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Effects of peer groups on the gender-wage gap and life after the MBA: Evidence from the random assignment of MBA peers

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Effects of Peer Groups on the Gender-Wage Gap and Life After the MBA: Evidence from the Random Assignment of MBA Peers

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ABSTRACT

Using the historical random assignment of MBA students to peer groups at a top business school in the United States, I study the effect of the gender composition of a student's peers on the gender pay gap at graduation and long-term labor market outcomes. I find that a 10 percentage point increase in the share of male peers leads to a 2.1 percent increase in the relative earnings of female students at graduation, closing the gender gap in earnings at graduation by two-thirds. The effects on women's long-term earnings grow even larger with time. Using novel data on job offers, I find that two different mechanisms drive the effects on short- and long-term earnings. Women with a greater share of male peers take more quantitative coursework in business school and receive job offers at graduation in occupations, industries, and firms associated with higher wages, longer hours, and greater earnings growth. However, the effect of male peers on women's earnings at graduation is primarily driven by female students' increased willingness to accept the maximum salary offered within their offer set. In contrast, peer-induced effects on human capital alone place female students on dramatically different long-term expected earnings paths due to changes in the initial occupation, initial industry, and initial firm accepted at graduation. This change in the characteristics of the first job at graduation largely explains the effect of peer gender composition on long-term outcomes.

JEL Classification Codes: I24, I26, J16, J24, J31, J44

Key Words: peer groups, gender gap, MBA students, course work, job offers, long-term earnings

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I. Introduction

Women have made enormous progress in educational attainment over the past several decades. In fact, there has been not only a narrowing but a complete reversal of the gender gap in college attainment. The gender gap in graduate degree attainment has narrowed as well, including in business education.¹ In spite of this, women continue to be underrepresented at the higher end of the wage distribution, and in particular in the highest-paying managerial and technical occupations.²

However, not all educational tracks are equal. Differences between men’s and women’s highest degree type and field of concentration explain a substantial portion of the gender gap in earnings.³ Figure I shows that women tend to specialize in fields with lower expected labor market earnings than men, even if men and women had the same expected earnings in each field.⁴ The figure shows that there is gender segregation across fields of concentration, which produces a segregation in expected earnings.⁵ It is therefore critical to understand the factors affecting gender segregation, not only in fields of concentration but also in the initial conditions of a career, and how these differences at the outset may translate into longer-term outcomes.

This paper studies the effect of the gender composition of a student’s peers in business school on the gender wage gap at graduation and on long-term labor market outcomes. The question of how peer gender composition affects students’ educational choices and career outcomes—and female students’, in particular—has been explored by previous literature, though identifying the causal impact is often empirically challenging. The voluntary formation of peer groups and social networks in the educational setting is likely to be endogenous to factors affecting both educational choices and labor market outcomes. While some recent work has addressed some of these empirical challenges, the ability to identify effects of peer gender composition on both human capital decisions and realized labor market outcomes, specifically, on earnings—both short- and long-term—is rare. Moreover, the available data often do not lend themselves to identifying the channels through which the peer effects are linked to labor market outcomes and whether it is indeed the *same* mechanism that impacts women’s earnings in the short term, at graduation, as that driving the effect of peers on the long-term earnings of women. Importantly, understanding the channels through which peer gender composition affects women’s long-term earnings also reveals a deeper understanding of the gender gap itself: to what extent the effects of gender itself are malleable, subject to social and environmental forces, and to

¹See Goldin, Katz, and Kuziemko (2006), Becker, Hubbard, and Murphy (2010).

²See Bertrand, Goldin, and Katz (2010), Bertrand and Hallock (2001), Blau and Kahn (2017), Bertrand (2018).

³Bertrand (2018) reports the mean earnings and 80th and 90th percentile earnings among men working full time who have completed a given degree–field of study combination, and then reports, by birth cohort, the gender gap (men-women) in such education-based earnings potentials. Figure I(a) updates this analysis to include more recent birth cohorts.

⁴Expected labor market earnings are determined by taking the expectation over the combination of the highest degree type and field of study.

⁵For example, in the 1950 birth cohort, women chose degrees and fields of study with mean earnings 19 percent below the mean earnings in the degrees and fields of study chosen by men.

what extent, if any, the effects of gender can be “undone.”⁶

This paper leverages the historical random assignment of Master of Business Administration (MBA) students to peer groups at a top business school in the United States to identify the causal effect of the gender composition of a student’s peers on labor market outcomes, on earnings at the time of graduation, and on long-term earnings. In this paper, I exploit a unique feature of this particular institutional setting: within each entering cohort, students are randomly assigned to peer groups of approximately 50 students, with whom they take their first semester courses. This institutional feature—together with rich data on background characteristics of each student, course transcript data, and employment and earnings data—allows for a direct test of how the gender composition of student peer groups causally affects both human capital choices and earnings outcomes without the concern of endogenous selection into peer groups, as detailed in Manski (1993).⁷

In order to address the second and third challenges, I build a novel data set, drawing on unique, rich data that come from an annual survey conducted by the Career Services office of the business school. This data includes not only student salaries at graduation, but also the full set of job *offers* received, for each student from the 1999 through 2011 graduating classes, along with acceptance decisions of each student. Specifically, for each job offer received, students are asked about the characteristics of the offer, including a variety of components of pay (e.g., salaries, bonuses, tuition reimbursement, etc.), job characteristics (e.g., industry, occupation, job title, location, firm), and whether or not they accepted the offer. Therefore, an advantage of the data is that they allow one to distinguish between the effect of peers on the *set of offers* received, arguably a measure of welfare, from a potential effect on preferences: the choice of job students make from within their offer *set*.⁸

In addition to drawing on this unique job offer data, I use data from a retrospective alumni survey, which collects actual employment and earnings data for each position held since graduation for a subset of nearly 20 graduating cohorts of students, thus collecting labor earnings data for the earliest cohorts of students for more than 15 years. The data allow not only for an analysis of the effect of peers on long-term earnings, but also for the construction of expected earnings paths for all students in the job offer data, including the most recent cohorts, who are not included in the alumni survey. Such expected earnings paths, conditional

⁶This last phrase alludes to literature in gender studies that conceptualizes gender as a practice or a manifestation of individual traits and behaviors: something that one “does.” See Butler (1999, 2004, 2011). The study of gender as an outcome of social forces or a practice, rather than a fixed characteristic, has entered the economics literature as well (Brenoe et al. (2022), Gneezy, Leonard, and List (2009), Bursztyn, Fujiwara, and Pallais (2017), Shan and Zolitz (2022)).

⁷As I show later on, students are more likely to continue to voluntarily take courses with members of their randomly assigned peer group, but this may be considered an intermediate effect of the assignment to peer groups and a mediating mechanism for some of the effects observed at graduation.

⁸Here, preferences are defined in a revealed preferences sense: by choosing one job offer in the choice set over all others, students who do not choose the maximum salary offer reveal their willingness to pay (WTP) for the non-wage amenities of the accepted job, relative to all other jobs in their offer set that offer a higher salary. See Mas and Pallais (2017), Sorkin (2018) for similar approaches.

on the characteristics of the first job accepted at graduation, can be constructed for each job *offer* received at graduation. For example, expected future earnings paths given the industry, occupation, and even the firm offer accepted at graduation can be constructed by averaging actual earnings of graduates from the alumni survey a given number of years after graduation over all those whose first job was in the same initial industry, occupation, or firm at graduation.⁹ An “offer” at graduation can be therefore be characterized by the future earnings path, in expectation, given that a graduating student starts his or her career path in a job of such characteristics (regardless of which industry, occupation, or firm in which the student ends up).¹⁰

By characterizing the set of offers at graduation using a longer time horizon, this paper offers a unique approach relative to previous literature. The data affords the opportunity to examine how much of the change in actual long-term labor market outcomes was already present at the time of graduation in the change in the expected earnings paths of the offers received at graduation. In other words, it allows one to explore how peer gender composition—through its effect on the characteristics of a first job—alters the long-term expected earnings paths of women and the realized earnings outcomes.

