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Comparing migrant integration in Ireland and Northern Ireland

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COMPARING MIGRANT INTEGRATION IN IRELAND AND NORTHERN IRELAND

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This report has been accepted for publication by the Institute, which does not itself take institutional policy positions. All ESRI Research Series reports are peer reviewed prior to publication. The authors are solely responsible for the content and the views expressed.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The increase in inward migration has been an important change in Ireland and Northern Ireland in recent decades. Migration can bring opportunities but also challenges. Integration not only allows immigrants to contribute to the economic, social, cultural, and political life of their host country, but is also important for social cohesion and inclusive growth.

This report examines migrant integration in Ireland and Northern Ireland, using information from national and international surveys as well as a consultation event with migrants, their representative groups and other key stakeholders. Migrants are defined as those born outside their country of residence. The report compares the composition of the migrant population in Northern Ireland and Ireland. It considers migrant employment rates and the nature of jobs they hold, as well as migrant-origin young people's academic outcomes and wellbeing, compared to their native-origin peers. It also considers attitudes to migrants in both jurisdictions, and migrants' experience of the border in Ireland.

KEY FINDINGS

- Based on Labour Force Survey data, a higher percentage of working age adults were born abroad in Ireland as compared to Northern Ireland: 20 per cent of working age adults were born abroad in Ireland, compared to 9 per cent in Northern Ireland. In both Ireland and Northern Ireland, around two-thirds of those born abroad were born in other EU countries.
- A significant proportion of those born outside of the island are in fact citizens of their new places of residence, though the share in Ireland is greater, where 35 per cent of those born abroad are Irish citizens, compared to 17 per cent of migrants resident in Northern Ireland holding British citizenship.
- In both jurisdictions, most migrant groups are highly skilled and more likely to have third-level qualifications than the native-born population, though the skills profile of migrants is generally higher in Ireland than in Northern Ireland. East European migrants are a distinctive group in Northern Ireland, tending to have lower educational qualifications than native-born and other migrant groups, and more likely to be living in rural areas than other migrants, or indeed East European migrants living in Ireland.
- Migrants in both jurisdictions have high employment rates, particularly EU migrants; in Northern Ireland, migrants overall are more likely to be employed than non-migrants. A higher proportion of migrants in both jurisdictions work in professional/managerial jobs, particularly EU West and non-EU migrants, than non-migrants. East Europeans in both jurisdictions are much less likely to

be in professional managerial jobs and are more likely to work in lower-paid sectors.

- When looking at outcomes for children, in 2018, there was little difference in either academic achievement scores or wellbeing at age 15 between migrant-origin children and their Irish-origin peers in Ireland. On the other hand, in Northern Ireland, first generation migrant-origin children (those born abroad) have considerably lower achievement scores in English reading and maths, which is partly explained by their generally more disadvantaged socio-economic circumstances and the schools they attend. Second generation migrant-origin children in Northern Ireland (those born there or in the UK mainland to migrant parents) have similar achievement scores to young people of Northern Irish/UK origin but have lower wellbeing at age 15 than young people born in Northern Ireland/UK, as well as first generation migrant children (born outside the UK).
- How migrants have been received differs when comparing both jurisdictions on the island of Ireland. Using comparative international data from 2017/2018, the report finds that attitudes to immigrants are more favourable in Ireland than in Northern Ireland on a range of outcomes measured – attitudes to EU migrants, attitudes to non-EU migrants and the contribution of non-EU immigration to society.
- These differences in attitudes appear to be explained by important differences between jurisdictions in other key drivers of immigration attitudes. People in Ireland are more likely to have migrants in their social networks, they are more optimistic about the future, and are more likely to believe their voice is heard in politics than people in Northern Ireland. Taken together, these factors explain most of the differences in attitudes between jurisdictions.
- Brexit has brought the issue of cross-border travel between Ireland and Northern Ireland to the fore. A consultation event with a wide range of organisations working with migrants and other key stakeholders raised a range of challenges. Cross-border travel can be a fraught experience for some migrants. Cross-border work has become considerably more complex. Some migrants may be effectively excluded from participation in activities such as education-related events, sports events, holidays, religious events, and family gatherings that require cross-border travel.
- One significant challenge raised in the consultation event related to border checks, particularly in travel from Northern Ireland to Ireland. With spot immigration checks, the consultation group highlighted instances of discrimination, with some checks on the basis of skin colour, or sometimes clothes and language/accent; other migrants who look and sound the same as most people living in Ireland and Northern Ireland are not checked.

- The consultation group also raised a lack of clarity around rights and entitlements to travel, work and access services in the other jurisdiction, which has led to considerable feelings of fear and uncertainty among migrant groups. This, in turn, has a negative impact on migrants' economic, social, and cultural integration, in that they are or feel limited in participating in cross-border activities or travel across the border.

CHAPTER 1

Introduction

The Irish Government's Shared Island initiative seeks to maximise the opportunities of greater cross-border cooperation and connections on the island of Ireland in support of a shared future underpinned by the Good Friday Agreement. One important transformation occurring across both Ireland and Northern Ireland is the substantial increase in immigration, and attendant national and ethnic diversity, since the 1990s. In Northern Ireland, censuses show the proportion born outside the UK rose from 4.1 per cent in 2001 to 6.5 per cent in 2011, and 8.6 per cent in 2021. In Ireland, the proportion born outside the Republic of Ireland increased from 10.4 per cent in 2002 to 17 per cent in 2011, and to 17.3 per cent in 2016.¹ Both jurisdictions have therefore seen, and will continue to see, the transformation of the national and ethnic make-up of society.

Immigration provides significant economic, social, and cultural benefits to the island of Ireland, but can also bring challenges. Migrants can face challenges to inclusion and integration in the economic and social fabric of society, both North and South of the border. Brexit may have also brought additional challenges for migrants and ethnic minorities; especially its potential implications for their freedom to live and work across the border. In addition, immigration can increase anxiety among sections of society, which can lead to racism and discrimination. Ensuring that a shared island is able to meet the challenges of the future requires enabling migrants, and ethnic minorities more broadly, to fully participate in society.

To support this objective, this project builds our understanding of the experiences of migrants across the island of Ireland. Limited previous research has been conducted comparing the situation of migrants in both jurisdictions, with the important exception of Fanning and Michael (2019) who took a largely qualitative approach. This study first considers migration patterns, both immigration and emigration to Ireland and Northern Ireland and the policy context for migration and integration. Building on previous research on migrant integration, which has largely considered both jurisdictions separately, the project then provides a comparison of migrant adult and child outcomes across Ireland and Northern Ireland in key life domains. The indicators used focus on labour market participation and the nature of jobs, as well as migrant children's wellbeing and educational outcomes. The analysis will consider how migrant outcomes differ

¹ Of the Northern Ireland population in 2001, 2011 and 2021; Ireland data from Census of population 2002, 2011, 2016. In both 2011 and 2021, 2.1 per cent of Northern Ireland residents were born in the Republic of Ireland. In Ireland in 2016, a total of 6.4 per cent of residents were born in the UK, which includes 1.3 per cent born in Northern Ireland.

from native-born in each jurisdiction, and will also examine whether migrants from different countries experience different challenges across different contexts.

Secondly, the project explores the social environments into which migrants arrive. Previous research found that attitudes towards immigrants and immigration became more negative in the financial crisis in Ireland from 2008, recovering somewhat thereafter (McGinnity et al., 2018); attitudes to immigration in general have become more positive in Northern Ireland since 2014, in contrast to mainland UK (Michael, 2021). In both jurisdictions, there is also evidence of an ethnic hierarchy, with more negative attitudes to Muslim immigrants or ethnic minorities (Joseph, 2018; McGinnity et al., 2018; Michael, 2021). This part of the report explores similarities and differences in anxiety and openness towards immigration across jurisdictions and the processes driving them.

Lastly, the report explores the implications of post-Brexit immigration changes in Northern Ireland on the lives of migrants and their families. While the effects of Brexit on mobility across the border for migrants are still evolving, there have been a range of impacts on the rights and ease of cross-border access to health, education, work and recreation. This analysis is based on a consultation event held with migrants and their representatives, as well as other key stakeholders in Ireland and Northern Ireland, on migrants' experiences of the border in Ireland. Many of the legal requirements for cross-border travel remain similar to those prior to Brexit, but for some groups rights and conditions have changed. We examine the ways in which migrants are affected in day-to-day life by cross-border travel restrictions and checks: from their ability to meet family and friends across the border, to their ability to participate in all-island sports competitions, access education, training, conferences, and professional opportunities across the border, as well as to access healthcare services delivered on an all-island basis.

Before considering migration flows and composition, Box 1 presents how migrants are usually defined in research on the topic, as well as definitions of citizenship or nationality, and ethnicity. Bearing these definitions in mind, we then discuss how migrants are defined in this report.

BOX 1 COUNTRY OF BIRTH, NATIONALITY AND ETHNICITY

Country of birth – refers to where someone was born, and country of birth is the most common definition of immigrants or migrants, with those born in their country of residence considered ‘non-migrants’, and those born abroad considered ‘migrants’.

Citizenship or nationality – refers to whether or not any individual is a citizen of a state, which can affect their rights to reside, work and access state benefits and services. In this report, we consider nationality and citizenship to mean the same thing. While there is overlap between nationality/citizenship and country of birth, they are not the same: not all those born abroad are foreign nationals, and not all those born in the jurisdiction are citizens of that jurisdiction. The people of Northern Ireland are entitled to both British and Irish citizenship where at least one parent is a citizen of Ireland or has a right to be. In Ireland, Irish citizenship can be obtained by birth on the island of Ireland (North or South if at least one parent is a citizen or, if in Ireland, if the parent has sufficient residency) or descent (born abroad to an Irish-citizen parent). Citizenship can also be acquired through naturalisation by residency in Ireland on a qualifying immigration status, or by residency in Ireland or Northern Ireland as the spouse of an Irish citizen. British citizenship in Northern Ireland can be acquired by birth (in Northern Ireland or elsewhere in the UK with at least one parent who is a citizen or a holder of settled status), descent (born abroad to a British-citizen parent), or through naturalisation. The UK also has language and civic knowledge requirements for naturalisation, which Ireland does not have (Groarke et al., 2020). See also Section 1.3.

Ethnicity refers to an individual’s self-defined ethnic or cultural background. As such, ethnicity differs from citizenship (a legal status and related to a country of birth) and migration status. In both Ireland and Northern Ireland, ethnicity categories are similar, though with some variations: White Irish, White Irish Traveller, any other White background, Black/Black Irish, Asian/Asian Irish, and other or mixed ethnicity (Census 2016); in Northern Ireland (Census 2021) White, Irish Traveller, Roma, Indian, Chinese, Filipino, Pakistan, Arab, Other Asian, Black African, Black Other, Mixed, Other ethnicities.

Migrant-origin children – refers to children of migrant origin. These can be children born abroad (first generation) or born to migrant parents in the host country (second generation).

Cross-border workers – those who live in one jurisdiction and work in the other, not necessarily migrants. See also: www.borderpeople.info/crossing-the-border-to-work.


Residence rights - Under the Common Travel Area (CTA), Irish and British citizens move freely and reside in either jurisdiction and enjoy associated rights and entitlements including access to employment, healthcare, education, social benefits, and the right to vote in certain elections. Within the European Union, EU citizens enjoy freedom of movement and residence across all EU Member States. In the UK, EU migrants can either apply for (pre-) settled status or for permission to reside. Nationals from outside the EU and the UK have to apply for residency permission in either Ireland or the UK, depending on where they reside. For further details on statuses such as EU settled status see: www.gov.uk/settled-status-eu-citizens-families.

In this report, we follow conventional definitions of migrants. This means that migrants in Ireland are defined as those born outside the Republic of Ireland. Migrants in Northern Ireland are those born outside the UK.² It is important to note that how migrants are defined in law, research or policy, may not be the same as how they are perceived by others. Irish citizens may not be identified as such by some sections of society because they are non-White or are a non-native English speaker. Perceptions of who counts as an immigrant or migrant in the general population may be different from a definition that counts those born abroad. This is particularly important for Chapter 4 in this report, which considers attitudes of the general population to immigration, as well as Chapter 5, which focuses on challenges migrants face in cross-border travel, and we return to this point in these chapters.

1.2 MIGRATION PATTERNS AND DIVERSITY

Prior to Brexit, EU citizens could live and work in Ireland and Northern Ireland without restrictions. Migrants from outside the EU have always been subject to migration controls, requiring a residence permission with specific conditions linked to that permission and, for some nationalities, a visa is required in order to present at the border for entry.

FIGURE 1.1A IMMIGRATION, EMIGRATION AND NET MIGRATION TO IRELAND 2001-2021



Source: Central Statistics Office. 'Population and Migration Estimates, April 2021', www.cso.ie.


Notes: The migration data are estimated using the Labour Force Survey (formerly the QNHS) and census data. Estimates are compiled against the backdrop of movements in other migration indicators such as PPS numbers and work permits issued. The number, age and sex, and nationality of people who joined, re-joined, deregistered, or transferred from the labour force survey and PPS registrations is determined. Year to end of April in reference year. Estimates include returning Irish nationals.

² Out of necessity, this means those born in the Republic of Ireland count as migrants in Northern Ireland and that those born in Northern Ireland count as migrants in Ireland.

In both jurisdictions, a considerable proportion of migrants have come from within the EU, particularly after the accession of ten East European countries in 2004. Non-EU migrants mainly came to work, typically in high-skilled occupations, to study, to join family or as a protection applicant or refugee.

Figures 1.1a and 1.1b present immigration, emigration and net migration to Ireland and Northern Ireland since 2001. There are no population registers in either Ireland or the UK, so migration figures come from different sources (see notes under Figures 1.1a and 1.1b). Even adjusting for population size – Ireland 5.01 million (April 2021) and Northern Ireland 1.9 million (March 2021)³ – migration flows to Ireland have been greater.

FIGURE 1.1B IMMIGRATION, EMIGRATION AND NET MIGRATION TO NORTHERN IRELAND FROM OUTSIDE THE UK, 2001-2020⁴



Source: NIRSA mid-year population estimates.

Notes: Migration flows are estimated from the Medical Card Register. The number, age and sex of people who joined, re-joined, deregistered, or transferred medical centres within a one-year period is determined. De-registrations are scaled up by an additional 67 per cent. This scaling factor was determined through analysis of historic population change using results from censuses of population year to end June in reference year. Figures for 2021 not yet available.

³ Central Statistics Office. 'Population and Migration Estimates, April 2021', www.cso.ie; Northern Ireland Statistics and Research Agency (NISRA). 'Census 2021 Population and household estimates for Northern Ireland: Statistical bulletin', www.nisra.gov.uk/system/files/statistics/census-2021-population-and-household-estimates-for-northern-ireland-statistical-bulletin-24-may-2022.pdf.

⁴ Due to the 2021 Census, mid-year estimates were not published by NISRA for 2021. The 2020 long-term international migration (LTIM) publication provides the most recent data available. Correspondence with NISRA, September 2022.


Labour migrants were drawn to a booming economy in Ireland throughout the 1990s (McGinnity et al., 2020). In 2004, the enlargement of the EU led to particularly high net inward migration. Ireland, the UK and Sweden were the only three EU Member States to open their labour markets, without restrictions, to workers from new Member States. Inward migration peaked in 2007 (see Figure 1.1a), with substantial immigration from Eastern Europe (see McGinnity et al., 2020). However, following the severe economic recession, unemployment rose rapidly (to 16 per cent in 2011) and there was a dramatic fall in immigration and a rise in emigration in Ireland, leading to negative net migration between 2010 and 2014. Nonetheless, from 2015 onwards immigration rose again, with net positive migration to 2019. This changed again during the COVID-19 pandemic.

In Northern Ireland, we see a similar peak in immigration in 2007. The labour market in Northern Ireland, as in the UK and Ireland, was also open to East European nationals following accession in 2004. After the financial crash in 2008, the fall in immigration in Northern Ireland was not as dramatic as that seen in Ireland.⁵ Nonetheless, rising emigration meant a net migration around zero in the period 2010-2013. Although there was a return to a net positive migration from 2014 to 2019, it returned to a net negative in 2020 during the COVID-19 pandemic.

Figure 1.2 presents immigration to Ireland and Northern Ireland by nationality between 2010 and 2020/2021. The regions of origin of migrants to Ireland and Northern Ireland are broadly similar, but EU East migrants make up a greater proportion of immigrant flows to Northern Ireland as compared to Ireland, and non-EU migrants make up a greater proportion of immigrants to Ireland, particularly since 2010. Figure 2 presents the region of origin of those who came: Chapter 2 considers the region of origin of migrants living in the jurisdictions.

⁵ Office for National Statistics. 'LFS: ILO unemployment rate: Northern Ireland'. Available at: www.ons.gov.uk/employmentandlabourmarket/peoplenotinwork/unemployment/timeseries/zsfb/lms.

FIGURE 1.2 IMMIGRATION TO IRELAND AND NORTHERN IRELAND BY NATIONALITY (PROPORTIONS) 2010-2021



Source: CSO Migration Estimates for Ireland. NISRA International Inflows to Northern Ireland by Country of Last Residence for Northern Ireland. EU East refers to EU Member States that joined the EU in 2004 (Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia), 2007 (Bulgaria and Romania) and 2013 (Croatia). EU West refers to 'Old' EU Member States, excluding Ireland and the UK: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and Sweden.

Notes: In Ireland, migration data are estimated using the Quarterly National Household Survey/Labour Force Survey and Census data. Estimates are compiled against the backdrop of movements in other migration indicators such as PPS numbers and work permits issued. The number, age, sex and nationality of people who joined, re-joined, deregistered, or transferred from the Labour Force Survey and PPSN registrations is determined. Estimates represent the April-March calendar year.

In Northern Ireland, migration flows are estimated from the Medical Card Register. The number, age and sex of people who joined or re-joined medical centres in Northern Ireland within a one-year period is determined. Estimates represent the January-December calendar year. All countries that have a count of 30 or more in the most recent year are included, non-specified countries of last residence are excluded from the above chart.

The reasons why people migrate vary. Among the most common reasons in both Ireland and Northern Ireland are work, education and family.⁶

Asylum applicants make up an important part of international migration flows in Ireland and Northern Ireland, with both seeing increases in applicants in recent years. In 2020, asylum applicants comprised 10.8 per cent of the international

⁶ For figures on Northern Ireland see: NISRA (2020). 'Long-Term International Migration Statistics for Northern Ireland'. www.nisra.gov.uk. For figures for Ireland for Non-EU nationals see: Eurostat. 'First permits by reason, length of validity and citizenship' [MIGR_RESFIRST__custom_3824407]. Date accessed: 10 November 2022.

migration into Northern Ireland.⁷ In Ireland, in the year to April 2020, approximately 7.2 per cent of total migration constituted asylum applicants.⁸ When looking at more recent figures, as of 30 September 2022, there were 1,710 asylum applicants (and persons whose appeals avenues were exhausted) receiving supports in Northern Ireland, marking an increase as compared to previous years.⁹ This is in line with an increase seen in both the UK and Ireland (Cunniffe et al., 2022). In Ireland, as of 12 October 2022, there were 15,983 people resident in International Protection Accommodation Services (IPAS) centres.¹⁰

Persons fleeing Ukraine following the Russian invasion in February 2022 constitute a significant part of international migration to Ireland in 2022. Ireland and the UK have implemented different legal arrangements for those arriving from Ukraine.¹¹ In Ireland, as of 11 December 2022, 67,448 Temporary Protection beneficiaries had arrived.¹² In Northern Ireland, while there is a significant undercount in the data due to Ukrainians arriving via Ireland, approximately 747 persons have arrived in Northern Ireland via the Ukrainian Sponsorship Scheme as of 13 December 2022, although there may be other Ukrainian nationals in Northern Ireland who have arrived under different schemes or who are not counted in these data.¹³

Migration patterns to Ireland and Northern Ireland and the various reasons for which people migrate have contributed to an increase in ethnic diversity. In Ireland, the 2016 Census showed 92.4 per cent of the population as White. This includes 82 per cent White Irish, 0.7 per cent Irish Traveller and 9.5 per cent 'Other White'. The remaining 7.6 per cent were Black (1.4 per cent); Asian (2.1 per cent); Other/Mixed ethnicity 1.5 per cent or not stated (2.6 per cent).¹⁴ In 2021, in

⁷ NISRA (2020). 'Long-Term International Migration Statistics for Northern Ireland'. www.nisra.gov.uk.

⁸ Based on CSO population estimates in year to April 2020 (85,400), of whom 28,900 were estimated to be Irish. In the year to April 2020, there were 4,050 applications for international protection in Ireland. Eurostat. Asylum applicants by type of applicant, citizenship, age and sex - monthly data [MIGR_ASYAPPCTZM__custom_3828452]. Date accessed: 10 November 2022.

⁹ This includes section 4 and section 95 supports. UK Home Office (24 November 2022). Immigration Statistics. Asylum and Protection - Asylum seekers in receipt of support by Local Authority. 'Asy_D11'.

¹⁰ Houses of the Oireachtas (18 October 2022). Response to Parliamentary Question [51897/22]. Some asylum applicants may live outside of IPAS accommodation centres or not have access to Public Funds in Northern Ireland and are not counted in these figures.

¹¹ Ireland participates in the EU's Temporary Protection Directive, whereas in the UK, there are two main visa routes, the Ukraine Family Scheme and the Ukraine Sponsorship Scheme, as well as the Ukraine Extension Scheme.

¹² Central Statistics Office (19 December 2022). Arrivals from Ukraine in Ireland Series 7. www.cso.ie.

¹³ These figures are for the Ukraine Sponsorship Scheme only. There are three schemes in the UK: Ukraine Family Scheme (for Ukrainian family members who are UK-based to apply for their family members outside the UK), the Ukraine Sponsorship Scheme (this allows Ukrainian nationals and their family members to come to the UK when sponsored by a private individual willing to provide accommodation for a minimum of six months, or the Scottish or Welsh government), and the Ukraine Extension Scheme visa (which allows Ukrainians already on visas in the UK to extend them). UK Home Office (13 December 2022). 'Ukraine Family Scheme, Ukraine Sponsorship Scheme (Homes for Ukraine) and Ukraine Extension Scheme visa data'. www.gov.uk. For the figures for Northern Ireland, the ONS states '1. There is a known undercount in the Northern Ireland 'Arrivals into the UK' data. This is due to people arriving into the Republic of Ireland and entering Northern Ireland via the Common Travel Area, where travel is not covered by the methods used to record entry to other parts of the UK. Ways to understand the scale of this undercount are being explored.'

¹⁴ Central Statistics Office. 'Census of Population 2016'. www.cso.ie.

Northern Ireland, 96.6 per cent of the usually resident population classified themselves as White, while 3.4 per cent of the population were from ethnic minorities. This includes 0.6 per cent of the population Black, 1.7 Asian overall (Indian, Chinese, Filipino, Arab, Pakistani, Other Asian), as well as other ethnicities, mixed ethnicities and Traveller.¹⁵ The situation in Northern Ireland regarding ethnic diversity is very different from the UK as a whole: for example, in 2021, 86 per cent of the population in England and Wales was White, with 14 per cent from a Black, Asian or Other background.¹⁶

1.3 OVERVIEW OF THE CONTEXT FOR MIGRATION AND INTEGRATION OF MIGRANTS AND ETHNIC MINORITIES

Following a period of substantial budget cuts and hiatus in policy activity (see McGinnity et al., 2014),¹⁷ migrant integration policy in Ireland was given significant impetus with the development of the Migrant Integration Strategy 2017-2020, (extended to 2021) (Department of Justice and Equality, 2017). The policy approach draws on the EU's Common Basic Principles of Immigrant Integration in the EU, and in keeping with the latest EU strategy, in Ireland the focus is on integration of both EU and non-EU migrants into a mainstreamed system of provision.¹⁸ Mainstreaming means there is not a separate 'Ministry for Integration', but migrants' needs are addressed in the departments of education, health, and social welfare, among others. Mainstreaming can be an effective long-term policy approach to the integration of migrants, though there is a risk that the needs of migrants are not met in mainstream services, particularly without integration monitoring (Collett and Petrovic, 2014). In addition, migrant-specific services such as (host-country) language training and settlement supports may not be prioritised (Gilmartin and Dagg, 2021).

In the UK, the Home Office is responsible for refugee integration and for settlement and citizenship policy, while the Minister of Housing, Communities and Local Government leads on community cohesion in England. As Broadhead (2020) notes, refugees are the only group in the UK for whom central government has consistently taken responsibility: unlike other EU states, including Ireland, other migrants are not a priority for information, advice or services, and there is no consensus on what the goals of such a policy might be. Family migrants, labour migrants and students are rarely a target of policy. As Broadhead, notes 'this may reflect an assumption that families, employers and education providers respectively fill the void' (Broadhead, 2020: 2). Consistent with the UK approach,

¹⁵ <https://www.nisra.gov.uk/publications/census-2021-main-statistics-ethnicity-tables>.

