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Working Paper

Setting Priorities in School Choice Enrollment Systems: Who Benefits from Placement Algorithm Preferences?

IZA Discussion Papers, No. 16776

Provided in Cooperation with:

IZA – Institute of Labor Economics

Suggested Citation: Valant, Jon; Walker, Brigham (2024) : Setting Priorities in School Choice Enrollment Systems: Who Benefits from Placement Algorithm Preferences?, IZA Discussion Papers, No. 16776, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA), Bonn

This Version is available at:

<https://hdl.handle.net/10419/295799>

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ISSN: 2365-9793

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ABSTRACT

Setting Priorities in School Choice Enrollment Systems: Who Benefits from Placement Algorithm Preferences?*

Many cities with school choice programs employ algorithms to determine which applicants get seats in oversubscribed schools. This study explores whether the New Orleans placement algorithm favored students of certain races or socioeconomic classes via its use of priorities such as geographic and sibling priority. We find that when Black and White applicants submitted the same first-choice request for kindergarten, Black applicants were 9 percentage points less likely to receive it, while students in poverty were 6 percentage points less likely to receive a first-choice placement than their peers. We examine these priorities and simulate placements under alternate policies.

JEL Classification: I24, C78

Keywords: school choice, algorithm, equity, access

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* The research reported here was approved by the Tulane IRB and supported by the Institute of Education Sciences, U.S. Department of Education, through Grant R305C180025 to The Administrators of the Tulane Educational Fund. Institutional support was provided by the Brookings Institution and Tulane University. The opinions expressed are those of the authors and do not represent views of the Institute or the U.S. Department of Education. The data used in this study were provided by the New Orleans Public Schools (NOLA-PS) at the discretion of NOLA-PS. We are grateful for support from our partners in the Education Research Alliance (ERA) for New Orleans at Tulane University as well as the New Orleans Public Schools. We received helpful feedback from Jamie Carroll, Douglas Harris, Jane Lincove, and participants in presentations to the Association for Education Finance and Policy (AEFP), the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management (APPAM), the National Center for Research on Education Access and Choice (REACH), and the University of Virginia School of Education and Human Development.

1. Introduction

In the United States, most school-age children are assigned to a public school based on where they live. Residential school assignment offers benefits, such as giving families a local, community-based option that typically does not require a long commute. However, coupling school assignment with residential location also has drawbacks, many of which relate to inequitable access to educational opportunities. If families perceive differences in the quality of public schools, those with the ability to pay can sort themselves into the most desirable school zones, thereby excluding less privileged families. This can result in stratification in educational opportunities as well as segregation by race, ethnicity, and socioeconomic status. Indeed, today's U.S. public school system is highly segregated, with students of color and students from low-income families concentrated in high-poverty schools, at the expense of their educational outcomes (Reardon, Weathers, Fahle, Jang, & Kalogrides, 2022).

Advocates of school choice reforms propose a straightforward solution to these problems. By weakening the links between where students live and which schools they can attend, these reforms could mitigate the roles that wealth and income play in determining children's educational opportunities. However, many school-choosing families—including a disproportionate share of marginalized and minoritized families—confront barriers to enrolling in schools they might desire (Sattin-Bajaj & Roda, 2020).

This study examines an especially formal type of barrier in school choice settings, albeit one that can be hidden from researchers' and the public's view. We explore the policies that define which students have priority access to high-demand schools as those priorities are coded into enrollment system placement algorithms. These algorithms use priorities, such as sibling and geographic priority, to determine which applicants receive seats in oversubscribed schools. K-12

placement algorithms in the U.S. do not explicitly prioritize students of certain races over others and, in many cases, do not explicitly prioritize students of certain socioeconomic classes over others. Nonetheless, they could benefit students of certain racial or socioeconomic groups. This can arise if an algorithm's priorities are correlated with student demographics. For example, if White families are more likely than Black families to live near popular schools in a system that uses geographic priorities, then White applicants could be more likely to obtain placements in those schools even if White and Black families submit identical applications. A pattern along these lines may constitute a type of disparate impact, where facially neutral policies have discriminatory effects in practice (Pager & Shepherd, 2008; U.S. Department of Justice & U.S. Department of Education, 2014). This also would have implications for equitable access to schools, which is a key consideration for school choice programs.

To explore whether (and how) a placement algorithm might discriminate against certain groups, we turn to the school choice enrollment system in New Orleans. With an all-charter public school system, New Orleans asks all families to participate in its choice process through a citywide unified enrollment (UE) system called OneApp.¹ This system uses a deferred-acceptance (DA) algorithm to place students in schools based on applicants' rank-ordered requests, schools' seat capacities, and school priorities. We examine how the policies that define the system's priorities within that DA algorithm affect student placements. This includes testing whether the 2018 OneApp algorithm systematically favored certain groups of students, as well as simulating how alternate priorities and seat capacities might have changed placement patterns. We also step back to examine how the various steps of the choice and enrollment process—from

¹ In 2021, New Orleans Public Schools renamed the city's unified enrollment system the "NOLA Public Schools Common Application Process," or NCAP (Juhasz, 2021). For clarity, we refer to the system as the OneApp throughout this manuscript.

families' initial requests to post-OneApp mobility—lead students of different racial and socioeconomic groups to enroll in schools with markedly different performance ratings.

Our results indicate that Black students and students in poverty are severely underrepresented in high-rated schools even in a system that theoretically removes many barriers to enrollment through its system-wide choice policies. A large share of this gap arises at the school request stage, which likely reflects a combination of different preferences and unequal vulnerability to barriers such as transportation and information availability. However, even conditional on submitting the same first-choice request for kindergarten, we find that Black and low-income applicants are less likely than their peers to receive a placement in their top-choice elementary school. This arises through priorities such as geographic priority that tend to benefit more advantaged applicants. Through simulations, we show that alternate specifications of the priorities could improve access for these groups—and, in fact, do tend to benefit more disadvantaged families in non-transition grades. Also, we show that increasing the seat capacity of oversubscribed schools, if feasible, would result in substantially more families receiving seats in the schools they most desire. However, while changing algorithm priorities and seat capacities could remove (or reverse) anti-Black and anti-poor placement patterns, these changes on their own are unlikely to produce a system in which historically disadvantaged and advantaged groups are similarly represented in high-rated schools.

2. Background

2.1. School choice reforms

Increasing school choice has been a prominent education reform strategy in the U.S. Advocates have argued that government-funded, privately run schools could bring market efficiencies to education (Friedman, 1955), improve alignment between school behaviors and

parents' interests (Chubb & Moe, 1990), mitigate inequities in access (Coons & Sugarman, 1978), and reduce school segregation (Kahlenberg, 2001). Policymakers created an assortment of school choice options in the late 20th and early 21st centuries, with mixed effects to date. For example, many students in urban charter schools outperform their peers academically (Epple, Romano, & Zimmer, 2016), but charter school expansion has slightly exacerbated racial segregation in public schools (Monarrez, Kisida, & Chingos, 2022).

Recent attention has focused on the design of school choice programs as well as the policy infrastructure surrounding those programs. This attention is rooted, in part, in concerns about the barriers that keep families—particularly those from historically disadvantaged groups—from accessing schools they might want. These barriers relate to issues such as proximity and transportation (Bierbaum, Karner, & Barajas, 2021; Valant & Lincove, 2023), information (Corcoran & Jennings, 2019; Valant & Weixler, 2020), enrollment processes (Weixler, Valant, Bassok, Doromal, & Gerry, 2020), and discriminatory school practices (Bergman & McFarlin, Jr., 2020). Sattin-Bajaj and Roda (2020) describe an intentionality behind many of these barriers, a form of “opportunity hoarding” in which advantaged families use their political power and other resources to secure preferential access to desirable placements.

2.2. Unified enrollment systems and placement algorithms

Much of the concern about school choice barriers has focused on the application and enrollment process. In a highly decentralized school choice environment, each school might manage its own process, leaving parents to navigate a complex, burdensome school choice landscape with little coordination or oversight (Gross, DeArmond, & Denice, 2015). These decentralized settings also lack a mechanism for assigning students to schools efficiently (Abdulkadiroğlu, Che, Pathak, Roth, & Tercieux, 2020).

Unified enrollment (UE) systems emerged as potential solutions to these problems. Today's UE systems differ from one another in important respects (Benner & Boser, 2018; Hesla, 2018), but they share two basic features. First, UE systems centralize the application process. Families can apply to many schools, ranked in their order of preference, using a single application. Second, UE systems centralize the placement process. That is, a central agency such as a school district uses an algorithm to place students in schools based on families' requests, seat capacities, and school priorities. These algorithms have been refined through extensive research on market design (e.g., Abdulkadiroğlu & Sönmez, 2013; Pathak, 2011). Several UE systems use DA algorithms that assign applicants to their highest-ranked school where they qualify for a seat (Abdulkadiroğlu & Sönmez, 2003; Gale & Shapley, 1962). Appendix A provides a stylized example of how a basic school choice DA algorithm like the one used in New Orleans can work. It illustrates how priorities affect which students are placed in which schools.

Most of today's DA placement algorithms are "strategy-proof," or nearly so, in that applicants cannot game the algorithm by ranking a less-preferred, higher-probability school ahead of a lower-probability school they prefer.² The practical benefits of using this type of algorithm include that families have clear instructions for how to use the system ("rank schools in your true order of preference") and rank-ordered requests should generate information about families' preferences. Several studies have examined applicants' requests to examine their revealed preferences for schools. Some find evidence of varied preferences across groups (e.g., Denice & Gross, 2016; Glazerman & Dotter, 2017; Harris & Larsen, 2022; Hastings, Kane, &

² A notable caveat is that many UE systems, including the one in New Orleans, limit the number of schools that applicants can request. Since it is possible that an applicant could fill an application with oversubscribed schools and not receive a placement in any of them, an optimal strategy could involve deviating from one's true preferences if one is at risk of not receiving any placement at all.