I find that a 10 percentage point increase in the share of male students in a peer group leads to a 2.1 percent increase in the salaries of female students at graduation relative to male, closing the gender gap in salaries at graduation by approximately two-thirds. In addition, women who are randomly assigned to a peer group with a greater share of male peers are more likely to enter male-dominated industries and job functions at graduation, such as investment banking, venture capital and investment management, and are less likely to enter relatively female-dominated industries, such as in marketing or product management. Specifically, I find that a 10 percentage point increase in the share of male peers closes the existing gender gap in entry into each of the most male-dominated job functions and industries by 50 percent or more and closes the gap in the gender-skewedness of industries and occupations accepted at graduation by female students relative to male by more than two-thirds.

I examine the effect of peers on the characteristics of the industries and occupations into which graduates are more likely to sort. Women with a greater share of male peers accept job offers at graduation in occupations, industries, and firms associated with higher wages, longer hours, and greater earnings growth. Though the wage differences are not large in the first year after graduation, the results show that having a larger share of male peers places women into jobs at graduation with very different average wage paths over time. Specifically, a 10 percentage point increase in the share of male peers causes female students to choose occupations with a wage that is on average \$0.69 per hour (1.7 percent) greater at graduation but that, 10 years after graduation, is on average \$16.55 per hour (10 percent) greater—an effect nearly 25 times

⁹A benefit of the approach is that such expected earnings trajectories can be created even for students who do not appear in the alumni survey.

¹⁰An “offer” includes a level and a slope.

the magnitude of the one at graduation. Similarly, such an increase in the share of male peers causes female students to choose industries at graduation that have an average wage that is \$1.21 per hour greater, but, 10 years after graduation, is \$17.9 per hour greater—a sorting effect at graduation that produces 15 times the magnitude of the effect observed at the time of graduation. In addition, a greater share of male peers causes women to choose occupations and industries at graduation with a lower likelihood of part-time work, a greater likelihood of overtime work, and lower average weekly hours of work.

I then explore the underlying mechanisms through which these effects at graduation may take place. Analysis of coursework and course transcript data shows that greater exposure to male peers causes female students to choose courses and fields of concentration that are relatively more male-dominated. In particular, women with a greater share of male peers concentrate in fields with a greater proportion of male students, are more likely to concentrate in a majority-male field of concentration, take a greater fraction of quantitative courses in general, and take a greater fraction of finance courses in particular. Women with a greater share of male peers are more likely to concentrate in finance, one of the highest-paying areas of concentration as well as a documented source of the gender earnings gap among MBAs at graduation.¹¹ They are less likely to concentrate in fields that are relatively more female-dominated, such as marketing.

Using the data on job offers, I examine both human capital explanations for the effect on the gender earnings gap at graduation as well as a potential role for preferences, or a change in female students' choice of offer from within their offer set. I find that the effect of a greater share of male peers on the starting salaries of women is almost entirely due to an increase in women's likelihood of choosing the maximum starting salary offer within their offer set.¹² While this is yet another dimension in which having more male peers causes female students to act more like the average male student, I show that this particular effect of male peers only affects earnings at graduation and has little persistence in terms of long-term earnings, given the offer *set* in-hand. However, women with more male peers also receive a better set of offers, when measured by the expected future earnings stream, conditional on starting one's career in such a job at graduation. I find that the effect of peers on offers for long-term earnings profiles is almost entirely driven by changes in human capital choices. Importantly, while peer gender composition does not immediately affect women's salary offers at graduation, I show that peer-induced changes in human capital choices place female students on vastly different long-term expected earnings paths, due to changes in the initial occupation, initial industry, and even the initial firm in which female students begin their careers.

Based on the results, a natural question might be, "Why does peer gender composition significantly affect the coursework and fields of concentration among women, but yet women's set of salary *offers* at graduation

¹¹See Bertrand, Goldin, and Katz (2010).

¹²I separately examine whether any effect of peer gender composition on a student's willingness to accept (WTA) a higher-paying salary job offer reflects a change in the willingness to pay (WTP) for non-wage amenities.

(not considering expected future earnings) are not significantly affected by the share of male peers?" I show that the marginal female student, who is randomly "induced to move" into quantitative coursework or more male-dominated fields of concentration, receives below-average offers in the industry, occupation, or firm from which she receives offers. This ex-ante sorting is consistent with the Roy model of self-selection. However, the marginal female student receives offers from higher-paying firms, occupations, and industries. The net effect is that randomly induced, endogenous increases in quantitative coursework or fields of concentration do not result in higher (or lower) salary offers for female students—at least not immediately at graduation. However, peer-induced changes in human capital choices do explain the dramatic differences in long-term expected earnings paths into which female students are placed due to changes in the types of job offers they receive at graduation. Analysis of data on long-term earnings is necessary, however, to determine whether their greater expected earnings result in greater realized long-term earnings.

Importantly, analysis of the long-term earnings data shows that having a greater share of male peers has large and positive effects on female graduates' long-term earnings, long after graduation. I find that while the effect of peers on women's earnings is small or negligible at graduation and in the years immediately following graduation, women with a greater share of male peers during business school see positive effects on their salaries of significantly larger magnitudes six and seven years after graduation, with effects almost 25 times the magnitude of effects observed at graduation. In particular, a 10 percentage point increase in the share of male peers increases female earnings six years after graduation by 27 percentage points relative to those of male graduates, closing the gender earnings gap by more than 50 percent. The same increase in the share of male peers increases female relative earnings by 50 percentage points seven years after graduation, closing the gender earnings gap by more than 70 percent.

Finally, I find that initial conditions matter. The occupation and industry accepted at graduation explain 43 percent and 50 percent, respectively, of the effect of peer gender composition on the long-term relative earnings of women. These results demonstrate that initial conditions at the start of the career—the initial occupation, industry, and firm—have lasting effects on long-term earnings, and the results reveal some underlying mechanisms through which the gender earnings gap—small at the time of graduation—can accumulate to the documented magnitudes over the course of the life cycle. Importantly, the results also reveal how environmental factors in the educational environment can influence the initial conditions of the career and can thereby mitigate some of the effects of gender in growing proportion as well.

This paper is related to three main strands of literature. First, it contributes to the literature on peer effects in higher education and to the small but growing literature on how peer gender composition in particular affects students' educational choices. The literature that studies educational effects of peer gender composition generally exploits year-to-year cohort variation in student gender composition. At the primary-

school level, Schneeweis and Zweimueller (2012) find that girls with more *female* peers are *less* likely to choose typical female-dominated school types in Austria. At the high school level, Zolitz and Breniøe (2020) use data from Denmark to show that female students in high school cohorts with a greater share of female peers are less likely to complete a university STEM degree and, instead, are more likely to obtain a bachelor’s degree in health or education. At the university level, Hill (2017) shows suggestive evidence that women exposed to a higher share of female peers in U.S. colleges are less likely to major in a STEM field.¹³ However, using year-to-year cohort variation for identification carries its own issues. For example, if the variation in the gender composition of the cohort is driven by a source that affects choice of major, such as time-varying local labor demand for female-dominated occupations, then the source of variation would not be exogenous to factors affecting choice of major or field. Time-varying gender-specific selection into schools may, in fact, be in anticipation of such factors.¹⁴ Leveraging random assignment of students to peer groups within each cohort resolves plausible concerns about endogeneity regarding the source of variation of the gender composition within-school and across cohorts.