¹⁶ <https://www.ethnicity-facts-figures.service.gov.uk/uk-population-by-ethnicity/national-and-regional-populations/population-of-england-and-wales/latest#main-facts-and-figures>.

¹⁷ For example the Minister for Integration post ceased to exist in 2011. And the Ministerial Council on Integration stopped meeting (McGinnity et al., 2014, Section 1.4.2).

¹⁸ https://ec.europa.eu/migrant-integration/news/ec-reveals-its-new-eu-action-plan-integration-and-inclusion-2021-2027_en.

in Northern Ireland, migrant integration has not been a policy focus. Northern Ireland is developing a separate refugee integration strategy, in recognition of the fact that this group may face particular challenges. However, as noted above, most migrants are labour migrants, predominantly from Eastern Europe, or students.¹⁹ Given differences in policy approaches to migrant integration between Ireland and UK, including Northern Ireland, it is not surprising that the migrant integration policy index (MIPEX), which considers eight policy areas, Ireland ranks higher than the UK. In 2019, the rank for Ireland was ‘comprehensive policies, top 10’ across 56 countries globally, which was higher than that of the UK, which was ranked ‘temporary integration, halfway favourable’.²⁰

Influenced by UK policies and norms, in Northern Ireland there has been a more consistent focus on ethnicity and racial discrimination, though policy development has been at a much slower pace than in other parts of the UK, partly due to its legislative autonomy and the priority given to managing legacies of sectarianism (Fanning and Michael, 2018). The Racial Equality Strategy 2015-2025 in Northern Ireland suggested a commitment to racial equality and addressing a range of actions, including ethnic monitoring and racial equality champions in all departments, though progress is not yet clear (Office of the First Minister and Deputy First Minister, 2015).

Policy towards racism and discrimination in Ireland, however, took a slightly different turn. While the legislation outlawing discrimination on the basis of nationality/race was in place, much of the infrastructure for monitoring, reporting and responding to racism and discrimination in Ireland was dismantled during the recession²¹ (Fanning and Michael, 2018), and there was little focus on racism in the Migrant Integration Strategy. Nonetheless, following a recent consultation, a National Action Plan Against Racism is currently being developed (Department of Children, Equality, Disability, Integration and Youth, 2021). As Fahey et al. (2019) note, there is currently no routine ethnic data collection in administrative data in Ireland, for example in Irish public services, though this may be introduced as part of the forthcoming National Action Plan Against Racism.²²

¹⁹ For details of the Refugee Integration Strategy in Northern Ireland, see <https://www.executiveoffice-ni.gov.uk/consultations/draft-refugee-integration-strategy>. In Ireland a ‘A White Paper to End Direct Provision and to Establish a New International Protection Support Service’. (<https://www.gov.ie/en/publication/7aad0-minister-gorman-publishes-the-white-paper-on-ending-direct-provision/>) has recently introduced a series of reforms, but not a separate refugee integration strategy.

²⁰ See <https://www.mipex.eu/key-findings> for further details. The eight policy areas are: labour market mobility, family reunion, education, health, political participation, permanent residence access to nationality, anti-discrimination.

²¹ The National Consultative Committee on Racism and Interculturalism was abolished in 2008 and the first National Action Plan Against Racism (2005-2008) was not renewed.

²² See also <https://www.cso.ie/en/methods/methodologicalresearch/rp-eda/equalitydataaudit2020/>.

The process of acquiring citizenship differs in both jurisdictions, though naturalisation influences the link between place of birth and citizenship. In Ireland, following a rapid increase in naturalisation, an estimated 35 per cent of adult migrants born in non-EEA countries were Irish citizens in 2019 (McGinnity et al., 2020). In order to acquire citizenship through naturalisation, a non-Irish national must be resident for five years, or three years if they are a recognised refugee or married to an Irish national.²³ There are no language or civic integration tests for citizenship in Ireland (Groarke et al., 2020).²⁴ In order to obtain UK citizenship, a non-national must have been resident in the UK for five years, or three years if married to a UK citizen and resident in the UK. For children born in the UK, eligibility for UK citizenship depends on the citizenship and immigration status of their parents.²⁵ In addition to length of time in the UK and/or legal status, there are also language requirements and ‘civic integration tests’. In the UK as a whole, approximately 39 per cent of people born abroad self-reported that they were UK citizens in 2019. This share was notably higher among non-EU born citizens (54 per cent) than EU born citizens (Fernández-Reino and Sumption, 2022). Approximately 17 per cent of persons born outside of Northern Ireland have acquired citizenship. Chapter 2 considers the citizenship of migrants in Northern Ireland compared to Ireland in the same time period.

1.3.1 Brexit and the Protocol on Ireland/Northern Ireland

A central part of the context for migration and integration in Northern Ireland is the Brexit referendum and the subsequent agreements, some of which remain under discussion. On 23 June 2016, a majority of the UK population voted to leave the European Union. Nonetheless, along with Scotland and Greater London, the population of Northern Ireland did not vote in favour of leaving the EU. Three years later, in October 2019, the UK and the EU agreed to the Withdrawal Agreement and the UK officially left the EU on 31 January 2020. The Withdrawal Agreement includes the Protocol on Ireland/Northern Ireland, which affirms the Good Friday Agreement and ensures that a hard border is avoided on the island of Ireland. It allows Northern Ireland to remain within the UK Customs territory and be aligned to a limited number of the EU Single Market rules. Article 3 of the Protocol recognises the Common Travel Area (CTA), and the ability of Ireland and the UK to make arrangements bilaterally as regards the movement of persons, so long as the rights of EU citizens are respected.²⁶

²³ Insofar as the person holds a residence permission that is valid for reckonable residence (e.g. the time students spend in Ireland on Stamp 1 permissions is not considered reckonable residence for the purposes of citizenship).

²⁴ Residence in Northern Ireland is not considered ‘reckonable’ for the purposes of applying for naturalisation, however, children of non-nationals who are resident for three years, including in Northern Ireland, are eligible for Irish citizenship (Groarke et al., 2020).

²⁵ For further details see: UK Government. ‘Apply for citizenship if you were born in the UK’, www.gov.uk.

²⁶ Protocol on Ireland/Northern Ireland, Agreement on the withdrawal of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland from the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community, OJ L 29, 31.1.2020, pp.7-187.

Brexit has had a considerable impact not only on the ability of EU nationals who are not Irish citizens to come to the UK, including Northern Ireland, but also on the rights of non-Irish EU citizens living in Northern Ireland.²⁷ The CTA, which is jointly maintained by the UK and Ireland, guarantees reciprocal rights for UK or Irish nationals to live and work in the other jurisdiction on the same basis as native-born citizens. While the Withdrawal Agreement recognises the Common Travel Area,²⁸ the reciprocal rights do not extend to those legally resident on the island but without UK or Irish citizenship. As such, Brexit also impacts the rights and ease of cross-border access to health, education, work and leisure for these migrants living on the island.²⁹ The impact of Brexit on non-Irish EU and non-EU citizens in Northern Ireland and cross-border travel is explored in greater detail in Chapter 5.

1.4 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES AND METHODS

This study has three main objectives:

1. To compare the profile of migrants and patterns of integration of adults and children from a migrant background in Ireland and Northern Ireland across a range of domains, including employment and the nature of the jobs they work in, migrant children's experiences in education, alongside their levels of wellbeing.
2. To compare the environments of openness/anxiety towards immigration in Ireland and Northern Ireland, into which migrants are arriving and integrating, by analysing patterns in the attitudes towards immigrants, immigration and integration among the majority, native-born members of the societies.
3. To explore what implications post-Brexit border changes at the UK level may have on cross-border travel, for business or pleasure, and the right to work/reside and access services for those without protected rights under the Common Travel Area (non-Irish and non-British citizens).

The project primarily takes a quantitative approach, using quantitative analysis of representative survey data to derive comparative, generalisable findings about migrants' situation. This is supplemented with qualitative approaches to yield detailed insights into rapidly evolving issues.

To explore objectives 1 and 2, this study analyses the highest quality, representative and recently available survey data on migrant outcomes. Performing a robust, comparative analysis between the two contexts requires harmonised data, containing identical survey questions and measures. Such data

²⁷ From January 2021 reforms to immigration policy means there is a single UK immigration system for both (non-Irish) EU citizens and non-EU citizens alike. In Ireland there has been no change to immigration policy in this regard.

²⁸ This is set out in a 2019 UK-Ireland Memorandum of Understanding. Available at:

www.dfa.ie/media/dfa/eu/brexit/brexitandyou/Memorandum-of-Understanding-Ire-version.pdf.

²⁹ The Nationality and Borders Bill was introduced on 28 April 2022, www.bills.parliament.uk/bills/3023.

allow us to be more certain that any differences between the two contexts are not simply a result of data/measurement differences, as well as test whether any differences between jurisdictions are indeed statistically significant. Where the comparable data are older or none are available, supplementary literature/sources are cited, with caveats on comparability.

TABLE 1.1 SECONDARY DATA USED IN THE REPORT

Theme	Name of dataset, sample and year	Indicators/Measures
Adult profile and labour market	European Labour Force Survey (EU-LFS)	Profile of migrants (Region of origin, education, gender, age, urban/rural, citizenship, duration of residence)
	EU LFS 2016-2019 (pooled to increase sample size)	Labour market -employment, unemployment, inactivity rates; occupational position, sector of employment.
Children's achievement and wellbeing (at 15)	Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA)	English reading and maths proficiency scores.
	PISA 2018, and 2015 for checks	Subjective wellbeing and eudemonia (purpose in life)
Attitudes to immigrants of host populations	Eurobarometer 2017/2018, Ireland and Northern Ireland	Attitudes towards EU and non-EU migrants 2017 Impact of Immigration 2017
	Northern Ireland Life and Times (NILT) 2012-2020	Attitudes to immigration over time, Northern Ireland
	European Social Survey (ESS) Ireland 2012-2018	Attitudes to immigration of same ethnic group over time, Ireland

To pursue objective 3, the project takes a qualitative approach. Given that the issues of cross-border travel have emerged more recently and are rapidly evolving, a qualitative approach allowed us to gather up-to-date data on those groups particularly affected by post-Brexit border developments. After reviewing previous recent literature on the topic, we consulted with migrants, their representative groups and other key stakeholders from both North and South to understand the impact of post-Brexit border arrangements on different types of migrant groups and the consequences for them, their families, and their broader communities. The consultation event was held online in early October 2022. This event is described in further detail in Chapter 5.

1.5 OUTLINE OF THE REPORT

The remainder of the report is structured as follows. Chapter 2 considers a profile of migrants using equivalent data for Ireland and Northern Ireland – where they come from (region of origin), educational qualifications, gender, age, where they live (urban/rural), their citizenship and duration of residence – all the time comparing them to native-born in both jurisdictions. Chapter 2 also considers how well migrants are faring in the labour markets – their employment, unemployment, inactivity rates; and if they are employed, whether they work in a

professional/managerial job and in which sector. Chapter 3 focuses on young people (15-year-olds) of migrant origin compared to peers of Irish origin (in Ireland) or UK origin (in Northern Ireland), comparing English reading and maths scores and two indicators of wellbeing. Chapter 4 compares how migrants have been received among the host populations, using identical datasets from 2017 on attitudes to EU and non-EU migrants and the overall impact of immigration. Chapter 5 considers migrants' lived experience of the border in Ireland, both in terms of cross-border travel and access to work and services across the border. Chapter 6 summarises some key findings and implications for policy.

CHAPTER 2

Adult migrants: Profile and labour market

2.1 INTRODUCTION

Employment is central to the process of economic integration and social inclusion for all members of society. As the OECD (2015) notes:

Jobs are immigrants' chief source of income. Finding one is therefore fundamental to their becoming part of the host country's economic fabric (p.79).

Employment is also closely linked to the ability to secure housing, and to wellbeing, identity and social status. Yet, jobs differ in terms of the wages and conditions of work, and having a poor quality job can have a damaging impact on other areas of life, such as housing; starting with a poor quality job can also mean migrants get trapped in these jobs (Barth et al., 2012; Michael et al., 2022). In this chapter, Section 2.4 considers whether migrants have a job, and some indicators about the nature of the job and how these differ from the native-born working population. Migrants' background and skills will influence their labour market participation, and, as such, we first compare the characteristics of migrants who are resident in Ireland and Northern Ireland, the proportion of the working age population they make up, and their region of origin (Section 2.3). This section also considers their education, age, gender, how long they have been living in Ireland or Northern Ireland, whether they live in rural/urban areas and whether or not they are citizens of the jurisdiction they live in. These are all factors that are likely to be linked to their labour market integration, but also integration more generally (OECD, 2018a; McGinnity et al., 2020).

2.2 DATA

To explore patterns of migrant labour market integration in Ireland and Northern Ireland we use quarterly data from the European Union Labour Force Survey (EU-LFS). The EU-LFS compiles information on people from Ireland (via the Irish Labour Force Survey) and people from Northern Ireland (via the UK Labour Force Survey). It contains a wide range of data on people's labour force status as well as the types of jobs they do and the conditions of their employment. Both the Irish and UK Labour Force Surveys are conducted quarterly, applying a rolling panel design, with households present in five consecutive quarters, and with one-fifth of households entering and one-fifth of households leaving the survey in each wave. We treat these data as pooled cross-sectional data and apply statistical weights to account for the presence of individuals in more than one quarter. The key advantage of the EU-LFS is that the data are harmonised between jurisdictions to account for any survey differences between countries. The disadvantage of the

EU-LFS is that detailed information on the country of birth of respondents (our indicator of migration status) is only available up to 2019.³⁰ The current analysis is therefore based on data covering 2016 to 2019 to provide an adequate sample size to generate more valid results.

2.3 PROFILE OF MIGRANTS


To understand how migrants fare in labour markets compared to those born in their host country, it is important to first look at differences and similarities in their social and demographic characteristics. This includes factors such as their education, age, gender, and whether they are concentrated in more urban or rural areas. These socio-demographic characteristics are strongly associated with people's participation and experience in labour markets (Barrett et al., 2016; Russell et al., 2014). For example, women, those with lower qualifications, and those in more rural areas tend to be less likely to be in employment, while older age groups, those in urban areas and those with higher qualifications are more likely to be working in higher status occupations. It is well known that migrants differ from non-migrants in a country in respect of their social and demographic composition. For example, compared to non-migrants, OECD research has shown how migrants are generally younger or tend to live in cities (OECD, 2018a). Migrant-native differences in labour market integration can therefore partly stem from differences in these characteristics (McGinnity et al., 2021a).

Migrants themselves also differ between one another in important ways that can shape their labour market integration. Migrants come from different countries and this can affect their experiences in the labour market. For instance, migrants from different countries often have different levels of English language ability, while qualifications from certain countries are more likely to be transferrable to host country labour markets. Migrants from different countries may also face more or less discrimination based on their ethnic or cultural backgrounds. Which countries migrants come from can also provide clues as to their reasons for migrating, such as whether they come for work, family reunification or international protection reasons, all of which can affect things like desire or ability to work. The length of time migrants have been in a host country is also important, and is associated with things like amount of work experience within the host country, likelihood of having acquired host-country qualifications, improved English language skills, and social integration more generally, all of which can improve labour market outcomes. Whether a migrant has citizenship within the host country is also important for labour market outcomes, affecting things like the right to work, move jobs, or claim social welfare.

³⁰ From 2020, we are unable to differentiate between migrants from Eastern EU countries and Western EU countries, which is critical given these groups exhibit very different patterns of integration across jurisdictions (<https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/1978984/6037342/EULFS-Database-UserGuide.pdf>).

To understand the experiences of migrants in the labour market in Ireland and Northern Ireland it is therefore important to examine the social and demographic characteristics of migrants in each jurisdiction, their countries of origin, their citizenship status, and how long they have lived there. To this end, Figures 2.1 and 2.2 begin by showing the composition of the migrant and non-migrant population in Ireland and Northern Ireland by their geographic region of birth (e.g. Africa, EU East countries, etc.). The figures detail migrant composition by EU West,³¹ EU East,³² North America, Australia and Oceania, Rest of Europe/Rest of the World, Africa and Asia.

FIGURE 2.1 MIGRANT COMPOSITION OF IRELAND BY COUNTRY OF BIRTH



Source: EU-Labour Force Survey (2016-2019): Ireland.

Note: *EU West includes UK migrants in Ireland.

Restricted to working age population (Age 15-64). Total sample size n=343,359; Native-born n=291,061; EU West n=22,399; EU East n=13,781; North America, Australia and Oceania n=2,688; Rest of Europe/Rest of the World n=3,392; Africa n=3,558; Asia n=6,480.


The first point to note is that a much larger portion of the population in Ireland is composed of people born abroad than in Northern Ireland – the proportion of migrants in Ireland (20 per cent) is more than double that of Northern Ireland (9 per cent). Despite differences in the size of the overall migrant population, there are key similarities between the two jurisdictions. The majority of migrants in both jurisdictions were born in Europe (69 per cent of migrants in Ireland and 66 per cent in Northern Ireland), although in Ireland a larger share of migrants is from

³¹ For statistical analysis, for Ireland, EU West includes UK nationals. For Northern Ireland, EU West includes Ireland.

³² EU East refers to EU Member States that joined the EU in 2004 (Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia), 2007 (Bulgaria and Romania) and 2013 (Croatia). EU West refers to 'Old' EU Member States, excluding Ireland and the UK: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and Sweden.

EU West (including UK)³³ (43 per cent of migrants) compared to EU East (26 per cent), whereas in Northern Ireland it is more balanced (30 per cent EU West and 33 per cent EU East). The next biggest group in both countries is migrants from Asia. However, this group makes up a larger share of migrants in Northern Ireland (17 per cent) compared to Ireland (12 per cent). A smaller proportion of all migrants in both jurisdictions is composed of those born in North America, Australia and Oceania (5 per cent in Ireland and 8 per cent in Northern Ireland), those born in the Rest of Europe/Rest of the World (Ireland: 7 per cent; Northern Ireland: 5 per cent), and Africa (Ireland: 7 per cent; Northern Ireland: 5 per cent).

FIGURE 2.2 MIGRANT COMPOSITION OF NORTHERN IRELAND BY COUNTRY OF BIRTH



Source: EU-Labour Force Survey (2016-2019): Northern Ireland. *In Northern Ireland, EU West includes Ireland.

Note: Total sample size n=42,824; Native-born n=39,170; EU West n=1,095; EU East n=1,315; North America, Australia and Oceania n=275; Rest of Europe/Rest of the World n=197; Africa n=168; Asia n=604

We next look at selected social and demographic characteristics of migrants in Ireland and Northern Ireland, alongside the characteristics of their native-born peers in both jurisdictions (Table 2.1). Firstly, migrants in both jurisdictions are generally more highly educated than native-born. In particular, migrants from EU West, North America, Australia and Oceania, Africa, and Asia are more likely to hold a third-level qualification than native-born in each jurisdiction. Yet, there are notable differences. In Ireland, EU East migrants are more qualified than those born in Ireland (41 per cent compared to 38 per cent of Irish-born), whereas in Northern Ireland, EU East migrants are less likely to have third-level qualifications (22 per cent compared to 36 per cent of Northern Ireland residents born in the UK). In fact, migrants as a whole in Ireland are generally more qualified than in Northern

³³ In Ireland, this includes UK nationals living in Ireland, who in the 2016 Irish Census were the second largest group of non-Irish nationals (103,113) behind Polish nationals (122,515).

Ireland: 55 per cent in Ireland have a third-level qualification compared to 41 per cent in Northern Ireland. This difference is particularly large for migrants from Asia and the Rest of Europe/Rest of the World, who are over 20 per cent more likely to have a third-level qualification in Ireland than in Northern Ireland. The only exception is migrants born in Africa, who are more highly qualified in Northern Ireland (66 per cent) than in Ireland (53 per cent).

TABLE 2.1 PROFILE OF MIGRANTS' SOCIAL AND DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS IN IRELAND AND NORTHERN IRELAND

	% Third-level Qualifications (age 25+)		% Female		% Age 15-29		% Cities & Towns		% Citizen	
	IRE	NI	IRE	NI	IRE	NI	IRE	NI	IRE	NI
Native-born	37.6	36.1	50.3	50.4	29.2	27.6	56.1	51.1	99.9	99.9
Non-Native-born	54.7	41.2	51.5	52.3	25.1	28.1	72.2	56.6	35.3	16.8
EU West*	55	52.1	50.7	52	21.9	21.2	55.7	50.4	47.5	17.2
EU East	40.6	22.3	51.9	51.9	23	33.4	77.8	45.7	13.6	2.8
North America, Australia, and Oceania	74.6	59	58.1	53.4	33.3	22.2	64.8	71.5	52.5	40.2
Rest of Europe/Rest of the World	65.2	37.9	53.6	54.8	34.6	17.9	87.4	57.4	27.3	31
Africa	52.9	66.3	50.8	58.7	24.5	29.6	87.5	66.5	54.3	41.7
Asia	73.5	49.9	49.3	50.9	29.8	31.2	88.1	78.7	41.3	25.6

Source: EU-Labour Force Survey (2016-2019): Ireland and Northern Ireland. *EU West includes UK migrants in Ireland and Irish migrants in Northern Ireland.

Note: Sample restricted to working age population (age 15-64), except for education, aged 25-64. Sample size (15-64) 262,719 Ireland; 38,710 Northern Ireland.


The gender of migrants in both jurisdictions is generally quite comparable, with a similar proportion of migrants from EU West, EU East, the Rest of Europe/Rest of the World, and Asia, being female (Table 2.1). There are notable differences between jurisdictions in the age of migrant groups. Migrants as a whole are somewhat older in Ireland than in Northern Ireland. In Ireland, some groups are generally younger, including migrants from North America, Australia and Oceania and the Rest of Europe/Rest of the World. In Northern Ireland, however, EU East migrants are generally younger (33 per cent aged 15-29 compared to 23 per cent in Ireland). In Ireland, migrants as a whole are more likely to be urbanised compared to their peers born in Ireland, while the gap in Northern Ireland is much smaller. EU East migrants are particularly different across jurisdictions. The percentage living in urban areas is 32 percentage points lower in Northern Ireland than EU East migrants in Ireland. Furthermore, EU East migrants in Northern Ireland are the only group across both jurisdictions to be notably less likely (5 percentage points lower) to be in urban areas than their UK-born counterparts: this is likely linked to the jobs they work in, for example in the manufacturing sector (see Figure 2.6).

Lastly, we also find that almost every migrant group in Ireland is more likely to have citizenship of their host country than is the case in Northern Ireland.³⁴ Citizenship of the host country confers a range of benefits for migrants, most notably the right to reside and to work in that country without restriction, and in this case also travel freely and work in the other jurisdiction. High rates of citizenship among migrants in Ireland has been noted before, linked to naturalisation (the acquisition of citizenship) (McGinnity et al., 2020). While very few EU East migrants are citizens in either jurisdiction, 41 per cent of Asians are Irish citizens, compared to one-quarter of Asians in Northern Ireland who are British citizens. A larger share of Africans are citizens in Ireland (54 per cent) compared to 42 per cent in Northern Ireland. The higher naturalisation rates among non-EU groups in Ireland may reflect the fact that conditions for acquiring citizenship differ (see Box 1). In addition, as McGinnity et al. (2020) point out, the limited long-term residence scheme in Ireland means some non-EU nationals may be more likely to naturalise in Ireland than in other countries. In the UK, some might be eligible for ‘settled status’ as a form of permanent residency after five years, and thus not naturalise. These proportions have implications for the Common Travel Area (see Chapters 1 and 5), as a significant proportion of migrants living on the island are Irish or British citizens, although they may not be perceived as such.

The last characteristic we look at is the length of time migrants have been resident in Ireland and Northern Ireland (Figure 2.3). Overall, migrants in Ireland have been resident for a somewhat longer period than migrants in Northern Ireland: 35 per cent have been resident for 15 years or more in Ireland, compared to 30 per cent in Northern Ireland. Some groups of migrants also share similar residency patterns across jurisdictions. This includes EU West migrants, EU East migrants and migrants from Asia. However, other groups show significantly different patterns. Indeed, a much larger proportion of migrants from the Rest of Europe/Rest of the World have arrived in Ireland in the past 1-6 years (60 per cent), whereas this group have resided in Northern Ireland for longer (43 per cent for 7-14 years). Among African migrants in Ireland, roughly equal proportions have resided for 1-6 years, 7-14 years, and 15-24 years. In Northern Ireland, however, there is a significant new group of arrivals: 42 per cent have resided for only 1-6 years. Yet, there is also a significant number of African migrants in Northern Ireland who have been resident for 25 years or more (23 per cent, compared to 3.4 per cent in Ireland).

