

Malesky, Edmund J.; Nguyen, Trung-Anh

Article

Historical Communist Party Strength and Modern Party Loyalty. A Replication Study of Barceló (PNAS, 2021)

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Appendix for

Malesky, E. J. and Nguyen T. (2024). Historical Communist Party Strength and Modern Party Loyalty: A Replication Study of Barceló (2021). *Journal of Comments and Replications in Economics*, Vol.3 (2024-5).

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
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A. Potential Pitfalls in the Instrumental Variable Approach to Causal Identification

Barceló argues that citizens exposed to violent conflicts will have greater trust in institutions and enhanced political participation, leading to higher levels of civic engagement than those untouched by war. To test this logic, he uses Vietnam War bombing data released by the US military as a proxy for conflict exposure at the provincial level. However, Barceló correctly notes that there is a critical threat of reverse causality—the US may have targeted areas with greater insurgency strength and therefore with greater prior engagement and trust in the communist Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV)’s institutions. To address this endogeneity threat, Barceló proposes a research design that he suggests allows him to identify an exogenous source of variation in US bombing that was not targeting politically engaged populations. His strategy in the PNAS piece is to use distance from the 17th parallel as an instrumental variable, arguing that the conflict was the heaviest around the arbitrary border set at the Geneva Conference in 1954. Because of the heavy military activity around the border, Barceló suggests that some citizens close to the 17th parallel were accidentally exposed to violence, allowing to him to trace through whether this conflict exposure generated the greater political participation in his theory.

The specific approach that Barceló uses is known as instrumental variables two-stage least squares (IV-2SLS) estimator, which we depict in Panel A of the figure below and explore mathematically. The basic strategy is to isolate a portion of variation in the treatment variable (D , bombing) that is plausibly exogenous and use only that portion in the second stage estimation. As Equation 1 shows, to do this, the analysis identifies an instrumental variable (Z , distance from the 17th parallel). The author then regresses D on Z , takes the predicted \hat{D}_i —the portion of D solely accounted for by Z , and uses it in the second stage regression. In this case, that means regressing the outcome variable (Y , civic engagement) on \hat{D}_i .

$$\begin{aligned} \text{First Stage: } D_i &= \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 Z_i + u_i \\ \text{Second Stage: } Y_i &= \beta_0 + \beta_1 \hat{D}_i + X_i + \varepsilon_i \end{aligned} \quad (1)$$



Suppose Z is a binary variable that shapes the probability $P(D = 1)$ according to DAG A above, we have:

$$E[Y] = \alpha + \delta E[D] + E[\epsilon]$$

This can then be rewritten as:

$$E[Y|Z = 1] - E[Y|Z = 0] = \delta(E[D|Z = 1] - E[D|Z = 0]) + (E[\epsilon|Z = 1] - E[\epsilon|Z = 0])$$

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{E[Y|Z = 1] - E[Y|Z = 0]}{E[D|Z = 1] - E[D|Z = 0]} &= \frac{\delta(E[D|Z = 1] - E[D|Z = 0]) + (E[\epsilon|Z = 1] - E[\epsilon|Z = 0])}{E[D|Z = 1] - E[D|Z = 0]} \end{aligned}$$

Under DAG A, where the exclusion restriction holds and $E[\epsilon|Z = 1] - E[\epsilon|Z = 0]$, we get the causal effect of D on Y as:

$$\frac{E[Y|Z = 1] - E[Y|Z = 0]}{E[D|Z = 1] - E[D|Z = 0]} = \delta$$

However, under DAG B, where the exclusion restriction is violated (Z is also affecting Y through channels other than D), the instrumental variable estimates a different quantity that is:

$$\frac{E[Y|Z = 1] - E[Y|Z = 0]}{E[D|Z = 1] - E[D|Z = 0]} = \delta + \frac{E[\epsilon|Z = 1] - E[\epsilon|Z = 0]}{E[D|Z = 1] - E[D|Z = 0]}$$

For this to produce a valid estimate, two critical assumptions must be met: 1) the exclusion restriction and 2) instrument variable strength. First, the exclusion restriction requires that any effect of the proposed instrument on the outcome is exclusively through its potential effect on exposure. A violation of the exclusion restriction can be shown in Panel B above, where Z is correlated with Y through a channel other than D (Angrist and Pischke, 2009; Sovey and Green, 2011).

