists, as the temporary successes of the radical right in regional elections indicate. Ignazi (2003: 82) concludes that the radical populist right has failed in Germany so far, ‘because of lack of legitimacy, linkage to the past, and inner structural weakness.’ One might add the repositioning of the CDU/CSU as one more explanatory factor: although it has not decisively changed its overall position, in the course of the nineties, together with its main competitors, the CDU/CSU moved further away from cultural liberalism and closer to a tough stance on immigration.

The configuration of the *Austrian* political space is quite similar to the German case (*Figure 4*). In 1975, the cultural dimension is marked by the opposition between support for culture and cultural liberalism, on the one hand, and budgetary rigor, on the other.<sup>28</sup> We also notice, quite surprisingly, that environmental protection is closely associated with the FPÖ. This was, however, a low-key issue that was salient only in the campaign of the FPÖ. As far as the configuration of parties is concerned, we first notice that all three are quite distant from economic liberalism. Even the two mainstream parties of the

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<sup>28</sup> In Austria, the army did not constitute a salient issue and was excluded from the analysis.

right are supportive of the welfare state. They have different profiles, however, with respect to the cultural dimension. Already at that time, the FPÖ strongly opposed cultural liberalism, while the ÖVP took a more moderate position, closer to that of the Social-Democrats.

Between the 1970s and the 1990s, the structure of the political space has changed in a way similar to what we observed for Germany. ‘Cultural liberalism’ still forms one pole of the integration-demarcation divide, but it is now most distant from the new issue of ‘immigration’. The transformation of the FPÖ into a right-wing populist party is most clearly expressed in the transformation of the meaning of the cultural dimension and in a general move of the party triangle in a more protectionist direction. With regard to the economic dimension, the ÖVP has taken a more central position and is now much closer to economic liberalism than the Freedom Party. Surprisingly, the FPÖ’s position is quite removed from Kitschelt’s ‘winning formula.’ From a liberal-conservative position in the early nineties, it has, in fact, moved to a protectionist position on both dimensions. Like in Germany, the change in the position of the Social-Democrats has been accompanied by the emergence of a Green party, who has a somewhat more left-libertarian profile than the SPÖ. Finally, the transformation of the FPÖ so far has prevented the emergence of new right-wing populist challengers.

In *Switzerland*, we again find a two-dimensional structure in the 1970s (*Figure 5*). ‘Welfare’ and ‘economic liberalism’ are the poles of the economic dimension, while the opposition between ‘cultural liberalism’ and support for the army constitutes the cultural axis. Contrary to the previous cases, however, we already notice some signs of an integration of these two axes, since ‘cultural liberalism’ and ‘welfare state’ can be found at almost the same location. The Social-democrats (SP) and the Christian-democrats (CVP) are close to this left-liberal pole, in opposition to the Liberals and the Conservatives (SVP). Like in Austria, none of the four major parties fully endorses economic liberalism. This issue takes a peripheral position in the political space.

Between the 1970s and the 1990s, the structure of the Swiss political space and the parties’ positions have changed more radically than in the two countries considered previously. The economic opposition is still present, although it has become somewhat less salient, as is indicated by the smaller distance between its two poles. Most important in this respect, however, is the sharp change in the position of liberal and conservative parties. Their positions are now very close to economic liberalism. Their shift has led to a stronger polarisation of the Swiss political space. As far as the cultural dimension is concerned, ‘cultural liberalism’ and ‘welfare state’ are still close to each other, but a new opposition has emerged between European integration and a restrictive immigration policy. The transformed cultural dimension remains partially integrated into the traditional left-right divide, which provides a nice illustration of the latter’s integrative

capacity: on the one side, the parties most favourable to European integration – SP and CVP – are at the same time closer to the welfare state than to economic liberalism. On the opposite side, the Swiss People’s Party and the smaller parties of the radical right defend both an economic liberalism and a more restrictive immigration policy. Contrary to the FPÖ, the SVP seems to follow Kitschelt’s ‘winning formula.’ This strategy has devastated the radical right challengers in Switzerland, as predicted by the polarization hypothesis (see references in note 12). In addition, it has allowed the SVP to grow at the detriment of its mainstream competitors on the right. While the major Swiss parties are aligned along this left-integrative vs. right-conservative axis, the Greens take a distinct position, in the lower-left hand corner. They are closer to the defence of the welfare state than to economic liberalism. But at the same time, they distance themselves from both European integration and a restrictive immigration policy.

The case of *the Netherlands* shares many similarities with Switzerland (*Figure 6*). Here too, the economic and cultural dimensions are already partly integrated in the 1970s. Support for cultural liberalism and for the welfare state are quite closely related and both opposed to economic liberalism, on the economic dimension, and to the army, on the cultural one. With five parties, the party system is more fragmented, but we can still identify three poles. The Social-Democrats, along with the Greens and D66, take a left-liberal position. The Christian-Democrats, similarly to their Swiss or Austrian counterparts, are also in favour of a strong welfare state and take a moderately liberal position on the cultural axis. The VVD, finally, differs from the latter by its more liberal orientation on economic issues.

By the nineties, a clear transformation of the cultural dimension has taken place. It now opposes ‘European integration’ and ‘cultural liberalism’ to support for a restrictive immigration policy. In this respect, the Dutch transformation resembles the Swiss one. Furthermore, as in the Swiss case, the two dimensions are more integrated than in Germany or Austria. ‘Cultural liberalism’ is still close to ‘welfare’, and the issue of immigration is much more distant from ‘welfare’ than from ‘economic liberalism’. In the Netherlands, however, the most impressive changes regard the positions of the parties. The major parties were aligned along a Europe vs. immigration axis in 1994, with the PvdA and the Greens forming the left-integrationist pole. Over the following years, however, the parties on the left and, to a lesser extent, the Christian-Democrats, have radically changed their position. They have become more distant from European integration and from cultural liberalism. Such a change is characteristic not only of the PvdA, but also of the Greens and of D66. In 2002, these left parties are still closer to the welfare state than to economic liberalism. But at the same time, they oppose both a restrictive immigration policy and European integration. As a matter of fact, their new position shares many similarities with that of the Greens in Switzerland. 2002, of

course, is also the first election in which the List Pim Fortuyn (LPF) has made its entry into Dutch politics. The LPF takes a rather undifferentiated position on the economic divide. By contrast, it clearly favours a demarcation strategy with respect to the new cultural conflict, although it has a more differentiated view on immigration than the other right-wing populist parties. It is the party located at the greatest distance from European integration and from cultural liberalism. Contrary to the Swiss case, however, the emergence of the LPF has not led to a polarisation of the political space, but to a more extreme version of the German development: the established parties have all moved towards each other and in the direction of the LPF, a development which neither the convergence, nor the polarization hypothesis is able to predict, but which is in line with our expectation that the emergence of a populist party on the right gives rise to a move of the center of gravity of the party system in the direction of cultural demarcation/protectionism. Note, however, that this move began well before the emergence of the LPF and that convergence has gone well beyond what one might have expected.