A smaller but important set of literature within this first strand uses random assignment to investigate how peer gender composition affects students’ choices of fields of study and labor market outcomes. In particular, Zolitz and Feld (2021) use the random assignment of university students in the Netherlands to study sections and, making a careful analysis, find that women randomly assigned to sections with more female peers are less likely to choose male-dominated majors. In addition, Oosterbeek and van Ewijk (2014) conduct an experiment in which first-year students in economics and business are randomly assigned to work groups with varying gender composition. They find no substantial gender peer effects on academic achievement, though they do not examine labor market outcomes. However, the previous literature using random assignment to study gender peer effects generally focuses on short-term impacts: academic outcomes and labor market outcomes in the first year after graduation.¹⁵ In contrast, this paper studies the effects on long-term labor market outcomes, with a sufficiently long time horizon for the effects of two different mechanisms—preferences and human capital explanations—to be uncovered and disentangled. In addition, it is worth noting that the previous literature has focused primarily on educational settings with much younger students. This paper investigates the effects of peer gender composition in an MBA setting, where students are, on average, significantly older at the time of entry, have greater prior work experience, and have significant industry-specific experience. It is possible that such students are more likely to have solidified

¹³Other studies show similar findings in the university setting, such as Anelli and Peri (2019), whose authors find that male students are more likely to choose a male-dominated college major when exposed to classes with over 80 percent male peers in Italian high schools.

¹⁴For instance, Zolitz and Brenøe (2020) must make the identifying assumption that the proportion of female students in particular schools or locations, in a given cohort, is exogenous to factors affecting STEM choice, such as time-varying local labor demand for female-dominated occupations.

¹⁵A notable exception is Zolitz and Feld (2021).

their career aspirations and intended fields of study, and that human capital investments and career trajectories may be less malleable at this stage.¹⁶¹⁷ This paper provides new evidence about whether social and environmental forces may still influence career and earnings trajectories at this later stage in the lifecycle, when large prior investments have already been made.

As a further contribution to this first strand of literature, this paper examines the effect of peers on the set of offers that students receive. By distinguishing between the effect of peers on the offer *set* and the effect on what jobs female students choose from *within* their offer set, this paper examines a new channel relative to the previous literature and can offer an explanation for why, in much of that literature, the effects of peer gender composition on earnings appear small or negligible in the years immediately following graduation but have effects of much larger magnitudes over time. It sheds new light on the timing of these two channels in terms of when the effects take place in the lifecycle, but also of when the effects are observed in terms of earnings. It further contributes to an understanding of how much of the effect of peers on women’s earnings is driven by the formation of preferences in the educational setting and how persistent such peer-induced effects on preferences are on the long-term earnings of women, relative to other factors that affect the choice set.

Second, this paper contributes to the large literature on the gender wage gap—in particular, the gap among MBAs and other graduates of professional degree programs, including Bertrand and Hallock (2001), Bertrand, Goldin, and Katz (2010), Bursztyn, Fujiwara, and Pallais (2017), and Cortes et al. (2023).¹⁸ Notably, Bertrand, Goldin, and Katz (2010) find that at the outset of their careers, male and female MBAs have nearly identical labor incomes, but their earnings soon diverge. But whereas Bertrand, Goldin, and Katz, among many others, document the sources of the gender wage gap, this paper examines whether differences often associated with gender, are, in fact, malleable, even at as late a point in the lifecycle as business or professional school. Furthermore, this paper, through its novel use of job offer data, combined with alumni survey data, contributes to an understanding of the *timing* of the divergence in earnings and hours by examining whether men and women receive, at the time of graduation, different initial job offers that already encapsulate different expected lifetime earnings and hours profiles.¹⁹²⁰ Closely related is the

¹⁶Wiswall and Zafar (2021) show that career aspirations and expectations of college students at ages 18 to 21 are predictive of future outcomes. For women in particular, expectations about working full- or part-time, relationship status, and earnings of spouses are all predictive of actual outcomes six years later.

¹⁷Goldin’s work has documented that young women’s career and family aspirations are often formed by ages 14 to 21, and while they may not always match their labor market behavior at age 35, changes in labor market and family timing expectations formed at younger ages were followed by changes in educational investments (Goldin (2002), Goldin (2006)).

¹⁸Other notable papers in the literature on the gender-wage gap among the highly skilled include Goldin (2014), Bertrand (2018), Blau and Kahn (2017), Cortes and Tessada (2011), and Cortes and Pan (2019).

¹⁹Of course, there may still be within-occupation, industry, and firm “child penalties” in earnings, where actual earnings may deviate from expected earnings in each of the job offers. However, prior research shows that differences across occupations still play a substantial role. See, for example, Denning et al. (2022).

²⁰Goldin (2014) documents both within-occupation differences and between-occupation differences in earnings by gender and shows that differences in occupational sorting, even if men and women were paid the same within an occupation, accounts for

research of Beneito et al. (2021), which examines the gender imbalance across subfields in economics and the timing of when these differences first emerge. Relative to this literature, the contribution of this paper is to examine whether a portion of these differences in offers and earnings trajectories at the time of graduation are, in fact, causally affected by the peer environment in business school.

Finally, this paper contributes to the literature on the gender gap in the valuation of non-wage amenities. One explanation for the persistence of gender wage gaps, even among those who have similar educational backgrounds and are similarly skilled, is that these gaps arise in part because women have a greater “willingness to pay” (WTP) for certain non-monetary job attributes, such as job flexibility or a lower frequency of overtime work, than men. Wiswall and Zafar (2018) address some of the empirical challenges of isolating workers’ preferences from equilibrium firm compensation decisions. They do so by conducting a survey of students in which hypothetical job scenarios are constructed, and they elicit workers’ preferences using the stated preferences of students in the survey. Mas and Pallais (2017) also employ a discrete-choice experiment to estimate the distribution of the willingness to pay for non-wage amenities. In their case, they use advertisements for real jobs but still elicit workers’ preferences using stated preferences in a survey.^{21,22} In contrast, this paper uses real, observed acceptance decisions from a set of actual job offers in a real-life, high-stakes setting. This paper contributes to the literature by exploiting a natural discrete-choice experiment based on the particular features in this institutional setting, where all job offers are held simultaneously in hand. It uses a “revealed preferences” approach to estimate the value of non-wage amenities, using data on the full set of job offers received and on the accepted job offer.²³ This paper goes beyond the previous literature in that it investigates whether these preferences or trade-offs that women make, relative to men, are inherently fixed or whether they can also be influenced by social, educational, or other environmental factors.

II. Setting

This paper exploits the historical random assignment of peer groups (often called “sections,” “clusters,” or “cohorts” by comparable business schools) to address the classic set of challenges in the identification of peer effects. In this setting, first-year MBA students are assigned to peer groups of approximately 50 to 60 students. The assignment procedure will be discussed more in Section IV. MBA students assigned to the same peer group are required to take a set of classes together during their first semester of business school.²⁴ The stated goal of the requirement is that through this experience, students get to know one another well

almost 30 percent of the gender gap in earnings.