³⁴ The only exception to this pattern is migrants from the Rest of Europe/Rest of the World, who are 4 per cent more likely to have citizenship in Northern Ireland.

FIGURE 2.3 YEARS THAT MIGRANTS HAVE BEEN RESIDENT IN IRELAND AND NORTHERN IRELAND



Source: EU-Labour Force Survey (2016-2019): Ireland and Northern Ireland. EU West includes UK migrants in Ireland and Irish migrants in Northern Ireland.

Note: Sample restricted to working age population (age 15-64), including n=47,533 migrants from Ireland and n=3,508 migrants from Northern Ireland; [x] signifies a proportion is based on a sample of <n=30.

2.4 LABOUR MARKET OUTCOMES


2.4.1 Employment status

We turn now to focus on patterns of labour market integration among migrants in Ireland and Northern Ireland, and how they compare to their native-born counterparts in each jurisdiction. In particular, we will examine three dimensions of labour market integration: labour market status (rates of employment, unemployment, and inactivity); occupational status (percentage in professional occupations) and sector of work.

As outlined, employment is one of the most important measures of migrant integration, since work allows migrants to earn an income and a chance to find their place in the host society (OECD, 2018a; 2015; McGinnity et al., 2020). Figure 2.4 shows the proportions of all migrants and native-born aged 15-64 that are employed, unemployed and economically inactive in Ireland and Northern Ireland. However, the figures do not include individuals who reported being in regular education in the past four weeks. This seeks to remove individuals from the economic inactivity group who are in full-time education, such as school, college, or university.

Generally speaking, migrants in Northern Ireland are more likely to be in employment compared to their UK-born counterparts (with 80 per cent of migrants in employment compared to 74 per cent of non-migrants). This ranges from migrants from the Rest of Europe/Rest of the World in Northern Ireland, whose employment rates are 2 percentage points higher than native-born, EU West migrants and those from North America, Australia and Oceania (4 and 5 percentage points higher), up to EU East migrants in Northern Ireland (12 percentage points higher). Only one migrant group has notably lower employment rates than the UK-born group in Northern Ireland and that is Africans, who have an employment rate that is 6 percentage points lower than the UK-born. In Ireland, however, migrant employment rates (76 per cent in employment) are much closer to that of Irish-born residents (75 per cent in employment). This average also hides some group variation, for example EU East migrants are 5 percentage points more likely to be in employment than Irish-born. By contrast, although Africans in both jurisdictions are less likely to be employed than their native-born counterparts, the employment rate of Africans in Ireland is 11 percentage points lower than among those born in Ireland. This is consistent with previous research which has highlighted very low employment rates among Africans in Ireland (O'Connell, 2019; McGinnity et al., 2020). Overall, migrant employment rates (compared to native-born employment rates) are higher in Northern Ireland than in Ireland.

FIGURE 2.4 LABOUR MARKET STATUS OF MIGRANTS AND NON-MIGRANTS IN IRELAND AND NORTHERN IRELAND



Source: EU-Labour Force Survey (2016-2019): Northern Ireland. EU West includes UK migrants in Ireland and Irish migrants in Northern Ireland.

Note: Sample restricted to working age population (age 15-64) and excluded individuals who responded they were in regular education in the last four weeks. Sample size n=219,813 in Ireland and n=34,296 in Northern Ireland. [x] signifies a proportion is based on a sample of <n=30.

In turn, when we look at unemployment rates among migrants, they are generally lower in Northern Ireland (ranging from 3 to 5 per cent) than in Ireland (ranging from 4 to 10 per cent). In both jurisdictions, migrants are somewhat more likely to be unemployed than their native-born counterparts, though generally differences are small. The exception to this pattern is African migrants who have the highest unemployment rates in both jurisdictions. In Northern Ireland their unemployment rate is 5 per cent while in Ireland it stands at 10 per cent, although there are indications that this pattern may be changing in Ireland (McGinnity et al., forthcoming).

Taken together, the results show that migrants in both jurisdictions are more likely to be in employment, slightly more likely to be unemployed, and less likely to be inactive than native-born. However, there are differences between jurisdictions in terms of which groups have more positive labour market status outcomes. Table A2.1 models whether any differences between native-born and migrants in their likelihood of not working (whether they are unemployed or inactive, compared to employed) can be accounted for by differences in their social and demographic characteristics outlined previously. For each jurisdiction, the first model presents odds ratios for country-of-origin groups and years without further adjustment. The second model in each case takes into account different characteristics and shows the odds of being out of work for each group relative to the comparison group, net of these characteristics. For example, the coefficient of 2.6 for female in Model 2 (Table A2.1), indicates that women in Ireland are 2.6 times more likely to be out of work as men, after accounting for other factors likely to influence their chances of working. Expressed another way, even if they were the same age, lived in the same area, had the same educational qualifications and other measured characteristics, women are 2.6 times as likely to be not working than men in Ireland.

The main takeaway from this modelling is that in both Ireland and Northern Ireland, once we account for the social and demographic characteristics of individuals, nearly all migrant groups, except those from the EU East, have a higher likelihood of being out of work compared to native-born. There are likely to be a number of potential explanations which we cannot investigate using the available data; for example, in some cases lower employment rates may be related to poor English language skills, migrant qualifications not being recognised or migrants' not being in the right networks to hear about jobs. Based on previous evidence, discrimination against migrants in recruitment is also likely to play a role (see McGinnity et al., 2021b for Ireland; Michael et al., 2022 for Northern Ireland). In other words, a large part of why we found many migrant groups were more likely to be working is that they tend to have more of the characteristics that are associated with being in work, such as generally being more educated, younger, or living in cities.

The models show a somewhat different pattern for migrants from EU East countries. In Ireland, their likelihood of being out of work does not differ from Irish-born once socio-demographic characteristics are taken into account. In Northern Ireland, however, even after accounting for things like their age, education, and where they live, EU East migrants are still more likely to be in work compared to their native-born counterparts.

2.4.2 Occupations and sector of employment

Another dimension of labour market integration is the kinds of occupations and the sectors of economic activity in which migrants are concentrated. Occupation refers to the role a worker plays in the organisation, which is often associated with their levels of autonomy, their salary, and levels of responsibility. Professional occupations, for example, tend to have more autonomy, higher salary, and greater responsibility.

We begin by looking at the proportion of migrants and native-born in professional occupations among individuals who are currently in employment (Figure 2.5). For occupational groups, jobs are classified in terms of their skill level and content using 1-digit ISCO 08 categories. Professional occupations include roles such as managerial, professional, and technician and associate professional positions. On the whole, migrants are more likely to be working in professional occupations in Ireland (44 per cent) than in Northern Ireland (35 per cent), while similar proportions of native-born in both jurisdictions are in professional roles (44-45 per cent).


In Northern Ireland, all migrant groups except EU East migrants in employment are either just as likely, or more likely, to be in professional occupations than their UK-born counterparts, ranging from migrants from the Rest of Europe/Rest of the World (similar likelihood); to migrants from Asia, Africa and North America, Australia, and Oceania 6-10 percentage points higher; to migrants from EU West countries 12 percentage points higher. In Ireland, however, the larger share of migrants in professional occupations is being driven by particular groups: North America, Australia and Oceania migrants, Asian migrants, and EU West migrants. The remaining groups are less likely to be professional occupations, including migrants from the Rest of Europe/Rest of the World, and EU East.

In sum, in Northern Ireland most groups are generally more likely to be in professional occupations than native-born, while in Ireland, big differences emerge between groups. In both jurisdictions, however, EU East migrants are much less likely to be in professional occupations than their native-born counterparts. Table A2.2 models the likelihood of being in a professional occupation (compared to a non-professional occupation) and explores how far differences in migrant and

non-migrant rates of being in professional occupations can be accounted for by differences in the social and demographic characteristics of migrants and non-migrants.

In Northern Ireland, the higher likelihood of being in a professional role among migrants from North America, Australia and Oceania, EU West, Africa, and Asia compared to UK-born can be largely accounted for by their social and demographic make-up (in particular, their higher qualifications). At the same time, in Northern Ireland, these characteristics account for only a small part of why EU East migrants are less likely than native-born to be in professional occupations. In Ireland, the social and demographic characteristics of migrants from EU West, North America, Australia and Oceania, and Asia account for some of why they are more likely to be employed in professional occupations compared to those born in Ireland; although, even after accounting for this, they remain more likely to be in professional occupations. However for other groups, such as Africans, those from the Rest of Europe/Rest of the World, and EU East, once we account for their socio-demographic characteristics, their likelihoods of being in professional occupations compared to non-migrants become even smaller. In other words, there are additional factors limiting their chances of being in professional occupations compared to their native-born peers.

FIGURE 2.5 PROPORTION OF MIGRANTS AND NON-MIGRANTS IN PROFESSIONAL OCCUPATIONS IN IRELAND AND NORTHERN IRELAND (%)



Source: EU-Labour Force Survey (2016-2019): Northern Ireland. EU West includes UK migrants in Ireland and Irish migrants in Northern Ireland.

Note: Sample restricted to working age population (age 15-64) in employment. Sample size n=176,326 in Ireland and n=26,920 in Northern Ireland.

Lastly, we look at the economic sectors in which migrant and native-born workers are found in Ireland and Northern Ireland (Figure 2.6). Sector refers to the economic activity of the organisation someone works for, based on the NACE international classification scheme.³⁵ Sector of work can shape things like job quality, for example, some sectors tend to be dominated by lower paid work, less secure employment, and more difficult working conditions, such as hospitality sectors. Due to the large number of economic sectors and smaller number of migrants in the EU-LFS data, we can only compare patterns between migrants and non-migrants from EU West, EU East, and non-EU countries. We also group different economic sectors together that tend to share similar characteristics. For example, grouping sectors such as ‘Wholesale and retail trade; Repair of motor vehicles; Transportation and storage; Accommodation and food services; and Administrative and support service activities’, which often have more domestically driven demand, are more labour intensive, and are lower-skill sectors.

Looking at migrants as a whole, two key differences emerge between jurisdictions. In Northern Ireland, migrants are more likely to be found in the manufacturing sector (24 per cent) than in Ireland (14 per cent). In Ireland, migrants are more likely to be found in the information sector (18 per cent) than in Northern Ireland (8 per cent). Broadly similar proportions tend to work in other sectors in both jurisdictions. However, when turning to particular migrant groups, we observe that in both jurisdictions, EU West migrants tend to occupy similar economic sectors of employment and are also closest to non-migrants in the sectors in which they work. EU West in Ireland are somewhat more likely to be in ‘Information and communication, Financial and insurance activities, Real estate activities, and Professional, scientific and technical activities’ than in Northern Ireland (17 per cent compared to 14 per cent in Northern Ireland). While in Northern Ireland, a greater share are in ‘Public administration and defence; Compulsory social security; and Education’ (20 per cent compared to 15 per cent in Ireland). However, they largely occupy similar sectors.


EU East migrants however are concentrated in different sectors in each jurisdiction. In Ireland, half of all EU East migrants (50 per cent) work in ‘Wholesale and retail trade; Repair of motor vehicles; Transportation and storage;

³⁵ Figure 2.6 creates job sector sub-groups based on the full NACE international classification schema: A-B Agriculture and mining = ‘A - Agriculture, forestry and fishing’, ‘B - Mining and quarrying’; C-D-E Manufacturing and utilities = ‘C - Manufacturing’, ‘D - Electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning supply’, ‘E - Water supply; Sewerage, Waste management and remediation activities’; F – Construction = ‘F – Construction’; G-H-I-N Wholesale, retail, transportation = ‘G - Wholesale and retail trade; Repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles’, ‘H - Transportation and storage’, ‘I - Accommodation and food service activities’, ‘N - Administrative and support service activities’; J-K-L-M Information, financial, real estate = ‘J - Information and communication’, ‘K - Financial and insurance activities’, ‘L - Real estate activities’, ‘M - Professional, scientific and technical activities’; O-P Public administration, Education = ‘O - Public administration and defence; Compulsory social security’, ‘P - Education’; Q Health and social work = ‘Q - Human health and social work activities’; R-S-T-U Entertainment and others = ‘R - Arts, entertainment and recreation’, ‘S - Other service activities’, ‘T - Activities of households as employers; Undifferentiated goods – and services – producing activities of households for own use’, ‘U - Activities of extraterritorial organisations and bodies’.

Accommodation and food services; and Administrative and support service activities’. In Northern Ireland, EU East migrants are also concentrated in ‘Wholesale and retail trade; Repair of motor vehicles; Transportation and storage; Accommodation and food services; and Administrative and support service activities’ (39 per cent). However, they are also highly concentrated in ‘Manufacturing’ (37 per cent, compared to 20 per cent in Ireland).

Looking at non-EU migrants in Ireland, they are more concentrated in ‘Information and communication; Financial and insurance activities; Real estate activities; and Professional, scientific and technical activities’ (21 per cent compared to 9 per cent in Northern Ireland) and also in ‘Retail, transport and hospitality (35 per cent compared to 28 per cent in Northern Ireland). In Northern Ireland, however, non-EU migrants are more likely to be working in ‘Public administration and education’ activities (14 per cent compared to 5 per cent in Ireland), ‘Human health and social work activities’ (26 per cent versus 22 per cent in Ireland), and ‘Manufacturing’ (14 per cent compared to 10 per cent in Ireland).

FIGURE 2.6 ECONOMIC SECTOR OF EMPLOYMENT AMONG MIGRANTS AND NON-MIGRANTS IN IRELAND AND NORTHERN IRELAND



Source: EU-Labour Force Survey (2016-2019): Northern Ireland. EU West includes UK migrants in Ireland and Irish migrants in Northern Ireland.

Note: Sample restricted to working age population (age 15-64) in employment. Sample size n=168,715 in Ireland and n=24,490 in Northern Ireland; [] signifies a proportion is based on a sample of <n=30; see footnote 34 for which job sectors are contained within each category.

2.5 SUMMARY

Migrants compose a larger proportion of the population in Ireland (10 percentage points higher) than Northern Ireland. The profile of migrants in both jurisdictions is quite similar on several characteristics. For example, the countries migrants come from across jurisdictions is broadly similar, with the majority in both coming from Europe; although there are slightly more Europeans and Africans in Ireland and slightly more migrants from North America, Australia and Oceania and Asia in Northern Ireland. EU West, EU East and migrants from Asia also generally share similar patterns of how long ago they became resident in both jurisdictions. However, there are some differences, where a much larger share of migrants from the Rest of Europe/Rest of the World are recent arrivals in Ireland while a much larger share of African migrants in Northern Ireland are recent arrivals. A similar proportion of migrant groups are female in both jurisdictions.

In other aspects, however, more notable differences exist between migrants in Ireland and Northern Ireland. All migrant groups in both jurisdictions are more highly educated than native-born, with the exception of Eastern Europeans in Northern Ireland. However, most migrant groups in Ireland are more likely to have third-level qualifications than their counterparts in Northern Ireland. Differences also exist in the age make-up of migrants between jurisdictions. Migrants from North America, Australia and Oceania and those from the Rest of Europe/Rest of the World are younger (aged 15-29) in Ireland, while migrants from Eastern Europe are younger in Northern Ireland. A significant difference is also that migrants are much more likely to live in urban areas in Ireland compared to Irish-born, while they are only somewhat more likely in Northern Ireland. African and the Rest of Europe/Rest of the World migrants in particular in Ireland are much more likely to live in urban areas than these groups in Northern Ireland, while Eastern European migrants are much less likely to live in urban areas in Ireland compared to Northern Ireland. In addition, all migrant groups in Ireland (with the exception of those from the Rest of Europe/Rest of the World) are more likely to have citizenship than migrants in Northern Ireland.

This chapter looked at patterns of migrant labour market integration in Ireland and Northern Ireland by comparing the labour market outcomes of migrants to their native-born counterparts in each jurisdiction. Employment rates for migrants are generally high across both jurisdictions (except for African migrants). However, once differences in the social and economic characteristics of migrants and non-migrants are controlled for, migrants in both jurisdictions (excluding Eastern Europeans) have a lower probability of being employed than non-migrants with the same characteristics. This suggests migrants in both jurisdictions experience additional factors depressing employment relative to natives. This could be due to problems with qualifications recognition, English language skills, or discrimination against migrants in recruitment – or a combination of factors.

Important similarities are also evident between Ireland and Northern Ireland after migrants have entered employment. Firstly, migrant groups in both jurisdictions have similar patterns of occupational status. In Ireland and Northern Ireland, migrants from EU West, North America, Australia, Oceania and Asia, are more likely than their native-born counterparts to be in professional occupations, whereas migrants from EU East are less likely to be in professional occupations than native-born workers. However, Africans are a notable exception, being more likely than native-born to be in professional occupations in Northern Ireland but less likely in Ireland. O'Connell (2019) finds part of this African disadvantage in employment in Ireland may be related to prolonged periods out of the labour market while in the asylum system, as well as recruitment discrimination against Africans. Overall, despite similar patterns across jurisdictions, migrants in Ireland are generally more likely to be in professional occupations compared to Northern Ireland.

Important similarities and differences emerge in the sectors in which migrants and non-migrants work. In both jurisdictions, EU West migrants tend to occupy broadly similar economic sectors of employment as their native-born counterparts. In Ireland, the biggest difference between EU East migrants and natives is their concentration in 'Wholesale and retail trade; Transportation, Accommodation and food services; and Administration activities'. In Northern Ireland, however, the biggest difference between EU East migrants and non-migrants is their concentration in manufacturing and utilities. Among non-EU migrants, the biggest migrant-native differences are that non-EU migrants in Ireland are less likely than Irish-born to be working in 'Manufacturing and related jobs', while they are more likely than native-born to be working in these jobs in Northern Ireland. While in Northern Ireland, migrants are less likely than non-migrants to be working in 'Information/Financial/Professional and Technical Activities', whereas in Ireland non-EU migrants are more likely than non-migrants to be working in these sectors.

Chapter 2 Appendix

TABLE A2.1 MODELLING NOT WORKING (EXCLUDING THOSE IN EDUCATION) (ODDS RATIOS)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
<i>Outcome (cf. working)</i>	Not working	Not working	Not working	Not working
<i>Jurisdiction</i>	IRE	IRE	NI	NI
	No Controls	With controls	No Controls	With controls
Baseline: Native-born	ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.
EU West	0.968 (0.019)	1.344*** (0.048)	0.812* (0.070)	1.283+ (0.173)
EU East	0.744*** (0.018)	1.001 (0.037)	0.466*** (0.045)	0.605*** (0.074)
North America, Australia and Oceania	1.031 (0.058)	1.762*** (0.117)	0.767 (0.134)	1.140 (0.281)
Rest of Europe/Rest of the World	0.886* (0.043)	1.474*** (0.082)	0.913 (0.168)	1.545* (0.342)
Africa	1.680*** (0.073)	2.753*** (0.153)	1.378+ (0.262)	2.871*** (0.682)
Asia	1.160*** (0.039)	2.269*** (0.099)	1.021 (0.120)	1.676*** (0.256)
Baseline: year 2017				
year 2018	0.951*** (0.012)	0.946*** (0.013)	0.941+ (0.033)	0.971 (0.036)
year 2019	0.911*** (0.011)	0.903*** (0.012)	0.849*** (0.028)	0.893** (0.031)
Baseline: Male		ref.		ref.
Female		2.565*** (0.030)		1.826*** (0.054)
Baseline: 15-29 years of age		ref.		ref.
30-39 years of age		0.697*** (0.013)		0.730*** (0.035)
40-49 years of age		0.745*** (0.014)		0.752*** (0.036)
50+ years of age		1.278*** (0.022)		1.639*** (0.069)
Baseline: Low: Lower secondary		ref.		ref.
Medium: Upper secondary		0.340*** (0.005)		0.405*** (0.014)
High: Third level		0.142*** (0.002)		0.165*** (0.006)
Baseline: Resided 1-6 years		ref.		ref.
7-14 years		0.921* (0.034)		0.672** (0.092)
15-24 years		0.894** (0.035)		0.559** (0.101)
25 years or more		0.809*** (0.037)		0.933 (0.150)

TABLE A2.1 CONTD.

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Outcome (cf. working)	Not working	Not working	Not working	Not working
Jurisdiction	IRE	IRE	NI	NI
	No Controls	With controls	No Controls	With controls
Baseline: Rural area		ref.		ref.
Cities (Densely-populated area)		1.007 (0.013)		1.072* (0.034)
Towns and suburbs (Intermediate density area)		1.207*** (0.017)		0.943 (0.040)
Constant	0.346*** (0.003)	0.639*** (0.014)	0.376*** (0.010)	0.583*** (0.031)
Observations	219,813	219,813	34,296	34,296

Source: EU-LFS, 2016-2019.

Note: *** p<.001, ** p<.01, * p<.05, + p<.10.

TABLE A2.2 MODELLING PROFESSIONAL OCCUPATION (ONLY THOSE IN WORK) (ODDS RATIOS)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Outcome (cf. non-professional occupation)	Professional	Professional	Professional	Professional
Jurisdiction	IRE	IRE	NI	NI
	No Controls	With controls	No Controls	With controls
Baseline: Native-born	ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.
EU West	1.570*** (0.031)	1.125** (0.044)	1.628*** (0.133)	0.900 (0.137)
EU East	0.390*** (0.010)	0.332*** (0.014)	0.176*** (0.017)	0.211*** (0.030)
North America, Australia and Oceania	2.273*** (0.131)	1.354*** (0.099)	1.415* (0.219)	0.694 (0.155)
Rest of Europe/Rest of the World	0.711*** (0.033)	0.389*** (0.022)	0.998 (0.183)	0.827 (0.227)
Africa	0.970 (0.049)	0.654*** (0.044)	1.480+ (0.316)	0.763 (0.192)
Asia	2.079*** (0.074)	1.109* (0.054)	1.297* (0.149)	0.939 (0.158)
Baseline: year 2017				
year 2018	0.985 (0.012)	0.987 (0.014)	0.989 (0.035)	0.959 (0.040)
year 2019	0.990 (0.012)	1.003 (0.015)	1.052 (0.034)	0.951 (0.036)

Contd.

TABLE A2.2 CONTD.

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Outcome (cf. non-professional occupation)	Professional	Professional	Professional	Professional
Jurisdiction	IRE	IRE	NI	NI
	No Controls	With controls	No Controls	With controls
Baseline: Male		ref.		ref.
Female		0.886*** (0.011)		1.068*** (0.033)
Baseline: 15-29 years of age		ref.		ref.
30-39 years of age		1.985*** (0.037)		2.168*** (0.103)
40-49 years of age		2.164*** (0.040)		2.292*** (0.108)
50+ years of age		2.203*** (0.040)		2.031*** (0.093)
Baseline: Low: Lower secondary		ref.		ref.
Medium: Upper secondary		2.102*** (0.049)		1.837*** (0.091)
High: Third level		17.566*** (0.411)		14.639*** (0.718)
Baseline: Resided 1-6 years		ref.		ref.
7-14 years		0.861*** (0.036)		0.831 (0.124)
15-24 years		0.939 (0.041)		1.555* (0.267)
25 years or more		1.130* (0.057)		1.521* (0.283)
Baseline: Rural area		ref.		ref.
Cities (Densely-populated area)		1.668*** (0.023)		1.269*** (0.043)
Towns and suburbs (Intermediate density area)		1.242*** (0.020)		1.206*** (0.055)
Constant	0.819*** (0.007)	0.068*** (0.002)	0.760*** (0.020)	0.091*** (0.006)
Observations	176,326	176,326	26,920	26,920

Source: EU-LFS, 2016-2019.

Note: *** p<.001, ** p<.01, * p<.05, + p<.10.

CHAPTER 3

Migrant children and young people

3.1 INTRODUCTION

The increase in immigration to Ireland and Northern Ireland presented in Chapter 1 has also led to an increasing number of migrant-origin children, either coming with their parents or born in their host country (Darmody et al., 2022). Indeed, while the integration of adults into society is often a key focus of research and policy, considering how the children of migrants are faring is arguably a more revealing indicator of integration, as many adult migrants will have lived, worked and been educated abroad (OECD, 2018a). This chapter compares both migrant-origin students' competence in English reading, maths, science, and their wellbeing compared to native-born peers using the latest wave of a high-quality international dataset, specially designed to compare children across countries (the Programme for International Student Assessment, PISA).

