

Lavoie, Marc

Book Review

Book review: Saith, Ashwani (2022): Cambridge Economics in the Post-Keynesian Era: The Eclipse of Heterodox Traditions, Cham, Switzerland (1188 pages, Palgrave Macmillan, hardback in two volumes, also available as ebook, ISBN 978-3-030-93018-9)

European Journal of Economics and Economic Policies: Intervention (EJEEP)

Provided in Cooperation with:

Edward Elgar Publishing

Suggested Citation: Lavoie, Marc (2023) : Book review: Saith, Ashwani (2022): Cambridge Economics in the Post-Keynesian Era: The Eclipse of Heterodox Traditions, Cham, Switzerland (1188 pages, Palgrave Macmillan, hardback in two volumes, also available as ebook, ISBN 978-3-030-93018-9), European Journal of Economics and Economic Policies: Intervention (EJEEP), ISSN 2052-7772, Edward Elgar Publishing, Cheltenham, Vol. 20, Iss. 2, pp. 388-395, <https://doi.org/10.4337/ejeep.2023.02.12>

This Version is available at:

<https://hdl.handle.net/10419/284338>

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:

Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.

Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.

Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte.

Terms of use:

Documents in EconStor may be saved and copied for your personal and scholarly purposes.

You are not to copy documents for public or commercial purposes, to exhibit the documents publicly, to make them publicly available on the internet, or to distribute or otherwise use the documents in public.

If the documents have been made available under an Open Content Licence (especially Creative Commons Licences), you may exercise further usage rights as specified in the indicated licence.



<https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/>

Book review

Saith, Ashwani (2022): *Cambridge Economics in the Post-Keynesian Era: The Eclipse of Heterodox Traditions*, Cham, Switzerland (1188 pages, Palgrave Macmillan, hardback in two volumes, also available as ebook, ISBN 978-3-030-93018-9)

Marc Lavoie

Professor Emeritus, University of Ottawa, Canada; University of Sorbonne Paris Nord, France; FMM Fellow

Ashwani Saith's book is monumental, enthralling, and beautifully written with its occasional satirical tone and its references to various Indian deities and faith, but as we are being warned, depressing as it provides a blow-by-blow description of a battle from the standpoint of the losers. It explains how the Faculty of Economics and Politics of the University of Cambridge – the world center of post-Keynesian economics – was gradually and entirely taken over by neoclassical economics and why the Department of Applied Economics, also at the heart of heterodox economics, eventually came to be dismantled. This was so far an untold story, except for a chapter on 'Faculty wars' in Saith's (2019) previous book – an intellectual biography of Ajit Singh. The current book provides a meticulous detective story, relying mostly on Cambridge archives, but also on testimonies, interviews, and previously published recollections of participants to these events. It even contains emails that were sent as comments to the first draft of the book. Saith does not hold back: he identifies the names of those who, inside and outside Cambridge, planned the demise of heterodox economics, convinced as they were that only neoclassical economics was proper economics. The book makes clear that, besides possible strategical mistakes made by the incumbent heterodox economists, sometimes due to personal grudges, there were inexorable and ineluctable outside forces that led to this dismal state of affairs, through the Americanization of the economics profession and through the changing political winds that blew out heterodox and left-wing economics nearly everywhere in the world.¹

Ashwani Saith does not say much about himself in the book. We are only told that he arrived at the University of Cambridge as a doctoral student in 1972 and stayed there for 10 years. Thus, the author was present at the apogee of the Cambridge heterodox period. As many of the Cambridge heterodox staff or students in those years, he went on to have a successful career elsewhere. He was at some point a Professor and Director at the Development Studies Institute of the London School of Economics and is now Emeritus

1. Similarly, at about the same time, international organizations such as the OECD were being cleansed of their Keynesian economists and Keynesian policies, first because the stagflation of the 1970s had given an opportunity to holders of alternative theories such as monetarism and New Classical economics to bash Keynesianism, but also because of the political pressures arising from the arrival of the Thatcher and Reagan governments in the early 1980s. An exemplar is the story of Stephen Marris, a graduate of Cambridge in the mid-1950s and a staunch defender of Cambridge Keynesianism, who was demoted from his position of Special Economic Advisor to the Secretary General of the OECD to become a *persona non grata* in 1983, as reported by Gayon (2022).

