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# Article An Empirical Law of the Stock Option Market

Zeitschrift für Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaften (ZWS) - Vierteljahresschrift der Gesellschaft für Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaften, Verein für Socialpolitik

**Provided in Cooperation with:** Duncker & Humblot, Berlin

*Suggested Citation:* Abel, U.; Boing, G. (1986) : An Empirical Law of the Stock Option Market, Zeitschrift für Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaften (ZWS) - Vierteljahresschrift der Gesellschaft für Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaften, Verein für Socialpolitik, ISSN 0342-1783, Duncker & Humblot, Berlin, Vol. 106, Iss. 1, pp. 15-24, https://doi.org/10.3790/schm.106.1.15

This Version is available at: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/291629

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# An Empirical Law of the Stock Option Market

By U. Abel and G. Boing

The investigation of the laws governing the prices of stock options is a problem of theoretical and practical interest. The paper empirically studies the relationship between the market prices of options out of the money and the difference between stock and exercise prices, the former being fixed. We use linear regression with subsequent analysis of the residuals. The results are compared with those obtained by the Black-Scholes model. Several applications of the findings are suggested.

# **I. Introduction**

Option prices depend on several parameters, such as stock price, striking (exercise) price, expiration time, dividends paid on stock before the expiration of the option, interest rates etc. Many attempts have been made to theoretically derive option or warrant prices under more or less restrictive model assumptions (e.g. References (1), (3), (4), (5), (7), (12), (14)).

The most famous valuation formula is undoubtedly the one proposed by *Black* and *Scholes* in 1973 for non dividend-paying stocks (3). It has prompted an extensive discussion of the model assumptions and empirical studies of the model fit. Today the formula (perhaps in an extended form allowing for dividends (16)) appears to be widely accepted.

Its greatest shortcoming is that it assumes a constant variance rate ("volatility")  $v^2$  which is an explicit model parameter. In reality the volatility of a stock can hardly be regarded as constant over the time to maturity of the option, and, in any way, determining the variance rate poses a practical problem. Clearly, historical estimates of v (2), (8), (9) can be unreliable and dangerous if money is at stake. Implied estimates are more satisfactory as they are derived from the present market. Their rationale is as follows:

Let k options of a stock be in the market priced at  $O_i$ , i = 1, ..., k. Putting  $O_i = \hat{O}_i(v)$ .


where 
$$\hat{O}_i(v)$$
 are the prices predicted by the *Black/Scholes* formula for unspecified  $v$ , estimated values  $v_1, \ldots, v_k$  are obtained which can be weighted and averaged to yield a weighted implied variance rate of the stock (6), (11), (13), (15).

Various weighting schemes have been used in the literature, all more or less arbitrary or chosen on empirical grounds, so that, in principle, the application of the Black/Scholes model shares some features with empirical valuation formulas such as the one given by *Kassouf* (10).

# II. An empirical law of the option market


We focus on the special problem of the relationship between the prices of options which are out of the money and the difference between the stock and exercise prices, the former being fixed. We contend that this relationships is approximately loglinear.

Fig. 1 a/b shows that the hypothesis of loglinearity is not farfetched.



The empirical study was based on option prices as published in the Wall Street Journal. Only informative prices were taken into consideration, that is

Option prices of <sup>1</sup>/<sub>16</sub> were excluded because at this level (the lowest possible) numerous anomalies arise. E.g., on Sept. 21st, the October \$ 15, 20 and 25 puts of Homestake were all priced at <sup>1</sup>/<sub>16</sub>.



2. Stocks with less than three prices above  $\frac{1}{16}$  of options out of the money were excluded since they carried no information as to our hypothesis.

We were slightly more restrictive in that three option prices  $> \frac{1}{16}$  for successive exercise prices had to be available in order to qualify the stock for the analysis.

For puts and calls different days had to be chosen for we failed to find one single day where the criteria of selection were met by a satisfactorily large sample of both calls and puts. The data bases for the analysis were the following:

Calls	expiration in October 1982 prices of June 23rd, 1982 20 eligible stocks			
Puts	expiration in January 1983 prices of September 22nd, 1982 22 eligible stocks.			