The *French* political space of 1978 also shows some signs of an integration of the economic and cultural divides (*Figure 7*). Like in Switzerland and in the Netherlands, support for cultural liberalism is much closer to the support of the welfare state than to economic liberalism. Similarly, in the seventies, all the political parties are also quite distant from economic liberalism. At one end of the political spectrum, the Socialist party supports the welfare state and cultural liberalism. At the other extreme, the Gaullists are quite strongly opposed to cultural liberalism, while taking an intermediary position on the economic dimension. The transformation of the political space has followed the pattern we already know from the other countries. The cultural dimension now opposes cultural liberalism and support for European integration, on the one side, and support for a more restrictive immigration policy, on the other. The French configuration is different from other countries to the extent that European integration and cultural liberalism are more consensual among the mainstream parties. With the emergence of the Front National, the structure of the party system is becoming increasingly tripolar, as has already been observed by Grunberg and Schweisguth (1997a, 1997b, 2003). The Socialists have moved toward the centre – but less markedly than the German SPD. They remain strong supporters of the welfare state and of cultural liberalism. The RPR, by contrast, has changed its position more substantially. It has moved closer to the integrationist pole of the cultural divide and now occupies a position which can hardly be distinguished from that of the UDF – a result that is not surprising, given the close collaboration of the two forces in the UMP. The two partners – RPR and UDF – differ from the Socialists on the economic dimension and from the FN on the cultural one. The FN has a clear anti-immigration profile. On the economic dimension, it is somewhat closer to economic liberalism than to the welfare state. By French standards, this

makes it the most economically liberal party, suggesting that it also tends to opt for Kitschelt's 'winning formula.'

Turning, finally, to *Britain*, we observe a low level of polarisation in 1974 (February) (*Figure 8*). The three parties are very closely located to one another. Their positions are rather undifferentiated, especially with respect to economic issues: all three are strong supporters of the welfare state. As far as issues of the cultural dimension are concerned, there is some opposition between the Labour and the Conservatives – the former defending cultural liberalism and the latter supporting law and order. Surprisingly, environmental protection and European integration are both located at the periphery of the political space. Both issues are not integrated in a more general division. As a matter of fact, they are strongly rejected by all three parties. The amorphous structure of the British political space of the early seventies has become more clear-cut in the 1990s and early 2000s. Support for environmental protection is now integrated in the major left-right division and Europe forms one of the poles of the cultural dimension, along with cultural liberalism and institutional reforms. Contrary to the other countries, however, the salience of the immigration question remains very low in British electoral contests and we could not include it in the analysis<sup>29</sup>. As far as the positioning of the parties in the transformed space is concerned, compared to the early seventies, it has become more polarized by the early nineties. But the polarization has been of only a temporary nature. By the elections of 1997, Third Way politics have moved the Labour party to the middle ground on the economic dimension, where it stayed in 2001. On the cultural dimension, the Conservatives are strongly opposed to cultural liberalism and especially to European integration, while Labour and the Liberal Democrats take a more integrationist position. But the Liberal Democrats have moved towards the Conservatives since 1992, while Labour took a more resolute profile in favour of cultural liberalism in the 2001 election. Finally, no challenger worth mentioning has made its entry into the British party space.

## **DISCUSSION**

Taken together, these analyses allow us to identify several common features of the structure of the national political space in the six countries. The first one is its *two-dimensionality*. In all countries considered here, we can identify an economic and a cultural dimension, both in the 1970s and in the more recent elections. These two dimensions are in some cases partially integrated – like in Switzerland, in the Netherlands or in France – but they never coincide. On the one hand, it is thus necessary to go beyond a simple description of the political space in terms of a one-dimensional left-right divide. This contradicts those observers who maintain that European party systems are on their

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<sup>29</sup> This is likely to change for the 2005 elections, however.

way to bipolarity (e.g. Bale 2003; for Austria in particular, Müller & Fallend 2004). In line with the results of Hooghe et al. (2002) and those of Gabel and Hix (2002), it also contradicts the ‘regulation model,’ which argues that issues linked with European Integration are fully integrated into the traditional left-right dimension (Marks & Steenbergen 2002). On the other hand, the new cleavage did not lead to the emergence of any additional dimension. Rather than constituting an additional dimension, the new conflicts were integrated into the existing two-dimensional structure. This is strong support for our embedding hypothesis and contradicts observers who maintain that West European policy spaces are characterized by the existence of three dimensions (Warwick 2002). The present analysis confirms an earlier MDS-analysis of the Flemish political space at the time of the 1991 Belgian national elections which also resulted in a two-dimensional structure with substantively quite similar dimensions (Swyngedouw 1995). Our results also bear some resemblance to those based on factor analyses of party manifestos. Thus, Budge et al. (1987) and Cole (2005) also argue that a two-dimensional structure is most appropriate to describe the political space of a considerable number of countries. However, our results support this hypothesis much more strongly: Budge and his co-authors, as well as Cole, actually obtained more than two factors and arbitrarily limited their analysis to two. By contrast, our analysis only yields two dimensions. Moreover, factor analyses of party manifestos usually require additional assumptions in order to avoid problems related to the small number of observations. Thus, Budge et al. (1987) must assume that the dimensions of the political space have remained unchanged during the period they cover (ca. 1945-1980), while Cole (2005) must assume that the structure of the political space is identical in the four countries she analyzes (Austria, France, Germany, Italia). The variations over time and between countries in our results show that both of these assumptions are problematic<sup>30</sup>.

