

Weiss, Julia; Hörisch, Felix

Article — Published Version

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International Journal of Social Welfare

Provided in Cooperation with:

John Wiley & Sons

Suggested Citation: Weiss, Julia; Hörisch, Felix (2021) : Security or autonomy? A comparative analysis of work values and labor market policies in different European welfare states, International Journal of Social Welfare, ISSN 1468-2397, Wiley, Hoboken, NJ, Vol. 31, Iss. 1, pp. 112-128, <https://doi.org/10.1111/ijsw.12497>

This Version is available at:

<https://hdl.handle.net/10419/284825>

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ORIGINAL ARTICLE

Security or autonomy? A comparative analysis of work values and labor market policies in different European welfare states

Julia Weiss¹  | Felix Hörisch² ¹Institute of Political Science, Heidelberg University, Heidelberg, Germany²School of Social Sciences, HTW Saar University of Applied Science, Saarbrücken, Germany**Correspondence**Julia Weiss, Institute of Political Science, Heidelberg University, Bergheimerstraße 58, 69115 Heidelberg, Germany.
Email: julia.weiss@ipw.uni-heidelberg.de**Funding information**

This article benefited from financial support by the project “Change through Crisis? Solidarity and Desolidarization in Germany and Europe” (Solikris; Federal Ministry of Education and Research of Germany).

Abstract

This paper analyzes whether and how work values differ between European Welfare states and change over time. We proceed in three steps: First, we show that—despite EU harmonization endeavors, for example, via the Europe 2020 strategy—work values still vary substantially between European countries and welfare regimes. Second, by analyzing data from the European Social Survey 2004 and 2010, we show how labor market policies, such as active and passive labor market policies, are associated with work values and how overall levels of work values changed over this period. Third, we discuss potential implications of the heterogeneity of work values for national as well as European labor market policy making. Altogether we are able to show that work values are substantially driven by the economic structure of a country and its labor market policy making.

KEYWORDS

active labor market policies, autonomy, financial crisis, labor market policies, passive labor market policies, security, welfare states, work values

INTRODUCTION

Work forms the basis for individuals and the state, albeit in very different ways. Although many individuals at least subjectively spend most of the time of the day working, the quality of work is of particular importance when it comes to their well-being (Eurofound, 2012). On the state side, however, jobs form the basis for economic development, what makes the quantity of jobs the main issue here. Economically turbulent times, such as the financial and economic crisis of 2008, combined with rising unemployment rates thus led the state side to a variety of policies to promote job quantity (Marques

& Hörisch, 2020; Tosun et al., 2017). The European Union (EU), for example, subsequently took action to fight unemployment. To increase employment opportunities and harmonize labor market policies, it launched several initiatives, such as the Europe 2020 strategy (2010), the Employment Package (2012), and with a special focus on young people, the Youth Guarantee (2013) as well as the Youth Employment Package (2013) (Tosun, 2017). These aimed to increase the flexibility of labor markets, to expand active labor market policies and lifelong learning, and to strengthen the coordination of employment policies and multilateral surveillance at the EU level (Tosun & Hörisch, 2019).

Abbreviations: ALMP, Active Labor Market Policies; CFPS, China family panel survey; CPD, Comparative Political Data Set; CWED, Comparative Welfare Entitlements Data Set; EU, European Union; ESS, European Social Survey; GDP, Gross Domestic Product; OECD, Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development; PLMP, Passive Labor Market Policies; UNPD, United Nations, population division.

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Despite these endeavors, labor market policy crisis reactions as well as labor market regimes, unemployment rates, and labor market developments still vary substantially between European states (Blum et al., 2014; Starke et al., 2014). Furthermore, and as we will show in this article, different welfare state regulations and the varying opportunity structures of the labor market often produce different individual preferences with regard to work values. In addition to the European goal of increasing job quantity, the focus is now on the quality of work. Here, work values define both the general motivation for work and what kind of job one prefers (Gesthuizen et al., 2019). Within the literature the existing dimensions of work values are most commonly separated into intrinsic and extrinsic work values. Extrinsic work values capture what the individual prefers in terms of the constitution of a job, which can often be considered in the context of job security or income. Intrinsic work values instead capture the desired content of the work itself and are often associated with aspects such as a work–family balance and room for individual initiative within the job. So far, in the literature, work values are seen as relatively stable over time (Clark, 2005; Esser & Lindh, 2018; Gallie, 2007). At the same time, individuals differ with regard to their preferences on intrinsic and extrinsic work values.

This paper analyzes whether work values remained stable in recent years and how labor market policies and changes in economic conditions are associated with individual work values in European countries. The central question here is how contextual level factors influence the relationship between extrinsic and intrinsic work values. Using data from the European Social Survey (ESS) 2004/2010, we assess whether economically turbulent times shift work values toward the relative importance of security, subsuming the preferences for a high income and high job security, compared with autonomy, which encompasses preferences for work–family balance as well as a higher leeway for individual initiative at work. In addition, we examine the influence of other contextual factors, more precisely of active and passive labor market policies as well as the industrial share of a country on the relationship between intrinsic and extrinsic work values.

This study makes an original contribution to the literature in at least two relevant and topical areas. First, it highlights the impact of economically turbulent times on the formation of work values by using data from the ESS before the outbreak of the financial crisis (2004) and afterward (2010). We hereby show that—despite the EU’s approaches to fighting unemployment and harmonizing labor market policies—work values with regard to the relative importance of security compared with autonomy still vary substantially between European countries. Second, we show how various labor market policies influence work values differently. Along these lines, we elaborate on possible implications of the heterogeneity of work values for national as well as European labor market policy making.

Key Practitioner Message:

- Work values vary substantially between European countries and welfare regimes.
- The change of work values is substantially driven by welfare state structures (both labor market policies implemented and industry share).
- Both European and national labor market policy making has to account for these different work values to be successful.

This paper unfolds as follows: We begin with the main theoretical argument, focusing on the effect of labor market policies as well as the economic structure of a welfare state on (the development of) work values. The third section considers methodological challenges making use of multilevel analysis in 19 European countries by applying data from the ESS 2004 and 2010. The fourth section presents our empirical findings and their possible implications for labor market policy making, both at the national and EU levels. Section five concludes.

