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HETEROGENEITY AND THE EQUITABLE RATE OF INTEREST

Riccardo M. Masolo*

February 17, 2023

Abstract

The *equitable rate of interest* represents a benchmark to evaluate the cross-sectional effects of monetary policy. I define it as the real rate of interest that minimizes the welfare losses associated to cross-sectional heterogeneity, under flexible prices. In a large class of models, it can be expressed as the payoff of a suitably chosen portfolio.

In a Two-Agent New Keynesian model the deviations of the optimal policy prescription, relative to a Representative-Agent benchmark, can be traced back to the equitable rate gap: the difference between prevailing real rates and the equitable rate. This parallels the way in which the natural rate is the reference stick to evaluate the stance of monetary policy with regards to aggregate stabilization. Indeed, the difference between the natural rate and the equitable rate marks the tradeoff between aggregate and cross-sectional stabilization, faced by a welfare-maximizing policymaker.

JEL Codes: E31, E52.

Keywords: Monetary Policy, Heterogeneous Agents, Optimal Policy.

1 Introduction

The effects of household heterogeneity and monetary policy are intertwined. Heterogeneity shapes the transmission of monetary policy (e.g. Bilbiie, 2008; Kaplan, Moll, and Violante, 2018; Auclert, 2019; Cloyne, Ferreira, and Surico, 2020; Bilbiie, 2021). At the same time, policy impacts the degree of heterogeneity (e.g. Coibion et al., 2017). These effects are particularly salient at a time when the pandemic, the recent rise in inflation and the subsequent hike in monetary policy rates have caused large variations in real rates of interest, which can cause sizeable redistributive effects (Doepke, Schneider, and Selezneva, 2019; Doepke and Schneider, 2006).

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Just as the natural rate of interest signals if the stance of monetary policy is tight or loose, in a Representative-Agent New Keynesian model (RANK; Woodford, 2003a, Galí, 2015), I propose the *equitable rate of interest* as the benchmark to evaluate the cross-sectional effects of monetary policy. I define it as the level of real rates that minimizes the welfare losses resulting from consumption heterogeneity, under flexible prices.¹

In a Two-Agent New Keynesian (TANK) model, it has an immediate economic interpretation. When prevailing real rates exceed the equitable rate (positive equitable rate gap), savers are better off than borrowers, while the opposite is true when the equitable rate gap is negative. Indeed, the equitable rate gap is a sufficient statistic for consumption heterogeneity, and measures the welfare losses associated to consumption heterogeneity.

The distinction between the equitable and natural rates of interest is also informative. In standard RANK models, optimal policy amounts to a form of flexible inflation targeting (Woodford, 2003a; Galí, 2015): the social welfare function can be approximated to second order as the weighted sum of square deviations of inflation from target and of output from potential.² In heterogeneous-agent models, the quadratic approximation to the utilitarian social welfare function can be split into two intuitive parts. The first mimics exactly the welfare function of RANK models. It captures welfare losses associated to inefficient variations in aggregate consumption and hours. And just as in RANK, the natural rate of interest will represent the level of real rates that minimizes this source of welfare losses, under flexible prices.

The second component captures the reduction in social welfare stemming from cross-sectional differences in consumption (and hours worked). The equitable rate will be the level of real rates a policymaker should track in order to minimize it. It immediately follows that whenever the equitable and natural rates differ it will not be possible, even in the best of circumstances, for a policymaker to attain full aggregate and cross-sectional stabilization. The difference between the two rates thus marks the tradeoff between aggregate and cross-sectional stabilization faced by a welfare-optimizing policymaker.

This can be clearly seen in the TANK model I consider. It builds on the limited asset market participation (LAMP-TANK) model proposed by Bilbiie (2008) and adds liquidity, i.e. borrowing and lending in strictly positive amounts (Eggertsson and Krugman, 2012). In a LAMP model, heterogeneity follows from an uneven participation to dividend payouts. The resulting utilitarian

¹I will often refer to policies aimed at reducing these losses as cross-sectional stabilization, as opposed to aggregate stabilization. By cross-sectional stabilization I mean a reduction in the differences in consumption (and hours worked) across the population. By aggregate stabilization I will refer to keeping aggregate consumption and hours worked close to their efficient level. Notice that, for the most part, both these terms will be expressed as a function of the same aggregate variables, e.g. inflation and the output gap. The dividing line will be the source of the welfare loss, which will become apparent once I define the quadratic approximation to the utilitarian social welfare function.

²Realistic degrees of price stickiness imply a much higher relative weight on inflation variation than on output gap deviation. In this sense, inflation stabilization is the primary objective.

social welfare function puts more weight on output gap stabilization, relative to RANK. Bilbiie (2008) shows that in a LAMP economy it is still possible for a policymaker to perfectly offset shocks to the natural rate of interest (Blanchard and Galí, 2007). This can be explained by the natural rate and the equitable rate coinciding with each other: when the real rate equals the natural rate, dividends are no source of heterogeneity in that particular economy. By tracking the natural rate of interest a policymaker can thus fully stabilize the aggregates and prevent the emergence of consumption heterogeneity at the same time.

Introducing liquidity changes the picture. Savers, who also correspond to stock holders, will benefit both from high dividends and high real rates. In this context, we can think of the equitable rate as the level of real rates that makes borrowers and savers equally well off, for a given level of dividends. The portfolio return interpretation I will give to the equitable rate will make manifest that it correspond to the return on a portfolio that is short on stocks. Or, put differently, it will call for real rates to be relatively low when dividends are high and viceversa.

It follows, that the equitable rate will in general differ from the natural rate. A new tradeoff emerges for policymakers. A shock to the natural rate cannot be fully offset. By tracking the natural rate the policymaker could maximize aggregate stabilization, while by tracking the equitable rate she would deliver cross-sectional stabilization. Clearly, neither of these corner solutions is optimal, but the difference between the natural and equitable rates illustrates the underlying tension. The structure of the economy will dictate how to resolve this tradeoff. For instance, a higher share of credit-constrained borrowers will put a premium on tracking closely the equitable rate.

Indeed, under a special calibration of my TANK model, a simple optimal targeting rule can be derived which shows that that the deviation of the optimal policy prescription from that of a RANK model is exactly proportional to the difference between the natural and equitable rates.

These considerations are not only relevant for a welfare-maximizing policymaker but also for one following a simple dual mandate, whose goals are to keep inflation close to target and economic activity at its potential level. Welfare-losses associated to cross-sectional heterogeneity change the weight assigned to inflation and the output gap. So they could directly affect the practical implementation of a dual mandate policy. If in a LAMP model, heterogeneity only translates into a higher weight attached to output gap stabilization, in my TANK model, movements in inflation and the policy rate itself will cause inefficient transfers of resources between savers and borrowers too. As a result, the penalty on inflation variations will increase. The overall weight on the output gap relative to inflation could be higher or lower, compared to a RANK benchmark, depending on the relative impact of limited asset market participation and nominal borrowing and lending on cross-sectional heterogeneity.

Moreover, this simple model provides an intuitive microfoundation for a term in the policymaker's objective function that penalizes large swings in the policy instrument itself. Changes

in the monetary policy rate are a source of transfer of resources between savers and borrowers which reduce overall social welfare. So a term in square deviations of the policy rate from its steady state level, typically added on realism grounds (e.g. Debortoli, Kim, et al., 2019) or as a solution to an optimal delegation problem (Woodford, 2003b), naturally shows up in the social welfare function.

The concept of the equitable rate applies well beyond TANK models and is not restricted to monetary policy analysis. In the first part of the paper, I show that consumption heterogeneity can be approximated to first order as a linear function of asset payoffs in a large class of heterogeneous-agent models. It then follows that the second-order approximation to the utilitarian social welfare function can be written as the sum of a component identical to the corresponding RANK model and one that depends on the covariance of asset payoffs.

In these models, the financial structure of the economy can be summarized by a matrix collecting the average relative elasticities of each agent-type consumption to each asset payoff.³ The properties of this matrix are key to characterize the equitable rate and to assess the extent to which policy can deliver an equitable allocation. In general, a larger set of assets, relative to the number of agents types, will make life easier for the policymaker. The rank of said matrix will also be indicative as to the degree of policy coordination (i.e. the number of policy instruments) required to deliver on that front.

It is well known that fiscal policy plays a central role in the presence of heterogeneity (Le Grand, Martin-Baillon, and Ragot, 2021). For the purpose of this paper I make an assumption that has been used in the literature (e.g. Bilbiie, 2008) and maximizes transparency and tractability. I maintain that transfers undo *average* distortions: the steady state of the models under consideration will thus be efficient and equitable, i.e. the consumption and hours worked are the same across agents and equal to their efficient levels.

The second part of the paper presents the TANK model briefly outlined above and studies optimal monetary policy in that context. The model features borrowers and savers and three assets. Nominal government bonds, which are in zero net supply and cannot be shorted. Deposits are also defined in nominal terms and in zero net supply, but borrowers and savers take opposite positions on that market. Finally, stocks are in positive supply and produce a string of dividends. The asset structure affects both the social welfare function and behavior of the private sector (the dynamic IS curve).

When it comes to optimal policy, I first consider a special case in which portfolio effects exactly offset the general equilibrium intertemporal-substitution effect. The optimal policy prescription under commitment boils down to a simple targeting rule comprising two terms. The

³By average relative elasticity I mean the elasticity of steady state consumption of an agent of type i to the payoff of asset j relative to elasticity of aggregate steady state consumption to the payoff from the same asset.

first is identical to the price-level targeting rule from RANK (Woodford, 2003a, ch. 7). The second is proportional to the equitable rate gap, which governs the deviation from optimal policy in RANK. Intuitively, suppose that the RANK price-level targeting rule lead to a rise in real rates, above the level of the equitable rate. That would open a positive equitable rate gap. It would then be optimal to run a higher output gap which, in turn, would boost real wages and reduce dividends. The end result would be a mitigation of the consumption heterogeneity that a strict price-targeting policy would induce.

This targeting rule also makes transparent that the natural and equitable rate will in general differ. As a consequence, policymakers will face a nontrivial tradeoff and will not be able to offset the aggregate and cross-sectional impact of a shock at the same time. Interestingly, just as in RANK models a distinction is made among shocks based on whether they induce a tradeoff between inflation and output gap stabilization, the same can be done with regards to the tradeoff between aggregate and cross-sectional stabilization. Shocks that move the real and natural rate in the same direction will pose a lesser challenge to policymakers.

The paper concludes with the analysis of optimal policy under a generic calibration of the TANK I consider. The joint analysis of the natural and equitable rate gaps will summarize the effects of policy stance and will give a clear indication as to whether policy is tight or loose from an aggregate perspective and whether it favor one type of households over another.

Related Literature. The role of heterogeneity for the transmission and the conduct of monetary policy has been the subject of a recent and fast-growing literature. Depending on the exact question at hand and on the tradeoff between analytical tractability and accurate quantitative characterization of cross-sectional heterogeneity, Heterogeneous-Agent New Keynesian models with individual risk (HANK), Tractable HANK models (THANK) or TANK models have been studied. McKay, Nakamura, and Steinsson (2016), Kaplan, Moll, and Violante (2018), Auclert (2019), and Luetticke (2021) present a primarily positive analysis of the transmission of monetary policy to the economy in HANK models. Acharya, Challe, and Dogra (2022), Dávila and Schaab (2022), and Bhandari et al. (2021), Le Grand, Martin-Baillon, and Ragot (2021), McKay and Wolf (2022), Nuño and Thomas (2022) take a normative perspective and characterize optimal policy prescriptions in HANK. A related strand of the literature (Challe, 2020; Bilbiie and Ragot, 2021; Bilbiie, 2021; Bilbiie, Känzig, and Surico, 2020; Cui and Sterk, 2021) studies optimal policy in THANK models, in which the modeling of the wealth distribution is somewhat simplified to the benefit of tractability.

Debortoli and Gali (2018) show that TANK models provide a good approximation to the implications of models with individual risk so long as aggregate shocks and aggregate macro variables are concerned. The TANK literature dates back to the seminal work of Campbell and Mankiw

(1989), and was later developed by Galí, López-Salido, and Vallés (2007), Bilbiie (2008), Eggertsson and Krugman (2012), Bilbiie, Monacelli, and Perotti (2013), Curdia and Woodford (2016), Debortoli and Galí (2018), Bilbiie, Känzig, and Surico (2020), Benigno, Eggertsson, and Romei (2020), Broer et al. (2020), Bilbiie, Monacelli, and Perotti (2021).⁴

With one exception, these papers typically assume some combination of the following: i) the two agent types consume the same share of income at all times; ii) the borrowing constraint is set to zero (*hand-to-mouth* agents); iii) profits are uniformly distributed to all households. Bilbiie, Monacelli, and Perotti (2013) allow for liquidity and limited asset market participation, but fiscal policy is such that equitability of the steady state obtains only in the special case in which the borrowing constraint and profits are both zero in steady state.

To my knowledge, the model I present is the first in which both a strictly positive level of borrowing and uneven profit distribution are a source of heterogeneity, while fiscal policy corrects for average consumption heterogeneity so that an equitable steady state obtains.⁵ Savers and borrowers will be equally well off on average, yet this model will preserve the intuitive feature that high real rates favor savers relative to borrowers and vice versa.

As hinted above, the models in Bilbiie (2008) and Eggertsson and Krugman (2012) are nested, as I will show in Section 3.3. In Bilbiie (2008) profit distribution is a source of heterogeneity but there is no borrowing and lending. In Eggertsson and Krugman (2012) profits are equally distributed to all households and heterogeneity is limited to borrowing and lending.

Finally, my paper contributes to a vast literature on optimal monetary policy at large, part of which is surveyed in Woodford (2010). A relevant recent contribution is Akinci et al. (2022), in which the analysis of policy based on the natural rate is complemented by a financial stability benchmark interest rate, to capture the possible financial instability side effects of policy interventions. Also relevant are works by Justiniano, Primiceri, and Tambalotti (2013), and Debortoli, Kim, et al. (2019) which show that welfare theoretic concepts, such as the natural level of output, serve as an important benchmark even in large quantitative models in which they do not fully characterize the social welfare function. The same goes for the equitable rate, which could serve as an important benchmark for monetary policy. One that would increase transparency by summarizing underlying complicated dynamics, related to the heterogeneous effects of monetary policy.

⁴A related but distinct strand of the literature, relies on more quantitative models with incomplete markets and borrowers and savers or limited asset market participation, e.g. Iacoviello (2005), Albonico, Paccagnini, and Tirelli (2017), Ferrero, Harrison, and Nelson (2018).

⁵Equitability is not really needed to define the equitable rate and study its implications. It has three considerable benefits, though. It makes the role of fiscal policy transparent. It simplifies the algebra: if the steady state was not equitable first-order terms in the quadratic approximation to the social welfare function would emerge. And finally it makes the comparison to the literature (e.g. Bilbiie (2008)) more straightforward.

2 General Setup

Models used to study monetary policy typically have a common core, the three-equation RANK model (Galì, 2015; Woodford, 2003a). It features a representative consumer/worker, and a pricing friction that gives rise to welfare losses when inflation deviates from its target value and output is away from potential.

When the representative agent assumption is relaxed social welfare will depend on the cross sectional distribution of consumption (and hours worked). I will now illustrate how, for a broad class of these models, it is possible to express the welfare cost associated to cross-sectional dispersion in consumption solely as a function of asset payoffs.

Consider an economy populated by a continuum of measure one of households, with identical separable period utility function in consumption and hours worked $u(C_{i,t}, N_{i,t})$. The labor market is homogeneous (all have the same productivity and earn the same hourly wage).

I allow for $i = 1, \dots, I$ distinct household types,⁶ where $0 < s_i < 1$, $\sum_{i=1}^I s_i = 1$, is the share of each type in the population. Financial markets are incomplete and characterized by $j = 1, \dots, J$ assets. Ω_j is the supply of each asset, $p_{j,t}$ denotes the asset price in units of consumption and $\Delta_{j,t}$ is the real value of the cashflow asset j produces in period t , e.g. a coupon or dividend.⁷ I maintain that agent i holdings of asset j can be represented by a constant $\omega_{i,j}$. This assumption simplifies the algebra significantly and is not very restrictive if one defines assets appropriately. In a TANK model with a fixed borrowing constraint, like the one I will consider, it is indeed the case that the asset shares do not vary across type over the business cycle. In a HANK model with some liquidity that is not the case, though. Each agents will optimally vary her asset holdings over time. However, as I show in Appendix F, if one assumes that portfolio managers carry out financial operations on behalf of households and defines $\omega_{i,j}$ as the loading on the payout of the entire portfolio, this setup extends to models with individual risk too.

Finally, I allow for lump-sum transfers of the form $T_{i,t} = \Lambda_t + \Theta_i$, in which the redistributive component does not vary over time.⁸ This assumption is not strictly necessary⁹ but it increases transparency of exposition. The functional form for the transfer I assume allows me to pin Θ_i down given an assumption about steady state consumption, e.g. that the consumption level is efficient and equal across types. This makes the role of fiscal policy very clear.

In an economy such as this, the gap between the consumption of an agent of type i and

⁶By household type I mean a set of agents who make the same economic decisions at all times.

⁷Asset prices and coupons/dividends in turn relate directly to asset returns, defined as $R_{j,t-1} = \frac{p_{j,t} + \Delta_{j,t}}{p_{j,t-1}}$. I will thus use asset prices, asset returns, and asset payoffs as synonyms, as they all map into each other.

⁸I normalize $\Lambda = 0$ in steady state.

⁹In Appendix E.7, for example, I present an example in which it is not verified but that can be easily accommodated.

aggregate consumption, her relative consumption, can be expressed (see Appendix A.1) as:

$$C_{it} - C_t = \sum_j (\Delta_{j,t} - \Delta_j) (\omega_{i,j} - \Omega_j) + w_t (N_{i,t} - N_t), \quad i = 1, \dots, I. \quad (1)$$

Relative consumption depends on the relative exposure $(\omega_{i,j} - \Omega_j)$ of agent i to asset class j , on whether this asset's current payoff is above or below average, $(\Delta_{j,t} - \Delta_j)$, and on agent i 's relative labor supply, $N_{i,t} - N_t$, where w_t is the real wage. The relative labor supply is tightly linked to consumption heterogeneity.

If leisure is a normal good, agents that enjoy above-average consumption will also want to consume high levels of leisure and will reduce their labor supply. To first order, the relative labor supply is proportional to $C_{i,t} - C_t$ and can thus be substituted out. As a consequence, relative consumption can be expressed solely as a function of asset payoffs.

Proposition 2.1 *Around an efficient and equitable steady state, consumption heterogeneity can be expressed as:*

$$\underline{c}_t = \mathcal{E} \underline{\delta}_t \quad (2)$$

where $\underline{c}_t = \left[\hat{C}_{1,t} - \hat{C}_t, \dots, \hat{C}_{I,t} - \hat{C}_t \right]'$, $\hat{C}_{i,t} \equiv \frac{C_{i,t} - C_t}{C}$, and $\hat{C}_t = \sum_{i=1}^I s_i \hat{C}_{i,t}$. \mathcal{E} is an $I \times J$ matrix whose entries take the form $\mathcal{E}_{i,j} = \frac{\eta_{i,j} - \eta_j}{1 + \eta_{N,C}}$, with $\eta_{i,j} \equiv \left. \frac{dC_{i,t}}{d\Delta_{j,t}} \frac{\Delta_{j,t}}{C_{i,t}} \right|_{s.s.} = \omega_{i,j} \frac{\Delta_j}{C_i}$, $\eta_j \equiv \sum_i s_i \eta_{i,j} = \frac{\Delta_j}{C} \Omega_j$, $\eta_{N,C} \equiv - \left. \frac{dN_{i,t}}{dC_{i,t}} \frac{C_{i,t}}{N_{i,t}} \right|_{lab. \ supply, \ s.s.}$, and $\underline{\delta}_t = \left[\hat{\Delta}_{1,t}, \dots, \hat{\Delta}_{J,t} \right]'$.