A second important similarity of these national political spaces concerns the *transformation of the cultural dimension*. In the 1970s, this dimension was dominated by issues linked to cultural liberalism. The parties’ positions with respect to the army were also structured along this dimension. Over the following decades, new issues have been integrated into the cultural dimension. The most important of these is immigration. This theme was absent from the debate in the 1970s. Since then, however, it has become a salient and much polarising issue. In Switzerland, Britain, and the Netherlands, the question of European integration now also characterises this second dimension. In spite of a rather high level of euroscepticism it does not do so in Austria, because Europe was not an important issue in the observed elections. On the other hand, some older issues

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<sup>30</sup> Van de Brug (1999, 2001) similarly criticizes these assumptions, which do not allow for the possibility that the relevant issues and the dimensions of the space vary from one election and from one country to the other.

have now been integrated into the traditional economic left-right divide. This is especially the case for environmental protection in all countries except Germany. Like in the 1970s, party competition is basically structured by an economic and a cultural dimension. However, the character of the two dimension has changed. The transformation of the cultural dimension in particular is strong evidence for the structuring capacity of the purported new integration/demarcation cleavage.

Third, the distinction between the two dimensions of the political space is all the more important as the positions of parties usually vary as strongly with respect to the cultural issues as with respect to the economic ones. Both dimensions are polarising. Furthermore, the *cultural dimension* has been gaining in importance as it has become the primary basis on which new parties or transformed established parties seek to mobilise their electorate. As it turns out, parties of the populist right do not stand out for their economic profile. It is on cultural issues, where they support a demarcation strategy much more strongly than (untransformed) mainstream parties. Similarly, on the left, the Social-Democrats and the Greens both defend the welfare state, while they have different positions on cultural issues. In Germany, Austria and the Netherlands, the Greens still strongly favour cultural liberalism, while the Social-Democrats have moderated their position on these issues. As already observed, Hooghe and Marks (2004) and Diez Medrano (2004), who analyze the attitudes of Europeans with regard to European integration similarly come to the conclusion that these attitudes primarily depend on identitarian characteristics and not on economic interests as has been maintained by the relevant literature so far.

The common features of the transformation of the national political space in the six countries mainly concern the basic structure of the space. Within the basic structural framework, the *configurations of the main parties* have, except for France, been tripolar already back in the seventies. They remain or have become more or less *tripolar* in all six countries in the course of the nineties. The populist right constitutes a new third pole in France. In all the other countries, the three poles are still being defined by the parties who have traditionally represented the three most important political camps – the Social-democrats, the Liberals and the Conservatives (or Christian-Democrats), although in Austria and Switzerland one of these parties has definitely changed its character and has become the equivalent of the FN in France. In the Netherlands, the LPF has temporarily constituted the third pole, but its precipitous decline resuscitated the traditional triangle whose poles may, as a result of this decline, move apart again. In Germany and in Britain, the traditional Conservative pole has not (yet) met with any serious challenge and still represents the unreconstructed third pole. The basic tripolar configuration of the party systems is an additional indication that we need two dimensions to account for their structuring.



Beyond this important common feature of tripolarity, the configurations of the six party systems present also diverging developments – as a result of the variable *contextual conditions*. We have not presented any explicit hypotheses concerning these diverging developments, but we can indicate some factors that are likely to account for them. For example, some of the emerging differences can be traced to the *electoral rules* and to the overall *institutional framework*. Thus, it is not surprising to observe that new parties, on the left or on the right, have been more successful in countries with proportional elections. Britain, one of the prime examples of a majoritarian democracy, has not seen the emergence of any significant green or right-wing populist party. While France is also a majoritarian democracy, the populist right and other possible outsiders play an important role in presidential campaigns. This may be explained by the fact that in the first round votes tend to be cast almost as in a PR system. Moreover, regional, local and European elections in France follow the rules of PR, which allows a party to become important, even if its chances at the national level are limited by a majoritarian system. Among the more consensual democracies, new parties on the left and on the radical right as well as transformed mainstream parties have had more success. Germany is the only case of a rather consensual democracy where no stable new national party has emerged on the right of the political spectrum.

While we acknowledge the impact of the institutional context, we believe that most of the emerging country-specific differences are attributable to the *strategies* which the mainstream parties adopt in the face of the challenges linked to the hypothetical new structural conflict between losers and winners of the opening up of the national borders, and to the *characteristics of the new challengers themselves*. Contrary to the basic structure of the space, these strategies are not generally predictable, but depend on the decisions taken by political actors. It is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss the related differences in detail for each country. Suffice it to observe that the two pairs of strategies which we have theoretically distinguished – convergence vs. polarization and stigmatization vs. cooperation – have all been applied in various combinations and with variable success by some parties in our countries at some point in time. In addition, we have also come across an unexpected pattern of reaction – the joint convergence of the three Dutch mainstream parties towards the position adopted by the new challenger –, which indicates that the distinction between convergence vs. polarization that has dominated the literature does not exhaust the strategic possibilities of established parties when they are faced with a new challenger.