THEORY

Work is an important topic for most people because they spent (at least subjectively) a large part of their day working. Previous studies agree that work values contain different dimensions, which are most often described as intrinsic and extrinsic (Gesthuizen et al., 2019). Work values differ between individuals and refer to the rewards that people want from their work. Looking for self-fulfillment in a job, intrinsic work values cover aspects such as the use of skills, self-realization, or personal development. Whereas in the context of extrinsic work values the focus is on, for example, income and working hours, to achieve goals outside work (Gallie, 2019).

In the theoretical derivation to justify the development and change of individual preferences in relation to these work values, a distinction must be made between individual and contextual levels. At the individual level, the formation process of work values is linked to early socialization, the extent of economic deprivation, and the work environment itself (Gallie, 2007). Socialization processes include the varying experiences with, for example, the education system or early gendered socialization and can mold preferences toward personal autonomy and self-development (Esser & Lindh, 2018). Furthermore, work values can vary according to a hierarchy of human needs (Inglehart, 1977; Maslow, 1954). Here, extrinsic values mark the foundation. If these are fulfilled, for example, during times of economic prosperity, preferences can shift toward intrinsic values. This change is associated

with a country's opportunity structures, that is, its level of economic development, how the labor market and welfare system promote employment, and if and how the structure provides basic income security (Esser & Lindh, 2018). Therefore, for the context of this study, a reverse expectation can be formulated. If economically prosperous times lead to a stronger preference for intrinsic values, a stronger preference for extrinsic values should be found in economically weaker times, such as during the course of the financial crisis of 2008/2009. Finally, work values can be shaped by the quality of the work itself. Here, previous studies showed that, for example, higher-quality jobs, which often allow more autonomy, are perceived as more meaningful and promote internal motivation (Esser & Lindh, 2018).

The development of work values is also dependent on the institutional context. Here it is argued that the lack of a basic human need, such as economic security, fosters the development of extrinsic work values (Gallie, 2007). The functioning of the welfare state in which one lives therefore has a central influence on personal preferences, as they differ in the degree to which a decent level of economic security is a social right and to what extent individuals can maintain a livelihood in case of unemployment (Steiber, 2013). In this sense, characteristics of welfare regimes influence work values via the provision of economic security, and it is assumed that in countries that provide basic security needs and social protection, individuals progress to intrinsic work values.

However, because the distribution of welfare state protection is not the same in all countries and for all groups within a country (Bonoli, 1997), a welfare-state institutional approach (Edlund & Grönlund, 2010; Gallie, 2007) is needed to examine changes in work values with regard to contextual factors. Here, "to the extent that more encompassing (generous) welfare states provide more extensive social protection, a shift in emphasis from extrinsic to intrinsic values can be expected" (Esser & Lindh, 2018, p. 147).

Building on this, we selected four contextual dimensions that we deem to be most essential for analyzing changes in work values and with regard to economically turbulent times. These are the impact of the financial crisis, the share of industry, active labor market policies, and passive labor market policies, which are all part of the opportunity structure within which individual work values are formed.¹ The aspects cho-

sen represent the core areas of a country's labor market policy (ALMP and PLMP), the structural setup of the labor market (share of industry), as well as the largest external economic impact for all countries in the period under study (financial crisis, tested by the impact in the form of the unemployment rate).

Looking first of all at the time aspect, it becomes clear that the available observation dates are before and after the financial crisis of 2008/2009. So, if an increase in intrinsic work values is expected in economically good times (Esser & Lindh, 2018), the opposite expectation is to be made for our case (Riekhoff, 2017). In this case, an economic downturn triggered by the financial crisis is added to an ever-increasing globalization and dualization of labor markets (Buss, 2019). Accordingly, we assume that the sum of these processes leads to a larger degree of uncertainty for employees and thus results in a greater demand for job security compared with autonomy. Although it is difficult to separate long-term labor market effects at this point, based on the sum of the previously mentioned aspects, the following hypothesis can be stated:

H 1 In times of economic crisis the preference for security compared with autonomy increases.

Beyond this time aspect, there are various labor market policies that influence work values. The industrial sector, as a proxy for the basic economic structure, inter alia controls for the export orientation of an economy. Because of its export orientation the industry sector is especially affected by globalization and financial crisis. As wages and job security within the industry usually are high, these processes challenge the high level of security of the labor market insiders working in the industry sector, who used to be sheltered from labor market risks to a higher degree compared with labor market outsiders, who did not enjoy such high protection levels (Duman & Kemmerling, 2020; Rueda, 2005; Schwander, 2019). Accordingly, we would expect that a higher industry share of a welfare state goes along with a higher demand of security as the labor market insiders want to defend their advantageous and beneficial position on the labor market.

Consequently, we expect that such changes are also reflected in work values, which leads to our second hypothesis:

H 2 A high industrial share leads to an increased preference for security compared with autonomy.

Furthermore, the generosity of labor market policies can have an influence. Here, employment insecurity provokes anxieties about the difficulty of finding a new job or alternative sources of non-work income (Carr & Chung, 2014). These aspects can be related to active and passive labor

¹The central interest of the study lies in the effect of contextual factors on work values. The selection of the factors considered is limited due to the method used and the number of countries available, which results in a limited number of degrees of freedom. At the same time, it is clear that factors at the individual level can also have an influence. Conceivable here are aspects such as socialization, education or cultural differences. These other factors cannot be considered within this study and instead form the basis for further research.

market policies. Previous research has shown that perceived labor market security is high if income protection or active labor market policies are provided (Anderson & Pontusson, 2007; Hipp, 2016). The EU also seems to have noticed this as they have made investments in active labor market policies as a central component of their policies against unemployment (Bonoli & Liechti, 2018; Marques & Hörisch, 2020). This might have a substantial effect on the work values of the individuals because these measures prevent—at least to some degree—social exclusion in case of unemployment, which is also of central importance given the centrality of work for social inclusion (Lindsay, 2009). However, for individuals and their work values, these measures either help to secure existing jobs—for example with training programs and short-term work schemes—or they might lower the expected costs of becoming unemployed, for example by means of direct job-creation schemes on the second labor market (Dengler, 2019).² This leads to the following hypothesis regarding active labor market policies:

H 3 Higher expenditures for active labor market policies lead to a decreased preference for security compared with autonomy.