Professor at the International Institute of Social Studies of the Erasmus University in Rotterdam.

Besides the preface, the book is made up of 14 chapters. The first two chapters set up the narrative and paint in broad brushes the events that will help the reader to understand the detailed drama that will follow in later chapters. Chapter 3 describes one of the outside forces that will come to bear on the demise of left-leaning economics, organized around the Mont Pèlerin Society, which besides its influence on the committee awarding the Bank of Sweden Prize in Economics in Memory of Alfred Nobel, had ramifications within Cambridge and through the Institute of Economic Affairs, a student of which was Margaret Thatcher. Chapter 4 goes over the skirmishes around seminars and textbooks. It discusses journals, in particular the reasons for the creation of *the Cambridge Journal of Economics* in 1977, the departure of the *Economic Journal*, and the history of the short-lived *Cambridge Economic Policy Review*, as also recalled in Saith (2023).

The next five chapters evoke the earlier history of the Department of Applied Economics (DAE) and explain how its rich and productive heterodox tradition was beheaded in just a few years. Chapter 5 sums it up. Chapter 6 explains how and why the Cambridge Economic Policy Group, led by Wynne Godley and Francis Cripps, had (most of) its funding cut off, following a review by the Social Science Research Council (SSRC) in 1982. Chapter 7 recalls how the SSRC was itself under review, and the negotiations that occurred under the new Thatcher government, leading to its new name – the Economics and Social Research Council (ESRC) – as well as its likely consequences for heterodox economics. Chapter 8 expounds how the Cambridge Growth Project (CGP), founded by Richard Stone and led by Terry Barker, next got its funding awarded conditionally and then cut off by the ESRC in 1986. And Chapter 9 goes over the protracted review of the DAE that was initiated in 1984 by the General Board of the University, ironically the same year that Stone, the founder of the CGP, received a ‘Nobel’ prize.² The review eventually led to the nomination of a neoclassical economist at the helm of the DAE in 1988, putting the final nail in the coffin of heterodox economics at the DAE, many such economists having left by then anyway.

The next three chapters describe what happened to three particular groups of researchers that were associated with the DAE or with the Faculty of Economics and Politics as these events unfolded. Chapter 10 is devoted to the empirical sociologists and labour economists. Chapter 11 is devoted to those scholars involved with development studies. Chapter 12 deals with economic historians. All three groups were eventually flushed out to other units, in particular development studies in 1995. Chapter 13 elucidates how the creation of the Research Assessment Exercise, with its capture in the field of economics by the neoclassical leaders at Cambridge, finished the job of purging heterodox economics from faculties of economics, both at Cambridge and elsewhere in the United Kingdom, as had been predicted by Frederic Lee in papers that more naïve observers had judged to be overly harsh and pessimistic (Lee/Hartley 1998; Lee 2007). The concluding Chapter 14 employs the same vocabulary used by the late Fred Lee. Within a dozen years, between 1982 and 1995, the DAE and the Faculty at Cambridge were *purged* from their *apostates* – heterodox economists. Neoclassical economists had managed to *purify* and *cleanse* the field of economics at the University of Cambridge, with economics students being only brought up and examined on neoclassical economics. Heterodox economists, post-Keynesians in particular, are now in other venues, such as the Department of Land Economy or the Judge Business School.

2. So strong were the winds of neoliberalism and of New Classical economics in the early 1980s that something similar happened to James Tobin, when the funding of his research programme got cut off the same year that he received the ‘Nobel’ in 1982.

The book review could end here. The outline of the book chapters tells it all. Those who wish to know a bit more may continue reading however. It should be pointed out that the book provides much more than just the detective story elucidating how neoclassical economists managed to take over what was the British or world center of heterodox and post-Keynesian economics, and the names of those that did it. On many topics and subjects, Ashwani Saith provides a historical analysis that goes back to Alfred Marshall and several other past contributors to economics, sociology or economic history at Cambridge. He provides a large number of one-page biographies of the main characters of his narrative, in or outside of Cambridge, as well as much longer biographies in the case of a few selected individuals. Devoted readers may find that there are some repetitions in the book, with identical statements and quotes appearing in different chapters. This is inevitable, as the chronicle and the explanations of what happened are being investigated from different angles.