For each selected stock a simple linear regression of

 $\log (O/S)$  vs  $\Delta = 100 \cdot |S - E|/S$ 

2 Zeitschrift für Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaften 1986/1

was performed (O, E, S denoting the option, exercise and stock prices respectively). Of course, log (O/S) and  $\Delta$  are linearly related if and only if log (O) and E - S are. The standardization was introduced in the hope that the result would prove independent of S and possibly even of the stock.

Unfortunately, no general test for linearity of a regression exists unless there are more degrees of freedoms than abscissa values, and this is not the case, here. It is, however, reasonable to assume that any alternative to linearity is either concavity or convexity. In both cases a systematic effect must show in the successive differences  $d_i = r_{i+1} - r_i$  of the residuals belonging to increasing abscissa values for each stock. In case of convexity the  $d_i$ ,  $i = 1, 2, \ldots$  should increase, in case of concavity they should decrease.

Tables 1 a/b and 2 a/b show the results. The  $d_i$  are very small compared with the change in the log (O/S)-values as predicted by the regression. This indicates that the linear model fits well. In two cases the log (O/S) lie even on straight lines.

The Hodges-Lehmann estimators of the median differences of the  $d_i$ , i = 1, 2, 3 were

-0.001 and -0.11 for calls and 0.009 and 0.19 for puts.

While there is no perceptible monotonic trend in the  $d_i$  of calls, such a trend, though very slight, can be ascertained in the samples of puts (Jonckheere test against ordered alternatives, p < 0.01). However, there were only 10 out of 22 stocks with a *strictly* montonic increase. On the other hand, there were 4 stocks with a strictly monotonic decrease and 2 stocks with equality of the  $d_i$ . Summarizing, deviations from linearity, if any, were small and not systematic in the majority of the stocks.

Table 1 a/b shows that the intercepts of the regression lines were densely packed, while the differences in the slopes were rather marked. Since calls and puts had about the same time to maturiy, it makes sense to compare their regression parameters, especially for those stocks appearing in both analyses. Slopes and intercepts were smaller in puts than in calls (the arithmetic means were -2.39 and -6.99 in puts versus -2.27 and -6.24 in calls). The parameters of puts of a stock were strikingly similar to those of the calls of the same stock, and, as far as were differences, there seems to be no rule for their sign.

We have seen that the regression lines for different stocks were not equal. It might still, however, be true that, for a given stock, they do not depend on the stock price S. An empirical check of this hypothesis is difficult and must rely on few data because large changes of stock prices require some time to