For passive labor market policies, we can build on the argumentation for active labor market policies because they might shape work values in a reasonably straightforward manner. Passive labor market policies either lower the risk of becoming unemployed—at least for the large group of labor market insiders—by introducing employment protection regulations, or they lower the economic (but not per se social) costs of being unemployed by guaranteeing unemployment replacement rates. However, the conditions vary depending on the country, for example when it comes to eligibility rules for unemployment insurance. Different criteria for access, thus, lead to different coverage, which in turn means that individuals are either part of the protected or unprotected group in case of unemployment (Pfeifer, 2010). Furthermore, Wulfgramm (2014) has shown that different levels of passive labor market policies substantially impact the attitudes of respondents, particularly life satisfaction. Overall, we expect higher levels of employment protection in the event of unemployment to accompany work values, which exhibit a lower

²Another relevant aspect, which unfortunately cannot be implemented at this point due to the limited data availability, are “demanding activation” policies. Existing research shows that, especially during economic downturns, countries introduce stronger sanctions for the unemployed in order to reconcile an increased need for social protection and lower tax revenues (Knotz, 2019). At the same time, however, it is also evident that such sanctions have hardly any positive effect on the labor rate. Instead, it turned out that requiring more active job search and the availability for a wider range of jobs leads to increased employment (Knotz, 2020). In the light of this research, an important next step is to consider how these frameworks affect work values.

(relative) need for security. Accordingly, our fourth hypothesis is as follows:

H 4 Higher levels of passive labor market policies (stricter employment protection as well as higher replacement rates within unemployment insurance) lead to a decreased preference for security compared with autonomy.

DATA, METHODS, AND MEASUREMENT

In this study, we rely on data³ from the ESS for individual-level data. The ESS is a representative transnational survey, which has been conducted in many countries every two years since 2001. The ESS is suitable for our study because of its high standards with regard to survey design and data collection and its coverage of several relevant indicators (Schnaudt et al., 2014). Furthermore, in the 2004 and 2010 rounds, questions were asked about work values, which facilitate our analysis. Thus, we created a pooled data set using these two rounds.

Comparing the situation before and after the start of the crisis, it cannot be assumed that the effects will be equally strong and timely in all countries. Nevertheless, the time periods of the two ESS waves allow a comparison. The ESS 2004 was surveyed from August 2004 to June 2005, which is well before the beginning of the crisis. The ESS 2010 was then surveyed from August 2010 to January 2012 (in Austria even from May to October 2013), which means that it can be assumed that the crisis has already come into effect in all countries in the sample.

In particular, we wish to shed light on changes of work values based on changes in economic and institutional indicators. Therefore, we require data on the country level for both years, which we draw from the World Bank, the OECD, the Comparative Political Data Set (CPD), and the Comparative Welfare Entitlements Data Set (CWED). To account for the fact that the surveys of the individual ESS waves, as just mentioned, each extend over a longer period than just one year, we have assigned the macro data to the respective interview time. That is, each individual interviewed has been assigned exactly the macro data values from the year in which the interview was conducted.⁴ So, for example, if the interview took place in 2012, the unemployment rate (macro level

³Descriptive statistics for all variables used in this study is given in Appendices A and B.

⁴The only exception is the replacement rate. Because the CWED data set only lasts until 2011, the values from 2011 were assigned here for 2012–2013. In the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, and Switzerland, the data set only lasted up to 2010, which is why the values from 2010 were used here accordingly. We consider this procedure to be justifiable because the variance between countries is significantly larger than between the (short) time periods of these cases.

indicator) was assigned from 2012 and not from 2010 (official ESS round year).

Following this, our data set includes information from the 19 countries for which we have data for both the 2004 and 2010 rounds of the ESS as well as the country-level indicators. These are Austria, Belgium, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom.

This leaves us with 51.626 individuals, nested in 38 country-year, nested in 19 different countries. Such a structure requires multilevel modeling, as ignoring the hierarchical structure could result in the underestimation of standard errors, subsequently leading to “spuriously ‘significant’ results” (Hox et al., 2018, p. 4). Because the dependent variable is linear, we undertake multilevel mixed-effects linear regressions. Previous research has mainly focused on the individual level and often neglected the influence of macro-indicators on work values. The method of multilevel modeling helps us to bring both levels together, enabling us to investigate the influence of macro indicators on work values. Before discussing the structure of the models and their results in more detail, we present the variables they contain.

Dependent variable

Following existing research in this area, we distinguish between intrinsic and extrinsic work values (Kalleberg & Marsden, 2019; Kraaykamp et al., 2019). The ESS contains questions for both types of work values. Respondents were asked how important several aspects would be for them if they needed to choose a job. On a scale from 1 to 5 (not important at all to very important), they indicated how important a secure job, a high income, the opportunity to act of their own initiative, and the ability to combine work and family responsibilities were to them.

To be able to evaluate the dimensionality of these four indicators, we conducted an exploratory factor analysis. The results showed that a secure job and high income load on the first factor, whereas own initiative and the ability to combine work and family load on the second factor. Based on this, we constructed two scales, namely one for “autonomy” (including own initiative and the ability to combine work and family)⁵ and one for “security” (including a secure job and high income).

⁵Whether the ability to combine work and family can be subsumed under the category of intrinsic work values is being discussed in the literature. Based on the results of our factor analysis and to distinguish between extrinsic and more materialist (security including a secure job and high income) on the one hand and intrinsic and more postmaterialist work values (autonomy including own initiative and the ability to combine work and family) on the other hand, we decided to group the latter into one category.

It is worthwhile at this point to examine the work values of individuals in comparison over time. Accordingly, Figures 1 and 2 depict averages by country for 2004 and 2010, respectively.⁶

The first point of note is that work values vary substantially on both dimensions. In 2004 they varied by approximately one full point on a 5-point Likert scale on the dimension of security and 0.6 points on the dimension of autonomy. In 2010, the security dimension varied again, from a value of roughly 3.6 in Denmark (DK) to a value of 4.6 in Greece (GR), whereas on the autonomy score the range is between 3.5 in Slovakia (SK) and 4.3 in Greece (GR). Secondly, an overall change between the years can be depicted. Countries that were at the top right of the figure in 2004 tend to move slightly toward the bottom left in 2010, whereas countries that were at the bottom left in 2004 tend to move slightly toward the top right in 2010. A strong example for the first group is Portugal (PT), whereas Germany (DE), for example, belongs to the second group. Overall, the trend is a kind of compression, that is, toward homogenization of work values. The only exceptions to this trend are the Czech Republic (CZ) and Slovakia (SK). The general trend toward a slight homogenization could be generated by EU policies aiming at convergence.