Staiger, 2009). However, these studies typically cannot disentangle different preferences for school characteristics (e.g., higher test scores) from different exposure to barriers (e.g., a lack of transportation) that keep families from accessing schools with those characteristics.

2.3. School choice and unified enrollment in New Orleans

The public education system in New Orleans has undergone major changes since Hurricane Katrina in 2005. After the storm, the state-run Recovery School District (RSD) took control of most public schools in New Orleans from the Orleans Parish School Board (OPSB)—a controversial move that reshaped education policy and politics in New Orleans (Harris, 2020). The RSD opted for a portfolio management model in which it would, for the most part, oversee charter schools rather than run schools directly (Cowen Institute, 2011). Families would request seats in these schools, as their children would no longer be assigned to a school by default. Policymakers' decisions about which individuals and organizations would lead schools intensified concerns about the disenfranchisement of the Black community in New Orleans, especially with respect to public education (Buras, 2011; Henry, 2021; Jabbar, 2015). The RSD held control of most New Orleans public schools until 2018, when it passed oversight authority back to OPSB. In 2019, New Orleans became the first major U.S. city with an all-charter public school system (Jewson, 2019).

Harris (2020) describes the charter school reforms in New Orleans as unfolding in phases. The early years were defined by extreme decentralization with little government coordination, oversight, or accountability. As inefficiencies and abuses arose—for instance, in the treatment of students with disabilities (Wolf, 2011)—the RSD began to assert itself more forcefully in certain areas, including enrollment. The RSD had used a common application for

most New Orleans schools since 2008-09 (Cowen Institute, 2011) and then pivoted to a UE system for the first time in 2012. Through OneApp, families would submit rank-ordered requests to the RSD, and then the RSD would place students in schools. OneApp has changed over time in many respects, including the algorithm design, types of participating schools, number of rounds, and priorities applied (Abdulkadiroğlu et al., 2017).

This study focuses on the system that families used to make requests for the 2018-19 school year. In that year, OneApp had two rounds. The first, or Main Round, closed in February 2018. The Main Round is when the most seats were available in the most schools. Applicants could request up to eight schools for elementary and secondary grades. At the time, the state’s private school voucher program was integrated in OneApp such that eligible families could request private schools alongside public/charter schools (Lincove, Cowen, & Imbrogno, 2018).³ The OneApp’s DA algorithm processed these requests and assigned students to schools. Families that did not participate in the Main Round, did not receive a seat, or wanted to change their placement could participate in a second round (“Round 2”) that also used an algorithm-based assignment process. After Round 2 was a late enrollment period during which families could work with district staff to find a seat in a school that had a seat available.

In the Main Round and Round 2, the OneApp placement algorithm used priorities and lottery numbers to assign seats in oversubscribed schools. State and district policy defined the basic parameters for these priorities, but the specific priorities used—and their hierarchical structure—varied across schools and, in some cases, grade levels within the same school.

³ We generally omit private schools from our analysis since they did not receive state performance ratings. However, applicants to private schools are retained in our student-level data for simulations involving the placement algorithm, as their applications can affect the placements of other applicants. Where we refer to “public” schools, we are including charter schools as well.

Appendix Table 1 shows the frequency of the different combinations of priorities for kindergarten, 4th grade, and 9th grade. Kindergarten and 9th grade are common entry grades in New Orleans, when students begin at a new school; 4th grade is not and serves as an example of a non-transition grade. Among the most frequently used priorities were those for siblings of current students, students living in a school’s geographic zone (with seven zones across the city), and students whose current school was closing. The closing school priority had recently become a high-ranking priority as part of a strategy to mitigate the harms and disruptions experienced by families whose schools were closing due to concerns such as academic underperformance (EdNavigator, 2019; Valant, 2021). A few schools applied other priorities such as those for students coming from affiliated programs (“feeder”), students with a disability (“IEP”, for Individualized Education Program), and students from economically disadvantaged families.

The core inputs for OneApp’s DA algorithm—applicant requests, seat capacity, and school priorities—suggest at least three areas where interventions might alter enrollment patterns. With respect to the first, information interventions have shown potential to affect applicants’ requests and placements (Corcoran, Jennings, Cohodes, Sattin-Bajaj, 2018; Hastings & Weinstein, 2008; Valant & Weixler, 2020). This study focuses on the latter two areas. We examine the impacts of priorities, as currently applied, and the consequences of possible changes to priorities and seat capacities.

2.4 Research questions and theory

Specifically, we seek answers to the following research questions (RQs):

- RQ 1: Do students of different racial and socioeconomic groups request, get assigned to, enroll in, and remain enrolled in schools with similar performance ratings?

- RQ 2: Do priorities systematically benefit students from certain racial or socioeconomic groups over others (without explicitly prioritizing those groups)?
- RQ 3: Which priorities benefit which groups of students?
- RQ 4: How might changes to school priorities or seat capacities affect placements?

Fundamentally, this study asks how a choice-oriented school system manages scarcity in a valuable resource: the number of seats available in high-demand (and, in some analyses, high-rated) schools. We are particularly interested in this question as it relates to the access afforded to Black families and families in poverty—historically marginalized groups in New Orleans and elsewhere around the country (Perry, 2020). These priorities are determined through political processes, and research from political science shows a tendency for marginalized groups to lose out in these processes. Schneider and Ingram (1993) describe how political leaders, when allocating scarce resources, might quietly convey tangible benefits to members of politically powerful groups (such as the wealthy) while making only symbolic gestures toward less powerful groups (such as the poor). In the context of school placement algorithms, this implies a hypothesis that some priorities might explicitly benefit marginalized groups, but these priorities will have less impact in practice than the priorities that benefit more advantaged groups.

A couple of prior studies consider related questions. Pathak (2017) explores the consequences of opting for different algorithm approaches debated in the market design literature (e.g., DA algorithms versus top-trading cycles, and various approaches to lottery-number tiebreakers). Ultimately, it concludes that these properties seem less important in practice than “basic issues” such as whether the public is well informed and how aftermarket (e.g., summer) placements work. The present study is motivated by a similar question about how policy design specifics can matter for student placements, but it focuses more specifically on the implications

for equitable access (rather than efficiency), especially as rooted in the implementation of priorities. This study is also keenly focused on New Orleans, a city that has made school choice reforms—and, specifically, a UE system that uses a DA placement algorithm—central to its K-12 education model. Gerry, Balfe, and Weixler (2020) also examined New Orleans, with a similar interest in understanding which students benefit from OneApp priorities. They focused on a “half-mile” priority that was implemented in 2019-20 (after the OneApp year examined in this study) to provide an added benefit to families who lived close to certain schools. They found that White and high-income applicants were more likely than Black and low-income applicants, respectively, to live within a half-mile of a high-demand school. However, they did not analyze whether or how these differences translated to different placements.

3. Data and Sample

3.1. OneApp data

This study uses OneApp data provided by the New Orleans Public Schools (NOLA-PS). These data include student-level files showing applicants’ ranked school requests, priority status at each ranked school, and placement outcomes. The data also include files at the school-grade level that identify the priorities used, the order in which those priorities applied, whether each priority applied to all available seats or only a subset, and seat capacities.

We focus primarily on requests for kindergarten for the 2018-19 school year. Focusing on 2018-19 enables us to analyze the most recent cohort for which we can observe students’ enrollment in the fall of the following school year (2019-20) without interruption from the COVID-19 pandemic. Focusing on kindergarten enables us to analyze a key entry grade in New Orleans, where elementary and middle school grades are typically integrated in the same schools

(e.g., K-8 schools). Some schools offer a pre-K program that provides a guaranteed seat in kindergarten in the following year (Weixler, Lincove, & Gerry, 2019), but we omit pre-K from our analyses due to complexities in the pre-K application process.⁴ For some analyses, we also examine non-transition grades (such as 4th grade) and 9th grade (the main entry grade for high school). However, our main focus is kindergarten entry due to its importance in determining students' school pathways and the suitability of kindergarten application data for our analyses.⁵

We do not have the exact code used to run the OneApp's placement algorithm. However, using the information provided to us about school requests, placements, and priorities—along with publicly available information about how the placement process works—we created a replica to ensure that we were properly coding a DA algorithm. Our replicated algorithm and the actual algorithm produce the same placement for nearly all applicants, with differences attributable to idiosyncrasies in the OneApp algorithm (e.g., its handling of twin siblings). In our simulations, we use a simplified version of our replica that omits some details of the OneApp algorithm. Using a simplified version provides greater clarity about how our various configurations of the algorithm differ from one another. We believe that it also improves the

⁴ The complexities in pre-K enrollment include an eligibility verification process that results in many families who submit applications for pre-K but do not complete the verification process from being considered by the OneApp placement algorithm (Weixler et al., 2020), as well as some, but not all, pre-K seats being means-tested.

⁵ In New Orleans, relatively few high schools are oversubscribed with large numbers of 9th-grade applicants of different races and socioeconomic groups. Our fixed-effects models that examine whether students of different subgroups fare differently when submitting the same first-choice requests identify their estimates from these oversubscribed schools with diverse applicant pools. We focus on elementary schools rather than high schools partly because the data are better suited for this analysis for these reasons. In addition, elementary school choice may be particularly important if families' elementary school choices affect their subsequent choices (e.g., if parents try to keep their children with the same classmates for high school).

generalizability of our simulation results by incorporating priorities common to other cities' systems without quirks that may be specific to New Orleans.