Saith mentions a number of rationalizations that have been advanced to explain the decline of heterodox economics in Cambridge. There are at least six: incumbents showed too much insularity and complacency, dealing with irrelevant topics (such as capital theory); they were overly ideological, a claim made elsewhere by Hodgson (2019); there was no coherence among the various strands of neo-Ricardians, post-Keynesians, or Marxists, as they were rife with intellectual and personal divisions; it was a natural demographic result, due to deaths and retirements; somehow tied to this is the argument that the leading incumbents did not care enough about intergenerational transmission, even self-inflicting harm; and there was no textbook of Cambridge Keynesian economics, although one could mention the early but unsuccessful Robinson/Eatwell (1973) introductory textbook and the neat book on Cambridge post-Keynesian economics by Jan Kregel (1973).³ While all of these explanations may carry some truth, Saith affirms that the main but yet untold account resides in a systematic campaign to purge heterodox economics, organized from within Cambridge with the help of outside actors from both the UK and the US, along with the political winds in favour of neoliberalism that were blowing at the time. Saith also denies that the demise of heterodox economics had anything to do with an intellectual superiority of the neoclassical research programme over heterodox economics, as some of the victorious protagonists of this saga would pretend.

How did the campaign get set off? Both in the first and the last chapter, Saith maintains that the beginning of the end occurred when in 1972 Frank Hahn was granted the chair previously held by Richard Kahn. Brought in by Kaldor, who had been his supervisor for a while at the London School of Economics (LSE), Hahn had held a lectureship in Cambridge from 1960 to 1967. But his shining return in 1972 'is a story of defeat: Troy destroyed after the Trojan horse, in the form of Frank Hahn, is pulled into the city center of Cambridge economics' (p. 17). Later, Saith continues: 'If Hahn was the Trojan horse, he was pulled into Cambridge city centre by no less distinguished a triumvirate than Richard Kahn, Brian Reddaway and Nicholas Kaldor' (p. 131). Hahn considered to be his duty to convert everyone to neoclassical economics and general equilibrium economics.⁴ The turnaround is illustrated by the battle for chairs. In 1976 and 1979 the chairs of Kaldor and of

3. The Robinson and Eatwell textbook in its 1976 French translation was used for the first-year introductory course at the University of Ottawa by my colleague Jacques Henry in the 1980s. An anecdotal marker of its lack of success is that my copy of the book was first owned by a student who became a hard-line neoclassical university professor!

4. Baranzini and Mirante (2018: 85) report that already in 1966 it was clear to Pasinetti that 'Hahn was quietly changing camp'. I met Hahn once in 1985 in the Tea Room of the Faculty. The meeting did not start well as I did not recognize him and asked him who he was. He responded by asking me what I was doing, and when I responded 'macroeconomics', he left.

Champernowne lapse, without successors. In 1980 the chair held by Stone goes to Godley but in the same year Robin Matthews inherits the prestigious chair of political economy previously held by Brian Reddaway. Then Robin Neild, an empirical Keynesian who disliked the Americanization of the profession and who had succeeded Joan Robinson in 1971, takes early retirement and his chair is taken over by Partha Dasgupta in 1985.⁵ And finally, as Godley's term ends at the helm of the DEA in 1988, David Newbery is named Professor and Director of the DAE, moving it towards empirical microeconomics. At that point the transition of power is fully completed. The group of four, the G4 as Saith calls it – Hahn, Matthews, Dasgupta and Newbery – have by then taken full neoclassical control of economics at Cambridge. Bob Rowthorn and Ajit Singh get chairs in 1991 and 1996 but by then the dice have already been loaded.