With regard to the differences between the countries, a much more contrasted picture appears. Here, no trade-off, but a general aspiration level, is shown. This is reflected in the corresponding correlation values between the indices for security and autonomy, which are 0.556*** for 2004 and 0.301*** for 2010. No clear patterns according to welfare state regimes can be found.

However, it is interesting to note that the countries with the highest overall aspirations, namely Greece (GR), Spain (ES), and Portugal (PT), are also the countries that have had to contend with high unemployment. In countries where the level of unemployment has dropped, such as Germany (DE), the aspiration level is somewhat lower and has risen slightly from 2004 to 2010. Overall, there are strong differences, both in terms of security and autonomy, between the countries.

Instead of using these two variables as dependent variables in separate models, we calculate the difference from both scales, which as a dependent variable indicates the distance between the importance of security to the importance of autonomy. This approach is in line with previous studies, which argue that surveys on preferences often do not force the respondents to rank the relative importance of their preferences or to contrast the preference dimensions directly (Busemeyer et al., 2018; Esser & Lindh, 2018; Hörisch et al., 2020). This can result in respondents ascribing high

⁶As recommended by the ESS, data are weighted with both poststratification and population weights.




FIGURE 1 Work values of 18 to 65 year olds in 2004. Source: Calculated from ESS (2004) data




FIGURE 2 Work values of 18 to 65 year olds in 2010. Source: Calculated from ESS (2010) data

importance to each preference, without seeing the preferences in relation to each other. To counteract this possible overestimation, we therefore use the difference between security and autonomy as a dependent variable, showing

the relative importance of the preferences. Thus, we investigate the extent to which the relevance of security changes, thereby following the latest developments in the literature on survey methodology.

Independent variables

To assess the impact of labor market policies and changes in economic indicators on work values, we included five country-level measures.⁷ First, we include the share of industry as percentage of GDP (World Bank, 2020a) to look at the structure of the labor market. Subsequently, we look at the level of protection against unemployment (OECD, 2020) and include the replacement rate under the unemployment insurance scheme (Scruggs et al., 2017). Third, we examine the role of political action, by including the spending on active market policies (Armingeon et al., 2019). Finally, we use a general assessment of the economic situation. For this purpose, we include the unemployment rate⁸ (World Bank, 2020b). Here, previous research has found that “a country's unemployment level is decisive for the perception of job security” (Esser & Olsen, 2012, p. 447), in the sense that it influences the probability of finding an alternative job in case of unemployment. We use the unemployment rate both to examine the question of the influence of the economic situation and as a general control variable at the country level. For better comparability, all country-level variables have been standardized (Gelman & Hill, 2006).

Control variables

We include five individual-level control variables in our analysis that were previously found to be related to work values, for which variances are expected.

First, in line with previous research (Esser & Olsen, 2012) and to check for a curvilinear relationship with work values, age is included.

Second, we control for the influence of gender (binary distinction between men (=1) and women). The literature has produced various findings on this topic in recent decades. In the early years of the expansion of women's participation in the labor market, it was assumed that women had different preferences to men. This assumption was characterized, for example, by a lower relevance of intrinsic work values for them (Gallie, 2019). In the following decades, some authors expected the preferences of men and women to converge (Gallie, 2019). However, more recent studies have not been able to prove this. Instead, it appears that differences in work values between women and men

are relatively stable, as they are rooted in lifestyle choices, which are made by the individual within the opportunity structure they live in (Eagly & Wood, 2013). Recent research has shown that women show stronger preferences for intrinsic work values than men do (Cemalcilar et al., 2019; Esser & Lindh, 2018), which is what we expect to find in our study as well.

Third, we include educational level because this has repeatedly shown to be strongly correlated to intrinsic work values (Gallie et al., 2012). More specifically, differences in work values reflect the different experiences of individuals within the education system, in the sense that a stronger focus on intrinsic values can be expected to be associated with longer/higher education (Inglehart, 1977). Education is measured by the highest qualification level that respondents achieved, distinguishing between primary, secondary, and tertiary education.

Fourth, the current employment status of the respondents is included. A distinction is made here between respondents, who are employed, unemployed, in education, and inactive. It is assumed that work values differ according to the respective employment situation. For example, extrinsic work values are expected to decrease with more precarious or distant labor market positions (Esser & Lindh, 2018).

Fifth, socioeconomic classification is measured according to Oesch's class schema (Oesch, 2006) and included in the analysis as previous studies have shown that an individual's location in the employment structure affects their work values (Esser & Olsen, 2012; Oesch, 2006). This schema enables researchers to “differentiate between more or less advantageous positions within labor markets and production units” (Oesch, 2006, p. 265). Combining the hierarchical criterion of marketable skills and a distinction between different work logics (technical work logic, organizational work logic, and interpersonal service logic), the schema results in an eight-class categorization.

EMPIRICAL RESULTS

As previously mentioned, we work on a hierarchical data set. We expect work values to be shaped by predictors both at the individual level and at the country-year level. We ran random intercept models (see Table 1), where M1 consists of explanatory variables at the individual level. Within M2-M5 explanatory variables at the country-year level are added. This results in separate models for each labor market policy indicator.

First of all, the results of the analysis clearly show that between 2004 and 2010, there has been a change in the dependent variable, that is, in the preference of security over autonomy. More precisely, the need for security has increased.

⁷A detailed description of the macro indicators and their respective sources is given in Appendix C.

⁸We also ran models with GDP as an alternative assessment of the economic situation. However, this did not yield significant results. Furthermore, we ran models in which we included the gender pay gap to control for a potentially different impact on men and women. These models did not yield significant results either.