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## APPENDIX

**Table A1:** Issue positions of Austrian parties in the four campaigns: average direction of the coded sentences for the twelve categories of issues

	welfare	eco lib.	budget	cult. lib.	europe	culture	immig.	army	security	env.	instit. ref.	infra
<i>gr</i>												
1994	0.00	-1.00	0.60	1.00	1.00	1.00	-0.11		1.00	1.00	-0.14	
1999	0.23	-0.25	1.00	0.47		1.00	-0.60	0.00	-0.60	0.92	1.00	1.00
2002	0.53	-0.13	0.00	0.53	0.56	0.42	-1.00	-0.81	0.00	1.00	0.00	-0.20
<i>spö</i>												
1975	0.59	-0.30	-0.40	0.91		0.69			0.81	0.00	0.29	0.90
1994	0.86	-0.15	0.46	0.65	0.80	0.75	0.66	-0.32	0.87	1.00	0.29	1.00
1999	0.57	0.26	0.89	0.44	1.00	0.71	-0.25	-0.74	0.50	0.76	0.74	0.73
2002	0.69	-0.58	0.67	0.48	0.29	0.64	-1.00	-0.93		0.89	0.74	0.82
<i>lif</i>												
1994	1.00	0.86		0.83	1.00	1.00	0.00	-1.00	1.00		-0.45	
1999	0.09	0.83	1.00	0.60	1.00	0.83		0.57	-1.00	1.00	0.40	1.00
<i>övp</i>												
1975	0.89	-0.37	0.50	0.50		0.14			1.00	1.00	0.37	0.80
1994	-0.34	0.43	0.88	0.21	0.94	0.26	-0.14	-0.14	0.65	0.00	0.34	1.00
1999	0.15	-0.04	1.00	-0.51	0.61	0.73		-0.28	1.00	0.47	0.70	
2002	0.14	0.14	0.83	0.34	0.50	0.68	0.38	0.30	0.67	0.73	0.18	0.00
<i>fpö</i>												
1975	-0.71	-0.17	0.73	-1.00		-1.00			1.00	1.00	0.82	1.00
1994	-0.20	-0.13	0.50	0.25	0.00	0.50	0.67	0.00	1.00	0.50	0.54	
1999	-0.23	-0.05	0.56	-0.55	-0.13	1.00	0.60	0.38	1.00	1.00	0.70	1.00
2002	0.38	-0.50	1.00	-0.83	0.20	-1.00	1.00	0.29	-1.00	1.00	0.35	0.54

**Table A2:** Issue salience for Austrian parties in the four campaigns: frequency (in %) with which a party addressed issues of a given category during each campaign and number of observations for each party (N and percentage of the corresponding election).

	welfare	eco lib.	budget	cult. lib.	europe	culture	immig.	army	security	env.	instit. ref.	infra	N	% of election
<i>gr</i>														
1994	3.92	1.96	9.80	3.92	1.96	13.73	17.65	0.00	13.73	19.61	13.73	0.00	51	6.31
1999	15.66	14.46	2.41	22.89	0.00	7.23	6.02	7.23	6.02	14.46	2.41	1.20	83	7.55
2002	10.76	2.53	1.27	10.76	5.70	8.23	4.43	11.39	1.90	26.58	10.13	6.33	158	15.98
<i>spö</i>														
1975	12.83	12.54	8.75	6.41		15.16			6.12	4.08	9.91	24.20	343	53.59
1994	10.45	12.24	7.76	17.61	5.97	7.16	5.67	4.18	15.82	0.60	5.67	6.87	335	41.46
1999	13.91	16.27	4.72	10.76	1.05	6.30	1.05	9.45	8.40	8.92	13.91	5.25	381	34.64
2002	25.93	7.04	8.89	8.52	2.59	10.37	1.48	10.00	0.00	14.07	7.04	4.07	270	27.30
<i>lif</i>														
1994	2.22	31.11	0.00	26.67	4.44	2.22	4.44	2.22	2.22	0.00	24.44	0.00	45	5.57
1999	23.71	23.71	9.28	5.15	3.09	12.37	0.00	7.22	1.03	3.09	10.31	1.03	97	8.82
<i>övp</i>														
1975	17.54	22.37	11.40	4.39		20.18			1.75	0.44	15.35	6.58	228	35.63
1994	17.32	17.65	5.56	12.42	5.56	6.21	2.29	6.86	12.09	0.33	11.44	2.29	306	37.87
1999	21.82	6.91	5.80	19.61	4.97	11.05	0.00	16.02	2.76	4.14	6.91	0.00	362	32.91
2002	20.36	8.40	10.43	7.38	10.69	7.12	10.69	7.12	1.53	11.45	4.33	0.51	393	39.74
<i>fpö</i>														
1975	10.14	17.39	21.74	1.45		7.25			7.25	13.04	15.94	5.80	69	10.78
1994	14.08	11.27	5.63	2.82	1.41	2.82	8.45	2.82	9.86	2.82	38.03	0.00	71	8.79
1999	16.95	11.86	5.08	11.30	2.26	5.65	11.86	9.04	6.21	1.69	15.25	2.82	177	16.09
2002	23.21	8.33	3.57	7.14	13.69	0.60	4.17	12.50	0.60	12.50	5.95	7.74	168	16.99

**Table A3:** Issue positions of Swiss parties in the four campaigns: average direction of the coded sentences for the twelve categories of issues

	welfare	eco lib.	budget	cult. lib.	europe	culture	immig.	army	security	env.	instit. ref.	infra
<i>gr</i>												
1991	0.83	-0.33	-1.00	0.63	-0.81	1.00	-1.00	-0.73		0.85	0.50	-0.84
1995		-0.33		0.00	-0.50		-1.00	-1.00		0.65	-0.75	-1.00
<i>sp</i>												
1975	0.77	-0.71	1.00	0.71		1.00		0.50	-1.00	0.83	0.32	
1991	0.74	-0.20	-0.09	0.69	0.76	-0.20	-0.41	-0.75		0.81	0.11	-0.20
1995	0.89	0.14	0.20	0.52	0.56	1.00	0.00	-0.15		0.95	-0.55	0.08
1999	0.83	-0.25		1.00	1.00	0.73	-0.78			0.58	-0.33	0.83
<i>cvp</i>												
1975	0.88	-0.22	1.00	0.78		1.00		0.25	0.25	1.00	0.41	
1991	0.67	0.20	0.14	0.11	0.55	0.33	-0.14	-0.40		0.62	0.58	0.67
1995	0.33	0.53	1.00	-0.25	0.33	1.00	-0.33	0.50		0.70	0.46	0.24
1999	1.00	-0.22	0.56	0.84	1.00	0.94	0.64	-1.00		0.57	-1.00	1.00
<i>lib</i>												
1975	0.26	0.00	0.78	0.47		0.64		0.50	0.88	-0.11	0.22	
1991	0.47	0.87	0.55	0.37	0.43	-1.00	0.67	0.76		0.74	0.59	0.60
1995	-0.56	0.93	0.93	0.09	0.44	1.00	0.14	0.75		0.50	0.21	1.00
1999	0.25	0.85	0.96	0.80	1.00	0.39	0.56	0.00		0.00	0.60	0.91
<i>svp</i>												
1975	-0.25	-0.40	1.00	0.41		1.00		1.00	1.00	0.63	0.09	
1991	-0.32	0.23	0.71	-0.18	-0.82	-0.50	0.71	0.75		-0.10	0.20	-0.10
1995	0.19	0.71	0.94	-0.87	-0.86	-0.50	0.83	0.88		0.92	0.46	-0.60
1999	-0.80	0.79	1.00	-0.26	-0.91	-0.60	0.69	1.00		0.00	0.83	1.00
<i>rr</i>												
1975	0.27	-1.00	1.00	-0.03		1.00		1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	
1991	-0.50	1.00	0.75	-0.58	-1.00		0.93	0.56		-0.18	1.00	0.33
1995	-1.00	1.00	1.00	-0.25	-1.00	0.00	0.91	1.00		-1.00	0.60	-0.67