Saith states that Hahn and his general equilibrium friend Terence Gorman were highly efficient in protecting and placing their former Birmingham, LSE or Cambridge graduates to chairs in the expanding system of UK universities when these former students were only in their thirties, which led them later to acquire chairs in Oxbridge and LSE. By contrast, promotions were slow to come by in Cambridge, and in addition the heterodox incumbents did not act resolutely to promote their followers. Besides Cambridge, these neoclassical economists in the G4 lineage eventually acquired and exercised professional power throughout the UK, through their own role in panels and through their command over the choice of experts and consultants for the SSRC and the RAE, and by taking over the Royal Economics Society (RES) that Hahn had started to overhaul. In the early 1980s, they combined with the monetarists and economists from the Treasury and the Bank of England. The DAE and the left-wing Keynesian economists in the Faculty in Cambridge were then subjected to a triangle of fire, Saith says, coming from LSE, MIT/Harvard and Chicago, as North American neoclassical economists could occasionally be imported to act as evaluators.

Within Cambridge, the crux of the battle between heterodox and neoclassical economists was the control over the composition of the Faculty Board, which in turn made appointments to the various committees that determined curricula, exam subjects, examiners, doctoral admissions, new staff and promotions. Economics had already been a place of animosity in the 1950s, as followers of Keynes, led by the rather intolerant Joan Robinson and the bellicose Kahn, gave a hard time to Dennis Robertson and his pupils. In the early 1960s, accorded to Amartya Sen as reported by Saith (p. 57), the triumvirate of Robinson/Kahn/Kaldor was so strong that it constituted the *dominant orthodoxy*, while Hahn was already the leader of the *rebels* attempting to overturn the dominant Keynesians. In the

5. I had no clue who Dasgupta was until I read an article in *Nature* by Alfred Eichner (1985), known for his work on the megacorp and pricing theory as well as his studies on the defensive role of central banks. In the short *Nature* article, he argued that neoclassical economics was based on metaphysical concepts and lacked empirical content, and thus was non-scientific. Dasgupta/Hahn (1985) were given the opportunity to publish a disparaging 'defence of economics', while Eichner was eventually denied a rejoinder. It is interesting to note that in a 1993 interview with John King (1995a: 181), when speaking of Eichner, Geoffrey Harcourt said that 'frankly, I don't think he was an absolutely top-line economist. I think he did a lot of harm to Post Keynesianism, first by claiming too much for it, and secondly by handling things at Rutgers so badly Intellectually he did a lot of harm. His theory was not a general theory; it was an interesting idea, quite a path-breaking idea, but that was it'. I should add, as I recalled in Lavoie (2022: 3) but without providing names, that when I visited Cambridge in 1985, I wanted to meet Godley as I had been so favourably impressed by his 1983 *Macroeconomics* book written with Francis Cripps, but when asking for advice from Harcourt who was my sponsor, he told me in no uncertain terms 'don't you waste your time meeting this ignorant fool'.

1970s, when throughout the world it became clear that orthodoxy in economics meant neoclassical economics and when Keynesianism was starting to have a bad connotation in top American economics departments, Marxists and left-wing Keynesians in Cambridge still held control over the Faculty Board, thanks mainly to the rallying and strategic efforts of Singh and Rowthorn. The DAE, besides its Keynesian macroeconomists, had several sociologists, economic historians and industrial economists that had left-leaning characteristics, and all of them could vote at the annual elections for the Faculty Board. The DAE members and the Faculty teaching staff were of approximately the same size. Any attempt to overturn the domination of heterodox economists on the Faculty Board thus had to arise from a change in the composition and size of the DAE, or else through a change in the regulations linking the DAE to the Faculty. The latter tactic was successfully applied in 1987–1988 when the rules to choose the director of the DAE, which were likely to favour continuity in the heterodox tradition, were suspended, allowing the nomination of Newbery, with the complicity of the high administration.