TABLE 1 Results of the models for the difference between security and autonomy

	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5
Year (2010 = 1)	0.146 [*] (2.06)	0.142 [*] (2.33)	0.150 ^{**} (2.74)	0.148 [*] (2.23)	0.143 [*] (2.07)
Age	0.0140 ^{***} (4.12)	0.0140 ^{***} (4.11)	0.0142 ^{***} (4.16)	0.0140 ^{***} (4.12)	0.0140 ^{***} (4.12)
Sex (male = 1)	0.0479 ^{***} (6.66)	0.0479 ^{***} (6.66)	0.0481 ^{***} (6.68)	0.0479 ^{***} (6.66)	0.0479 ^{***} (6.66)
Employment status ^x					
<i>In education</i>	-0.127 ^{***} (-7.82)	-0.127 ^{***} (-7.84)	-0.127 ^{***} (-7.81)	-0.127 ^{***} (-7.82)	-0.127 ^{***} (-7.82)
<i>Unemployed</i>	0.0189 (1.49)	0.0190 (1.50)	0.0190 (1.50)	0.0189 (1.49)	0.0189 (1.49)
<i>Inactive</i>	-0.132 ^{***} (-14.94)	-0.132 ^{***} (-14.94)	-0.132 ^{***} (-14.91)	-0.132 ^{***} (-14.94)	-0.132 ^{***} (-14.93)
Level of education ^{xx}					
<i>Secondary education</i>	-0.132 ^{***} (-7.88)	-0.134 ^{***} (-8.04)	-0.127 ^{***} (-7.67)	-0.132 ^{***} (-7.90)	-0.131 ^{***} (-7.85)
<i>Tertiary education</i>	-0.287 ^{***} (-15.35)	-0.290 ^{***} (-15.50)	-0.282 ^{***} (-15.19)	-0.287 ^{***} (-15.37)	-0.287 ^{***} (-15.32)
Oesch's class schema ^{xxx}					
<i>Small business owners</i>	0.172 ^{***} (7.22)	0.172 ^{***} (7.22)	0.172 ^{***} (7.22)	0.172 ^{***} (7.22)	0.172 ^{***} (7.22)
<i>Technical (semi)professionals</i>	0.331 ^{***} (13.25)	0.331 ^{***} (13.25)	0.331 ^{***} (13.25)	0.331 ^{***} (13.25)	0.331 ^{***} (13.25)
<i>Production workers</i>	0.590 ^{***} (25.49)	0.589 ^{***} (25.47)	0.590 ^{***} (25.51)	0.590 ^{***} (25.49)	0.590 ^{***} (25.49)
<i>(Associate) managers</i>	0.306 ^{***} (13.23)	0.306 ^{***} (13.23)	0.306 ^{***} (13.23)	0.306 ^{***} (13.23)	0.306 ^{***} (13.24)
<i>Clerks</i>	0.435 ^{***} (18.12)	0.435 ^{***} (18.13)	0.435 ^{***} (18.13)	0.435 ^{***} (18.13)	0.435 ^{***} (18.12)
<i>Sociocultural (semi)professionals</i>	0.276 ^{***} (11.76)	0.276 ^{***} (11.75)	0.276 ^{***} (11.77)	0.276 ^{***} (11.76)	0.276 ^{***} (11.76)
<i>Service workers</i>	0.484 ^{***} (20.92)	0.483 ^{***} (20.91)	0.484 ^{***} (20.94)	0.484 ^{***} (20.92)	0.484 ^{***} (20.92)
Unemployment rate	0.0875 ^{**} (2.89)	0.105 ^{***} (3.89)	0.0762 ^{**} (3.00)	0.0741 [*] (2.50)	0.0884 ^{**} (2.96)
Industry		0.111 ^{***} (3.73)			
Expenditures on ALMP			-0.116 ^{***} (-4.70)		
Replacement rate				-0.0799 [*] (-2.46)	
Employment protection					0.0392 (1.13)

(Continues)

TABLE 1 (Continued)

	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5
Constant	-0.293 ^{***} (-5.27)	-0.287 ^{***} (-5.80)	-0.293 ^{***} (-6.39)	-0.294 ^{***} (-5.58)	-0.292 ^{***} (-5.33)
Var (countryyear)	1.53e-13 (-0.97)	2.73e-13 (-0.81)	3.92e-13 (-0.91)	1.98e-13 (-1.04)	1.67e-13 (-0.99)
Var (country)	0.0466 ^{***} (-12.65)	0.0343 ^{***} (-14.04)	0.0278 ^{***} (-14.75)	0.0407 ^{***} (-13.29)	0.0448 ^{***} (-12.80)
Var (residual)	0.536 ^{***} (-100.19)	0.536 ^{***} (-100.19)	0.536 ^{***} (-100.18)	0.536 ^{***} (-100.19)	0.536 ^{***} (-100.19)
Observations	51,626	51,626	51,626	51,626	51,626
AIC	114,521.9	114,511.7	114,507.2	114,518.1	114,522.6
BIC	114,698.9	114,697.6	114,693.1	114,704.0	114,708.5

Note: x = The reference category is in paid work. xx = The reference category is primary education. xxx = The reference category is "Self-employed professionals and large employers." *t* statistics in parentheses.

* $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$.

Source: Own calculations based on European Social Survey data, World Bank data, the Comparative Political Data Set, and the Comparative Welfare Entitlements Data Set.

This forms the basis for testing the first hypothesis. If we now look at the influence of the unemployment rate, we see a significant positive effect on preferences for security over autonomy. Evidently, the preference for security increases as unemployment rates rise. The results indicate that the first hypothesis can be confirmed. Thus, the result suggest that an increase in extrinsic work values can be expected in economically turbulent times.

A look at the general influence of labor market policies, independent of time and change, on work values now reveals further relevant results. First, with regard to the share of industry the hypothesis formulated above is also confirmed, as work values in countries with a higher industry share shift toward security. This is not about the direct effect on individual workers in the industry, but supports our expectations that a higher industry share in a country goes along with a higher demand for security. Reasons for this could be that not only the industry itself but also the suppliers (e.g., external IT services or consulting services for the industry) may be affected. A higher share of industry is accompanied by a higher share of exports, which in turn can increase safety expectations in the context of, for example, labor market challenges such as globalization, dualization, and the financial crisis.