In Barceló's case, the exclusion restriction requires that any effect of the distance from the 17th parallel on civic engagement must be exclusively through its potential effect on bombing. This has several implications. First, the exclusion restriction would be violated if it could be shown that the border at the 17th parallel was not arbitrarily set. If placement of the border was drawn to account for military or political power structures on the ground, distance from that border cannot be considered an exogenous determinant of bombing intensity. Second, the exclusion restriction implies that all provinces and the citizens living in those provinces (regardless of their proximity to the 17th parallel) were sufficiently similar in their pre-conflict levels of civic engagement and institutional trust and other observational factors, such that differences in measurement of civic engagement and institutional trust observed 25 years after the conflict can be attributed to the bombing. If it could be shown that provinces further away from the 17th parallel were fundamentally different from those close to it on factors that might influence civic engagement, this would invalidate the author's findings. A third violation could occur if distance from the border is associated with factors other than bombing that could lead to higher levels of civic engagement. For instance, scholars have shown that jurisdictions closer to the border received higher government transfers and state investment (Miguel and Roland, 2011),

which led to greater economic dependence on the central regime (Malesky and Taussig, 2009). The second assumption of instrumental variable strength implies that Z explains a significant share of the variation in D (Bound, Jaeger, and Baker, 1995; Lee et al., 2022). In practice this means that α_i is sufficiently large and statistically significant, which is usually measured by an F-test of its contribution to explained variance. In Barceló's case, this means that if distance from the 17th parallel is only weakly correlated with bombing, coefficients on bombing could be biased upward in the second stage.

As we demonstrate in the main text, it is highly unlikely that either the exclusion restriction or instrument strength assumptions are met in practice. The selection of the 17th parallel was the outcome of intensive multi-actor political negotiations. Even if we concede, however, that the 17th parallel might have been arbitrarily set to divide Vietnam in two in 1954, it happens that this demarcation ran through central Vietnam—a region then designated as Zone IV, a pre-1954 Communist stronghold consisting of the provinces of Thanh Hoa, Nghe An, Ha Tinh, Quang Binh, Quang Tri, and Thua Thien. As Zone IV already saw higher political activity with more politically engaged and connected citizens before the Second Indochina War (we further discuss this in the next section), the author's instrumental variable (distance to the 17th parallel), which is supposedly capturing levels of bombing, is in fact proxying for historical Communist party engagement and membership. Because historical communist strength in areas surrounding the 17th parallel violates the exclusion restriction, such an instrumental variable will exacerbate and not reduce endogeneity (Lal et al., 2021). This would lead to IV-2SLS estimated coefficients that are biased and are therefore greater than the OLS estimator.

Table B. Robustness Check of OLS Results without Party Members

Variables	Civic engagement (log) in 2001							
	With party members, original		Without party members, original		Without party members, with corrections			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Bombs, per km2 (log) (residence pre-1975)	0.08** (0.01)	0.12** (0.02)	0.05** (0.01)	0.05** (0.02)	0.04** (0.01)	0.03 (0.03)	0.05** (0.02)	0.04 (0.03)
Female=1		-0.06* (0.04)		-0.04 (0.03)		-0.05 (0.03)		-0.03 (0.03)
Age		-0.002 (0.001)		-0.002** (0.001)		-0.002 (0.001)		-0.002 (0.001)
Education		0.03** (0.01)		0.0005 (0.01)		0.004 (0.01)		0.01 (0.01)
Population density (1960 to 61) ('000)		-0.05* (0.02)		0.01 (0.02)		0.03 (0.03)		0.01 (0.03)
Average precipitation ('00)		0.03 (0.10)		0.07 (0.09)		-0.01 (0.10)		-0.03 (0.11)
South		-0.47** (0.15)		-0.30** (0.14)				
Latitude (°0)		-0.33** (0.16)		-0.23** (0.14)				
Zone IV=1					0.22** (0.04)	0.25** (0.05)		
CCOM Members in 1951							-0.005 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.03)
Constant	-0.38** (0.03)	0.26 (0.30)	-0.46** (0.02)	0.04 (0.27)	-0.46** (0.03)	-0.33* (0.20)	-0.46** (0.03)	-0.32 (0.22)
Clustered SEs (HC0)	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y
Observations	875	862	619	608	619	608	619	608
R-squared	0.04	0.09	0.02	0.04	0.05	0.06	0.02	0.03
RMSE	0.52 (df = 873)	0.52 (df = 853)	0.39 (df = 617)	0.03 (df = 599)	0.39 (df = 616)	0.39 (df = 600)	0.39 (df = 616)	0.39 (df = 600)