One may wonder why the administrators of the General Board at Cambridge would want to review and terminate what many considered to be an original and unique tradition of research. Saith (p. 603) says that ‘there was also talk in corridors and colleges of concerns that the DAE and Faculty had become a hotbed of Marxists and leftists who needed to be flushed out’. Another answer was that the various components of the DAE had been subjected during the 1980s to a continuous character assassination by the neoclassical G4. In addition, because of their visibility, ‘New Cambridge and the CEPG were being caricatured and stereotyped’ (p. 457), somehow like Modern Money Theory is being caricatured and over-simplified by its mainstream foes nowadays. The 1984–1987 review of the DAE was the occasion to recycle the arguments which had been previously offered by the SSRC in 1982, without taking account of any of the strong counter-arguments offered then by Godley. Saith (pp. 608–616) provides excerpts of the many letters that Hahn, Matthews, Dasgupta and Newbery sent to the review committee. The argument was that the DAE is no longer what it used to be, and that the quality of its research is poor and no longer trendy, in part because its members are overly insular and refuse to imitate American mainstream authors. Because the presence of its members allows heterodox economists to control the Faculty Board, the DAE hurts the reputation and quality of the Faculty of Economics and hence that of the whole university. All of this is reminiscent of what happened with the Department of Economics at the University of Notre Dame in the early 2000s, when management decided to split the economics department into two departments – a heterodox one and a mainstream one – only to close down the former a few years later, the high administration there having also been convinced that an economics department with heterodox economists lacked prestige and could never rise in the rankings of doctoral programs.

The woes of the heterodox tradition at the DAE started when the SSRC declined to renew (most of) its previous grant to the CEPG modelling team in 1982. Why was that? It first must be pointed out that Michael Posner, a member of the Faculty at Cambridge and a Keynesian economist, had been nominated at the head of the SSRC in 1979. Posner, along with Richard Kahn, it must be remembered, was a member of the duo that baptised the claims and policies advocated by the CEPG – particularly Godley, Cripps and Neild, but also Kaldor – as the New Cambridge, in opposition to the Old Cambridge, which stood for traditional Keynesian theories. Alan Shipman (2019: 139–145) gives an account of this internal clash between the two Keynesian groups that filled the pages of *The Times* and of the *New Statement* in 1974, and Saith (pp. 509–511) provides extracts of some of the letters that were privately exchanged between the protagonists. Did this episode have any bearing on the CEPG being beheaded in 1982?

In any case, as Saith demonstrates, Posner had already decided by 1981 that one of the existing four large forecasting teams was to lose its SSRC funding. With its continuous critique of the policies of the Thatcher government, the writing was on the wall that this would be the CEPG. Saith points out that the Consortium set up by Posner that was in charge of assessing macro-modelling submissions in 1982 (and in 1986 in the case of the CGP) was mainly made up of Treasury and Bank of England economists. They could not be impartial referees having themselves been subjected to heavy criticisms from the CEPG. Despite initial praise, without a site visit, and just a few days after an interview conducted by David Hendry and the monetarist David Laidler in the presence of Posner, the Thatcherite *bête noire* was shown the door. Subsidies went instead to a monetarist outfit at Liverpool University and to a supply-side economics unit at the City University Business School. Posner did further damage during the university review of the DAE, arguing that it should adopt conventional econometrics and mainstream economic theory.

Something similar happened to Barker's CGP. The external consultants of the 1986 review were Robert Gordon, who had done his doctorate under Solow (a good friend and co-author of Hahn), and John Helliwell, a Canadian who had done his with Gorman (another close friend of Hahn). One critique against the CGP was that its model was overly disaggregated and did not entertain the rational expectations hypothesis. This did not seem to hinder the CGP model because as studies done by the Consortium itself had shown, the CGP model outperformed all other econometric models in forecasting. This, however, turned out to be insufficient. With one exception, 'the composition of the ESRC and Consortium committees was stacked full of members and experts hostile to CGP, the DAE, and to Cambridge heterodox economics' (p. 582). The Consortium included one of Thatcher's economics gurus, in addition to Laidler and Stephen Nickell. The work of the latter, that European unemployment was caused by overly high real wages, was to be ridiculed by Anyadike-Danes/Godley (1989) through a *reductio ad absurdum* proof. In any event, the decision to pull the plug was made by the ESRC in 1986, and hence the CGP was terminated in 1987.