Furthermore, our findings support our third hypothesis as the effect on active labor market policies is strong and shows that the preferences for security declines as expenditures on active labor market policies increase. This is not about the effect of a single policy but about general labor market patterns, that is, the differences between countries and their respective labor market policies. The empirical results show that employees' preferences in countries with higher expenditures for active labor market policies are less orientated around security than autonomy. As active labor market policies comprise

a wide variety of measures (Fredriksson, 2021), this might be driven by several factors. For this reason, we calculated the impact of individual measures of ALMP as part of a sensitivity analysis. The detailed regression results of this can be found in the Online Appendix. On the one hand, every measure comprised within the concept of active labor market policies share the aim of fighting unemployment effectively, for example, by securing existing jobs or by implementing short-term work schemes (Hörisch & Weber, 2014). On the other hand, they also might lower the expected costs of becoming unemployed by providing training programs or by means of direct job-creation schemes in case of unemployment. The results of the sensitivity analysis show that two measures have a significant influence in the way that they decrease the preference for security. These are, on the one hand, public employment services and administration, and on the other hand training programs. In contrast, job creation, start-up incentives and employment incentives show no significant influence. It should be noted, however, that at least direct job creation and start-up incentives are much smaller in their (financial) scope than the two significant ALMPs. It could also be that they are simply used too little to have a (significant) impact. Nevertheless, the results suggest that, public employment services and administration as one aspect for lowering the costs of becoming unemployed, as well as training opportunities as a factor that helps to secure existing jobs, decrease the preference for security.

In contrast, the findings for our fourth hypothesis on passive labor market policies that include employment protection and a replacement rate in case of unemployment are rather mixed. Employment protection does not show a significant influence on work values. In contrast, the opposite effect is shown for the replacement rate. For countries

with a higher replacement rate, the preferences for security becomes weaker. This finding—which is in line with our expectations—essentially corresponds with classical economic expectations as higher replacement rates per definition lower the (economic) costs of unemployment.

Concluding, the analysis of the influence of the variables on the individual level now shows the following results. With increasing age, also the preference for security over autonomy increases. More men than women prefer security over autonomy and the preference for security decreases with increasing education. Looking at the influence of class, all groups have a greater preference for security than the reference group, which consists of self-employed professionals and large employers. Here, small business owners constitute the group with the lowest effect size and production workers the group with the highest. A mixed picture emerges with regard to employment status. Those who were in education or inactive have a lower preference for security than those in paid work (reference group). Unemployment, on the other hand, has no significant impact.

It should be noted that we ran several checks to further assess the robustness of the presented effects. In a first step, we applied a manual jackknifing procedure to ensure that the results are not distorted by individual influential countries. We tested the influence of a single country by excluding a country when estimating the fully specified models.⁹ The results indicate that some models could potentially be vulnerable to the exclusion of a country. However, the exclusion of a country and all observations in this country might cause a loss of statistical power in multilevel analyses. Thus, we ran further models in which instead of excluding those countries, we included dummies for the potential influential cases (van der Meer et al., 2010). Following this, it became clear that the results of the model for the replacement rate seem to be vulnerable to the exclusion of the United Kingdom. Following the country dummy procedure, the presented effects for the replacement rate changed slightly to -0.118^{***} (see table Appendix D). Thus, the previously mentioned result is reinforced and does not change the direction.

What are the policy implications that can be derived from the results reported above? Building on the research by Bredgaard et al. (2006) and Wilthagen and Tros (2004), who convincingly argued that successful diffusion and transferability of flexicurity policies depend heavily on the political institutional capacity, we would suggest that also work values of the individuals in a country have to complement the labor market policies implemented. For example, active labor market policies in the form of start-up incentives can only be successfully implemented if there

is a certain willingness to become self-employed or an entrepreneur because this implies that the value of autonomy is acknowledged compared with security—at least to a certain degree. Otherwise, start-up incentives offered by a country will miss the mark. The same applies to active labor market measures (Graham et al., 2010) that foster retraining for older employees or migration incentives offered by national welfare policy makers or the European Union, as these presuppose a certain degree of flexibility regarding the contents of the work and the willingness to move, respectively.

Accordingly, we argue that further research should consider thoroughly the work values of the target group when evaluating labor market policy measures. We would therefore expect the limited success, for example, of the EU's endeavors to harmonize the labor market—as well as the adoption, policy diffusion or shared policy learning of national labor markets—to be rooted at least to some degree in the negligence of the work values of the target group.

CONCLUSION

In this article, we have shown that despite EU harmonization endeavors work values regarding the relative importance of security compared with autonomy still vary greatly between European countries. Our results suggest that—in addition to the state of the literature on the micro level—the preference for security over autonomy is substantially driven by the economic structure of a country and its labor market policy making. Unsurprisingly, where unemployment is high, the preferences for security are stronger. In addition, our results underline the influence of active labor market policies on work values as high expenditures on active labor market policies reduce the relative importance of security either by securing existing jobs or by lowering the (social and economic) costs in case of unemployment. By analyzing data from 2004 and 2010, the results suggest that economically turbulent times are associated with the development of individuals' work values in different European countries. Here, we were able to show that work values changed toward a higher preference for security over autonomy. Further, and regardless of this change, we were able to show that in terms of the general influence of labor market policies on work values, in countries with a high industry relevance for the overall GDP, security became more important than autonomy. The same effect was presented for expenditures on ALMP; in contrast, in countries with high replacement rates in case of unemployment, the relative importance of security decreased. Last but not least, we discussed the possible implications of the proven heterogeneity of work values for national as well as European labor market policy making by arguing that labor

⁹A detailed description of the jackknifing procedure can be provided on request from the authors.

market policy making has to account for the work values of their target group to be implemented successfully.

With these findings, we hope to advance the literature in at least two ways. First, we hope to advance the literature on work values by emphasizing the interplay between work values and labor market policies. Our results stress that work values are not only driven by individual factors such as age, gender, education, employment status, or sector of employment. Besides these factors—and not to mention the vast body of literature that convincingly stresses both the prevailing relative stability of work values (Clark, 2005; Esser & Lindh, 2018; Gallie, 2007) as well as the importance of intergenerational transmission on work values and social policy preferences (Cemalcilar et al., 2018; Tosun et al., 2019)—we show that the development of work values can be moderately influenced by economically turbulent times. Furthermore, we demonstrate that this variation is substantially shaped by the economic structure of a country as well as their labor market policies. Second, we hope to speak to the literature on public policies as well as on policy learning and policy diffusion by arguing that—to fight unemployment successfully—labor market policy makers have to consider the preferences of their target group.