Finally, $\underline{n}_t = -\frac{1}{\eta_{N,C}} \underline{c}_t$, where \underline{n}_t is defined just like \underline{c}_t .

Proof. See Appendix A.1.

Key to this result is matrix \mathcal{E} . The numerator of each entry, $\eta_{i,j} - \eta_j$, captures the elasticity of the consumption of agent i to asset j 's payoff, relative to the aggregate-consumption elasticity to asset j . Some asset can be in zero aggregate supply, so that $\eta_j = 0$, and yet some consumers may have a positive exposure to the asset payoffs $\eta_{i,j} > 0$ and others a negative one. In the model I present in the next section, deposits are in zero net supply but savers' consumption is increasing in the returns on deposits while the opposite is true for borrowers. As a result, deposits will be an important determinant of consumption heterogeneity despite being in zero net supply.

Alternatively, it could be that some agent is not exposed at all to payoffs from a certain asset class, $\eta_{i,j} = 0$. This is common in models with limited-asset market participation (Bilbiie, 2008), in which some agents do not hold stocks. On average, however, consumption responds to variations in dividends ($\eta_j > 0$), so $\eta_{i,j} - \eta_j \neq 0$ and dividend payouts become a determinant of consumption heterogeneity.

The denominator of the entries of \mathcal{E} is common across agents and assets and scales the impact of asset return heterogeneity onto consumption. It captures labor supply flexibility. In the extreme case in which utility is linear in leisure, the labor supply is infinitely elastic and there is no consumption heterogeneity. Workers will compensate any variation in the payoffs from their assets by adjusting their labor supply. At the other extreme, if labor supply is fixed, the effects of changes in financial returns on consumption heterogeneity are maximized.

This result has some very practical implications. Matrix \mathcal{E} can be readily estimated. As all the entries are *average*, or steady state, elasticities, they can be quantified using low-frequency survey data. The complexity of summarizing consumption distributions is reduced to a simpler problem of estimating elasticities, in a way that relates to Auclert (2019).

In this class of economies, the second-order approximation to social welfare can be expressed by terms in aggregate consumption and hours, plus terms in consumption heterogeneity. This way of breaking down the quadratic social welfare function is convenient as the first term turns out to be identical to that from the corresponding representative-agent economy, while the second, capturing the degree of equitability, in light of Proposition 2.1, can be written as a function of asset payoffs.

Proposition 2.2 *The period objective function of a utilitarian planner, $U_t = \sum_{i=1}^I s_i u(C_{i,t}, N_{i,t})$, can be approximated to the second order as:*

$$U_t = U + \bar{U}_t + U_t^\diamond, \quad (3)$$

$$\bar{U}_t \equiv \left(u_1 C \hat{C}_t + \frac{1}{2} u_{11} C^2 \hat{C}_t^2 \right) + \left(u_2 N \hat{N}_t + \frac{1}{2} u_{22} N^2 \hat{N}_t^2 \right), \quad (4)$$

$$U_t^\diamond \equiv \frac{\varphi}{2} \underline{\delta}'_t \mathcal{E}' \mathcal{S} \mathcal{E} \underline{\delta}_t, \quad (5)$$

where $\mathcal{S} = \text{diag}(s_1, \dots, s_I)$ is an $I \times I$ matrix, and $\varphi = \left[u_{11} C^2 + \eta_{N,C}^2 u_{22} N^2 \right] < 0$ a scalar.

Proof. See Appendix A.2.

\bar{U}_t corresponds to the welfare criterion in RANK models. U_t^\diamond captures the welfare losses associated with cross-sectional dispersion in consumption and hours, which makes it a measure of equitability. Importantly, all the variables entering the loss function are not individual specific and are easily observable.

\bar{U}_t can typically be expressed as a function of square deviations of inflation from target and of output from potential. The addition of U_t^\diamond will change the relative weights on inflation and the output gap and also typically introduce cross-product terms, so that the welfare loss associated with, say, an inflation deviation from target will depend on its sign and on the level of other macro aggregates.

2.1 The equitable rate of interest

I define *the equitable rate of interest* as the level of real rates that maximizes U_t^\diamond under flexible prices. This definition parallels that of the natural rate of interest in RANK economies (Woodford, 2003a), which, given the notation laid out above, is the real rate that maximizes \bar{U}_t under flexible prices.

The parallelism in the definition makes for an immediate comparison. Deviations of real rates from the equitable rate (the equitable rate gap) will be a measure of the degree of consumption heterogeneity. When the equitable rate is closed, the degree of equitability is maximized.

As such the definition of the equitable rate applies to any model with heterogeneous agents and nominal frictions. The assumptions in the previous sections, however, enable me to study some of its properties simply based on the financial structure of the economy, as summarized by the matrix \mathcal{E} .

Equation (5) shows that the properties of $\mathcal{E}'\mathcal{S}\mathcal{E}$ determine the extent to which equitability can be attained. If it is full rank, a fully equitable allocation (such that $U_t^\diamond = 0$) can only be attained in steady state ($\underline{\delta}_t = 0$). When $\mathcal{E}'\mathcal{S}\mathcal{E}$ is singular, that is not necessarily the case. Rather, this will depend on two features of the economy. The first pertains to the structure of the financial market, summarized by the rank of $\mathcal{E}'\mathcal{S}\mathcal{E}$, and by the number of the policy levers. The second depends on the structure of the economy at large, which translates in whether some optimality conditions of the private sector (in the flexible price economy) are binding constraints for the policymaker. This second condition depends on the specifics of a model, but in many cases, including the economy I will describe next, the private sector optimality conditions do not represent a binding constraint for policy implementation.

We can thus focus on the the properties of $\mathcal{E}'\mathcal{S}\mathcal{E}$ for a characterization of the properties of the equitable rate.

$J > I$ is a sufficient condition for singularity of $\mathcal{E}'\mathcal{S}\mathcal{E}$ – see Appendix A.3 for details. A sufficiently large number of assets, relative to the number of types, is thus a prerequisite for the attainability of an equitable allocation. This is not surprising and the larger number of assets typically mitigates markets incompleteness.

The rank of $\mathcal{E}'\mathcal{S}\mathcal{E}$ is an indicator of the degree of policy coordination required: it represents the minimum number of policy instruments needed to deliver an equitable allocation away from steady state. So, if $\text{rank}(\mathcal{E}'\mathcal{S}\mathcal{E}) > 1$, traditional monetary policy (for which the only instrument is the short-term rate) cannot possibly deliver $U_t^\diamond = 0$ outside steady state.

Having discussed these necessary conditions for a fully equitable allocation, I will now turn a simple characterization of the equitable rate as the return to a suitably chosen portfolio.

The equitable rate as the payoff of a portfolio. So long as a bond is traded, whose nominal return is controlled by monetary policy, a term proportional to the real rate of interest, defined

in deviation from steady state as $\hat{R}_{t-1} = \hat{I}_{t-1} - \hat{\Pi}_t$,¹⁰ will enter $\underline{\delta}_t$.¹¹

Moreover, I will say that the real rate is *effective* when it has a direct impact on consumption heterogeneity, e.g. when it transfers resources between savers and borrowers. In an economy with no liquidity, the real rate will usually not be *effective*. So long as borrowing and lending in strictly positive amounts is allowed for, it will typically be, though. Under these conditions the following Proposition applies.

Proposition 2.3 *If:*

- i. $\hat{\Delta}_{1,t} = \alpha \hat{R}_{t-1}$, $\alpha \neq 0$;
- ii. \hat{R}_{t-1} is *effective*, i.e. at least one eigenvector associated to a strictly positive eigenvalue of $\mathcal{E}'\mathcal{S}\mathcal{E}$ loads onto \hat{R}_{t-1} ;
- iii. the flexible-price economy private sector optimality conditions are not binding constraints;

the equitable rate of interest, in percent deviation from steady state, can be expressed as:

$$\hat{R}_{t-1}^\diamond = \sum_{j=2}^J \Phi_j \hat{\Delta}_{j,t}, \quad (6)$$

where $\Phi_j \equiv -\frac{\sum_{h=1}^J l_h \mathcal{V}_{j,h} \mathcal{V}_{1,h}}{\alpha \sum_{h=1}^J l_h \mathcal{V}_{1,h}^2}$, with $l_h \geq 0$ the eigenvalues of $\mathcal{E}'\mathcal{S}\mathcal{E}$, and \mathcal{V} the associated matrix of orthonormal eigenvectors.

If $\text{rank}(\mathcal{E}'\mathcal{S}\mathcal{E}) = 1$, then $\hat{R}_{t-1} = \hat{R}_{t-1}^\diamond$ implies that $\underline{c}_t = \underline{0}$ and $U_t^\diamond = 0$, a fully equitable allocation.

Proof. See Appendix A.4.

Assumption ii. is the formalization of the idea that the real rate directly impacts consumption heterogeneity and thus U_t^\diamond . Together with i., it ensures that the denominator of the Φ_j 's is nonzero. Under these assumptions, the equitable rate can be written as a linear combination of the other asset payoffs, or as the payoff of a portfolio. This can also help estimating the value of the equitable rate, given an estimate/calibration for \mathcal{E} and \mathcal{S} . The weights ultimately reflect the comovements of the various assets and aim at delivering the smallest variance in consumption heterogeneity.

Figure 1 illustrates the proposition graphically for an economy with just two assets ($J = 2$), the payoff of the first of which is proportional to the real rate.

¹⁰Where \hat{I}_{t-1} and $\hat{\Pi}_t$ are the percent deviation of the gross nominal interest rate and the gross inflation rate, from steady state.

¹¹The timing of the interest rate definition is arbitrary. Here I define \hat{R}_{t-1} as the real return between period $t-1$ and t . As such it is paid out at time t and enters the time- t budget constraints. I will maintain, without loss of generality, that it is the first entry of $\underline{\delta}_t$ the one proportional to \hat{R}_{t-1} .




Figure 1: U_t^\diamond , in an economy with $J = 2$ assets, with payouts αR_{t-1} and $\hat{\Delta}_{2,t}$ respectively. On the left, $\text{rank}(\mathcal{E}'\mathcal{S}\mathcal{E}) = 2$. The red dot represents the welfare maximum (steady state), the blue line the level of welfare when $\hat{R}_{t-1} = \hat{R}_{t-1}^\diamond = \Phi_2 \hat{\Delta}_{2,t}$. On the right, $\text{rank}(\mathcal{E}'\mathcal{S}\mathcal{E}) = 1$, the red line represents the level of welfare when $\hat{R}_{t-1} = \hat{R}_{t-1}^\diamond$, which, in this case, is the same as in steady state.

On the left pane is represented an economy in which $\text{rank}(\mathcal{E}'\mathcal{S}\mathcal{E}) = 2$. The blue line traces out the equitable rate of interest as a linear function of the only other asset $\hat{\Delta}_{2,t}$. Full equitability can only be attained in steady state. Around steady state, the blue line follows the direction along which U_t^\diamond is flatter.

In the right pane is depicted a situation in which $\text{rank}(\mathcal{E}'\mathcal{S}\mathcal{E}) = 1$. There exists a linear combination of \hat{R}_{t-1} and $\hat{\Delta}_{2,t}$ such that $U_t^\diamond = 0$, traced out by the red line, which depicts the equitable rate of interest. In this case, tracking the equitable rate attains full equitability.

A new take on policy tradeoffs. Even if theoretically possible, pursuing full equitability will typically incur a penalty in terms of aggregate stabilization. Indeed, only when the equitable and natural rates are equal to each other it will be possible for policy to attain both aggregate and cross-sectional stabilization. The very difference between the equitable and natural rates will signal the presence and severity of this tradeoff.

In the next section, after laying out a fully specified model, I will show that assumptions i., ii., and iii. typically hold in TANK economies in which the private sector behavior is summarized by a dynamic IS curve¹² and I will illustrate the policy tradeoff in terms of tracking the equitable and the natural rates of interest.

¹²I will also illustrate a case in which assumption ii. does not hold but in which it is still very easy to work out the value of the equitable rate.

3 A TANK model

I consider an economy in which borrowers and savers differ in their subjective discount factor. There are three assets: government bonds, deposits and stocks. Relative to the existing literature, I combine a strictly positive borrowing constraint with concentrated stock holdings. As a result, this model nests a RANK, a TANK with limited-asset market participation (Bilbiie, 2008), and a TANK with borrowers and savers that share firm profits equally (Eggertsson and Krugman, 2012).

3.1 Setup

There is a continuum of households $i \in [0, 1]$, a share ς of whom are savers (patient) and the remainder borrowers (impatient).

Savers' problem. Savers can invest in government bonds, deposits, and stocks in the mutual fund. They discount future utility by $0 < \beta < 1$, and are subject to a borrowing constraint $-\bar{D}$. They solve the following problem:

$$\max_{C_{S,t}, N_{S,t}, D_{S,t}, B_{S,t}, H_{S,t}} \mathbb{E}_t \sum_{j=0}^{\infty} \beta^j \left(\frac{C_{S,t+j}^{1-\gamma}}{1-\gamma} - \frac{N_{S,t+j}^{1+\psi}}{1+\psi} \right) \quad (7)$$

$$s.t. \quad C_{S,t+j} + B_{S,t+j} + D_{S,t+j} + p_{H,t+j} H_{S,t+j} = R_{B,t+j-1} B_{S,t+j-1} + R_{D,t+j-1} D_{S,t+j-1} + (p_{H,t+j} + Z_{t+j}) H_{S,t+j-1} + w_{t+j} N_{S,t+j} - T_{S,t+j}, \quad (8)$$

$$D_{S,t+j} \geq -\bar{D}. \quad (9)$$

where $C_{S,t}$ is savers' consumption, $N_{S,t}$ hours worked, $B_{S,t}$ government bond holding, $D_{S,t}$ deposit holdings (where a negative sign indicates borrowing), and $H_{S,t}$ stock holdings in the mutual fund. $R_{B,t-1} = \frac{I_{B,t-1}}{\Pi_t}$ is the real gross return on government bonds, $I_{B,t-1}$ being the nominal return on government bonds issued in $t-1$ and maturing in period t , which is set by the central bank, and $\Pi_t = \frac{P_t}{P_{t-1}}$ gross inflation. $R_{D,t-1}$ is the real return on deposits, $p_{H,t}$ the price of shares in the mutual fund in units of consumption, and Z_t real dividends from the mutual fund.

In equilibrium, the borrowing constraint will not be binding for savers, so their behavior is characterized by an intratemporal Euler equation, which pins down their labor supply, and

pricing equations for each of the assets:

$$w_t = N_{S,t}^\psi C_{S,t}^\gamma, \quad (10)$$

$$C_{S,t}^{-\gamma} = \beta \mathbb{E}_t R_{B,t} C_{S,t+1}^{-\gamma}, \quad (11)$$

$$C_{S,t}^{-\gamma} = \beta \mathbb{E}_t R_{D,t} C_{S,t+1}^{-\gamma}, \quad (12)$$

$$C_{S,t}^{-\gamma} = \beta \mathbb{E}_t \frac{p_{H,t+1} + Z_{t+1}}{p_{H,t}} C_{S,t+1}^{-\gamma}. \quad (13)$$

Their level of consumption will be pinned down by their budget constraint, which I will return to, after having defined asset returns and transfers in greater detail.

Borrowers' Problem. A share $1 - \varsigma$ of the population has discount factor $\delta\beta < \beta$, $0 < \delta < 1$. They are relatively impatient and will borrow, on the deposits market, from savers and will not invest in any of the other assets, which cannot be shorted. So their problem (where I omit stocks and bonds for simplicity) is:

$$\max_{C_{B,t}, N_{B,t}, D_{B,t}} \mathbb{E}_t \sum_{j=0}^{\infty} (\delta\beta)^j \left(\frac{C_{B,t+j}^{1-\gamma}}{1-\gamma} - \frac{N_{B,t+j}^{1+\psi}}{1+\psi} \right), \quad (14)$$

$$s.t. C_{B,t+j} + D_{B,t+j} = R_{D,t+j-1} D_{B,t+j-1} + w_{t+j} N_{B,t+j} - T_{B,t+j}, \quad (15)$$

$$D_{B,t+j} \geq -\bar{D}, \quad (16)$$

where all the variable definitions parallel those for savers. In a steady state in which $R_D < \frac{1}{\delta\beta}$ the borrowing constraint will be binding, $D_{B,t} = -\bar{D}$, and the intertemporal Euler equation will be slack. So their economic decisions will be characterized by their intratemporal Euler equation:

$$w_t = N_{B,t}^\psi C_{B,t}^\gamma, \quad (17)$$

and their budget constraint, which I will return to below.

Production and Dividends. A continuum, $f \in [0, 1]$, of intermediate-good firms compete monopolistically and are subject to Rotemberg price-adjustment costs $\Gamma(\Pi_t) = \frac{\vartheta}{2} \left(\frac{\Pi_t}{\bar{\Pi}} - 1 \right)^2$, where $\bar{\Pi}$ stands for steady state inflation. A competitive final-good producer combines intermediate goods to produce the homogeneous final good according to $Y_t = \left[\int_0^1 Y_{f,t}^{\frac{\epsilon-1}{\epsilon}} df \right]^{\frac{\epsilon}{\epsilon-1}}$, where $Y_{f,t}$ are the intermediate goods.

The production function for intermediate good producer f is $Y_{f,t} = A_t N_{f,t}$, where A_t is a stationary technology process, common across firms.

I consider a symmetric equilibrium in which all firms set the same price. The resulting non-linear Phillips curve is:

$$1 - \vartheta \left(\frac{\Pi_t}{\bar{\Pi}} - 1 \right) \frac{\Pi_t}{\bar{\Pi}} + \vartheta \beta \mathbb{E}_t \frac{C_{S,t+1}^{-\gamma} Y_{t+1}}{C_{S,t}^{-\gamma} Y_t} \left(\frac{\Pi_{t+1}}{\bar{\Pi}} - 1 \right) \frac{\Pi_{t+1}}{\bar{\Pi}} = \epsilon (1 - MC_t). \quad (18)$$

I assume that firms discount the future by the discount factor of their ultimate owners, who are savers.¹³ The marginal cost, $MC_t = (1 - \tau) \frac{w_t}{A_t}$, is defined net of the production subsidy τ , and is the same for all firms. The level of the subsidy will ensure that the steady state is efficient.

The dividend is identical for all firms:

$$\text{Div}_t = Y_t - (1 - \tau) w_t N_t - \Gamma(\Pi_t) Y_t = (A \Xi(\Pi_t) - (1 - \tau) w_t) N_t, \quad (19)$$

where I use the production function to substitute out Y_t and define $\Xi(\Pi_t) \equiv 1 - \Gamma(\Pi_t) \leq 1$.