Saith's book provides, purposefully or not, vivid portraits of the various protagonists that were involved in the Cambridge saga for power acquisition or retention in the 1970s and 1980s. One gets a picture that goes beyond the academic work of these economists and beyond many of the comparatively lenient obituaries or testimonials that one may have read in the past. Some of the characters turn out to look quite good, but even those who do are usually not exempted from what turned out to be a tactical mistake. Others take the role of the villains, as do Posner and the gang of four (the G4) among many others, with Dasgupta boasting that he 'had to take recourse to underhand practice' (p. 966). Richard Kahn comes out as enigmatic. On one side, in trying to uphold the Keynesian tradition in Faculty Board elections in the 1960s he is compared to a mafioso by Neild, but on the other side his role in the demise of the heterodox tradition is obscure, as recalled by Saith (pp. 444–453). He strongly objects to Neild getting Robinson's chair in 1971; he maneuvers to have Hahn as his successor in 1972; he launches the attack against New Cambridge in 1974; he has close connections with Posner and many other adversaries of the DAE; he remains in friendly terms with Harry G. Johnson who at the time was disparaging Cambridge Keynesians; he objects to the creation of the *Cambridge Journal of Economics* and refuses to be one of its patrons;⁶ and he remains silent during the early 1980s, when left-Keynesianism is under attack. My former co-author, Wynne Godley, also does not always look good, but for other reasons. He is

6. Although he did publish an interesting critique of a model of Malinvaud in the first volume of the *Cambridge Journal of Economics* (Kahn 1977).

said to be ‘politically ineffective’ (p. 87), ‘replete with eccentricities and idiosyncrasies’ (p. 428), ‘a brilliantly intuitive mind ... coupled occasionally with a startling degree of innocence, naiveté, gullibility and extreme candour’ (p. 429).⁷

On various occasions, in particular in his preface, Ashwani Saith wonders whether things could have turned out differently if this or that event had not occurred. He goes back as far as asking what if Allyn Young and Keynes had not died so early? What if Labour had not lost a vote of confidence by a single vote in 1979, so that the arrival of the Thatcher government would have been delayed? What if Matthews had not been given the chair of political economy in 1980, with Luigi Pasinetti obtaining it instead?⁸ What if the CEPG had survived, with Francis Cripps (or Barker or Singh) being promoted to professor in 1985 and being awarded the directorship of the DAE in 1988? Would the American neoclassical invasion have been unstoppable anyway? As Saith mentions, ‘the experience of the purges of the heterodox schools in Cambridge was replicated almost universally in the departments of economics elsewhere. The Cambridge story has to be placed in this wider context’ (p. 285). Indeed, something similar happened in my own economics department at the University of Ottawa, as a very eclectic department was quickly transformed in the mid-1980s into a department which attempted to purge its heterodox elements without tenure (mainly unsuccessfully, due to the fact that the department was within a faculty of social sciences), with the help or passive behaviour of members which one would have thought to be heterodox-friendly, cleansing being later achieved thanks to demographic attrition and the refusal of recruiting committees to hire or even interview heterodox economists.

In the last chapter, Saith insists that despite the 1980s debacle, with the Faculty of Economics now looking like a clone of US universities, all is not lost with the various strands of Cambridge heterodox economics, either because its representatives have migrated and found a place in other sites, such as the Judge Business School or the Centre of Development Studies, or because the tradition is being perpetuated or reincarnated in other universities, in the UK and abroad, or within modelling teams now operating mostly in the private sector, such as the teams of Cripps and of Barker. Saith adds that private donors seem to be keen in endorsing non-neoclassical research efforts at Cambridge. Despite his expressed doubts, it seems to me that Saith is overly optimistic about the effect of these gifts on research being conducted at the Faculty. A cursory look at the titles of the papers being produced at the initiative of the grants provided by C-INET justifies the

7. Saith (p. 104) adds that Godley did not care enough about non-tenured staff, whose contracts had to be constantly renewed and were dependent on outside funding. I was stunned when a similar remark was made by a sociologist who had worked at the DAE when I encountered her at an INET conference in the Paris OECD building in 2015. Having observed in 2005 that Wynne knew personally some of the gardeners at King’s College, I did not expect this.

8. Pasinetti, off from Milan, was a visiting professor here in Ottawa in the Fall term of 1981. Three of us had a private dinner with him. Pasinetti confided that he did not get the Cambridge chair because of the lack of backing from someone who should have supported him. Reading Saith’s Chapter 6, Kahn looks like a possible suspect, but I remember Pasinetti uttering the name of another very well-known post-Keynesian. I have asked my colleague Mario Seccareccia, who was present at the dinner, but while he remembered the conversation, he had forgotten the name. The third person, Jacques Henry, died in 1989. Hence the mystery remains, which with Pasinetti having recently passed away, only his intellectual biographers Mauro Baranzini and Amalia Mirante (2018) could possibly unveil, although there is no information whatsoever in their book about this episode. Note that Matthews had friends on both sides of the divide: for instance, Harcourt wrote the entry on Matthews in *The Palgrave Companion to Cambridge Economics* (Cord 2017).

recent decision of the Institute of New Economic Thinking to pull the plug in Cambridge and to spend its dollars on more heterodox-friendly initiatives.