Some limitations need to be mentioned. Because of the given number of countries and the resulting limited degrees of freedom only a limited number of macrovariables could be included in the models. The results can, therefore, only be considered in the context of European countries, and further analysis on a broader data basis that allows for more extensive models would be desirable. Furthermore, the use of cross-sectional data brings the well-known problem of the limited possibility to examine causalities; especially to get closer to the question of causality, panel data would be particularly well suited for further analysis here. Thus, further research and additional data with more points in time would be required to gain a deeper understanding of the interplay between changes in labor market public policies, specific labor market reforms, and work values. In addition, it would be interesting to examine the interactions between country-level variables and individual-level characteristics. This would give the opportunity to see whether welfare state policies affect the various subgroups of the population equally or whether there are differences based on individual characteristics.

Nevertheless, by comparing data before and after the outbreak of the financial crisis, we were able to show that variation at the country level in the form of economic structures and labor market policies do influence individual work values. Furthermore, it is worth noting that we were able to show that no trade-off between the two dimensions of security and autonomy existed. Instead, both dimensions are positively correlated and are thus more related in the sense of an overall aspirations level for work values. As can be seen in Figures 1 and 2, the countries with the highest aspiration

levels are the southern European countries characterized by high unemployment rates, namely Greece (GR), Spain (ES), and Portugal (PT). On the other hand, the Netherlands (NL) and Denmark (DK) have the lowest aspiration levels. These two countries are usually seen as the forerunners of flexicurity (Arndt & Hörisch, 2015), a characteristic of labor market policies combining the command of flexibility with higher levels of security (Gallie, 2017). This overall impression can provide the basis for future research, for example in the form of in-depth country studies.

Besides, our results could facilitate future studies of whether and to what extent labor market policies were particularly successful (or failed) because they fitted (or did not fit) with the work values of the individuals in a specific country. This would also help us to better understand the chances as well as limits of policy diffusion and policy learning between different countries and welfare state systems.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

We would like to thank Christin Heinz-Fischer for her valuable assistance in data preparation and Laurence Crumbie for language editing.

CONFLICT OF INTEREST

No conflict of interest has been declared by the authors.

DATA AVAILABILITY STATEMENT

The data that support the findings of this study are openly available. Appendix C provides links to the respective sources.

ORCID

Julia Weiss  <https://orcid.org/0000-0001-7315-2687>

Felix Hörisch  <https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0503-3680>

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SUPPORTING INFORMATION

Additional supporting information may be found online in the Supporting Information section.

How to cite this article: Weiss, J., & Hörisch, F. (2022). Security or autonomy? A comparative analysis of work values and labor market policies in different European welfare states. *International Journal of Social Welfare*, 31, 112–128. <https://doi.org/10.1111/ijsw.12497>

APPENDIX A

SUMMARY STATISTICS

Variable	Mean	SD	Min	Max	Observations
<i>Individual-level variables</i>					
Difference between security and autonomy (dependent variable)	0.061	0.80	−4	4	51.626
Age	42.85	12.81	18	65	51.626
Sex (male = 1)	0.48	0.50	0	1	51.626
<i>Employment status</i>					
Employed	0.67	0.47	0	1	51.626
In education	0.05	0.21	0	1	51.626
Unemployed	0.07	0.26	0	1	51.626
Inactive	0.21	0.41	0	1	51.626
<i>Educational level</i>					
Primary education	0.26	0.44	0	1	51.626
Secondary education	0.56	0.49	0	1	51.626
Tertiary education	0.18	0.38	0	1	51.626
<i>Oesch's class schema</i>					
Self-employed professionals and large employers	0.02	0.15	0	1	51.626
Small business owners	0.11	0.31	0	1	51.626
Technical (semi)professionals	0.06	0.24	0	1	51.626
Production workers	0.22	0.41	0	1	51.626
(Associate) managers	0.14	0.35	0	1	51.626
Clerks	0.11	0.31	0	1	51.626
Sociocultural (semi)professionals	0.12	0.33	0	1	51.626
Service workers	0.22	0.42	0	1	51.626
<i>Country-level variables</i>					
Industry	−0.004	0.99	−1.90	1.99	51.626
ALMP	0.04	1.01	−1.45	3.32	51.626
Replacement rate	0.013	1.01	−2.66	1.54	51.626
Unemployment protection	−0.02	0.99	−1.69	2.91	51.626
Unemployment rate	−0.03	0.99	−1.46	2.70	51.626

Note: The country-level variables shown here are the standardized values used for the analysis. The nonstandardized values by country and year can be found in Appendix B.