²¹Closely related is the role of gender differences in psychological attributes, for example, in competitiveness, as in Reuben, Sapienza and Zingales (2015), and risk aversion in job search, as in Cortes et al. (2023), among several others.

²²See Bertrand (2011) for a review of the literature on gender differences in psychological attributes.

²³See Sorkin (2018) and Mas and Thomas (2021) for similar approaches.

²⁴Due to the data-use agreement, details that would identify the particular business school must be omitted.

and begin forming networks early on in their academic experience. As with a number of other top MBA programs in the U.S., the required aspect of the peer group experience does not last throughout the MBA program. The experience of convening as a group begins before the start of the term, and required courses only last for the first semester. However, these peer groups often continue to reconvene voluntarily for events and social activities.²⁵ Though requirements only last for one semester, prior literature that has studied similar peer groups in elite business schools has found that the social ties established in the first year remain extremely strong, even long after graduation.²⁶

Importantly, members of the same peer group often continue to take classes together voluntarily, even after the requirement to take first-semester courses together has ended. Specifically, in our data, the average share of students in a course section who are members of a student’s assigned peer group is 14.4 percent among courses taken over the remaining two years of the program. For comparison, the average share of students in a course section made up of an arbitrary subset of students of the same graduating cohort and of the same group size as the actual peer group is 7.4 percent.²⁷ In addition, a student has, on average, eight other members of his or her peer group taking the same course section. Table B.I shows that this equates to four more students from one’s own peer group than from an arbitrary subset of students from the same cohort, in any given course section. Therefore, the interactions between students of the same peer group throughout the course of their two years in business school lasts long after the first-semester compulsory coursework has been completed.

The compulsory aspect of the peer group system includes a discussion-oriented course that is designed to enhance students’ self-awareness by providing them with an opportunity to reflect on critical aspects of leadership—working in teams, influencing others, conflict management, interpersonal communication, presentation skills. The course is designed to challenge students to explore who they are as leaders and to create a personalized plan to guide their continued development in the MBA program and in life after the MBA. Students are encouraged to engage in self-reflection, discuss goals and aspirations—including those surrounding work-life balance—and work on desired leadership traits in alignment with personal and professional aspirations. Students and faculty members alike describe the required portions as not only

²⁵For example, after the first-semester requirements are completed, it is common for the peer groups to voluntarily come together for intramural sports, competitions against peer schools, admitted students’ weekends, and other social events. Groups often choose names and colors and may have a flag or mascot that reflects a group identity and kinship.

²⁶For instance, Lerner and Malmendier (2013) find that among Harvard Business School (HBS) students, at the 25th alumni reunions, fundraising and many activities are arranged on a section-by-section basis. Shue (2013) demonstrates the role of ongoing social interactions by showing that peer effects are more than twice as strong in the year following staggered alumni reunions among HBS students, even though peer-group requirements end after the first year of the MBA program. More recently, Hampole, Truffa, and Wong (2023) find that student peer groups in a top MBA setting affect social connections that last long after graduation, by providing job referral and work-related opportunities, support, and gender-specific information, affecting the likelihood that women reach a senior management position 15 years after graduation.

²⁷The difference is statistically significant, and the 95 percent confidence interval indicates that the share of a course section’s students made up of members of the peer group is, at a minimum, approximately twice the share made up of an arbitrary subset of students in the cohort of the same group size. See Appendix Figure B.I and Table B.I for more details.

teaching the fundamentals of the basic disciplines, such as economics, statistics, and behavioral science, but also including a focus on long-term growth, where students discuss career and personal aspirations as a group and make informed choices about academics, leadership, career management and work-life balance along the way.

III. Datasets

A. Employment Offer Data

An unique data set used in this paper comes from survey data collected separately by the university in which data is recorded on the full set of job offers received for each student from the 1999- through 2011-graduating classes. Moreover, this employment offer data includes the job offer accepted by each student. The data come from a salary survey conducted by the Career Services office at the time of graduation and consist of student self-reported salary and position information for each job offer received. By matching the administrative data to this employment-offer data set, I can observe the complete choice set of each student, along with salaries, bonuses, and a wide variety of pecuniary and non-pecuniary benefits. To date, this is the first paper in which a data set that contains the full choice sets of workers in a real, high-stakes setting has been used. Observing the full choice set as well as the accepted job offer allows us to distinguish between the effect of peer-group gender composition on the distribution of starting salaries that students are offered and the salaries they accept, conditional on their choice set. Importantly, analysis of the full set of job offers and the choice of jobs, given each student’s offer set, allows us to examine whether peer-group gender composition also has an effect on preferences, as revealed through their choice of jobs and their revealed willingness to pay for non-pecuniary benefits.

Specifically, for each student, the survey records pecuniary characteristics of each job offer, including the base salary offered, signing bonuses offered, tuition bonuses offered, profit-sharing bonuses offered, relocation bonuses offered, stock options offered, guaranteed year-end bonuses, performance bonuses, and other bonuses.²⁸ In addition, for each job offer, the survey collects data on the industries, job functions, job titles, and job locations offered, as well as on the particular firm making the offer.²⁹ Furthermore, the survey collects information on student self-reported preferences—whether the job offer was the student’s first-choice, second-choice, or third-choice job—and whether the student negotiated his or her offered salary.³⁰ Finally, by matching the survey data collected by career services at the time of graduation with the data from the

²⁸For each of the pecuniary job characteristics, nominal values in each year were converted into real earnings in 2006 dollars using the Consumer Price Index for Urban Consumers (CPI-U).

²⁹I aggregate job functions into 37 major categories, and industries into 54 main categories.

³⁰Reported salaries are the final offered salaries, after negotiation.

alumni survey that follows students up to 16 years after graduation, based on the first job held at graduation, I can take advantage of the additional long-term job attribute data and observe the evolution of job function, industry, and even firm characteristics up to 16 years after graduation. Specifically, the average weekly hours of work, the frequency of part-time work, the frequency of overtime work, and the average hourly wage within a job function and within an industry are calculated from the alumni survey data. These job and industry attributes are then matched to the employment offer data in order to observe a wide array of the non-wage attributes of the job offers that students receive and of the jobs that students accept at graduation.³¹

The vast majority of MBA students who are offered a job through the university's on-campus recruiting system accepts one of the job offers. Across the 15 years of data for which employment offers are observed, only 201 students, or approximately 3 percent, who are offered at least one job do not accept any of the jobs offered.³² Of the remaining 97 percent, approximately 30 percent of students had more than one full-time job offer. The number of full-time job offers that students received ranged from zero to seven. Among students who received more than one job offer, more than one-third accepted a job offer whose salary offer was less than the maximum salary offer in their offer set.³³ The mean difference between the salary offer accepted and the maximum salary offered to a student, among students who received more than one job offer and accepted a job other than their maximum salary offer, was \$32,500, in 2006 dollars.³⁴ The mean difference between the second-highest salary offer and the highest salary offer, among those who received more than one offer, was a 21.7 log point difference.

Weekly hours of work are high for almost all MBA positions. Across industries, weekly work hours are highest in investment banking and consulting, with averages of 69 and 61 hours per week, respectively. Just below consulting, those employed in the venture capital industry worked an average of 60 hours per week. Across job functions, hours are highest in investment banking as well, while product-management and company-finance job functions require fewer hours of work per week than the average MBA position, each averaging 53 hours per week. Interestingly, while the dispersion in average weekly hours falls over time since graduation, the dispersion in the average hourly wage across industries and job functions increases. Comparing across industries, weekly work hours at graduation average 74 per week in investment banking and 64 per week in consulting, but 10 years after graduation, the average weekly work hours in the same two industries decline to 63 and 56, respectively. Among job functions, weekly hours at graduation are 53

³¹The survey did not include a question on "part-time" versus "full-time" work. I assign "full-time" status to those who report working more than "30–40 hours per week" and "part-time" to those who report working at most "30–40 hours per week."