**Table A4:** Issue salience for Swiss parties in the four campaigns: frequency (in %) with which a party addressed issues of a given category during each campaign and number of observations for each party (N and percentage of the corresponding election).

	welfare	eco lib.	budget	cult. lib.	europe	culture	immig.	army	security	env.	instit. ref.	infra	N	% of election
<i>gr</i>														
1991	3.35	1.68	1.12	8.94	30.17	2.79	2.79	6.15		18.44	3.35	21.23	179	13.33
1995	0.00	7.69	0.00	20.51	10.26	0.00	2.56	2.56		43.59	5.13	7.69	39	3.92
<i>sp</i>														
1975	19.13	12.17	7.83	25.22		3.48		9.57	2.61	5.22	14.78		115	18.91
1991	13.31	8.06	12.90	18.15	9.27	2.02	6.85	8.87		12.90	3.63	4.03	248	18.47
1995	20.11	15.22	2.72	17.93	4.89	0.54	1.09	7.07		11.96	11.96	6.52	184	18.49
1999	13.64	9.09	0.00	10.61	3.03	22.73	13.64	0.00		9.09	9.09	9.09	66	8.96
<i>cvp</i>														
1975	14.41	8.11	9.01	28.83		5.41		3.60	7.21	3.60	19.82		111	18.26
1991	10.76	3.98	2.79	19.92	15.54	1.20	8.37	3.98		23.51	5.18	4.78	251	18.69
1995	9.55	12.10	17.83	10.19	1.91	1.91	3.82	1.27		21.02	8.28	12.10	157	15.78
1999	7.86	12.86	11.43	17.86	2.86	18.57	5.00	2.86		10.71	2.14	7.86	140	19.00
<i>lib</i>														
1975	18.58	25.22	7.96	8.41		4.87		7.08	7.52	3.98	16.37		226	37.17
1991	11.11	12.82	9.40	13.96	11.68	0.28	6.55	4.84		15.10	11.40	2.85	351	26.14
1995	7.38	24.59	8.61	13.11	11.07	5.33	5.74	3.28		1.64	11.89	7.38	244	24.52
1999	6.72	21.43	19.33	4.20	2.52	17.23	13.03	0.84		3.36	2.10	9.24	238	32.29
<i>svp</i>														
1975	8.89	11.11	8.89	24.44		4.44		8.89	12.22	8.89	12.22		90	14.80
1991	12.50	11.00	3.50	17.00	11.00	2.00	20.50	5.00		12.50	2.50	2.50	200	14.89
1995	6.19	2.41	12.37	10.65	45.70	0.69	4.12	5.84		2.06	8.25	1.72	291	29.25
1999	3.41	6.48	22.87	6.48	7.51	8.19	29.01	7.51		2.05	3.07	3.41	293	39.76
<i>rr</i>														
1975	16.67	4.55	1.52	48.48		6.06		7.58	3.03	3.03	9.09		66	10.86
1991	1.75	4.39	7.02	16.67	9.65	0.00	23.68	7.02		19.30	5.26	5.26	114	8.49
1995	6.25	5.00	10.00	10.00	10.00	1.25	27.50	6.25		3.75	12.50	7.50	80	8.04

**Table A5:** Issue positions of German parties in the four campaigns: average direction of the coded sentences for the twelve categories of issues

	welfare	eco lib.	budget	cult. lib.	europe	culture	immig.	army	security	env.	instit. ref.	infra
<i>pds</i>												
1998	0.85	0.06		0.80		1.00		-0.67	-0.33	0.83	0.00	0.50
<i>gr</i>												
1994	0.86	-0.70	-1.00	0.71		1.00	-1.00	-1.00		1.00	0.75	0.50
1998	0.58	-0.56	1.00	0.67		0.29	-1.00	0.04	-0.63	0.82		-0.13
2002	0.33	0.11	0.60	0.72			-1.00		0.00	0.98	1.00	0.00
<i>spd</i>												
1976	0.27	-0.29	-0.63	0.66		0.80		-0.90	0.21	1.00		0.63
1994	0.34	-0.93	0.87	0.45	0.21	0.50	-1.00	-0.33	0.64	0.50	1.00	0.76
1998	0.32	0.00	0.40	0.42		0.83	1.00	0.17	0.83	0.86	0.27	0.79
2002	0.59	0.22	-0.29	0.40	1.00	0.97	-0.44	0.64	0.63	0.65	0.43	0.78
<i>fpd</i>												
1976	0.07	0.46	-0.78	0.79		0.56		-0.63	0.00	0.16		-0.71
1994	0.06	0.68	0.33	0.36	-0.09	0.00	-0.75	0.60	0.00	0.60	0.43	
1998	-0.52	0.96	0.92	0.87	0.00	0.60	-0.56	0.07	0.69	0.00	0.71	0.71
2002	-0.13	0.57	1.00	0.54	1.00	0.67	0.33		-0.50	-1.00	0.88	0.67
<i>union</i>												
1976	0.30	0.56	0.40	-0.24		0.33		0.45	0.87			-0.56
1994	0.20	0.54	0.73	0.17	0.63	0.60	0.85	0.88	0.64	0.76	0.72	0.58
1998	0.09	0.61	0.59	-0.08	1.00	1.00	0.94	1.00	0.97	-0.05	0.40	0.29
2002	0.43	0.22	0.58	0.15	1.00	0.60	0.64	1.00	0.91	-0.03	0.85	0.25

