

Jakobi, Anja P.

Working Paper

World society and the transformation of national defense: exploring world cultural impact on security and military

TranState Working Papers, No. 101

Provided in Cooperation with:

University of Bremen, Collaborative Research Center 597: Transformations of the State

Suggested Citation: Jakobi, Anja P. (2009) : World society and the transformation of national defense: exploring world cultural impact on security and military, TranState Working Papers, No. 101, Universität Bremen, Collaborative Research Center 597 - Transformations of the State, Bremen

This Version is available at:

<https://hdl.handle.net/10419/28399>

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:

Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.

Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.

Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte.

Terms of use:

Documents in EconStor may be saved and copied for your personal and scholarly purposes.

You are not to copy documents for public or commercial purposes, to exhibit the documents publicly, to make them publicly available on the internet, or to distribute or otherwise use the documents in public.

If the documents have been made available under an Open Content Licence (especially Creative Commons Licences), you may exercise further usage rights as specified in the indicated licence.



TranState Working Papers

WORLD SOCIETY
AND THE TRANSFORMATION
OF NATIONAL DEFENSE:
EXPLORING WORLD CULTURAL
IMPACT ON SECURITY AND MILITARY

ANJA P. JAKOBI

No. 101

Universität Bremen • University of Bremen
Jacobs Universität Bremen • Jacobs University Bremen
Universität Oldenburg • University of Oldenburg

Staatlichkeit im Wandel • Transformations of the State
Sonderforschungsbereich 597 • Collaborative Research Center 597

Anja P. Jakobi

***World Society and the Transformation of National Defense:
Exploring World Cultural Impact on Security and Military***

TranState Working Papers

No. 101

Sfb597 „Staatlichkeit im Wandel“ – „Transformations of the State“

Bremen, 2009

[ISSN 1861-1176]

Anja P. Jakobi

World Society and the Transformation of National Defense: Exploring World

Cultural Impact on Security and Military

(TranState Working Papers, 101)

Bremen: Sfb 597 „Staatlichkeit im Wandel“, 2009

ISSN 1861-1176

Universität Bremen

Sonderforschungsbereich 597 / Collaborative Research Center 597

Staatlichkeit im Wandel / Transformations of the State

Postfach 33 04 40

D - 28334 Bremen

Tel.:+ 49 421 218-8720

Fax:+ 49 421 218-8721

Homepage: <http://www.staatlichkeit.uni-bremen.de>

World Society and the Transformation of National Defense: Exploring World Cultural Impact on Security and Military

ABSTRACT

In this paper, I explore the applicability of sociological institutionalism for the analysis of security and the military. Based on cross-sectional data from 50 countries, I show how values linked to the nation state and security are related to world cultural ideas and the diffusion of rationalized organizational models. Such linkage could explain the transformation of the military as a common and worldwide trend, being based on political and societal preconditions that converge across countries. The paper is structured as follows: I first introduce basics on military transformation in the course of time, before I turn to the framework of sociological new institutionalism. I particularly emphasize world cultural values and rationalized organizational forms as well as the diffusion process linked to them. In the empirical analysis, I first show how values linked to individualism, the nation state and world society are linked to national security. As suggested by sociological institutionalism, individual values and the importance of world society are wide-spread and also linked to less nationalism and a lower significance for security and defense. However, the nation state is still an important point of reference. In the second empirical analysis, I turn to the organizational form of the military, showing changing aims, and changed ways of organizing the service. Here we find that the military has indeed transformed to an organization with features comparable to the non-military world, supporting sociological institutionalist claims. In sum, the findings point towards changed security policies induced by world cultural norms. However, further analyses are needed to explore this relationship in more detail and to ultimately test this theory against functionalist explanations.

CONTENTS

| | |
|--|----|
| INTRODUCTION | 1 |
| MILITARY TRANSFORMATION OVER TIME..... | 3 |
| SOCIOLOGICAL INSTITUTIONALISM AND MILITARY POLICIES..... | 5 |
| World Society and World Culture..... | 6 |
| World Society and Forms of Rationalized Organizing | 7 |
| The Relevance of Sociological Institutionalism for Analyzing Security and Military | 8 |
| DATA AND METHODS | 9 |
| WORLD CULTURAL VALUES AND SECURITY | 11 |
| WORLD CULTURE AND THE ORGANIZATION OF THE MILITARY | 16 |
| CONCLUSIONS..... | 21 |
| ANNEX | 23 |
| REFERENCES..... | 28 |
| BIOGRAPHICAL NOTE | 33 |

World Society and the Transformation of National Defense: Exploring World Cultural Impact on Security and Military

INTRODUCTION¹

Since the end of the cold war, the military has faced multiple changes, both in means and ends. Territorial defense went down, while humanitarian interventions and out-of-area missions have become widespread. Interstate conflicts have been suspended by asymmetric warfare with transnational actors. In the same time, the size of the army has been reduced, increasingly relying on professional soldiers and volunteers instead of conscripts. In particular NATO countries have shifted towards deployable forces that work together internationally, while only some countries still follow the principles of total national defense or compulsory military service. As a consequence, a shift to a postmodern military has been assessed, marked by organizational changes and the loosening of ties with the nation state. In the same time, internationalization has taken place so that missions authorized by international actors like the NATO are becoming more common (Moskos et al. 2000:1-2, see also Dandeker 1999, Mayer 2009). Besides, the outsourcing of military services has become increasingly widespread, constituting a big market for private military firms (Singer 2008). In sum, these developments point towards a new function of the military and new ways of organizing this central institution of statehood.

In this conceptual paper, I am interested in whether military transformation can be explained by concepts of world culture known from sociological institutionalism: Military culture has always been a subject of cultural diffusion (Dearborn Spindler 1948:87-8), and the military is linked to cultural values of the parenting societies (Dandeker 1994:639). Moreover, the military has always been an exceptional institution, following a strong orientation both on values and on rational organizing (Carforio and Nuciari 1994:364-5, relying on Selznick). Whether the military has shifted from an institution or profession to an occupation has been a large debate in military studies (see several contributions in Carforio 1998). Nonetheless, the very idea of a world culture has not yet been linked to military transformation². From a sociological institutionalist perspective, changes in military policies would be a worldwide phenomenon, based not only on functional needs, but also on societal ideas on security, the individual and the normative force of rational organization. Military transformation could thus represent a further field where institutionalist analyses could provide important explanations.

¹ I thank Sebastian Mayer and two anonymous reviewers for very helpful comments on a first version of this paper. Ina Shakhrai and Maren Sennhenn provided valuable research assistance for constructing the data set. Any remaining errors are, of course, my own.

² But see Richter and Portugall (2008:158-60) for an first application linked to the German Bundeswehr.

Exploring the potential of sociological institutionalism is important for a number of reasons: Political science and international relations often reduce this strand of research³ to the importance that global values have in shaping national policies, while the organizational theory linked to sociological institutionalism remains largely in the background. In brief, sociological institutionalism predicts the spreading of individualism, actorhood and rationality - opposed to formerly common ideas like collectivism, fate, destiny or the will of God as rule of the world. The theory predicts that societies across the world are more and more influenced by these modern values, and that they start introducing new forms of organization that incorporate these principles, for example through a rights-based policy, empowerment of formerly suppressed actors or organizational forms that do not primarily rely on trust and personal bonds or relationships, but on rational accounting and personnel policies. It is thus a specific kind of values and organizational forms that world culture disseminates. Applying the value-oriented as well as the organizational perspective, this paper tries to explore more elements of sociological institutionalism for political science analyses.

Analyses of sociological institutionalism have most often been restricted to areas like human rights, education, and some social and environmental policies⁴. Inquiring world cultural impact on military policies – defined as policies related to the structure and the aims of national military (compare Werkner 2006:83) – thus adds a new field of analysis to sociological institutionalism. However, given the often apparent power games in the field of security, a theoretical account that relies on values, norms and soft instruments might at first sight seem inadequate for the analysis (but see Katzenstein 1996). In fact, the military constitutes a ‘critical case’ for testing sociological institutionalism: Although researchers on military affairs often conceive parallels to other organizations and their transformation (Dandeker 2006:412,415, Manigart 2006:324-25,338), the military is still at the core of the modern nation state, it is at the heart of national policy-making authority and deeply entrenched to ideas of national defense and survival. Moreover, the army is still an outstanding organization in its structure: Unlike in many other organizations, command rules are a usual and accepted element of military life, and freedom for individual actorhood highly depends on the rank.⁵ Even more, in conscript-based armies, organizational members are not necessarily voluntary members, so that the army is based on duty much more than on individual decision. An impact of world society on this institution would signify a successful penetration of world models to most central areas of statehood and nationalism.

³ In fact, the very term of sociological institutionalism – common in political science – already neglects that sociology knows different ‘institutionalisms’ (see e.g. Hasse and Kruecken 1999). The strand of theory used in this paper is ‘new institutionalism’ for sociologists, but for reasons of common readability in political science, I stick to the term sociological institutionalism.

⁴ See e.g. Meyer et al. (1997a,b) or Boli and Thomas (1999), for security issues see Finnemore 1999, 1996a, 2003).

⁵ But see Dandeker (1999:35-37) for a summary on delayering and the introduction of new hierarchical structures.

The paper is structured as follows: First, I shortly introduce military transformation and its new organizational structures. Then I present the theoretical framework of new institutionalism and its idea of world society. In brief, this account assumes the diffusion of specific values and organizational forms across the world. In a further step, I present the data and methods for the analysis. I rely on a cross-section dataset derived from public sources that contains information on military policies, individualization in society and linkage to international organizations in 50 countries, including individual level data from the World Values Survey. Afterwards, I analyze two clusters of questions, representing values and forms linked to security and the military. Finally, waging possible explanations for the findings, I conclude that world cultural perspectives have the potential to provide important answers, but further analyses with additional data would be needed for clarifying the role of world culture and its link to military policies.