Mutual fund. A competitive portfolio manager runs a mutual fund, which collects dividends from all firms and rebates them to its stock holders net of a lump-sum transfer.

The cash flow of the portfolio manager is dividends net of $T_{pf,t} = \tau (w_t N_t - wN)$ levied on her:

$$Z_t = \int_0^1 \text{Div}_t df - \tau (w_t N_t - wN) = (A_t \Xi(\Pi_t) - w_t) N_t + \tau wN. \quad (20)$$

The transfer $T_{pf,t}$ represents the cyclical component of the production transfer and is zero on average. This way of splitting the subsidy between households and the mutual fund is convenient in that it makes for strictly positive mutual fund dividends in steady state, but ultimately it is immaterial insofar as the full amount of the production subsidy falls onto firm owners.

The portfolio manager rebates Z_t to its owners on a period-by-period basis.

Government and transfers. The government runs a balanced budget in each period. Transfers are pinned down by the maintained assumption that the steady state be efficient and equitable:

$$T_{S,t} = \frac{1}{\epsilon} \frac{wN}{s} + (R_D - 1) \frac{1 - s}{s} \bar{D}, \quad (21)$$

$$T_{B,t} = -(R_D - 1) \bar{D}. \quad (22)$$

The transfer from savers taxes away the steady-state net return on deposits and steady state dividends $Z = \frac{wN}{\epsilon}$. The former is redistributed to borrowers, the latter goes to firms.¹⁴

¹³The exact discount factor is irrelevant for the linear-quadratic optimal policy problem I will consider.

¹⁴These transfers can equivalently be computed according to the general principles laid out in the proof of Proposition 2.1.

Overall, the government collects $\frac{1}{\epsilon}wN + (R^D - 1)(1 - \varsigma)\bar{D} + \tau w_t N_t - \tau wN$ from savers and the mutual fund. It pays out $(R_D - 1)(1 - \varsigma)\bar{D}$ to borrowers and $\tau w_t N_t$ to firms, which balances its budget given $\tau = \frac{1}{\epsilon}$.

Consumption levels. Given $B_{S,t} = 0$, $D_{S,t} = \frac{1-\varsigma}{\varsigma}\bar{D}$, and $H_{S,t} = \frac{1}{\varsigma}$,¹⁵ and the level of the transfers, the consumption of savers amounts to:

$$C_{S,t} = (R_{D,t-1} - R_D) \frac{1 - \varsigma}{\varsigma} \bar{D} + (A_t \Xi(\Pi_t) - w_t) N_t \frac{1}{\varsigma} + w_t N_{S,t}. \quad (23)$$

For borrowers, $B_{B,t} = 0$, $D_{B,t} = -\bar{D}$, and $H_{B,t} = 0$, which results in:

$$C_{B,t} = -\left(R_{D,t-1} - R^D\right) \bar{D} + w_t N_{B,t}. \quad (24)$$

Aggregate consumption is defined as $C_t = \varsigma C_{S,t} + (1 - \varsigma) C_{B,t}$ and aggregate hours as $N_t = \varsigma N_{S,t} + (1 - \varsigma) N_{B,t}$. Using these definitions yields $C_t = A_t \Xi(\Pi_t) N_t$. Just as in equation (1), relative consumption depends on different exposures to the financial assets and differences in each type's labor supply.

Market clearing. Deposits are in zero net supply and each borrower holds $D_{B,t} = -\bar{D}$, which pins down the deposits of the saver, $D_{S,t} = \frac{1-\varsigma}{\varsigma}\bar{D}$. Only savers hold shares in the mutual fund ($H_{B,t} = 0$), whose supply is normalized to 1, so $H_{S,t} = \frac{1}{\varsigma}$. Government bonds are in zero-net supply and cannot be shorted, so $B_{S,t} = B_{B,t} = 0$.

On the final goods market $Y_t = C_t + \Gamma(\Pi_t) Y_t$, which is equivalent to $C_t = A_t \Xi(\Pi_t) N_t$, derived in the previous paragraph.

Steady state. In steady state $\Pi = \bar{\Pi}$, which I normalize to 1 without any loss of generality. I also set $A = 1$, a scaling parameter. It follows that $\Gamma(\bar{\Pi}) = 0$, $\Xi(\bar{\Pi}) = 1$. The left-hand side of equation (18) equals 1 in steady state, which implies $MC = \frac{\epsilon-1}{\epsilon}$. Given the definition of marginal cost and the steady-state value of the subsidy, $w = 1$. It follows that $\text{Div} = \frac{N}{\epsilon}$ and $Z = \text{Div}$. Using this in equations (23) and (24) obtains that $C_S = N_S$ and $C_B = N_B$. The labor-supply equations further imply that $N_B = N_S = 1$ and thus $C_B = C_S = 1$: the steady state is equitable. The fact that $C = AN$ and $w = A$ shows that the steady state is efficient.

The pricing equations (11), (12), (13) imply $I_B = R_B = R_D = 1 + \frac{Z}{p^H} = \frac{1}{\beta}$. This, in turn, confirms that $R_D < \frac{1}{\delta\beta}$, and that borrowers will be credit constrained. Equitability and efficiency of the steady state immediately imply that $R^\circ = R^n = \frac{1}{\beta}$.

¹⁵See the next paragraph on market clearing for more details about these values.

3.2 Linear-Quadratic Representation

3.2.1 Quadratic welfare function

The key to deriving the loss function is computing the elasticities that enter \mathcal{E} . Starting with savers, each of them holds deposits in amount equal to $\frac{1-\varsigma}{\varsigma}\bar{D}$. Each unit yields $R_D - 1 = \frac{1-\beta}{\beta}$ in steady state. Hence $\eta_{S,D} = \frac{1-\varsigma}{\varsigma}\bar{D}\frac{1-\beta}{\beta}$, given that $C = 1$ in steady state. Each borrower borrows $-\bar{D}$, which costs him $R_D - 1$, hence $\eta_{B,D} = -\bar{D}\frac{1-\beta}{\beta}$. Finally, $\eta_D = \varsigma\eta_{S,D} + (1-\varsigma)\eta_{B,D} = 0$, which reflects deposits being in zero net supply. For what concerns stocks, $\eta_{S,H} = \frac{1}{\epsilon\varsigma}$, the real value of steady state dividends received by each saver. Clearly, $\eta_{B,H} = 0$, and $\eta_H = \frac{1}{\epsilon}$. So, while borrowers do not hold any stocks, $\hat{C}_{B,t} - \hat{C}_t$ is sensitive to variations in dividend payouts. Finally, $\eta_{N,C} = \frac{\gamma}{\psi}$ under constant elasticity of substitution preferences. So, ultimately, \mathcal{E} reads:

$$\mathcal{E} = \frac{\psi}{\psi + \gamma} \begin{bmatrix} 0 & \frac{1-\varsigma}{\varsigma}\bar{D}\frac{1-\beta}{\beta} & \frac{1}{\epsilon}\frac{1-\varsigma}{\varsigma} \\ 0 & -\bar{D}\frac{1-\beta}{\beta} & -\frac{1}{\epsilon} \end{bmatrix}, \quad (25)$$

where the first row refers to savers and the second to borrowers, and assets (in the columns) are ordered with government bonds first, deposits second, and stocks third.

Proposition 3.1 *The quadratic loss function for the TANK economy described above is:*

$$U_t - U \approx \bar{U}_t + U_t^\circ, \quad (26)$$

$$\bar{U}_t = \left(\hat{C}_t - \hat{N}_t\right) - \frac{1}{2} \left(\gamma\hat{C}_t^2 - \psi\hat{N}_t^2\right) = -\frac{1}{2} \left[\vartheta\pi_t^2 + (\gamma + \psi)\tilde{y}_t^2\right], \quad (27)$$

$$U_t^\circ = -\frac{1}{2} \frac{\gamma\psi}{\gamma + \psi} \frac{1-\varsigma}{\varsigma} \left\{ \frac{\bar{D}^2}{\beta^2} \hat{R}_{D,t-1}^2 + \frac{1}{\epsilon^2} \hat{Z}_t^2 + 2\frac{\bar{D}}{\epsilon\beta} \hat{R}_{D,t-1} \hat{Z}_t \right\}, \quad (28)$$

where lowercase letters denote log-deviations from steady state and \tilde{y}_t is the flexible-price output gap.

Proof. See Appendix C.1.

This proposition exemplifies the general properties presented in Proposition 2.2.¹⁶ \bar{U}_t is the same as in a RANK, while U_t° relates to asset payoffs, and both are only a function of aggregate variables. The dispersion term depends on preferences in a straightforward way. If agents had quasilinear preferences in either consumption or leisure ($\gamma = 0$ or $\psi = 0$), heterogeneity would not affect welfare, as expected.

¹⁶Log-deviations, denoted by lower-case letters, are the same as percent deviations, denoted by a hat, to a first-order approximation. I thus use them interchangeably for first-order approximations, depending on the context. The difference becomes relevant for second-order approximations, as customary in the literature and detailed in Appendix C.1.

Equation (28) illustrates that cross-product terms arise naturally in the presence of asset heterogeneity. High (low) real rates and high (low) dividends both increase (decrease) the consumption of savers relative to borrowers. As a result, they reduce social welfare by increasing consumption heterogeneity. Not only the volatility of asset returns is detrimental to welfare, their comovement can be too, depending on the structure of the economy and the type of shock under consideration.

It is immediate to solve for the equitable rate of interest:¹⁷

$$\hat{R}_{t-1}^\circ = -\frac{\beta}{\epsilon D} \hat{Z}_t, \quad (29)$$

an expression that can be equivalently derived by computing the eigenvalues and eigenvectors of $\mathcal{E}'\mathcal{S}\mathcal{E}$ and verifying that $\text{rank}(\mathcal{E}'\mathcal{S}\mathcal{E}) = 1$. The interpretation is straightforward. Low real rates tend to favor borrowers relative to savers. High dividends have the opposite effect. So, from an equitability perspective, it is desirable to have a negative correlation between dividends and real rates. The coefficient $-\frac{\beta}{\epsilon D}$ is such that when the two payoffs move in that exact proportion, the relative consumption of savers and borrowers is not affected. Equivalently we can think of this as the return on a portfolio that is short on stocks.

It is also easy to show that the equitable rate gap is a sufficient statistic for consumption heterogeneity:

$$\hat{C}_{S,t} - \hat{C}_{B,t} = \frac{\psi}{\psi + \gamma \mathfrak{s}} \frac{1}{\beta} \frac{\bar{D}}{\mathfrak{s}} \left(\hat{R}_{t-1} - \hat{R}_{t-1}^\circ \right). \quad (30)$$

It subsumes the two sources of heterogeneity (from deposits and dividends) and makes it transparent that closing the equitable rate gap delivers a fully equitable allocation. Indeed, we can express U_t° solely as a function of the equitable rate gap squared:

$$U_t^\circ = -\frac{1}{2} \frac{\gamma \psi}{\gamma + \psi} \frac{1 - \mathfrak{s}}{\mathfrak{s}} \frac{\bar{D}^2}{\beta^2} \left(\hat{R}_{t-1} - \hat{R}_{t-1}^\circ \right)^2. \quad (31)$$

Clearly, $\hat{R}_{t-1} = \hat{R}_{t-1}^\circ$ implies a fully equitable allocation and social welfare will decrease with the distance between the real rate and the equitable rate. The speed at which it will decrease will depend on the preference for smoothing consumption and hours worked. It will also be increasing in the share of credit-constrained households (decreasing in \mathfrak{s}), in the level of debt (\bar{D}) and in the steady state level of real rates ($\frac{1}{\beta}$).

¹⁷In Appendix E.3, I verify that the dynamic IS curve, derived below, is not a binding constraint. Moreover, as the return on deposits and bonds is the same, I simply drop the D and B subscripts.

For ease of comparison, it is convenient to re-write U_t as a function of the output gap, inflation and the short-term rate, and re-scale it so that inflation deviations have unitary weight in \bar{U}_t . To begin with, notice that $\underline{\delta}_t = \left[\frac{\hat{R}_{B,t-1}}{1-\beta}, \frac{\hat{R}_{D,t-1}}{1-\beta}, \hat{Z}_t \right]'$ is a linear function of $\left[i_{t-1} \ \pi_t \ \tilde{y}_t \right]'$ according to:¹⁸

$$\begin{bmatrix} \frac{\hat{R}_{B,t-1}}{1-\beta} \\ \frac{\hat{R}_{D,t-1}}{1-\beta} \\ \hat{Z}_t \end{bmatrix} = \underbrace{\begin{bmatrix} \frac{1}{1-\beta} & -\frac{1}{1-\beta} & 0 \\ \frac{1}{1-\beta} & -\frac{1}{1-\beta} & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & -\epsilon(\psi + \gamma) \end{bmatrix}}_{\mathcal{F}} \begin{bmatrix} i_{t-1} \\ \pi_t \\ \tilde{y}_t \end{bmatrix}. \quad (32)$$

The social welfare function can thus be re-written as:

$$\tilde{U}_t = -\frac{1}{2} \left[\underbrace{(\pi_t^2 + \lambda_y \tilde{y}_t^2)}_{\bar{U}_t/\vartheta} + \underbrace{\lambda_r (i_{t-1} - \pi_t)^2 + \lambda_z \tilde{y}_t^2 - 2\lambda_z \frac{\bar{D}}{\beta(\gamma + \psi)} (i_{t-1} - \pi_t) \tilde{y}_t}_{U_t^\circ/\vartheta} \right] \quad (33)$$

$$= -\frac{1}{2} \left[(1 + \lambda_r) \pi_t^2 + (\lambda_y + \lambda_z) \tilde{y}_t^2 + \lambda_r i_{t-1}^2 - 2\lambda_r i_{t-1} \pi_t - 2\lambda_z \frac{\bar{D}}{\beta(\gamma + \psi)} i_{t-1} \tilde{y}_t + 2\lambda_z \frac{\bar{D}}{\beta(\gamma + \psi)} \pi_t \tilde{y}_t \right], \quad (34)$$

$$\tilde{U}_t \equiv \frac{U_t - U}{\vartheta}, \quad \lambda_y = \frac{\gamma + \psi}{\vartheta}, \quad \lambda_z = \gamma\psi \frac{1 - \varsigma}{\varsigma} \frac{\psi + \gamma}{\vartheta}, \quad \lambda_r = \frac{\gamma\psi}{\gamma + \psi} \frac{1 - \varsigma}{\varsigma} \frac{\bar{D}^2}{\vartheta\beta^2}.$$

\bar{U}_t in equation (33) directly compares to the loss functions from RANK. Equation (34) shows the interdependence between \bar{U}_t and U_t° . Asset heterogeneity changes the weights on inflation and the output gap. The latter effect is common in limited-asset market participation models (Bilbiie, 2008), the former captures the transfer of resources between savers and borrowers brought about by variations in inflation. The level of liquidity in the economy (\bar{D}), that of real rates ($1/\beta$), and the degree of rigidity (γ, ψ) will ultimately determine the relative increases in the weights on inflation and the output gap.

In this economy, the marginal losses associated with inflation and output gap variations depend on the state of the economy at large, as captured by the cross-product terms. For instance, a positive deviation of inflation from target incurs a greater loss, relative to a RANK economy, when policy rates are low and output is above potential.

Finally, it is worth noting that heterogeneity adds a term in the past level of the policy rate, i_{t-1} , which can be seen as a microfoundation for a penalization to excessive movements in the

¹⁸Details in Appendix C.2

policy instrument (Woodford, 2003b).

The equitable rate of interest can correspondingly be re-written as a function of the output gap, as opposed to dividends – I will use log-deviations as opposed to percent deviations for consistency:

$$r_{t-1}^\diamond = \frac{\beta(\gamma + \psi)}{\bar{D}} \tilde{y}_t. \quad (35)$$

The intuition is the same as above once we consider that dividends and the output gap are inversely related in the New Keynesian model.¹⁹ A positive output gap (low dividends and high wages) favors borrowers, in relative terms. A high level of real rates counters that, by reducing the consumption of borrowers. So ultimately, a positive output gap helps reduce consumption heterogeneity when real rates are high, and viceversa.

This also illustrates how demand and supply shocks will tend to have different impacts on consumption heterogeneity. Shocks that induce a positive comovement between the output gap and real rates will be easier to deal with insofar as equitability is concerned.

3.2.2 Linear constraints

The description of the economy is completed by the structural equations that govern the behavior of the private sector. Aggregate demand can be summarized by a dynamic IS curve, and supply by a standard Phillips Curve.

IS Curve. The dynamic IS curve stems from a consumption Euler equation, equation (12), in which consumption is expressed as a function of the output gap, and real rates as a function of the natural rate gap – full derivation in Appendix D.1. It reflects both the usual intertemporal substitution effect, common to RANK models, as well as portfolio effects:

$$(1 + \Psi_z) \tilde{y}_t = \left[\Psi_r - \frac{1}{\gamma} \right] \mathbb{E}_t (i_t - \pi_{t+1} - r_t^n) - \Psi_r (i_{t-1} - \pi_t - r_{t-1}^n) + (1 + \Psi_z) \mathbb{E}_t \tilde{y}_{t+1}, \quad (36)$$

$$\Psi_z \equiv -\psi \frac{1 - \varsigma}{\varsigma} < 0, \quad \Psi_r \equiv \frac{\psi}{\psi + \gamma} \frac{1 - \varsigma \bar{D}}{\varsigma \beta},$$

where r_t^n is the natural rate of interest, which is solely a function of the technology process, and thus exogenous, in this economy.

¹⁹This is primarily due to dividends being inversely related to wages. The cyclicity of profits in the New Keynesian model has been the subject of an extensive literature (e.g. Cantore, Ferroni, and León-Ledesma, 2021) and I take it as is for the purpose of this exercise.

Ψ_r and Ψ_z capture the portfolio effects. This can be seen by multiplying \mathcal{EF} and expressing consumption as a function of the output gap:

$$\begin{aligned} \begin{bmatrix} \hat{C}_{S,t} \\ \hat{C}_{B,t} \end{bmatrix} &= \mathcal{EF} \begin{bmatrix} i_{t-1} \\ \pi_t \\ \tilde{y}_t \end{bmatrix} + \begin{bmatrix} 1 \\ 1 \end{bmatrix} \hat{C}_t \\ &= \frac{\psi}{\psi + \gamma} \begin{bmatrix} \frac{1-s}{s} \frac{\bar{D}}{\beta} & -\frac{1-s}{s} \frac{\bar{D}}{\beta} & -\frac{1-s}{s} (\psi + \gamma) \\ -\frac{\bar{D}}{\beta} & \frac{\bar{D}}{\beta} & (\gamma + \psi) \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} i_{t-1} \\ \pi_t \\ \tilde{y}_t \end{bmatrix} + \begin{bmatrix} 1 \\ 1 \end{bmatrix} \left(\tilde{y}_t + \frac{1 + \psi}{\psi + \gamma} \hat{A}_t \right). \end{aligned} \quad (37)$$

$\Psi_z = (\mathcal{FE})_{1,3}$ captures the elasticity of the consumption of the saver to dividends, when expressed as a function of the output gap. $\Psi_r = (\mathcal{FE})_{1,1} = -(\mathcal{FE})_{1,2}$ represents the portfolio effect of the real rate of interest onto the consumption of the saver. These effects add to the general equilibrium effect, by which aggregate consumption moves one for one with the output gap.²⁰ When they equal zero $\Psi_z = \Psi_r = 0$, equation (36) collapses to the standard consumption Euler equation in RANK, in which γ governs the intertemporal substitution of consumption.