**Table A6:** Issue salience for German parties in the four campaigns: frequency (in %) with which a party addressed issues of a given category during each campaign and number of observations for each party (N and percentage of the corresponding election).

	welfare	eco lib.	budget	cult. lib.	europe	culture	immig.	army	security	env.	instit. ref.	infra	N	% of election
<i>pds</i>														
1998	19.70	27.27	0.00	15.15	0.00	3.03	0.00	9.09	4.55	9.09	6.06	6.06	66	5.81
<i>gr</i>														
1994	13.46	9.62	3.85	13.46	0.00	1.92	3.85	7.69	0.00	23.08	15.38	7.69	52	5.49
1998	18.90	4.88	1.83	18.29	0.00	4.27	7.93	7.32	9.76	17.07	0.00	9.76	164	14.44
2002	11.21	8.41	4.67	16.82	0.00	0.00	0.93	0.00	6.54	42.99	6.54	1.87	107	9.15
<i>spd</i>														
1976	17.52	13.25	3.42	30.34		4.27		4.27	10.26	0.43		16.24	234	38.36
1994	18.30	10.27	6.70	17.86	6.25	5.36	1.34	6.70	6.25	9.38	4.02	7.59	224	23.63
1998	30.56	9.72	3.47	13.54	0.00	4.17	1.39	2.08	15.97	11.11	3.82	4.17	288	25.35
2002	16.16	16.87	7.99	26.29	1.07	5.33	1.60	3.91	8.17	6.04	2.49	4.09	563	48.16
<i>fpd</i>														
1976	15.73	26.97	5.06	15.73		9.55		2.25	6.18	10.67		7.87	178	29.18
1994	13.14	18.25	8.76	20.44	8.03	7.30	5.84	3.65	5.84	3.65	5.11	0.00	137	14.45
1998	17.78	13.89	6.67	25.00	2.22	2.78	10.00	3.89	7.22	2.78	3.89	3.89	180	15.85
2002	14.29	18.75	32.14	11.61	0.89	5.36	2.68	0.00	3.57	0.89	7.14	2.68	112	9.58
<i>union</i>														
1976	16.67	19.70	12.63	31.82		1.52		5.56	7.58	0.00		4.55	198	32.46
1994	16.07	12.52	7.48	14.21	9.53	1.87	2.43	4.49	10.65	10.47	5.42	4.86	535	56.43
1998	17.81	5.02	11.42	21.46	0.68	3.88	8.22	1.83	15.30	6.62	3.42	4.34	438	38.56
2002	20.93	12.66	10.85	14.21	3.36	1.29	9.30	1.29	11.63	9.04	3.36	2.07	387	33.11

**Table A7:** Issue positions of French parties in the four campaigns: average direction of the coded sentences for the twelve categories of issues

	welfare	eco lib.	budget	cult. lib.	europe	culture	immig.	security	env.	instit. ref.
<i>rl</i>										
1988	1.00	-0.85	-1.00	1.00		1.00	1.00	1.00		1.00
2002	1.00	-1.00	0.25				-1.00	-0.33		0.33
<i>pcf</i>										
1978	0.94	-0.94	-0.44	0.46		0.82		1.00	-1.00	0.82
1988	0.91	-1.00	-0.75	1.00	-1.00	1.00	-0.80	0.20		0.92
1995	0.75	-0.94	-1.00	0.83	-0.50	1.00	-0.50	1.00		0.57
2002	1.00	-0.87	0.33	0.60		0.60	-1.00	1.00		-1.00
<i>psf</i>										
1978	0.71	-0.86	-0.35	0.76		0.46		0.80	1.00	0.58
1988	0.72	-0.48	0.21	0.98	1.00	1.00	-0.46	0.29		0.49
1995	0.78	-0.86	-0.10	0.75	0.95	0.94	-0.44	0.71		0.46
2002	0.63	-0.67	0.34	0.46	1.00	1.00	-1.00	0.92		0.65
<i>eco</i>										
2002	0.88	-1.00	-0.25	0.43		1.00	-1.00	-0.14		-0.27
<i>mrg</i>										
1978	0.77	-0.58	0.17	0.20		0.50		1.00	0.67	0.94
1995	0.56	-1.00	0.00	1.00	1.00		-1.00			1.00
<i>udf</i>										
1978	0.23	-0.37	0.84	0.07		1.00		0.92	0.61	0.64
1988	0.16	0.30	0.87	0.82	1.00	0.94	0.78	0.76		0.84
1995	-0.33	-0.71	1.00	1.00	0.56		1.00	1.00		0.75
2002	-0.22	-0.28	0.64	0.40		1.00	-1.00	1.00		0.71
<i>rpr</i>										
1978	-0.05	-0.04	0.85	-0.72		1.00		1.00	0.33	0.04
1988	0.20	0.32	1.00	0.12	0.91	0.85	0.56	0.72		0.09
1995	0.24	-0.47	0.60	0.26	0.59	0.90	0.76	1.00		0.45
2002	0.05	0.21	0.94	0.43	1.00	1.00	-0.85	0.96		0.00
<i>rr</i>										
1988	-0.05	-0.71	0.88	-0.79	1.00	-0.14	1.00	1.00		0.73
1995	0.29	0.00	0.75	-0.69	-1.00	-1.00	0.68	1.00		0.64
2002	-0.11	0.41	1.00	-0.71	-1.00	0.71	0.85	0.80		0.80



**Table A8:** Issue salience for French parties in the four campaigns: frequency (in %) with which a party addressed issues of a given category during each campaign and number of observations for each party (N and percentage of the corresponding election).