MILITARY TRANSFORMATION OVER TIME

The transformation of the military has been a continuous subject of analysis in military studies. In the most comprehensive form, we can say that the modern military is currently being transformed to a post-modern military, coined by new missions, forms of organization and membership (Moskos and Burk 1994). Different analyses name different periods of time, but basically, three phases can be isolated: Before the end of World War II, the idea of ‘total war’ was predominant, while two significantly different periods of military transformation can be distinguished afterwards, namely the Cold War period and the years after (compare Kümmel 2006b:433, also Moskos et al. 2000, Moskos and Burk 1994): In the Cold War, high military capability was used to prevent a war between the two blocks. A high number of soldiers represented a means of deterrence. Additionally, the setting was imprinted by the predominance of possible interstate wars, with a clear focus on state actors as a threat and territorial defense as the main mission. Accordingly, armies were staffed with a large number of soldiers, in many countries including a large number of conscripts (Howorth 2006:37-38). With the end of the Cold War, this situation has changed tremendously, leading to new military and foreign policies. Countries were confronted with a situation of the US as the sole superpower, former ‘frontline states’ were about to become minor actors, and threats moved from the East-West conflict to conflicts within countries and by non-state actors (Kümmel 2006a:206, Williams 2006:5, Heurlin 2006:161). In the same time, military cooperation within the frame of NATO and the EU has become common, and countries need to consider international commitments when developing military policies (IISS 2008:9).

As a consequence, the size of most Western armies has been reduced significantly, relying on increasingly longer-serving individuals with substantial training (Williams 2006:5,11-14). At the same time, the number of missions has increased and changed from territorial defense to peace-keeping and humanitarian interventions. While in the Cold War, the military was

virtually non-deployed, in the early 2000s members of the military ‘were seriously overstretched, large numbers of them being at one stage or another of the three-stage cycle of deploying, resting, or preparing to deploy (Howorth 2006:38, referring to the UK). Moreover, today’s armies are regularly deployed for reasons of humanitarian purposes, aims – at least rhetorically – linked to safeguard democracy and human rights. As Kümmel states, globalization ‘increased the public’s sense of international responsibility and solidarity [...M]eans of communication serve to disseminate knowledge of the life, the cultures, the living standards, and also the plights of people in other parts of the globe, which may elicit a humanitarian impulse, a sense that “something must be done”’ (Kümmel 2006a:204, see also Heurlin 2006:174). As a consequence of this enlarged military mandate, the number of soldiers in out-of-area missions has risen sharply: While until the early 1990s, less than 10.000 NATO or European soldiers were deployed in out-of-area missions, this number has grown to around 50.000 NATO soldiers and around 60.000 from Europe in the early 2000s (Kümmel 2006a:204-5). Such internationalization processes have also furthered the specialization of forces, so that many armies in smaller countries cannot perform all functions in an international mission, but do perform only some (IISS 2008:9).

In particular the transformation to all-volunteer forces has become an important element of the changing security landscape (Williams 2005, Jehn and Selden 2002): They are often seen as a means to establish a professional army whose soldiers serve a longer period of time and can be trained in specialized tasks. Moreover, deployment in nowadays’ wars and peace-keeping missions needs additional qualifications of soldiers – ‘well educated and aware of international relations, fluent in languages, and expert in civil-military relations: in other words, true professionals’ (Urbelis 2006:114). Advanced conventional equipment and new strategies also require intense training, and countries differ widely in the extent to which they have implemented these demands (Howorth 2006:57-60). Training has been prominently emphasized after the first Gulf war by leading army figures: ‘Equipment didn’t win this thing. If we had used the Iraqi equipment we still would have prevailed. It was the training of our officers and men that made it happen’ (quoted after Adams 2006:28-29). In the same time conscripts can usually not be deployed in out-of-area missions, for political and juridical reasons (Howorth 2006:41, Jehn and Selden 2002:95). As one consequence, the army might be large in size, but most of its parts can actually not be deployed. This happened in the first Gulf war, when France could only deploy a small number of its active-duty force (Bloch 2000). The transition to all-volunteer forces thus supports the creation of globally acting forces in many respects.

Lastly, societal changes are likely to cause major problems both for conscription and all-volunteer forces: Since many Western countries face declining birthrates, the number of potential recruits is becoming smaller in the coming years. In case the size of the army should remain constant, an ever growing percentage of youth needs to be recruited. At the same time, civil labor market competes for this youth, so that military careers need to be comparatively

attractive in benefits (Sandell 2006).⁶ Military sociology also points towards changing values in societies that emphasize individuality, autonomy and cosmopolitanism instead of military values like authority, duty and patriotism (Kümmel 2006a:206). However, the development of a ‘global consciousness’ concerning humanitarian values can also lead to additional support for military missions linked to universal – not solely national – values (Heurlin 2006:174).

We thus face major shifts in military strategy and policies: The size of armies has been reduced, many countries have turned towards all-volunteer forces that include prolonged times of training and growing specialization. Societal developments as changes in demography and values, however, can make recruiting more difficult. In the meantime, international cooperation in the frame of NATO or the EU has become more important, and out-of-area missions have become common. New military tasks also include humanitarian interventions and peace keeping, less total defense as in the Cold War. Both means and ends of the military have thus changed dramatically since the early 1990s. The next section elaborates on how such transformation can be framed in terms of sociological institutionalism, before a closer analysis of values and forms linked to military transformation is conducted.

SOCIOLOGICAL INSTITUTIONALISM AND MILITARY POLICIES

Known as a constructivist account in international relations’ theory, sociological institutionalism has gained some prominence in recent years (e.g. Radaelli 2000, Campbell and Pedersen 2001, Djelic and Sahlin-Andersson 2006b, Meyer et al. 1997b). In particular the normative role of international organization had been inquired by scholars, showing that the international level influences many national policy choices (Finnemore and Sikkink 1999, Finnemore 1993, Börzel and Risse 2000).

As a sociological theory, however, sociological institutionalism does not only analyze the relation of states and international society, but also the transformation within countries and organizations (e.g. Meyer 2000, Meyer et al. 1997a, Scott and Meyer 1994, Thomas et al. 1987). The common ground for these analyses is a macro-theoretical perspective that emphasizes structural forces imprinting on the individual, organizations and nations. Following this account, action can best be explained by reference to the surrounding societal structure and its expectations, not by presuming autonomous and rational actors (Meyer 1992a, Meyer 1986, Meyer 1992b). Sociological institutionalism further assumes that increasing international activity leads to the dissemination of social values and models across countries, therewith explaining the decreasing variance in individual life courses or the nearly universal acknowledgement of human rights. As quantitative analyses show, formerly exclusive organizations like universities have spread across countries and more and more people finish higher educa-

⁶ See Clay-Mendez (2006) and Rostker and Gilroy (2006) for the US experience in how to balance this relation and how to offer attractive but not excessive benefits.

tion, also in developing countries (Meyer 2000, Meyer and Ramirez 2003). Other empirical analyses relate to issues as diverse as human rights, identity questions, child labor or educational curricula (Meyer et al. 1992, Soysal 1994, Abu Shark 2002).

Sociological institutionalism's central term 'world society' is linked to ideas on structures and processes: It refers to the establishment of international organizations as important parts of rule-making and dissemination of ideas. Governmental and non-governmental organizations create a structure in which world problems are discussed and solutions can be found. This does not only concern the political realm, also global professional associations establish worldwide business models, or international science congresses shape a common problem definition and solution. In all these cases, the growing global exchange is facilitated through the creation of global structures of exchange, leading to the diffusion of world societal values and ideas.⁷ It is against this background that international exchange and in particular international organizations have been analyzed as important 'teachers of norms' (Finnemore 1993, Finnemore and Sikkink 1999, see also Djelic and Sahlin-Andersson 2006a, 2006b).

Sociological institutionalism thus offers a far-reaching explanation for astonishing similar developments in many countries. In the following, I stress clusters of arguments based on sociological institutionalism that I consider to be highly relevant in the context of military transformation: Firstly, with reference to values, I show how world culture and its diffusion is conceptualized in sociological institutionalism. Secondly, with reference to the form, I show how sociological institutionalism conceives the spread of specific organizational models across countries. I conclude with summarizing the relevance of sociological institutionalism for the analysis of military transformation.

World Society and World Culture

Among the different values disseminated by world culture, individualism and actorhood are the most central: Individualism is a general feature of most current worldviews, also in social science. Individual actors are assumed to be the crucial factor for explaining social structures, society is thus aggregated individual activity (see e.g. Esser 1999). Institutionalists assume that such individual agency is a social construct, based on societal creation and legitimation (Meyer et al. 1994:9). Accordingly, the idea of the individual, its actorhood and interest is a world cultural model, turning the 'a priori' of individual actorhood as the basis of society to an 'a posteriori'. As Meyer puts it: 'By >individual< or >actor<, we should mean not only some supposedly natural or primordial entity, but one of the most culturally elaborated and legally supported constructions of the modern system [...]' (Meyer 1988:56-7). The principle of individualism is, however, not only an analytical category, but it is realized in daily collective and individual practice. It is the foundation on which rights are claimed and on which

⁷ In its essence, diffusion means that an 'innovation' is spread within a given population, whereby the innovation is not necessarily something objectively new, but new for the recipient of it (Rogers 2003:5).

personal development becomes an important goal in life. The idea of an individual subject – a self – ‘is a centre of sovereign and responsible motives and perceptions’ constituting the ‘ultimate subject and object of rationalized society’ (Meyer 1986:199). Following these cultural principles, it is the individual on which society is based, implying that individuals are free in how far they serve collective goals and that collectivism represents the outcome of individual choices. The affiliation to a state or a collective becomes a less important reference point in guiding individual action (compare Drori et al. 2006:13-14).