STOCK	INTERC.	SLOPE	
FEDEXP	- 1.944107	- 7.94420	
FLUOR	- 2.531504	- 2.95640	
HALBTN	- 2.366208	- 4.91840	
HOMESTK	-2.027928	- 2.89740	
MERCK	-2.868246	- 8.36761	
MONSAN	-2.497658	- 10.60607	
PENNZ	-2.221898	- 3.03217	
STORTEC	- 2.240172	- 3.81818	
TELDYN	- 2.052711	- 8.53185	
AMEXP	- 2.368962	- 9.64208	
DIGEQ	-2.251492	- 9.15036	
HUTTON	- 1.815444	- 3.78057	
LILLY	- 2.540796	- 11.78133	
MERRIL	- 2.077980	- 5.36468	
COMSAT	- 2.177308	- 9.29057	
OAK	-2.164429	- 2.73604	
WESTUN	- 2.208561	- 6.73506	
BALDUN	- 2.388497	- 4.81473	
DSHAM	- 2.546658	- 3.36863	
WANGB	- 2.023090	- 5.05841	
	Table 1 b		
STOCK	INTERC.	SLOPE	
STOCK BURLN		SLOPE - 6.51496	
BURLN	INTERC.		
BURLN EASTKD	INTERC. - 2.493704	- 6.51496	
BURLN EASTKD FEDEXP	INTERC. - 2.493704 - 2.626853	- 6.51496 - 12.17279	
BURLN EASTKD FEDEXP HOMESTK	INTERC. - 2.493704 - 2.626853 - 2.203536	- 6.51496 - 12.17279 - 7.34584	
BURLN EASTKD FEDEXP HOMESTK IBM	INTERC. - 2.493704 - 2.626853 - 2.203536 - 2.031629	- 6.51496 - 12.17279 - 7.34584 - 4.37037	
BURLN EASTKD FEDEXP HOMESTK IBM JOHNJ	INTERC. - 2.493704 - 2.626853 - 2.203536 - 2.031629 - 2.900605	- 6.51496 - 12.17279 - 7.34584 - 4.37037 - 6.53806	
BURLN EASTKD FEDEXP HOMESTK IBM JOHNJ MMM	INTERC. - 2.493704 - 2.626853 - 2.203536 - 2.031629 - 2.900605 - 2.761150	$\begin{array}{rrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrr$	
BURLN EASTKD FEDEXP HOMESTK IBM JOHNJ MMM MONSAN	INTERC. - 2.493704 - 2.626853 - 2.203536 - 2.031629 - 2.900605 - 2.761150 - 2.575750	$\begin{array}{rrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrr$	
BURLN EASTKD FEDEXP HOMESTK IBM JOHNJ MMM MONSAN PEPSI	INTERC. - 2.493704 - 2.626853 - 2.203536 - 2.031629 - 2.900605 - 2.761150 - 2.575750 - 2.894036	$\begin{array}{rrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrr$	
BURLN EASTKD FEDEXP HOMESTK IBM JOHNJ MMM MONSAN PEPSI FELDYN	INTERC. - 2.493704 - 2.626853 - 2.203536 - 2.031629 - 2.900605 - 2.761150 - 2.575750 - 2.894036 - 3.237197	$\begin{array}{rrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrr$	
BURLN EASTKD FEDEXP HOMESTK IBM JOHNJ MMM MONSAN PEPSI FELDYN FEXIN	INTERC. - 2.493704 - 2.626853 - 2.203536 - 2.031629 - 2.900605 - 2.761150 - 2.575750 - 2.894036 - 3.237197 - 2.019670	$\begin{array}{rrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrr$	
BURLN EASTKD FEDEXP HOMESTK IBM JOHNJ MMM MONSAN PEPSI FELDYN FELDYN FEXIN AMEXP	INTERC. - 2.493704 - 2.626853 - 2.203536 - 2.031629 - 2.900605 - 2.761150 - 2.575750 - 2.894036 - 3.237197 - 2.019670 - 2.251436	$\begin{array}{rrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrr$	
BURLN EASTKD FEDEXP HOMESTK IBM JOHNJ MMM MONSAN PEPSI FELDYN FELDYN FEXIN AMEXP DIGEQ	INTERC. - 2.493704 - 2.626853 - 2.203536 - 2.031629 - 2.900605 - 2.761150 - 2.575750 - 2.894036 - 3.237197 - 2.019670 - 2.251436 - 1.981937	$\begin{array}{rrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrr$	
BURLN EASTKD FEDEXP HOMESTK IBM JOHNJ MMM MONSAN PEPSI FELDYN FEXIN AMEXP DIGEQ DUPONT	INTERC. - 2.493704 - 2.626853 - 2.203536 - 2.031629 - 2.900605 - 2.761150 - 2.575750 - 2.894036 - 3.237197 - 2.019670 - 2.251436 - 1.981937 - 2.248021	$\begin{array}{rrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrr$	
	INTERC. - 2.493704 - 2.626853 - 2.203536 - 2.031629 - 2.900605 - 2.761150 - 2.575750 - 2.894036 - 3.237197 - 2.019670 - 2.251436 - 1.981937 - 2.248021 - 2.821536	$\begin{array}{rrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrr$	
BURLN EASTKD FEDEXP HOMESTK IBM JOHNJ MMM MONSAN PEPSI TELDYN TEXIN AMEXP DIGEQ DUPONT HUTTON MERRIL	INTERC. - 2.493704 - 2.626853 - 2.03536 - 2.031629 - 2.900605 - 2.761150 - 2.575750 - 2.894036 - 3.237197 - 2.019670 - 2.251436 - 1.981937 - 2.248021 - 2.821536 - 1.941320	$\begin{array}{rrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrr$	
BURLN EASTKD FEDEXP HOMESTK IBM JOHNJ MMM MONSAN PEPSI TELDYN TEXIN AMEXP DIGEQ DUPONT HUTTON	INTERC. - 2.493704 - 2.626853 - 2.203536 - 2.031629 - 2.900605 - 2.761150 - 2.575750 - 2.894036 - 3.237197 - 2.019670 - 2.251436 - 1.981937 - 2.248021 - 2.821536 - 1.941320 - 1.840691	$\begin{array}{rrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrr$	
BURLN EASTKD FEDEXP HOMESTK IBM JOHNJ MMM MONSAN PEPSI TELDYN TEXIN AMEXP DIGEQ DUPONT HUTTON MERRIL MOTORLA PROCG	INTERC. - 2.493704 - 2.626853 - 2.203536 - 2.031629 - 2.900605 - 2.761150 - 2.575750 - 2.894036 - 3.237197 - 2.019670 - 2.251436 - 1.981937 - 2.248021 - 2.821536 - 1.941320 - 1.840691 - 2.365029	$\begin{array}{rrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrr$	
BURLN EASTKD FEDEXP HOMESTK IBM JOHNJ MMM MONSAN PEPSI TELDYN TEXIN AMEXP DIGEQ DUPONT HUTTON MERRIL MOTORLA	INTERC. - 2.493704 - 2.626853 - 2.203536 - 2.031629 - 2.900605 - 2.761150 - 2.575750 - 2.894036 - 3.237197 - 2.019670 - 2.251436 - 1.981937 - 2.248021 - 2.821536 - 1.941320 - 1.840691 - 2.365029 - 2.953498	$\begin{array}{rrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrr$	
BURLN EASTKD FEDEXP HOMESTK IBM JOHNJ MMM MONSAN PEPSI TELDYN TEXIN AMEXP DIGEQ DUPONT HUTTON MERRIL MOTORLA PROCG WESTNG	INTERC. - 2.493704 - 2.626853 - 2.203536 - 2.031629 - 2.900605 - 2.761150 - 2.575750 - 2.894036 - 3.237197 - 2.019670 - 2.251436 - 1.981937 - 2.248021 - 2.821536 - 1.941320 - 1.840691 - 2.365029 - 2.953498 - 2.585875	$\begin{array}{rrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrr$	