Performance on numerical and literacy tests yields insight into migrant-origin students' skill development and is likely to be associated with future educational achievement and employment outcomes. In most EU countries, migrant-origin students score significantly lower than their native-born peers in terms of (host-country) reading literacy at age 15 (OECD, 2018a). However, the gap in reading literacy scores varies considerably across countries, with notably smaller gaps observed in the UK and particularly Ireland (as well as in non-EU OECD countries Canada, Australia and New Zealand) (*ibid.*) Factors such as socio-economic and linguistic background play an important role in test scores, and these often account for some, if not all of the differences found. Typically differences between migrant-origin students and their native-born peers in numerical reasoning are smaller than for reading, though here again there is variation across countries (OECD, 2019a).

A key focus of the literature on the topic has been on generational status, that is whether children's outcomes differ depending on whether they were born in the host country to migrant parents (usually called the second-generation) or whether they migrated as children (first generation)³⁶ (Kalter et al., 2018). The expectation is that if children are born in their country of residence, they will be more integrated and similar to their native-born peers than if they were born abroad. While in general this is found (see OECD, 2018b), it can depend on how well migrant parents are faring (in terms of their employment and income). Migrant parents' linguistic background – in particular whether it is the same as that of the

³⁶ Sometimes called 1.5 generation, depending on their age at migration. For ease of reading all groups are referred to as of 'migrant-origin' in this discussion.

host country – and parents’ country of origin is also important for the outcomes of their children, and this can differ between first- and second- generation cohorts in a country, and between countries. Using *Growing Up in Ireland* data on children born in 1998 and living in Ireland at age 9, McGinnity et al. (2022a) found lower reading scores for Asian, African and particularly East-European origin children at age nine.³⁷ Darmody and Smyth (2018) analysing the same children at age 13, find lower verbal reasoning scores among migrant-origin students at 13, though no difference in maths. They also highlight the role of English language in the achievement gap: migrant-origin students where English is spoken in the home tend to perform significantly better on verbal reasoning compared to students from families with a different dominant language. For numerical reasoning, the reverse pattern is found, with slightly but significantly higher scores among non-English speakers compared to English speakers. More recent analysis of children born in 2008, all of whom were born in Ireland, East European-origin children had much lower vocabulary scores at age 3, but by age 9 almost catch up with their Irish-origin peers (Darmody et al., 2022). Smyth et al. (2022) compare reading and maths scores in Ireland and Northern Ireland among 15-year-olds using these data (PISA, 2018), and find high scores in both jurisdictions in reading, with slightly higher scores in Ireland, with maths and science scores broadly similar in both. This chapter builds upon these analyses to focus on differences between migrant-origin and native-origin children in Ireland and Northern Ireland.

Numerical and literacy skills are only part of children’s lives. While the focus of much less international research, another important indicator of integration and how children are faring is their wellbeing (Johnson and Mood, 2018). Given the disruption caused by migration, and potential difficulties adjusting to their new country, we might expect that wellbeing would be lower among first-generation migrant-origin children. Yet, challenges of adaptation and acculturation might also be relevant for the second generation too, as they as individuals or migrant groups struggle to ‘fit in’ and feel like they belong, particularly if they experience discrimination and high levels of negative sentiment (Johnson and Mood, 2018). Previous research in Ireland, for example, has shown that migrant-origin children at age nine (first and second-generation combined, all born in 1998) tend to have lower participation in sports and social activities (Darmody and Smyth, 2017) and fewer friends than their Irish peers (McGinnity and Darmody, 2019), which may affect their wellbeing. Darmody et al. (2022) however find that self-concept (also termed self-image) among second-generation migrant-origin children is no lower than that of their Irish-origin peers at age nine. In Northern Ireland, McMullen et al. (2020) also find that while refugee children struggle more, overall, migrant-origin children did not have higher than average levels of socio-emotional

³⁷ The *Growing Up in Ireland* the national longitudinal study of children and young people in Ireland. The study started in 2006 and follows the progress of two groups of children: 8,000 9-year-olds (Cohort ‘98) and 10,000 9-month-olds (Cohort ‘08).

difficulties (as measured by the strengths and difficulties questionnaire). This echoes findings of Johnsson and Mood (2018), examining wellbeing among migrant-origin 14–15-year-olds in England, Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden.

3.2 DATA AND METHODOLOGY

To explore the social integration experiences of the children of migrants in Ireland and Northern Ireland we draw on data from the PISA programme. PISA collects internationally comparable data on the performance of 15-year-old school pupils using standardised tests of maths, science and reading ability. It also gathers data on the social and demographic characteristics of children, such as their migration status and their parents' educational background, alongside other child outcomes such as their mental wellbeing. We draw on the most recent Irish (5,577 students) and Northern Irish (2,413 students) data available, gathered in 2018, but also replicate our analysis of cognitive outcomes using data from 2015 to look at patterns of stability over time.

The PISA data provide measures of student performance through plausible values obtained from item response theory models. Plausible values are generated through 'multiple imputations based upon pupils' answers to the sub-set of test questions they were randomly assigned and their responses to the background questionnaires'.³⁸

In 2015 and 2018, each student received ten plausible values. Generating student-level estimates of skill level from these ten plausible values requires several steps, which are automated using Stata's 'repest' programme (Avvisati and Keslair, 2020).

3.2.1 Defining migrant-origin children and generational status

Children in this analysis are defined as having a migrant background if one or both of their parents were born abroad (although we also explore whether defining having a migrant-background solely as those with two parents born abroad leads to different results).³⁹ However, migrant-origin children are not a homogeneous group and differ on several dimensions that can shape their experiences in education and society. One key distinguishing characteristic that we will focus on is their generational status – whether they were born abroad and migrated to their new host country (first-generation migrant-origin students), or whether they were

³⁸ OECD. 'How to prepare and analyse the PISA database'. Available at: <https://www.oecd.org/pisa/data/httpoecdorgpisadatabase-instructions.htm>.

³⁹ Defining children's migration status as either one parent born abroad or both parents born abroad are both applied in the literature. We opt for the former definition due to small sample size issues in Northern Ireland when migration status is defined using the latter. However, we replicate all analyses applying the latter definition and discuss any significant differences that emerge.

born in the host country itself (second-generation migrant-origin students). Whether a migrant-origin child was born in their host country or not can affect their experiences in school through shaping migration-related challenges such as linguistic ability in the host country language and socio-cultural adaptation (Darmody et al., 2022).

In comparing the experiences of native- and migrant-origin children in Ireland and Northern Ireland we will therefore account for differences in generational status between migrant-origin children using the following typology:

- ‘Native-origin children’ – these are children whose parents were born in the host country. For the analysis of Ireland, this is whether the parents were born in Ireland, and for the Northern Ireland analysis, this is whether the parents were born in the United Kingdom.
- ‘First generation migrant-origin children’ – these are children born abroad, who have at least one parent who was also born abroad.
- ‘Second generation migrant-origin children’ – these are children who are born in the host country, who have at least one parent who was also born abroad.

Using this typology, we will first examine whether there are any differences in educational outcomes or subjective wellbeing between those with a migrant background and those without, and also whether any differences emerge between first- and second-generation children of migrants. Secondly, we will explore how far any differences between migrant-origin and native-origin children in these outcomes can be explained by factors known to affect migrant-origin children’s experiences, such as their English language ability,⁴⁰ and also factors known to affect children in general, such as their parents’ socio-economic status or the socio-economic composition of their schools.

3.3 READING AND MATHS SCORES FOR CHILDREN WITH AND WITHOUT AND MIGRANT BACKGROUND


We now explore how the children of migrants are faring in terms of their educational outcomes and how they are performing compared to children without a migrant background, in both Ireland and Northern Ireland. We begin by looking at students’ reading proficiency. It is worth noting that both Ireland and the UK as a whole score above the average in reading proficiency for countries in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (OECD, 2019b).

⁴⁰ The PISA data ask more specifically about whether the student speaks the language in which the tests were conducted at home. In Ireland and Northern Ireland, 99 per cent of students took the test in English and 1 per cent took it in Irish. Therefore, for conciseness, we refer to variable as ‘English speaking’.

Figure 3.1 shows the average reading proficiency score among native children, and first and second-generation migrant-origin children, in Ireland and Northern Ireland. In Ireland, reading scores are broadly similar between native-origin and migrant-origin children. First generation migrant-origin children have slightly lower scores than their native peers (scoring 4 points lower), although this difference is not statistically significant (Table 3.1). Second generation migrant-origin children in Ireland, however, have slightly higher scores than their native peers (8 points higher), and this difference is statistically significant at the $p < 0.05$ level (Table 3.1). However, in substantive terms, these differences in scores are relatively small (OECD 2019b). In Northern Ireland, we also find second-generation migrant-origin children reporting slightly higher reading proficiency scores than their native peers (5 points higher). However, a substantial difference between jurisdictions is that first-generation migrant-origin children in Northern Ireland report much lower reading scores than their native peers (scoring 45 points less).

This 45 point difference in reading scores between first-generation migrant-origin children and native children in Northern Ireland is substantively large. For example, this difference is nearly twice as large as the difference in reading scores between children whose parents have a third-level educational qualification and those whose parents do not (26 point difference).⁴¹


⁴¹ For further details of proficiency levels, see OECD (2019a). 'The Road to Integration: Education and migration', in OECD *Reviews of migrant education*. OECD Publishing. <https://doi.org/10.1787/d8ceec5d-en>.

FIGURE 3.1 MEAN READING ABILITY SCORES AMONG NATIVE-ORIGIN, AND FIRST- AND SECOND-GENERATION MIGRANT-ORIGIN STUDENTS AT AGE 15

Source: Programme for International Student Assessment (2018).

Note: Sample sizes: native-born n=3,555 (IRE), n=1,802 (NI); 1st generation n=727 (IRE), n=254 (NI); 2nd generation n=1,202 (IRE), n=224 (NI).

We next look at children's proficiency in maths. Again, it is worth noting that both Ireland and the UK as a whole score above the average in maths proficiency for OECD countries (OECD, 2019b). Figure 3.2 shows the average maths proficiency score among native children, and first- and second-generation migrant-origin children, in the two jurisdictions. In Ireland, we again see very little difference between groups of migrant-origin children and Irish-origin children. First-generation migrant-origin children essentially score the same as Irish-origin children (a 1 point difference). Second-generation migrant-origin children again have marginally higher scores than their Irish-origin peers (scoring 6 points higher), and this difference is also statistically significant (Table A3.1). In Northern Ireland, we again see highly similar scores between native-origin children and second-generation migrant-origin children (scoring 5 points higher). However, we also again see first-generation migrant-origin children recording substantially lower scores than their peers of Northern Irish (UK) origin (scoring 39 points lower). Again, this score is substantively large. This 39 point difference is also larger than the difference in maths scores between children whose parents do and do not have tertiary educations (a 28 point difference). The scores for proficiency in science follow a similar pattern as for maths and reading proficiency (Figure A3.1).

FIGURE 3.2 MEAN MATHS ABILITY SCORES AMONG NATIVE-ORIGIN STUDENTS, AND FIRST- AND SECOND-GENERATION MIGRANT-ORIGIN STUDENTS AT AGE 15

Source: Programme for International Student Assessment (2018).

Note: Sample sizes: native-born n=3,555 (IRE), n=1,802 (NI); 1st generation n=727 (IRE), n=254 (NI); 2nd generation n=1,202 (IRE), n=224 (NI).

In summary, in Ireland, migration background (and generational status) matter little for children's educational outcomes. Both first- and second-generation migrant-origin children perform just as well, if not slightly better, than their native peers. In Northern Ireland, however, we see a different pattern. As in Ireland, second-generation migrant-origin children are also performing at least as well as their native peers. However, first-generation migrant-origin children report much lower scores than their native peers and second-generation migrant-origin peers. These patterns are broadly consistent across reading, maths, and science proficiency scores.

3.4 EXPLAINING DIFFERENCES IN PROFICIENCY SCORES BETWEEN CHILDREN WITH AND WITHOUT A MIGRANT BACKGROUND IN IRELAND AND NORTHERN IRELAND

The findings above show that some migrant-origin groups exhibit differences in their cognitive outcomes compared to their native peers, especially in Northern Ireland. However, young people's cognitive outcomes are shaped by a range of factors, including the characteristics of children themselves (such as their gender and age), the socio-economic status of their parents (such as parental education or occupation), as well as characteristics of students' schools and local areas. Migrant-origin young people often differ from their native peers in relation to these characteristics as well. For example, migrant-origin children can be over-

represented in more disadvantaged schools or live in households with lower economic resources (Darmody et al., 2022). Migrant-origin children also differ between one another in terms of their linguistic background and host-country language skills. Any differences in cognitive outcomes between migrant-origin children and their native peers could therefore be driven by these other characteristics.

In the following section, we explore how far we can explain differences in cognitive scores between native young people and those of migrant origin in Ireland and Northern Ireland. To do so, we begin by modelling students' reading scores using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression. Table 3.1 shows the results of these OLS models for students' reading ability in Ireland (Models 1-3) and Northern Ireland (Models 4-6). In Models 1 and 4, we only include an indicator of students' migration status, where native children are the reference or baseline category. Coefficients for each group of migrant-origin children therefore represent the difference in their reading score compared to natives' reading score. In Models 2 and 5 we add children's English language ability (proxied by whether they speak English at home or not) to the model to see how far its inclusion changes the coefficients for our indicator of migration status. In Models 3 and 6 we then add in a full range of indicators of children's socio-demographic status. These variables include: a student's gender; age; a composite index of students' economic, social and cultural status⁴² (ESCS); the proportion of a student's year group in their school whose 'heritage language is different from test language' (a binary variable comparing schools where 10 per cent or less students have a different heritage language, to schools where 11 per cent or more do – estimated by school administrator); the proportion of a student's year group in their school who are 'from socioeconomically disadvantaged homes' (a binary variable comparing schools where 10 per cent or less students come from socioeconomically disadvantaged homes, to schools where 11 per cent or more do – estimated by school administrator); and whether a student's school is in a more urban or rural area.

⁴² The ESCS is a composite indicator of a student's social, economic, and cultural background, pre-derived within the PISA data based on three indicators: highest parental occupation, parental education, and an indicator of a child's home possessions. The indicator of home possessions is a summary index of whether a child has (or lives in a household with) various household items, such as their own bedroom, the number of books in the household, car(s), or if they have computers in their household.

TABLE 3.1 MODELLING DIFFERENCES IN READING ABILITY BETWEEN CHILDREN WITH AND WITHOUT A MIGRANT BACKGROUND AT AGE 15 (OLS)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
	IRE	IRE	IRE	NI	NI	NI
	No controls	+ English at home	+ socio-demographics	No controls	+ English at home	+ socio-demographics
Baseline: not migrant-origin						
1st Gen.	-3.745	11.55*	4.565	-45.43***	-41.515***	-33.908***
2nd Gen.	8.077*	11.058**	3.578	5.054	5.672	2.434
Baseline: other language at home						
English spoken at home		30.588***	19.306***		11.62	9.5
Baseline: female						
Male			-19.869***			-32.48***
Age			12.411***			9.589
Index of economic, social and cultural status			31.975***			20.016***
Baseline: 0-10% of school non-native students						
11+% of school composed of non-native students			-3.436			-23.181**
Missing			-10.219			25.277
Baseline: 0-10% of school composed of disadvantaged students						
11+% of school composed of disadvantaged students			-14.031**			-59.543***
Missing			-13.378			-44.691*
Baseline: Village, hamlet, rural area						
Small town			11.507*			45.356***
Town			0.773			44.14**
City			1.028			64.144***
Large city			9.829			85.794***
Missing			24.118			-
Constant	518.131***	487.592***	338.052***	509.156***	497.8***	396.64***
Observations	5,484	5,484	5,484	2,280	2,280	2,280

Source: 2018 PISA.

Note: *** p<.001, ** p<.01, * p<.05, + p<.10. Weighted.

Model 1 (Table 3.1) demonstrates that, in Ireland, there is no significant difference between the reading scores of native students and first-generation migrant-origin students. It also confirms that second-generation migrant-origin students perform slightly better than their native peers (this difference is statistically significant). Model 2 accounts for whether students speak English at home or not. Speaking English at home has a clear positive association with students' reading proficiency

(those who do speak English at home score, on average, 31 points higher). However, after accounting for students' linguistic background, first-generation migrant-origin children now perform significantly better than their native peers (and second-generation migrant-origin children see their positive reading score gap with native children further increase). Migrant-origin children, especially the first-generation, are less likely to speak English at home (only 50 per cent of first-generation migrant-origin students do), disadvantaging their English reading proficiency relative to non-migrant-origin students. However, once we account for this educational disadvantage, first-generation migrant-origin children actually perform better than native children.

We next explore whether differences in students' socio-demographic characteristics can account for these higher reading scores among first- and second-generation migrant-origin children. After controlling for the full range of socio-demographic control variables (Model 3), the higher reading scores among first- and second-generation migrant-origin children are now reduced by between 60 and 70 per cent and are no longer significantly different from their native peers. A key reason for this is that migrant-origin children score higher on their index of household economic, social, and cultural status – a strong predictor of better educational outcomes. This corresponds to findings from Chapter 2 demonstrating that adult migrants in Ireland, for example, generally have higher levels of education than non-migrant adults or are just as likely to be in professional occupations. Once we account for this relative advantage among migrant-origin students in Ireland, they perform just as well as native children in reading proficiency.

Turning our focus to Northern Ireland, Model 4 confirms that there is almost no difference in the reading scores between native and second-generation migrant-origin children but that first-generation migrant-origin children score much lower than their native peers (and this difference is highly significant). Unlike in Ireland, however, accounting for students' linguistic background explains little of the differences in reading scores among first-generation migrant-origin students – the size of their performance gap with native students is only reduced by 8 per cent after controlling for whether children speak English at home (Model 5). However, Model 6 demonstrates that socio-demographic differences between students do explain part of the lower test scores of first-generation migrant-origin children – the size of their reading-score gap with native students is now reduced by 18 per cent. As in Ireland, migrants' economic, social, and cultural household status appears to be the main reason for this. However, unlike in Ireland, first-generation migrant-origin students come from somewhat more disadvantaged backgrounds than their native peers. This is similarly reflected in the findings from Chapter 2, in which migrants in Northern Ireland have similar levels of education but are less likely to be in professional occupations. This relative disadvantage thus explains

part of the lower reading scores among first-generation migrant-origin students. However, even after accounting for such socio-demographic differences, they continue to score far below their native peers as well as their second-generation migrant-origin peers.

These findings are broadly consistent for students' maths proficiency (see Table A3.1). The only divergence in this pattern is that no statistically significant differences emerge in maths scores in Ireland between native and first-generation migrant-origin children, regardless of differences in their linguistic and economic, social, and cultural backgrounds.⁴³ Defining migrant-origin children as those with two parents born abroad rather than one also generates broadly comparable findings as those reported here.⁴⁴

Several notable differences also emerge between Ireland and Northern Ireland in the effects of students' socio-economic backgrounds on their cognitive outcomes. School and place characteristics appear more important in Northern Ireland: the migrant composition of schools matters for Northern Irish students, but not Irish students. School socio-economic composition also has a much stronger effect on student outcomes in Northern Ireland – over and above an individual student's background. This is consistent with the findings of Smyth et al. (2022), who find much larger differences between schools in Northern Ireland than in Ireland, and attribute this to the selective nature of secondary education in Northern Ireland.⁴⁵ Further research would be needed to investigate in more depth whether migrant-origin children are less likely to be found in the more advantaged grammar schools in Northern Ireland, and whether this contributes to their lower achievement scores. In Northern Ireland, the models also show that students in rural areas perform worse than their peers in more urbanised areas. However, in Ireland, we see much less difference in scores between more rural and more urban areas. While in general migrants are more likely to live in urban areas, Chapter 2 showed how East Europeans in Northern Ireland are more likely to live in rural areas. The strong area-effects in NI too would merit further investigation.

⁴³ This is likely because English language ability is less important for maths proficiency than reading proficiency

⁴⁴ The findings for Northern Ireland do not significantly change between definitions of a child's migrant-background. In Ireland, defining migrants as those with two parents born abroad does not lead to large differences in their maths or science scores relative to native-born student; only that migrant children with two parents born abroad report similar maths and science scores as their native-born peers, and not the marginally higher scores observed here. A larger difference emerges for reading proficiency in Ireland – first- and second-generation migrant children (where both their parents were born abroad) report lower reading scores than their native-born peers. This, however, is driven by the higher likelihood that they do not speak English at home.

⁴⁵ See Smyth et al. (2022) for further discussion of academic selection in the secondary school system in Northern Ireland.

3.5 COMPARING WELLBEING AMONG CHILDREN WITH AND WITHOUT A MIGRATION BACKGROUND


The second dimension of migrant-origin children's social integration that we explore is patterns of wellbeing. The PISA data provide two instruments for measuring students' wellbeing. The first is an index capturing 'subjective wellbeing: positive affect' (SWB). Positive affect refers to 'the extent to which an individual subjectively experiences positive moods such as joy, interest, and alertness', and persons who experience a greater range of mental and physical health benefits (Miller, 2011). Students were asked: '[t]hinking about yourself and how you normally feel: how often do you feel as described below?' Feelings included 'joyful', 'cheerful' and 'happy', and responses ranged from (1) 'Never' to (4) 'Always'. Responses were transformed into a derived index of SWB which is available within the data (ranging from -3 to 1.2).

We begin by looking at average levels of SWB among native children and different groups of migrant-origin children (Figure 3.3). On average, young people in Ireland have higher SWB than their Northern Irish peers, which stands at -0.08 in Ireland and -0.18 in Northern Ireland. The average across all countries in the PISA data is 0.1, suggesting both jurisdictions have below average SWB, although Northern Ireland youth more so.⁴⁶

Among migrant-origin students in Ireland, the first-generation report slightly lower SWB than their native peers (0.07 points lower). SWB is somewhat better among the second generation in Ireland, who essentially report the same SWB as their native peers. However, these differences across all groups in Ireland are very small. In Northern Ireland, there are essentially no differences in SWB between first-generation migrant-origin students and their native peers (whose SWB is 0.01 points higher). Where there are differences is between natives and second-generation migrant-origin children: their SWB is 0.21 points lower than their native peers. This difference is substantively important in comparative terms. For example, it is close to the difference in SWB between young people who 'never or almost never' experienced being 'hit or pushed around by other students' during the past 12 months and those who experienced it 'a few times a month' (whose SWB is 0.25 points lower).

⁴⁶ Across all participating countries, Panama (average 0.39), Montenegro (0.4), and Kazakhstan (0.57) have some of the highest youth SWB, while countries such as Slovenia (average -0.61), Lebanon (-0.32), and Turkey (-0.26) have some of the lowest SWB.


FIGURE 3.3 MEANS SCORES OF SUBJECTIVE WELLBEING (SWB) AMONG NATIVE AND MIGRANT-ORIGIN CHILDREN IN IRELAND AND NORTHERN IRELAND AT AGE 15



Source: Programme for International Student Assessment (2018)
Note: Sample sizes: native-born n=3,384 (IRE), n=1,689 (NI); 1st generation n=685 (IRE), n=230 (NI); 2nd generation n=1,144 (IRE), n=207 (NI).

A complementary way of measuring wellbeing is via students’ ‘Eudemonia: meaning in life’ (EUD), that is achieved through having a meaningful purpose in one’s life, where individuals feel a sense of control of their lives and have connections with other people (Niemiec, 2014).

FIGURE 3.4 MEAN SCORES OF EUDEMONIA (EUD) AMONG NATIVE AND MIGRANT CHILDREN IN IRELAND AND NORTHERN IRELAND



Source: Programme for International Student Assessment (2018)
Note: Sample sizes: native-born n=3,384 (IRE), n=1,689 (NI); 1st generation n=685 (IRE), n=230 (NI); 2nd generation n=1,144 (IRE), n=207 (NI).

Students were asked: '[h]ow much do you agree with the following statements?' 'My life has clear meaning or purpose', 'I have discovered a satisfactory meaning in life', and 'I have a clear sense of what gives meaning to my life', with responses ranging from (1) 'Strongly Disagree' to (4) 'Strongly Agree'. Responses were transformed into an index of EUD that is provided within the PISA data. For the most part, these patterns mirror those of SWB, although the differences are not quite as large (see Figure 3.4).

We now examine whether any of the differences in SWB between migrant-origin children and their native peers can be explained by any differences in their linguistic background, their socio-economic backgrounds, the schools they go to, or the type of area in which they live. To do so, we apply multi-level linear models⁴⁷ to examine the predictors of SWB (Table 3.2). Models 1 (Ireland) and 4 (Northern Ireland) only include a student's migration status to predict SWB, with native children as the reference category. Models 2 (Ireland) and 5 (Northern Ireland) then include all the available measures of students' linguistic, parental, and socio-demographic backgrounds. Model 3 (Ireland) and 6 (Northern Ireland) then include an indicator of a student's sense of belonging to school.