At the same time, the idea of world society assumes that countries, organizations and individuals increasingly refer to universalized world models for justifying action and change. Examples are the need to have a constitution, to empower women or to acknowledge formal education – models that are spread nearly universally around the globe without a central order but because they are regarded as necessary and attractive. World society thus creates new implicit or explicit standards, on which individual and collective activity is oriented. These models constitute a frame of reference, and national and historical specificities become increasingly redundant – ‘...images and realities of a world society arise and intensify so that it becomes more and more routine to discuss social life in a global frame than in a national or local one’ (Meyer et al. 2006:25).

Following on from that, sociological institutionalism predicts the decline of collective and national values, and the rise of individualism, actorhood and a world horizon. For security policies, this means that we should be able to observe a relative decline of the importance of national collective values, but a growing importance of values linked to individualism and world society. The consequences for military service would be growing difficulties to motivate candidates for service as an obligation towards the state, less importance of the state per se, but at the same time a growing importance of the world as one entity.

World Society and Forms of Rationalized Organizing

A further important feature of world society is the reliance on rationalized forms of organizing, specifically the ‘rationalized organization’:⁸ Organizations – understood as formally established entities with a clear purpose and own determined lines of activities – have become a widespread form of social organization. The number of organizations has grown considerably over the years, and their internal structure has been subject to many reforms with the aim of optimal efficiency. Like traditional forms of organization, bureaucracies or traditional professional associations, modern organizations have clearly defined and certified personnel, formalized roles and decision-making structures. Besides, however, they are rationalized in the sense that they follow a clear purpose along lines of causal theories: ‘The rationalization describes both means-ends relationships, or how purposes are to be achieved, and a control sys-

⁸ This development is supported by increased scientization in world society, an important process from which rational actorhood can be derived (see Drori and Meyer 2006a, 2006b, Drori et al. 2003).

tem, or how local activities are ultimately under the control of organizational sovereignty' (Drori et al. 2006:15). An important element is the description of organizations as collective actors, not as a bureaucratic tool in the hands of a superior entity, for example the state, private owners and the like. The notion of control has thus increasingly shifted from the environment to the organization itself (Drori and Meyer 2006b:36). Part of this development is the new role of the organization's members: The modern organization is made up of professionals in the sense of well-trained, self-reflective and self-improving individuals who survey their own fields of work (Drori and Meyer 2006b:37-39). The key change is that the modern professional now cooperates and collaborates in the successful operation of the organization as an actor (Drori and Meyer 2006b:37). Modern organizations thus show a large amount of management within the organization, and authority is disseminated wider among its members. Members are expected to create a dynamic, adoptive and innovative organization, realizing individual and collective actorhood as central element of modern organizing (Drori et al. 2006:15-16).

In brief, current forms of organization in very different sectors share common characteristics based on world cultural principles. Linked to the military, this means that we should observe a tendency to organize military according to rational principles and to conceive it as built upon individual actors with a professional role. All-volunteer-forces, for example, would be an example of an individualized, professionalized and rationalized form of military organization, given that they rely on voluntary service with education and training for specific tasks and an overall aim of selecting the best and most capable for the job.

The Relevance of Sociological Institutionalism for Analyzing Security and Military

Taken together, sociological institutionalism assesses globalization processes from a very distinctive perspective: Common feature of the rise of a world society is the creation of a common and global frame of reference, promoting individualism and rendering other frames like the nation-state or the local group increasingly irrelevant. Global actors, as international organizations, disseminate world cultural principles and cause policy change in national politics and society. Among the elements prominently diffused are cultural ideas as individualism, actorhood, but also notions of rationalized organizations that are active entities made up by professional members. In consequence, we should be able to observe changes towards individualistic values, oriented less on a national community but on world perspectives. Linked to security and military, this means that collective national security should become less relevant while individualism and the orientation on a common world should be rising. With a view to organizational forms, we should observe a change towards commonly acknowledged models of rationalized organizing also in the sector of security and the military.

However, it goes without saying that alternative theories for the transformation of the military exist. A standard account to this development is a functionalist explanation. From such

perspective, military policies follow military problems, for example, the new security landscape after the end of the Cold War. It would be the growing interdependence that makes a transition to global forces necessary. It would be the need to professionalize the army that drive personnel policies, and changes in the willingness to join the forces are to be met by more attractive offers. This paper is not intended to prove functionalism is necessarily wrong. The ultimate argument against functionalism would be the proof of dis-functionalism or at least independence of form and function. This is hard to prove, although some events are listed in this paper. Focusing on a conceptual aim, this paper explores reach and conditions for explanations derived from sociological institutionalism. Besides, functionalism and sociological institutionalism do not only produce rival hypotheses but they can also be seen as complementary: Only if specific forms work in some countries in a very functionalist sense, they can be transferred to others in a more normative way, becoming the ‘standard’. However, given the conceptual nature of this paper and data restrictions, the ultimate test whether or not military policies are more likely determined by world cultural principles or by functionalist reasoning is still to be conducted.

DATA AND METHODS

For inquiring the relation of world society and military transformation, I conduct a cross-sectional analysis, including data on 50 countries at the time around 2007.⁹ The dataset used is a merger of several different publicly available data sets:

Firstly, data of the 2007 wave of the World Values Survey used (World Values Survey 2005). It is a quantitative source based on standardized interviews conducted in countries all over the world, asking for items linked to personal and societal values, political attitudes and the individual situation. Until today, five waves of interviews have taken place, with a total of different 97 countries, 80 of which are included in all waves. In sum, 275.000 respondents have taken part in the different waves, of which 77.000 in the last wave 2005-2006 (World Values Survey 2009:5). 54 countries are included in this wave, of which two (Andorra and Hong Kong) do not have an army, and Western and Eastern Germany are listed as single countries besides Unified Germany. Excluding these countries from the data still keeps 74.048 respondents of 50 countries in the set, although not all items are available for each country.

⁹ Countries included are Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Chile, China, Colombia, Cyprus, Egypt, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Germany, Ghana, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Malaysia, Mali, Mexico, Moldova, Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Peru, Poland, Romania, Russia, Rwanda, Serbia, Slovenia, South Africa, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom (Britain), USA, Vietnam and Zambia.

Variables used for my analysis mostly represent items linked to individualism, the state and the army. For example, respondents were asked whether they trust the army, whether they would fight for the country or how far they consider themselves being a citizen of the nation, of the continent or of the overall world. I examine these indicators extensively in the first cluster of my analysis, differentiating across countries and conducting correlation analyses of different items. I also recoded several variables from the world values survey from an ordinal scale to binary variables: Variables that stated how far a person would consider itself a world citizen, a citizen of its home country or an autonomous individual, are used either in their original format or as a recoded binary variable. The same is done, for example, with the variable asking for whether a person is proud to be of her or his nationality.¹⁰ I treat the World Values Survey as a representative study of the countries included. This is in line with other research based on the survey (e.g. Inglehard and Welzel 2005), and draws on the initial aim of the study to give representative information of the countries concerned.

I merged information of the survey with data on military service and capacities, as well as with some basic economic and country data. This partly implies a changing unit of analysis, from individual level data to country data, reducing the number of cases to 50. Main data on military affairs derived from the CIA World Fact Book (online version of late 2008). The fact book gives quantitative data on several security relevant items. For example, I used figures of the populations' size or the share of GDP for military expenditures. I recoded the data on whether or not a country has voluntary forces or is based on conscription into a binary dummy-variable.¹¹ Further, I coded a binary dummy-variable on whether or not a country was a NATO-member in 2007, corresponding information was accessed via the NATO webpage.¹² I also coded whether or not a country was an EU member in 2007, based on information on the EU website.¹³ Additionally, the World Development Indicators were accessed to include the GNI per Capita in 2007 in the dataset.¹⁴ Lastly, the 'Military Balance 2007' was used for figures on the total force of a country in 2007.¹⁵

¹⁰ For example, Variables V210, V212 and V214 were recoded from 'strongly agree', 'agree', 'disagree' and 'strongly disagree' to 'agree' and 'disagree'; Variable V209 was recoded from 'very proud', 'quite proud', 'not very proud' and 'not proud at all' to 'proud' and 'not proud'.

¹¹ Voluntary service includes cases in which countries have the statutory right, for example in wartime, to establish compulsory military service.

¹² See <http://www.nato.int/pfp/eapc-cnt.htm> (accessed on 23.02.09).

¹³ Sources are http://europa.eu/abc/european_countries/eu_members/romania/index_en.htm and http://ec.europa.eu/enlarge ment/candidate-countries/turkey/eu_turkey_relations_en.htm (accessed on 19.03.09)

¹⁴ See: <http://ddp-ext.worldbank.org/ext/DDPQQ/member.do?method=getMembers&userid=1&queryId=135> (accessed 3.12.08.)

¹⁵ IISS The military Balance, Volume 107, Issue 1, 2007.

A major shortcoming of the data is that a longitudinal analysis so far can only be done in a very restricted way: Data on the introduction of all volunteer forces – representing organizational forms - are available over time, but data acquisition would be needed to show changing values over time to show more variance than only a binary coding of military organization. Nonetheless, data is sufficient for this explorative paper and the constructed dataset is adequate for a cross-sectional analysis, the time point being around 2007. The world value survey data was conducted in 2005/6 and published in 2008. Data taken from the World Fact Book represents early 2009 or late 2008, whereas it is reasonable not to assume large changes in the data since 2007. Methods applied for the analysis are descriptive and explanative statistics, in particular cross tables, frequencies, mean values and correlation analyses.

WORLD CULTURAL VALUES AND SECURITY

As presented above, sociological institutionalism conceptualizes an increasing relevance of a common world horizon, while the national boundaries are becoming increasingly irrelevant. At the same time, values as individualism and individual actorhood are becoming more important.