In general, though, changes in real rates will have two contrasting effects in this economy. As in RANK, they will incentivize an increase in savings and a consequent reduction in current consumption. Unlike in RANK, for a given level of future aggregate consumption, they will increase the expected consumption level of savers, as the return on their deposit holdings will go up. Households will optimally want to bring forward some of that higher expected consumption, which will boost current consumption.

Phillips Curve. The Phillips curve is entirely standard (details in Appendix D.2) and reads:

$$\pi_t = \kappa \tilde{y}_t + \beta \mathbb{E}_t \pi_{t+1}, \quad \kappa \equiv \frac{(\epsilon - 1)(\gamma + \psi)}{\vartheta}. \quad (38)$$

3.3 Optimal Monetary Policy

In RANK, the IS Curve is not a binding constraint. That is not generally the case in this environment, but optimal policy under timeless commitment can still be characterized by a simple targeting rule in a special case.

²⁰The term in \hat{A}_t in equation (37) will pin down the level of the natural rate of interest (Appendix D.1).

3.3.1 Special case

The model simplifies considerably if portfolio effects neutralize the intertemporal substitution effect. This amounts to choosing a parametrization such that $\Psi_z = -1$, and $\Psi_r = \frac{1}{\gamma}$.²¹ When that is the case, the IS schedule collapses to a Fisher equation:

$$i_{t-1} - \pi_t = r_{t-1}^n. \quad (39)$$

The real rate, equal to the natural rate at all times, is completely exogenous, and the consumption of savers independent of policy (Appendix E.4):

$$\hat{C}_{S,t} = \frac{1}{\gamma} r_{t-1}^n + \frac{1+\psi}{\psi+\gamma} \hat{A}_t. \quad (40)$$

In spite of this, monetary policy will still have an impact on consumption heterogeneity, as the consumption of borrowers will depend on the level of activity as follows:

$$\hat{C}_{B,t} = -\frac{\mathfrak{s}}{1-\mathfrak{s}} \frac{1}{\gamma} r_{t-1}^n + \frac{1}{1-\mathfrak{s}} \tilde{y}_t + \frac{1+\psi}{\psi+\gamma} \hat{A}_t. \quad (41)$$

The same mechanism described above is at work here. High, exogenous, real rates will transfer resources from borrower to savers. Running a positive output gap, on the other hand, will boost wages and reduce dividends, which works in the opposite direction.

All this implies that the optimal policy prescription under timeless commitment boils down to an intuitive targeting rule.²²

Proposition 3.2 *If $\Psi_z = -1$, and $\Psi_r = \frac{1}{\gamma}$, the optimal policy plan can be characterized by the following targeting rule:*

$$\tilde{y}_t = -\frac{\kappa}{\lambda_y} p_t + \frac{\lambda_z}{\lambda_y} \frac{\bar{D}}{\beta(\gamma+\psi)} (r_{t-1}^n - r_{t-1}^\diamond), \quad (42)$$

where p_t represents the log of the price level. Inflation and the nominal rate are pinned down by equations (38), and (39).

Proof. See Appendix E.5.

The first term on the right-hand side of equation (42) is entirely standard. It comes from

²¹This obtains, for example, by setting $\psi = \frac{\mathfrak{s}}{1-\mathfrak{s}} > 0$, for a given level level of \mathfrak{s} ; and $\bar{D} = \beta \frac{\gamma+\psi}{\gamma} > 0$, for given levels of β and γ .

²²The intertemporal nature of the optimal policy problem requires taking a stand on the intertemporal discount factor. I set it to β , which is commonly assumed in the literature (e.g. Benigno, Eggertsson, and Romei, 2020; Ferrero, Harrison, and Nelson, 2018), and holds as the limit case in which $\delta \rightarrow 1$.

the price-targeting rule in RANK models (Woodford, 2003a, ch. 7). In this economy, however, the optimal level of the output gap will deviate from the price-targeting benchmark by a term depending on the equitable interest rate gap. If $r_{t-1} = r_{t-1}^n > r_t^\diamond$, the consumption of savers will exceed that of borrowers. It is thus optimal to run a higher output gap than prescribed by price-targeting, as higher levels of activity (and wages) boost borrowers' consumption, relative to savers'.

Equation (42) illustrates the welfare benefits of generating a positive comovement between real rates and the output gap. It also makes clear that the optimal deviation from price-targeting depends on the relative importance of cross-sectional versus aggregate stabilization, captured by $\frac{\lambda_z}{\lambda_y} = \gamma\psi\frac{1-\varsigma}{\varsigma}$. Notably, a higher share of credit constrained agents (low ς) will put a premium on cross-sectional stabilization.

Proposition 3.2 also shows that the coincidence discussed in Blanchard and Galí (2007), and shown to hold also in TANK models with no liquidity (Bilbiie, 2008),²³ does not hold in this economy.

Shocks to the natural rate of interest cause a deviation of the output gap from the price-targeting rule, as can be seen by substituting the definition of r_{t-1}^\diamond and solving for the output gap: $\tilde{y}_t = -\frac{\kappa}{\lambda_z + \lambda_y} p_t + \frac{\lambda_z}{\lambda_z + \lambda_y} \frac{\bar{D}}{\beta(\gamma + \psi)} r_{t-1}^n$. First-best will not be attained.

Neither will full equitability, as an equitable rate gap will open too. The equitable rate of interest can be written out as a function of the natural rate as $r_{t-1}^\diamond = \frac{\beta(\gamma + \psi)}{D(\lambda_z + \lambda_y)} p_t + \frac{\lambda_z}{\lambda_z + \lambda_y} r_{t-1}^n$, which, in general, implies that $r_{t-1}^\diamond \neq r_{t-1}^n$. The difference between the two reference rates will illustrate the tradeoff between aggregate and cross-sectional stabilization faced by a policymakers.

Notably, as the weight cross-sectional stabilization carries in the social welfare function increases ($\lambda_z \rightarrow +\infty$), r_{t-1}^\diamond will respond less and less to exogenous shocks to the natural rate, which signals a more severe tradeoff.

Finally, it is instructive to re-express the targeting rule in terms of observable asset prices (in light of the results in Section 2), as opposed to the welfare-relevant but unobserved variables used in equation (42):

$$p_t = \frac{\lambda_z + \lambda_y}{\kappa \epsilon (\psi + \gamma)} \hat{Z}_t + \frac{\lambda_z}{\kappa (\psi + \gamma)} \frac{\bar{D}}{\beta} r_{t-1}^n. \quad (43)$$

Equation (43) shows that the optimal level of inflation is a simple linear combination of the changes in dividends and those in the real rate of interest. An increase in dividends and real rates redistributes towards savers. Higher inflation does the opposite. The optimal variation in inflation to compensate the effect of the rise in r_{t-1}^n is, again, increasing in λ_z .

²³This can also be seen here simply by setting $\bar{D} = 0$.




Figure 2: Responses of the output gap (top left), inflation (top right), the real rate gap (bottom left), and the real rate of interest (top right) to a 1 percent fall in the natural rate. The black dashed lines represent a model in which $\lambda_r = \Psi_r = 0$, the red dash-dotted lines a model in which $\lambda_z = \Psi_z = 0$, and the solid orange lines my baseline model.

3.3.2 General case

To characterize the optimal policy response under a generic calibration²⁴ I will proceed in steps. Keeping the structural parameters fixed, I will first focus on an economy with no liquidity ($\bar{D} = 0$), so that the real rate has no direct bearing on consumption heterogeneity - it is not *effective* in the sense of Proposition 2.3. I will then proceed to one in which dividends are evenly distributed, so that they will not be a source of cross sectional dispersion in consumption. By combining both, my baseline model will obtain. Importantly, \bar{U}_t and the Phillips curve will remain the same across the three scenarios, while both U_t^\diamond and the IS curve will change.

I consider a shock to the natural rate of interest,²⁵ as the characterization of the optimal response in RANK is stark and well known: the real rate will track the natural rate, and the output

²⁴For the purpose of this analysis I use the following: $\beta = .995$, $\gamma = \psi = 1$, $\epsilon = 11$, which are entirely standard. I set $\varsigma = 2/3$ in line with the literature (e.g. Bilbiie, Monacelli, and Perotti, 2013), and $\vartheta = 235$ so as to obtain a slope of the Phillips curve that would correspond to a 4-quarter average price duration in a Calvo setting. I set $\bar{D} = 3$, a relatively moderate level of debt equivalent to three quarters of consumption. I set the persistence of the exogenous shock to .7. None of these parameter values are key for the discussion, even though the rich dynamics of the IS equation implies that parameter values impact the determinacy region, as documented by Bilbiie (2008) in a related context.

²⁵To inspect the workings of the model it is easier to consider the natural rate as an exogenous AR(1) process. In this model it is exogenous and only a function of technology, however parameter values change the mapping from a shock to productivity to the natural rate. The comparison is more straightforward if I assume the same exact profile for the natural rate across different parametrizations (the exogenous AR(1) process) and focus on the different responses of the other variables.

gap, and inflation will not move at all, which amounts to attaining the first-best allocation.

No liquidity. Setting $\bar{D} = 0$ corresponds to a standard limited-asset market participation economy (Bilbiie, 2008). It translates into $\lambda_r = 0$, $\Psi_r = 0$. The real rate will not directly transfer any resources between borrowers and savers, the only source of heterogeneity being the uneven participation to the stock market. As a result, $U_t^\diamond = \lambda_z \tilde{y}_t^2$ and Proposition 2.3 will not apply.²⁶ However, it is still simple to compute r_{t-1}^\diamond by noting that, under flexible prices, the minimization problem of U_t^\diamond is isomorphic to that of \bar{U}_t – Appendix E.2. As a result, $r_{t-1}^\diamond = r_{t-1}^n$: there is no gap between the natural and the equitable rate. It then follows that efficiency and equitability can be attained at the same time (Bilbiie, 2008).

The dashed black lines in Figure 2 show the responses of the output gap, inflation, the real rate, the natural rate gap, and the equitable rate gap. Just as in RANK, the real rate tracks the natural rate. This maximizes both \bar{U}_t and U_t^\diamond , and there is no deviation from the efficient and equitable steady state. As shown by Bilbiie (2008), different exposures to dividend payouts, per se, do not prevent monetary policy to attain both aggregate and cross-sectional stabilization, as tracking the natural rate delivers on both fronts.

Debt-only economy. In this scenario, I let $\bar{D} > 0$ while profits are equally shared across savers and borrowers. This amounts to setting $\lambda_z = 0$, $\Psi_z = 0$, as shown in Appendix E.7. It follows that $U_t^\diamond = \lambda_r r_{t-1}^2$, so clearly $r_{t-1}^\diamond = 0$. The only source of heterogeneity stems from variations in debt servicing costs. Neutralizing that will deliver equitability. In general, though, $r_{t-1}^\diamond \neq r_{t-1}^n$, so a tradeoff emerges between aggregate and cross-sectional stabilization.

The red dash-dotted lines in Figure 2 represent the responses under optimal policy. In the face of an exogenous fall in the natural rate, the policy stimulus (measured by the fall in the real rate) is smaller than it would take to prevent a contraction in aggregate demand, in order to limit the transfer of resources from savers to borrowers. A positive natural rate gap opens while inflation and the output gap fall. The equitable rate gap goes negative: a fall in the natural rate, and the resulting fall in actual real rates to limit the fall in aggregate demand, will boost the consumption of borrowers relative to that of savers.

Clearly, the policymaker cannot close both the natural and equitable rate gaps. The exact tradeoff between aggregate and cross-sectional stabilization will depend on the calibration. For example, decreasing intertemporal substitutability (high γ) would make for a larger natural rate gap and a smaller equitable rate gap. However, the equitable and efficient allocation is out of reach, when a natural-rate shock hits a TANK economy with positive levels of debt.

²⁶It is not possible to write $\tilde{y}_t = \alpha r_{t-1}$. Yet \tilde{y}_t and r_{t-1} are related dynamically, via the IS curve, so it is possible to work out the equitable rate of interest.

Baseline economy. The orange solid lines in Figure 2 represent optimal responses in the economy described in Section 3.1, in which $r_{t-1}^\diamond = \frac{\beta(\gamma+\psi)}{D} \tilde{y}_t$. A natural rate shock tends to drive real rates down and dividends up (negative output gap). The former boosts the (relative) consumption of borrowers, the latter that of savers. In other words, a shock to the natural rate generates a “good covariance” between asset payoffs, in that they tend to have compensating effects on consumption heterogeneity, which mitigates the tradeoff faced by the policymaker. What appears to be an extra source of heterogeneity (uneven distribution of profits on top of opposite positions on the deposits market) can actually reduce the policy tradeoff in response to shocks that induce compensating effects.

The natural rate gap is smaller and, overall, inflation and the output gap deviate less from the efficient level than in the previous scenario.²⁷ The surprise increase in dividends, while past nominal rates are at steady state and inflation varies very little, make savers better off in the first period (in relative terms). Afterwards, the fall in rates favors borrowers, instead.

The sign of the gaps is again informative. The policymaker runs a relative tight policy stance, with regards to aggregate stabilization (positive natural rate gap), to mitigate the redistribution of consumption from savers to borrowers induced by the shock.

Under my baseline calibration, the optimal policy prescription appears to “give priority” to aggregate stabilization. The real rate tracks very closely, if not exactly, the natural rate, resulting in a natural rate gap much smaller than the equitable rate gap. However, this is a quantitative finding that depends on the exact calibration. For instance, if I make consumers more averse to variations in consumption (by increasing γ) the optimal policy prescription changes as shown by the blue lines in Figure 3.

The increased propensity for a smooth consumption profile, while in principle boosting both the desire for aggregate and cross-sectional stabilization (λ_y , λ_z , λ_r all increase), tilts the balance in favor of the latter. The degree of policy stimulus, in response to the shock to the natural rate, is more modest, as shown by the smaller fall in the real rate. The policymaker optimally tolerates a larger natural rate gap, in exchange for a smaller equitable rate gap. In doing so it reduces consumption dispersion. At the aggregate level, the response of the output gap is smaller on impact, albeit more persistent, as a result of the dislike for large swings in consumption and the resulting decreased elasticity of the consumption of savers to changes in the real rate of interest. The response of inflation is somewhat larger, though. Higher γ makes output gap stabilization relatively more important than inflation stabilization (higher λ_y). Also, it makes the Phillips curve

²⁷The overall weight on output gap stabilization is higher in this scenario relative to the previous one ($\lambda_y + \lambda_z$ vs λ_y) which explains why, in relative terms, the output gap variation is smaller in the baseline. Overall, though, the output gap response is actually an order of magnitude larger than that of inflation, as a direct consequence of a relatively flat Phillips curve.




Figure 3: Responses of the output gap (top left), inflation (top right), the real rate gap (bottom left), and the real rate of interest (top right) to a 1 percent fall in the natural rate. The orange solid lines correspond to my baseline scenario, while the blue dash-dotted line to the optimal policy responses when γ is raised from 1 to 10.

steeper – equation (38) – so that for a given change in the output gap, inflation will tend to move more.

Numerical details aside, this alternative calibration illustrates how the two interest-rate gaps cast light on the relative merits of aggregate and cross-section stabilization.

4 Conclusion

Accounting for household heterogeneity is central to the study of optimal monetary policy. The equitable rate of interest is a convenient benchmark against which the impact of monetary policy on cross-sectional heterogeneity can be judged. In a large class of models, the equitable rate can be simply characterized as the payoff of a portfolio of the assets, in which the portfolio weights are chosen to minimize the welfare loss resulting from consumption heterogeneity.

Comparing the equitable rate to the natural rate of interest will immediately show if monetary policy has a chance at delivering a fully efficient and equitable allocation. In general, that will not be the case. Yet the equitable rate gap will provide a straightforward reference stick for policy. A positive gap will signal that agents whose consumption is increasing in real rates (savers) are better off, and viceversa when the gap is negative.

Clearly, these considerations extend beyond the realms of monetary policy and the simple,

largely analytical, TANK model I presented. The joint analysis of the equitable and natural rates provides an immediate summary of the policy stance.

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APPENDIX

A General Results

A.1 Proof of Proposition 2.1

In this economy the budget constraint (in consumption units) of each agent type i can be written out as:

$$C_{it} + \sum_j p_{j,t} \omega_{i,j} = \sum_j (p_{j,t} + \Delta_{j,t}) \omega_{i,j} + w_t N_{i,t} - \Lambda_t - \Theta_i \quad (\text{A.1})$$

The constant-shares assumption immediately implies.

$$C_{it} = \sum_j \Delta_{j,t} \omega_{i,j} + w_t N_{i,t} - \Lambda_t - \Theta_i \quad (\text{A.2})$$

Aggregate consumption, defined as $C_t \equiv \sum_i s_i C_{i,t}$, reads:

$$C_t = \sum_j \Delta_{j,t} \Omega_j + w_t N_t - \Lambda_t - \sum_i s_i \Theta_i, \quad (\text{A.3})$$

where I define aggregate hours as $N_t \equiv \sum_i s_i N_{i,t}$, and the supply of each asset j as $\Omega_j = \sum_i s_i \omega_{i,j}$. In steady state:

$$C_i = \sum_j \Delta_j \omega_{i,j} + w N_i - \Theta_i \quad (\text{A.4})$$

$$C = \sum_j \Delta_j \Omega_j + w N - \sum_i s_i \Theta_i \quad (\text{A.5})$$

Steady state efficiency implies that that $C = AN$ and $w = A$ and so $C = wN$. Using this in equation (A.5) yields:

$$\sum_i s_i \Theta_i = \sum_j \Delta_j \Omega_j \quad (\text{A.6})$$

Equitability implies $C_i = C$ and $N_i = N$, so:

$$\sum_j \Delta_j \omega_{i,j} + w N_i - \Theta_i = \sum_j \Delta_j \Omega_j + w N - \sum_i s_i \Theta_i \quad (\text{A.7})$$

$$\sum_j \Delta_j \omega_{i,j} - \Theta_i = \sum_j \Delta_j \Omega_j - \sum_i s_i \Theta_i \quad (\text{A.8})$$

$$\sum_j \Delta_j \omega_{i,j} - \Theta_i = \sum_j \Delta_j \Omega_j - \sum_j \Delta_j \Omega_j \quad (\text{A.9})$$

$$\Theta_i = \sum_j \Delta_j \omega_{i,j}, \quad (\text{A.10})$$

where in the next to last line I used the equality in equation (A.6).

Using this in equation (A.2):

$$C_{it} = \sum_j \Delta_{j,t} \omega_{i,j} + w_t N_{i,t} - \Lambda_t - \Theta_i \quad (\text{A.11})$$

$$C_{it} = \sum_j \Delta_{j,t} \omega_{i,j} + w_t N_{i,t} - \Lambda_t - \sum_j \Delta_j \omega_{i,j} \quad (\text{A.12})$$

$$C_{it} = \sum_j (\Delta_{j,t} - \Delta_j) \omega_{i,j} + w_t N_{i,t} - \Lambda_t. \quad (\text{A.13})$$

And using (A.6) into (A.3):

$$C_t = \sum_j \Delta_{j,t} \Omega_j + w_t N_t - \Lambda_t - \sum_j \Delta_j \Omega_j \quad (\text{A.14})$$

$$C_t = \sum_j (\Delta_{j,t} - \Delta_j) \Omega_j + w_t N_t - \Lambda_t \quad (\text{A.15})$$

Taking the difference $C_{i,t} - C_t$ delivers equation (1).