³²Of these students, 17 percent reported not working at the time of graduation, while only 6 percent reported on the alumni survey being self-employed at the time of graduation.

³³Salary offer, here, refers to "permanent salary," which is the sum of the base salary offer, guaranteed year-end bonuses, profit-sharing bonuses, and stock options offered. Performance pay as well as one-time signing bonuses are not included.

³⁴The median was \$14,229 in 2006 dollars.

in both company finance and product management, but ten years after graduation, average weekly hours in company finance increases to 56, while in product management, average hours stay relatively stable at 53 per week.

In contrast, the dispersion in hourly wages across industries and job functions increases over time since graduation. Among industries, hourly wages are the greatest in investment banking, venture capital, and the investment management industries. Hourly wages in the three industries at graduation are, on average, \$43, \$46, and \$48, respectively, but 10 years after graduation, average hourly wages in these three industries are \$250, \$235, \$272 per hour, respectively. In contrast, hourly wages in the lower-paying industries and job functions do not increase at nearly the same rate. Among job functions, average hourly wages are among the lowest for product management and company finance and, at graduation, are \$36 and \$37 per hour, respectively. Ten years after graduation, hourly wages in these two job functions are, on average, \$62 per hour and \$75 per hour, respectively.

B. Data on Background Characteristics

Pre-MBA (pretreatment) data come primarily from administrative data collected by the university and include all background characteristics known about students at the time of admission. The pretreatment data include the age of the student, work experience prior to business school, gender, race, marital status,³⁵ citizenship, visa, permanent residency and work-permit status, undergraduate major, the student’s undergraduate institution, undergraduate GPA, any advanced degrees received prior to business school, the advanced degree-granting institution, and advanced degree GPA. In addition, the pretreatment data includes student GMAT scores: scores and percentile attained separately on the quantitative, verbal, and analytical writing sections, as well as the total GMAT score. Finally, from the survey data, the pretreatment data also includes the backgrounds of students prior to business school, including the previous industries, job functions, and job titles in their most recent job prior to business school. Summary statistics are provided in Table I.

C. Coursework and Transcript Data

In addition to the administrative data that provide information on student background characteristics at the time of admission, in this paper I also utilize administrative data on coursework and course transcript data, including grades received by students during the course of their MBA program and their chosen fields of concentration, and I match this to the administrative data. In particular, I use data at the person-course

³⁵I again classify those living with a partner as “married.”

level containing the course number, title, and field of each course taken, as well as the grade achieved in each course and the semester and year in which the course was taken. From this data, I generate GPAs for each student for the first semester, the first year, and for the entire MBA program. In addition, I generate within-field GPAs for the nine largest fields of study. Finally, students have an option to take a combination of courses that leads to a concentration in a particular area or field of interest. While concentrations are not required, 97 percent of students fulfill requirements for one to four concentrations.³⁶ I merge the data set on coursework with an additional administrative data set that provides data on student concentrations within the MBA program.

D. MBA Alumni Survey

The survey data come from a web-based survey conducted of the MBA alumni from the graduating classes of 1990 to 2006. The participants were asked detailed questions about each of the jobs or positions they had held since graduation, including earnings (both at the beginning and the end of a given position), usual hours of work per week, job function, industry, size of the firm, and type of firm.³⁷ The earnings questions asked for total annual earnings, before taxes and other deductions, in the first and last year at each job. The responses to the earnings questions and usual weekly hours worked were collected in discrete bins that were transformed into real-valued variables, using the midpoint of each bin. Individual earnings in a given year were computed by linear extrapolation between the first and last year at each job.³⁸ Information was also gathered on all post-MBA spells of nonemployment (periods of six months or longer in which an individual was not working for pay). Among the MBAs in these classes who responded to the survey, 1,487 (or 97 percent) were matched to the university administrative records, of which 1,106 were men and 381 were women. Though the fraction of women in this sample is considerably lower than the national average of the fraction of MBAs earned by women, which was about 40 percent for the same period, the gender proportion is fairly representative of elite business schools in the U.S. during this period.³⁹

Respondents were also asked about their current marital status and, for those who were married,⁴⁰ about their spouse's educational attainment, employment status, and earnings. At the time of the survey, female MBAs in the sample were less likely to be married than their male counterparts: 65 percent of female MBAs

³⁶The program curriculum description indicates that students typically fulfill concentration requirements in order to signal deeper knowledge within a particular field of study and to assemble a combination of skills relevant to particular areas and fields of interest.

³⁷Job functions and industries are aggregated into the same set of 37 job function and 54 industry categories as was done with the employment offer data.

³⁸Nominal values in each year were converted into real earnings in 2006 dollars using the Consumer Price Index for Urban Consumers (CPI-U).

³⁹Among Harvard Business School MBAs from 1990 to 2006, 31 percent were female. Among University of Chicago MBAs for the same period, 25 percent of graduates were female (Bertrand, Goldin, and Katz, 2010).

⁴⁰I classify those living with a partner as "married."

were married, whereas 81 percent of male MBAs were married.

All respondents were asked whether they had any children, the year of birth of each child, and the allocation of childcare responsibilities in preschool years between themselves, their spouse, other family members, home care, and day care.

IV. Are peer-group assignments Truly Random?

Students are assigned to peer groups by a computer program developed by the Information Technology Services department of the business school. Across the 15 entering cohorts of the sample, there are 156 separate peer groups with an average of 53.1 incoming first-year MBA students. To properly identify peer effects, there must be sufficient variation in the pretreatment characteristics across groups. Under pure random assignment, the standard deviation of each average peer-group characteristic should be equal to the population standard deviation divided by the square root of 53.1. This is largely the case in my sample. For example, the standard deviation of the share of women within a peer group is 0.065, while the standard deviation of the share of women in a randomly drawn sample of the population is 0.062 ($.450/\sqrt{53.1}$). However, note that peer-group assignment is conducted within cohort, and there is variation in a few of the average pretreatment characteristics across cohorts, particularly the fraction of women and the average GMAT score of an incoming cohort. Therefore, the variance of the average peer-group characteristic across peer groups should be larger than the variance of the average peer-group characteristic in a randomly drawn sample of the entire population, as the former is composed of both the expectation of the within-cohort variance and the across-cohort variance of the cohort population mean. This is generally the case in my sample as well. For example, the standard deviation of the average GMAT score of a peer group is 14.81, while the standard deviation of the peer group average GMAT score in a population where peer groups are randomly drawn samples of the within-cohort population is 14.57 (expectation of within-cohort variance = 44.01; across-cohort variance = 168.47).

It should be noted that the university's Office of Student Records, which conducts the peer-group assignments, makes some effort to balance peer groups by gender, race, country of origin, and age of students. In particular, the office conducting peer-group assignments maintains an algorithm that assigns each year's admitted students to peer groups. Specifically, the algorithm first randomizes the order in which the students are listed. Second, it orders students by gender, visa/permanent residency status, country of citizenship, ethnicity, and date of birth, and then assigns each student, in the order listed, to a peer-group "bin," rotating the bins in order. For example, if there are 10 peer groups, the first student in the list is assigned to "Bin 1," the second, to "Bin 2," and so on, until the tenth student is assigned to "Bin 10." After that, the pro-

gression repeats: the eleventh student is assigned to “Bin 1,” the twelfth student to “Bin 2,” and so on. The office of student records uses this process in an attempt to keep peer groups relatively balanced across these characteristics. The stated goal is to provide students with the best learning experience. The effect of this process, as will be shown using the data, is to assign students to peer groups that are random, conditional on the characteristics that the Office of Student Records aims to keep balanced.