3.2. Demographic and enrollment data

Our core objective in analyzing OneApp data is to explore how students of different races and socioeconomic groups fare in actual and simulated placements. This requires data on students' race and family income. Obtaining these data for some students is challenging because the OneApp does not ask applicants to identify their race and only asks applicants to certain programs to identify their family income (e.g., those who have applied to publicly funded early childhood programs). Therefore, we merge OneApp records with NOLA-PS student enrollment records to obtain student-level data on race and family income. We use these enrollment records to identify the demographic characteristics of most applicants. However, students who never enroll in a New Orleans public school do not have enrollment records. For students whose demographic characteristics are not directly observable, we impute data using the race/family income of their siblings and then modal characteristics from their neighborhoods. We check the robustness of our estimates to approaches that include only applicants with directly observed demographic data (and find substantively similar results).⁶

We begin with enrollment data in which we directly observe students' race/ethnicity or free/reduced-price lunch (FRL) status. We do this with panel data covering the 2016-17 through 2020-21 school years. For race/ethnicity, we create indicator variables for whether a student was ever identified as Black, White, Hispanic, Asian, or another race/ethnicity. Due to statistical power considerations (i.e., small numbers for some groups), we focus on three groups—Black,

⁶ We do not use imputed data for the descriptive analyses of enrollment patterns.

White, and people identifying as another race or multiple races—but we note that our “other/multi-race” category includes students from a diverse set of backgrounds. For family income, we use the same data but take a slightly different approach. Since family income changes from one year to the next, we use the student’s FRL status from the year closest to (or just before) our primary data analysis year of 2018. That is, we take the student’s FRL status from the 2017-18 year if it is available; if not, we look to 2016-17, then 2018-19, then 2019-20, and finally 2020-21.

We directly observe the race/ethnicity and FRL status of 67% of kindergarten applicants in the 2018 OneApp Main Round. We provide a set of analyses only for students whose demographics we observe directly, which we treat as a robustness check. For our main OneApp analyses, we rely on additional data that we impute. We believe that imputation is necessary due to the possibility that applicants from some subgroups might be more likely than others to enroll in a public school after submitting a OneApp. Consider the following hypothetical scenario: 100 Black applicants and 20 White applicants vie for 60 seats in the same school. Half of the applicants in each group receive a placement (50 Black students, 10 White students). While all 50 unseated Black students find seats in other public schools in New Orleans, half of the 10 unseated White students enroll in private schools and do not have directly observed demographic data. If we only included students with directly observed data, we might estimate that 50% of Black applicants to this school received a placement (50 of 100) but 67% of White applicants received a placement (10 of 15). This would suggest that Black students had a lower placement rate than White students in this school when, in reality, each group had a 50% placement rate. This necessitates the use of data imputation for our main analyses.

Our approach for the imputations is to use data from as close as possible to the child while attempting to minimize missingness. For a small share of applicants, we can use their siblings' directly observed demographics. We then look to their neighborhoods. After geocoding the street addresses that applicants entered on their OneApp, we identified their home block groups, census tracts, and zip codes. We found the modal value of race/ethnicity and FRL status for each geographic unit for OneApp applicants in that year (from any grade level). If we observed the race/FRL status of at least 10 applicants from the child's block group, we used the modal value as our imputed race for the child. This accounts for 21% of the sample for both race and FRL. If not, we looked to the child's census tract, which accounts for 9% of the sample for race and 10% for FRL. If we did not observe the race/FRL of at least 10 applicants from their census tract, we then looked to their zip code, which accounts for 2% for both race and FRL. With these imputations, we have usable demographic data for nearly all applicants. We note that this imputation process has limitations. For example, since we are using observed demographic data to infer the demographics of applicants in that geographic area, we might wrongly identify some non-Black students as Black (or vice versa) if a disproportionate share of Black students in that area ultimately enroll in local public schools. However, analyses suggest that a large majority of students are likely identified correctly via this imputation process, and our results are robust to various approaches to imputation (or no imputation at all).⁷

⁷ We ran the same imputation process for students whose demographics we do observe directly in order to assess the accuracy of the process. About 87% of our would-be-imputed values of race match the same student's directly observed race. The share is higher for Black students (88%) than White students (69%). Among the students we would have identified as White who are not White in directly observed data, about half are directly observed as multi-race. About 72% of our imputed values of FRL status match the same student's directly observed status (with similar percentages for FRL-eligible and ineligible families). Some of the FRL discrepancies likely reflect year-to-year changes in families' FRL status.

Among kindergarten applicants, we identify 76% as Black, 13% as White, 8% as multiracial, 3% as Hispanic, and a small share as having another race/ethnicity. These are applicants, not enrolled students, but these numbers are broadly comparable to the demographics of the city's public school population (Cowen Institute, 2020). The population of New Orleans is more racially diverse than its public schools, with 59% of its residents Black, 33% White, 6% Hispanic/Latino, and all other groups below 3% (U.S. Census Bureau, 2021). This partly reflects that New Orleans has one of the highest rates of private school enrollment in the U.S. (roughly 25%), with a disproportionate share of private school students coming from affluent families (Cowen Institute, 2020). We identify 52% of our kindergarten applicant sample as eligible for free lunch and 1% as eligible for reduced-price lunch.⁸ For simplicity in reporting outcomes, we focus on students eligible for free lunch as our subgroup of low-income applicants (and group the other applicants together). Our results are not substantively different if we include students eligible for reduced-price lunch in the low-income group.

3.3. School performance ratings

This study examines (a) which families get seats in their first-choice schools and (b) which families get seats in their first-choice schools if those schools have strong performance ratings. Investigating the former allows us to assess whether families are getting what they want, whatever that may be, while the latter considers access to high-demand, high-rated schools. We incorporate school ratings with an awareness that any school rating is reductive and subjective and that some parents might not value traditional measures of school quality (Abdulkadiroğlu,

⁸ In NOLA-PS enrollment data, a larger share of students was identified as eligible for free lunch during this period (approximately two-thirds). In large part, this likely reflects differences between the characteristics of students who apply for kindergarten and the students who enroll.

Pathak, Schellenberg, & Walters, 2020). However, assessing whether a school system provides equitable access requires understanding which students have, and do not have, access to some of that system's most sought-after, highly acclaimed schools.

We use school ratings assigned by the Louisiana Department of Education as part of the state's accountability system. For many years, these ratings have been available to families through OneApp materials, state and district websites, and school guides provided by nonprofit organizations. We focus on the ratings that were available as families requested schools for the 2018-19 school year. The state computed School Performance Scores and then converted those numerical scores to letter grades. For elementary schools, these ratings were based largely on students' scores on state assessments. These ratings have shortcomings, including what some believe is an overemphasis on student levels (performance at a single point in time) relative to student growth (how much students learn from one year to the next) (Harris, 2011). However, they were the most visible indicators of school performance, and research from Louisiana indicates that school-level test levels and value-added scores are highly correlated, especially for elementary and middle schools (Harris & Liu, 2021).

Of the schools with kindergarten programs available in the 2018-19 OneApp Main Round, three received an "A", two received a "B", 26 received a "C", 13 received a "D", and one received an "F". A few schools received a "T" (one for kindergarten), which the state used for schools that were transitioning to a new operator (typically to keep from punishing schools for their performance under a prior operator). New schools did not have a performance rating. A few of the city's highest-rated public schools did not participate in OneApp in 2018, opting instead to run their own application and enrollment processes (Jewson, 2021).

4. Empirical Strategy

4.1. Describing request, placement, and enrollment patterns

Our first objective is to explore demographic patterns in school requests, placements, and enrollments. We incorporate state school ratings to assess whether and where disparities arise with respect to high-rated schools. We convert these ratings to a standard grade-point average (GPA) that ranges from 0 to 4 (A=4, B=3, C=2, D=1, F/T=0). Specifically, we examine the schools that students of various subgroups request (first-choice requests in the 2018 Main Round), the schools in which they are placed (in the 2018 Main Round and then in 2018 Round 2), and the schools where they enroll (in the fall of 2018 and again one year later). By including enrollment one year later, we explore whether student mobility or changes in schools' performance ratings over time contribute to the differences in the types of schools where various student subgroups enroll.

4.2. Assessing disparate impact in the placement algorithm

The descriptive analyses in 4.1 examine how request, placement, and enrollment patterns differ across groups. *Why* they differ is not always clear, but part of the request-placement-enrollment process is straightforward and observable. Conditional on submitting an eligible application, whether an applicant is assigned to their first-choice school depends on whether that school is oversubscribed and, if it is, how the system uses priorities to allocate seats.

Our objective is to understand whether students of certain racial groups (Black/White) or socioeconomic groups (free lunch eligible/ineligible) tend to benefit from the OneApp's priorities. We begin with a simple test of whether the 2018 OneApp algorithm systematically favors certain groups of students. Using a fixed-effects model, we examine cases in which Black and White (or poor and nonpoor) students requested the same school as their first choice. We test

whether one group is more likely than the other to receive a first-choice placement. We define the following regression model:

$$Placed_{isg} = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 Black_i + \alpha_2 OtherRace_i + \tau_{sg} + \varepsilon_{isg} \quad [1]$$

In this model, whether student i is assigned to their first-choice school s for grade g is a function of their race (with White students the omitted reference group), a set of first-choice school fixed effects (τ_{sg}), and a random error term (ε_{isg}). For analyses based on family income, we replace the race-related variables with income-related variables. In alternate specifications, we restrict our data to “A” and “B”-rated schools to determine whether different patterns arise at the highest-rated schools.

These models incorporate first-choice school fixed effects. In effect, this model looks at the applicant pool to each school-grade, focusing only on applicants’ top choices, and then assesses whether applicants from certain subgroups were more likely than others to receive a placement. We emphasize first choices because we are primarily interested in which families receive seats in the schools they most want. For ease of interpretation, the Results section focuses on estimates from linear probability models. Results from logistic regression models are substantively similar.

4.3. Identifying which priorities favor which groups

The analyses described in 4.2 assess the extent to which race and family income are associated with the probability of receiving a first-choice placement, conditional on families’ first-choice requests. Next, we consider which priorities produce those associations. For a certain priority to contribute to unequal placement probabilities, it must be correlated with race or family

income (i.e., some groups are more likely to qualify than others) and consequential in making placements.

We ran the same model described in Equation 1 but replaced the outcome variable with an indicator for a specific priority. This entails regressing whether a student receives a certain type of priority (e.g., sibling priority) on the student's race, with first-choice school fixed effects. This shows, for each priority, whether students of certain racial/income groups were more likely to have that priority when competing for a first-choice school. This illuminates which groups tend to qualify for which priorities. However, it does not necessarily show that these differences were consequential in making placements. For example, even if White students were more likely than Black students to have a certain type of priority, it might not matter if that priority seldom determines placements. This could happen if the priority ranks low in the hierarchical structure of priorities.