I then linearize equation (1) around the efficient and equitable steady state and denote with a hat the percent deviations from steady state, e.g. $\hat{C}_{i,t} = \frac{C_{i,t} - C_i}{C_i}$:

$$\hat{C}_{it} - \hat{C}_t = \sum_j \frac{\Delta_j}{C} \hat{\Delta}_{j,t} (\omega_{i,j} - \Omega_j) + (\hat{N}_{i,t} - \hat{N}_t). \quad (\text{A.16})$$

A homogeneous labor market means that the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure is the same across all agent types and equal to the real wage:

$$w_t = -\frac{u_{2,i,t}}{u_{1,i,t}}, \quad (\text{A.17})$$

where $u_{1,i,t} \equiv \frac{\partial u(C_{i,t}, N_{i,t})}{\partial C_{i,t}}$, the marginal utility of consumption, and $u_{2,i,t} \equiv \frac{\partial u(C_{i,t}, N_{i,t})}{\partial N_{i,t}} < 0$ the marginal disutility of working. Preferences are assumed to be separable so the marginal utility of consumption does not depend on hours worked and vice versa. Log-linearizing it produces:

$$\hat{w}_t w = -\frac{u_{2,i}}{u_{1,i}} \frac{u_{22,i}}{u_{2,i}} N_i \hat{N}_{i,t} + \frac{u_{2,i}}{u_{1,i}^2} u_{11,i} C_i \hat{C}_{i,t}. \quad (\text{A.18})$$

The functional forms are the same by assumption across all agent types. Equitability ensures that the arguments are the same also. So I can drop the i subscripts from all steady state values. I then define $\psi \equiv \frac{u_{22}}{u_2} N$, and $\gamma = -\frac{u_{11}}{u_1} C$, the elasticities of substitution in steady state, which, in the case of a Constant Elasticity of Substitution utility function, correspond to deep parameters. This, together with $w = -\frac{u_2}{u_1}$, yields:

$$\hat{w}_t = \psi \hat{N}_{i,t} + \gamma \hat{C}_{i,t}. \quad (\text{A.19})$$

At an equitable steady state the weights are the same in the log-linear form as in the original definition of aggregate consumption:

$$C_t = \sum_i s_i C_{i,t} \Rightarrow \hat{C}_t = \sum_i s_i \hat{C}_{i,t}. \quad (\text{A.20})$$

The same obviously holds for aggregate hours so, the aggregate labor supply can be written out as:

$$\sum_i s_i (\gamma \hat{C}_{i,t} + \psi \hat{N}_{i,t} - \hat{w}_t) = 0 \Rightarrow \gamma \hat{C}_t + \psi \hat{N}_t = \hat{w}_t. \quad (\text{A.21})$$

So:

$$(\hat{N}_{i,t} - \hat{N}_t) = -\eta_{N,C} (\hat{C}_{i,t} - \hat{C}_t), \quad (\text{A.22})$$

where:

$$\eta_{N,C} \equiv -\left. \frac{dN_{i,t}}{dC_{i,t}} \frac{C_{i,t}}{N_{i,t}} \right|_{lab.sup.,s.s.} = \frac{\gamma}{\psi}. \quad (\text{A.23})$$

I also define:

$$\eta_{i,j} \equiv \left. \frac{dC_{i,t}}{d\Delta_{j,t}} \frac{\Delta_{j,t}}{C_{i,t}} \right|_{s.s.} = \omega_{i,j} \frac{\Delta_j}{C_i}, \quad (\text{A.24})$$

$$\eta_j \equiv \sum_i s_i \eta_{i,j} = \sum_i s_i \omega_{i,j} \frac{\Delta_j}{C} = \frac{\Delta_j}{C} \sum_i s_i \omega_{i,j} = \frac{\Delta_j}{C} \Omega_j. \quad (\text{A.25})$$

Using all this in equation (A.19):

$$\hat{C}_{it} - \hat{C}_t = \sum_j \hat{\Delta}_{j,t} (\eta_{i,j} - \eta_j) - \eta_{N,C} (\hat{C}_{i,t} - \hat{C}_t). \quad (\text{A.26})$$

Rearranging delivers the result.

A.2 Proof of Proposition 2.2

The second-order approximation U_t around the efficient equitable steady state, noting that the cross-derivatives are zero, can be written out as:

$$U_t \approx U + \sum_i s_i \left[\left(u_1 C \hat{C}_{i,t} + \frac{1}{2} u_{11} C^2 \hat{C}_{i,t}^2 \right) + \left(u_2 N \hat{N}_{i,t} + \frac{1}{2} u_{22} N^2 \hat{N}_{i,t}^2 \right) \right] \quad (\text{A.27})$$

$$\begin{aligned} U_t \approx & U + \left(u_1 C \hat{C}_t + \frac{1}{2} u_{11} C^2 \hat{C}_t^2 \right) + \left(u_2 N \hat{N}_t + \frac{1}{2} u_{22} N^2 \hat{N}_t^2 \right) + \\ & + \sum_i s_i \left[\left(u_1 C (\hat{C}_{i,t} - \hat{C}_t) + \frac{1}{2} u_{11} C^2 (\hat{C}_{i,t}^2 - \hat{C}_t^2) \right) + \left(u_2 N (\hat{N}_{i,t} - \hat{N}_t) + \frac{1}{2} u_{22} N^2 (\hat{N}_{i,t}^2 - \hat{N}_t^2) \right) \right] \end{aligned} \quad (\text{A.28})$$

$$U_t \approx U + \bar{U}_t + \frac{1}{2} \sum_i s_i \left[u_{11} C^2 (\hat{C}_{i,t}^2 - \hat{C}_t^2) + u_{22} N^2 (\hat{N}_{i,t}^2 - \hat{N}_t^2) \right], \quad (\text{A.29})$$

where I defined $\bar{U}_t \equiv \left(u_1 C \hat{C}_t + \frac{1}{2} u_{11} C^2 \hat{C}_t^2 \right) + \left(u_2 N \hat{N}_t + \frac{1}{2} u_{22} N^2 \hat{N}_t^2 \right)$ the term that depends on aggregate variables, and note that $\sum_i s_i u_1 C (\hat{C}_{i,t} - \hat{C}_t) = \sum_i s_i u_2 N (\hat{N}_{i,t} - \hat{N}_t) = 0$.

Completing the square:

$$\frac{1}{2}u_{11}C^2 \sum_i s_i \left(\hat{C}_{i,t}^2 - \hat{C}_t^2 \right) = \frac{1}{2}u_{11}C^2 \sum_i s_i \left(\hat{C}_{i,t}^2 - \hat{C}_t^2 + 2\hat{C}_t^2 - 2\hat{C}_{i,t}\hat{C}_t \right) - 2\hat{C}_t^2 + 2\hat{C}_{i,t}\hat{C}_t \quad (\text{A.30})$$

$$= \frac{1}{2}u_{11}C^2 \sum_i s_i \left(\hat{C}_{i,t} - \hat{C}_t \right)^2 - 2\hat{C}_t^2 + 2\hat{C}_{i,t}\hat{C}_t \quad (\text{A.31})$$

$$= \frac{1}{2}u_{11}C^2 \left[\sum_i s_i \left(\hat{C}_{i,t} - \hat{C}_t \right)^2 - 2\hat{C}_t^2 + 2\hat{C}_t \sum_i s_i \hat{C}_{i,t} \right] \quad (\text{A.32})$$

$$= \frac{1}{2}u_{11}C^2 \sum_i s_i \left(\hat{C}_{i,t} - \hat{C}_t \right)^2. \quad (\text{A.33})$$

The same holds of hours. Using this into equation (A.29):

$$U_t \approx U + \bar{U}_t + \frac{1}{2} \sum_i s_i \left[u_{11}C^2 \left(\hat{C}_{i,t} - \hat{C}_t \right)^2 + u_{22}N^2 \left(\hat{N}_{i,t} - \hat{N}_t \right)^2 \right] \quad (\text{A.34})$$

$$U_t \approx U + \bar{U}_t + \frac{1}{2} \sum_i s_i \left[u_{11}C^2 \left(\hat{C}_{i,t} - \hat{C}_t \right)^2 + u_{22}N^2 \eta_{N,C}^2 \left(\hat{C}_{i,t} - \hat{C}_t \right)^2 \right] \quad (\text{A.35})$$

$$U_t \approx U + \bar{U}_t + \frac{1}{2} \left[u_{11}C^2 + u_{22}N^2 \eta_{N,C}^2 \right] \sum_i s_i \left(\hat{C}_{i,t} - \hat{C}_t \right)^2. \quad (\text{A.36})$$

In the next to last line I used equation (A.22).

Given Proposition 2.1:

$$\sum_i s_i \left(\hat{C}_{i,t} - \hat{C}_t \right)^2 = \underline{\delta}_t' \mathcal{E}' \mathcal{S} \mathcal{E} \underline{\delta}_t, \quad (\text{A.37})$$

where $\mathcal{S} = \text{diag}(s_1, \dots, s_I)$. Defining $\varphi \equiv u_{11}C^2 + u_{22}N^2 \eta_{N,C}^2$ delivers the result.

A.3 Properties of $\mathcal{E}'\mathcal{S}\mathcal{E}$

For the sake of brevity I define $\mathcal{K} \equiv \mathcal{E}'\mathcal{S}\mathcal{E}$.

\mathcal{S} is diagonal and thus symmetric. It follows that \mathcal{K} is symmetric: $\mathcal{K}' = \mathcal{E}'\mathcal{S}'\mathcal{E} = \mathcal{E}'\mathcal{S}\mathcal{E} = \mathcal{K}$. \mathcal{S} is also positive definite, so I can define $\sqrt{\mathcal{S}} = \text{diag}(\sqrt{s_1}, \dots, \sqrt{s_I})$, s.t. $\sqrt{\mathcal{S}}\sqrt{\mathcal{S}} = \mathcal{S}$. $\sqrt{\mathcal{S}}$ is symmetric and positive definite too. Then $\mathcal{K} = \mathcal{E}'\sqrt{\mathcal{S}}'\sqrt{\mathcal{S}}\mathcal{E} = \left(\sqrt{\mathcal{S}}\mathcal{E}\right)' \left(\sqrt{\mathcal{S}}\mathcal{E}\right)$ is positive semi-definite. Symmetry and positive semi-definiteness imply that $\underline{\delta}_t' \mathcal{K} \underline{\delta}_t \geq 0, \forall \underline{\delta}_t \in \mathbb{R}^J$. If \mathcal{K} is full rank $\underline{\delta}_t' \mathcal{K} \underline{\delta}_t = 0$ if and only if $\underline{\delta}_t = \underline{0}$, while that is not necessarily the case if \mathcal{K} is singular.

If $J > I$, $\text{rank}(\mathcal{E}) \leq I < J$. \mathcal{S} being square and full rank, $\text{rank}(\sqrt{\mathcal{S}}) = I$, $\text{rank}(\sqrt{\mathcal{S}}\mathcal{E}) =$

$\text{rank}(\mathcal{E}) < J$ and $\text{rank}(\mathcal{K}) \leq \text{rank}(\mathcal{E}) < J$.²⁸ So \mathcal{K} is singular.

A.4 Proof of Proposition 2.3

\mathcal{K} , defined just above, is symmetric and so can be orthogonally diagonalized as $\mathcal{K} = \mathcal{V}\mathcal{L}\mathcal{V}'$, with $\mathcal{L} = \text{diag}(l_1, \dots, l_J)$, l_j being an eigenvalue of \mathcal{K} , and \mathcal{V} being the matrix of orthonormal eigenvectors, i.e. each column is normalized by its Euclidean norm. \mathcal{K} being symmetric and positive semi-definite means its eigenvalues $l_j \geq 0$, $j = 1, \dots, J$ and real. I can equivalently write the diagonalization as $\mathcal{K} = \sum_{h=1}^J l_h \mathcal{V}_h \mathcal{V}_h'$, where \mathcal{V}_h is the h -th column of \mathcal{V} . Then:

$$\underline{\delta}_t' \mathcal{K} \underline{\delta}_t = \underline{\delta}_t' \left[\sum_{h=1}^J l_h \mathcal{V}_h \mathcal{V}_h' \right] \underline{\delta}_t = \sum_{h=1}^J l_h \underline{\delta}_t' \mathcal{V}_h \mathcal{V}_h' \underline{\delta}_t, \quad (\text{A.38})$$

$\underline{\delta}_t' \mathcal{V}_h = \sum_{j=1}^J \delta_{j,t} \mathcal{V}_{j,h}$, a scalar. So:

$$\underline{\delta}_t' \mathcal{K} \underline{\delta}_t = \sum_{h=1}^J l_h \left(\sum_{j=1}^J \delta_{j,t} \mathcal{V}_{j,h} \right)^2. \quad (\text{A.39})$$

By assumption, the first element of $\underline{\delta}_t$ can be written as $\alpha \hat{R}_{t-1}$, the real rate of interest:

$$\underline{\delta}_t' \mathcal{K} \underline{\delta}_t = \sum_{h=1}^J l_h \left(\alpha \hat{R}_{t-1} \mathcal{V}_{1,h} + \sum_{j=2}^J \delta_{j,t} \mathcal{V}_{j,h} \right)^2. \quad (\text{A.40})$$

I then minimize $\underline{\delta}_t' \mathcal{K} \underline{\delta}_t$ w.r.t. \hat{R}_{t-1} , obtaining the first-order necessary condition:

$$2 \sum_{h=1}^J l_h \left(\alpha \hat{R}_{t-1} \mathcal{V}_{1,h} + \sum_{j=2}^J \delta_{j,t} \mathcal{V}_{j,h} \right) \alpha \mathcal{V}_{1,h} = 0. \quad (\text{A.41})$$

Rearranging it obtains:

$$\hat{R}_{t-1} = \sum_{j=2}^J \Phi_j \delta_{j,t}, \quad \Phi_j \equiv - \frac{\sum_{h=1}^J l_h \mathcal{V}_{j,h} \mathcal{V}_{1,h}}{\alpha \sum_{h=1}^J l_h \mathcal{V}_{1,h}^2}, \quad (\text{A.42})$$

²⁸For more details, Taboga (2021) or this webpage.

Where assumptions i. and ii. ensure the denominator of the Φ_j 's is nonzero.

If $\text{rank}(\mathcal{K}) = 1$ only one eigenvalue is strictly positive. I assume it is the J -th, which implies:

$$\Phi_j = -\frac{l_j \mathcal{V}_{j,J} \mathcal{V}_{1,J}}{\alpha l_j \mathcal{V}_{1,J}^2} = -\frac{\mathcal{V}_{j,J}}{\alpha \mathcal{V}_{1,J}}. \quad (\text{A.43})$$

Then:

$$\underline{\delta}'_t \mathcal{K} \underline{\delta}_t = l_J \left(\alpha \hat{R}_{t-1} \mathcal{V}_{1,J} + \sum_{j=2}^J \delta_{j,t} \mathcal{V}_{j,J} \right)^2 = l_J \left(\alpha \mathcal{V}_{1,J} \sum_{j=2}^J \left(-\frac{\mathcal{V}_{j,J}}{\alpha \mathcal{V}_{1,J}} \right) \delta_{j,t} + \sum_{j=2}^J \delta_{j,t} \mathcal{V}_{j,J} \right)^2 = 0. \quad (\text{A.44})$$

B Flex price economy

I will focus on what changes relative to the sticky price economy and to save on notation will denote the flex-price counterparts with the a superscript n only in their percent deviations from steady state. Also notice that in this economy, given the optimal production subsidy, the natural and flex-price concepts are equivalent.

The intermediate-firm pricing problem becomes:

$$\frac{P_{it}}{P_t} \left(\frac{P_{it}}{P_t} \right)^{-\epsilon} Y_t - (1 - \tau) \frac{w_t}{A_t} \left(\frac{P_{it}}{P_t} \right)^{-\epsilon} Y_t = [p_{it}^{1-\epsilon} - MC_t p_{it}^{-\epsilon}] Y_t. \quad (\text{B.1})$$

I define $p_{i,t} = \frac{P_{i,t}}{P_t}$ and write out the first-order condition as:

$$p_{i,t} = \frac{\epsilon}{\epsilon - 1} MC_t. \quad (\text{B.2})$$

In a symmetric equilibrium $p_{i,t} = 1$, which implies constant marginal cost $MC_t = \frac{\epsilon-1}{\epsilon}$.

In turn, this implies:

$$MC_t = (1 - \tau) \frac{w_t}{A_t} = \left(1 - \frac{1}{\epsilon} \right) \frac{w_t}{A_t} = \frac{\epsilon - 1}{\epsilon} \Rightarrow w_t = A_t. \quad (\text{B.3})$$

From the aggregate labor supply approximated to the first order:

$$\hat{w}_t^n = \gamma \hat{C}_t^n + \psi \hat{N}_t^n \quad (\text{B.4})$$

$$\hat{A}_t = \gamma \left(\hat{A}_t + \hat{N}_t^n \right) + \psi \hat{N}_t^n \quad (\text{B.5})$$

$$\hat{N}_t^n = \frac{1 - \gamma}{\gamma + \psi} \hat{A}_t, \quad (\text{B.6})$$

the natural level of employment, where I have used $\hat{C}_t^n = \hat{A}_t + \hat{N}_t^n$.

So the natural level of output is:

$$\hat{Y}_t^n = \hat{A}_t + \hat{N}_t^n = \frac{1 + \psi}{\gamma + \psi} \hat{A}_t. \quad (\text{B.7})$$

I define the natural rate of interest in Section D.1, when I derive the dynamic IS curve.

C Loss Functions

C.1 Proof of Proposition 3.1

There are two agent types, $i \in \{S, B\}$, with $s_S = \mathfrak{s}$ and $s_B = 1 - \mathfrak{s}$. There are three assets $j \in \{B, D, H\}$, with $\Omega_B = \Omega_D = 0$ and $\Omega_H = 1$. Portfolio holdings are constant in equilibrium. For savers, we have $\omega_{S,B} = 0$, $\omega_{S,D} = \frac{1-\mathfrak{s}}{\mathfrak{s}} \bar{D}$, $\omega_{S,H} = \frac{1}{\mathfrak{s}}$. For borrowers, the portfolio holdings are $\omega_{B,B} = 0$, $\omega_{B,D} = -\bar{D}$, $\omega_{B,H} = 0$. Bonds trade at consumption prices. So $p_{B,t} = p_{B,t+1} = 1$. It then follows that $\Delta_{B,t} = R_{B,t-1} - 1$ and $\hat{\Delta}_{B,t} = \frac{\hat{R}_{B,t-1}}{1-\beta}$.²⁹ The same is true for deposits: $\Delta_{D,t} = R_{D,t-1} - 1$, with $\hat{\Delta}_{D,t} = \frac{\hat{R}_{D,t-1}}{1-\beta}$. For stocks the payout is $\Delta_{H,t} = Z_t$ and $\hat{\Delta}_{H,t} = \hat{Z}_t$.