The cross-sectional data of the World Values Survey can partly confirm this view (see figure 1, table A-2 for all values): While it cannot show a development over time, we can see that, asked whether an individual perceives itself as a world citizen, national citizen and autonomous individual (non-exclusive categories), the national identity is still the one most often named: Across countries, 95.83 percent respondents have agreed on the national identity, while 77.11 percent agreed on world citizenship and 71.73 percent on individual identity.¹⁶

The relation to the nation and its security also differs across countries, and extreme values differ widely: Asked whether or not they would fight in a future war for their country, an average of 71.19 percent reported to be willing. Such statement can most often be found in Vietnam (95.4 percent), while Japanese respondents were most reluctant in doing so (24.6 percent). Only 14.1 percent of Taiwanese are very proud of their country, while 93.1 of Ghanaian are so (Mean: 57.38 percent). Among a selection of four different most important aims of the country, an average of 11.24 percent found national defense the most important issue, the lowest score being found in Sweden with only 1.6 percent, the highest in Rwanda with 44.3 percent. Finally, the trust in the armed forces is highly different across countries, too: An

¹⁶ There are, however, highly different extreme values that show large differences across countries: In Bulgaria only 45.5 percent perceive themselves as world citizens, representing the lowest number, while in Rwanda, 98.1 percent do so. Germans are the country where least people report a national identity (84.4 percent), while in Ghana, nearly all do (99.7 percent). Individualism is even more unequally dispersed, represented by the lowest value of 9.6 percent in Brazil, but 98.4 percent in Finland.

average of 23.5 percent has ‘a great deal of confidence’ in the armed forces. Here, the Dutch are least often doing so, while Jordanians most often give such statement (1.6 percent and 70.7 percent). Figure 1 illustrates these findings (see also table A-2).

Figure 1: Selected Items in the World Values Survey: Mean Values, Lowest and Highest Values of Cross-national Analysis



Source: World Values Survey, 5th wave, own calculations

While these values refer to country-level data, the world values survey is actually based on individuals, enabling to see whether world society really has an impact on citizens and their relation to the state: For example, we can observe that several of the above mentioned items are correlated, but show remarkable differences. Overall, 78.3 percent of all the people perceive themselves as world citizens, 95.8 percent as citizens of their home country, and 73.1 percent state that they consider themselves as autonomous individuals. These are obviously non-exclusive categories, but institutionalists would assume that autonomy and world citizenship are growing values, while nationalism is decreasing. Since our data cannot provide for a longitudinal analysis, we can at least check whether the different perceptions correlate and how. Although sociological institutionalism would not predict a clear linkage or causal chain of these two values, we can assume that both of them are more likely to represent an expression of world culture than does the national identity. As table 1 shows, the mentioning of one own world citizenship, national citizenship and autonomy correlate positively and significantly. However, we can also observe that the correlations differ, so that the perception as world citizen seems not to prevent the perception as individual or national citizen – the high-

est correlation being the one of world citizen and individual –, while the perception as national citizen is not that strongly linked to individualism.¹⁷

Table 1: Correlations in Perceptions as World Citizen, National Citizen and Individual (ordinal scale)

| | I see myself as | |
|----------------------------------|------------------|----------------------------------|
| | ...World Citizen | ...Citizen of respective Country |
| ... Autonomous Individual | 0.246** | 0.193** |
| ...Citizen of respective Country | 0.239** | --- |

**Significant at 0.01, two-tailed test, Kendal-Tau

Source: World Values Survey, 5th wave, own calculations.

Institutionalists are thus right in emphasizing the importance of world society and individualism. We can assess this relation even more closely by examining how far the types of world citizens, national citizens and the individual are proud of their country or whether they would fight a war for it. In total, with large national differences, 90.8 percent of all respondents are proud or very proud of their country, only 1.9 percent are not proud at all.¹⁸ 72.5 percent of the respondents state that they would fight in a war for their country, of which 46.8 percent were female. Correlating these values with whether the individual feels as world citizen, national citizen and autonomous individual again reveals the above-shown pattern: While all combinations are positively correlated, respondents that perceive themselves as national citizens are more often proud of their country and would fight in a war for it. World citizenship is less often linked to these characteristics, and a much smaller number of persons that consider themselves autonomous individuals are proud of their country and would fight a war (see table 2).

While these findings are obviously relevant to military policies, since a growth of individualism might result in increasing reluctance concerning defense capabilities, the World Values Survey additionally examines the specific attitudes to the armed forces and national defense: Across countries, only 9.2 percent of all respondents do not at all have confidence in the armed forces, while 64.9 percent trust them very much or quite a lot. Compared to other political or societal organizations in the survey, the armed forces are institutions associated with high confidence (see figure 2): Only the churches score higher in these categories, named by 66.8 percent of the respondents. Police, the justice system or government rank considerably lower, so that charitable organizations are subject to more confidence. Only a very small

¹⁷ This difference becomes even more visible when recoding the variables to binary variables (‘perception as world citizen: yes/no’ and the like): In this case, the correlation of world citizenship with individualism is 0.182, the correlation of world citizenship with nationalism is 0.1 and the correlation of national citizenship and individualism is 0.49 (all significant at 0.01, two-tailed test, Spearman-Rho).

¹⁸ 7.3 percent of respondent are ‘not so proud’.

number of respondents do not trust the armed forces at all (9.2 percent), comparable to charitable organizations and churches (9.1 and 9.7 percent). Compared to the national institutions, confidence in the world organization of the United Nations is lower, but still higher than confidence in press or political parties – both being central parts of a national democratic system.¹⁹


Table 2: Correlations of World Citizen, National Citizen and Individuals with National Pride and Willingness to Fight in War (binary coding)

| | <i>I am proud of my country</i> | <i>I would fight a war for my country</i> |
|------------------------|---------------------------------|---|
| <i>I see myself as</i> | | |
| World citizen | .096** | .085** |
| National citizen | .227** | .107** |
| Autonomous individual | .020** | .025** |

**significant at 0.01, two-tailed test, Spearman-Rho

Source: World Values Survey, 5th wave, own calculations.

Figure 2: Confidence in different Organizations



Source: World Values Survey, 5th wave, own calculations.

Trust in the armed forces again varies according to whether individuals perceive themselves as world citizens, national citizens and autonomous individuals: Correlation values linked to types of ‘World Citizen’ and ‘Autonomous Individual’ score lower than those of ‘National Citizens’. However, whether or not a person assumes national defense to be a very important

¹⁹ The percentage of people who have ‘a great deal’ of confidence in the education system is also very high (33.1 percent). However, it is based on a small subset of the survey only (N=2117), so that I do not further consider it here. All values reported above are based on N≥63.000.

aim of the country shows a slightly different pattern with lower correlation values. The relation of individualism and national defense is even slightly negative (see table 3 for both).

Table 3: Confidence in Armed Forces and Importance of National Defense

| | <i>At least some Confidence in Armed Forces</i> | <i>High Importance of National Defense</i> |
|------------------------|---|--|
| <i>I see myself as</i> | | |
| World citizen | 0.024** | .015** |
| National citizen | 0.102** | .009* |
| Individual | 0.017** | -.018** |

*significant at 0.05, two-tailed test, Spearman-Rho; **significant at 0.01, two-tailed test, Spearman-Rho

Source: World Values Survey, 5th wave, own calculations.

A correlation analysis based on the aggregate data shows that security issues are highly correlated with each other (see table A-2 in annex).²⁰ Countries that report a high percentage of people who consider themselves national citizens are thus often reporting a high percentage of people who would fight in war, who are very proud of their country and consider defense an important issue – but not necessarily have a high confidence in the armed forces. World citizenship reveals the same pattern, but with lower correlation values. There is, however, no significant correlation of individualism with any of the security items. Moreover, on the aggregated level the correlation to nationalism disappears, too, so that only a linkage to world citizenship remains. This means that on the country level, individualism is associated with world society, but not with national identity and collective security.

In sum, the analysis of data linked to values and their diffusion supports many sociological institutionalism assumptions: The nation is still a central institution, and most of the people consider themselves to be their country's citizens. However, a large number also reports to be a world citizen, placing themselves in a setting that reaches beyond the national borders, and nearly the same amount conceives itself as an autonomous individual. As the correlation analysis shows, world society and individualism are linked. However, individualists, both on the individual as well as on the aggregate level, are less likely to be proud of their country, willing to fight a war, consider national security as important or trust the armed forces. All in all, these findings leave us with the impression that there are some tensions between collective security and defense on one hand and world society and individualism on the other. World cultural values are thus likely to impact on military and security. The next section will shed light on whether the transformation of military organization also proceeds along world cultural lines.

²⁰ In particular the confidence in armed forces is closely linked to the percentage of people that would fight a war, are proud of their country and see defense as an important aim of the country.

WORLD CULTURE AND THE ORGANIZATION OF THE MILITARY


The traditional role of the army has been linked to national security in a narrow sense, being the fighting against enemies and the defense of territory. With the rise of a global horizon, we should expect a changing role, linking the army to tasks not immediately bound to the countries territorial defense, but in line with thoughts of global consciousness and the construction of a shared responsibility for defense beyond national borders. One important indicator for this trend is the number of missions that the national military is actually involved in. Figures clearly show that, since the 1990s, deployment to out-of-area-missions is on the rise: As IISS data shows, European countries have deployed more and more people, and supported a growing number of missions and observer missions (IISS 2008:13,157-168).²¹ In 1995, 39.367 persons were deployed in international missions, rising to 71.162 in 2007. In the same time, the number of missions more than tripled from 59 to 190, observer missions have grown from 109 missions to 133 (see figure 4). These missions included Afghanistan, Iraq, Sudan or the Lebanon, to name just a few.

Research has also shown that, over time, the purpose of intervention has changed considerably: While in earlier times, war had been a glorious activity, nowadays the use of military force is often targeted at protecting the lives of citizens as human beings. By doing so, states follow norms of universal humanity and establish order based on common norms (Finnemore 1996a, 2003). In particular the intervention to Somalia proved to be a crucial case of US engagement in a country where it had no strategic interest, but pursued primarily humanitarian aims (Finnemore 1996a). A further development is the merging of civilian and military roles in conflict areas, most visible in the merging of policing and soldiering: The number of police forces in peace-keeping has continuously risen in the last decade, while soldiers have also increasingly been part of non-combat activities (Lutterbeck 2005:237-8).