4.4. Simulating placements with alternate priorities and seat capacities

One way to assess which priorities matter in practice is to evaluate how placements would differ if a particular priority were eliminated or reconfigured. Here, we use simulations to explore how alternate policies might result in different placements. We focus on two types of possible policy reforms. The first involves changing the priorities in the algorithm. The second involves increasing seat capacity such that more families could obtain seats in their top-choice schools. We also consider models that combine these two reforms (changes in priorities and increases in seat capacity). In short, our approach is to create several versions of a placement algorithm and then run that algorithm using families' actual school requests and priority status before assessing the resulting placements.

We begin by creating a basic DA algorithm like the one that OneApp used to place students in schools in the 2018-19 Main Round. Our baseline algorithm follows the logic described in Appendix A while incorporating three core priorities. These are a “guaranteed” priority that largely applies to students who remain in the same school, “sibling” priority that applies to students with siblings already enrolled (in a non-terminal grade), and a “geographic” priority that applies to students who live in a school’s geographic zone.⁹ We chose this as our baseline algorithm after reviewing other cities’ enrollment system policies and assessing that this constitutes a rough baseline across those systems. For simplicity and generalizability, we omit some details of the New Orleans placement rules, such as a “Family Link” option that allows applicants to request that multiple children are assigned to the same school even if that results in one or more children being assigned to a lower-ranked school. We also operationalize all priorities as “full” (applying to all seats) rather than “partial” (applying to only a subset of seats).

We begin by running our baseline algorithm using applicants’ actual requests and priority status (Simulation 1).¹⁰ We then create several alternate formulations of the algorithm. First, since questions of geographic priority are so fundamental to school choice reforms, we create an algorithm that fully eliminates geographic priorities from our baseline algorithm (Simulation 2). To do this, we take the ordered priorities for each school-grade, remove every priority that includes geographic considerations (for any seat), and then renumber the priorities while preserving the order of the surviving priorities. Next, we create a parallel version that drops sibling priority instead of geographic priority (Simulation 3). Then, we combine these first two

⁹ A single applicant may qualify for multiple priorities, which could place them ahead of an applicant with just one of those priorities (and no higher-ranking priorities). For example, an applicant with sibling and geographic priority would be ahead of an applicant with only sibling or geographic priority. A more detailed explanation appears as a note in Appendix Table 1.

¹⁰ For the simulations, we dropped applicant requests that were flagged in the data as ineligible.

steps, eliminating both geographic and sibling priorities. We do this separately for models that preserve the guaranteed priority (Simulation 4) and eliminate it (Simulation 5). The latter shows the placements that would result from a system that uses lottery numbers only and incorporates no other priorities.

Next, we construct several versions of the algorithm that prioritize vulnerable and/or economically disadvantaged students. We do this to understand the potential impacts of creating a system that intentionally prioritizes these subgroups. To do so, we create a “disadvantaged” priority that considers, in order: (1) eligibility for free lunch, (2) enrollment in a school that is closing, (3) enrollment in a school with a “D”, “F”, or “T” state rating, (4) enrollment in a school with a “C” rating, and (5) eligibility for reduced-price lunch. Some students are members of two or more of these groups, and we define our priority structures in ways that account for this possibility. For example, we define the highest possible priority group as students who are eligible for free lunch and enrolled in a school with a “D”, “F”, or “T” rating that is scheduled to close. We examine three versions of this simulation. The first omits sibling and geographic priority altogether (Simulation 6). The second places the priority for disadvantaged students ahead of sibling and geographic priorities (Simulation 7). The third places sibling and geographic priorities ahead of the priority for disadvantaged students (Simulation 8). We list the priorities that we applied, in order, in tables showing the results of these simulations.

Finally, we examine would-be placements if schools’ seat capacities were higher. We simulate a scenario in which the maximum number of seats available in each school-grade increases by 10% (rounding up, as needed). For instance, if a school-grade had a capacity of 50 students, we increased it to 55 students. A uniform increase in seat capacity would not result in every school enrolling more students, as many schools are undersubscribed (and increasing

capacity in oversubscribed schools could lead to fewer placements in other schools). Of course, a universal increase in seat capacities would be logistically difficult, but targeted seat increases have occurred frequently in New Orleans, whether through relocations, renovations, or simply placing more students in the same physical space. We run two simulations that involve seat capacity increases: one that uses the priorities from our baseline algorithm (Simulation 9) and one that incorporates a high-ranking priority for disadvantaged students (Simulation 10).

For each of these scenarios, we simulate the placements that would occur using actual, eligible OneApp requests (with students' actual school priorities as indicated in our data). That is, we assume that families would have submitted the same requests, in the same order, that they submitted in the 2018-19 Main Round. This assumption is broadly consistent with the idea that families have an incentive to apply to all schools they are interested in, ranked in their true order of preference, at least in the short run. However, changes to priorities or seat capacities could induce different application behaviors if, for example, families are less inclined to rank a school if they believe it is unlikely that they (or their peers) will receive a seat. Idoux (2022) found evidence suggesting that New York City middle school applicants incorporated their probability of admission in their school rankings after some highly publicized changes to the admissions process. Also, changing priorities in one year could affect who attends that school, which could have long-term effects on who applies. How, exactly, application behaviors would change in response to policy changes is difficult to predict but important to consider.

After running these various formulations of the algorithm, we examine the simulated placements. First, we compare placements with respect to the number of students (overall and for each subgroup) that received a first-choice school. We then look specifically at assignments to "A"-rated or "B"-rated schools to see whether alternate formulations of the placement algorithm

result in meaningful differences in who is assigned to the highest-rated schools. We then use the regression model in Equation 1 to assess how different versions of the algorithm tend to benefit certain racial or socioeconomic groups relative to others.

5. Results

5.1. Describing request, placement, and enrollment patterns

Through its school choice reforms, New Orleans has weakened the link between where students live and which schools are available to them. Yet, gaps in the types of schools that students of different races, ethnicities, and socioeconomic groups attend are clear.

Figure 1 shows enrollment patterns for K-12 students in New Orleans public schools by the schools' state ratings. Figure 1a disaggregates by race and ethnicity, showing starkly different distributions for Black and Hispanic/Latino students versus White and other/multi-race students. For example, more than one-third of the city's White (40%) and other/multi-race (38%) students attended a school with an "A" rating, which was not the case for the city's Black (10%) and Hispanic/Latino (7%) students.¹¹ Figure 1b presents parallel results by family income, where students eligible for free lunch (7%) were much less likely to attend an "A"-rated school than students eligible for reduced-price lunch (29%) or ineligible for FRL (23%).

Table 1 examines pathways into schools, focusing on students who started kindergarten in 2018-19. Here, too, we use school performance ratings, but in this case, we convert them to a four-point GPA. We show the ratings of schools that families requested as their first choice in the Main Round, received via OneApp in the Main Round and Round 2, and enrolled in the

¹¹ These figures include public/charter schools in New Orleans that did not participate in OneApp.

subsequent school year (2018-19) as well as one year later (2019-20).¹² Examining the 2019-20 school year enables us to see patterns after one year of mobility and changes in school performance. For this year, we show performance ratings that were issued in 2018 (such that a student's school GPA would not change if the student stayed in the same school) and 2019 (such that it could). Panel A restricts the sample to students observed in each step with a school that has a state rating. Panel B does not impose this restriction. The patterns are similar across these panels, so we focus this discussion on the results from Panel A.

This table reveals large differences across subgroups that begin with applicants' Main Round requests. For example, in Panel A, we see differences between 0.99 and 1.40 GPA points for Black and White students (1.11 for Main Round requests), with differences between 0.37 and 0.69 GPA points for students eligible for free lunch and students ineligible for FRL (0.44 for Main Round requests). Table 1 also shows that the average school rating of families' first-choice requests is higher than the average rating of the schools where they are placed. This is consistent with data showing that OneApp applicants' higher-ranked choices tend to have higher performance ratings (Lincove, Valant, & Cowen, 2018). However, the data in Table 1 do not allow for a rigorous examination of whether the algorithm tends to favor some groups of students over others. This requires a look at students of different groups who apply to the same schools.

5.2. Assessing disparate impact in the placement algorithm

Table 2 presents evidence on disparities that arise from the algorithm's priorities. This table is divided into two parts. Columns 1 and 2 show differences by race and family income

¹² If a family did not participate in Round 2, its Main Round placement would be its Round 2 placement as well.

(from separate models) in whether applicants receive a first-choice placement. Columns 3 and 4 show differences by race and family income in whether applicants receive a first-choice placement if that school has an “A” or “B” rating. Odd-numbered columns show raw differences that do not restrict comparisons to applicants to the same schools. Even-numbered columns show differences with first-choice school fixed effects that allow for causal interpretations. With these fixed effects, we are identifying differences in the probability, in percentage-point terms, that students of different races or family incomes receive a first-choice placement when their first-choice requests are the same. Only oversubscribed school-grades with Black and White (or poor and nonpoor) applicants contribute data to these coefficients, and schools with more applicants—and more applicants of each subgroup—receive greater weight.

The negative coefficients on Black in Panel A indicate that Black students are generally less likely than White students (the omitted group) to receive a first-choice placement in this sample. From Column 2, we estimate that Black applicants are 8.6 percentage points ($SE=0.035$, $p=0.02$) less likely than White applicants to obtain a first-choice kindergarten placement when they apply for the same first-choice school. This comes in comparison to a baseline placement rate of 59.7% for White applicants in this group. When we focus on “A”-rated or “B”-rated schools, we find a similar difference of 8.3 percentage points ($SE=0.039$, $p=0.04$). Here, the baseline placement rate is 51.7% for White applicants.