Table 1 a

# U. Abel and G. Boing

# Table 2 a

# **Successive Differences of Residuals**

NO	D1	D2	D3	D4	
FEDEXP	235175	006917	.244398	( <u>*</u> )	
FLUOR	.202733	202733		<del></del>	
HALBTN	.020637	.017681	.002938	-	
HOMESTK	.160299	.077412	.263515	_	
MERCK	.026622	.026622	-	-	
MONSAN	.095310	.095310	-		
PENNZ	.071381	.053032	120991	.0305587	
STORTEC	.127967	.127967		—	
TELDYN	062600	.065234	024378	-	
AMEXP	052680	.052680		-	
DIGEQ	113763	.048756	.048756		
HUTTON	.220916	.220916			
LILLY	.309520	.309520	-	-	
MERRIL	.314304	314304	-	-	
COMSAT	.038481	038481	-	S	
OAK	.111572	111572			
WESTUN	235002	.235002		—	
BALDUN	.009475	.343481	467449	-	
DSHAM	.412088	412088		_	
WANGB	-235002	.235002			

#### Table 2 b

# **Successive Differences of Residuals**

NO	D1 D2		D3	D4	D5	
NO	DI	D2	D3	D4	D3	
BURLN	018870	.018870	-	-	-	
EASTKD	105532	.042684	.048619	—	-	
FEDEXP	078327	.078327	-	—	-	
HOMESTK	022607	059962	.102557	—	-	
IBM	155301	.020430	.128061	-	—	
JOHNJ	111572	.111572	_	-	-	
MMM	008687	.072049	087379			
MONSAN	.426039	380436	.377249	421258	-	
PEPSI	020411	.020411	-	-	-	
TELDYN	142430	291465	.253466	.194043	157934	
TEXIN	221645	012083	237756	—	—	
AMEXP	011236	011236	—	-	-	
DIGEQ	.033605	257272	.161438	.110145	_	
DUPONT	053815	.053815	-	_	2 <u></u> 2	
HUTTON	000000	.000000	-	-	3 <del></del>	
MERRIL	031143	.006598	.022346	)	) <u> </u>	
MOTORLA	020469	168685	184189	.549780	-	
PROCG	.159227	159227	-		-	
WESTNG	.235002	.235002	—	—	_	
WESTUN	.000000	.000000	_	-		
BALDUN	154809	.154809	—	-	—	
WANGB	.018184	018184	_	-	1 <u></u> 1	