In Ireland, only first-generation migrant-origin students have a statistically significant lower SWB score than their native peers, although the difference is marginal (and only significant at the $p < 0.1$ level) (Model 1). However, this gap cannot be explained by any differences in their socio-demographic backgrounds. Once we control for their social and demographic background, their SWB gap actually increases slightly (and is now statistically significant at the $p < 0.05$ level) (Model 2). In Northern Ireland, only second-generation migrant-origin children have a statistically significant lower SWB score than their native peers (Model 4), although this gap is twice as large as the gap for first-generation English-at-home speakers in Ireland. None of their lower SWB can be explained by differences in their social and demographic backgrounds with native peers (Model 5).

⁴⁷ This accounts for the clustering of students within schools.

TABLE 3.2 MODELLING NATIVE-MIGRANT-ORIGIN SUBJECTIVE WELLBEING IN IRELAND AND NORTHERN IRELAND (MIXED LINEAR MODELS)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Jurisdiction	IRE	IRE	IRE	NI	NI	NI
	No controls	Full controls	+ school belonging	No controls	Full controls	+ school belonging
Baseline: native						
1st Gen.	-0.079 ⁺	-0.119 [*]	-0.080 ⁺	-0.032	0.025	0.006
	(0.045)	(0.055)	(0.048)	(0.083)	(0.098)	(0.096)
2nd Gen.	-0.021	-0.036	-0.026	-0.230 ^{**}	-0.229 ^{**}	-0.176 [*]
	(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.031)	(0.077)	(0.077)	(0.069)
Baseline: other language at home						
English spoken at home		-0.077	-0.095		0.140	0.052
		(0.072)	(0.063)		(0.113)	(0.107)
Baseline: female						
Male		0.017	-0.059 [*]		-0.052	-0.100 [*]
		(0.033)	(0.028)		(0.057)	(0.050)
Age		-0.006	0.015		-0.033	-0.072
		(0.047)	(0.044)		(0.090)	(0.084)
Index of economic, social and cultural status		0.055 ^{**}	0.036 [*]		0.078 ^{**}	0.059 [*]
		(0.018)	(0.017)		(0.028)	(0.025)
Baseline: 0-10% of school non-native students						
11+% of school composed of non-native students		-0.046	-0.036		0.018	-0.015
		(0.037)	(0.033)		(0.091)	(0.073)
Missing		0.012	0.018		-0.122 ⁺	-0.114 [*]
		(0.053)	(0.051)		(0.071)	(0.051)
Baseline: 0-10% of school composed of disadvantaged students						
11+% of school composed of disadvantaged students		0.051	0.028		0.056	0.083
		(0.034)	(0.032)		(0.066)	(0.062)
Missing		0.046	0.023		0.287 ⁺	0.354 ^{**}
		(0.099)	(0.095)		(0.157)	(0.132)
Baseline: Village, hamlet, rural area						
Small town		0.006	0.024		-0.020	0.031
		(0.042)	(0.039)		(0.109)	(0.083)
Town		-0.025	-0.018		-0.045	-0.012
		(0.046)	(0.042)		(0.107)	(0.086)
City		0.015	0.007		-0.057	0.019
		(0.046)	(0.051)		(0.111)	(0.088)

Contd.

TABLE 3.2 CONTD.

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Jurisdiction	IRE	IRE	IRE	NI	NI	NI
	No controls	Full controls	+ school belonging	No controls	Full controls	+ school belonging
Large city		-0.077 ⁺ (0.045)	-0.073 ⁺ (0.044)		-0.308 ^{**} (0.118)	-0.336 ^{***} (0.097)
Missing		-0.081 (0.103)	-0.149 (0.094)		0.000 (.)	0.000 (.)
Sense of school belonging			0.406 ^{***} (0.013)			0.439 ^{***} (0.023)
Constant	-0.081 ^{***} (0.018)	0.046 (0.740)	-0.081 (0.689)	-0.160 ^{***} (0.028)	0.270 (1.440)	1.062 (1.343)
Observations	5,213	5,213	5,161	2,126	2,126	2,098

Source: 2018 PISA.

Note: *** p<.001, ** p<.01, * p<.05, + p<.10.

One factor that does appear to be important for explaining gaps in migrant-origin children's lower SWB where they appear is their sense of belonging to school, such as 'how far they feel like an outsider (or are left out of things) at school', whether they 'feel like they belong at school', or how far they 'feel lonely'. In Model 3 (Ireland) and Model 6 (Northern Ireland) we include a composite indicator of a student's sense of school belonging. In Ireland, first-generation migrant-origin children have levels of school belonging almost twice as low as their native-peers. When we account for this difference, the observed gap in SWB between first-generation migrant-origin students and native is reduced by 33 per cent, and now significant only at the p<0.1 level (Model 3). In Northern Ireland, it is second-generation migrant-origin children who have levels of school belonging that are almost twice as low as their native peers. Once we account for students' feelings of belonging to their school, the gap between these groups is reduced by 25 per cent (Model 6).

3.6 SUMMARY

This chapter explored the cognitive outcomes (maths/reading/science) and mental wellbeing of the children of migrant-origin students and their native peers in Ireland and Northern Ireland. In Ireland, differences in cognitive outcomes between migrant-origin students and their native peers are generally small. Second-generation migrant-origin children do tend to report somewhat better scores than their native peers. Furthermore, once poorer English language skills among first-generation migrant-origin children in Ireland are accounted for, first-generation migrant-origin children also perform better than their native peers. A key part of why migrant-origin children in Ireland are performing somewhat

better than their native peers is because, on average, they come from households with relatively greater social, economic and cultural resources, which are strongly associated with educational outcomes.


In Northern Ireland, we also find second generation migrant-origin children performing at least as well as their native peers in maths, reading and science proficiency. However, unlike their experience in Ireland, first-generation migrant-origin students in Northern Ireland report much lower scores than their native peers. Part of the reason for this is that, unlike in Ireland, first-generation migrant-origin children in Northern Ireland come, on average, from households with somewhat fewer social, economic and cultural resources, which disadvantages their educational outcomes. However, even after accounting for differences in students' linguistic and socio-demographic backgrounds, first-generation migrant-origin children in Northern Ireland continue to experience a large gap in their cognitive scores with their native peers.

In both jurisdictions, therefore, second-generation migrant-origin children are performing at least as well, if not better, than their native peers. Yet, first-generation migrant-origin children in Northern Ireland see a significant gap in their cognitive outcomes with their native peers that is not present in Ireland, and this gap cannot be explained by their linguistic or socio-demographic characteristics.

The mental wellbeing of most children of migrants does not substantially differ from that of their native peers in either jurisdiction. In Ireland, wellbeing is slightly lower among first-generation migrant-origin children, although this difference is marginal. In Northern Ireland, levels of wellbeing are also essentially the same between natives and first-generation migrant-origin groups. The exception to this pattern is second generation migrant-origin students in Northern Ireland. This group show lower mental wellbeing than their native peers. None of the wellbeing differences between natives and migrant-origin students in Ireland or Northern Ireland appear driven by differences in the socio-demographic factors studied here, though we do find that some of the gap is explained by a lower sense of belonging in school experienced by migrant-origin young people in Northern Ireland. It is likely that some migrant-origin children experience greater difficulties, for example those from ethnic minority or refugee backgrounds, both factors we do not observe in these data (McMullen et al., 2020). It may also be that differences in the attitudinal climate towards migrants in the two jurisdictions may play a role in children's acculturation and sense of belonging. Examining this among children would require further investigation using different data. The next chapter does address how immigrants and their families have been received by the host populations in Ireland and Northern Ireland.

Chapter 3 Appendix

FIGURE A3.1 MEAN SCIENCE ABILITY SCORES AMONG NATIVES, AND FIRST- AND SECOND-GENERATION MIGRANT-ORIGIN STUDENTS BY WHETHER THEY SPEAK ENGLISH AT HOME



Source: Programme for International Student Assessment (2018)

Note: Sample sizes: native-born n=3,555 (IRE), n=1,802 (NI); 1st generation n=727 (IRE), n=254 (NI); 2nd generation n=1,202 (IRE), n=224 (NI).

TABLE A3.1 MODELLING NATIVE-MIGRANT DIFFERENCES IN MATHS ABILITY (OLS)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
	IRE	IRE	IRE	NI	NI	NI
	No controls	+ English at home	+ socio-demographics	No controls	+ English at home	+ socio-demographics
Baseline: native						
1st Gen.	1.227	3.281	-2.516	-38.754***	-37.122***	-30.522**
2nd Gen.	6.169 ⁺	6.569*	1.109	4.691	4.948	0.015
Baseline: other language at home						
English spoken at home		4.107	-6.542		4.846	2.676
Baseline: female						
Male			8.777**			-2.903
Age			13.111**			13.678 ⁺
Index of economic, social and cultural status			30.066***			22.529***
Baseline: 0-10% of school non-native students						
11+% of school composed of non-native students			-4.3			-23.379**
Missing			-6.256			25.233
Baseline: 0-10% of school composed of disadvantaged students						
11+% of school composed of disadvantaged students			-10.397*			-54.043***
Missing			-5.148			-40.883
Baseline: Village, hamlet, rural area						
Small town			8.471 ⁺			43.695***
Town			-1.026			43.536**
City			-1.963			58.474***
Large city			1.748			59.476***
Missing			14.562			
Constant	498.961***	494.861***	290.385***	498.744***	494.008***	281.618***
Observations	5,484	5,484	5,484	2,280	2,280	2,280

Source: 2018 PISA.

Note: *** p<.001, ** p<.01, * p<.05, + p<.10. Weighted.

CHAPTER 4

Comparing attitudes to immigrants

4.1 PREVIOUS EVIDENCE ON ATTITUDES TO IMMIGRANTS

As noted in Chapter 1, while migrants have much to contribute to their host countries, there can be a certain level of anxiety among the host population about migrants and their impact, which may manifest differently in Ireland and Northern Ireland as compared to elsewhere as there is no long history of inward migration (Crangle, 2023). Understanding these attitudes is important. The ‘attitudinal climate’ will affect how welcome migrants feel, their everyday experience and their wellbeing. Attitudes may also affect decision-makers and the decisions they make, be they employers, service providers or policymakers. Immigration can sometimes be a highly salient and divisive political issue, which may influence and indeed polarise attitudes (Ford and Heath, 2014). This chapter compares attitudes towards immigrants in Ireland and Northern Ireland, using high-quality, identical questions in 2017/2018 survey data.

Most research in the area draws on social identity theory – the idea that people construct ‘in-groups’ and ‘out-groups’, and perceive positive qualities of the former and negative characteristics of the latter (Hewstone et al., 2002). An extension of social identity theory – group threat theory – argues that the in-group perceive the out-group to be a threat to their jobs, welfare or cultural values (Quillian, 1995; Hainmueller and Hopkins, 2014). Two types of threat are usually distinguished. One is primarily material or realistic, referring to any threat to the economic or physical wellbeing of the ‘in-group’ for example to their jobs, financial resources or housing. The second is more symbolic, that is the perception that immigrants have differing belief systems and moral values that pose a threat to the values and symbols of the majority group, regarding for example the role of women in society or religious values. Some authors argue that economic threat might be more relevant for attitudes to economic migrants, and cultural threat for those from different cultures (Heath and Richards, 2016).

Consistent with the fact that migration has been predominantly labour migration since 2000 in both jurisdictions (see Chapter 1), previous research has shown that the population values migrants’ contribution to the labour force in both Ireland and Northern Ireland (Michael, 2021). Yet, consistent with research on economic threat (Billiet et al., 2014), attitudes in Ireland were found to be quite sensitive to the economic cycle. McGinnity and Kingston (2017) showed how attitudes became more positive during the economic boom, a period when many migrants came to Ireland, but became more negative in the recession period as jobs became scarce.

Related to the economic threat hypothesis, how people perceive their current social and economic situation and whether it will get better or worse in the future also relates to their attitudes to immigration. People who feel more insecure about their socio-economic position, and that their conditions in life are likely not to improve, or even to get worse, can feel immigrants are a potential threat to their current standing and security, and view them as a competition for scarce resources, such as employment, welfare support, health services and housing; in turn, this leads to greater hostility towards migrants (Billiet, 2014).

Drawing on the notion of cultural threat, previous research has also shown evidence of 'ethnic hierarchies' in attitudes, with groups perceived as being more culturally or ethnically different perceived more negatively. This is true of, for example, Muslims and Roma in Ireland (McGinnity et al., 2018), and in Northern Ireland (McKee, 2016; Devine, 2018).⁴⁸ In Ireland immigration from the same ethnic group as most Irish people – White immigration – is consistently viewed more favourably than immigration from a different ethnic group (McGinnity et al., 2018), and EU immigration is viewed more favourably than non-EU immigration (*ibid.*).

Some authors point to the role of political and media commentary in the public understanding of and attitudes to immigration. As Ivarsflaten (2005) notes, anti-immigrant elites such as explicitly anti-immigrant political parties and prominent anti-immigrant media outlets play an important role in persuading the public that restrictive immigration and asylum policies are an appropriate response to concerns about culture and identity. This was particularly true in the UK, and likely linked to the Brexit vote (Portes, 2020).

What factors can modify these views? Extensive research shows that positive social contact with immigrants (and members of ethnic outgroups more generally) can reduce prejudice, feelings of threat and anxiety towards immigrants, not least by undermining the stereotypes people hold about immigrants (Allport, 1954; Hewstone and Swart, 2011). Particularly effective for improving attitudes are close social bonds with immigrants, such as having immigrant friends and family (Pettigrew and Tropp, 2006). Previous research has shown that people with more frequent social contact with migrants and ethnic minorities tend to be more welcoming towards immigrants and immigration in Ireland (McGinnity et al.,

⁴⁸ Attitudes to Irish Travellers are particularly negative in both jurisdictions (Devine, 2018; MacGreil, 2011).

2018).⁴⁹ In Northern Ireland, McKee (2016) finds partial support for the social contact hypothesis for less positive attitudes to migrants among Protestants.

Another relevant factor associated with attitudes to immigration is individuals' political efficacy – that is to what extent an individual feels 'that political and social change is possible and that the individual citizen can play a part in bringing about this change' (Campbell, 1954, p. 187). Feeling like one cannot affect change in society via political means can heighten feelings of powerlessness and alienation, undermine political trust, and generate perceptions that one's status may be threatened by newly arriving groups without the means to protect it (Ziller and Berning, 2021).

A recurring theme in research on the topic in Northern Ireland has been the relationship between racism and sectarianism (antipathy in the relationship between Protestants and Catholics). Several authors have argued that sectarianism in Northern Ireland is, in fact, an extension of racism, and have found that those who are more sectarian (culturally distant from or negative towards the other religion) also hold more negative attitudes to immigrants or ethnic minorities (McKee, 2016). Religion also appears to play a role, with Protestants in Northern Ireland found to hold more negative attitudes to immigrants and ethnic minorities than Catholics, even after accounting for levels of sectarian sentiment (McKee, 2016; Devine, 2018; Doebler et al., 2018). For example, Devine (2018) using Northern Ireland Life and Times data found that between 2005 and 2016, a higher proportion of Protestant respondents reported they were very or a little prejudiced against people from minority ethnic communities (29 per cent in 2016, compared to 21 per cent of Catholics). However, this gap between Protestant and Catholics has narrowed since the early 2000s, mainly due to more favourable attitudes among the Protestant community (*ibid.*; see also Michael et al., 2021). Religious affiliation is not measured in the comparative data source for the chapter, nor is there any potential measure of sectarian attitudes, so while we acknowledge the role sectarianism may play in understanding attitudes to immigrants and immigration Northern Ireland, we cannot explicitly investigate this. It has also not been a theme in research on the topic in Ireland.

⁴⁹ McGinnity et al. (2018) do note that it is not always possible to assess the direction of effect here: it could also be that those with more positive attitudes to immigrants are more likely to seek contact.

4.2 COMPARING ATTITUDES TO MIGRANTS IN IRELAND AND NORTHERN IRELAND

4.2.1 Comparing attitudes to immigration and its impact in Ireland and Northern Ireland

To robustly compare attitudes towards migrants in Ireland and Northern Ireland we require datasets that asked people in both jurisdictions identical survey questions on their immigration attitudes. The Eurobarometer 88.2 (conducted in October 2017) and 89.1 (conducted in March 2018) datasets fulfil this criteria and provide a unique opportunity to directly compare people's attitudes towards immigration in Ireland and Northern Ireland. The key strengths of these data are that identical survey questions were asked in both jurisdictions; and prior to March 2018, the Eurobarometer included a boosted sample size of respondents in Northern Ireland⁵⁰ (necessary to generate more robust inferences). With these data, we can be much more confident that any differences in people's responses to questions on immigration in Ireland and Northern Ireland reflect substantive variations across contexts. In addition, the data contain questions on things like people's social mixing with migrants or their political efficacy, alongside their social and demographic characteristics. With these additional measures, we can also try and explain any differences in attitudes towards immigration that exist between jurisdictions. These data were collected following the Brexit vote (June 2016), but prior to the announcement of the Withdrawal Agreement and the UK leaving the EU (see Chapter 1). Section 4.3 compares more recent data, albeit with slightly different questions.


In the following section, we will compare attitudes towards immigration and integration in Ireland and Northern Ireland. We will then look at differences in key predictors of immigration attitudes between people in Ireland and Northern Ireland, including: their levels of social mixing with migrants, their levels of political efficacy, and their perceptions of whether their life will be better or worse in the future. Finally, we will explore how far these key predictors can explain any differences in attitudes towards immigration between jurisdictions.

We begin by looking directly at people's feelings towards immigration that comes from countries within the EU as opposed to countries outside the EU (Figure 4.1). This question was only available in the Eurobarometer 89.1 (March 2018) data. We find that in both jurisdictions people are more positive towards EU migrants than non-EU migrants, in line with previous research (Heath and Richards, 2016).

⁵⁰ After the UK decision to leave the EU, subsequent Eurobarometer waves no longer collected a Northern Ireland booster sample. Data from 2017 and 2018 are therefore the most recent data available to perform a comparative analysis between jurisdictions with a sufficiently large Northern Ireland sample size.

However, people in Ireland hold more positive views towards EU migrants than people in Northern Ireland, and also feel more positive towards non-EU migrants than people in Northern Ireland. In fact, in Ireland, people are essentially just as positive about non-EU migrants as people in Northern Ireland are about EU migrants.

FIGURE 4.1 ATTITUDES TOWARDS EU AND NON-EU MIGRANTS IN IRELAND AND NORTHERN IRELAND



Source: Eurobarometer 89.1 (March 2018).

Note: Sample size: n=947 in Ireland and n=301 in Northern Ireland. Question: 'Please tell me whether each of the following statements evokes a positive or negative feeling for you': (1) 'Immigration of people from other EU Member States'; and (2) 'Immigration of people from outside the EU'.

As discussed previously, research shows that one of the main determinants of whether people feel more positive or negative about migrants and immigration is what impact they think migrants will have on their society, such as whether migrants will take jobs away, increase crime, or enrich their society's culture – that is, their 'perceived threat' (Hainmueller and Hopkins, 2014). Such feelings of threat can lead to greater hostility or anxiety towards immigrants, support for more restrictive immigration policies, or even discrimination and harassment.

In the following section, we therefore look at how positively or negatively people evaluate the impact of immigrants on their society. In measuring these beliefs, the


Eurobarometer asked respondents to think specifically about the impact of non-EU migrants in particular.⁵¹ Respondents to the survey were asked: ‘There are different views regarding the impact of immigrants on society in [your country]. To what extent do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements? Overall, immigrants...’: (1) ‘Have an overall positive impact on [your country’s] economy’; (2) ‘Are a burden on our welfare system’ (score is reversed); (3) ‘Take jobs away from workers in [your country]’ (reversed); (4) ‘Help to fill jobs for which it’s hard to find workers in [your country]’; (5) ‘Bring new ideas and/or boost innovation in [your country]’; (6) ‘Enrich [your country’s] cultural life (art, music, food etc.)’; and (7) ‘Worsen the crime problems in [your country]’ (reversed). As these seven measures are highly related, they are combined to generate a mean score of how positive an individual feels non-EU immigration impacts their society, ranging from 1 ‘all negative’ to 4 ‘all positive’.

Figure 4.2 shows the average score of people’s views on how immigration impacts their society (where more positive values equate to more positive attitudes towards immigration), for Ireland and Northern Ireland. We can see that people in Ireland view the impact of non-EU immigration more positively (a mean score of 2.85) compared to people in Northern Ireland (a mean score of 2.64). On some dimensions, people in Ireland and Northern Ireland share more similar views. For example, the proportion of people in Ireland who ‘totally agree’ immigrants ‘help to fill jobs for which it’s hard to find workers’ is 3 percentage points higher than in Northern Ireland (35.5 per cent in Ireland and 32.9 per cent in NI), while the proportion of people is 6 percentage points higher in Ireland who ‘totally disagree’ that immigrants ‘are a burden on our welfare system’ (19.9 per cent in IRE and 13.7 per cent in NI). However, on other dimensions, people in Ireland are more positive: the proportion of people in Ireland who ‘totally disagree’ that immigrants ‘take jobs away from workers in [their country]’ is 9 percentage points higher (25.2 per cent in IRE and 16.4 per cent in NI), while the proportion in Ireland who ‘totally disagree’ that immigrants ‘worsen crime problems’ is 11 percentage points higher (23.8 per cent in IRE and 13 per cent in NI). This gap grows even larger for other dimensions. The proportion of people in Ireland who ‘totally agree’ that immigrants ‘have an overall positive impact on [their country’s] economy’ is 13 percentage points higher than in Northern Ireland (27.5 per cent in IRE and 14.6 per cent in NI), it is 13 percentage points higher in Ireland who ‘totally agree’ that immigrants ‘enrich [their country’s] cultural life (art, music, food etc.)’ (30.4 per cent in IRE and 17.3 per cent in NI), and 18 percentage points higher in Ireland who

⁵¹ Respondents were primed with the following instruction: ‘In the next questions, we will ask your opinion about immigrants in [your country] and the EU. In this interview, immigrants are defined as people born outside the European Union, who have moved away from their country of birth and are at the moment staying legally in [your country]. We are not talking about EU citizens, children of immigrants who have [your country’s] nationality and immigrants staying illegally’.

‘totally agree’ that immigrants ‘bring new ideas and/or boost innovation in [their country]’ (29 per cent in IRE and 11.5 per cent in NI).

FIGURE 4.2 BELIEF ABOUT THE IMPACT NON-EU IMMIGRATION IS PERCEIVED TO HAVE ON SOCIETY, IN IRELAND AND NORTHERN IRELAND



Source: Eurobarometer 88.2 (October 2017)

Note: Sample size: n=722 in Ireland and n=200 in Northern Ireland. Indicator is a mean score (1-4) of seven survey question responses: ‘There are different views regarding the impact of immigrants on society in [your country]. To what extent do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements? Overall, immigrants...’: (1) ‘Have an overall positive impact on [your country’s] economy’; (2) ‘Are a burden on our welfare system’ (reversed); (3) ‘Take jobs away from workers in [your country]’ (reversed); (4) ‘Help to fill jobs for which it’s hard to find workers in [your country]’; (5) ‘Bring new ideas and/or boost innovation in [your country]’; (6) ‘Enrich [your country’s] cultural life (art, music, food etc.)’; and (7) ‘Worsen the crime problems in [your country]’ (reversed).


4.2.2 Key drivers of beliefs about the impact of immigration

The findings so far suggest people in Ireland feel more positive about immigrants, feel immigrants are more successfully integrated into their society, and believe the impact of immigrants will be more positive, compared to people in Northern Ireland. We now explore how far such differences between jurisdictions can be explained based on insights from previous research discussed in Section 4.1. One reason we find differences in attitudes towards immigrants in Ireland and Northern Ireland is that people may have different levels of social contact with immigrants, different levels of political efficacy, and different views on their future life conditions. To explore this idea, we look at whether there are differences in the

levels of these three key drivers of immigration attitudes across the two jurisdictions.⁵²

Figure 4.3 looks at levels of political efficacy in the two jurisdictions. We capture political efficacy by creating a total score (ranging from 0 to 6) of people's responses to the following questions: 'Please tell me to what extent you agree or disagree with each of the following statements:' (1) 'My voice counts in the European Union'; and (2) 'My voice counts in [your country]'.⁵³ Figure 4.3 shows that people in Ireland report higher political efficacy than people in Northern Ireland. Interestingly, this difference applies to both their country and the EU. Looked at in detail, the proportion of people who 'totally agree' their voice counts is 11 percentage points higher in Ireland than in Northern Ireland (21 per cent compared to 10 per cent in Northern Ireland). Similarly, the proportion who 'totally agree' their voice counts in the EU is also 11 percentage points higher in Ireland than in Northern Ireland (16 per cent and 5 per cent in Northern Ireland).