APPENDIX B

DESCRIPTIVES OF THE MACRO INDICATORS AND WORK VALUE INDICES PER COUNTRY AND YEAR

	Unemployment rate		Industry		Expenditure on ALMP		Replacement rate		Employment protection		Security index (mean)		Autonomy index (mean)	
	2004	2010	2004	2010	2004	2010	2004	2010	2004	2010	2004	2010	2004	2010
Austria	5.63	5.34	27.07	25.52	0.60	0.75	0.73	0.73	2.37	2.37	4.10	4.25	4.15	4.17
Belgium	7.36 (8.44)	7.14 (8.29)	22.96 (22.57)	20.78 (20.89)	0.63 (0.65)	0.84 (0.76)	0.71	0.73	1.89	2.08	4.10	4.10	4.12	4.06
Czech Republic	8.21	6.71	34.08	33.41	0.23	0.26	0.52	0.52	3.31	3.05	4.20	4.09	3.83	3.70
Denmark	5.20 (4.83)	7.46 (7.57)	22.13 (22.24)	19.70 (20.06)	1.64 (1.53)	2.02	0.64	0.59	2.68	2.13 (2.20)	3.50	3.64	3.97	4.02
Finland	10.36	8.39	29.37	26.16	0.93	1.00	0.68	0.65	2.17	2.17	3.92	3.99	3.87	3.99
France	8.50 (8.91)	8.87 (8.81)	19.61 (19.96)	17.85 (17.98)	0.89 (0.95)	1.13 (0.93)	0.70	0.69	2.47	2.38	4.04	4.11	4.09	4.06
Germany	10.7 (11.17)	6.96 (5.82)	26.40 (26.35)	26.85 (27.07)	1.12	0.89 (0.77)	0.71	0.71	2.68	2.68	4.16	4.25	4.01	4.20
Greece	9.99	17.87	17.8	13.68	0.07	0.09	0.62	0.66	2.8	2.17	4.67	4.61	4.43	4.28
Hungary	7.12	11.17	27.13	25.32	0.32	0.63	0.51	0.61	2.00	2.00	4.41	4.46	3.99	3.99
Ireland	4.34	15.35 (15.45)	30.00	24.56 (24.50)	0.61	0.89 (0.88)	0.59	0.71	1.44	1.27 (1.40)	4.20	4.07	4.29	4.09
Netherlands	4.64 (4.72)	4.45 (4.97)	20.71 (21.02)	19.69 (20.06)	1.26 (1.18)	1.11 (1.02)	0.78	0.82 (0.78)	2.88	2.82	3.61	3.76	3.94	4.03
Norway	4.26 (4.38)	3.52 (3.21)	35.00 (37.97)	34.77 (37.03)	0.76 (0.72)	0.62 (0.56)	0.72	0.72	2.33	2.33	4.07	4.18	4.04	4.05
Poland	19.07	9.64	28.97	29.18 (29.83)	0.34	0.68	0.35	0.32	2.23	2.23	4.43	4.47	4.13	4.12
Portugal	7.58 (6.31)	12.67 (10.77)	21.38 (22.24)	19.34 (19.95)	0.65	0.58 (0.67)	0.76	0.77	4.42	4.13	4.51	4.27	4.37	4.01
Slovakia	18.6	14.38 (13.61)	32.04	30.67 (31.07)	0.23	0.32 (0.29)	0.51	0.55	2.22	2.22	4.07	4.15	3.78	3.48
Spain	11.09 (9.15)	21.39	27.0 (27.17)	22.08	0.73 (0.76)	0.87	0.75	0.77	2.36	2.21	4.51	4.51	4.27	4.23
Sweden	6.69 (7.49)	8.61 (7.80)	24.98 (24.82)	23.80 (23.56)	1.03 (1.10)	1.11 (1.16)	0.80 (0.78)	0.66 (0.64)	2.61	2.61	3.88	3.94	4.15	4.16
Switzerland	4.32 (4.43)	4.81 (4.40)	25.87 (26.00)	25.60 (25.96)	0.70 (0.67)	0.60 (0.55)	0.84 (0.83)	0.85	1.60	1.60	3.85	3.95	4.17	4.17
United Kingdom	4.60 (4.72)	7.79 (8.04)	20.26 (20.21)	18.87 (18.67)	0.41 (0.39)	0.38 (0.23)	0.42	0.44 (0.45)	1.26	1.26	3.95	4.06	4.07	4.14

Note: In some countries, the interviewees were surveyed in different years. Therefore, the number in parentheses indicates the value of the respective indicator at the time of the survey of the smaller group of each countries sample if the value differs from the other time point. The macro indicators have been standardized before being included in the models.

APPENDIX C

DESCRIPTION OF COUNTRY LEVEL VARIABLES

Name of variable	Source	Description	Link
Industry	World Bank	Industry (including construction), value added as % of GDP	https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NV.IND.TOTL.ZS
Unemployment	World Bank	Unemployment rate (% of total labor force) (modeled ILO estimate)	https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.UEM.TOTL.ZS
Employment protection (PLMP)	OECD	Employment protection index: The index incorporates 8 data items concerning regulations for individual dismissals.	https://www.oecd.org/employment/emp/oecdindicatorsofemploymentprotection.htm
Unemployment insurance (PLMP)	CWED	Replacement rate: Family (100%/0%)	http://cwed2.org/
ALMP	CPD	Total public and mandatory private expenditure on active labor market programs as percentage of GDP	https://www.cpds-data.org/index.php/data
Employment services and administration (ALMP)	CPD	Public and mandatory private employment services and administration as a percentage of GDP	https://www.cpds-data.org/index.php/data
Training (ALMP)	CPD	Public and mandatory private expenditure on labor market training as a percentage of GDP	https://www.cpds-data.org/index.php/data
Employment incentives (ALMP)	CPD	Public and mandatory private expenditure on employment incentives (recruitment and employment maintenance incentives) as a percentage of GDP	https://www.cpds-data.org/index.php/data
Job creation (ALMP)	CPD	Public and private mandatory expenditure on direct job creation (usually in the public or nonprofit sector) as a percentage of GDP	https://www.cpds-data.org/index.php/data
Start-up incentives (ALMP)	CPD	Public and mandatory private support of unemployed persons (or closely related groups) starting enterprises or becoming self-employed as a percentage of GDP	https://www.cpds-data.org/index.php/data

APPENDIX D

MODEL FOR REPLACEMENT RATE
WITH UK COUNTRY DUMMY

	M Appendix
Year (2010 = 1)	0.149* (2.42)
Age	0.000908** (3.15)
Sex (male = 1)	0.0483*** (6.71)
Employment status ^x	
<i>In education</i>	-0.128*** (-7.79)
<i>unemployed</i>	0.0187 (1.47)
<i>Inactive</i>	-0.130*** (-14.61)
Level of education ^{xx}	
<i>Secondary education</i>	-0.135*** (-8.08)
<i>Tertiary education</i>	-0.291*** (-15.56)
Oesch's class schema ^{xxx}	
<i>Small business owners</i>	0.172*** (7.21)
<i>Technical (semi)professionals</i>	0.330*** (13.21)
<i>Production workers</i>	0.588*** (25.43)
<i>(Associate) managers</i>	0.306*** (13.21)
<i>Clerks</i>	0.434*** (18.09)
<i>Sociocultural (semi)professionals</i>	0.275*** (11.74)
<i>Service workers</i>	0.483*** (20.87)
Unemployment rate	0.0589* (2.02)
UK (=1)	-0.391* (-2.51)
Replacement rate	-0.118*** (-3.46)
Constant	-0.290*** (-5.55)

APPENDIX D (Continued)

	M Appendix
Var (country-year)	2.52e-13 (-0.79)
Var (country)	0.0355*** (-13.96)
Var (residual)	0.536*** (-100.18)
Observations	51,626
AIC	114,521.1
BIC	114,715.8

Note: x = The reference category is in paid work. xx, The reference category is primary education. xxx = The reference category is "Self-employed professionals and large employers." *t* statistics in parentheses.

Source: Own calculations based on ESS data, World Bank data, the Comparative Political Data Set, and the Comparative Welfare Entitlements Data Set.

* $p < 0.05$,

** $p < 0.01$,

*** $p < 0.001$.

(Continues)