	welfare	eco lib.	budget	cult. lib.	europe	culture	immig.	security	env.	instit. ref.	N	% of election
<i>rl</i>												
1988	52.08	27.08	2.08	6.25	0.00	4.17	2.08	2.08		4.17	48	2.43
2002	36.07	34.43	13.11	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.64	4.92		9.84	61	5.73
<i>pcf</i>												
1978	27.66	28.51	11.06	17.45		4.68		0.85	0.43	9.36	235	16.57
1988	38.18	16.97	4.85	9.09	4.24	7.88	12.12	3.03		3.64	165	8.34
1995	23.53	30.39	1.96	11.76	3.92	7.84	3.92	2.94		13.73	102	6.05
2002	43.24	20.27	8.11	6.76	0.00	6.76	8.11	4.05		2.70	74	6.95
<i>psf</i>												
1978	34.47	24.84	10.25	10.56		4.35		3.11	0.93	11.49	322	22.71
1988	23.36	19.19	4.16	12.48	8.72	15.44	6.31	3.76		6.58	745	37.66
1995	28.59	22.94	3.39	6.79	6.30	5.33	5.17	5.49		15.99	619	36.74
2002	30.23	12.21	12.79	10.47	2.91	7.56	4.36	14.53		4.94	344	32.33
<i>eco</i>												
2002	20.24	16.67	7.14	8.33	0.00	9.52	3.57	21.43		13.10	84	7.89
<i>mrg</i>												
1978	26.32	34.21	4.74	7.89		6.32		1.05	3.16	16.32	190	13.40
1995	23.68	21.05	10.53	15.79	7.89	0.00	15.79	0.00		5.26	38	2.26
<i>udf</i>												
1978	19.96	23.03	5.48	17.32		5.48		5.70	10.09	12.94	456	32.16
1988	19.06	18.78	9.39	6.08	8.01	18.51	2.49	9.94		7.73	362	18.30
1995	8.57	20.00	8.57	11.43	22.86	0.00	2.86	2.86		22.86	35	2.08
2002	20.69	18.39	12.64	11.49	0.00	4.60	8.05	16.09		8.05	87	8.18
<i>rpr</i>												
1978	29.30	21.40	9.30	17.21		4.65		6.05	1.40	10.70	215	15.16
1988	21.05	19.37	3.37	11.16	4.63	8.21	13.26	11.79		7.16	475	24.01
1995	21.68	20.92	11.35	7.27	10.20	6.51	2.17	4.59		15.31	784	46.53
2002	19.86	18.05	11.55	7.58	1.08	3.97	4.69	17.69		15.52	277	26.03
<i>rr</i>												
1988	10.38	3.83	7.10	11.48	2.73	3.83	33.88	14.75		12.02	183	9.25
1995	13.08	12.15	7.48	16.82	9.35	1.87	23.36	5.61		10.28	107	6.35
2002	13.14	12.41	6.57	10.22	4.38	5.11	18.98	21.90		7.30	137	12.88

**Table A9:** Issue positions of Dutch parties in the five campaigns: average direction of the coded sentences for the twelve categories of issues

	welfare	eco lib.	budget	cult. lib.	europe	culture	immig.	army	security	env.	instit. ref.	infra
<i>gl</i>												
1972	0.61	-1.00	0.00	1.00		1.00		-1.00	-1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
1994	0.56	-0.50		0.25		0.00	-1.00	-1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	-1.00
2002	1.00			-0.50		1.00	-0.60	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	0.61
<i>pvda</i>												
1972	0.79	-1.00	-0.15	0.81		1.00		-0.59	-0.45	1.00	1.00	-0.33
1994	0.33	0.14	0.10	0.33	0.78	0.39	-0.16	0.50	0.04	0.75	0.00	-0.33
1998	0.74	-0.50	-0.38	0.43	-0.23	0.89	-0.50	-0.50	0.53	1.00	0.33	0.80
2002	0.29	-0.50	0.57	-0.31	-0.67	0.11	-0.20	-0.35	0.44	0.27	0.14	0.74
<i>d66</i>												
1972	0.69	-1.00	-1.00	0.63		1.00		-1.00	-1.00	0.20	1.00	0.00
1994	0.32	1.00	-1.00	0.00		1.00	0.00	1.00	0.25	1.00		-0.25
1998	0.63	1.00	1.00	0.68	1.00	0.66	-0.96	-1.00	-0.04	0.75	0.33	1.00
2002	0.23			0.07	1.00	0.11	0.00	-0.93	1.00	1.00	0.50	
<i>cd</i>												
1972	0.59	-0.52	-0.07	0.50		0.59		0.00	0.80	0.98	0.57	0.65
1994	-0.10	0.55	0.75	0.58	-0.17	0.67	0.62		0.36	0.81	-0.60	0.25
1998	-0.67	0.33		0.19	-0.20	1.00	-1.00	1.00	0.78	1.00	1.00	1.00
2002	0.05	-0.50	-0.05	-0.05	0.38	0.38	-0.44	0.50	0.43	0.04	0.70	0.27
<i>vvd</i>												
1972	-0.39	0.43	0.64	0.40		0.17		0.06	0.90	1.00	0.58	1.00
1994	-0.43	1.00	0.43	-0.56	-0.50	-0.38	0.50	1.00	0.64	-0.08	-1.00	-1.00
1998	-0.33	0.12	0.66	-0.30	-0.06	1.00	0.57	0.90	-0.05	-0.72	1.00	0.07
2002	-0.11	0.30	0.28	0.00	-0.61	1.00	1.00	0.15	0.40	0.44	0.38	0.45
<i>lpf</i>												
2002	-0.30	0.33	-0.08	-0.33	-0.67	-0.18	-0.29	0.14	-0.10	-1.00	0.43	-0.57

**Table A10:** Issue salience for Dutch parties in the five campaigns: frequency (in %) with which a party addressed issues of a given category during each campaign and number of observations for each party (N and percentage of the corresponding election).