FIGURE 4.3 POLITICAL EFFICACY IN IRELAND AND NORTHERN IRELAND ('MY VOICE COUNTS')



Source: Eurobarometer 88.2 (October 2017).


Note: Indicator the sum (ranging 0-6) of two survey questions: 'Please tell me to what extent you agree or disagree with each of the following statements: (1) 'My voice counts in the European Union'; and (2) 'My voice counts in [your country]'".

⁵² As discussed above, these data do not allow us to examine the religion of respondents or their attitudes to other religious groups.

⁵³ In Ireland the wording was 'My voice counts in Ireland'; in Northern Ireland 'My voice counts in the UK'.

We next turn to look at people’s views on whether their condition in life will get better or worse in the future. Respondents were asked: ‘In your opinion, in five years’ time, do you think that your life conditions will be better, worse, or the same than today?’ (1) ‘Better’; (2) ‘Worse’; (3) ‘The same/no change’ and (4) ‘Don’t Know’. Figure 4.4 shows the proportion of people in each jurisdiction who responded in each way. We see that the proportion of people in Northern Ireland who think their life will get worse is 5 percentage points higher than in Ireland (13 per cent compared to 8 per cent in Ireland), while the proportion in Northern Ireland who think their life will get better is 22 percentage points lower than in Ireland (24 per cent in Northern Ireland compared to 46 per cent in Ireland). In fact, feeling life will get better is actually the most common response in Ireland.

FIGURE 4.4 WHETHER PEOPLE THINK THEIR CONDITION IN LIFE WILL BE BETTER/WORSE IN FIVE YEAR’S TIME




Source: Eurobarometer 88.2 (October 2017).

Note: Survey question: ‘In your opinion, in five years’ time, do you think that your life conditions will be better, worse, or the same than today?’ (1) ‘Better’; (2) ‘Worse’; and (3) ‘The same/ no change’; (4) ‘don’t know’.

Lastly, we look at the proportion of people in Ireland and Northern Ireland who have friends and family members who are immigrants. Figure 4.5 shows that people in Northern Ireland appear to have fewer social ties with immigrants, where the majority of people have no immigrant family or friends (68 per cent). People in Northern Ireland also appear less likely to have immigrant family members, with only 6 per cent having immigrants in their family networks, while 26 per cent have at least an immigrant friend (but no family members). People in Ireland however are more likely to have immigrant family members and friends. Although 47 per cent have no immigrant family or friends, 13 per cent have an immigrant family

member, and 40 per cent have at least an immigrant friend (but no family members).

FIGURE 4.5 IMMIGRANT FAMILY AND FRIENDS IN IRELAND AND NORTHERN IRELAND



Source: Eurobarometer 88.2 (October 2017).

Note: Survey question: 'Please tell me which of the following statements applies best to you?': (1) 'You have friends who are immigrants currently living in the UK'; (2) 'You have family members who are immigrants currently living in the UK'; (3) 'You have both friends and family members who are immigrants currently living in the UK'; and (4) 'None'.

4.2.3 Explaining differences in how positively or negatively people view the impact of immigration between Ireland and Northern Ireland

We previously saw that people in Northern Ireland believe non-EU immigration is more likely to have a negative impact on their society, compared to people in Ireland (Figure 4.2). As outlined, social contact with immigrants, higher political efficacy, and more positive outlooks for one's future are generally associated with more positive attitudes towards immigration. We also saw that people in Northern Ireland tend to score lower on all these dimensions. Potentially, part of the reason why we find less positive views on immigration in Northern Ireland compared to Ireland may be explained by these differences in key drivers of immigration attitudes. This is what we explore in the next section.

To do so, we perform Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression analysis to model individuals' views on how positive or negative non-EU immigration is for their

society (where higher scores equate to feeling immigration will have a more positive effect). The results of this regression analysis can be found in Table A4.1. Our aim is to try and explain the less positive attitudes in Northern Ireland. Model 1 simply includes a binary variable for whether an individual lives in Ireland (the reference category) or Northern Ireland. In Model 2, we then introduce individuals' social and demographic characteristics (their age, gender, marital status, number of children <18 in the household, employment/occupational status, education, and urban/rural residence). These characteristics are frequently found to predict people's immigration attitudes and could help explain differences in attitudes between the jurisdictions. In Models 3-5, we then examine how much of the difference in attitudes between Ireland and Northern Ireland can be explained by each of our three key drivers. In Model 3, we add political efficacy to the model. In Model 4, we remove political efficacy and replace it with whether one thinks their life will become better or worse in the next five years. In Model 5, we remove this and replace it with whether an individual has immigrant friends and/or family. In the final model (Model 6), we include all three key drivers to see the total difference in attitudes between Ireland and Northern Ireland that these drivers explain.

Figure 4.6 visualises to what extent differences in immigration attitudes between Ireland and Northern Ireland can be explained by differences in the socio-demographic characteristics of people, and differences in levels of the key drivers of immigration attitudes.

Each graph shows predicted score of how positively/negatively people view immigrants' impact in Ireland and Northern Ireland, based (from left to right) on Models 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 (Table A4.1). In this way, we can see how the gap in attitudes changes when we account for different explanatory variables and controls.

The first graph (furthest left) shows predicted immigration attitudes after only controlling for individuals' social and demographic characteristics. Differences in the socio-demographic characteristics of people in Ireland and Northern Ireland (e.g. education, urban/rural residence) account for very little of the difference in immigration attitudes, and the gap in attitudes is only reduced by 12 per cent and remains statistically significant.


The second graph shows predicted attitudes after adding political efficacy to the model (alongside socio-demographics). We find people with higher political efficacy do report more positive immigration attitudes – people who 'totally agree' their voice is heard score 0.5 points higher on their immigration attitudes (on a scale of 1 to 4) than those who 'totally disagree'. We also see that the difference

in immigration attitudes between jurisdictions is reduced by 43 per cent, suggesting a large part of why people in Northern Ireland have less positive attitudes is because of their lower political efficacy.

The third graph shows predicted attitudes after removing political efficacy from the model and replacing it with individuals' views of whether their life will be better or worse in five years' time (alongside socio-demographic controls). People who believe their life will be better in five years report immigration attitudes that are 0.3 points more positive compared to those who think it will get worse. Furthermore, the gap in attitudes between jurisdictions is reduced by 50 per cent, suggesting that another key reason people in Northern Ireland report less positive immigration attitudes is due to the lower proportion of people who believe their life will get better in five years.

The fourth graph shows predicted immigration attitudes after removing people's views on their future prospects from the model and replacing it with whether people have immigrant friends and/or family. Having immigrant friends, or immigrant friends and family, is associated with immigration attitudes that are 0.3 to 0.4 points higher, compared to those without any immigrant friends or family members. Accounting for social contact with immigrants also reduces the gap in attitudes between Ireland and Northern Ireland by 54 per cent (and the difference between jurisdictions is now no longer statistically significant). This variable alone therefore accounts for over half of the difference in attitudes between jurisdictions.

FIGURE 4.6 UNDERSTANDING THE DIFFERENCE IN IMMIGRATION ATTITUDES BETWEEN IRELAND AND NORTHERN IRELAND



Source: Eurobarometer 88.2 (October 2017).

Note: Based on models in Table A4.1.

The fifth and final graph shows predicted immigration attitudes after we include all three key drivers of attitudes in the model. On doing so, the difference in attitudes towards immigration between Ireland and Northern Ireland is reduced by 93 per cent. In other words, almost all of the less positive attitudes that people in Northern Ireland have about immigration can be explained by their lower levels of political efficacy, their less optimistic outlook regarding their future, and the fewer immigrant friends and family they have.

4.3 HAVE ATTITUDES TO IMMIGRATION IN IRELAND AND NORTHERN IRELAND CHANGED OVER TIME?

Above, we looked at differences in the *level* of attitudes towards migrants in Ireland and Northern Ireland in late 2017 and early 2018 – that is, whether people have more positive or negative attitudes north and south of the border. However, people’s attitudes are not fixed and can change over time. Various factors occurring within a society, as well as across the world, can affect people’s views of migrants and migration. In particular, attitudes to immigrants or factors influencing attitudes, like political efficacy, may have changed following the Brexit vote in June 2016 and associated negotiations on the Withdrawal Agreement and the Northern Ireland protocol; economic recovery may have also changed attitudes in Ireland.

The analysis above used data that asked residents of both jurisdictions identical questions on their immigration attitudes at a single point in time. However, there are no similar datasets that also ask residents identical survey questions over multiple time points. We therefore turn to using two different sources of data (one for Ireland and one for Northern Ireland) which asked residents similar but not identical survey questions over multiple points in time. As slightly different survey questions are asked in each jurisdiction, we cannot directly compare the *level* of immigration attitudes in each jurisdiction, i.e. we cannot use these data to say whether attitudes are more or less positive in each jurisdiction (as we could above). Instead, these data can tell us about trends over time in people's attitudes towards immigration in each jurisdiction, and whether they are travelling in the same or a different direction.

To track changes over time in immigration attitudes in Northern Ireland, we use the Northern Ireland Life and Times survey (NILT). This is a yearly survey on the views and attitudes of Northern Irish residents. Respondents were asked: 'Do you think the number of immigrants to Northern Ireland nowadays should be increased a lot, increased a little, remain the same as it is, reduced a little, or reduced a lot?' This question was asked in 2012, 2013, 2014, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019 and 2020. For Ireland, we use data on Irish residents contained within the European Social Survey (ESS). This is a biennial Europe-wide survey of people's social and political attitudes.⁵⁴ The closest available ESS survey question to that contained in the NILT survey asks respondents a two-part question: 'Now some questions about people from other countries coming to live in Ireland. (1) To what extent do you think Ireland should allow people of the same race or ethnic group as most Irish people to come and live here' and '(2) How about people of a different race or ethnic group from most Irish people'. The response categories were: 'allow many to come live here', 'allow some', 'allow a few', 'allow none'. To make sure we are looking at a comparable timeframe to the Northern Ireland data, we look at responses in 2012, 2014, 2016 and 2018.⁵⁵


A key advantage of these questions is that they both ask people whether they are happy for immigrants to come to their country/region or not. In Northern Ireland, we look at the proportion of people who think immigration should be 'increased a lot/a little' while in Ireland we look at the proportion who believe Ireland should allow many/allow some' immigrants to come. Both these questions therefore capture the proportion who, ostensibly, are pro-immigration. That said, in Northern Ireland (NILT) respondents are asked about their views towards 'immigrants' while in Ireland (ESS) people are asked about their separate views on

⁵⁴ The ESS data do include the United Kingdom and therefore Northern Ireland. However, the number of respondents in Northern Ireland in the ESS is too low to generate robust measurements of their attitudes.

⁵⁵ ESS data from 2020 are set to be released in Spring 2023.

‘people of the same race or ethnic group’ coming to live in Ireland. We also consider attitudes in Ireland to ‘people of a different race or ethnic group’.


FIGURE 4.7 TRENDS OVER TIME IN ATTITUDES TOWARDS IMMIGRATION IN IRELAND



Source: European Social Survey 2012-2018

Note: Based on n=9,991 responses; weighted; survey question: ‘To what extent do you think Ireland should allow people of the same race or ethnic group as most Irish people to come and live here’...‘How about people of a different race or ethnic group from most Irish people’ – ‘allow many to come live here’, ‘allow some’, ‘allow a few’, ‘allow none’

We begin by looking at immigration attitudes in Ireland (Figure 4.8). Generally speaking, attitudes towards immigration have improved over time, coinciding with economic recovery. This is consistent with previous research which showed attitudes towards immigration in Ireland became more negative in recession and positive in times of economic growth (McGinnity and Kingston, 2017). Between 2012 and 2014 there was a slight decline in attitudes before they became more positive into 2016. Attitudes then improved at an even faster rate into 2018. By 2018, the proportion of people in Ireland who believed ‘many’ (same/different race/ethnicity) migrants should be allowed to come to Ireland was 10 to 12 percentage points higher than in 2012. We also find that people in Ireland are more positive about immigrants with the same race/ethnicity than a different race/ethnicity to most people in Ireland in all years.

FIGURE 4.8 TRENDS OVER TIME IN ATTITUDES TOWARDS IMMIGRATION IN NORTHERN IRELAND

Source: Northern Ireland Life and Times survey 2012-2020.

Note: Based on n=8,978 responses; weighted; survey question: 'Do you think the number of immigrants to Northern Ireland nowadays should be increased a lot, increased a little, remain the same as it is, reduced a little, or reduced a lot?'

In Figure 4.9, we look at immigration attitudes over time in Northern Ireland. We see that attitudes towards immigration in Northern Ireland follow a similar pattern of becoming generally more positive over time. From 2012 to 2014, we also saw a slight worsening of attitudes, with a decline in the proportion of people who would like immigration increased 'a little/a lot'. However, immigration attitudes then also became more positive again between 2014 and 2016, and, similar to Ireland, attitudes continued to become more positive and to improve at a faster rate up to 2020. By 2020, 25 per cent more people in Northern Ireland believed the amount of immigration should be increased 'a little/a lot' than in 2012.

It is striking that in both Ireland and Northern Ireland attitudes towards immigration have become more positive since 2012, especially since 2016 onward in Northern Ireland (see also Michael, 2021). In Northern Ireland, this trend mirrors a general improvement in immigration attitudes witnessed across the UK as a whole, especially since 2016. In the last five to six years, people in the UK have become more positive about the impact of immigration, less likely to want immigration reduced, and less likely to see immigration as an important issue facing the UK (Blinder and Richards, 2020; Portes, 2020; Rolfe et al., 2021). Several possible drivers for this shift have been suggested. The 2016 Brexit referendum may have led people to believe the UK now has more control over immigration,

and it was the amount of (perceived) control rather than the amount of immigration that mattered the most (Portes 2020; Rolfe, et al., 2021). The volume and tone of media stories around immigration may have become less negative since the Brexit referendum, an increase in the number of stories showing the damage caused by reduced immigration (e.g. shortage of nurses, lorry drivers) (Portes, 2020; Rolfe, et al., 2021). The pandemic may also have contributed to improved perceptions given the over-representation of migrants in key worker roles, especially during the pandemic (Portes, 2020). Interestingly, such improvement in attitudes have been seen among both those who voted Leave and Remain during the EU Referendum (Blinder and Richards, 2020). That said, Brexit debates in Northern Ireland have also differed from those in mainland UK, given the particular context there, and as Michael (2021) shows, increasing positive sentiment towards immigrants is part of a longer-term trend in Northern Ireland.

In Ireland, the improvement in attitudes may be driven by the continued improvement of the economy since the 2008-2009 recession. McGinnity et al. (2018) have shown the close link between the performance of the Irish economy and Irish attitudes towards immigration. As the economy continues to perform well, especially in the latter half of the last decade, Irish immigration attitudes may be continuing to improve. Attitudes may also be responding to the historically high levels of ethnic diversity in Ireland, which may be increasing levels of positive inter-ethnic contact with immigrants which we know, from above, is important for Ireland's positive attitudes towards immigrants.

What are the implications for the comparison of attitudes presented in Section 4.2? Based on Figures 4.7 and 4.8, attitudes to immigrants became more positive in Northern Ireland and Ireland. Although subject to a number of different factors, it seems likely that if we were to use identical questions for 2022 as presented in Section 4.2, the results would be broadly similar. If anything, the gap in attitudes between the jurisdictions might be slightly smaller in 2022 than in 2018, though without the data this is difficult to predict.

4.4 SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION

This chapter looked at differences in people's attitudes towards immigrants and immigration in Ireland and Northern Ireland in late 2017/2018. On the whole, people in Ireland have more positive attitudes towards immigrants and immigration than people in Northern Ireland. They hold more positive feelings towards immigrants from the EU and also for migrants from outside of the EU than their Northern Irish counterparts. They also believe that the impact of non-EU immigration will be more positive for their society than people in Northern Ireland, on dimensions such as the cultural life of their country or on jobs. Attitudes to immigrants vary considerably across different levels of education or social class, as

expected, but these factors do not account for the differences observed between Ireland and Northern Ireland.

There are also important differences in the levels of other key drivers of immigration attitudes between jurisdictions. People in Ireland are more likely to have friends and family who are immigrants, they report having greater political efficacy and feel their voice is more likely to be heard in politics, and they are also more optimistic about the condition of their life in five years' time. Positive contact with immigrants, political efficacy, and optimism about the future are strongly associated with more positive attitudes towards immigrants.⁵⁶ Testing demonstrated that almost all of the more negative views about the impact of immigration seen in Northern Ireland can be explained by these factors. In other words, attitudes towards immigration appear less positive in Northern Ireland primarily because people have lower levels of political efficacy, they have less optimistic outlooks regarding their future, and have fewer immigrant friends and family. Importantly, it is the combination of all three factors which account for the difference in immigration attitudes between jurisdictions.

In subsequent analysis we investigate change over time in attitudes to immigrants in both jurisdictions using two more recent data sources. While not directly comparable, these allow us to assess trends and the direction of change. Broadly, attitudes to immigration have become more supportive of immigration in both Ireland and Northern Ireland over recent years, with a particularly large increase in positive attitudes in Northern Ireland since 2016. While the increased positive sentiment in Northern Ireland was somewhat surprising, it is consistent with trends elsewhere in the UK.

We do not know exactly who or what respondents are thinking of when they hear the terms immigrant or non-EU immigrant: while these questions are carefully worded, there may be a discrepancy between who is perceived as an immigrant by the population and who counts as an immigrant for research or policymaking (see Chapter 1). Nor can we be sure that respondents are honestly revealing any negative sentiment they may hold. Creighton et al. (2022) found significant masking of negative attitudes to Black immigration in Ireland: attitudes to Black immigration were significantly more negative when respondents could anonymously express their attitudes via a survey experiment. That said, while some support for immigration may be overstated, if the extent of masking does

⁵⁶ Because these are cross-sectional data, we cannot infer from these associations that they are causal effects. For example, people with more positive immigration attitudes may be more likely to form friendships with immigrants, rather than friendship with immigration causing attitudes to improve. In all likelihood, such associations are bi-directional, with effects operating in both directions.

not differ between Ireland and Northern Ireland, our overall conclusion will not change.

We can be reasonably confident that, overall, attitudes are more positive to immigrants in Ireland than in Northern Ireland, with likely consequences for immigrants' wellbeing and feeling of belonging.

Chapter 4 Appendix

TABLE A4.1 MODELLING THE DIFFERENCES IN IMMIGRATION ATTITUDES NORTH AND SOUTH

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
	Impact of non-EU migration	Impact of non-EU migration	Impact of non-EU migration	Impact of non-EU migration	Impact of non-EU migration	Impact of non-EU migration
Variables present in the model	No controls	Demographics	Political efficacy	Life in 5 years' time	Immigrants as friends/family	All variables
Baseline - COUNTRY: IRE	ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.
NI	-0.197** (0.064)	-0.174** (0.059)	-0.113+ (0.059)	-0.100+ (0.057)	-0.090 (0.057)	-0.014 (0.056)
Age		-0.001 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.000 (0.002)	0.000 (0.002)	0.001 (0.002)
Baseline: Male		ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.
Female		0.026 (0.049)	0.038 (0.047)	0.010 (0.048)	0.040 (0.046)	0.031 (0.045)
Baseline: Unmarried		ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.
(Re-)Married/cohabiting		0.001 (0.078)	0.003 (0.074)	-0.002 (0.077)	-0.036 (0.074)	-0.034 (0.070)
Divorced or separated		-0.051 (0.132)	0.018 (0.131)	-0.047 (0.125)	-0.122 (0.120)	-0.069 (0.116)
Widowed		-0.093 (0.120)	-0.103 (0.117)	-0.092 (0.119)	-0.105 (0.116)	-0.109 (0.113)
Other		1.114*** (0.158)	0.801*** (0.165)	1.027*** (0.159)	1.248*** (0.156)	0.893*** (0.166)
Number of children <18 in HH		-0.034 (0.023)	-0.029 (0.023)	-0.035 (0.023)	-0.046* (0.022)	-0.040+ (0.022)
Baseline: Managers		ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.
Self-employed		-0.143 (0.092)	-0.102 (0.089)	-0.127 (0.093)	-0.109 (0.088)	-0.086 (0.086)
Other white collars		-0.267** (0.088)	-0.247** (0.086)	-0.271** (0.086)	-0.238** (0.083)	-0.233** (0.080)
Manual workers		-0.252** (0.084)	-0.207* (0.082)	-0.240** (0.085)	-0.241** (0.082)	-0.208** (0.080)
House persons		-0.127 (0.090)	-0.063 (0.091)	-0.091 (0.089)	-0.057 (0.090)	-0.002 (0.088)
Unemployed		-0.352* (0.137)	-0.273* (0.133)	-0.317* (0.133)	-0.278* (0.131)	-0.207 (0.127)
Retired		-0.162+ (0.091)	-0.119 (0.089)	-0.127 (0.090)	-0.126 (0.087)	-0.083 (0.084)
Students		0.196 (0.150)	0.186 (0.144)	0.206 (0.145)	0.143 (0.136)	0.149 (0.130)

Contd.

TABLE A4.1 CONTD.

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
	Impact of non-EU migration	Impact of non-EU migration	Impact of non-EU migration	Impact of non-EU migration	Impact of non-EU migration	Impact of non-EU migration
Variables present in the model	No controls	Demographics	Political efficacy	Life in 5 years' time	Immigrants as friends/family	All variables
Baseline: Rural area or village		ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.
Small/middle town		-0.172** (0.053)	-0.185*** (0.052)	-0.151** (0.052)	-0.179*** (0.051)	-0.169*** (0.050)
Large town		0.001 (0.057)	-0.003 (0.056)	0.001 (0.056)	-0.046 (0.055)	-0.041 (0.054)
Baseline: Age left school - 16 years or younger	ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.
17-18 years		0.154* (0.074)	0.118+ (0.072)	0.154* (0.072)	0.142* (0.070)	0.116+ (0.068)
19-20 years		0.240** (0.083)	0.194* (0.082)	0.241** (0.081)	0.160* (0.081)	0.134+ (0.081)
21 years and older		0.390*** (0.081)	0.304*** (0.080)	0.397*** (0.081)	0.327*** (0.079)	0.275*** (0.077)
Still studying		0.000 (.)	0.000 (.)	0.000 (.)	0.000 (.)	0.000 (.)
Refusal/Don't Know		0.074 (0.168)	0.018 (0.130)	0.082 (0.179)	0.004 (0.149)	-0.004 (0.139)
Baseline political efficacy: Totally Disagree have a voice EU/Nat			ref.			ref.
Level 1			0.027 (0.149)			-0.007 (0.145)
Level 2			0.129 (0.106)			0.087 (0.098)
Level 3			0.175 (0.111)			0.142 (0.104)
Level 4			0.265** (0.099)			0.161+ (0.093)
Level 5			0.551*** (0.120)			0.432*** (0.113)
Totally Agree - Level 6			0.393*** (0.116)			0.254* (0.110)
Don't know			0.235 (0.158)			0.313* (0.153)

Contd.

TABLE A4.1 CONTD.

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
	Impact of non-EU migration	Impact of non-EU migration	Impact of non-EU migration	Impact of non-EU migration	Impact of non-EU migration	Impact of non-EU migration
Variables present in the model	No controls	Demographics	Political efficacy	Life in 5 years' time	Immigrants as friends/family	All variables
Baseline: things will be worse in 5 years time				ref.		ref.
The same/no change				0.209**		0.148*
				(0.073)		(0.072)
Better				0.286***		0.215**
				(0.079)		(0.079)
Don't Know				-0.160		-0.126
				(0.155)		(0.144)
Baseline: No immigrant friends/family					ref.	ref.
You have friends who are immigrants currently living in (YOUR COUNTRY)					0.357***	0.322***
					(0.050)	(0.050)
You have family members who are immigrants currently living in (YOUR COUNTRY)					0.223*	0.202 ⁺
					(0.110)	(0.119)
You have both friends and family members who are immigrants currently living in (YOUR COUNTRY)					0.422***	0.353***
					(0.068)	(0.071)
Constant		2.892***	2.687***	2.612***	2.689***	2.362***
		(0.158)	(0.177)	(0.166)	(0.151)	(0.175)
Observations		815	815	815	815	815

Source: Eurobarometer 88.2 (October 2017).