Meanwhile, students eligible for free lunch are 5.6 percentage points less likely ($SE=0.029$, $p=0.05$) to receive a first-choice placement than others who submit the same first-choice request. This comes in comparison to a baseline placement rate of 70.8% for applicants ineligible for free lunch. When focusing on “A”-rated or “B”-rated schools by family income, we see a negative coefficient but not a statistically significant difference.

The sample for Table 2—our preferred sample—excludes students with guaranteed placements (i.e., those who had been enrolled in a pre-K program at the same school). In Appendix Table 2, we remove this restriction as a robustness check. We obtain generally similar estimates in our fixed-effects models, but they are attenuated toward zero since all students with guaranteed placements (regardless of their race and family income) receive a placement. In Appendix Table 3, we restrict the sample to students whose demographics we observe directly, without imputation. Here, too, we find similar results. Black applicants are less likely than White applicants to receive a first-choice placement (8.8 percentage points) and first-choice placement in an “A”-rated or “B”-rated school (11.0 percentage points), while the coefficients on free lunch are negative but statistically insignificant.

5.3. Identifying which priorities favor which groups

The Black-White differences observed in Table 2 arise without any explicit racial priorities in OneApp. Therefore, race must be correlated with priorities in ways that affect placements. Next, we examine which groups of students are more likely to have which priorities. We examine several of the most prominent priorities for kindergarten placements in 2018-19. Appendix Table 1 shows the priority combinations—in hierarchical order—that schools used for kindergarten, 4th grade (an example of a non-transition grade), and 9th grade. Technically, the most common priority sequence for kindergarten is (1) closing school, (2) sibling, and then (3) geography. However, as shown in Appendix Table 4, no kindergarten applicants qualified for

closing school priority at their first-choice school.¹³ In kindergarten, applicants most often qualified for geographic priority (35.3%) or sibling priority (22.9%).

Table 3 shows differences in the groups that qualify for various priorities at their first-choice schools. These models are identical to those from Table 2 except that we switch the dependent variable from whether students received a first-choice placement to whether they received each priority at their first-choice schools. Here, we present only results from fixed-effects models, as these models provide a better glimpse of who benefits when different groups vie for the same seats.

Some of the differences in Table 3 are large. Black applicants were 32.1 percentage points ($SE=0.028$, $p<0.01$) less likely than White applicants to qualify for geographic priority when they applied to the same first-choice schools for kindergarten, and that difference climbs to 36.5 percentage points ($SE=0.030$, $p<0.01$) when those schools have “A” or “B” ratings. Black applicants are also much less likely to have sibling priority than the White applicants who seek the same seats, with differences of about 9 percentage points for all schools ($SE=0.029$, $p<0.01$) and “A”-rated or “B”-rated schools alone ($SE=0.032$, $p=0.01$). On the other hand, Black applicants are more likely to receive at-risk and IEP priorities (estimate=0.052 [$SE=0.017$, $p<0.01$] and estimate=0.015 [$SE=0.007$, $p=0.03$], respectively).¹⁴ However, relatively few

¹³ This illustrates a broader point, which is that simply having a certain priority does not mean that many students will receive that priority or that it will affect placements. For example, some schools add grade levels over time as their students “age up.” A school that offers a small number of grades (e.g., only kindergarten and 1st grade) might have a sibling priority but find that few applicants qualify for it.

¹⁴ This does not imply that, in general, Black students are more likely than White students to have an IEP (a question that is beyond the scope of this analysis). Rather, we observe a difference within our pool of applicants to oversubscribed schools.

schools used these priorities for kindergarten (Appendix Table 1), and relatively few kindergarten applicants qualified for them (Appendix Table 4).

The differences by family income (Panel B) are weaker in magnitude. Students eligible for free lunch were 10.4 percentage points less likely to qualify for geographic priority (SE=0.022, $p<0.01$) than other students, and 13.2 percentage points less likely when applying to “A”-rated or “B”-rated schools (SE=0.023, $p<0.01$). Applicants eligible for free lunch were about 2 percentage points more likely to qualify for IEP priority.

5.4. Examining non-transition grade levels

Appendix Table 4 suggests important differences between an elementary school entry grade (kindergarten) and non-entry grade (4th grade). In particular, the second-most common priority for 4th-grade applicants is closing school priority, while no kindergarten first-choice applicants receive that priority. Given that closing school priority is the highest-ranking priority for 4th grade in most schools (Appendix Table 1)—ahead of even sibling and geographic priority—we might expect different patterns in which groups obtain contested, first-choice seats for 4th grade than kindergarten.

Table 4 presents estimates for non-transition grades, aggregated across grades 1-8. It reports on models parallel to the ones in Tables 2 and 3 and shows that placement patterns were, in fact, different in non-transition grades. In these grades, Black students were 5.3 percentage points *more* likely than White students to receive a first-choice placement when vying for the same seats (SE=0.009, $p<0.01$). Students eligible for free lunch were 2.9 percentage points more likely than other students to receive a first-choice placement (SE=0.009, $p<0.01$).

In non-transition grades, like in kindergarten, Black students and students eligible for free lunch are less likely to have geographic priority than others seeking the same seats. However, Black students are 10.1 percentage points more likely than White students to have closing school priority (SE=0.014, $p<0.01$), while students eligible for free lunch are 9.3 percentage points more likely than students ineligible for free lunch to receive that same priority (SE=0.012, $p<0.01$). Compared to kindergarten applicants, a much smaller share of non-transition grade applicants have sibling priority (Appendix Table 4), and among those who do, we do not see significant differences in which groups receive them (Table 4). All in all, it appears that the relative strength of the closing school priority, coupled with the large and disproportionate share of Black and free lunch-eligible students who qualify for that priority, leads to a reversal in the groups that tend to obtain oversubscribed seats (relative to kindergarten).

5.5. Simulating placements with alternate priorities and seat capacities

To assess how kindergarten placements might differ under alternate priorities and seat capacities, we next turn to our simulated placements. These results appear in Table 5. The first columns show the actual placement results for the students in our analytical sample. For example, 2,661 of the full sample of 3,427 children were placed in their first-choice school for kindergarten.¹⁵ The next column, Simulation 1, shows the number of placements resulting from a basic DA algorithm that gives priority, in order, to (1) students with a guaranteed placement, (2) siblings of current students, and (3) students who live in a school's geographic zone. We use this

¹⁵ Note that some baseline samples sizes—e.g., for White and “other/multi-race” applicants, and for placements in “A”-rated and “B”-rated schools—are relatively small. For these groups, simulations that change the placements of a small number of students still could register as reasonably large changes in percentage terms.

as our baseline simulation, with the results of other simulations compared to the results of this one. (Appendix Table 5 presents results of the same simulations with the lottery-only simulation as its baseline model.) The remaining simulations (Simulations 2 through 10) show differences in percentage terms between that simulation and Simulation 1. For example, when we drop geographic priority from the basic DA model (Simulation 2), we see a 1% increase in the number of students who receive a first-choice placement, with a 2% increase for Black students and 6% decrease for White students.

Several results in this table are worth highlighting. First, as noted in the preceding paragraph, running a basic DA algorithm without geographic priorities (Simulation 2) leads to more Black and free lunch-eligible students getting first-choice placements and placements in “A”-rated or “B”-rated schools. Removing sibling priority, on its own, does not have this same effect. This is further evidence that differences in which students qualify for geographic priority contribute heavily to the gaps observed in Table 2. Second, giving priority to disadvantaged students can have a fairly large impact on the distribution of students across schools, but: 1) its impact depends on how it is implemented; and 2) even a high-ranking priority for disadvantaged students (Simulation 6) probably would not be enough, in the short run, to eliminate the large gaps seen in Table 1 in the ratings of school where students are placed and enroll. By comparing the placements in Simulation 7 and Simulation 8, we see how important the hierarchical ordering of priorities can be in determining which students obtain seats in oversubscribed schools. Black and free lunch-eligible students benefit much more when the priority for disadvantaged students ranks ahead of sibling and geographic priorities (Simulation 7) than below them (Simulation 8). Third, increasing seat capacity results in fairly uniform increases in the share of students from these subgroups who obtain a first-choice or “A”/“B” placement (Simulation 9). However,

pairing seat capacity increases with changes to priorities can result in substantial changes in which subgroups obtain desirable seats (Simulation 10). This illustrates an important point, which is that simply increasing seat capacity will tend to benefit the same groups that are advantaged by a placement algorithm's existing priority structure. On the other hand, coupling seat capacity increases with a move toward different priority structures could have a multiplicative effect.

Table 6 analyzes these simulated placements from the perspective of potential disparities in which students are placed in their top-choice schools (parallel to Table 2's fixed-effects models). Panel A shows results by race, while Panel B shows results by family income. Interestingly, eliminating geographic priority alone, while leaving sibling priority, is enough to eliminate a statistically significant difference by race. This is evident in the estimate for Black in Simulation 2. Eliminating sibling priority does not have the same effect, as the estimates for Black are very similar in Simulations 1 and 3. Increasing capacity, on its own, also does not eliminate racial disparities (Simulation 9). Meanwhile, the simulations that incorporate explicit preferences for historically disadvantaged students either remove or reverse these disparities (Simulations 6, 7, 8, and 10). Panel B shows more modest differences in general. Unsurprisingly, however, priorities that explicitly benefit economically (and otherwise) disadvantaged students tend to result in free lunch-eligible children winning seats in first-choice schools when they vie for those seats against more economically advantaged peers.

6. Discussion

By weakening the links between where students live and which schools they can attend, school choice policies have the potential to remake enrollment patterns. In settings with high

levels of racial, ethnic, and socioeconomic segregation, this could result in more integrated schools and more equal access to the most sought-after educational opportunities. However, just giving families the ability to request more schools does not ensure meaningful change in access or enrollment patterns. Barriers to enrollment, from transportation to admissions processes, often keep families from accessing schools they might want. These barriers tend to create the steepest challenges for the most disadvantaged families (e.g., Bergman & McFarlin, Jr., 2018; Cohodes, Corcoran, Jennings, & Sattin-Bajaj, 2022; Valant & Lincove, 2023).