Note: p<0.05, *p<0.1. Models 1-2 replicate the trimmed and fully-specified OLS Models 1-2 in Table 1 from Barceló (2023). Models 3-4 replicate the trimmed and fully-specified OLS Models 1-2 that exclude party members in SI Appendix K.3 from Barceló (2023). Models 5-8 use the same specification as 3-4 while dropping the controls for South and Latitude and adding the new treatment variables of Zone IV and Second Central Committee Members (1951) using data that excludes communist party members.


Table C. Raw Count of the Survey Answers for 14 Categories (1000 respondents in total).

Organization	No	Yes
Social welfare services	735	265
Religious organization	896	104
Education, arts, music or cultural activities	827	173
Labor unions	887	113
Political groups or organizations	715	285
Local community actions on social issues	738	262
Third world development or human rights	985	15
Conservation, environment, animal rights groups	924	76
Professional associations	867	133
Youth work (scouts, guides, youth clubs, etc.)	846	154
Sports or recreation	808	192
Women's groups	716	284
Peace movements	908	92
Voluntary organizations concerned with health	852	148

Table D. 14 types of social groups and volunteer organizations used in WVS.

	Words in English	<u>Original Vietnamese wording</u>	Most likely VFF organizations
1	Social welfare services	Các dịch vụ phúc lợi xã hội cho người già tàn tật và người túng thiếu	Hội Chữ thập đỏ Việt Nam (VN), Hội người mù VN, Hội nạn nhân chất độc da cam/đioxin VN, Hội Bảo trợ Người khuyết tật và trẻ mồ côi, Hội Cứu trợ trẻ em tàn tật
2	Religious organization	Các tổ chức tôn giáo	Giáo hội Phật giáo VN, Ủy ban đoàn kết Công giáo VN, Hội Thánh tin lành VN
3	Education, arts, music or cultural activities	Các hoạt động giáo dục, nghệ thuật, âm nhạc hoặc văn hoá	Liên hiệp các Hội Văn học nghệ thuật VN, Hội Khuyến học VN
4	Labor unions	Các liên đoàn lao động	Công đoàn VN
5	Political groups or organizations	Các tổ chức, đoàn thể chính trị	Đảng Cộng sản VN
6	Local community actions on social issues	Hoạt động tại cộng đồng địa phương về các vấn đề như nghèo khổ, việc làm, nhà cửa, bình đẳng chủng tộc	Hội Liên hiệp Phụ nữ VN
7	Third world development or human rights	Các tổ chức phát triển thế giới thứ 3	
8	Conservation, environment, animal rights groups	Các nhóm bảo tồn, môi trường, quyền động vật	Hội nước sạch và môi trường
9	Professional associations	Các hiệp hội nghề nghiệp	Hội nông dân Việt Nam, Liên hiệp các hội Khoa học và Kỹ thuật VN, Liên minh Hợp tác xã VN, Liên đoàn thương mại và công nghiệp VN, Hội Luật gia VN, Hội Nhà báo VN, Hội làm vườn VN, Hội sinh vật cảnh VN, Tổng hội Y học VN, Hội Khoa học Lịch sử VN, Hội Mỹ nghệ-Kim hoàn-Đá quý VN, Hội Cựu Giáo chức VN, Hội Xuất bản, Hội Nghề cá,

			Hội Y tế công cộng, Hội Cựu thanh niên xung phong, Hiệp hội Doanh nghiệp của Thương binh và người khuyết tật, Hiệp hội doanh nghiệp nhỏ và vừa, Hội Đông y, Hội Doanh nhân trẻ, Liên đoàn Luật sư
10	Youth work (scouts, guides, youth clubs, etc.)	Công tác thanh niên (tức là các câu lạc bộ thanh niên, hướng dẫn viên, hướng đạo sinh v.v)	Đoàn Thanh niên Cộng sản Hồ Chí Minh, Hội liên hiệp Thanh niên VN
11	Sports or recreation	Thể thao hoặc giải trí	
12	Women's groups	Các nhóm phụ nữ	Hội Liên hiệp Phụ nữ VN
13	Peace movements	Phong trào vì hoà bình	Liên hiệp các tổ chức Hữu nghị VN
14	Voluntary organizations concerned with health	Các tổ chức tình nguyện liên quan đến sức khỏe	Hội kế hoạch hoá gia đình