Note: *** p<.001, ** p<.01, * p<.05, + p<.10.

CHAPTER 5

Migrants' experience of the border in Ireland

5.1 INTRODUCTION

Brexit has brought the issue of cross-border travel between Northern Ireland and Ireland to the fore. The UK and Ireland are part of a Common Travel Area (CTA), which has long shaped travel between the two countries. The Withdrawal Agreement between the UK and the European Union reaffirms the CTA arrangements.⁵⁷ While much of the focus has been on reciprocal rights of the UK and Irish citizens, the impact of Brexit will also affect migrants, and their cross-border travel. This, in turn, is likely to significantly affect their opportunities for social, cultural and economic integration. This chapter provides an overview of emerging issues that migrants from each jurisdiction face regarding cross-border travel for work or personal reasons, and access to work and services in the other jurisdiction. It draws primarily on an online consultation event held with migrant organisations and other stakeholders in October 2022, with additional evidence from previous literature, and other consultations and events held on the issue.

The consultation event drew together a wide range of organisations working with migrants in Northern Ireland and Ireland, advocacy groups, policymakers, representatives of the Equality Commission Northern Ireland and the Irish Human Rights and Equality Commission, and others with knowledge of, or interest in, the issue. These were organisations/individuals known to be working with migrants/ethnic minorities, with some experience of these issues and/or (in some cases) actively campaigning on these issues. Seventeen organisations/individuals were based in Northern Ireland, five were based in Ireland, and four worked cross border or were involved in cross-border research. We pooled contact lists from a range of sources, including previous consultations and literature on the topic, to identify whom to invite. Some organisations provide information/advice to migrants and ethnic minorities and also do advocacy; some were purely advocacy organisations. In total, 32 attendees (with some organisations represented by multiple attendees) were present at the event (see Table A5.1 for a list of organisations represented).

The objectives of the consultation event were to explore experiences on what impact post-Brexit immigration changes at the UK level may currently have or will have in the future on cross-border travel, for business or personal reasons, and the ability to work and access services for non-Irish and non-British citizens. Participants shared their experience and insights into the issues from a diverse

⁵⁷ Article 3, Agreement on the Withdrawal of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland from the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community OJ L 29, 31.1.2020, p. 7-187.

range of perspectives, including in terms of the nature of their work, the groups they work with, and their ethnic/national background. At the event, an introduction to the report was presented, along with some findings emerging from a review of the recent literature and previous consultation events. Participants were then split into breakout rooms, to discuss five key questions (see Sections 5.3 to 5.7).

The research team acted as facilitators and took notes of breakout room sessions. Chatham House rules applied in these sessions, which meant that the information is free to use, but the identity and the affiliation of speakers will not be revealed. Participant rapporteurs reported back to the plenary, and, with permission, these summaries were recorded. The transcript of the recording brings together the viewpoints, by way of consensus, from the participants within the four groups. This provides a top-level overview of issues through a discursive expert forum, while still maintaining the anonymity of the participants within the research outputs. Direct quotes from the transcript are presented in italics throughout this chapter.

The transcript and research notes form the basis of this chapter, with Sections 5.3 to 5.7 organised around five key themes (Brooks et al., 2015): migrants' experience of cross-border travel; migrants' experience of working and accessing services across the border; which migrant groups are most affected; where migrants seek assistance to resolve these issues; and what measures could be undertaken by governments or other bodies to make things easier. Following this, Section 5.8 offers a summary of key findings. As context for discussing issues raised, Section 5.2 briefly summarises the legal situation regarding cross-border travel, accessing work and services, and how this has changed since Brexit.

5.2 BREXIT AND IMPLICATIONS FOR CROSS-BORDER TRAVEL FOR MIGRANTS: THE LEGAL SITUATION

The Common Travel Area (CTA) is an arrangement between the UK and Ireland that is implemented through various national legislative acts in each jurisdiction as well as through bilateral agreements.⁵⁸ Deriving from the CTA are reciprocal rights for UK and Irish citizens in the other jurisdiction, including the right to reside, to vote,

⁵⁸ The CTA is not an international agreement. The arrangement is present in different pieces of UK and Irish legislation, and the ability for the UK and Ireland to maintain the CTA is recognised by the EU in Protocol 20 to the Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union. For a comprehensive overview of the CTA see: De Mars et al. (2018), 'Discussion Paper on the Common Travel Area', Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission and the Irish Human Rights and Equality Commission.

to access services, among other rights.⁵⁹ Travel within the CTA is considered a 'local' journey.⁶⁰

Prior to Brexit, all Irish, British and EU nationals were generally able to travel between Northern Ireland and Ireland without prior immigration permission or border checks.⁶¹ Checkpoints and security controls were prevalent across the land border during the conflict in Northern Ireland, and a key element of the Good Friday Agreement (GFA) was to dismantle border controls. The land border also had Customs checks until the UK and Ireland acceded to the European Communities in 1973, leading to the abolition of such checks. Consequently, one of the core elements of the Northern Ireland/Ireland Protocol is to avoid border controls and a 'hard border' (Article 3(1) of the Protocol). The land border is long (310 miles), with many crossings (circa 400) and is now largely invisible. In 2017, there were an estimated 110 million person/crossings a year.⁶²

For non-EU nationals, there were restrictions on cross-border travel prior to Brexit and these differed depending on whether the person was visa required to enter Ireland or the UK.⁶³ Ireland and the UK have different visa regimes but have broadly similar visa requirements.⁶⁴ Short stays in the UK are for six months, whereas in Ireland they are for 90 days. For persons from countries that are non-visa required to enter both Ireland and the UK for short stays (e.g. US, Canada), they could travel between the jurisdictions without prior immigration permission, however nationalities that were visa required (e.g. China, Afghanistan) needed to obtain prior immigration permission.⁶⁵ For some nationalities, the visa requirements are different in Ireland as compared to the UK; for example, South Africans are not visa required for short-stay entry to Ireland, but are visa required for short-stay entry to the UK. While short-stay travel requirements are relevant for cross-border travel, in terms of long-term stays (e.g. for work), non-nationals (including EU nationals) are required to secure residence permissions in the UK, and non-EU nationals are required to hold permissions for Ireland. This requirement typically

⁵⁹ The 2019 Memorandum of Understanding between the UK and Ireland reaffirmed the CTA and the associated rights and privileges for British and Irish Citizens.

⁶⁰ Section 11(4) of the Immigration Act 1971 (UK).

⁶¹ As well as EEA and Swiss nationals.

⁶² UK Parliament. 'The land border between Northern Ireland and Ireland'. www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201719/cmselect/cmniaf/329/32902.htm.

⁶³ Under Article 3(1)(b) of the Immigration (Control of Entry through Republic of Ireland) Order 1972 and paragraph 15 of the UK Immigration Rules state that certain individuals who enter the UK through Ireland 'do require leave [permission] to enter', including 'persons requiring visas'.

⁶⁴ Immigration Service Delivery. 'Visa and Non-Visa Required Countries', Department of Justice, available at: www.irishimmigration.ie. UK Government 918 October 2022). 'Guidance: UK visa requirements (accessible version)', www.gov.uk/government/publications/uk-visa-requirements-list-for-carriers/uk-visa-requirements-for-international-carriers. See also: De Mars et al. (2018), 'Discussion Paper on the Common Travel Area', Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission and the Irish Human Rights and Equality Commission.

⁶⁵ Section 11(4) of the Immigration Act 1971. Article 3(1)(b) of the Immigration (Control of Entry through Republic of Ireland) Order 1972 and paragraph 15 of the UK Immigration Rules state that certain individuals who enter the UK through Ireland 'do require leave [permission] to enter', including 'persons requiring visas'.

applies regardless of whether a person is visa required or not. The UK and Ireland have implemented some measures to allow certain visa holders in one jurisdiction to travel to the other in the form of the Short Stay Visa Waiver Programme⁶⁶ and the British Irish Visa Scheme for Chinese and Indian nationalities on certain visas.

Separate to prior immigration permission are border checks (CAJ, 2022). While there are no routine border checks within the CTA, irrespective of the requirements for visas, there are ‘mobile’ border checks along the border between Ireland and Northern Ireland, which are not routine and are conducted by Irish or UK authorities (e.g. on public transport). In Ireland, these checks are carried out under the Immigration Act 2004, whereas in the UK it is by Home Office officials or under the Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Act 2019.⁶⁷ Although Irish, UK and EU nationals are exempt from the identity document checks in Ireland, it has been highlighted that in practice, in order to prove exemption, one must produce documentation.⁶⁸

After Brexit, many of the legal requirements for cross-border travel remain similar to those in place pre-Brexit. The 2019 Memorandum of Understanding between the UK and Ireland reaffirmed the CTA and the associated rights and privileges for British and Irish Citizens.⁶⁹ For EU, EEA and Swiss citizens, while they maintain free movement rights in Ireland, if they do not hold residency in the UK (e.g. in the form of Settled Status), they can enter Northern Ireland without prior immigration permission for short-stays (up to six months) as visitors. In order to live on a more permanent basis, such as for work, they are required to apply for immigration permission. EU, EEA and Swiss nationals who lived on one side of the border but worked on the other prior to 31 December 2020 can also apply for Frontier Worker Permits. After this date, these nationals are required to apply for work visas for the UK (although those crossing the border to work in Ireland from the UK could continue to do so as EU, EEA and Swiss citizens).⁷⁰ For non-EEA nationals, the immigration rules remain similar to those pre-Brexit. For asylum applicants, cross-border travel was restricted prior to Brexit, and this remains the case, albeit with new legislation implemented in both jurisdictions on the admissibility of

⁶⁶ Eligible countries of nationality include: Bahrain, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Colombia, India, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Kosovo, Kuwait, Montenegro, Oman, Peoples Republic of China, Peru, Philippines, Qatar, Republic of North Macedonia, Saudi Arabia, Serbia, Thailand, Turkey, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Vietnam.

⁶⁷ Immigration Act 2004. Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Act 2019.

⁶⁸ While Irish, UK and EU nationals are exempt under the Immigration Act 2004 (excluded from the definition of a ‘non-national’), as highlighted in a case in the High Court, individuals must produce documentation in order to evidence their exemption (*Pachero v Minister for Justice* [2011] 4 IR 698, [18]).

⁶⁹ Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of Ireland.

⁷⁰ UK Government. ‘Frontier Worker permit’, www.gov.uk/frontier-worker-permit. For information in Ireland see www.gov.ie/en/publication/b6a44-information-for-current-and-future-frontier-workers/.

applications.⁷¹ Overall, and as was highlighted in the consultation event discussed below, many of the issues with cross-border travel, particularly for non-EU nationals, existed before Brexit.

Going forward, the Nationality and Borders Act 2022 in the UK introduces an Electronic Travel Authorisation (ETA), which would apply to non-British or Irish people visitors to the UK without immigration permission to be in the UK (for example a UK visa).⁷² As currently conceived, all people in this category would need to apply to obtain an ETA before crossing the border from South to North (the ETA scheme would not lead to any new controls on migrants traveling from North to South). This would mark a significant change for those who did not require a prior immigration permission to enter the UK. It has yet to be seen how this will be implemented for cross-border travel in Ireland, and the applicability of the ETA to non-Irish nationals resident in Ireland remains under discussion.⁷³ As is clear from Chapter 1, the majority of migrants in both Ireland and Northern Ireland are from other EU countries, so this would affect a large number of people. The ETA scheme would also apply to other non-Irish residents, including, for example Americans and Canadians. Therefore the scheme risks affecting a large proportion of Ireland's resident population.

5.3 MIGRANTS' EXPERIENCE OF CROSS-BORDER TRAVEL

The first question posed to participants in the consultation event concerned migrants' experience of cross-border travel: 'What is migrants' experience of cross border travel for work or personal reasons?' In the discussion on this question, border checks and racial profiling were a consistent theme. With respect to instances of profiling during checks, participants described how nationality mattered less than your profile – skin colour, language spoken, accent and name – and participants reported many incidents of racial profiling with particular groups of people are asked to produce their passports.

Consultation participants stressed that this was not a new issue, but that it was heightened following Brexit. While the immigration rules for non-EU migrants have not changed, participants reported the frequency of incidents of racial profiling at the border, with people being asked to produce identity documents, having increased since Brexit:

⁷¹ Section 21, 51A, 51B and 51C, International Protection Act 2015, as amended by the Withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the European Union (Consequential Provisions) Act 2020.

⁷² ETA <https://www.parliament.uk/business/news/2021/december-2021/lords-debates-nationality-and-borders-bill/>.

⁷³ UK Parliament (9 November 2022). 'Travel Requirements: Republic of Ireland, Question for Home Office UIN 76149, tabled on 1 November 2022'.

there was discrimination and it's ongoing, it's not new. It was always there but that Brexit has made it worse in some cases. So, it's important to acknowledge that.

Discrimination literature highlights how in situations where information is lacking, stereotypes can fill the vacuum in information (Neumark, 2018). Stereotypes are often faulty generalisations about a group. In this case, for example, the stereotype may be 'most immigrants are non-White'. Given some migrants cannot cross the border, but as there are no routine border controls, non-White individuals are targeted for checks on the basis of race/ethnicity, while White migrants are much less likely to be stopped.

Experiences of discrimination translate into 'fear', a sentiment raised several times in the consultation event as well as by stakeholders elsewhere, including the North West Migrants Forum and the Northern Ireland Human Rights and Equality Commissioner.⁷⁴ Consultation participants described a sense of fear among migrants about travel across the border, even if the individual lives near it and crossings may be otherwise a normal part of life at the border. This fear often took the form of worry about being stopped by Gardaí or UK authorities (participants primarily referenced the Gardaí), and even if not detained, that such interactions with authorities may lead to subsequent problems in applications for citizenship. Another fear raised was that even when migrants are Irish or British citizens, that they will be singled out and asked for documentation:

People want to live their lives legally, they want to live in the open, and the fear that any small incident or connection with authorities by accident or by necessity would unravel their lives is a significant challenge and fear underpinning much of this.

Despite valid reasons for cross-border travel and, in many cases, the right to do so, people feel constrained from engaging in such travel due to racial profiling. This undermines not only their ability to cross the border but also participating in normal aspects of life near or around the border. As one participant summarised, 'the border then is not open to everyone who's using it post-Brexit'. Another reported that the racial profiling is unsettling to witness, not just for the person being profiled but also the witnesses.

⁷⁴ North West Migrants Forum (2022). CTA Policy Brief. www.mwfm.org.uk. Houses of the Oireachtas (22 September 2022). 'Northern Ireland commissioner for human rights: Joint Committee on the Implementation of the Good Friday Agreement debate', www.oireachtas.ie.

This, in turn, relates to another issue raised in the consultation by a participant working in a migrant support organisation: that EU workers are not typically stopped while crossing from Ireland to Northern Ireland, it is only when they ask advice from the migrant support organisation that they learn that they are unable to work in Northern Ireland without permission, and that if they did, they would be doing so illegally. This point regarding a lack of knowledge among some migrants regarding rights crossing the border was repeated through the consultation – many migrants are just not aware of their rights and entitlements. This connects to previous discussions of fear around cross-border travel. Participants described how checks are more common when crossing from Northern Ireland to Ireland and by the Gardaí, especially on buses and on the Belfast-Dublin route. Participants reported much fewer incidents of police in Northern Ireland conducting such checks. This led to some participants expressing a feeling that migrants in the South have an easier time going North than migrants in the North going South.

Some participants also discussed the difficulty in documenting immigration checks and instances of racial profiling, but also the importance of doing so to provide data on its prevalence. Although such data are not routinely published, recent media reports on immigration checks in Northern Ireland detail how between 2015 and 2020, 8,429 people were subject to immigration checks, primarily at ferry ports and airports, but also in internal checks in Belfast, Newry, Derry, Craigavon and Enniskillen.⁷⁵ Moreover, elsewhere it was reported that between 2012 and 2019, Romanian, Chinese and British nationals were the most common nationalities stopped in these immigration checks.⁷⁶ CAJ have highlighted how these figures may only be the 'tip of the iceberg' as the more informal immigration checks are not recorded.⁷⁷ In turn, in Ireland, data from An Garda Síochána indicate that checks do happen and that, for instance, in 2017, 228 people were refused entry to Ireland when entering from Northern Ireland, and in 2018, this figure was 121.⁷⁸ However, these figures are not published routinely.

Participants expressed interest in continuing to request data from the Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI) and An Garda Síochána about border checks and

⁷⁵ Butterly L. (24 October 2022). 'Ethnic minorities fear being racially profiled during immigration checks in North', *The Irish Times*, www.irishtimes.com/crime-law/2022/10/24/ethnic-minorities-fear-being-racially-profiled-during-immigration-checks. See also: Butterly, L. (23 April 2021). 'Belfast: Pattern of immigration checks raises profiling concerns', *Al Jazeera*, www.aljazeera.com.

⁷⁶ Fagan, M. and L. Butterly (8 June 2020). 'Scale of immigration checks higher in Belfast than London', *The Detail*.

⁷⁷ Butterly L. (24 October 2022). 'Ethnic minorities fear being racially profiled during immigration checks in North', *The Irish Times*, www.irishtimes.com/crime-law/2022/10/24/ethnic-minorities-fear-being-racially-profiled-during-immigration-checks.

⁷⁸ Persons can be refused entry on a variety of grounds, including failure to hold valid visa where they are visa-required or they intend to enter the State for purposes other than those expressed, among other factors set out under section 4(3) of the Immigration Act 2004, as amended. A data request to An Garda Síochána showed the following figures for refusals of entry: 2017 – 228, 2018 – 121, 2019 – 175, 2020 – 51, 2021 – 106, and 2022 (to October) – 37.

who is being checked. Yet, some civil society organisations present reported following up on complaints of profiling at border checks, but the response they usually receive from An Garda Síochána is that everyone is being checked and there is no racial profiling:

There's also a denial of this happening and there's no formal statistics about racial profiling. ...We discussed that there is a need to continue evidencing racial profiling and explaining that this is actually happening.

Several participants reported being tired of having to continually retell very personal stories of cross-border travel experiences to try to be heard and seeing nothing happen. This point again underscores the importance of available data on cross-border checks to support calls to eradicate profiling.

The issues raised in this consultation event echo findings of previous research and consultation groups, including frequent immigration checks on the Belfast-Dublin route and racial profiling (CAJ, 2022), which are not necessarily new but may be increasing (MRCI, 2011).

Other issues raised around cross-border travel included the impact of constrained access to Dublin airport, which is often cheaper to fly from and more widely connected as a flight hub than Belfast airports. This was reported to be a 'particular issue for students and for those on low incomes', as well as for family emergencies, when people need to fly home quickly and Dublin airport would provide the easiest and cheapest route. Instead, migrant students often need to fly to London first to travel onwards. Similarly, it was reported that access to embassies and consulates was made difficult as migrants had to travel to London to access these as they could not attend the embassies or consulate in Dublin. In line with previous consultations on this topic, some participants distinguished different challenges faced for those migrants making Belfast-Dublin journeys and travel to Dublin airport, from those migrants living in rural and small-town border areas, who make a large number of small journeys (CAJ, 2022).

5.4 CHALLENGES ACCESSING WORK AND SERVICES ACROSS THE BORDER

The second question posed to participants in the consultation event concerned migrants' experience of accessing services and work: What is migrants' experience of living in one jurisdiction and accessing services (like healthcare, education/childcare) and accessing work in the other?

Healthcare

The Co-operation and Working Together (CAWT) partnership between health services North and South has been in place for over 25 years.⁷⁹ Services are often arranged through service-level agreements and include all-island paediatric cardiology services, the North West Cancer Centre in Derry and various initiatives to reduce waiting lists. Healthcare access was highlighted in the consultation group as a particularly urgent issue, due to the immediate impacts and risks of not being able to access it.

As well as a general discussion on accessing emergency medicine that had been raised in previous consultations, the issue of family members visiting hospitals was cited. While the patient may negotiate the cross-border access to the service if that involves hospitalisation, issues can arise where the parent or family members do not have access to the patient if they do not have access to the jurisdiction:

there was an example of a child who needed cardiac surgery, the paediatrics hospital is in Dublin, the child's mother and father had to all get visas. [This was] an extremely long, drawn-out process.

This example was also cited in a recent report published by CAJ (2022). It was noted that one group particularly affected was asylum applicants, for whom the border was effectively a hard border and the inability to travel can be particularly harmful for medical procedures or in emergencies. This was noted as a particular problem for asylum applicants in the North West who have to travel to Dublin for services because they are unable to access services in Northern Ireland but given most travel routes cross the border into Northern Ireland on the way to Dublin, they are effectively breaking the law.

Education

Access to education was also discussed by participants. One issue raised concerned rural border areas, and children from one jurisdiction attending primary school in the other. Participants reported:

An impact on border communities, particularly around primary school education in rural communities and in areas like Derry City or Newry, where the nearest school is in the wrong jurisdiction and where by custom and practice that has not been a difficulty before Brexit, but has become a difficulty after Brexit.

⁷⁹ www.hse.ie/brexit/cross-border-and-treatment-abroad/.

A recurring issue was cross-border school-based activities, for example school trips, for which some children may be required to have a visa, which may result in them being excluded from the event if they are a non-EU national. If children are going to play a sports match in the other jurisdiction, non-EU national children also need a visa. One case that was mentioned was that of a Syrian girl in who was part of a sports team at school in Northern Ireland. The sports team travelled to Ireland for a match, however, she was unable to participate as she could not travel with them. This was described as a clear example of exclusion.

While in general there were no significant issues reported of supply of places at primary and second level, the situation is different at higher level, where there are fewer options for migrant young people. One participant noted the situation of technical colleges and where young people are accessing further and higher education in those colleges on different sides of the border, and this poses significant challenges for migrants if they want to study in the other jurisdiction. Additionally, it was reported that there were students who wanted travel to attend academic conferences in the other jurisdiction and were unable to.

Cross-border work and workers

Frontier workers, also known as cross-border workers, are workers who live in one jurisdiction and work in the other. While there is a general sense that the level of cross-border employment has increased substantially in recent years, there are no accurate or recent estimates of the number of cross-border workers.⁸⁰ Research by the Migrant Centre Northern Ireland (MCNI), reported by CAJ, found that migrant frontier workers seem to be one of the groups most forgotten about and with least clarity as to status (CAJ, 2022).

While there is a Frontier Workers permit scheme, participants noted that it is poorly advertised, and the website is only in English. It was noted in the consultation discussion that there were:

issues raised regarding the hidden issues for frontier workers and the kind of chaotic nature of that introduction of that frontier worker visa and frontier worker status. The advice and guidance on how that scheme is going to work didn't come through until very late so it was very difficult for advisors to give people the correct advice on that scheme.

⁸⁰ A figure of 30,000 regularly referred to. See, for example: www.rte.ie/brainstorm/2018/1206/1015500-what-will-brex-it-mean-for-30-000-cross-border-workers/.

Participants noted that a lot of people unknowingly end up working illegally or crossing the border illegally due to a lack of knowledge of the scheme.

Specific issues in terms of cross-border working that were highlighted were cross-border trades like lorry driving, as well as situations where the workplace itself is cross-border. This could be on farms and other, quite often rural, workplaces connected to food harvesting and processing, where the work involves frequent border crossings. One participant described that:

There is a chill factor on employers within those agencies, farms, agrifood businesses, on employing migrants who don't have access to both sides of the border.

Cultural activities and cross-border initiatives

The fourth area discussed under this theme was cross-border cultural activities and cross-border initiatives. One specific issue was cross-border religious activities:

One of the issues being raised around ability for faith communities to connect with each other across the island but also to attend sports or other cultural events that are happening.

Participants also raised the issue of cross-border initiatives, either initiated by national governments or the EU, that migrants were excluded from. From the perspective of migrants, some did not see the point in shared island initiatives if participation is confined to only some communities. Others noted how under the Peace Programme, there are many EU-funded cross-border community programmes, and that certain migrants can be excluded from these as they cannot easily cross the border.⁸¹

A cross-cutting issue on access to both employment and services is that rights and rules are not clear and that migrants often do not understand their rights, nor do service providers and employers. The result of this is an ad hoc application of rules. This discussion echoes MCNI finding on wrongful querying of entitlements when accessing health, social protection, housing and education by service providers (CAJ, 2022).

In all, the above-mentioned difficulties in access to services, although not necessarily new, raise questions as to the location of the border beyond the land border. 'Border checks' may now be expected to be done by service providers,

⁸¹ For further information see: www.peaceplatform.seupb.eu/en/.

employers and others – who may or may not be fully aware of the rights and entitlements of migrants.