This study examines student enrollment patterns in New Orleans, which has perhaps the most choice-oriented school system in the United States. Even in this setting, we observe a highly unequal distribution of students across schools (e.g., a disproportionate share of White and nonpoor students in schools with the strongest state performance ratings). Our data suggest these patterns are attributable to an assortment of factors, many of which are hard to disentangle. For example, historically disadvantaged groups are less likely to request high-rated elementary schools, which could reflect a variety of factors, including differences in how much families value state performance ratings, the geographic dispersion of high-rated schools, and an assortment of barriers that can keep disadvantaged families from applying to certain schools (e.g., information inequities, transportation barriers, and discriminatory school practices).

However, one aspect of the student enrollment process is largely observable: which applicants in the New Orleans choice system receive the placements they request. That is the primary focus of this study. We find that when families of Black and White children submit the same first-choice requests for kindergarten placements, White children are 9 percentage points more likely to receive a first-choice placement. When poor and nonpoor families submit the same first-choice requests, nonpoor families are 6 percentage points more likely to have that

request fulfilled. This disparity arises because students' race and family income are correlated with priorities that are influential in determining placements at oversubscribed schools.

Geographic priorities, in particular, tend to benefit White and nonpoor applicants, since a disproportionate share of these applicants reside within priority-conveying geographic zones of the most sought-after schools.

This raises a basic, if fraught, question about unified enrollment systems. If they result in different placement rates for students of different races, conditional on families requesting the same schools, are their placement algorithms racially discriminatory? This certainly seems to satisfy some longstanding definitions of discrimination (Pager & Shepherd, 2008). At the same time, context is important. In the U.S., access to schools has long been unequal by race, ethnicity, and socioeconomic status. That is not unique to New Orleans, nor to cities with school choice policies. What distinguishes a setting like New Orleans from cities with more traditional systems of residential school assignment is probably not the presence of disparate treatment in the school enrollment process. Rather, it is the relative ease with which we can identify and measure certain types of disparities. It is notable, too, that the main factor working against Black and poor kindergarten applicants in New Orleans appears to be the system's geographic priorities. We might expect that a system that assigns students to schools based solely on where they live amplifies these disparities, albeit in less measurable ways.

As deeply rooted as they may be, racial disparities are not inescapable realities of school choice placement algorithms. Unsurprisingly, when we simulate placements using (a) alternate priority configurations and (b) increased seat capacities, we see that these types of disparities could be eliminated or reversed through policy. Perhaps more surprisingly, we find that Black and low-income applicants tend to fare well when they seek placements in non-transition grades.

In grades 1 through 8, Black students are 5 percentage points *more* likely than White students to receive a seat when they apply for the same school at the same grade level, and students eligible for free lunch are 3 percentage points more likely than students ineligible for free lunch.

However, context is important here, too. This pattern appears to arise from a high-ranking priority for students whose current schools were closing. The priority exists to mitigate a direct harm experienced disproportionately by Black families and families in poverty, and it applied to grade levels where relatively few seats in popular schools were available. Perhaps this closing school priority in New Orleans—or a similar priority elsewhere (Young, 2022)—serves as a proof of concept, politically, that cities can implement sets of priorities that benefit marginalized students. However, it is a limited proof of concept.

It is also important to note that while we can remove or reverse anti-Black and anti-poor disparities through simulations (or by looking to the non-transition grades), there is no plausible short-term path to eliminating racial segregation simply by tinkering with algorithm policies. Our simulations show the potential for policy changes to shift placement patterns, and some configurations—e.g., those that change priorities and seat capacities—result in a meaningful amount of movement. However, at least in present-day New Orleans, policymakers could not realistically engineer their way to an integrated system through changes to priorities or seat capacities alone. They can remove a certain type of disparity from these systems through algorithm reform, but the sources of inequity and segregation run too deep to be addressed simply with changes to a placement algorithm.

This study has limitations and relies on some assumptions. The first, which applies to our simulations, is an assumption that applicants would have submitted the same school requests even if schools had different priorities or seat capacities. This is broadly consistent with the logic

of a strategy-proof algorithm (where families should rank schools in their true order of preference with little, if any, consideration of placement probabilities). However, families might not behave this way in practice (Idoux, 2022; Kapor, Neilson, & Zimmerman, 2020), and changes in which students enroll in one year could affect families' desires for that school in a subsequent year. A second limitation relates to our data, as we cannot observe demographic information for children who never enroll in a public school. However, we can impute students' likely demographic characteristics based on the home neighborhoods, and our preferred estimates are similar to estimates obtained from samples restricted to students with directly observed demographics. Third, the multiple grade-level entry points into New Orleans elementary schools (pre-K and kindergarten), coupled with complexity in pre-K entry, limits our view of elementary school entry. We focus on kindergarten to avoid issues associated with pre-K enrollment, but this could result in missing certain types of students or schools. Finally, one might wonder about the generalizability of these findings to other settings. The divergent patterns we observe across transition and non-transition grades serve as a reminder that placement policies could look quite different across—and even within—various contexts. These contexts differ on many dimensions, including their school choice policy landscapes, geographic characteristics, population demographics, school participation in unified enrollment, and algorithm designs. This implies a need for similar research from other settings. These analyses, if conducted with local data, might also help to inform decision-making as school choice policies are debated.

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TABLE 1

State Performance Ratings of Schools Where Students Applied to Kindergarten, Were Placed, and Enrolled, By Race and Family Income

	Race			Free/Reduced-Price Lunch Eligibility		
	Black	White	Other/ Unknown	Free	No FRL	Reduced/ Unknown
<u>A. Balanced panel</u>						
Main Round first choice for 2018-19	1.79	2.90	2.24	1.82	2.26	2.74
Main Round placement for 2018-19	1.69	2.75	2.13	1.72	2.12	2.66
Round 2 placement for 2018-19	1.72	2.74	2.14	1.76	2.13	2.69
Schools attended in 2018-19 (2018 rating)	1.76	2.82	2.19	1.77	2.24	2.69
Schools attended in 2019-20 (2018 rating)	1.83	2.82	2.21	1.80	2.33	2.64
Schools attended in 2019-20 (2019 rating)	1.57	2.97	2.10	1.55	2.24	2.79
N	1,490	259	310	1,256	768	35
<u>B. All observations</u>						
Main Round first choice for 2018-19	1.83	2.92	2.32	1.84	2.31	2.40
Main Round placement for 2018-19	1.67	2.69	1.97	1.71	2.08	1.95
Round 2 placement for 2018-19	1.69	2.66	1.94	1.73	2.06	1.92
Schools attended in 2018-19 (2018 rating)	1.73	2.89	2.06	1.73	2.18	2.73
Schools attended in 2019-20 (2018 rating)	1.82	2.94	2.11	1.78	2.31	2.81
Schools attended in 2019-20 (2019 rating)	1.55	3.00	1.95	1.51	2.17	2.92
N (range)	1,702- 2,731	302- 409	525- 1,158	1,435- 2,293	898- 1,382	59- 825

Notes: Table shows the state performance ratings of public schools in New Orleans where students applied to kindergarten for the 2018-19 school year, were placed (in the Main Round and then Round 2), and enrolled (in 2018-19 and then 2019-20). Ratings come from school letter grades assigned by the Louisiana Department of Education and were converted to a standard GPA with a range of 0 to 4 (A=4, B=3, C=2, D=1, F/T=0). Schools that were new or transitioning to a different charter management organization received a rating of T. Schools without ratings are omitted from these analyses. Panel A restricts sample to students observed at each step with an associated school with a non-missing rating. Panel B does not apply this restriction. Students who enrolled in multiple schools in one year are given the mean GPA of those schools. For enrollment in the 2019-20 school year, results are reported separately based on the ratings issued to those schools in 2018 and 2019.

TABLE 2

Placed in First-Choice School for Kindergarten, By Race and Family Income

	<u>Placed in First-Choice School</u>		<u>Placed in First-Choice School if "A"/ "B"-Rated School</u>	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
<u>Panel A. Race</u>				
Black	-0.063*	-0.086**	-0.032	-0.083**
SE	0.034	0.035	0.039	0.039
P	0.07	0.02	0.42	0.04
Other/Multi-race	-0.013	-0.042	0.051	-0.018
SE	0.053	0.054	0.061	0.062
P	0.81	0.43	0.41	0.77
School fixed effects		X		X
N	1,144	1,144	765	765
<u>Panel B. Family income</u>				
Free lunch	-0.043	-0.056**	0.006	-0.029
SE	0.030	0.029	0.037	0.034
P	0.15	0.05	0.88	0.39
School fixed effects		X		X
N	1,144	1,144	765	765

Notes: Dependent variable is an indicator for whether students were placed in their first-choice school in the Main Round. In Panel A, the reference group is White students. In Panel B, the reference group is students ineligible for free lunch (which combines students eligible for reduced-price lunch and students ineligible for free or reduced-price lunch). Sample includes students whose demographic information is directly observed and students whose demographic information is imputed as described in the Data and Sample section. Sample is limited to students without a guaranteed placement. Significance: * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

TABLE 3

Qualified for Priority Status at First-Choice School for Kindergarten, By Race and Family Income

	<u>Priority at First-Choice School</u>				<u>Priority at First-Choice School if</u> <u>“A”/ “B”-Rated School</u>			
	Geography (1)	Sibling (2)	At-Risk (3)	IEP (4)	Geography (5)	Sibling (6)	At-Risk (7)	IEP (8)
<u>Panel A. Race</u>								
Black	-0.321***	-0.092***	0.052***	0.015**	-0.365***	-0.087***	0.034*	0.020**
SE	0.028	0.029	0.017	0.007	0.030	0.032	0.020	0.009
P	<0.01	<0.01	<0.01	0.03	<0.01	0.01	0.09	0.03
Other/Multi-race	-0.220***	-0.064	0.036	-0.002	-0.210***	-0.059	0.026	-0.004
SE	0.042	0.042	0.025	0.009	0.045	0.049	0.033	0.012
P	<0.01	0.13	0.16	0.85	<0.01	0.23	0.43	0.77
School fixed effects	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
N	1,144	1,144	1,144	1,144	765	765	765	765
<u>Panel B.</u>								
<u>Family income</u>								
Free lunch	-0.104***	-0.028	0.020	0.015**	-0.132***	-0.016	0.027	0.022**
SE	0.022	0.021	0.014	0.008	0.023	0.026	0.020	0.011
P	<0.01	0.18	0.15	0.05	<0.01	0.55	0.17	0.05
School fixed effects	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
N	1,144	1,144	1,144	1,144	765	765	765	765