Range bars represent 95% CI with SEs clustered at wartime province level

Figure E. Historical Party Strength at the Province Level Is Associated with Civic Engagement and Participation Today

Table F1. List of the 2nd Central Committee (1951-1960) Members

Name	Birth province		Region	Zone IV	Status
Hồ Chí Minh	Nghệ An		Central	Y	Fulltime
Trương Chinh	Nam Định		North	N	Fulltime
Lê Duân	Quảng Trị		Central	Y	Fulltime
Phạm Văn Đồng	Quảng Ngãi		Central	N	Fulltime
Võ Nguyên Giáp	Quảng Bình		Central	Y	Fulltime
Lê Đức Thọ	Nam Định		North	N	Fulltime
Nguyễn Chí Thanh	Thừa Thiên Huế		Central	Y	Fulltime
Nguyễn Lương Bằng	Hải Dương		North	N	Fulltime
Hoàng Quốc Việt	Bắc Ninh		North	N	Fulltime
Chu Văn Tấn	Thái Nguyên		North	N	Fulltime
Tôn Đức Thắng	An Giang		South	N	Fulltime
Lê Văn Lương	Bắc Ninh		North	N	Fulltime
Trần Đăng Ninh	Hà Đông*	Hà Tây	North	N	Fulltime
Hoàng Văn Hoan	Nghệ An		Central	Y	Fulltime
Trần Quốc Hoàn	Nghệ An		Central	Y	Fulltime
Lê Thanh Nghị	Hải Dương		North	N	Fulltime
Nguyễn Duy Trinh	Nghệ An		Central	Y	Fulltime
Phạm Hùng	Vĩnh Long		South	N	Fulltime
Ung Văn Khiêm	An Giang		South	N	Fulltime
Nguyễn Khang	Thái Bình		North	N	Alternate
Nguyễn Văn Trân	Bắc Ninh		North	N	Alternate
Hà Huy Giáp	Hà Tĩnh		Central	Y	Alternate
Hồ Sĩ Kháng	Nghệ An		Central	Y	Alternate
Văn Tiên Dũng	Hà Nội		North	N	Alternate
Tổ Hữu	Thừa Thiên Huế		Central	Y	Alternate
Hồ Tùng Mậu	Nghệ An		Central	Y	Alternate
Nguyễn Văn Kinh	Sài Gòn		South	N	Alternate
Nguyễn Chánh	Quảng Ngãi		Central	N	Alternate
Hoàng Anh	Thừa Thiên Huế		Central	Y	Alternate
Trần Hữu Dực	Quảng Trị		Central	Y	Alternate
Bùi Quang Tạo	Thái Bình		North	N	Alternate
Xuân Thuỷ	Hà Đông*	Hà Tây	North	N	Alternate
Trần Lương	Quảng Ngãi		Central	N	Alternate
Nguyễn Thị Thập	Tiền Giang		South	N	Alternate
Đỗ Mười	Hà Đông*	Hà Tây	North	N	Alternate

* denotes the name of an old province that no longer exists; the new province name as of 2001 is provided in the next column