	welfare	eco lib.	budget	cult. lib.	europe	culture	immig.	army	security	env.	instit. ref.	infra	N	% of election
<i>gl</i>														
1972	31.82	2.27	4.55	2.27		18.18		18.18	4.55	6.82	6.82	4.55	44	5.63
1994	19.05	9.52	0.00	9.52	0.00	4.76	9.52	2.38	4.76	26.19	4.76	9.52	42	6.04
2002	21.05	0.00	0.00	10.53	0.00	7.89	13.16	2.63	5.26	5.26	10.53	23.68	38	2.90
<i>pvda</i>														
1972	25.49	2.94	12.75	7.84		12.75		15.69	10.78	2.94	5.88	2.94	102	13.06
1994	18.61	3.03	4.33	6.49	3.90	19.48	10.82	2.60	15.58	9.52	4.33	1.30	231	33.24
1998	13.29	8.39	11.19	9.79	7.69	9.79	5.59	5.59	13.99	5.59	2.10	6.99	143	29.07
2002	9.48	6.21	2.29	7.84	0.98	2.94	7.52	39.87	5.88	7.19	2.29	7.52	306	23.36
<i>d66</i>														
1972	36.73	2.04	4.08	8.16		12.24		10.20	2.04	10.20	10.20	4.08	49	6.27
1994	25.58	2.33	2.33	9.30	0.00	4.65	9.30	4.65	18.60	9.30	0.00	13.95	43	6.19
1998	16.00	4.67	0.67	24.00	2.67	10.67	8.67	2.00	18.67	5.33	6.00	0.67	150	30.49
2002	15.96	0.00	0.00	28.72	1.06	9.57	2.13	23.40	4.26	2.13	12.77	0.00	94	7.18
<i>cd</i>														
1972	26.86	8.78	7.18	11.97		10.37		4.52	6.65	6.65	11.70	5.32	376	48.14
1994	28.82	7.64	7.64	10.42	7.29	2.08	5.90	0.00	18.40	7.29	1.74	2.78	288	41.44
1998	15.79	7.89	0.00	21.05	13.16	2.63	2.63	5.26	23.68	2.63	2.63	2.63	38	7.72
2002	17.50	3.33	7.92	17.92	3.33	5.00	3.33	4.58	18.75	9.58	4.17	4.58	240	18.32
<i>vvd</i>														
1972	25.24	6.67	11.90	11.43		5.71		15.24	9.52	2.86	9.05	2.38	210	26.89
1994	7.69	5.49	7.69	9.89	8.79	4.40	32.97	2.20	12.09	6.59	1.10	1.10	91	13.09
1998	13.04	10.56	9.94	6.21	21.12	1.24	8.70	3.11	6.21	5.59	0.62	13.66	161	32.72
2002	13.06	7.56	3.09	11.68	4.81	1.37	2.06	8.93	25.09	6.19	12.37	3.78	291	22.21
<i>lpf</i>														
2002	13.49	2.64	3.81	16.13	3.52	3.23	7.62	4.11	17.89	1.47	10.56	15.54	341	26.03

**Table A11:** Issue positions of British parties in the four campaigns: average direction of the coded sentences for the twelve categories of issues

	welfare	eco lib.	budget	cult. lib.	europe	culture	security	env.	instit. ref.	infra
<i>lab</i>										
1974	0.92	-0.28	0.23	1.00	-1.00	1.00	-0.67	-1.00	1.00	0.82
1992	0.48	-0.88	-0.53	-0.35	0.33	0.56	-0.33	1.00	-0.07	
1997	0.41	-0.10	0.29	0.10	-0.50	0.68	0.86	0.81	0.21	0.70
2001	0.60	-0.01	-0.03	0.67	0.37	0.55	0.86	0.48	0.70	0.05
<i>libdem</i>										
1974	1.00	-0.27	-1.00		-1.00			-1.00	1.00	1.00
1992	1.00	0.60	-0.80	1.00		0.80		1.00	0.79	
1997	0.03	-0.73	-1.00	0.80	0.89	1.00	0.33	1.00	0.54	0.78
2001	1.00	0.60		-1.00		1.00	1.00	0.00	1.00	
<i>cons</i>										
1974	0.90	0.09	0.33	-0.16	-0.50	-0.05	0.38	-0.77	0.60	0.86
1992	0.60	0.35	0.48	-0.22	-0.20	0.61	1.00	0.47	-0.75	1.00
1997	0.11	0.48	0.25	-0.21	-0.79	0.43	0.93	1.00	0.24	0.42
2001	0.30	0.23	0.46	0.23	-0.79	0.00	1.00	-0.71	-0.20	

**Table A12:** Issue salience for British parties in the four campaigns: frequency (in %) with which a party addressed issues of a given category during each campaign and number of observations for each party (N and percentage of the corresponding election).

	welfare	eco lib.	budget	cult. lib.	europe	culture	security	env.	instit. ref.	infra	N	% of election
<i>lab</i>												
1974	15.03	38.73	7.51	2.89	11.56	3.47	3.47	2.31	8.67	6.36	173	32.28
1992	29.02	21.88	7.14	7.59	1.34	18.30	1.34	1.34	12.05	0.00	224	37.40
1997	10.52	18.82	5.72	11.07	11.99	10.33	15.68	4.80	7.38	3.69	542	44.35
2001	13.04	20.37	3.43	4.81	13.50	7.09	13.27	7.09	12.81	4.58	437	69.48
<i>libdem</i>												
1974	24.32	29.73	13.51	0.00	2.70	0.00	0.00	2.70	24.32	2.70	37	6.90
1992	8.16	10.20	20.41	12.24	0.00	10.20	0.00	4.08	34.69	0.00	49	8.18
1997	12.20	9.15	3.05	16.46	5.49	6.10	9.15	20.73	7.93	9.76	164	13.42
2001	30.00	25.00	0.00	5.00	0.00	25.00	5.00	5.00	5.00	0.00	20	3.18
<i>cons</i>												
1974	7.98	33.44	2.76	11.66	3.68	5.83	8.90	9.20	3.07	13.50	326	60.82
1992	14.11	15.95	14.72	11.35	3.07	14.11	9.82	4.60	9.82	2.45	326	54.42
1997	15.50	11.24	2.33	11.05	18.41	7.75	15.89	5.23	5.62	6.98	516	42.23
2001	13.37	7.56	8.14	7.56	29.07	11.63	9.88	4.07	8.72	0.00	172	27.34