Notes: Dependent variable is an indicator for whether students received the specified priority at their first-choice school in the Main Round. In Panel A, the reference group is White students. In Panel B, the reference group is students ineligible for free lunch (which combines students eligible for reduced-price lunch and students ineligible for free or reduced-price lunch). Sample includes students whose demographic information is directly observed and students whose demographic information is imputed as described in the Data and Sample section. Sample is limited to students without a guaranteed placement. Significance: * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

TABLE 4

Placed or Qualified for Priority Status at First-Choice School for Non-Transition Grades 1 through 8, By Race and Family Income

	Placement	Priority		
	(1)	Geography (2)	Sibling (3)	Closing (4)
<u>Panel A. Race</u>				
Black	0.053***	-0.295***	0.007	0.101***
SE	0.009	0.037	0.013	0.014
P	<0.01	<0.01	0.57	<0.01
Other/Multi-race	0.048***	-0.204***	-0.009	0.082***
SE	0.015	0.042	0.016	0.021
P	<0.01	<0.01	0.57	<0.01
School fixed effects	X	X	X	X
N	2,838	2,838	2,838	2,838
<u>Panel B. Family income</u>				
Free lunch	0.029***	-0.075***	-0.008	0.093***
SE	0.009	0.016	0.009	0.012
P	<0.01	<0.01	0.38	<0.01
School fixed effects	X	X	X	X
N	2,838	2,838	2,838	2,838

Notes: Dependent variable is an indicator for whether students were placed in their first-choice school (Column 1) or whether they received the specified priority at their first-choice school (Columns 2-5) in the Main Round. In Panel A, the reference group is White students. In Panel B, the reference group is students ineligible for free lunch (which combines students eligible for reduced-price lunch and students ineligible for free or reduced-price lunch). Sample includes students whose demographic information is directly observed and students whose demographic information is imputed as described in the Data and Sample section. Sample is limited to students without a guaranteed placement. Significance: * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

TABLE 5

Differences in Kindergarten Placements with Simulated Changes to Priorities and Seat Capacities

	Number of Students Applied	Number of Students Placed	Sim. 1: Basic DA algorithm	Sim. 2: No Geo.	Sim. 3: No Sibling	Sim. 4: Guar. Only	Sim. 5: Lottery Only	Sim. 6: Disadv. Only	Sim. 7: Basic DA + Disadv. (High Priority)	Sim. 8: Basic DA + Disadv. (Low Priority)	Sim. 9: Basic DA + Increase Seat Capacity	Sim. 10: Basic DA + Increase Seat Capacity + Disadv.
Priority rank in algorithm												
Guaranteed (Guar.)			1	1	1	1			1	1	1	1
Sibling			2	2					3	2	2	3
Geography (Geo.)			3		2				4	3	3	4
Disadvantaged (Disadv.)								1	2	4		2
Increase capacity by 10%											X	X
Panel A. Placement in first-choice school												
All students	3,427	2,661	2,645	1%	-1%	2%	1%	1%	1%	0%	3%	4%
Black	2,592	2,085	2,062	2%	-1%	3%	3%	5%	3%	0%	3%	6%
White	447	267	280	-6%	-2%	-11%	-12%	-27%	-13%	-4%	6%	-9%
Other/Multi-race	388	309	303	0%	-1%	1%	-1%	-4%	-3%	-1%	3%	-2%
Free lunch	1,756	1,478	1,481	1%	-1%	2%	1%	6%	4%	1%	2%	7%
Non-free lunch	1,647	1,165	1,147	1%	-1%	1%	2%	-6%	-4%	-2%	4%	0%
Panel B. Placement in “A”/“B”-rated school												
All students	1,061	530	525	2%	-2%	3%	1%	-3%	1%	-1%	9%	9%
Black	606	286	273	8%	-4%	15%	13%	17%	10%	1%	11%	22%
White	317	164	175	-5%	1%	-13%	-13%	-29%	-8%	-2%	8%	-3%
Other/Multi-race	138	80	77	-5%	-1%	-4%	-12%	-13%	-13%	-5%	6%	-10%
Free lunch	375	199	197	5%	-6%	8%	1%	19%	15%	6%	9%	23%
Non-free lunch	673	322	320	0%	0%	0%	1%	-17%	-9%	-6%	10%	-1%

Notes: Table shows placements resulting from simulated changes to school priorities and/or seat capacities. The first two columns show the actual number of students in the analytic sample who applied and were placed in their first-choice school (Panel A) or an “A”/“B”-rated school (Panel B). The third column (Simulation 1) shows the number of students placed using a simulated, basic deferred-acceptance (DA) algorithm. Simulations 2-10 show how the number of students placed would differ from the corresponding number in Simulation 1 (e.g., Simulation 2 results in 1% more students being placed in a first-choice school than Simulation 1). Several simulations incorporate priorities for vulnerable students. This “disadvantaged” priority considers, in order: (a) eligibility for free lunch, (b) enrollment in a school that is closing, (c) enrollment in a school with a D/F/T rating, (d) enrollment in a school with C rating, and (e) eligibility for reduced-price lunch. Simulations 9 and 10 increase the seat capacity of each school by 10%. Students with a guaranteed seat are included in these simulations (and account for 36% of all applicants in this sample).

TABLE 6


Placed in First-Choice School for Kindergarten with Simulated Changes to Priorities and Seat Capacities, By Race and Family Income

	Sim. 1: Basic DA algorithm	Sim. 2: No Geo.	Sim. 3: No Sibling	Sim. 4: Guar. Only	Sim. 5: Lottery Only	Sim. 6: Disadv. Only	Sim. 7: Basic DA + Disadv. (High Pri.)	Sim. 8: Basic DA + Disadv. (Low Pri.)	Sim. 9: Basic DA + Increase Seat Capacity	Sim. 10: Basic DA + Increase Seat Capacity + Disadv.
Priority rank in algorithm										
Guaranteed (Guar.)	1	1	1	1			1	1	1	1
Sibling	2	2					3	2	2	3
Geography (Geo.)	3		2				4	3	3	4
Disadvantaged (Disadv.)						1	2	4		2
Increase capacity by 10%									X	X
<u>Panel A. Race</u>										
Black	-0.193***	-0.014	-0.213***	0.043	0.055	0.337***	0.245***	-0.020	-0.213***	0.280***
SE	0.051	0.053	0.050	0.051	0.051	0.040	0.040	0.044	0.050	0.042
P	<0.01	0.80	<0.01	0.40	0.28	<0.01	<0.01	0.66	<0.01	<0.01
Other/Multi-race	-0.177***	-0.070	-0.123*	-0.016	0.038	0.083**	0.031	-0.057	-0.178***	-0.004
SE	0.072	0.071	0.071	0.069	0.069	0.047	0.043	0.060	0.072	0.045
P	0.01	0.32	0.08	0.81	0.58	0.08	0.47	0.34	0.01	0.93
School fixed effects	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
<u>Panel B. Family Income</u>										
Free lunch	-0.018	-0.022	-0.042	0.027	0.019	0.423***	0.336***	0.158***	-0.043	0.380***
SE	0.045	0.047	0.044	0.048	0.047	0.045	0.045	0.043	0.045	0.044
P	0.69	0.65	0.34	0.57	0.69	<0.01	<0.01	<0.01	0.35	<0.01
School fixed effects	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X


Notes: This table shows the results of regression models mirroring the models from Table 2 using the simulated priorities and seat capacities presented in Table 5. Students with guaranteed placements are omitted. Significance: * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

FIGURE 1
State Performance Ratings of Schools Where Students Enrolled in Grades K-12, By Race and Family Income

1a. Enrollment by Race/Ethnicity



1b. Enrollment by Family Income (Free or Reduced-Price Lunch Eligibility)



Notes: Figures show the state performance ratings of public schools in New Orleans where students were enrolled during the 2018-19 school year (grades K-12). Ratings come from school ratings assigned by the Louisiana Department of Education in 2018. Schools that were new or transitioning to a different charter management organization received a rating of T. Schools without ratings—and students without directly observed demographic data—are omitted from these analyses.

APPENDIX TABLE 1

Counts of Priority Combinations by School, Disaggregated by Grade

Sequence of Priorities					Number of Schools		
Priority 1	Priority 2	Priority 3	Priority 4	Priority 5	Kindergarten	Grade 4	Grade 9
Closing school	Sibling	Geography			41	50	7
Feeder	Sibling	Geography			9		1
IEP	At-Risk	Sibling	Feeder		3		
Sibling	Geography				2		
Sibling	School-specific				2		
Sibling					1	1	20
Feeder	IEP	Sibling	Child of staff	Geography	1	1	1
Closing school	Feeder	Sibling	Geography		1	1	
Closing school	Sibling	At-Risk	Geography		1	1	
IEP	At-Risk	Sibling			1		
Sibling	Feeder					3	1
Closing school	Sibling	School-specific				2	
Feeder	Sibling						3
IEP	Sibling						1
Sibling	Feeder	Geography					1

Notes: Table shows the number of public schools with the specified sequence of priorities in the 2018-19 Main Round. The full priority hierarchy includes combinations of these priorities. For example, if a school has three ordered priorities—A, B, and C—the full priority hierarchy would be: 1) A+B+C, 2) A+B, 3) A+C, 4) A, 5) B+C, 6) B, and then 7) C. Some priorities apply to all seats; others apply to only a subset of seats (e.g., geography). School-specific priorities are unique to particular schools (e.g., a priority for children of French nationals in a French immersion program). Schools are included regardless of whether any applicants qualified for the priorities listed.