Because an attempt is made to balance peer groups by gender, the variation in the share of women in a peer group comes from two main sources. First, either the number of women in the admitted class or the total number of admitted students may not be divisible by the number of peer groups, so some groups will be assigned a larger share of women than others. Second, not all students accept their offer of admission. In particular, it is important to note that students do not have any knowledge of their peer-group assignment at the time that they accept or reject their offer of admission. Therefore, students who reject their offer of admission do not do so on the basis of any peer group characteristics. The main identifying assumption in this paper is that, for a given cohort, the gender composition of a student’s peer group is unrelated to the pretreatment characteristics of the student. This assumption is justified as long as the information set of the student at the time of his or her decision to accept or reject the offer of admission is orthogonal to the characteristics of the other students in that student’s peer group.

Although some students are admitted later from the wait list as other students reject their offers of admission, admitted students who are added from the wait list are added to peer groups by resuming the same order of peer-group assignment. The stated goal of the assignment mechanism of students admitted from the wait list is only to keep the total number of students in a peer group balanced. Here, the main identifying assumption is still justified, since students are not added to peer groups on the basis of the characteristics of other students in their peer group.

I test whether this assumption is justified in the data. Within each entering cohort, I test for randomness in peer-group assignments in Table II, which shows how the main independent variable, the share of women in a student’s peer group, is correlated with individual pretreatment characteristics—specifically, how the share of women in a student’s peer group is correlated with the student’s GMAT score, GMAT quantitative score, GMAT verbal score, undergraduate GPA, undergraduate major, work experience prior to business school, race, age, citizenship, and whether the student attended a “top 20” undergraduate institution. Table II shows that, conditional on cohort, there is no relationship between student i ’s background characteristics and the gender composition of i ’s peer group.

Table II shows the relationship between a variety of student characteristics prior to entering business school and the gender composition of the student’s assigned peer group, for both the full sample, shown in columns (1) and (2), and separately for male and female students in columns (3) and (4). I separate the

sample by gender because the expected share of a student’s peer group that are women is mechanically lower for female students than for male students, due to the fact that individuals cannot be their own peers.⁴¹ As a result, regressions shown without a correction for this bias can produce a slightly positive coefficient for the characteristics that are correlated with being male, such as the quantitative GMAT score, work experience, age at graduation, or having a hard-science undergraduate major type, even when peers are truly randomly assigned. Column (1) controls for whether the student is female. However, the bias due to the mechanical relationship between own gender and the share of women in randomly assigned peer groups is larger in small cohorts than in large cohorts, and larger in small peer groups than in large peer groups. Therefore, in column (2), instead of controlling for whether the student is female, I control for the average characteristics of possible peers in the peer group, to correct for the mechanical negative bias, as suggested by Guryan, Kroft, and Notowidigdo (2009).⁴² Columns (3) and (4), in which the sample is separated by gender, show that there is a minimal relationship between the student’s pretreatment characteristics and the share of women in the student’s assigned peer group. In Appendix Table B.II, I also regress share of women on all of the individual student’s pretreatment characteristics, and I report the F -test for the joint significance of student background characteristics. The results show that student pretreatment characteristics clearly remain unrelated to the share of women in the student’s peer group.

V. Empirical Methodology

The goal of this paper is to estimate the effect of the gender composition of a student’s peer group on students’ employment outcomes, both at the time of graduation and for long-term employment outcomes. In addition, I will distinguish between the effect on employment outcomes due to a change in the characteristics of the jobs offered and the effect due to a change in the characteristics of the job offers that students accept, conditional on their offer set. In order to understand some of the underlying mechanisms, I estimate the effect of peer-group gender composition on choice of coursework, grades, and the choice of concentration in business school. I also examine effects on the characteristics of the first job at graduation and on the characteristics of the set of job *offers*. In this analysis, observations are at the individual student level.⁴³ Finally, I will estimate the effect of the gender composition of a student’s peer group on long-term outcomes,

⁴¹Intuitively, as described by Guryan, Kroft, and Notowidigdo (2009), under true random assignment, the urn from which the peers of an individual are drawn does not include the individual.

⁴²The solution proposed by Guryan, Kroft, and Notowidigdo (2009)—controlling for the composition of the population at risk of being the individual’s peers—is not sufficient here because some of the variation in the share of women across peer groups is due to attrition of students who are accepted. The ideal method of correcting for the bias described would be to control both for the population in the cohort at risk of being the individual’s peers as well as for the population in the initially admitted cohort at risk of remaining the individual’s peers (not rejecting their offer of admission). Because I do not have data on the initially admitted students and only on the students who enroll, the ideal bias correction cannot be made.

⁴³Effects on the set of job offers will use outcome variables such as the mean, median, and maximum of the set of job offers for each student.

such as annual earnings post-graduation in each year after graduation.

Specifically, I estimate the following equation:

$$Y_{igc} = \phi_0 + \phi_1 Female_i \times ShareMale_{igc} + \phi_2 ShareMale_{igc} + \beta X_i + \gamma_c + \varepsilon_{igc}, \quad (1)$$

where Y_{igc} is the outcome of interest for student i in peer group g , in cohort c , where "cohort" is defined as the year of entry into business school,⁴⁴ and $ShareMale_{igc}$ is the treatment variable of interest: the fraction of all other peers in student i 's peer group, other than student i , that are male.⁴⁵ The parameters of interest are ϕ_2 , which shows the causal effect of increasing the proportion of male peers on the outcome of interest for men, and ϕ_1 , which captures the relative effect of increasing the proportion of male peers for women relative to men. Thus, the parameter ϕ_1 captures the effect of peer gender composition on the gender gap in outcomes, conditional on other control variables. The term X_i is a vector of student i 's individual pre-MBA (pretreatment) characteristics, including GMAT scores (quantitative, verbal, and total), undergraduate GPA, indicator variables for whether the student attended a "top 10" or "top 20" undergraduate institution, age at entry into business school, age squared, years of work experience prior to business school, experience squared, indicator variables for race/ethnicity, gender, and country of origin. The term γ_c represents cohort fixed effects, which controls for any unobserved cohort-specific shocks common across peer groups—for example, unobserved differences in employment outcomes or in academic outcomes across cohorts—and ε_{igc} is the error term. Given the potential for error correlation across individuals within a peer group, standard errors are clustered at the peer group level.

VI. Results

A. Labor Market Effects at Graduation

Table III presents the estimated coefficients from the ordinary least squares estimation of Equation (1) under different specifications, in which the dependent variable is the natural log of the annual base salary of the job offer accepted, in terms of gross earnings. The reported coefficients are those from those in which $ShareMale$ and $Female \times ShareMale$ are each defined as deviations from the mean, so that the interpretation of the coefficient on $Female$ is the baseline gender-earnings gap for those with the average

⁴⁴"Cohort" is defined as the year of entry into business school, rather than the graduation year, since graduation timing may be endogenous to such things as number of employment offers, salaries offered, and field of concentration and coursework taken in business school, all of which may be causally impacted by the gender composition of the peer group. Graduation timing may also be endogenous to the gender composition of the peer group itself. See Schwandt and von Wachter (2019) for a discussion.