These new missions as peace keeping or humanitarian interventions imply new roles for soldiers: Besides fighting, they are expected to be skilled in diplomacy, politically educated and cooperative, and they should develop, ‘as part of his professional self-perception as a soldier, some sort of humanitarian cosmopolitanism that exists besides feelings of patriotism and of national commitment, i.e., that does not contradict national interests but extends them’ (Kümmel 2006b:432). This is partly at odds with the traditional role of the soldier, and requires an individual and collective redefinition of soldiering (Segal et al. 1997).

²¹ The countries analyzed are Albania, Armenia, Austria, Azerbaidjan, Belgium, Bosnia, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, FYROM, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Moldova, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom.

Figure 4: Number of Missions, Observer Missions and Deployed Personnel of 38 European Countries 1995-2007



Source: IISS (2008:157-68), own account

One important means to achieve a high standard in executing these different tasks and in realizing a global and multinational reach has been the introduction of all-volunteer forces. All-volunteer-forces do not rely on conscripts, but on a lower number of professional soldiers only. This organizational form is considered as being more adequate for current deployments in the frame of NATO compared to large numbers of soldiers required for homeland defense. Moreover, conscripts can seldomly perform tasks that require intense training, like peace-keeping missions or rapid deployment, and are often not legally allowed to take part in operations beyond national borders. ‘Furthermore, volunteerism allows individual countries within NATO to specialize in the performance of specific tasks within the overall NATO missions in ways that could not be accomplished in armies in which draftees predominate [...]’ (Warner and Negrusa 2006:150). In recent years, more and more armies have switched to a model of all-volunteer-forces, aiming to staff their forces with less, but longer serving and better trained individuals (see table 4). Also countries that still rely on conscription, for example because they assume it as an integrating factor, have started to decrease the number of conscripts, and key personnel are volunteers (Williams 2006:6).

All-volunteer-forces are usually smaller in size, they spend a high amount on modern equipment that is assumed to substitute personnel, and given these restrictions of size, they need to pay much attention on skill distribution and the talents of individual soldiers (Williams 2006:11-12). Given the fact that all-volunteer forces cannot rely on a cheap force of conscripts, personnel policies and payment are an important issue to attract candidates (see e.g. Williams 2004). The military competes directly with other employers, so that a competitive salary is needed. As a consequence, all volunteer-forces are not necessarily cheaper than conscript-based forces, even if they employ a lower number of personnel.

Table 4: End of Conscription in European and NATO-Countries

| Country | Year |
|----------------|------|
| UK | 1963 |
| Luxemburg | 1967 |
| USA | 1973 |
| Belgium | 1994 |
| Netherlands | 1996 |
| France | 2001 |
| Spain | 2001 |
| Portugal | 2003 |
| Hungary | 2004 |
| Slovenia | 2004 |
| Czech Republic | 2005 |
| Italy | 2005 |
| Latvia | 2006 |
| Slovakia | 2006 |
| Romania | 2007 |

Source: based on Williams (2006:18-19) and Howorth (2006:43), own account

In parallel to the new tasks realized and the restructuring of the troops, international exchange on military policies has grown, and both EU and NATO have furthered their coordination in military affairs and missions (Kantner 2006, Theiler 2006). In 2004, a NATO summit decided that in each member state, up to 8 percent of ground forces should be deployed continuously, and up to 40 percent should be deployable in principle (IISS 2008:13). The newly established NATO Rapid Response Force creates a common instrument for quick intervention in crises.²² The European Union has made comparable attempts (Quille 2006, Lindstrom 2007, IISS 2008:13). Additionally, deployments can also be made through the UN or by single countries alone (IISS 2008:17). In parallel, to enhance cooperation and effectiveness, ‘NATO and the EU have launched institutional initiatives aimed at guiding member states towards capability profiles that more adequately reflect the demands and requirements of contemporary operations’ (IISS 2008:19). The missions to which troops are nowadays deployed have changed from mainly European-based Cold War deterrence to a global reach of multinational operations, marked by limited objectives but a wide range of tasks, linked to a longer duration and the simultaneity of operations in different regions of the world (IISS 2008:19-29): Multinationality in global operations allows for sharing the burden among different states, but it also increases the legitimacy of operations, since they are based on an international consensus. The objectives for such operations are limited and fixed politically, for example, to stabilize a country, but not to occupy it. Such missions can take a long time, and they may take place in different places of the world in parallel. At the same time, tasks become more diverse, ranging from peace-keeping to humanitarian and rescue tasks. In some cases, these targets are addi-

²² See <http://www.nato.int/issues/nrf/index.html>, last access in March 2008.

tionally bound to rapid reaction, so that a fixed percentage of troops should be deployable at short notice.

The changes in military operations and the reliance of volunteer forces have also been linked to new training methods, including communication skills with other troops and standardization efforts concerning the equipment. Against the background of continuous military reforms (Adams 2006), the US had been a pressuring force for reforms in other NATO countries. ‘The belief was that technology would enable armed forces to have far greater operational effectiveness that had previously been possible, but with far smaller numbers of deployed troops. Operational experience in Iraq and Afghanistan has since muddied the picture, showing the value of “boots-on the ground” and more traditional soldiering skills’ (IISS 2008:23). Educating new skills and inventing new technology thus not always pays off in task performance, but it is assumed that members of the military increasingly need a liberal education beyond the technical education of war-fighting skills (Dandeker 1994:644-5).

A further change in military policies is the concern to respond to overall societal values, introducing policies for women, homosexual members and also minorities. While the army traditionally represented a male organization and male culture, societal discussion on gender and sexual preferences has also entered the debate on military policies. While women are now part of the army in many Western nations, the debate on homosexual members is still going on (Dandeker 1994:648-50). Besides the difficulties in implementing regulations, the discussion on integrating women, homosexuals and minorities resembles ‘diversity policies’ of other businesses (Harvard Business Review 2002), and is also in line with world cultural trends observed in other fields.

Besides, the military has increasingly outsourced functions comparable to other businesses. Today, even the advanced US military hires external soldiers, external consultants and external logistics to support warfare – so-called private military firms (Singer 2008). This outsourcing was partly used to conceal the number of dead US-soldiers in the public – because these firms are not part of the US army, even if they fight for it – but outsourcing was also used to support the shrinkage and the flexibility of the army. However, results cannot always be called functional: US outsourcing led to the hiring of firms linked to organized crime and weapons trafficking, thus delivering profit to individuals that US foreign policy officially condemned, and only partly without noticing it (Farah and Braun 2007:215-51). Even more severe, the outsourcing of Canadian army logistics led to an incident in which a ship transporting a substantial part of the Canadian army returning home cruised in international waters for almost two weeks, only because contractors and subcontractors of the firm hired could not agree on payment procedures. As a consequence, around one third of the Canadian army’s equipment was effectively led off, due to the argued flexible and cost-saving model of outsourcing services (Singer 2008:160). The model of a flexible, reduced force, supported by temporary external employees (private soldiers), external consultants and external logistics

reminds of widely promoted business models of outsourcing, even if the stakes of national defense might be quite different from other business fields.

In brief, we can observe several changes in military policies that indeed point towards the diffusion of organizational forms linked to world culture. Linked to the aims of the military and their missions, we can say that it is increasingly used to serve world societal concerns instead of narrower national goals: The number of out-of-area missions has grown considerably, turning the military into a global force, even under strict national auspices. With a view to the organizational form, we can say that the idea of an all-volunteer-force has become wide-spread, and even forces that still rely on conscripts have successively increased the number of volunteers. We can thus say that voluntary military service has established as a new standard of military organization, even if not all countries follow this route. Linked to the internal organization of the military, we can see that the organization increasingly introduces diverse forms of training, turning officers into an active and professionalized member of the organization. Moreover, minority policies are introduced to establish diversity management comparable to other business organizations. Finally, outsourcing trends have also become part of the military organization. The functionality of these developments is not necessarily given: Education and advanced training in technology has not replaced the need for traditional soldiering skills and outsourcing has made the army dependent on external support and logistical supply.

The organizational features of modern military have become part of international exchange, both through military cooperation and international organizations like NATO or the EU. In particular NATO, which relies on military cooperation and effective missions, spread the idea of a professional and voluntary force. The data used in this paper shows that 25 of the 50 countries analyzed have all-volunteer-forces, of which nine are NATO members and eight EU members.²³ A correlation analysis reveals no correlation between EU membership and an all-volunteer-force, but NATO membership correlates positively at .281 (significant at 0.05, two-tailed test, Spearman-Rho). Other correlations are hard to find, in fact huge differences prevail among countries, even if they share the model of all-volunteer forces.

In sum, the development and diffusion of standards linked to military organization show what sociological institutionalism would assume: Reforms are typically linked to make the military modern, effective also in comparison to other countries and they are justified in terms of progress and also individualism. Taken together, we can thus state that the military, as other organizations, too, is subject to rationalization processes and thus shows comparable developments as other organizations in world society, among these emphasizing technology, the need to qualified personnel and inclusion of diverse groups of society.

²³ In the whole dataset 12 countries are NATO members, 13 are EU members, both are highly correlated (.735, significant at 0.01, two-tailed test, Spearman-Rho)

CONCLUSIONS

This article has explored the potential of sociological institutionalism for analyzing security and military policies. In sum, the analysis has shown that we find some developments that are in line with sociological institutionalism, so that further inquiries seem worth being pursued. While values worldwide tend toward individualism and orientations on world societal values, armies increasingly rely on individuals that join the forces on a voluntary basis, which can be interpreted as both an empowerment of individual actorhood, but is also linked to the idea of having more ‘professional’ forces.