Table F2. List of the 3rd Central Committee (1960-1976) Members

Name	Birth province		Region	Zone IV	Status
Hồ Chí Minh	Nghệ An		Central	Y	Fulltime
Trương Chinh	Nam Định		North	N	Fulltime
Lê Duẩn	Quảng Trị		Central	Y	Fulltime
Phạm Văn Đồng	Quảng Ngãi		Central	N	Fulltime
Võ Nguyên Giáp	Quảng Bình		Central	Y	Fulltime
Phạm Hùng	Vĩnh Long		South	N	Fulltime
Nguyễn Duy Trinh	Nghệ An		Central	Y	Fulltime
Nguyễn Chí Thanh	Thừa Thiên Huế		Central	Y	Fulltime
Chu Văn Tấn	Thái Nguyên		North	N	Fulltime
Tôn Đức Thắng	An Giang		South	N	Fulltime
Nguyễn Văn Linh	Hung Yên		North	N	Fulltime
Nguyễn Lương Bằng	Hải Dương		North	N	Fulltime
Văn Tiến Dũng	Hà Nội		North	N	Fulltime
Nguyễn Văn Trân	Bắc Ninh		North	N	Fulltime
Song hào	Thanh Hoá		Central	Y	Fulltime
Phan Văn Đăng	Vĩnh Long		South	N	Fulltime
Phạm Văn Xô	Nam Định		North	N	Fulltime
Trần Tử Bình	Hà Nam		North	N	Fulltime
Lê Thanh Nghị	Hải Dương		North	N	Fulltime
Tổ Hữu	Thừa Thiên Huế		Central	Y	Fulltime
Xuân Thủy	Hà Đông		North	N	Fulltime
Ung Văn Khiêm	An Giang		South	N	Fulltime
Lê Văn Lương	Bắc Ninh		North	N	Fulltime
Nguyễn Thị Thập	Tiền Giang		South	N	Fulltime
Võ Chí Công	Quảng Nam		Central	N	Fulltime
Lê Đức Thọ	Nam Định		North	N	Fulltime
Trần Quốc Hoàn	Nghệ An		Central	Y	Fulltime
Hoàng Anh	Thừa Thiên Huế		Central	Y	Fulltime
Đỗ Mười	Hà Đông*	Hà Tây	North	N	Fulltime
Hoàng Quốc Việt	Bắc Ninh		North	N	Fulltime
Hoàng Văn Hoan	Nghệ An		Central	Y	Fulltime
Lê Hiến Mai	Sơn Tây*	Hà Tây	North	N	Fulltime
Lê Quảng Ba	Cao Bằng		North	N	Fulltime
Nguyễn Côn	Nghệ An		Central	Y	Fulltime
Hà Huy Giáp	Hà Tĩnh		Central	Y	Fulltime
Bùi Quang Tạo	Thái Bình		North	N	Fulltime
Trần Hữu Dực	Quảng Trị		Central	Y	Fulltime
Nguyễn Lam	Hà Nam		North	N	Fulltime
Nguyễn Khang	Thái Bình		North	N	Fulltime
Hà Thị Quế	Ninh Bình		North	N	Fulltime
Hoàng Văn Thái	Thái Bình		North	N	Fulltime

Chu Huy Mân	Nghệ An		Central	Y	Fulltime
Võ Thúc Đồng	Nghệ An		Central	Y	Fulltime
Nguyễn Văn Kinh	Sài Gòn		South	N	Fulltime
Lê Quốc Thân	Hà Nam		North	N	Fulltime
Phan Trọng Tuệ	Son Tây*	Hà Tây	North	N	Fulltime
Lý Ban	Long An		South	N	Alternate
Nguyễn Thanh Bình	Bắc Ninh		North	N	Alternate
Phạm Thái Bường	Trà Vinh		South	N	Alternate
Đinh Thị Cẩn	Nghệ An		Central	Y	Alternate
Nguyễn Thọ Chân	Hà Nội		North	N	Alternate
Trương Chí Cương	Quảng Nam		Central	N	Alternate
Lê Quang Đạo	Bắc Ninh		North	N	Alternate
Trần Độ	Thái Bình		North	N	Alternate
Nguyễn Đôn	Quảng Ngãi		Central	N	Alternate
Trần Quý Hai	Quảng Ngãi		Central	N	Alternate
Lê Hoàng	Thái Nguyên		North	N	Alternate
Trần Quang Huy	Khánh Hoà		South	N	Alternate
Nguyễn Khai					Alternate
Nguyễn Hữu Khiếu	Quảng Trị		Central	Y	Alternate
Võ Văn Kiệt	Vĩnh Long		South	N	Alternate
Hoàng Văn Kiêu	Son La		North	N	Alternate
Lê Liêm	Hà Đông*	Hà Tây	North	N	Alternate
Ngô Minh Loan	Nghệ An		Central	Y	Alternate
Nguyễn Văn Lộc	Hà Đông*	Hà Tây	North	N	Alternate
Nguyễn Hữu Mai	Quảng Trị		Central	Y	Alternate
Trần Văn Quang	Nghệ An		Central	Y	Alternate
Hà Kế Tấn	Son Tây*	Hà Tây	North	N	Alternate
Lê Thành	Thái Bình		North	N	Alternate
Đinh Đức Thiện	Nam Định		North	N	Alternate
Ngô Thuyền	Thanh Hoá		Central	N	Alternate
Lê Toàn Thư	Ninh Bình		North	N	Alternate
Nguyễn Khánh Toàn	Thừa Thiên Huế		Central	Y	Alternate
Trần Văn Trà	Quảng Ngãi		Central	N	Alternate
Bùi Công Trùng	Thừa Thiên Huế		Central	Y	Alternate
Hoàng Tùng	Hà Nam		North	N	Alternate
Trần Danh Tuyên	Bắc Giang		North	N	Alternate
Nguyễn Trọng Vĩnh	Thanh Hoá		Central	Y	Alternate
Nguyễn Văn Vịnh	Nam Định		North	N	Alternate