⁴⁵ $ShareMale_{igc} = (\sum_{k \in G(g), k \neq i} Male_{kgc}) / (n_{gc} - 1)$, where all peers in student i 's peer group are indexed by the set of indexes $G(g)$.

share of male peers, before accounting for any peer effects. Column (1) shows the estimated coefficients of a specification that includes no other pretreatment characteristics than gender. Column (2) includes controls for student GMAT scores and undergraduate GPA⁴⁶. Column (3) includes two additional dummy variables for whether the student attended a “Top 10” or a “Top 20” undergraduate institution.⁴⁷ Column (4) includes additional dummy variables for marital status at the start of business school, marital status interacted with female, age, and age squared at the start of business school. In addition, column (4) includes race indicator variables (indicators for Black, Hispanic, Asian, South Asian, and “other” are included). Column (5) controls for years of work experience prior to business school and years of experience squared, in addition to all controls included in column (4).

The estimates show that a 10 percentage point increase in the share of males in a student’s peer group leads to a 2.1 percent increase in the base salary of the job offer accepted by female students relative to male, while there is no significant effect of the gender composition of a student’s peer group observed for men. It is interesting to note that the baseline gender gap in starting salary is between three and four percentage points, which is consistent with previous literature on the gender-wage gap among MBA students.⁴⁸ Importantly, the results also imply that a 10 percentage point increase in the fraction of male peers—a little more than a one-standard-deviation increase—would close the gender gap in starting salaries at graduation by approximately two-thirds. The magnitude of these estimates is particularly important in light of literature showing that the gender wage gap for graduates of top MBA programs is primarily explained by gender differences in coursework taken during business school, the types of jobs accepted at graduation, and weekly hours of work.⁴⁹ While the results shown here are not inconsistent with these findings, and the effects on these proximate causes are addressed later in the paper, the evidence shown here suggests that a substantial portion of the documented effects of gender may, in fact, be malleable with respect to environmental factors in the educational environment.

I next examine the effect of peers on the characteristics of the industries and job functions⁵⁰ into which students at graduation are more likely to sort. Table IV shows the estimated coefficients from the estimation of Equation 1, in which the dependent variable varies in each column but each specification uses the full set of controls in column (5) of Table III. The dependent variable in each column is an indicator variable

⁴⁶Since many students attended undergraduate institutions outside of the United States, where GPAs are not on a 4.0 scale, GPAs are normalized to a 4.0 scale based on the maximum GPA attainable at the undergraduate institution. Data on the maximum GPA attainable at the undergraduate institution are also included in the administrative data.

⁴⁷Because a “top 10” institution is also a “top 20” institution, the coefficient on “top 10” should be interpreted as the coefficient on an interaction term.

⁴⁸Bertrand, Goldin, and Katz (2010) find that the raw gap in mean log earnings between men and women is small at graduation—11 log points—but jumps to 31 log points five years out, and to nearly 60 log points 10 or more years after graduation.

⁴⁹See Bertrand, Goldin, and Katz (2010).

⁵⁰Job functions are more narrowly defined occupations.

for the industry or job function accepted at graduation. I find that women who are randomly assigned to a peer group with a greater share of men are more likely to choose jobs in male-dominated industries and job functions at graduation and less likely to choose jobs in relatively more female-dominated industries and job functions. Table IV reports the coefficients from a subset of the industry and job-function categories. Specifically, the outcomes for a few of the topmost “gender-skewed” occupations and industries are reported.⁵¹ The baseline gender differences in occupation and industry selection at graduation are large. In particular, the coefficients on *Female* indicate that women, on average, are 11 percentage points (39 percent) less likely to accept a job in investment banking, 5 percentage points (63 percent) less likely to accept a job in investment management, and 3 percentage points (nearly 100 percent) less likely to accept a job in venture capital as industries at graduation. However, a 10 percentage point increase in the share of male peers increases the relative likelihood of women choosing investment banking by 5.5 percentage points, investment management by 2.2 percentage points, and venture capital by 2.4 percentage points. Such an increase in the share of male peers therefore closes the gender gap in selection into each of the most male-dominated job functions and industries by 50 percent or more.

In addition, the results in Table IV indicate that an increase in the share of male peers also closes the gender gap in selection into relatively more female-dominated industries and occupations as well. In particular, product management is the most female-dominated job function, consistently across cohorts, with women being 9 percentage points more likely to accept a job in product management at graduation than men (more than 100 percent relative to the mean). The reduction of the gender gap in selection into female-dominated occupations and industries is primarily a result of women with more male peers being less likely to accept jobs in female-skewed occupations and industries at graduation. The results show that a 10 percentage point increase in the share of male peers reduces the likelihood that female students accept a job in product management at graduation by 3.9 percentage points (56 percent), again closing the gender gap in selection into female-dominated job functions by close to half (43 percent).

In order to examine the overall effect of peer gender composition on the types of jobs selected at graduation for the entire set of job functions and industries, rather than on only a subset, the gender-skewedness of each industry and job function is categorized by “Industry Share Male” or “Job Function Share Male,” which is defined as the fraction of graduating students in each student’s cohort accepting a job in the same industry or job function as the student who are male.⁵² Table V shows that exposure to a greater share of male peers causes women to accept jobs at graduation in more male-dominated industries and occupations than they otherwise would, relative to men, and that this effect occurs generally, rather than being restricted to

⁵¹The most “gender-skewed” occupations and industries reported are those in which more than 3 percent of graduating students accepted a job.

⁵²“Industry Share Male” and “Job Function Share Male” are defined at the student-cohort level.

a few key occupations and industries. Although men with more male peers accept jobs at graduation in *less* male-dominated industries and job functions, Table B.VII in the Appendix VIII. shows that the decrease in the gender gap in selection into male-dominated occupations and industries is not driven by a change in the sorting of men, alone, across occupations and industries. Women with a 10 percentage point increase in the share of male peers select industries and occupations at graduation that have 2.9 percentage point (4 percent) and 3.9 percentage point (5 percent) greater male shares, respectively, in absolute terms—not only relative to men.

In order to examine the effects of peer gender composition on the characteristics of the occupations and industries students choose, I examine the effects on the average weekly hours of work, the frequency of part-time work, the frequency of overtime work, and the average hourly wage in the occupation (job function) or industry at the time of graduation. The mean job characteristics of each occupation and industry job offer held at graduation are constructed using the alumni survey data collected on job attributes and are defined for a given number of years after graduation. The characteristics of a job offer held at graduation are the mean characteristics from the alumni survey.⁵³ The occupation and industry mean job characteristics are then assigned to all students in the job offer data who received such a job offer at graduation.⁵⁴ The results in Table VI show that both men and women with a greater share of male peers accept jobs at graduation in occupations and industries with longer weekly hours of work, a greater frequency of overtime work, and a lower frequency of part-time work in the first year after graduation.⁵⁵ However, the effect on weekly hours of work and frequency of overtime work of the occupations that women select is significantly greater than the effect on that of men, thus reducing the gender gap in selection into mean job characteristics by occupation. On the other hand, with respect to industry characteristics at graduation, a greater share of male peers affects only the mean job characteristics of the industries whose offers were accepted by women at graduation. The results show that a greater share of male peers causes female students in particular to select industries at graduation with greater weekly hours of work, a lower frequency of part-time work, and a greater frequency of overtime work. In addition, women with a greater share of male peers enter into both occupations and industries at graduation with higher hourly wages.⁵⁶

Table VI shows that a 10 percentage point increase in the share of male peers increases the mean weekly hours of work in job functions accepted by women at graduation by 1.4 hours (2.2 percent), and in the

⁵³I use data on job characteristics specific to a given number of years after graduation, since the attributes of jobs in an occupation or industry may change over time. This is an advantage of the data relative to the previous literature, such as Zolitz and Feld (2021), where survey results on job attributes are pooled across years.