These conclusions are based on several steps of analysis: I first introduced some basics on military transformation over time. Then I outlined the theoretical background of new institutionalism, distinguishing particularly the dissemination of world cultural values and organizational forms. World cultural values and forms have then been analyzed separately, also relying on quantitative data. World cultural values have been analyzed in their relation to security and military issues. Findings showed that national citizenship is more closely correlated with issues of national defense than are identities as world citizenship or individualist perceptions. Values, we could see, indeed tend towards world cultural ideas, even if the nation state still remains an important point of reference. Forms of military organizing have been analyzed showing different features where the current idea of a military resembles other organizational forms, like business, which deliver the standard for appropriate organizing. Specifically, I showed that the number of out-of-area missions increased over time, de-coupling national military from the task of national defense towards a force concerned with world wide developments. I also showed the trend towards all-volunteer-forces, professionalizing the military in several countries. Further, I presented trends as outsourcing, military training and education as well as policies of inclusion, which all remind of standard forms of organizations, also underlining the role of international exchange in establishing such standards.

However, this paper could only be a first step in analyzing the relation of security and world society theory more closely, and it should not be overseen that functional arguments relying on new tasks for the military still have a strong point in explaining change. Further research linked to sociological institutionalism could analyze the international level as standard setter, for example, policies and activities of NATO and the EU establishing and transmitting standards and norms. On the country level, case studies and crucial cases should be identified, examining how far countries adopt a world model and which arguments they use for policy change. Moreover, additional data on all-volunteer-forces could also be used to analyze the shift toward voluntary forms of national service and to rights-based policies in military affairs, comparable to other changes over time analyzed in sociological institutionalism. In particular, quantitative cross-time, cross-section analyses could shed light on whether national preconditions, like the need to fight war, demography or similar reasons, can explain military transformation, or whether world cultural explanations offer the better account. Much

still remains to be analyzed in the context of military transformation and its relation to the nation state and internationalization.

ANNEX

Table A-1: Analysis of selected Items across Countries

| Country Name | N* | See myself as world citizen | See myself as country's citizen | See myself as autonomous Individual | 1st and 2nd mentioned Identity | Fighting War for Country | High Level of National Pride | National Defense very Important | High Confidence in Armed Forces |
|--------------|------|------------------------------|---------------------------------|-------------------------------------|--------------------------------------|--------------------------|------------------------------|---------------------------------|---------------------------------------|
| | | agree or strongly agree in % | | | W: World, N: National, I: Individual | yes in % | ,very proud' as % | 1st mentioning as % | % having ,a great deal of confidence' |
| Argentina | 1002 | 68.3 | 96.1 | 74.1 | N,I | 57.9 | 61.8 | 8.0 | 5.6 |
| Australia | 1421 | 80.7 | 97.0 | 63.1 | N,W | 62.8 | 68.1 | 12.0 | 24.9 |
| Brazil | 1500 | 78.6 | 92.8 | 9.6 | N,W | 61.1 | 39.1 | 9.6 | 24.4 |
| Bulgaria | 1001 | 45.5 | 91.4 | 67.2 | N,I | 59.5 | 43.6 | 4.4 | 26.9 |
| Burkina Faso | 1534 | 86.1 | 97.9 | 65.6 | N,I | 85.3 | 83.4 | 14.3 | 22.5 |
| Chile | 1000 | 73.0 | 96.0 | 15.5 | N,W | 58.1 | 59.2 | 7.7 | 17.2 |
| China | 2015 | 84.1 | 97.7 | 88.5 | N,I | 86.9 | 21.3 | 22.7 | 35.2 |
| Colombia | 3025 | 96.2 | 93.5 | 79.9 | W,N | M | 90.4 | M | 27.2 |
| Cyprus | 1050 | 74.8 | 95.7 | 90.4 | N,I | 83.9 | 54.8 | 18.8 | 38.9 |
| Egypt | 3051 | 57.5 | 97.8 | 58.9 | N,I | 78.4 | 73.3 | 13.7 | M |
| Ethiopia | 1500 | 92.1 | 94.3 | 94.2 | N,I | 76.9 | 69.5 | 11.4 | 17.6 |
| Finland | 1014 | 63.9 | 98.8 | 98.4 | N,I | 84.0 | 55.3 | 8.9 | 28.8 |
| France | 1001 | M | M | M | M | 60.5 | 29.2 | 7.1 | 15.1 |
| Germany | 2064 | 50.7 | 84.4 | 76.8 | N,I | 34.0 | 22.1 | 2.5 | 6.2 |
| Ghana | 1534 | 81.1 | 99.7 | 52.7 | N,W | 89.1 | 93.2 | 13.6 | 34.0 |
| India | 2001 | 78.1 | 95.1 | 84.4 | N,I | 81.4 | 72.8 | 14.3 | 50.2 |
| Indonesia | 2015 | 92.0 | 98.6 | 80.6 | N,W | 92.3 | 46.2 | 6.0 | M |
| Iran | 2667 | 81.6 | 97.3 | 84.1 | N,I | 81.3 | 63.0 | 12.8 | 21.6 |
| Iraq | 2701 | M | M | M | M | 37.2 | 83.1 | M | 33.7 |

| Country Name | N* | See myself as world citizen | See myself as country's citizen | See myself as autonomous Individual | 1st and 2nd mentioned Identity | Fighting War for Country | High Level of National Pride | National Defense very Important | High Confidence in Armed Forces |
|--------------|------|------------------------------|---------------------------------|-------------------------------------|--------------------------------------|--------------------------|------------------------------|---------------------------------|---------------------------------------|
| | | agree or strongly agree in % | | | W: World, N: National, I: Individual | yes in % | ,very proud' as % | 1st mentioning as % | % having ,a great deal of confidence' |
| Italy | 1012 | 61.9 | 93.2 | 46.9 | N,W | 43.4 | 42.0 | 2.2 | 14.4 |
| Japan | 1096 | 93.7 | 98.8 | 91.4 | N,W | 24.6 | 22.2 | 8.7 | 12.1 |
| Jordan | 1200 | 72.5 | 99.0 | 88.8 | N,I | 92.8 | 70.2 | 20.8 | 70.7 |
| Malaysia | 1201 | 90.1 | 94.3 | 81.9 | N,W | 79.3 | 69.2 | 18.4 | 30.6 |
| Mali | 1534 | 94.6 | 98.7 | 78.8 | N,W | 88.2 | 90.0 | 21.4 | 47.9 |
| Mexiko | 1560 | 90.6 | 97.8 | 71.7 | N,W | 75.5 | 82.9 | 6.0 | 27.3 |
| Moldova | 1046 | 64.6 | 96.6 | 52.9 | N,W | 68.2 | 18.8 | 6.6 | 5.9 |
| Morocco | 1200 | 46.2 | 98.2 | 15.5 | N,W | 76.9 | 57.7 | 12.9 | 30.9 |
| Netherlands | 1050 | M | M | M | M | 48.1 | 26.4 | 4.6 | 3.6 |
| New Zealand | 954 | M | M | M | M | 62.9 | 71.2 | 4.9 | 16.3 |
| Peru | 1500 | M | M | M | M | 77.0 | M | 4.9 | 8.0 |
| Poland | 1000 | 73.6 | 98.4 | 82.9 | N,I | 74.2 | 62.8 | 5.1 | 17.7 |
| Romania | 1776 | 53.9 | 91.5 | 67.8 | N,I | 67.7 | 38.3 | 7.8 | 32.5 |
| Russia | 2033 | M | M | M | M | 84.0 | 44.9 | 11.5 | 20.7 |
| Rwanda | 1507 | 98.1 | 99.4 | 73.3 | N,W | 95.2 | 78.3 | 44.3 | M |
| South Africa | 2988 | 86.5 | 96.5 | 78.5 | N,W | 61.4 | 76.9 | 9.7 | 18.1 |
| South Korea | 1200 | 83.4 | 93.8 | 69.9 | N,W | 72.2 | 18.0 | 6.0 | 7.9 |
| Serbia | 1220 | 77.9 | 90.4 | 83.4 | N,I | 61.2 | 48.5 | 8.3 | 9.7 |
| Slovenia | 1037 | 74.3 | 95.9 | 83.4 | N,I | 74.5 | 57.1 | 2.6 | 6.0 |
| Spain | 1200 | 79.9 | 96.1 | 79.1 | N,W | 44.7 | 60.0 | 8.7 | 9.5 |
| Sweden | 1003 | 85.0 | 99.0 | 94.9 | N,I | 85.7 | 42.7 | 1.6 | 4.2 |
| Switzerland | 1241 | 80.0 | 89.3 | 86.8 | N,I | 65.1 | 37.7 | 3.1 | 8.9 |
| Taiwan | 1227 | M | M | M | m | 86.0 | 14.1 | 10.1 | 5.6 |

| Country Name | N* | See myself as world citizen | See myself as country's citizen | See myself as autonomous Individual | 1st and 2nd mentioned Identity | Fighting War for Country | High Level of National Pride | National Defense very Important | High Confidence in Armed Forces |
|---------------------|----------------|------------------------------|---------------------------------|-------------------------------------|--------------------------------------|--------------------------|------------------------------|---------------------------------|---------------------------------------|
| | | agree or strongly agree in % | | | W: World, N: National, I: Individual | yes in % | ,very proud' as % | 1st mentioning as % | % having ,a great deal of confidence' |
| Thailand | 1534 | 96.1 | 96.7 | 56.2 | N,W | 89.9 | 85.3 | 21.4 | 12.8 |
| Trinidad and Tobago | 1002 | 74.4 | 99.1 | 90.2 | N,I | 67.8 | 90.9 | 10.5 | 11.6 |
| Turkey | 1346 | 84.3 | 93.1 | 76.2 | N,W | 97.1 | 81.2 | 15.5 | 65.9 |
| UK | 1041 | M | M | M | M | 62.1 | 54.6 | 12.4 | 29.2 |
| USA | 1249 | 66.9 | 98.0 | 62.1 | N,W | 64.9 | 66.2 | 32.1 | 35.9 |
| Ukraine | 1000 | 60.4 | 92.6 | 73.5 | N,I | 67.0 | 30.0 | 6.8 | 7.8 |
| Vietnam | 1495 | 93.1 | 98.9 | 74.1 | N,W | 95.4 | 80.9 | 11.6 | 81.4 |
| Zambia | 1500 | 72.2 | 95.6 | 68.5 | N,W | 64.8 | 63.3 | 11.3 | 21.5 |
| <i>Mean</i> | <i>1480.96</i> | <i>77.11</i> | <i>95.83</i> | <i>71.73</i> | | <i>71.19</i> | <i>57.38</i> | <i>11.24</i> | <i>23.5</i> |

* N here refers to the number of questionnaires in the respective country. However, not all items were asked in all countries and non-valid responses are excluded from this table, so that the actual number of respondents varies across the items.