APPENDIX TABLE 2

Placed in First-Choice School for Kindergarten, By Race and Family Income—Students with Guaranteed Seats Included

	<u>Placed in First-Choice School</u>		<u>Placed in First-Choice School if</u> <u>“A”/“B”-Rated School</u>	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
<u>Panel A. Race</u>				
Black	0.207***	-0.064***	-0.045	-0.058*
SE	0.025	0.026	0.035	0.033
P	<0.01	0.01	0.19	0.08
Other/Multi-race	0.199***	-0.032	0.062	0.020
SE	0.031	0.029	0.051	0.048
P	<0.01	0.27	0.22	0.67
School fixed effects		X		X
N	3,427	3,427	1,061	1,061
<u>Panel B. Family income</u>				
Free lunch	0.134***	0.003	0.048	0.020
SE	0.014	0.012	0.032	0.029
P	<0.01	0.79	0.13	0.48
School fixed effects		X		X
N	3,427	3,427	1,061	1,061

Notes: Dependent variable is an indicator for whether students were placed in their first-choice school in the Main Round. In Panel A, the reference group is White students. In Panel B, the reference group is students ineligible for free lunch (which combines students eligible for reduced-price lunch and students ineligible for free or reduced-price lunch). Sample includes students whose demographic information is directly observed and students whose demographic information is imputed as described in the Data and Sample section. This table is parallel to Table 2, but this sample also includes students who were guaranteed a seat in their first-choice school. Significance: * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

APPENDIX TABLE 3

Placed in First-Choice School for Kindergarten, By Race and Family Income—Restricted to Students with Directly Observed Demographic Data

	<u>Placed in First-Choice School</u>		<u>Placed in First-Choice School if “A”/“B”-Rated School</u>	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
<u>Panel A. Race</u>				
Black	-0.110**	-0.088*	-0.078**	-0.110*
SE	0.048	0.053	0.059	0.064
P	0.02	0.10	0.19	0.09
Other/Multi-race	-0.062	-0.048	0.012	-0.042
SE	0.070	0.073	0.085	0.088
P	0.38	0.51	0.89	0.63
School fixed effects		X		X
N	614	614	370	370
<u>Panel B. Family income</u>				
Free lunch	-0.078*	-0.042	-0.047	-0.013
SE	0.047	0.047	0.063	0.061
P	0.10	0.37	0.46	0.83
School fixed effects		X		X
N	614	614	370	370

Notes: Dependent variable is an indicator for whether students were placed in their first-choice school in the Main Round. In Panel A, the reference group is White students. In Panel B, the reference group is students ineligible for free lunch (which combines students eligible for reduced-price lunch and students ineligible for free or reduced-price lunch). Sample is limited to students without a guaranteed placement. This table is parallel to Table 2, but this sample is restricted to students whose race/ethnicity and family income are directly observed in administrative data (no imputations). Significance: * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

APPENDIX TABLE 4

Share of Applicants with Priority Status at Their First-Choice School, Disaggregated by Grade

	Kindergarten	Grade 4	Grade 9
At-Risk	5.1	0.0	0.0
Child of staff	0.0	0.0	0.0
Closing school	0.0	17.5	0.0
Feeder	2.5	0.0	10.2
Geography	35.5	45.5	12.4
IEP	1.0	0.0	0.2
School-specific	0.4	0.4	0.0
Sibling	22.9	6.0	11.4

Notes: Table shows the percentage of applicants who had the specified priority at their top-ranked public school. Applicants were marked as *not* having a priority if either: (a) their top-ranked school used that priority but the applicant did not qualify; or (b) their top-ranked school did not use that priority. School-specific priorities are unique to a small number of schools. Table only includes students without a guaranteed placement in that school.

APPENDIX TABLE 5

Differences in Kindergarten Placements with Simulated Changes to Priorities and Seat Capacities (Reference = Lottery-only Simulation)

	Number of Students Applied	Number of Students Placed	Sim. 5: Lottery Only	Sim. 1: Basic DA algorithm	Sim. 2: No Geo.	Sim. 3: No Sibling	Sim. 4: Guar. Only	Sim. 6: Disadv. Only	Sim. 7: Basic DA + Disadv. (High Priority)	Sim. 8: Basic DA + Disadv. (Low Priority)	Sim. 9: Basic DA + Increase Seat Capacity	Sim. 10: Basic DA + Increase Seat Capacity + Disadv.
Priority rank in algorithm												
Guaranteed (Guar.)				1	1	1	1		1	1	1	1
Sibling				2	2				3	2	2	3
Geography (Geo.)				3		2			4	3	3	4
Disadvantaged (Disadv.)								1	2	4		2
Increase capacity by 10%											X	X
Panel A. Placement in first-choice school												
All students	3,427	2,661	2,672	-1%	0%	-2%	1%	0%	0%	-1%	2%	3%
Black	2,592	2,085	2,127	-3%	-1%	-4%	0%	2%	0%	-3%	0%	3%
White	447	267	246	14%	7%	12%	2%	-17%	-1%	10%	20%	4%
Other/Multi-race	388	309	299	1%	2%	1%	2%	-2%	-2%	0%	4%	0%
Free lunch	1,756	1,478	1,492	-1%	1%	-1%	1%	5%	3%	1%	1%	6%
Non-free lunch	1,647	1,165	1,166	-2%	0%	-2%	0%	-8%	-5%	-4%	3%	-2%
Panel B. Placement in “A”/“B”-rated school												
All students	1,061	530	529	-1%	1%	-3%	2%	-4%	0%	-2%	8%	8%
Black	606	286	308	-11%	-4%	-15%	2%	4%	-2%	-11%	-2%	8%
White	317	164	153	14%	9%	15%	0%	-19%	5%	12%	24%	10%
Other/Multi-race	138	80	68	13%	7%	12%	9%	-1%	-1%	7%	21%	1%
Free lunch	375	199	198	-1%	4%	-6%	8%	18%	14%	6%	8%	22%
Non-free lunch	673	322	323	-1%	-1%	-1%	-1%	-17%	-10%	-7%	9%	-2%

Notes: Table shows placements resulting from simulated changes to school priorities and/or seat capacities. This table is parallel to Table 5 but compares all placement simulations to a lottery-only simulation rather than a basic DA algorithm simulation. The first two columns show the actual number of students in the analytic sample who applied and were placed in their first-choice school (Panel A) or an “A”/“B”-rated school (Panel B). Students with a guaranteed seat are included in these simulations (and account for 36% of all applicants in this sample).

Online Appendix A

This appendix provides a stylized example of how the OneApp’s deferred-acceptance algorithm works. Figure A1.1 depicts a scenario in which four students (Chris, Imani, James, and Kayla) submit rank-ordered requests for up to five schools (Schools A, B, C, D, and E). In this scenario, each school has only one seat available. Priorities determine which students receive seats in cases of oversubscription, with some priorities common across all schools and others specific to individual schools. For example, while Chris is first in line at most schools (perhaps because he is coming from a “D” or “F”-rated school), James has a sibling enrolled in School C, which places him ahead of Chris in that school’s priority order.

Figure A1.1

	Chris	Imani	James	Kayla
Choice #1	C	D	C	A
Choice #2	D	A	D	D
Choice #3		E	A	
Choice #4		B		
Placement				
Student priority order: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • School A: Chris, Imani, James, Kayla • School B: Chris, Imani, James, Kayla • School C: James (sibling), Chris, Imani, Kayla • School D: Chris, Imani, James, Kayla • School E: Imani (guaranteed), Chris, James, Kayla 				

The algorithm initially works through applicants’ first choices. It tentatively places Imani in School D and Kayla in School A since those schools only had one first-choice request. Chris and James both requested School C. Chris receives that tentative placement because of his higher priority status, which means that James is eliminated from consideration for School C.

Figure A1.2

	Chris	Imani	James	Kayla
Choice #1	€	D (tentative)	C (tentative)	A (tentative)
Choice #2	D	A	D	D
Choice #3		E	A	
Choice #4		B		
Placement				

On the algorithm’s second pass, it will give Chris—the one applicant without a tentative placement at that point—full consideration at his second-ranked choice, School D. This is key to the algorithm being (nearly) strategy-proof. Chris is not punished for ranking School D second when others (Imani) ranked it first. In fact, Chris has higher priority at School D, so he tentatively takes Imani’s placement in School D and Imani is eliminated from consideration for that school. This leaves Imani without a seat, at least temporarily.

Figure A1.3

	Chris	Imani	James	Kayla
Choice #1	€	⊘	C (tentative)	A (tentative)
Choice #2	D (tentative)	A	D	D
Choice #3		E	A	
Choice #4		B		
Placement				

In the algorithm’s third pass, Imani receives full consideration for School A. Since Imani has higher priority than Kayla at School A, she takes Kayla’s (tentative) seat. This eliminates Kayla from consideration for a Main Round placement in School A.

Figure A1.4

	Chris	Imani	James	Kayla
Choice #1	€	⊘	C (tentative)	A
Choice #2	D (tentative)	A (tentative)	D	D
Choice #3		E	A	
Choice #4		B		
Placement				

In what will be the final pass for this this algorithm, Kayla is considered for a seat in School D. However, James holds onto that seat by virtue of his higher priority status. Since Kayla did not request any other schools, she will not receive a placement in this round.

Figure A1.5

	Chris	Imani	James	Kayla
Choice #1	€	⊘	C	A
Choice #2	D	A	D	⊘
Choice #3		E	A	
Choice #4		B		
Placement	D	A	C	Unassigned

At this point, the tentative placements are finalized. The system assigns Chris to School D, Imani to School A, and James to School C. Kayla will need to seek out a seat through another pathway (e.g., Round 2 or summer enrollment) or find an alternative option (e.g., private school).