I hope that my enthusiasm for Saith's book and this extended book review will induce interested scholars and graduate students to actually read the detailed saga provided by Ashwani Saith, along with his narrative of the role of several other important actors which I have not mentioned here. With nearly 1200 pages spread over two volumes, the paper version of the book is expensive as one would expect, but several university libraries that carry an arrangement with Palgrave provide a free PDF version of the book. The book is worth reading, if only to draw lessons from the Cambridge debacle for the future of existing centers of heterodox economics. Perhaps Fred Lee was right when he contended that 'Post Keynesians need to see that what they have to do is to capture the academic institutions, and behave as ruthlessly in terms of hiring and controlling the institutions as the neoclassicals' (King 1995b: 200).⁹

REFERENCES

- Anydike-Danes, M., Godley, W. (1989): Real wages and employment: a sceptical view of some recent econometric work, in: *Manchester School*, 57(2), 172–187.
- Baranzini, M.L., Mirante, A. (2018): *Luigi L. Pasinetti: An Intellectual Biography: Leading Scholar and System Builder of the Cambridge School of Economics*, Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Cord, R.A. (ed.) (2017): *The Palgrave Companion to Cambridge Economics*, London: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Dasgupta, P., Hahn, F. (1985): To the defence of economics, in: *Nature*, 317, 589–590.
- Eichner, A.S. (1985): The lack of progress in economics, in: *Nature*, 313, 427–428.
- Gayon, V. (2022): Memories of an apparatchik without future, in: *Revue française de science politique*, 72 (1–2), 55–79.
- Hodgson, G.M. (2019): *Is There a Future for Heterodox Economics? Institutions, Ideology and a Scientific Community*, Cheltenham, UK and Northampton, MA, USA: Edward Elgar.
- Kahn, R.F. (1977): Malinvaud on Keynes, in: *Cambridge Journal of Economics*, 1(4), 375–388.
- King, J.E. (1995a): Geoff Harcourt, in: *Conversations with Post Keynesians*, London: Macmillan.
- King, J.E. (1995b): Fred Lee, in: *Conversations with Post Keynesians*, London: Macmillan.
- Kregel, J.A. (1973): *The Reconstruction of Political Economy: An Introduction to Post-Keynesian Economics*, London: Macmillan.
- Lavoie, M. (2022): The Godley-Tobin Memorial Lecture: Godley versus Tobin on monetary matters, in: *Review of Keynesian Economics*, 10(1), 1–24.
- Lee, F.S. (2007): The Research Assessment Exercise, the state and the dominance of mainstream economics, in: *Cambridge Journal of Economics*, 31(2), 309–325.
- Lee, F.S., Hartley, S. (1998): Peer review, the Research Assessment Exercise and the demise of non-mainstream economics, in: *Capital and Class*, 22(3), 25–51.
- Palley, T.I. (1997): The economic jungle: social practice and the evolution of economic ideas, in: *Review of Radical Political Economics*, 29(3), 22–33.
- Robinson, J., Eatwell, J. (1973): *An Introduction to Modern Economics*, London: McGraw-Hill.
- Saith, A. (2019): *Ajit Singh of Cambridge and Chandigarh: An Intellectual Biography of the Radical Sikh Economist*, Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Saith, A. (2023): The *Cambridge Journal of Economics* – A forum of one's own, in: *Review of Political Economy*, 35(1), 28–49.
- Shipman, A. (2019): *Wynne Godley: A Biography*, Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan.

9. From what I could observe from a seminar devoted to pluralism and organized by heterodox doctoral students a few years ago, young scholars still appeared to be a bit naïve in that regard. They would be well inspired to mull over the little model that Tom Palley (1997) produced to explain the evolution of schools of thought in economics.