M=Missing

Source: World Values Survey, 5th wave, own calculations

Table A-2: Correlations of Items linked to World Society and Security (Country level)

| Percentage | | | | | | | |
|--|--|--|--|--------------------------------------|--|---|--|
| Percentage | - perceiv- ing them- selves as World Citizen | - perceiving themselves as National Citizen | - perceiving themselves as autono- mous indi- vidual | - willing to fight in next war | - being very proud of their coun- try | - mention- ing defense as first aim | - having a great deal of confi- dence in armed forces |
| - perceiving themselves as World Citi- zen | | .362* | .315* | .371* | .401** | .334* | .164 |
| - perceiving themselves as National Citizen | .362* | | .049 | .473** | .442** | .393* | .273 |
| - perceiving themselves as autonomous individual | .315* | .049 | | .156 | .033 | .012 | .044 |
| - willing to fight in next war | .371* | .473** | .156 | | .364* | .459** | .494** |
| - being very proud of their country | .401* | .442** | .033 | .364* | | .413** | .479** |
| - mentioning defense as first aim | .334* | .393* | .012 | .459** | .413** | | .573** |
| - having a great deal of confidence in armed forces | .164 | .273 | .044 | .494** | .479** | .573** | |

* significant at 0.05, two-tailed test, Pearson ** significant at 0.01, two-tailed test, Pearson

Source: World Values Survey, 5th wave, own calculations.

Table A-3: Correlation Analyses of Potential Factors linked to All-Volunteer-Forces

| | <i>All-Volunteer-Force</i> |
|--|----------------------------|
| Number of Deployed Personnel accumulated 1995-2007 | .313 |
| Number of Missions accumulated 1995-2007 | .241 |
| Number of Observer Missions accumulated 1995-2007 | -.168 |
| Military Expenditures as % of GDP 2007 | -.111 |
| NATO Membership | .281* |
| EU Membership | .137 |
| Percentage who Would Fight in next War | -.432** |
| Percentage Perceiving themselves as World Citizen | -.124 |
| Percentage Perceiving themselves as National Citizen | .038 |
| Percentage Perceiving themselves as Autonomous Individuals | -.043 |
| Percentage who are very Proud of their Country | .153 |
| Percentage Mentioning Defense as First Aim of Country | -.035 |
| Percentage with Great Deal of Confidence in Armed Forces | .005 |
| Size of Army relative to Population | -.211 |

*significant at 0.05, two-tailed, Spearman-Rho; **significant at 0.05, two-tailed, Spearman-Rho

Sources: World Values Survey, 5th wave, Military Balance 2007, and World Fact Book (online), own calculations

REFERENCES

- Abu Shark, Miriam (2002) History and Results of Labour Standard Initiatives : An Event History and Panel Analysis of the Ratification Patterns and Effects of the International Labor Organization's first Child Labor Convention Berlin, Free University.
- Adams, Thomas K. (2006) *The Army after Next. The First Postindustrial Army*, Westport, Praeger Security.
- Bloch, George A. (2000) French Military Reform: Lessons for America's Army. *Parameters*, 33-45.
- Boli, John & Thomas, George M. (Eds.) (1999) *Constructing World Culture*, Stanford, Stanford University Press
- Börzel, Tanja A. & Risse, Thomas (2000) When Europe Hits Home: Europeanization and Domestic Change. *European Integration Online Papers*, 4.
- Campbell, John L. & Pedersen, Ove K. (Eds.) (2001) *The Rise of Neoliberalism and Institutional Analysis*, Princeton and Oxford, Princeton University Press
- Carforio, Guisepe (Ed.) (1998) *The Sociology of the Military*, Cheltenham and Northampton, Edward Elgar
- Carforio, Guisepe & Nuciari, Marina (1994) The Office Profession: Ideal-type. *Current Sociology*, 42, 33-56.
- Clay-Mendez, Deborah (2006) Cash and In-Kind Compensation Policies for a Volunteer Force. In Gilroy, Curtis & Williams, Cindy (Eds.) *Service to Country. Personnel Policy and the Transformation of Western Militaries*. Cambridge, MIT Press. 263-286
- Dandeker, Christopher (1994) New Times for the Military: Some Sociological Remarks on the Changing Role and Structure of the Armed Forces of the Advanced Societies. *British Journal of Sociology*, 45, 637-54.
- Dandeker, Christopher (1999) *Facing Uncertainty. Flexible Forces for the Twenty-First Century*, Karlstad, National Defense College.
- Dandeker, Christopher (2006) Building Flexible Forces for the 21st Century: Key Challenges for the Contemporary Armed Services. In Carforio, Guisepe (Ed.) *Handbook of the Sociology of the Military*. New York, Springer. 405-416
- Dearborn Spindler, G. (1948) The Military - A Systematic Analysis. *Social Forces*, 27, 83-88.
- Djelic, Marie-Laure & Sahlin-Andersson, Kerstin (2006a) Introduction: A World of Governance: The Rise of Transnational Regulation. In Djelic, Marie-Laure & Sahlin-Andersson, Kerstin (Eds.) *Transnational Governance. Institutional Dynamics of Regulation*. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. 1-30
- Djelic, Marie-Laure & Sahlin-Andersson, Kerstin (Eds.) (2006b) *Transnational Governance. Institutional Dynamics of Regulation*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press
- Drori, Gili S. & Meyer, John W. (2006a) Global Scientization: An Environment for Expanded Organization. IN Drori, Gili S., Meyer, John W. & Hwang, Hokyu (Eds.) *Globalization and Organization. World Society and Organizational Change*. Oxford, Oxford University Press. 50-68
- Drori, Gili S. & Meyer, John W. (2006b) Scientization: Making a World Safe for Organizing. In Djelic, Marie-Laure & Sahlin-Andersson, Kerstin (Eds.) *Transnational Governance. Institutional Dynamics of Regulation*. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. 31-52
- Drori, Gili S., Meyer, John W. & Hwang, Hokyu (2006) Introduction. In Drori, Gili S., Meyer, John W. & Hwang, Hokyu (Eds.) *Globalization and Organization. World Society and Organizational Change*. Oxford, Oxford University Press. 1-23

- Drori, Gili S., Ramirez, Francisco O. & Schofer, Evan (Eds.) (2003) *Science in the Modern World Polity. Institutionalization and Globalization*, Stanford, Stanford University Press
- Esser, Hartmut (1999) *Soziologie. Allgemeine Grundlagen.*, Frankfurt/Main and New York, Campus.
- Farah, Douglas & Braun, Stephen (2007) *Merchant of Death. Money, Guns, Planes, and the Man who makes War possible*, Hoboken, John Wiley and Sons.
- Finnemore, Martha (1993) International Organizations as Teachers of Norms: The United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization and Science Policy. *International Organization*, 47, 565 - 597.
- Finnemore, Martha (1996a) Constructing Norms of Humanitarian Intervention. In Katzenstein, Peter J. (Ed.) *The Culture of National Security. Norms and Identity in World Politics* New York, Columbia University Press. 153-185
- Finnemore, Martha (1996b) *National Interests in International Society*, Ithaca, London, Cornell University Press.
- Finnemore, Martha (1999) Rules of War and Wars of Rules: The International Red Cross and the Restraint of State Violence IN Boli, John & Thomas, George M. (Eds.) *Constructing World Culture. International Non-governmental Organizations since 1875*. Stanford, Stanford University Press. 149 - 165
- Finnemore, Martha (2003) *The Purpose of Intervention. Changing Beliefs about the Use of Force*, Ithaca and London, Cornell University Press.
- Finnemore, Martha & Sikkink, Kathryn (1999) International Norm Dynamics and Political Change. In Katzenstein, Peter J., Keohane, Robert O. & Krasner, Stephen D. (Eds.) *Exploration and Contestation in the Study of World Politics*. Cambridge MA, MIT Press. 247 - 277
- Harvard Business Review (2002) *Harvard Business Review on Managing Diversity*, Cambridge, Harvard Business School.
- Hasse, Raimund & Kruecken, Georg (1999) *Neo-Institutionalismus*, Bielefeld, Transcript.
- Heurlin, Bertel (2006) The New Danish Model: Limited Conscription and Deployable Professionals. In Gilroy, Curtis & Williams, Cindy (Eds.) *Service to Country. Personnel Policy and the Transformation of Western Militaries*. Cambridge, MIT Press. 157-178
- Howorth, Jolyon (2006) The Transformation of European Military Capability, 1989-2005. In Gilroy, Curtis & Williams, Cindy (Eds.) *Service to Country. Personnel Policy and the Transformation of Western Militaries*. Cambridge, MIT Press. 37-64
- IISS (2008) *European Military Capabilities. Building Armed Forces for Modern Operations*, London, IISS.
- Inglehard, Ronald & Welzel, Christian (2005) Exploring the Unknown: Predicting the Responses of Publics not yet Surveyed. *International Review of Sociology*, 15, 173-201.
- Jehn, Christopher & Selden, Zachary (2002) The End of Conscription in Europe? *Contemporary Economic Policy*, 20, 93-100.
- Kantner, Cathleen (2006) Europäische Sicherheits-und Verteidigungspolitik. In Gareis, Sven Bernhard & Klein, Paul (Eds.) *Handbuch Militär und Sozialwissenschaft*. Wiesbaden, VS Verlag. 250-261
- Katzenstein, Peter J. (Ed.) (1996) *The Culture of National Security. Norms and Identities in World Politics*, New York, Columbia University Press