The consumption elasticities for savers are $\eta_{S,B} = 0$, $\eta_{S,D} = \frac{\frac{1-\mathfrak{s}}{\mathfrak{s}} \bar{D} (R_D - 1)}{C} = \frac{1-\mathfrak{s}}{\mathfrak{s}} \bar{D} \frac{1-\beta}{\beta}$, $\eta_{S,H} = \frac{\frac{1}{\mathfrak{s}}}{\frac{1}{\mathfrak{s}} C} = \frac{1}{\mathfrak{s} C}$, where I have used $C = 1$ and $R_D = 1/\beta$. For borrowers $\eta_{B,B} = 0$, $\eta_{B,D} = -\frac{\bar{D} (R_D - 1)}{C} = -\bar{D} \frac{1-\beta}{\beta}$, $\eta_{B,H} = 0$. For what concerns aggregate consumption $\eta_B = 0$, $\eta_D = 0$, $\eta_H = \frac{1}{C} = \frac{1}{\mathfrak{s}}$.³⁰ Finally $\eta_{N,C} = \frac{\psi}{\psi}$.

²⁹This follows from the steady state value $R_B = 1/\beta$ and $\Delta_B = (1 - \beta) / \beta$.

³⁰It is also possible to verify that $\Theta_S = T_S = \omega_{S,D} \Delta_{S,D} + \omega_{S,H} \Delta_H = \frac{1-\mathfrak{s}}{\mathfrak{s}} \bar{D} (R_D - 1) + \frac{1}{\mathfrak{s}} Z$ as per the restriction of the equitable steady state that $\Theta_i = \sum_j \omega_{i,j} \Delta_j$. For borrowers $\Theta_B = T_B = -(R_D - 1) \bar{D}$, which again meets the requirement.

It follows that:

$$\underline{c}_t = \begin{bmatrix} \hat{C}_{S,t} - \hat{C}_t \\ \hat{C}_{B,t} - \hat{C}_t \end{bmatrix} \quad (\text{C.1})$$

$$\underline{\mathcal{E}} = \frac{\psi}{\psi + \gamma} \begin{bmatrix} 0 & \frac{1-s}{s} \bar{D} \frac{1-\beta}{\beta} & \frac{1}{\epsilon s} - \frac{1}{\epsilon} \\ 0 & -\bar{D} \frac{1-\beta}{\beta} & -\frac{1}{\epsilon} \end{bmatrix} = \frac{\psi}{\psi + \gamma} \begin{bmatrix} 0 & \frac{1-s}{s} \bar{D} \frac{1-\beta}{\beta} & \frac{1}{\epsilon} \frac{1-s}{s} \\ 0 & -\bar{D} \frac{1-\beta}{\beta} & -\frac{1}{\epsilon} \end{bmatrix} \quad (\text{C.2})$$

$$\underline{\delta}_t = \begin{bmatrix} \frac{\hat{R}_{B,t-1}}{1-\beta} \\ \frac{\hat{R}_{D,t-1}}{1-\beta} \\ \hat{Z}_t \end{bmatrix} \quad (\text{C.3})$$

$$\underline{\mathcal{S}} = \begin{bmatrix} s & 0 \\ 0 & 1-s \end{bmatrix} \quad (\text{C.4})$$

$$\varphi = \left[-\gamma + \frac{\gamma^2}{\psi^2} (-\psi) \right] = \frac{-\gamma\psi - \gamma^2}{\psi} = -\frac{\gamma(\psi + \gamma)}{\psi}. \quad (\text{C.5})$$

Then:

$$\begin{aligned} \underline{\delta}'_t \underline{\mathcal{E}}' \underline{\mathcal{S}} \underline{\mathcal{E}} \underline{\delta}_t &= \left(\frac{\psi}{\psi + \gamma} \right)^2 \left\{ \left[(1-s) \frac{\bar{D}}{\beta} \hat{R}_{D,t-1} + (1-s) \frac{\hat{Z}_t}{\epsilon} \right] \left[\frac{1-s}{s} \frac{\bar{D}}{\beta} \hat{R}_{D,t-1} + \frac{1-s}{s} \frac{\hat{Z}_t}{\epsilon} \right] \right. \\ &+ \left. \left[-(1-s) \frac{\bar{D}}{\beta} \hat{R}_{D,t-1} - (1-s) \frac{\hat{Z}_t}{\epsilon} \right] \left[-\frac{\bar{D}}{\beta} \hat{R}_{D,t-1} - \frac{\hat{Z}_t}{\epsilon} \right] \right\} \quad (\text{C.6}) \end{aligned}$$

$$= \left(\frac{\psi}{\psi + \gamma} \right)^2 (1-s)^2 \left\{ \frac{\bar{D}^2}{\beta^2} \left(\frac{1}{s} + \frac{1}{1-s} \right) \hat{R}_{D,t-1}^2 + \left(\frac{1}{s} + \frac{1}{1-s} \right) \frac{\hat{Z}_t^2}{\epsilon^2} + \left(\frac{1}{s} + \frac{1}{1-s} \right) 2 \frac{\bar{D}}{\beta} \hat{R}_{D,t-1} \frac{\hat{Z}_t}{\epsilon} \right\} \quad (\text{C.7})$$

$$= \left(\frac{\psi}{\psi + \gamma} \right)^2 \frac{1-s}{s} \left\{ \frac{\bar{D}^2}{\beta^2} \hat{R}_{D,t-1}^2 + \frac{\hat{Z}_t^2}{\epsilon^2} + 2 \frac{\bar{D}}{\beta} \hat{R}_{D,t-1} \frac{\hat{Z}_t}{\epsilon} \right\}. \quad (\text{C.8})$$

For what concerns \bar{U}_t , I use log-deviations and the second-order approximation to percent deviations to get rid of first-order terms. I define lower-case c_t as the log deviation of consumption from steady state:

$$C_t = C \frac{C_t}{C} = C e^{\log\left(\frac{C_t}{C}\right)} = C e^{c_t} \quad c_t \equiv \log\left(\frac{C_t}{C}\right). \quad (\text{C.9})$$

And:

$$C_t \approx C e^{c-c} + C e^{c-c} c_t + \frac{1}{2} C e^{c-c} c_t^2 = C \left(1 + c_t + \frac{1}{2} c_t^2 \right) \Rightarrow \hat{C}_t = \frac{C_t - C}{C} \approx c_t + \frac{1}{2} c_t^2. \quad (\text{C.10})$$

To eliminate first-order terms I compute the second-order approximation to the resource con-

straint:

$$C e^{c_t} = Y e^{y_t} \Xi e^{\xi_t} \quad (\text{C.11})$$

$$\left(1 + c_t + \frac{1}{2}c_t^2\right) = \left(1 + y_t + \frac{1}{2}y_t^2\right) \left(1 + \xi_t + \frac{1}{2}\xi_t^2\right). \quad (\text{C.12})$$

Then:

$$\begin{aligned} \xi_t &= \log\left(\frac{\Xi(\Pi_t)}{\Xi(1)}\right) = \log(\Xi(e^{\pi_t})) = \log(1 - \Gamma(\Pi_t)) = \\ &= \log(1 - \Gamma(1)) - \frac{1}{(1 - \Gamma(1))} d\Gamma_t - \frac{1}{2} \frac{1}{(1 - \Gamma(1))^2} d\Gamma_t^2 = -d\Gamma_t - \frac{1}{2} d\Gamma_t^2. \end{aligned} \quad (\text{C.13})$$

And:

$$\Gamma(\pi_t) = \frac{\vartheta}{2} (e^{\pi_t} - 1)^2 \quad (\text{C.14})$$

$$d\Gamma(\pi_t) = \Gamma(0) + \vartheta (e^{\pi_t} - 1) e^{\pi_t} d\pi_t + \frac{1}{2} \vartheta (e^{2\pi_t} + (e^{\pi_t} - 1) e^{\pi_t}) d\pi_t^2 \quad (\text{C.15})$$

$$d\Gamma(\pi_t)|_{s.s.} = \frac{1}{2} \vartheta \pi_t^2 \quad (\text{C.16})$$

So, up to second-order:

$$\xi_t = -\frac{1}{2} \vartheta \pi_t^2 \quad (\text{C.17})$$

Using this in the resource constraint:

$$\left(1 + c_t + \frac{1}{2}c_t^2\right) = \left(1 + y_t + \frac{1}{2}y_t^2\right) \left(1 - \frac{1}{2}\vartheta\pi_t^2\right) \quad (\text{C.18})$$

$$c_t + \frac{1}{2}c_t^2 = y_t + \frac{1}{2}y_t^2 - \frac{1}{2}\vartheta\pi_t^2 + \text{higher-order terms.} \quad (\text{C.19})$$

Using this in the loss function I can start writing everything a function of lowercase variables:

$$\bar{U}_t \approx \hat{C}_t - \hat{N}_t - \frac{1}{2}\gamma\hat{C}_t^2 - \frac{1}{2}\psi\hat{N}_t^2 = y_t + \frac{1}{2}y_t^2 - \frac{1}{2}\vartheta\pi_t^2 - n_t - \frac{1}{2}n_t^2 - \frac{1}{2}\gamma y_t^2 - \frac{1}{2}\psi n_t^2 \quad (\text{C.20})$$

$$\bar{U}_t \approx (y_t - n_t) - \frac{1}{2}\vartheta\pi_t^2 - \frac{1}{2}(\gamma - 1)y_t^2 - \frac{1}{2}(1 + \psi)n_t^2 \quad (\text{C.21})$$

$$\bar{U}_t \approx a_t - \frac{1}{2}\vartheta\pi_t^2 - \frac{1}{2}(\gamma - 1)y_t^2 - \frac{1}{2}(1 + \psi)(y_t - a_t)^2 \quad (\text{C.22})$$

$$\bar{U}_t \approx -\frac{1}{2}\vartheta\pi_t^2 - \frac{1}{2}(\gamma - 1 + 1 + \psi)y_t^2 + (1 + \psi)y_t a_t + \text{t.i.p.} \quad (\text{C.23})$$

$$\bar{U}_t \approx -\frac{1}{2}\vartheta\pi_t^2 - \frac{1}{2}(\gamma + \psi)y_t^2 + (1 + \psi)y_t \frac{\gamma + \psi}{1 + \psi}y_t^n + \text{t.i.p.} \quad (\text{C.24})$$

$$\bar{U}_t \approx -\frac{1}{2}\vartheta\pi_t^2 - \frac{1}{2}(\gamma + \psi)(y_t^2 - 2y_t y_t^n) + \text{t.i.p.} \quad (\text{C.25})$$

$$\bar{U}_t \approx -\frac{1}{2}\vartheta\pi_t^2 - \frac{1}{2}(\gamma + \psi)(y_t^2 - 2y_t y_t^n + y_t^{n2}) + \frac{1}{2}(\gamma + \psi)y_t^{n2} + \text{t.i.p.} \quad (\text{C.26})$$

$$\bar{U}_t \approx -\frac{1}{2}\vartheta\pi_t^2 - \frac{1}{2}(\gamma + \psi)\tilde{y}_t^2 + \text{t.i.p.} \quad (\text{C.27})$$

where I used the definition of the natural rate of output in equation (B.7), I define the output gap as $\tilde{y}_t \equiv (y_t - y_t^n)$ and t.i.p. refers to terms independent of policy, exogenous terms like the technology process and the natural level of output, which is proportional to it.

C.2 Background to equation (32)

Linearizing Z_t yields:

$$dZ_t = N(Ad\Xi_t + \Xi(\Pi)dA_t - dw_t) + (A\Xi(\Pi) - w)dN_t \quad (\text{C.28})$$

$$dZ_t = N(Ad\Xi_t + \Xi(\Pi)dA_t - dw_t) \quad (\text{C.29})$$

$$dZ_t = N(A(-\Gamma'(\Pi)d\Pi_t) + \Xi(\Pi)dA_t - dw_t) \quad (\text{C.30})$$

$$dZ_t = N(A(-\vartheta \cdot 0 \cdot d\Pi_t) + \Xi(\Pi)dA_t - dw_t) \quad (\text{C.31})$$

$$dZ_t = N(dA_t - dw_t) \quad (\text{C.32})$$

$$dZ_t = (dA_t - dw_t) \quad (\text{C.33})$$

$$\frac{1}{\epsilon}\hat{Z}_t = A\hat{A}_t - w\hat{w}_t \quad (\text{C.34})$$

$$\hat{Z}_t = \epsilon(\hat{A}_t - \hat{w}_t). \quad (\text{C.35})$$

Then I can relate it to the output gap as:

$$\hat{Z}_t = \epsilon \left(\hat{A}_t - \psi \hat{N}_t - \gamma \hat{C}_t \right) \quad (\text{C.36})$$

$$\hat{Z}_t = \epsilon \left(\hat{A}_t - \psi \hat{N}_t - \gamma \hat{A}_t - \gamma \hat{N}_t \right) \quad (\text{C.37})$$

$$\hat{Z}_t = \epsilon \left((1 - \gamma) \hat{A}_t - (\psi + \gamma) \hat{N}_t \right) \quad (\text{C.38})$$

$$\hat{Z}_t = \epsilon \left((1 - \gamma) \frac{\gamma + \psi}{1 - \gamma} N_t^n - (\psi + \gamma) \hat{N}_t \right) \quad (\text{C.39})$$

$$\hat{Z}_t = \epsilon (\psi + \gamma) \left(N_t^n - \hat{N}_t \right) \quad (\text{C.40})$$

$$\hat{Z}_t = \epsilon (\psi + \gamma) \left(\hat{A}_t + N_t^n - \hat{A}_t - \hat{N}_t \right) \quad (\text{C.41})$$

$$\hat{Z}_t = \epsilon (\psi + \gamma) \left(\hat{Y}_t^n - \hat{Y}_t \right) \quad (\text{C.42})$$

$$\hat{Z}_t = -\epsilon (\psi + \gamma) \tilde{y}_t. \quad (\text{C.43})$$

The other entries of \mathcal{F} are immediate to back out.

D First-order constraints

D.1 IS Curve

Log-linearizing equation (12) results in:

$$\hat{C}_{S,t} = \mathbb{E}_t \hat{C}_{S,t+1} - \frac{1}{\gamma} \hat{R}_{D,t}. \quad (\text{D.1})$$

I apply Proposition (2.1) to express the consumption of savers as a function of aggregate consumption, real rates, and dividends. Then I express aggregate consumption and dividends as a

function of the output gap (equations (B.7) and (C.43)):

$$\hat{C}_{S,t} = \frac{\psi}{\psi + \gamma} \frac{1 - \mathfrak{s}}{\mathfrak{s}} \left(\frac{\bar{D}}{\beta} \frac{1 - \beta}{1 - \beta} \hat{R}_{D,t-1} + \frac{1}{\epsilon} \hat{Z}_t \right) + \hat{C}_t \quad (\text{D.2})$$

$$\hat{C}_{S,t} = \frac{\psi}{\psi + \gamma} \frac{1 - \mathfrak{s}}{\mathfrak{s}} \left(\frac{\bar{D}}{\beta} (i_{t-1} - \pi_t) - (\psi + \gamma) \tilde{y}_t \right) + (\hat{A}_t + \hat{N}_t) \quad (\text{D.3})$$

$$\hat{C}_{S,t} = \frac{\psi}{\psi + \gamma} \frac{1 - \mathfrak{s}}{\mathfrak{s}} \left(\frac{\bar{D}}{\beta} (i_{t-1} - \pi_t) - (\psi + \gamma) \tilde{y}_t \right) + \left(\frac{\gamma + \psi}{1 - \gamma} \hat{N}_t^n + \hat{N}_t \right) \quad (\text{D.4})$$

$$\hat{C}_{S,t} = \frac{\psi}{\psi + \gamma} \frac{1 - \mathfrak{s}}{\mathfrak{s}} \left(\frac{\bar{D}}{\beta} (i_{t-1} - \pi_t) - (\psi + \gamma) \tilde{y}_t \right) + \left(\frac{\gamma + \psi + 1 - \gamma}{1 - \gamma} \hat{N}_t^n + \hat{N}_t - N_t^n \right) \quad (\text{D.5})$$

$$\hat{C}_{S,t} = \frac{\psi}{\psi + \gamma} \frac{1 - \mathfrak{s}}{\mathfrak{s}} \left(\frac{\bar{D}}{\beta} (i_{t-1} - \pi_t) - (\psi + \gamma) \tilde{y}_t \right) + \left(\frac{1 + \psi}{1 - \gamma} \hat{N}_t^n + \tilde{y}_t \right) \quad (\text{D.6})$$

$$\hat{C}_{S,t} = \frac{\psi}{\psi + \gamma} \frac{1 - \mathfrak{s}}{\mathfrak{s}} \left(\frac{\bar{D}}{\beta} (i_{t-1} - \pi_t) - (\psi + \gamma) \tilde{y}_t \right) + \left(\frac{1 + \psi}{1 - \gamma} \frac{1 - \gamma}{\psi + \gamma} \hat{A}_t + \tilde{y}_t \right) \quad (\text{D.7})$$

$$\hat{C}_{S,t} = \frac{\psi}{\psi + \gamma} \frac{1 - \mathfrak{s}}{\mathfrak{s}} \frac{\bar{D}}{\beta} (i_{t-1} - \pi_t) + \left(-\frac{\psi}{\psi + \gamma} \frac{1 - \mathfrak{s}}{\mathfrak{s}} (\psi + \gamma) + 1 \right) \tilde{y}_t + \frac{1 + \psi}{\psi + \gamma} \hat{A}_t \quad (\text{D.8})$$

$$\hat{C}_{S,t} = \frac{\psi}{\psi + \gamma} \frac{1 - \mathfrak{s}}{\mathfrak{s}} \frac{\bar{D}}{\beta} (i_{t-1} - \pi_t) + \left(1 - \psi \frac{1 - \mathfrak{s}}{\mathfrak{s}} \right) \tilde{y}_t + \frac{1 + \psi}{\psi + \gamma} \hat{A}_t. \quad (\text{D.9})$$

I use this in the Euler equation:

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{\psi}{\psi + \gamma} \frac{1 - \mathfrak{s}}{\mathfrak{s}} \frac{\bar{D}}{\beta} (i_{t-1} - \pi_t) + \left(1 - \psi \frac{1 - \mathfrak{s}}{\mathfrak{s}} \right) \tilde{y}_t + \frac{1 + \psi}{\psi + \gamma} \hat{A}_t &= \mathbb{E}_t \left(\frac{\psi}{\psi + \gamma} \frac{1 - \mathfrak{s}}{\mathfrak{s}} \frac{\bar{D}}{\beta} (i_t - \mathbb{E}_t \pi_{t+1}) + \left(1 - \psi \frac{1 - \mathfrak{s}}{\mathfrak{s}} \right) \tilde{y}_{t+1} + \frac{1 + \psi}{\psi + \gamma} \hat{A}_{t+1} \right) \\ \frac{\psi}{\psi + \gamma} \frac{1 - \mathfrak{s}}{\mathfrak{s}} \frac{\bar{D}}{\beta} (i_{t-1} - \pi_t) + \left(1 - \psi \frac{1 - \mathfrak{s}}{\mathfrak{s}} \right) \tilde{y}_t + \frac{1 + \psi}{\psi + \gamma} (1 - \rho_a) \hat{A}_t &= \mathbb{E}_t \left(\frac{\psi}{\psi + \gamma} \frac{1 - \mathfrak{s}}{\mathfrak{s}} \frac{\bar{D}}{\beta} (i_t - \pi_{t+1}) + \left(1 - \psi \frac{1 - \mathfrak{s}}{\mathfrak{s}} \right) \tilde{y}_{t+1} \right) + \\ &\quad - \frac{1}{\gamma} \mathbb{E}_t (i_t - \mathbb{E}_t \pi_{t+1}). \end{aligned}$$

