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Article

Giving in Unilaterally Risky Dictator Games: A Model of Allocation Decisions Under Existential Threat

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Online-Appendix zu

„Giving in Unilaterally Risky Dictator Games: A Model of Allocation Decisions Under Existential Threat“

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Table A1: Summary of treatments

Task	Payoff for Dictator [m€]	Payoff for Recipient [m€]
T_C	$10 - x$	x
T_25	$\begin{cases} 0, & \text{with } p = 0.25 \\ 10 - x, & \text{with } 1 - p = 0.75 \end{cases}$	x
T_50	$\begin{cases} 0, & \text{with } p = 0.5 \\ 10 - x, & \text{with } 1 - p = 0.5 \end{cases}$	x
T_75	$\begin{cases} 0, & \text{with } p = 0.75 \\ 10 - x, & \text{with } 1 - p = 0.25 \end{cases}$	x
T_H	$\begin{cases} 0, & \text{with } p = 0.5 \\ 10 - x, & \text{with } 1 - p = 0.5 \end{cases}$	$\begin{cases} x + \left(\frac{10 - x}{1 + 0.1}\right), & \text{with } p = 0.5 \\ x, & \text{with } 1 - p = 0.5 \end{cases}$

Table A2: Differences in giving by cluster

	n	T_C	T_25	T_50	T_75	T_H
Cluster 1	70	2,83	4,87	6,01	6,83	5,54
Cluster 2	51	2,57	4,55	5,02	6,29	5,24
Cluster 3	53	2,47	4,68	5,28	5,47	5,21
Cluster 4	4	2,00	1,75	4,00	4,75	2,25
All	178	2,63	4,65	5,47	6,22	5,28

Cluster 1: strictly risk-averse ($0 < P < 50$); Cluster 2: risk-averse ($50 \leq P < 99$); Cluster 3: risk-neutral ($99 \leq P < 101$), Cluster 4: risk-loving ($101 \leq P$)

Table A3: Standard deviation by cluster

	n	T_C	T_25	T_50	T_75	T_H
Cluster 1	70	0,20	0,22	0,55	0,60	0,26
Cluster 2	51	-0,06	-0,10	-0,45	0,07	-0,05
Cluster 3	53	-0,16	0,03	-0,18	-0,75	-0,07
Cluster 4	4	-0,63	-2,90	-1,47	-1,47	-3,03

Cluster 1: strictly risk-averse ($0 < P < 50$); Cluster 2: risk-averse ($50 \leq P < 99$); Cluster 3: risk-neutral ($99 \leq P < 101$), Cluster 4: risk-loving ($101 \leq P$)

Table A4: Gender-specific differences in giving (means)

	n	T_C	T_25	T_50	T_75	T_H
Mean (F)	64	3,31	5,17	6,03	7,17	6,33
Mean (M)	114	2,25	4,36	5,15	5,69	4,69

Figure A5: Mean giving by treatment





Figure A6: Percentage of dictators allocating $x > 5$ and $x > \text{'fair split ex post'}$



*For the individual treatments, this means: $x > 5$ (T_C); $x > 6$ (T_25), $x > 7$ (T_50), $x > 8$ (T_75); $x > 10$ (T_H)

Appendix 7: Instructions (in the original order of the treatments)

QL: Suppose you are offered a ticket for a lottery with a 50% chance of winning €200 and an equal chance of winning nothing. How much would you be willing to pay for the ticket (max=€200)?

T_C (baseline treatment): For the remainder of the experiment, your decisions will influence you and another person. Pairs will be formed anonymously after you have finished the experiment. You are endowed with a fund of €10 million, while your counterpart has nothing. In each of the following tasks, you can decide if and how you would like to split the endowment. Transfers to your counterpart only allow discrete amounts [m€10, 9, ... 0].

Which amount of money would you like to transfer to your counterpart? (in m€)

T_25 (treatment 2): Again, you are endowed with an additional fund of €10 million and can decide how to split it. While your counterpart's share will be realized with certainty, the share kept to yourself is subject to a 25% risk of value loss. Example: If you keep €10 million to yourself, you will realize the full amount with a probability 75% and you will have zero income with a 25% probability. Yet, if you give €10 million to your counterpart, he/she will certainly realize €10 million.

Which amount of money would you like to transfer to your counterpart? (in m€)

T_50 (treatment 3): Again, you are endowed with an additional fund of €10 million and can decide how to split it. While your counterpart's share will be realized with certainty, the share kept to yourself is subject to a 50% risk of value loss. Example: If you keep €10 million to yourself, you will realize the full amount with a probability 50% and you will have zero income with a 50% probability. Yet, if you give €10 million to your counterpart, he/she will certainly realize €10 million.

Which amount of money would you like to transfer to your counterpart? (in m€)

T_75 (treatment 4): Again, you are endowed with an additional fund of €10 million and can decide how to split it. While your counterpart's share will be realized with certainty, the share kept to yourself is subject to a 75% risk of value loss. Example: If you keep €10 million to yourself, you will realize the full amount with a probability 25% and you will have zero income with a 75% probability. Yet, if you give €10 million to your counterpart, he/she will certainly realize €10 million.

Which amount of money would you like to transfer to your counterpart? (in m€)

T_H (treatment 5): Again, you are endowed with a fund of €10 million and can decide how to split it. While your counterpart's share will be realized with certainty, the share kept to yourself will be subject to a 50% risk of value loss. Additionally, if the lottery determines that you lose your share, the money initially kept to yourself will be transferred to your counterpart with a discount factor of 10%. Example: Example: If you keep €10 million to yourself, you will realize the full amount with a probability of 50% and you will have zero income with a probability of 50%. In case that you lose your money, your counterpart will realize €9 million. Yet, if you give €10 to your counterpart, he/she will certainly realize €10 million.

Which amount of money would you like to transfer to your counterpart? (in m€)

QMS_75: Final question...

Imagine that you just got home from the hospital. The doctor presented you with the shattering results of your last medical examination. You have been diagnosed with a rare terminal illness. Only 25% of all patients can be cured. With a probability of 75%, you will die within the next couple of days. There is absolutely no chance of a mis-diagnosis. Given this situation, please indicate what you would do with your money if you had €10 million in your bank account. What would you buy, which wishes should not remain unfulfilled? Consider consumption options as well as transfers to another person or entity. Please justify your answer.

How would you spend your €10 million given the situation outlined above?

Reward: Among all participants, a lottery will be drawn to determine who will be paid out the cumulative income generated in questions 4-8 of the experiment. An income of €1 million in the game equals a payoff of €1.