20

occur so that the change in time to maturity exerts influence on the option prices. The examples given in Table 3 show that the parameters of the linear regression remain constant even after pronounced short-term changes of the stock price. This stability is remarkable in view of the extreme sensitivity of the parameters to small variations of the option prices.

		Motorola maturity Apr. 1984		St. Oil Ohio maturity March 1984		Coleco maturity Apr. 1984	
date <sup>(a)</sup>		Dec. 2nd	Dec. 14th	Dec. 2nd	Dec. 14th	Dec. 16th Dec. 23r	
stock	price	1421/4	1353⁄4	453⁄4	413⁄4	253/8 205/8	
calls:	intercept slope	(b)	- 2.56 - 0.055	-2.61 - 0.154	-2.86 -0.165	- 1.86 - 0.115	- 1.88 - 0.1
puts:	intercept slope	- 2.88 - 0.065	- 2.74 - 0.065	- 2.94 - 0.254	(b)	- 1.92 - 0.159	-1.64 - 0.16

Table 3: Changes of the parameters of the linear regression of log (O/S) vs. |E - S| after sharp movements of stock prices.

(a) Year 1983. - (b) No calculation possible.

Without presenting a detailed analysis we finally note that for options *in the money* a loglinear relation between the premia and  $\triangle$  holds, too, though outliers are more frequent.


#### **III.** Discussion

The empirical investigation has shown that for fixed stock prices S a loglinear relationship between the prices O of options out of the money and the difference between S and the exercise price E very approximately holds. Observe that this is not a consequence of the interval E - S being small (so that it necessarily follows by Taylor expansion approximation). For a stock priced at about \$ 100, a \$ 40-interval (such as in Fig. 1) is not small as any investor knows, and, moreover, linearity between S - E and some other function of O (say O or  $O^2$ ) definitely does *not* hold.

The relationship put forward in this article is not incompatible with *Black/Scholes*'s formula as Fig. 2 shows. However, we have been unable, so far, to deduce approximate loglinearity from this formula.

Our finding gives a strong support to a special estimator for implied volatility of a stock, viz. the value v which minimizes

$$\sum_{i} (\log (O_i) - \log (\hat{O}_i))^2.$$



Apart from this, it can be applied in several ways.

First, it can be used for predictions of option prices for future stock prices. If changes in stock prices do not occur rapidly, prognosis will require interpolation between the prices predicted for the available times to maturity.

Second, it allows the easy detection of options which are under- or overvalued with respect to other options of the same stock.

Third, it can be exploited for practical investment. We suggest the following (winning?) strategy:

Determine the intercept and slope for the puts and calls of the same stock. Calculate the value  $S_{\min}$  such that a given spraddle, i.e. a combination of one put and one call of the stock with

$$E_{\rm call} > S > E_{\rm put}$$
,

assumes its minimum<sup>1</sup>. Invest when  $S = S_{min}$ . Take profit on any movement of the stock price.

 $<sup>^1\,</sup>$  Given the regression parameters,  $S_{\min}$  can be determined analytically by standard calculus.

#### Summary

It is shown that the relationship between the prices of options out of the money and the difference between stock and exercise prices, the former being fixed, is approximately loglinear. This finding can be applied in various ways.

#### Zusammenfassung

Es wird gezeigt, daß eine approximativ loglineare Beziehung besteht zwischen den Preisen von Optionen, die nicht im Geld sind, und der Differenz zwischen Basispreis und Aktienkurs, sofern letzterer konstant gehalten wird. Dieses Resultat besitzt eine Reihe von Anwendungen.

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# U. Abel and G. Boing

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24