- Kümmel, Gerhard (2006a) An All-Volunteer Force in Disguise: On the Transformation of the Armed Forces in Germany. IN Gilroy, Curtis & Williams, Cindy (Eds.) *Service to Country. Personnel Policy and the Transformation of Western Militaries*. Cambridge, MIT Press. 203-230
- Kümmel, Gerhard (2006b) A Soldier is a Soldier is a Soldier?! The Military and Its Soldiers in an Era of Globalization. IN Caforio, Guiseppe (Ed.) *Handbook of the Sociology of the Military*. New York, Springer. 417-433
- Lechner, Frank J. & Boli, John (2005) Constructing World Culture: UN Meetings a Global Ritual. In Lechner, Frank J. & Boli, John (Eds.) *World Culture. Origins and Consequences*. Malden, Oxford and Victoria, Blackwell. 81 - 108
- Lindstrom, Gustav (2007) *Enter the EU Battlegroups. Chaillot Paper no 97.*, Paris, Institute for Security Studies.
- Lutterbeck, Derek (2005) Blurring the Dividing Line: The Convergence of Internal and External Security in Western Europe. *European Security*, 14.
- Manigart, Philippe (2006) Restructuring of the Armed Forces. In Caforio, Guiseppe (Ed.) *Handbook of the Sociology of the Military*. New York, Springer. 323-344
- Mayer, Sebastian (2009) *Europäische Sicherheitspolitik jenseits des Nationalstaates. Die Internationalisierung von Präventions- und Interventionsmaßnahmen in NATO und EU*, Frankfurt and New York, Campus.
- Meyer, John W. (1986) The Self and the Life-Course: Institutionalization and its Effects. In Sorensen, Aage B., Weinert, Franz E. & Sherrod, Lonnie S. (Eds.) *Human Development and the Life Course: Multidisciplinary Perspectives*. Hillsdale and London, Lawrence Earlbaum. 199 - 216
- Meyer, John W. (1988) Levels of Analysis: The Life Course as a Cultural Construction. In Riley, Matilda White (Ed.) *Social Structures and Human Lives*. Newbury Park and others, Sage. 49 - 62
- Meyer, John W. (1992a) The Life Course as a Professionalized Cultural Construction. In Heinz, Walter R. (Ed.) *Institutions and Gatekeeping in the Life Course*. Weinheim, Deutscher Studienverlag. 83 - 95
- Meyer, John W. (1992b) The Social Construction of Motives for Educational Expansion. In Fuller, Bruce & Rubinson, Richard (Eds.) *The political Construction of Education. The State, School Expansion and Economic Change*. New York, Westport and London, Praeger
- Meyer, John W. (2000) Globalization. Sources and Effects on National States and Societies. *International Sociology*, 15, 233 - 248.
- Meyer, John W., Boli, John & Thomas, George M. (1994) Ontology and Rationalization in the Western Cultural Account. In Scott, W. Richard, Meyer, John W. & Associates (Eds.) *Institutional Environments and Organizations*. Thousand Oaks, London and New Delhi, Sage. 9 - 27
- Meyer, John W., Boli, John, Thomas, George M. & Ramirez, Francisco O. (1997a) World Society and the Nation-State. *American Journal of Sociology*, 103, 144 - 181.
- Meyer, John W., Drori, Gili S. & Hwang, Hokyu (2006) World Society and the Proliferation of Formal Organization. In Drori, Gili S., Meyer, John W. & Hwang, Hokyu (Eds.) *Globalization and Organization. World Society and Organizational Change*. Oxford, Oxford University Press. 25-49
- Meyer, John W., Frank, David John, Hironaka, Ann, Schofer, Evan & Tuma, Nancy Brandon (1997b) The Structuring of a World Environmental Regime, 1870 - 1990. *International Organization*, 51, 623 - 651.
- Meyer, John W., Kamens, David & Benavot, Aron (1992) *School Knowledge for the Masses*, Washington Falmer.

- Meyer, John W. & Ramirez, Francisco O. (2003) The World Institutionalization of Education. In Schriever, Juergen (Ed.) *Discourse Formation in Comparative Education*. 2 ed. Frankfurt/Main, Peter Lang. 111-132
- Moskos, Charles C. & Burk, James (1994) The Postmodern Military. In Burk, James (Ed.) *The Military in New Times: Adapting Armed Forces to A Turbulent World*. Boulder, Westview Press. 141-162
- Moskos, Charles C., Williams, John Allen & Segal, David R. (2000) Armed Forces after the Cold War. In Moskos, Charles C., Williams, John Allen & Segal, David R. (Eds.) *The Postmodern Military. Armed Forces after the Cold War*. New York and Oxford, Oxford University Press. 1-13
- Quille, Gerrard (2006) *The EU Battlegroups*. DGExPo/B/PolDep/Note/2006_145, Brussels, European Parliament.
- Radaelli, Claudio M. (2000) Policy Transfer in the European Union: Institutional Isomorphism as a Source of Legitimacy. *Governance*, 13, 25- 43.
- Richter, Gregor & Portugall, Gerd (2008) Ökonomische Modernisierung von Streitkräften - Anmerkungen aus Sicht des >>Neuen Institutionalismus<<. In: Helmig, Jan and Schörnig, Niklas (eds): Die Transformation der Streitkräfte im 21. Jahrhundert. Militärische und politische Dimensionen der aktuellen >>Revolution in Military Affairs<<. Frankfurt am Main: Campus, 147-164.
- Rogers, Everett M. (2003) *The Diffusion of Innovations*, London and others, Free Press.
- Rostker, Bernard D. & Gilroy, Curtis L. (2006) The Transition to an All-Volunteer Force: The U.S. Experience. IN Gilroy, Curtis & Williams, Cindy (Eds.) *Service to Country. Personnel Policy and the Transformation of Western Militaries*. Cambridge, MIT Press. 233-262
- Sandell, Rickard (2006) Coping with Demography in NATO Europe: Military Recruitment in Times of Population Decline. IN Gilroy, Curtis & Williams, Cindy (Eds.) *Service to Country. Personnel Policy and the Transformation of Western Militaries*. Cambridge, MIT Press. 65-96
- Scott, W. Richard & Meyer, John W. (1994) The Rise of Training Programs in Firms and Agencies: An Institutional Perspective. IN Scott, W. Richard, Meyer, John W. & Associates (Eds.) *Institutional Environments and Organizations*. Thousand Oaks, London and New Delhi, Sage. 228 - 254
- Segal, David R., Wechsler Segal, Mady & Eyre, Dana P. (1992) The Social Construction of Peace-Keeping in America. *Sociological Forum*, 7, 121-136.
- Singer, Peter Warren (2008) *Corporate Warriors. The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry*, Ithaca, Cornell University Press.
- Soysal, Yasemin Nuhoglu (1994) *Limits of Citizenship. Migrants and Postnational Membership in Europe*.
- Strang, David & Meyer, John W. (1994) Institutional Conditions for Diffusion. In Scott, W. Richard, Meyer, John W. & Associates (Eds.) *Institutional Environments and Organizations*. Thousand Oaks, London and New Delhi, Sage. 100 - 112
- Theiler, Olaf (2006) Die 'Neue NATO' - eine Allianz im Wandel In Gareis, Sven Bernhard & Klein, Paul (Eds.) *Handbuch Militär und Sozialwissenschaft*. Wiesbaden, VS Verlag. 238-249
- Thomas, George M., Meyer, John W., Ramirez, Francisco O. & Boli, John (1987) *Institutional Structure. Constituting State, Society and the Individual*, Newsbury Park and others, Sage.

- Urbelis, Vaidotas (2006) Impact of NATO Membership on Military Service in the Baltic States. In Gilroy, Curtis & Williams, Cindy (Eds.) *Service to Country. Personnel Policy and the Transformation of Western Militaries*. Cambridge, MIT Press. 97-119
- Warner, Jon T. & Negrusa, Sebastian (2006) The Economic Case of All-Volunteer Forces. In Gilroy, Curtis & Williams, Cindy (Eds.) *Service to Country. Personnel Policy and the Transformation of Western Militaries*. Cambridge, MIT Press. 123-156
- Werkner, INes-Jacqueline (2006) Wehrstrukturen im Internationalen Vergleich In Gareis, Sven Bernhard & Klein, Paul (Eds.) *Handbuch Militär und Sozialwissenschaft*. Wiesbaden, VS Verlag. 81-92
- Williams, Cindy (Ed.) (2004) *Filling the Ranks: Transforming the US Military Personnel System*, Cambridge, The MIT Press
- Williams, Cindy (2005) From Conscripts to Volunteers: NATO's Transitions to All-Volunteer Forces. *Naval War College Review*, 58.
- Williams, Cindy (2006) Introduction. In Gilroy, Curtis & Williams, Cindy (Eds.) *Service to Country. Personnel Policy and the Transformation of Western Militaries*. Cambridge, MIT Press. 1-35
- World Values Survey (2005) *World Values Survey 2005 Data*. Available at <http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/>, last access in March 2009.
- World Values Survey (2009) *Values Change the World. World Values Survey*. Publication downloaded at <http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/>, last access in March 2009.

BIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

Anja P. Jakobi, Dr., is a research fellow at the Peace Research Institute Frankfurt (PRIF/HSFK). Her research interests are world politics, international organizations and internationalization of public policy, mainly in the fields of crime, security, social and education policy.

Telephone: +49 69 95 91 04 58

Fax: +49 69 55 84 81

E-Mail: jakobi@hsfk.de

Address: Peace Research Institute Frankfurt (PRIF/HSFK), Baseler Str. 27-31,
D-60329 Frankfurt am Main