Or:

$$\left(1 - \psi \frac{1 - \mathfrak{s}}{\mathfrak{s}} \right) \tilde{y}_t = \left[\frac{\psi}{\psi + \gamma} \frac{1 - \mathfrak{s}}{\mathfrak{s}} \frac{\bar{D}}{\beta} - \frac{1}{\gamma} \right] \mathbb{E}_t (i_t - \pi_{t+1}) - \left[\frac{\psi}{\psi + \gamma} \frac{1 - \mathfrak{s}}{\mathfrak{s}} \frac{\bar{D}}{\beta} \right] (i_{t-1} - \pi_t) + \left(1 - \psi \frac{1 - \mathfrak{s}}{\mathfrak{s}} \right) \mathbb{E}_t \tilde{y}_{t+1} - \frac{1 + \psi}{\psi + \gamma} (1 - \rho_a) \hat{A}_t. \quad (\text{D.11})$$

This equation pins down the natural rate of interest when $\tilde{y}_t = \tilde{y}_{t+1} = 0$:

$$0 = \left[\frac{\psi}{\psi + \gamma} \frac{1 - \mathfrak{s}}{\mathfrak{s}} \frac{\bar{D}}{\beta} - \frac{1}{\gamma} \right] r_t^n - \left[\frac{\psi}{\psi + \gamma} \frac{1 - \mathfrak{s}}{\mathfrak{s}} \frac{\bar{D}}{\beta} \right] r_{t-1}^n - \frac{1 + \psi}{\psi + \gamma} (1 - \rho_a) \hat{A}_t. \quad (\text{D.12})$$

So I can rewrite the IS equation as:

$$\left(1 - \psi \frac{1-s}{s}\right) \tilde{y}_t = \left[\frac{\psi}{\psi + \gamma} \frac{1-s}{s} \frac{\bar{D}}{\beta} - \frac{1}{\gamma} \right] \mathbb{E}_t (i_t - \pi_{t+1} - r_t^n) - \left[\frac{\psi}{\psi + \gamma} \frac{1-s}{s} \frac{\bar{D}}{\beta} \right] (i_{t-1} - \pi_t - r_{t-1}^n) + \left(1 - \psi \frac{1-s}{s}\right) \mathbb{E}_t \tilde{y}_{t+1}. \quad (\text{D.13})$$

D.2 Phillips Curve

Log-linearizing the pricing equation (18), and using $\Pi = \bar{\Pi}$:

$$-\hat{\Pi}_t + \mathbb{E}_t \beta \hat{\Pi}_{t+1} = -\frac{\epsilon - 1}{\vartheta} \hat{MC}_t. \quad (\text{D.14})$$

The marginal cost is proportional to the output gap:

$$\hat{MC}_t = \hat{w}_t - \hat{A}_t \quad (\text{D.15})$$

$$\hat{MC}_t = \gamma \hat{C}_t + \psi \hat{N}_t - \hat{A}_t \quad (\text{D.16})$$

$$\hat{MC}_t = -(1 - \gamma) \hat{A}_t + (\gamma + \psi) \hat{N}_t \quad (\text{D.17})$$

$$\hat{MC}_t = -(1 - \gamma) \hat{A}_t + (\gamma + \psi) (\hat{Y}_t - \hat{A}_t) \quad (\text{D.18})$$

$$\hat{MC}_t = -(1 + \psi) \frac{\gamma + \psi}{1 + \psi} \hat{Y}_t^n + (\gamma + \psi) \hat{Y}_t \quad (\text{D.19})$$

$$\hat{MC}_t = (\gamma + \psi) \tilde{Y}_t. \quad (\text{D.20})$$

Using the log-deviation notation produces:

$$\pi_t = \underbrace{\frac{(\epsilon - 1)(\gamma + \psi)}{\vartheta}}_{\kappa} \tilde{y}_t + \beta \pi_{t+1}. \quad (\text{D.21})$$

E Optimal Policy

E.1 Social welfare under flex prices

I first rescale everything by ϑ and denote the resulting λ 's by a tilde.

$$-\frac{1}{2} \left[\left(\vartheta \pi_t^2 + \tilde{\lambda}_y \tilde{y}_t^2 \right) + \tilde{\lambda}_r (i_{t-1} - \pi_t)^2 + \tilde{\lambda}_z \tilde{y}_t^2 - 2\tilde{\lambda}_z \frac{\bar{D}}{\beta(\gamma + \psi)} (i_{t-1} - \pi_t) \tilde{y}_t \right], \quad (\text{E.1})$$

where all the $\tilde{\lambda}$'s are independent of ϑ .

Then set $\vartheta = 0$ and define the real rate as stand-alone variable:

$$-\frac{1}{2} \left[\underbrace{\tilde{\lambda}_y \tilde{y}_t^2}_{\bar{U}_t^f} + \underbrace{\tilde{\lambda}_r r_{t-1}^2 + \tilde{\lambda}_z \tilde{y}_t^2 - 2\tilde{\lambda}_z \frac{\bar{D}}{\beta(\gamma + \psi)} r_{t-1} \tilde{y}_t}_{U_t^{\circ f}} \right]. \quad (\text{E.2})$$

E.2 Natural rate

It obtains by minimizing \bar{U}_t^f given the IS curve:

$$\begin{aligned} \max_{\tilde{y}_{t+j}, r_{t+j-1}, \mu_{t+j}} & -\frac{1}{2} \mathbb{E}_t \sum_{j=0}^{\infty} \beta^j \left\{ \left[\tilde{\lambda}_y \tilde{y}_{t+j}^2 \right] + 2\mu_{t+j} \left(-(1 + \Psi_z) \tilde{y}_{t+j} + \left[\Psi_r - \frac{1}{\gamma} \right] (r_{t+j} - r_{t+j}^n) - \Psi_r (r_{t+j-1} - r_{t+j-1}^n) + (1 + \Psi_z) \tilde{y}_{t+j+1} \right) \right\} + \\ & - \beta^{-1} \mu_{t-1} \left(-(1 + \Psi_z) \tilde{y}_{t-1} + \left[\Psi_r - \frac{1}{\gamma} \right] (r_{t-1} - r_{t-1}^n) - \Psi_r (r_{t-2} - r_{t-2}^n) + (1 + \Psi_z) \tilde{y}_t \right) \end{aligned} \quad (\text{E.3})$$

FONCs:

$$-\tilde{\lambda}_y \tilde{y}_t + \mu_t (1 + \Psi_z) - \beta^{-1} \mu_{t-1} (1 + \Psi_z) = 0 \quad (\text{E.4})$$

$$\mu_t \Psi_r - \beta^{-1} \mu_{t-1} \left[\Psi_r - \frac{1}{\gamma} \right] = 0 \quad (\text{E.5})$$

The solution is $\mu_t = 0$ from the second FONC, and thus $\tilde{y}_t = 0$ from the first. This finally implies $r_{t-1} = r_{t-1}^n$ from the IS curve.

E.3 Equitable rate

It obtains by minimizing $U_t^{\circ f}$ given the IS curve. $U_t^{\circ f}$ simplifies if I substitute in the values of the $\tilde{\lambda}$'s:

$$U_t^{\circ} = \tilde{\lambda}_r r_{t+j-1}^2 + \tilde{\lambda}_z \tilde{y}_{t+j}^2 - 2\tilde{\lambda}_z \frac{\bar{D}}{\beta(\gamma + \psi)} r_{t+j-1} \tilde{y}_{t+j} \quad (\text{E.6})$$

$$= \frac{\gamma\psi}{\gamma + \psi} \frac{1 - \mathfrak{s}}{\mathfrak{s}} \frac{\bar{D}^2}{\beta^2} r_{t+j-1}^2 + \gamma\psi \frac{1 - \mathfrak{s}}{\mathfrak{s}} (\gamma + \psi) \tilde{y}_{t+j}^2 - 2\gamma\psi \frac{1 - \mathfrak{s}}{\mathfrak{s}} (\gamma + \psi) \frac{\bar{D}}{\beta(\gamma + \psi)} r_{t+j-1} \tilde{y}_{t+j} \quad (\text{E.7})$$

$$= \frac{\gamma\psi}{\gamma + \psi} \frac{1 - \mathfrak{s}}{\mathfrak{s}} \left[\frac{\bar{D}^2}{\beta^2} r_{t+j-1}^2 + (\gamma + \psi)^2 \tilde{y}_{t+j}^2 - 2(\gamma + \psi) \frac{\bar{D}}{\beta} r_{t+j-1} \tilde{y}_{t+j} \right] \quad (\text{E.8})$$

$$= \frac{\gamma\psi}{\gamma + \psi} \frac{1 - \mathfrak{s}}{\mathfrak{s}} \left[\frac{\bar{D}}{\beta} r_{t+j-1} - (\gamma + \psi) \tilde{y}_{t+j} \right]^2. \quad (\text{E.9})$$

Then the optimal policy problem becomes:

$$\begin{aligned}
\max_{\tilde{y}_{t+j}, r_{t+j-1}, \mu_{t+j}} & -\frac{1}{2} \mathbb{E}_t \sum_{j=0}^{\infty} \beta^j \left\{ \frac{\gamma\psi}{\gamma+\psi} \frac{1-\mathfrak{s}}{\mathfrak{s}} \left[\frac{\bar{D}}{\beta} r_{t+j-1} - (\gamma+\psi) \tilde{y}_{t+j} \right]^2 + \right. \\
& + 2\mu_{t+j} \left(-(1+\Psi_z) \tilde{y}_{t+j} + \left[\Psi_r - \frac{1}{\gamma} \right] (r_{t+j} - r_{t+j}^n) - \Psi_r (r_{t+j-1} - r_{t+j-1}^n) + (1+\Psi_z) \tilde{y}_{t+j+1} \right) \left. \right\} + \\
& - \beta^{-1} \mu_{t-1} \left(-(1+\Psi_z) \tilde{y}_{t-1} + \left[\Psi_r - \frac{1}{\gamma} \right] (r_{t-1} - r_{t-1}^n) - \Psi_r (r_{t-2} - r_{t-2}^n) + (1+\Psi_z) \tilde{y}_t \right) \quad (\text{E.10})
\end{aligned}$$

FONCs:

$$\frac{\gamma\psi}{\gamma+\psi} \frac{1-\mathfrak{s}}{\mathfrak{s}} \left[\frac{\bar{D}}{\beta} r_{t-1} - (\gamma+\psi) \tilde{y}_t \right] (\gamma+\psi) + \mu_t (1+\Psi_z) - \beta^{-1} \mu_{t-1} (1+\Psi_z) = 0 \quad (\text{E.11})$$

$$-\frac{\gamma\psi}{\gamma+\psi} \frac{1-\mathfrak{s}}{\mathfrak{s}} \left[\frac{\bar{D}}{\beta} r_{t-1} - (\gamma+\psi) \tilde{y}_t \right] \frac{\bar{D}}{\beta} + \mu_t \Psi_r - \beta^{-1} \mu_{t-1} \left[\Psi_r - \frac{1}{\gamma} \right] = 0. \quad (\text{E.12})$$

From the second I get:

$$\left[\frac{\bar{D}}{\beta} r_{t-1} - (\gamma+\psi) \tilde{y}_t \right] = \mu_t \frac{1}{\gamma} - \beta^{-1} \mu_{t-1} \frac{\left[\Psi_r - \frac{1}{\gamma} \right]}{\gamma \Psi_r}. \quad (\text{E.13})$$

Using this to substitute for $\left[\frac{\bar{D}}{\beta} r_{t-1} - (\gamma+\psi) \tilde{y}_t \right]$ in the first FONC delivers an expression in μ_t and μ_{t-1} only, which implies they can only be zero at all times. Given that, it also has to be that $r_{t-1} = \frac{\beta(\gamma+\psi)}{\bar{D}} \tilde{y}_t$, the definition of equitable rate.

E.4 Derivation of equations (40) and (41)

Under parametrizations that deliver $\Psi_z = -1$ and $\Psi_r = \frac{1}{\gamma}$, the consumption of savers and borrowers in deviation from steady state can be expressed as:

$$\hat{C}_{S,t} = \frac{\psi}{\psi + \gamma} \frac{1 - \mathfrak{s}}{\mathfrak{s}} \frac{\bar{D}}{\beta} (i_{t-1} - \pi_t) - \frac{1 - \mathfrak{s}}{\mathfrak{s}} \psi \tilde{y}_t + \hat{C}_t \quad (\text{E.14})$$

$$\hat{C}_{B,t} = -\frac{\psi}{\psi + \gamma} \frac{\bar{D}}{\beta} (i_{t-1} - \pi_t) + \psi \tilde{y}_t + \hat{C}_t \quad (\text{E.15})$$

$$\hat{C}_{S,t} = \frac{1}{\psi + \gamma} \frac{\bar{D}}{\beta} (i_{t-1} - \pi_t) - \tilde{y}_t + \hat{C}_t \quad (\text{E.16})$$

$$\hat{C}_{B,t} = -\frac{1}{\psi + \gamma} \frac{\mathfrak{s}}{1 - \mathfrak{s}} \frac{\bar{D}}{\beta} (i_{t-1} - \pi_t) + \frac{\mathfrak{s}}{1 - \mathfrak{s}} \tilde{y}_t + \hat{C}_t \quad (\text{E.17})$$

$$\hat{C}_{S,t} = \frac{1}{\gamma} (i_{t-1} - \pi_t) - \tilde{y}_t + \hat{C}_t \quad (\text{E.18})$$

$$\hat{C}_{B,t} = -\frac{\mathfrak{s}}{1 - \mathfrak{s}} \frac{1}{\gamma} (i_{t-1} - \pi_t) + \frac{\mathfrak{s}}{1 - \mathfrak{s}} \tilde{y}_t + \hat{C}_t \quad (\text{E.19})$$

$$\hat{C}_{S,t} = \frac{1}{\gamma} r_{t-1}^n - \tilde{y}_t + \tilde{y}_t + \frac{1 + \psi}{\psi + \gamma} \hat{A}_t \quad (\text{E.20})$$

$$\hat{C}_{B,t} = -\frac{\mathfrak{s}}{1 - \mathfrak{s}} \frac{1}{\gamma} r_{t-1}^n + \frac{\mathfrak{s}}{1 - \mathfrak{s}} \tilde{y}_t + \tilde{y}_t + \frac{1 + \psi}{\psi + \gamma} \hat{A}_t \quad (\text{E.21})$$

$$\hat{C}_{S,t} = \frac{1}{\gamma} r_{t-1}^n + \frac{1 + \psi}{\psi + \gamma} \hat{A}_t \quad (\text{E.22})$$

$$\hat{C}_{B,t} = -\frac{\mathfrak{s}}{1 - \mathfrak{s}} \frac{1}{\gamma} r_{t-1}^n + \frac{1}{1 - \mathfrak{s}} \tilde{y}_t + \frac{1 + \psi}{\psi + \gamma} \hat{A}_t \quad (\text{E.23})$$

where I have used that $\psi = \frac{\mathfrak{s}}{1 - \mathfrak{s}}$ for $\Psi_z = 1$, then that $\frac{\psi}{\psi + \gamma} \frac{1 - \mathfrak{s}}{\mathfrak{s}} \frac{\bar{D}}{\beta} = \frac{1}{\psi + \gamma} \frac{\bar{D}}{\beta} = \frac{1}{\gamma}$ when $\Psi_r = \frac{1}{\gamma}$, and finally $\hat{C}_t = \hat{Y}_t = \tilde{y}_t + \hat{Y}_t^n$.

E.5 Proof of Proposition 3.2

Given $i_{t-1} - \pi_t = r_{t-1}^n$ the Phillips curve can be rewritten as:

$$(i_{t-1} - r_{t-1}^n) = \kappa \tilde{y}_t + \beta (i_t - r_t^n). \quad (\text{E.24})$$

The Phillips curve pins down the output gap for given levels of the past and current level of the policy rate. Importantly, there are no expectational terms, which implies that I do not need to add the time- $(t - 1)$ constraint.