5.5 WHICH MIGRANT GROUPS ARE MOST AFFECTED?

The third question asked of participants concerned whether some migrant groups are more affected than others: ‘Are specific migrant groups particularly affected (i.e. based on their region of origin (EU/non-EU), language background/skills, ethnicity/race, legal status (e.g. asylum seekers))?’ As discussed in Section 5.3, for many participants the key issue determining those most affected in travelling across the border was skin colour, not citizenship or country of origin. This was also true of accessing services:

Black and Asian people are more likely to be stopped, more likely to be checked, they have difficulties going through checks, and hospitals when it comes to accessing services. And even difficulties when they have an ethnic surname.

Other participants raised the issue of multiple exclusion, describing ‘layers of otherness’ and the obstacles this caused:

So if you are an excluded person by status and you’re also a person of colour, you’re in a worse position. And you just build on that, if you’re a person of colour, with poor English. If you’re a person of colour, with poor English, and a member of the LGBT community. So basically the more layers of otherness that you are tagged with, the more difficult it is to overcome those obstacles and the more obstacles you will face.

Visa issues are most pertinent for non-EU migrants. This can have knock-on effects on access to healthcare, education activities at primary, secondary and tertiary level, as well as work. As discussed, it also affects access to cultural activities and cross-border initiatives. In this regard, non-EU migrant groups are more affected than EEA migrants.

One category of persons discussed was non-EU family members of EU, Irish and British nationals, particularly where the non-EU family member is required to obtain a visa prior to cross-border travel. This raises challenges for mixed couples and diverse families, and their integration into community life. Examples such as the need for non-EU family members from the UK to have a visa simply to see relatives in Ireland, or attend family events such as weddings and funerals, were raised.

Another category of persons discussed were asylum seekers. As mentioned in Chapter 1, in Northern Ireland as of 30 September 2022, there were 1,710 asylum applicants (and persons whose appeals avenues were exhausted) receiving supports; and in Ireland, as of 12 October 2022, there were 15,983 people resident in International Protection Accommodation Services (IPAS) centres.⁸²

Participants commented on this group with regard to cross-border travel for asylum applicants who are resident in Donegal:

Refugees and asylum seekers, I think particularly our group raised in terms of racial profiling but also in terms of the kind of structural difficulties, there's still direct provision centres that are very remote where travel through Northern Ireland is necessary to get to appointments that they have in Dublin and so on.

Another related affected group is persons who have fled Ukraine. There are different legal regimes for protection in Ireland and Northern Ireland, with the EU's Temporary Protection Directive applicable in Ireland, whereas in Northern Ireland the UK's Ukraine Family Scheme or the UK's Ukraine Sponsorship Scheme apply (see Chapter 1). There was a discussion of how Ukrainians are not allowed to cross the border, and particularly not for work. Thus, for those who do cross and are undocumented, it was highlighted that this can result in exploitation and illegal work due to their precarious legal status. Participants described a lack of awareness among Ukrainians of the restrictions on work and the different legal regimes.⁸³

Lastly, students were another group identified as facing particular cross-border travel issues. It was reported that there are many international students in universities in Northern Ireland who cannot participate in island-wide education, training and conferences.

5.6 SEEKING HELP

The fourth theme concerned who migrants turn to in seeking to resolve issues. Many of the organisations in attendance at the consultation event were examples of those offering help.

⁸² Houses of the Oireachtas (18 October 2022). Response to Parliamentary Question [51897/22]. Some asylum applicants may live outside of IPAS accommodation centres or not have access to Public Funds in Northern Ireland and are not counted in these figures.

⁸³ See also: Butterly, L. (19 May 2022). 'In Northern Ireland, Ukrainian refugees find themselves in limbo', www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/5/19/limbo-for-ukrainian-refugees-in-northern-ireland.

Participants described how, in the first instance, migrants may turn to someone they know who has been through a similar experience and then turn to local organisations. Issues were raised regarding the potential for misinformation when relying on informal networks, as well as the potential for using ‘rogue advisors’ who often levy high charges when the advice is freely available elsewhere. Participants highlighted how there are information services available:

But actually there’s great advice services, particularly with regard to the EU settlement scheme. Really good free advice on that and advice available through some formal organisations, like STEP and Advice NI. But people are still using informal networks.

Nonetheless, other participants described a lack of resources and funding in the advice sector, which can result in people choosing informal advice. Relatedly, participants described a lack of knowledge of where to go among migrants:

There were a couple of things that really came out of our group which was around the infrastructure and capacity to respond. There is a very severe lack of resources in the community and advice sector. That is showing in people choosing illegal advice and informal advice because they can’t get access to it or they’re being signposted elsewhere. But I think also knowledge of where to go to is probably an issue too.

In terms of resolving issues, it is very important for advice services to have the right information to be able to give the correct advice in the appropriate language:

[T]here simply are not the resources to train staff, to employ staff to do the awareness raising, to fund their promotion, to provide appropriate language supports, to provide information in other languages.

Some consultation attendees who were involved in information provision highlighted the complexity of the rules and how difficult it can be to effectively convey these rights to service users. Others expressed a concern that the most vulnerable were not accessing help:

People will seek the most readily available help and the more vulnerable you are the greater the necessity to seek safe help. So the further out you are, the more difficult it is to access safe and reliable information.

These organisations offer expertise based on past experiences. Often their role is that of ‘fire-fighting’, but the scale of the problems faced means they are often fighting against ‘a deaf ear and a glass ceiling’.

Relatedly, and connected to Section 5.4, confusion and uncertainty were also recurring themes in the discussion of access to work and services. This was experienced by both migrants and migrant support organisations themselves. As one participant expressed it:

In terms of resolving issues, it's very important for advice services to have the right information to be able to give advice so that people are operating within the law.

This uncertainty about rules was described as creating stress for migrants and support organisations.

5.7 POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS

The last question concerned measures that could be taken to make cross-border travel and access to services easier: What measures could be undertaken to make things easier in terms of cross-border travel and access to work/services? Who/which relevant authority needs to take action?

Among the solutions discussed were agreements on visas. This included the need for the UK and Ireland to recognise each other's visas and more cooperation between governments in this area:

[t]he impact that would have on students in particular, on tourism, and the ability to travel North-South, South-North without having to access a different visa or a visa specifically for travel would be very beneficial for people.

Temporary visas for non-EU nationals to travel across the border were also suggested.

There were suggestions that legislation could be reviewed, including the EU Settlement Scheme in the UK to reduce the potential for inequality, as well as the Immigration Act 2004 in Ireland to be amended 'to, for example, get rid of powers to conduct checks or at least to make that not inherently racist.' In terms of legislation, participants also raised concerns about the Common Travel Area – and the possibility of introducing a stronger legal footing, so that this agreement would 'be formalised in some way – rather than a vague agreement between two states.'

Other legal changes discussed included changing the citizenship legislation in Ireland to allow residents in Northern Ireland to apply for an Irish passport after

five years residence. Some of these suggestions are similar to those raised in campaigning by the North West Migrants Forum,⁸⁴ as well as by CAJ,⁸⁵ who have also called for non-EU nationals who are visa required in Ireland but are resident in Northern Ireland to be granted a form of a 'deemed permission' to enter Ireland as visitors.⁸⁶

With regard to racial profiling, participants described a need to recognise and stop the practice, and to collect better data on profiling at the border. This related to a discussion of the need to pursue accountability from policing authorities. Others described a need to train officials who work on the frontline and conduct these border checks. It was expressed that when a person is required to enforce legislation but is not informed enough, they tend to enforce it more strictly.

Concerns were also raised about the introduction of Electronic Travel Authorisation to enter the UK.

A lot of lack of clarity around that [ETA], an impending urgency on that since it's to come in in 2023, and not 2024 now. So it is to be intelligence-led ad hoc checks rather than permanent checks. But I think there is a degree of shared concern that that really just means racial profiling all over again.

Lastly, solutions were discussed in relation to the use of resources and the duty of public services to resource according to the needs of the community. Participants described a need for the government to better resource migrant support services and a need for improved rights awareness among both service providers and migrants themselves. Some participants highlighted the lack of migrant representation within state bodies and public services, which should instead reflect the make-up of the community they serve.

5.8 SUMMARY

Discussions by participants in the consultation event covered a broad area of issues, many of which echo findings from previous consultation groups (CAJ, 2022). Among the key points addressed was concerns about racial profiling at border checks, which results in considerable fear and anxiety among migrants. While the legal provisions for cross-border travel after Brexit remain broadly similar to pre-Brexit, participants described heightened profiling on the basis of skin colour,

⁸⁴ North West Migrants Forum. 'Common Travel Area Petition'. Available at: <https://www.nwmf.org.uk/common-travel-area-petition-north-west-migrants-forum/>.

⁸⁵ Commission on Access to Justice (CAJ) 'CAJ note on post-Brexit CTA arrangements movement of people arrangements'.

⁸⁶ North West Migrants Forum. 'Common Travel Area Petition'. Available at: <https://www.nwmf.org.uk/common-travel-area-petition-north-west-migrants-forum/>.

clothes, language/accent, among other characteristics, in the aftermath of Brexit, particularly on journeys from Northern Ireland into Ireland. Some migrants cannot cross the border without permission, and as there are no routine border controls those who are perceived as migrants may be checked. These checks may be carried out for example on non-White migrants who may be Irish or British citizens, whereas White migrants or other Irish or Northern Irish residents are not checked. This leads to the perception among migrants, particularly ethnic minorities, that the border is open to many but not to them.

Difficulties faced in access to services, including healthcare, education, work and cultural and religious activities were discussed and these were connected to obstacles for broader social integration due to the exclusion of certain groups. Relatedly, participants described a lack of clarity around rights and entitlements. This resulted in a feeling of uncertainty and stress among migrants. Lack of clarity resulted in wrongful querying of migrants' entitlements by service providers, such as hospitals, often on the basis of language or skin colour. When discussing whether some migrants are more affected than others, participants described how a persons' characteristics mattered more than legal status. Nonetheless, certain groups highlighted included asylum applicants, refugees, students, and non-EU family members of EU, Irish and UK citizens, as well as frontier workers. Such issues in cross-border access to services raise questions as to the location of the 'border' for migrants, with differences in access to services beyond the land border and service providers needing to be fully informed of rights and entitlements of migrants.

In terms of who migrants turn to when seeking help, many of the participants were from migrant support and migrant rights organisations. While the work of such organisations was recognised, there was a discussion of the need for more information and resourcing of these organisations. Participants also described the use of informal networks and rogue advisors by migrants seeking information, which can lead to incorrect, unduly expensive, or potentially harmful advice being received. Lastly, in moving forward, participants described a need for public bodies and services to be representative of the populations they serve. An urgent need to end racial profiling, as well as a need for data from authorities on such profiling, was discussed. Legal changes, including amendments to visa regimes, an immigration permission for non-EU migrant residents to engage in cross-border travel, and placing the CTA on more formal, legal footing were suggestions that arose. Relatedly, it was highlighted that advice services needed to have access to the right information in order for them to give out correct advice. Participants at this consultation expressed considerable frustration that migrants repeatedly had to tell very personal stories about the challenges they faced, but the situation was not being improved.

Participants described how the challenges migrants experience in terms of travel, access to work and services on a cross-border basis have implications more generally for the economic, social and cultural integration of migrants in Northern Ireland and Ireland. Many of these issues are taken for granted by Irish and British citizens. Cross-border travel can be a fraught experience for some migrants. Cross-border work has become considerably more complex. Participation in education courses at third-level or education-related events is difficult for some, and impossible for other migrants without either Irish or British citizenship. Migrants may be excluded from participation in activities such as sports events, holidays, religious events and family gatherings. In particular, any cross-border initiatives, be they from national or EU governments, or from civil society, will struggle to include some migrants and compromise their full participation in society. Addressing these issues will bring significant benefits to migrants' lives, allowing them to participate in the social, economic and cultural life of the island of Ireland more fully, but in doing so, their ability to contribute more fully to life in both jurisdictions should lead greater social, economic and cultural benefits for all residents, North and South.

Chapter 5 Appendix

TABLE A5.1 CONSULTATION EVENT (OCTOBER 2022) ORGANISATIONS WHO ATTENDED

ORGANISATION
Advice Northern Ireland
Belfast Metropolitan College
Centre for Cross Border Studies (Border People project)
Committee on the Administration of Justice (CAJ) Northern Ireland
CRAIC Northern Ireland
Crosscare
Department of Children, Equality, Disability, Integration and Youth (Ireland)
Department of Justice (Ireland)
Department of the Taoiseach (Ireland)
Equality Commission for Northern Ireland
European Migration Network Ireland
Hindu Council of Ireland
Human Rights Consortium
Immigrant Council of Ireland
Irish Human Rights and Equality Commission
Irish Refugee Council
Law Centre Northern Ireland
Lucy Michael Research
Migrant Centre Northern Ireland
Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission
North West Migrants Forum
Northern Ireland Council for Racial Equality (NICRE)
Omagh Ethnic Communities Support Group
Queen's University Belfast (individual)
Roma Support Hub
South Tyrone Empowerment Programme (STEP)

CHAPTER 6

Conclusions and implications for policy

6.1 SUMMARY OF KEY FINDINGS

Migrants now make up a considerable proportion of society in Ireland, North and South. Both jurisdictions saw substantial flows of migrants from Eastern Europe since 2004, though flows were less volatile in Northern Ireland, and more substantial, relative to population size, in Ireland. This report finds a picture of key similarities in the experiences of some migrant groups on the island of Ireland but also important differences in the experiences of other groups, as well as in the attitudes of the majority group, across the jurisdictions.

Comparing identical data for the period 2016-2019, we find 20 per cent of working age adults in Ireland were born abroad, compared to 9 per cent in Northern Ireland. In 2019, most migrants in Ireland and Northern Ireland – around two in every three – were born in other EU countries, and the gender profile of migrants is broadly similar. In both jurisdictions, most migrant groups are highly skilled and more likely to have third-level qualifications than native-born, though the skills profile of migrants in Ireland is generally higher. East European migrants are a distinctive group in Northern Ireland, with much lower educational qualifications than native-born and other migrant groups, and more likely to be living in rural areas than other migrants. Significant proportions of those born outside of the island are in fact citizens of their new places of residence, though the share in Ireland is greater, where 35 per cent of those born abroad are Irish citizens, compared to 17 per cent of migrants resident in Northern Ireland who are British citizens.

Migrants in both jurisdictions have high employment rates, particularly EU migrants: in Northern Ireland migrants overall are more likely to be employed than native-born. Employment rates of some non-EU groups are lower, particularly African-born migrants in Ireland. A higher proportion of migrants in both jurisdictions work in professional/managerial jobs, particularly EU West and non-EU migrants. However, model estimates suggest that after controlling for characteristics like education, these groups should be even more likely to be employed or in professional occupations, suggesting other factors operating in both jurisdictions limiting opportunities. East Europeans in both jurisdictions are much less likely to be in professional managerial jobs and more likely to work in lower-paid sectors such as retail and accommodation/food (Ireland), or manufacturing (Northern Ireland).

Chapter 3 considered both academic outcomes and wellbeing among migrant-origin children at age 15 in Ireland and Northern Ireland in 2018. In Ireland, there is little difference in either academic achievement scores or wellbeing at age 15 between migrant-origin children and their native-born peers. In Northern Ireland, first generation migrant-origin children (those born abroad) have considerably lower achievement scores in English reading, maths and science, which is partly explained by their more disadvantaged socio-economic background and the profile of the schools they attend, though not completely. Second generation migrant-origin children in Northern Ireland have similar achievement scores to their native peers but have lower wellbeing at age 15 than children whose parents were born in Northern Ireland/UK as well as first generation migrant children.

Chapter 4 explored how migrants have been received in both jurisdictions, using comparative international data from 2018. Attitudes to immigrants are more negative in Northern Ireland on a range of outcomes measured – attitudes to EU migrants, attitudes to non-EU migrants and the contribution of non-EU immigration to society. Attitudes vary by respondents' and educational attainment and social class in both jurisdictions, but this does not explain the differences observed. Instead, these differences in attitudes appear to be explained by important differences between jurisdictions in other key drivers of immigration attitudes. People in Ireland are more likely to have migrants in their social networks, they are more optimistic about the future, and are more likely to believe their voice is heard in politics than people in Northern Ireland, and together these factors explain most of the differences in attitudes towards migrants between Ireland and Northern Ireland. Due to a lack of comparable data, this project did not compare the experiences of discrimination or harassment of migrants themselves, though evidence from other sources suggests that racism, particularly racist violence, and the experience of discrimination by migrants and ethnic minorities is more prevalent in Northern Ireland (Fanning and Michael, 2018; Michael and Fanning, 2019), which is consistent with more negative attitudes to migrants observed in this report. However, over time, attitudes towards migrants appear to be improving in both jurisdictions, especially in the last six years or so.

Brexit has brought the issue of cross-border travel between Ireland and Northern Ireland to the fore. While much of the focus has been on reciprocal rights of the UK and Irish citizens in Ireland under the Common Travel Area, Brexit also impacts migrants and their cross-border travel. A consultation event with a wide range of organisations working with migrants raised a range of challenges regarding the rights and ease of cross-border travel for health, education, work, and recreation purposes. One significant challenge related to border checks, particularly in travel from Northern Ireland to Ireland. Without routine passport checks, the consultation raised the issue that some migrants are checked on the basis of their skin colour, sometimes also their clothes and language/accent; other migrants who

look and sound the same as most people living in Ireland are not checked. Lack of clarity around rights and entitlements to travel, work and access services in the other jurisdiction has led to considerable feelings of fear and uncertainty among migrant groups. This in turn has a negative impact on migrants' participation in economic, social and cultural integration, in that they are or feel limited in participating in cross-border activities or travel.

6.2 LIMITATIONS: IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH AND DATA COLLECTION

Chapter 2 provided an overview of labour market participation among migrants, though more detailed analysis could consider how wages and job quality compare (see Laurence et al., 2023, for Ireland). Similarly, issues that were not the focus here, but are clearly important for migrant integration include housing (see McGinnity et al., 2022b) and poverty. McGinnity et al. (2020) find that poverty is particularly high among some non-EU migrant groups in Ireland. Subsequent analyses of migrant integration could include housing, poverty and health.

Information on ethnicity is crucial for any monitoring of the planned anti-racism strategy in Ireland. While ethnicity is regularly measured in the UK Labour Force Survey, it is not currently measured in the Labour Force Survey in Ireland. As a result, it is not possible to monitor the labour market situation of ethnic minorities outside census years. A new national equality data strategy is being developed in Ireland, which should be in place for 2023.⁸⁷ In Northern Ireland, ethnic equality monitoring was part of the Northern Ireland Act 1998, though this has been challenging to implement.⁸⁸

The fact that the UK has left the EU has implications for data collection, and the ease of comparative projects like this. The national Labour Force Surveys are close in design, but for other international surveys, the fact that Northern Ireland is now a region outside the EU can bring challenges in terms of comparability.

The Northern Ireland Life and Times survey is an exceptionally useful source of information for a range of attitudes in Northern Ireland. While the population is much larger, Ireland lacks regular surveys on social attitudes and has largely had to rely on European surveys, such as the European Social Survey and the Eurobarometer. These have a smaller number of cases and are not specifically

⁸⁷ <https://www.gov.ie/en/press-release/5a7f4-minister-ogorman-announces-the-development-of-a-national-equality-data-strategy/>.

⁸⁸ https://ukparliament.shorthandstories.com/minority-ethnic-and-migrant-people-experiences-NIAC-report/index.html?utm_source=committees.parliament.uk&utm_medium=referrals&utm_campaign=minority-ethnic-migrant-experiences-NI&utm_content=organic.

tailored to the situation in Ireland or to pressing issues. A survey of social attitudes in Ireland that had some matched questions with the Northern Ireland Life and Times survey would be an exceptionally useful resource for comparing attitudes in both jurisdictions. In addition, collaboration and cooperation on data collection and measures used in surveys and in equality monitoring using administrative data would greatly facilitate comparisons across the jurisdictions, including, but not limited to, comparisons of migrants and ethnic minorities.

6.3 IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICY

In recent years, the Irish State has taken a more proactive role in migrant integration policy, which contrasts with policy in Northern Ireland, consistent with the approach in the UK in general, where the focus has been on refugee integration.

Chapter 2 finds that while employment rates are high, migrants may still experience some barriers to labour market integration. Consistent with other research (for example, Laurence et al., 2023), this implies that more action may be needed in terms of improving qualification recognition among employers, along with awareness raising and more effective implementation of the Quality and Qualifications Ireland (QQI) system, which acts as the Irish National Academic Recognition Information Centre (NARIC) and the UK NARIC.⁸⁹ Some coordination of qualification recognition might make it easier for migrants to make use of their skills on both sides of the border.

English language training for adult migrants is not coordinated in either jurisdiction. Increasing supports for language learning and providing information could help migrants not only in the labour market, but also in their broader social integration, given what is known about the importance of host-country language skills for integration more broadly (Portes and Rumbaut, 2006).

The finding that the attitudinal climate and response to migration is more negative in Northern Ireland is concerning, though perhaps not surprising, given previous research. The strong implication from the findings in Chapter 4 is that attitudes to migrants would be more positive in Northern Ireland if both political efficacy and optimism about the future were improved for the general population. Neither of these may be easily amenable to policy change, but a move forward on getting the Northern Ireland Assembly fully operational might help people to believe that their voice mattered in politics and give reason for optimism in the future. In addition,

⁸⁹ Department for Communities. 'Are your country's qualifications recognised in the UK?', www.communities-ni.gov.uk/topics/finding-employment/are-your-countrys-qualifications-recognised-uk.

providing greater opportunities for inter-ethnic contact and increasing the diversity of people's social networks in Northern Ireland could be an effective means of both improving attitudes and fostering the social integration of migrants. This could involve equality of access to employment and workplaces to foster greater workplace mixing and investing in the civic engagement opportunities such as volunteering, which can help bring groups together from different backgrounds in common cause.

Particularly in the current climate, with large inflows of refugees from Ukraine, as well as increases in international protection applicants in Ireland, it may mean that extra efforts, including targeted supports, are needed to facilitate refugee integration. The current development of a refugee integration strategy in Northern Ireland may be relevant here.

One implication is that citizenship acquisition means that many people born abroad are either UK or Irish citizens. Citizenship acquisition is an important component of integration as it allows people rights and responsibilities equivalent to a native-born citizen, and to plan for permanent residence. It is particularly relevant with CTA debates and focus on Irish and British citizenship for free movement within the island, which has come to the fore since Brexit. It may be that common understandings of who is an Irish or British citizen have not kept pace with the changing nature of both societies. An issue that arose in the consultation is that who is perceived as an Irish or British citizen may differ from who actually holds citizenship, and it may be these perceptions that influence behaviour (for example that non-White migrants are not citizens of either Britain or Ireland).

There are still many migrants without citizenship though, and Brexit has proved very challenging for them (see Chapter 5). Among the solutions discussed in the consultation were agreements on visas. This included the need for the UK and Ireland to recognise each other's visas and more cooperation between governments in this area. Temporary visas for non-EU nationals to travel across the border were also suggested. Some participants also called for non-EU nationals who are visa required in Ireland but are legal residents in Northern Ireland to be granted a form of a 'deemed permission', so they have permission to enter Ireland as visitors as part of their residence permission. Others suggested placing the CTA on more formal, legal footing.

Chapter 5 also documented considerable confusion among migrants, service providers and employers about the rights and entitlements of migrants. If these were communicated (clearly) to migrant organisations, border check staff, as well as commonly accessed cross-border services, this would reduce the potential for

wrongful querying of entitlements or discriminatory treatment based on stereotypes. The provision of clear information also applies to any future changes, such as the planned introduction of the Electronic Travel Authorisation.

With regard to border checks, participants at the consultation described a need to recognise racial profiling and stop the practice to significantly improve the experience of migrants crossing the land border. This related to a discussion of the need to pursue accountability from policing authorities. Providing guidelines for how these checks could be conducted and training officials who work on the frontline and conduct these border checks would be helpful.⁹⁰ All of these could be considered as a matter of urgency.

For any Shared Island activities – and other cross-border initiatives – border restrictions, real or perceived, may mean migrants in general and non-EU migrants in particular may be excluded. This has the potential to compromise both the inclusivity of Shared Island initiatives, as well as to compromise migrant integration on the island.

⁹⁰ To note that the Policing Authority provides oversight over An Garda Síochána, including the Garda National Immigration Bureau, and factors influencing reasons for immigration checks in cross-border activity was a discussion point in the Policing Authority's meeting in February 2022. Meeting minutes available here: www.policingauthority.ie/en/authority-meetings/previous-meetings-details/policing-authority-meeting-with-the-garda-commissioner-in-public-24-february-22.

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