* denotes the name of an old province that no longer exists; the new province name as of 2001 is provided in the next column




Figure G1. Maps of Pre-War Central Committee Representation

- A. Geographic distribution of the 2nd CCOM membership
- B. Geographic distribution of the 3rd CCOM membership
- C. Geographic distribution of the average membership in the 2nd and 3rd CCOM




Figure G2. Maps of Bombing and Pre-war Central Committee Representation

- A. Geographic distribution on bombing from the original article by Barceló (2021)
- B. Geographic distribution of the average membership in the 2nd and 3rd CCOM

Table H. Original Estimates Only Significant for Northern Vietnamese Provinces, not South

Variables	Civic Engagement (log) in 2001											
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
	Original						Corrected					
	North			South			North			South		
	IV (3)	IV (4)	IV (5)	IV (3)	IV (4)	IV (5)	IV (3)	IV (4)	IV (5)	IV (3)	IV (4)	IV (5)
Bombs, per km2 (log)	0.21**	0.19**	0.21**	0.09	0.07	0.38	0.24**	0.22**	0.22**	0.09	0.08	0.25
(residence pre-1975)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.12)	(0.09)	(0.27)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.14)	(0.09)	(0.34)
Female=1			-0.02			-0.13**			-0.02			-0.11**
			(0.05)			(0.07)			(0.04)			(0.07)
Age			0.0002			-0.004			0.0003			-0.004
			(0.002)			(0.002)			(0.002)			(0.004)
Education			0.01			0.03**			0.01			0.03*
			(0.01)			(0.02)			(0.02)			(0.02)
Population density		-0.20**	-0.22**		-0.22	-0.14		-0.24**	-0.23**		-0.02	-0.10
(1960 to 61) ('000)		(0.06)	(0.06)		(0.23)	(0.10)		(0.04)	(0.06)		(0.02)	(0.14)
Average precipitation			-0.11			-0.41			0.04			-0.30
('00)			(0.15)			(0.29)			(0.29)			(0.39)
Constant	-0.57**	-0.45**	-0.37	-0.49	-0.41	-0.56	-0.62**	-0.48**	-0.61	-0.49	-0.41	-0.40
	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.26)	(0.38)	(0.29)	(0.37)	(0.11)	(0.08)	(0.47)	(0.49)	(0.31)	(0.41)
Clustered SEs ("HC0")	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
First Stage												
Distance to 17th Parallel	-0.86**	-0.96**	-1.10**	-0.12**	-0.15**	-0.09**	-0.97**	-1.04**	-1.04**	-0.15**	-0.19**	-0.16
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.16)	(0.11)	(0.13)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.11)
F-Statistic	772.9	1868.3	358.5	49.3	102.6	13.7	38.4	85.0	67.5	8.68	11.5	1.88
Observations	473	473	464	402	402	398	466	466	457	409	409	405

Note: All models use show an instrumental variables two-staged least squared regression. SEs in parentheses (**p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.). Models 1-3 reproduce Models 3-5 from Barceló (2023, 24)'s SI Table M. Using our own calculations, we were unable to replicate Barceló's F-statistics for Models 1-3, which are 1064, 2041, and 37.3, respectively, as the replication code for the Appendix is not available. Models 4-6 show the same models with data subset to South instead of North. Models 7-12 run the same exact specifications as 1-6 but with our corrections, which include correctly coded provinces on whether they are located in North or South Vietnam and robust clustered SEs.

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