The policymaker objective function can also be simplified:

$$\tilde{U}_t = -\frac{1}{2} \left[\left((i_{t-1} - r_{t-1}^n)^2 + \lambda_y \tilde{y}_t^2 \right) + \lambda_r (r_{t-1}^n)^2 + \lambda_z \tilde{y}_t^2 - 2\lambda_z \frac{\bar{D}}{\beta(\gamma + \psi)} (r_{t-1}^n) \tilde{y}_t \right] \quad (\text{E.25})$$

$$\tilde{U}_t = -\frac{1}{2} \left[(i_{t-1} - r_{t-1}^n)^2 + (\lambda_y + \lambda_z) \tilde{y}_t^2 - 2\lambda_z \frac{\bar{D}}{\beta(\gamma + \psi)} r_{t-1}^n \tilde{y}_t \right] + \text{t.i.p.} \quad (\text{E.26})$$

So the optimal policy problem becomes:

$$\max_{i_{t+j}, \tilde{y}_{t+j}, v_{t+j}} -\frac{1}{2} \mathbb{E}_t \sum_{j=0}^{\infty} \beta^j \left[(i_{t+j-1} - r_{t+j-1}^n)^2 + (\lambda_y + \lambda_z) \tilde{y}_{t+j}^2 - 2\lambda_z \frac{\bar{D}}{\beta(\gamma + \psi)} r_{t+j-1}^n \tilde{y}_{t+j} \right] \quad (\text{E.27})$$

$$\text{s.t. } \mathbb{E}_t (i_{t+j-1} - r_{t+j-1}^n) = \mathbb{E}_t \kappa \tilde{y}_{t+j} + \beta (i_{t+j} - \mathbb{E}_t r_{t+j}^n). \quad (\text{E.28})$$

FONCs:

$$\beta v_t - \beta (i_t - r_t^n) - \beta \mathbb{E}_t v_{t+1} = 0 \quad (\text{E.29})$$

$$-(\lambda_y + \lambda_z) \tilde{y}_t + \lambda_z \frac{\bar{D}}{\beta(\gamma + \psi)} r_{t-1}^n + v_t \kappa = 0 \quad (\text{E.30})$$

$$(i_{t-1} - r_{t-1}^n) = \kappa \tilde{y}_t + \beta (i_t - r_t^n) \quad (\text{E.31})$$

Noting that $i_t - r_t^n = \pi_{t+1}$ implies that $v_t = -p_t$ up to normalization, where, with an abuse of notation, I now use lowercase p_t to denote the log of the price level. Then:

$$v_t = -p_t \quad (\text{E.32})$$

$$\tilde{y}_t = \frac{\lambda_z}{\lambda_z + \lambda_y} \frac{\bar{D}}{\beta(\gamma + \psi)} r_{t-1}^n - \frac{\kappa}{\lambda_z + \lambda_y} p_t \quad (\text{E.33})$$

$$\pi_t = \kappa \tilde{y}_t + \beta \mathbb{E}_t \pi_{t+1}. \quad (\text{E.34})$$

Rewriting the second equation, using r_{t-1}^\diamond :

$$\tilde{y}_t = -\frac{\kappa}{\lambda_z + \lambda_y} p_t + \frac{\lambda_z}{\lambda_z + \lambda_y} \frac{\bar{D}}{\beta(\gamma + \psi)} (r_{t-1}^n - r_{t-1}^\diamond) + \frac{\lambda_z}{\lambda_z + \lambda_y} \tilde{y}_t \quad (\text{E.35})$$

$$\tilde{y}_t \left(1 - \frac{\lambda_z}{\lambda_z + \lambda_y} \right) = -\frac{\kappa}{\lambda_z + \lambda_y} p_t + \frac{\lambda_z}{\lambda_z + \lambda_y} \frac{\bar{D}}{\beta(\gamma + \psi)} (r_{t-1}^n - r_{t-1}^\diamond) \quad (\text{E.36})$$

$$\tilde{y}_t = -\frac{\kappa}{\lambda_y} p_t + \frac{\lambda_z}{\lambda_y} \frac{\bar{D}}{\beta(\gamma + \psi)} (r_{t-1}^n - r_{t-1}^\diamond). \quad (\text{E.37})$$

E.6 Optimal policy: general case

The timeless optimal policy problem under commitment is:

$$\begin{aligned} \max_{\pi_{t+j}, \tilde{y}_{t+j}, i_{t+j}, \mu_{t+j}, v_{t+j}} & -\frac{1}{2} \mathbb{E}_t \sum_{j=0}^{\infty} \beta^j \left\{ \left[(1+\lambda_r) \pi_{t+j}^2 + (\lambda_y + \lambda_z) \tilde{y}_{t+j}^2 + \lambda_r i_{t+j-1}^2 - 2\lambda_r i_{t+j-1} \pi_{t+j} - 2\lambda_z \frac{\bar{D}}{\beta(\gamma+\psi)} i_{t+j-1} \tilde{y}_{t+j} + 2\lambda_z \frac{\bar{D}}{\beta(\gamma+\psi)} \pi_{t+j} \tilde{y}_{t+j} \right] \right. \\ & + 2\mu_{t+j} \left(-(1+\Psi_z) \tilde{y}_{t+j} + \left[\Psi_r - \frac{1}{\gamma} \right] (i_{t+j} - \pi_{t+j+1} - r_{t+j}^n) - \Psi_r (i_{t+j-1} - \pi_{t+j} - r_{t+j-1}^n) + (1+\Psi_z) \tilde{y}_{t+j+1} \right) + \\ & + 2v_{t+j} (-\pi_{t+j} + \kappa \tilde{y}_{t+j} + \beta \pi_{t+j+1}) \left. \right\} + \\ & - \beta^{-1} \mu_{t-1} \left(-(1+\Psi_z) \tilde{y}_{t-1} + \left[\Psi_r - \frac{1}{\gamma} \right] (i_{t-1} - \pi_t - r_{t-1}^n) - \Psi_r (i_{t-2} - \pi_{t-1} - r_{t-2}^n) + (1+\Psi_z) \tilde{y}_t \right) + \\ & - \beta^{-1} v_{t-1} (-\pi_{t-1} + \kappa \tilde{y}_{t-1} + \beta \pi_t) \end{aligned} \quad (\text{E.38})$$

FONCs (except for those for the multipliers, which correspond to the constraints):

$$-(1+\lambda_r) \pi_t + \lambda_r i_{t-1} - \lambda_z \frac{\bar{D}}{\beta(\gamma+\psi)} \tilde{y}_t - \mu_t \Psi_r + v_t + \beta^{-1} \mu_{t-1} \left[\Psi_r - \frac{1}{\gamma} \right] - v_{t-1} = 0 \quad (\text{E.39})$$

$$-(\lambda_y + \lambda_z) \tilde{y}_t + \lambda_z \frac{\bar{D}}{\beta(\gamma+\psi)} i_{t-1} - \lambda_z \frac{\bar{D}}{\beta(\gamma+\psi)} \pi_t + \mu_t (1+\Psi_z) - v_t \kappa - \beta^{-1} \mu_{t-1} (1+\Psi_z) = 0 \quad (\text{E.40})$$

$$-\mu_t \left[\Psi_r - \frac{1}{\gamma} \right] - \beta \lambda_r i_t + \beta \lambda_r \mathbb{E}_t \pi_{t+1} + \beta \lambda_z \frac{\bar{D}}{\beta(\gamma+\psi)} \mathbb{E}_t \tilde{y}_{t+1} + \beta \mathbb{E}_t \mu_{t+1} \Psi_r = 0 \quad (\text{E.41})$$

E.7 Dividend redistribution

If dividends are redistributed equally to all households $\eta_{S,Z} = \eta_{B,Z} = \eta_Z = \frac{1}{\epsilon}$.³¹ As a result the \mathcal{E} matrix becomes:

$$\mathcal{E} = \frac{\psi}{\psi + \gamma} \begin{bmatrix} 0 & \frac{1-\varsigma}{\varsigma} \frac{\bar{D}^{1-\beta}}{\beta} & 0 \\ 0 & -\bar{D} \frac{1-\beta}{\beta} & 0 \end{bmatrix} \quad (\text{E.42})$$

And:

$$\varphi \delta'_t \mathcal{E}' \mathcal{S} \mathcal{E} \delta_t = -\frac{\gamma \psi}{\psi + \gamma} \frac{1-\varsigma}{\varsigma} \frac{\bar{D}^2}{\beta^2} \hat{R}_{D,t-1}^2. \quad (\text{E.43})$$

Comparing this expression with those in equation (28) shows (\mathcal{F} is unaffected by the redistribution of dividends) that $\lambda_z = 0$, and λ_r is unaffected.

Moreover:

$$\mathcal{E} \mathcal{F} = \frac{\psi}{\psi + \gamma} \begin{bmatrix} \frac{1-\varsigma}{\varsigma} \frac{\bar{D}}{\beta} & -\frac{1-\varsigma}{\varsigma} \frac{\bar{D}}{\beta} & 0 \\ -\frac{\bar{D}}{\beta} & \frac{\bar{D}}{\beta} & 0 \end{bmatrix} \quad (\text{E.44})$$

³¹All household could partake of dividends either because each of them owned a differentiated portfolio of firms or because dividends going to savers would then be redistributed via a government transfer. This also shows that the restriction on the form of the transfers in Section 2 simplifies the algebra but the argument carries through more generally if I define the payoffs of assets net of transfers.

So $\Psi_z = (\mathcal{EF})_{1,3} = 0$, while $\Psi_r = (\mathcal{EF})_{1,1} = -(\mathcal{EF})_{1,2}$ is unaffected.

Intuitively, when dividends are distributed evenly across all households they do not contribute to heterogeneity. As a result, the output gap (which is proportional to dividends) need not receive an extra weight, nor I need to take into account the comovement of the output gap with the real rate of interest.

Another way to think about this is that when I assume $\bar{D} = 0$ on top of dividend redistribution, there is no heterogeneity surviving in the economy and both the loss function and the IS curve are identical to those from the representative-agent version.

F A HANK Model

To illustrate how the notation presented in Section 2 extends to models with individual risk, I will now sketch a THANK model and suitable definition of assets. Taking the TANK model in Section 3.1 as the starting point, I assume the following:

- i. type-specific labor productivity e_i , $i \in \{S, B\}$ differs across types $e_S > e_B$,³²
- ii. households can switch type over time: ϕ_S denotes the probability that a saver in period t remains a saver in period $t + 1$, and ϕ_B the corresponding probability for a borrower.
- iii. Labor supply is inelastic and normalized to one. The effective labor supply (adjusted by productivity) differs by type, as a result of the different productivity levels.
- iv. Profits are distributed uniformly.
- v. \bar{D} is small enough so that upon switching to the B type a saver consumes all her wealth in the first period.

Assumptions i. and ii. introduce uninsurable individual risk.

Assumption iii. could easily be replaced by a labor market with search frictions at the cost of some extra algebra. Assumption iv. has the only goal of limiting the sources of heterogeneity, while v. is the moderate liquidity assumption proposed by (Cui and Sterk, 2021). It makes for a well defined wealth distribution. In particular, it allows me to characterize the wealth distribution by a finite number of agent types, which will pin down the dimension of \mathcal{E} .

³²The type labels refer to the fact that more productive workers will be building up the saving buffer, while less productive workers will want to borrow.

Savers' problem. Savers anticipate that their income may be falling in the future. As a result they will want to save. It should be noted that, in this economy, “savers” refers to the type, rather than to each of them necessarily holding positive financial wealth. A new saver, who was a borrower in the previous period, will actually start off with negative deposits, $-\bar{D}$. What remains always true, though, is that saver-type agents will be building up their saving buffer.

The fact that all new savers are characterized by the same state variables will imply that they will make the same decisions. In turn, this will imply that all who have been savers for the same number of consecutive periods will be identical. As a result, one can model cohorts of savers, indexed by the number of consecutive periods they have been savers for – Cui and Sterk (2021) and Masolo (2022) for more details. After a sufficiently long spell as a saver, an agent saving buffer will plateau. It is thus possible to truncate the number of cohorts at some value large but finite value K .

The problem of a saver of a generic cohort k can be written out as:

$$V_{S,k,t} = \max_{C_{S,k,t}, D_{S,k,t}} \frac{C_{S,k,t}^{1-\gamma}}{1-\gamma} + \beta \mathbb{E}_t \left\{ \phi_S V_{S,k+1,t+1} + (1-\phi_S) V_{BN,k+1,t+1} \right\}, \quad k = 0, \dots, K \quad (\text{F.1})$$

$$s.t. \quad C_{S,k,t} + D_{S,k,t} = R_{D,t-1} D_{S,k-1,t-1} + Z_t + w_t e_S - T_{H,k,t}, \quad (\text{F.2})$$

$$D_{S,k,t} \geq -\bar{D}. \quad (\text{F.3})$$

$V_{BN,k+1,t+1}$ is the value function of a new borrower who was a saver of cohort k in the previous period.

The borrowing constraint will not be binding, as the saver will want to build up her level of wealth. Given the envelope conditions, the Euler equation reads:

$$C_{S,k,t}^{-\gamma} = \beta \mathbb{E}_t R_{D,t} \left\{ \phi_S C_{S,k+1,t+1}^{-\gamma} + (1-\phi_S) C_{BN,k+1,t+1}^{-\gamma} \right\}, \quad k = 0, \dots, K-1 \quad (\text{F.4})$$

$$C_{S,K,t}^{-\gamma} = \beta \mathbb{E}_t R_{D,t} \left\{ \phi_S C_{S,K,t+1}^{-\gamma} + (1-\phi_S) C_{BN,K,t+1}^{-\gamma} \right\}, \quad k = K. \quad (\text{F.5})$$

The Euler equation for cohort K is derived by noting that cohort K and a hypothetical cohort $K+1$ are identical by definition. Contrary to a TANK model, here the savings level $D_{S,k,t}$ will be varying over time.

To cast this problem in the setup laid out in Section 2, it is thus convenient to assume that each cohort of savers has a portfolio manager overlooking their financial decisions and rebating the cash flow to them.³³ I will denote with $j = (S, k)$ the asset corresponding to the payout to as

³³The problem of a competitive portfolio manager of a cohort- k saver can be written out as:

$$\begin{aligned} V_{pf,(S,k),t} &= \max_{D_{S,k,t}} \lambda_{S,k,t} \left[R_{D,t-1} D_{S,k-1,t-1} - D_{S,k,t} - \Delta_{(S,k),t} \right] \\ &+ \beta \mathbb{E}_t \left[\phi_S V_{pf,(S,k+1),t+1} + (1-\phi_S) V_{pf,(BN,k+1),t+1} \right] \end{aligned} \quad (\text{F.6})$$

saver of cohort k :

$$\Delta_{(S,k),t} = R_{D,t-1}D_{S,k-1,t-1} - D_{S,k,t}, \quad k = 0, \dots, K-1, \quad (\text{F.9})$$

$$\Delta_{(S,K),t} = (R_{D,t-1} - 1)D_{S,K,t-1}, \quad k = K. \quad (\text{F.10})$$

Each saver of cohort k will hold one unit of this asset and zero of all the others:

$$\omega_{(S,k),j} = \begin{cases} 1 & j = (S, k) \\ 0 & j \neq (S, k) \end{cases} \quad (\text{F.11})$$

Each period, the asset holdings of a particular agents will vary with her tenure as a saver or with her status becoming that of a borrower.

Since the labor supply is inelastic, it is convenient to also think of labor as an asset, with payoff $\Delta_{N,t} = w_t$, and holdings $\omega_{i,N} = e_S, \forall i \in (S, 0) \dots (S, K)$. Finally, I have $\Delta_{H,t} = Z_t$ and $\omega_{i,H} = 1, \forall i \in (S, 0) \dots (S, K)$. I can thus write out the consumption of cohort- k saver as:

$$C_{S,k,t} = \Delta_{(S,k),t} + \Delta_{H,t} + \Delta_{N,t}\omega_{(S,k),N} - T_{S,k,t}, \quad (\text{F.12})$$

which fits into my general setup.

Borrowers' problem. I need to distinguish new borrowers, which begin the period with a positive level of savings, from those that have been borrowers for more than a period, whom, by assumption, will start the period with wealth equal to $-\bar{D}$.

where the pf subscript denotes the value function of a portfolio manager, and $\lambda_{S,k,t}$ is the marginal utility of consumption for the agent the manager works for. In each period the portfolio manager receives the payout of the investment made in the previous period, makes a new investment $D_{S,k,t}$ and rebates $\Delta_{(S,k),t}$ back to the household (or receives that amount if negative). The first-order condition is:

$$-\lambda_{S,k,t} + \beta \mathbb{E}_t \left[\phi_S \frac{\partial V_{pf,(S,k+1),t+1}}{\partial D_{S,k,t}} + (1 - \phi_S) \frac{\partial V_{pf,(BN,k+1),t+1}}{\partial D_{S,k,t}} \right] = 0. \quad (\text{F.7})$$

Using the envelope conditions:

$$-\lambda_{S,k,t} + \beta \mathbb{E}_t \left[\phi_S \lambda_{S,k+1,t+1} + (1 - \phi_S) \lambda_{BN,k+1,t+1} \right] R_{D,t} = 0. \quad (\text{F.8})$$

Plugging in the values of the marginal utilities of consumption delivers equation (F.4). The zero-profit condition, then implies equation (F.9).

The consumption of new borrowers of cohort k , $i = (BN, k)$, is:

$$C_{BN,k,t} = \Delta_{(BN,k),t} + \Delta_{H,t} + \Delta_{N,t}\omega_{i,N} - T_{BN,k,t}, \quad (\text{F.13})$$

$$\Delta_{(BN,k),t} = R_{D,t-1}D_{S,k-1,t-1} + \bar{D}, \quad (\text{F.14})$$

$$\omega_{i,N} = e_L \quad \forall i \in (BN, 1) \dots (BN, K), \quad (\text{F.15})$$

where the payoff $\Delta_{BN,k,t}$ reflects the fact that new borrowers use up all their accumulated savings and borrow all the way to the limit. For this to be the case, the following condition must be met:

$$C_{BN,K,t}^{-\gamma} > \beta \mathbb{E}_t \left\{ (1 - \phi_L) C_{S,0,t+1}^{-\gamma} + \phi_L C_{BO,t+1}^{-\gamma} \right\}, \quad (\text{F.16})$$

which is to say that the Euler equation of the wealthiest new borrower (of cohort K) will be slack. $C_{BO,t+1}$ is the consumption of a borrower for more than one period, defined below. If the inequality holds for $k = K$ it will also hold for all the other cohorts, as their wealth is lower and thus their marginal utility of consumption higher.

The consumption of agents having been borrowers for two periods or longer (old borrowers denotes with the BO subscript) is:

$$C_{BO,t} = \Delta_{(BO),t} + \Delta_{H,t} + \Delta_{N,t}\omega_{BO,N} - T_{BO,t}, \quad (\text{F.17})$$

$$\Delta_{(BO),t} = -(R_{D,t-1} - 1) \bar{D}, \quad (\text{F.18})$$

$$\omega_{BO,N} = e_L. \quad (\text{F.19})$$

Shares. The share of savers is a function of ϕ_S and ϕ_L :

$$\mathfrak{s} = \frac{1 - \phi_L}{1 - \phi_S + 1 - \phi_L}. \quad (\text{F.20})$$

Within the group of saver types, I will denote with \varkappa_k the share of each cohort k :

$$\varkappa_0 = \frac{(1 - \phi_L)(1 - \mathfrak{s})}{\mathfrak{s}}, \quad (\text{F.21})$$

$$\varkappa_k = \phi_S \varkappa_{k-1} \quad \forall 1 \leq k \leq K - 1, \quad (\text{F.22})$$

$$\varkappa_K = 1 - \sum_{k=0}^{K-1} \varkappa_k. \quad (\text{F.23})$$

The share of new borrowers, as a fraction of total borrowers is:

$$\varkappa_{BN} = \frac{(1 - \phi_S) \mathfrak{s}}{1 - \mathfrak{s}}. \quad (\text{F.24})$$

Asset Structure. In this economy there exist $I = 2(K + 1)$ types, $K+1$ cohorts of savers, K cohorts of new borrowers, and one of old borrowers. The shares s_i can be easily computed given \mathfrak{s} and \varkappa_k 's. There are $J = 2(K + 1) + 2 > I$ assets: $K + 1$ for savers, K for new borrowers, one for old borrowers, the labor-market asset, and stocks.

Production. I keep the same exact production structure as in Section 3.1, defining aggregate hours in effective terms as:

$$N_t = \mathfrak{s}e_S + (1 - \mathfrak{s})e_L, \quad (\text{F.25})$$

which is clearly constant.

I maintain that $w_t = A_t$, the real wage equals the marginal product of labor as above.

Market Clearing. I define aggregate consumption by summing up the consumption levels of all the different types in the economy:

$$C_t = \underbrace{\mathfrak{s} \left[\sum_{k=0}^K \varkappa_k C_{S,k,t} \right]}_{C_{S,t}} + (1 - \mathfrak{s}) \underbrace{\left[\varkappa_{BN} \sum_{k=0}^K \varkappa_k C_{BN,k,t} + (1 - \varkappa_{BN}) C_{BO,t} \right]}_{C_{B,t}}. \quad (\text{F.26})$$

Given aggregate consumption, market clearing is as in equation (??).

On the deposit markets the following has to hold:

$$\mathfrak{s} \sum_{k=0}^K \varkappa_k D_{S,k,t} = (1 - \mathfrak{s}) \bar{D}. \quad (\text{F.27})$$

This shows that the apparatus in Section 2 applies to models with individual risk too. Indeed one could use the same approach presented in Appendix A.1 to compute the transfers that make for an equitable steady state. It should be noted that equitability presents a conceptual challenge in a typical HANK model. It does away, by design, with individual risk in steady state. High-productivity workers would be just as well off as low-productivity workers. And so would agents of different cohorts.

If one wasn't comfortable with this feature, a family structure akin to that in Bilbiie (2019) could be adopted. Or else, one could simply study the economy around a steady state that is not equitable and deal with it as discussed in the literature, e.g. Benigno and Woodford (2005).

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