⁵⁴Such job characteristics can be created even for students observed in the employment data whose individual data do not appear in the alumni survey.

⁵⁵“Overtime work” is an indicator variable, defined as 1 if the usual hours of work per week reported is greater than 60 and 0 otherwise.

⁵⁶“Average hourly wage” is defined as the average of the self-reported annual earnings divided by the product of usual weekly hours of work and 52.

industries accepted by women at graduation, by 1.15 hours (1.8 percent). This reduces the gender gap in hours of work of job functions accepted at graduation by just under one-half, and in industries accepted by over one-half. While the effect on hourly wages is a bit smaller as a percentage change relative to the mean, the effect is still a sizable portion of the baseline gender-wage gap at graduation. A 10 percentage point increase in the share of male peers reduces the gender gap in mean hourly wages of job functions accepted at graduation by just over one-third. It reduces the gender gap in mean hourly wages of industries chosen at graduation by approximately two-thirds—a sizable reduction in the gender gap in hourly wages across industries.

Though the wage differences across occupations and industries selected by women with more male peers are not large in the first year after graduation, having a larger share of male peers places women into occupations and industries at graduation with very different mean wage paths over time. Columns (4) of Tables VI and VII show that a 10 percentage point increase in the share of male peers leads female students to choose occupations with wages that are on average \$0.69 per hour (1.7 percent) greater at graduation but are \$16.55 per hour (10 percent) greater 10 years after graduation—an effect nearly 25 times the magnitude as the one at graduation. Similarly, a 10 percentage point increase in the share of male peers leads female students to choose industries at graduation with average wages that are \$1.21 per hour greater at graduation, but, 10 years after graduation, \$17.90 per hour greater—a sorting effect at graduation that results in 15 times the effect on mean wages in the industry as that observed at the time of graduation.⁵⁷ Meanwhile, both panels of Tables VI and VII show that the effect of an increase in the share of male peers on the average weekly work hours of the occupations and industries chosen by women at graduation is similar in magnitude to the effect on average weekly work hours 10 years after graduation. Thus, one cannot infer that women with more male peers chose occupations and industries with greater weekly work hours early in the career but fewer hours later in the career, for example. While the results shown in Tables VI and VII use mean earnings and hours at the occupation and industry levels as dependent variables, rather than individual-level outcomes, the results show that peer gender composition causally affects occupational and industry sorting at graduation along dimensions that not only change the average attributes of the job at graduation, but also the average attributes in the occupations and industries 10 years after graduation and to an even greater degree over time.

However, the average wages and other mean attributes of those who remain in the same job function or industry 10 years after graduation may be a biased measure of average wages in an occupation or industry, since those who remain in the same industry or job function for a given number years may be an increasingly

⁵⁷I distinguish between average wages in the first year after graduation and 10 years after graduation, as opposed to simply using self-reported weekly hours across all years since graduation, a contribution relative to the previous literature in this area.

selected sample. Therefore, I also use, as an outcome variable, the mean characteristics of the jobs that graduates hold 10 years after graduation, conditional on the *initial* job function or industry into which they entered at graduation, regardless of the occupation or industry into which the graduate moves in the years following graduation. The mean job characteristics a given number of years after graduation, conditional on initial occupation or industry, are then assigned to all students in the job offer data who accepted a job in the same initial occupation or industry at graduation. The effect of peers on the initial choices at graduation and the ensuing expected trajectory of students, conditional on initial job characteristics, is arguably a better measure of the expected lifetime consequences of peers on initial choices at graduation. Figure II and Appendix Table B.VIII show these results.

Figure II plots the effect of peers on the gender gap in expected wages and hours, conditional on the initial occupation and industry chosen at graduation, for each year since graduation.⁵⁸ Specifically, I construct expected earnings and hours paths, conditional on the initial industry, occupation, and even initial firm of the offer accepted at graduation for each student in the job offer data by taking the mean of actual earnings of graduates from the alumni survey a given number of years after graduation over all those whose first job was in the same initial industry, occupation, or firm at graduation. In particular, each subfigure in Figure II plots the coefficients on $Female_i \times ShareMale_{igc}$ for a set of regressions, each with the same specification as Equation 1, but where the dependent variable for student i at time t is the expected job characteristic t years after graduation, averaged over all those students who began their careers in the same initial job function or industry as student i .^{59,60} Appendix Figure B.III completes the same exercise conditional on initial firm.⁶¹

The results show that a greater share of male peers causes women to select job functions and industries with longer expected weekly hours of work in each year after graduation. What is apparent from the figures is that a greater share of male peers causes a change in initial occupation, industry, and even firms chosen by women that result in expected wage trajectories that are greater than and increasingly divergent from the wages and expected wage paths of women with less exposure to male peers.⁶² The results suggest the possibility that peer-induced changes in the initial opportunities and choices of women at graduation have the potential to mitigate a substantial portion of the gender-wage gap at graduation as well as its growth

⁵⁸Note that these coefficients reflect the effects on expected wages of women relative to men. However, since the effects are not significant for men, I focus on the effects on women relative to men.

⁵⁹ $Expwage_{i,Ind_{i,0},t} = \sum_{j \in I(Ind_{i,0})} wage_{j,t}$, where $Expwage_{i,Ind_{i,0},t}$ is the expected wage of student i t years after graduation, conditional on the industry in which student i accepts a job at graduation, $Ind_{i,0}$ is the industry in which student i accepts a job at graduation, $I(Ind_{i,0})$ is the set of all students other than student i who accept a job in the same industry as student i at graduation, and $wage_{j,t}$ is the wage of student j t years after graduation, regardless of the industry in which student j works at time t .

⁶⁰ $Expwage_{i,JobFunc_{i,0},t} = \sum_{j \in I(JobFunc_{i,0})} wage_{j,t}$ is defined similarly.

⁶¹For each of these figures, averages are taken over hours and wages where “zeros” are used for the value of hours and wages for those who are not working. Appendix Figure B.IV plots the coefficients of the same set of regression specifications, but where expected values are taken only over the sample of those who are working.

⁶²The results shown in Figure [fig:hoursz_wagez_startfuncind] reflect the effect on women's expected wages relative to men's.

over time. I will explore this possibility in greater detail using realized long-term outcomes in Part E.⁶³⁶⁴

These results are largely consistent with findings from Zolitz and Feld (2021) and Zolitz and Brenoe (2020), which study the effect of peer gender composition on education and labor market outcomes in secondary and postsecondary education settings, though not in the MBA setting, and in settings with younger students on average. Zolitz and Brenoe (2020) utilize Danish registry data and find that a greater proportion of male high school peers increases women’s likelihood of working in a STEM occupation and that such women have higher earnings at age 36. Zolitz and Feld (2021) find results consistent with those shown here, using the random assignment of university students in the Netherlands to study sections. Their paper finds that women who have had a greater proportion of male peers end up in jobs where they earn more and work a greater number of hours. They, too, find that only the labor market outcomes for women are affected with any consistent statistical significance.⁶⁵

How do these results compare in magnitude? Zolitz and Brenoe (2020) find that a 10 percentage point increase in the proportion of male peers in high school increases the probability that women work in a STEM occupation by 0.42 percentage points, a 3.9 percent increase from the baseline, but they find an effect on occupational sorting only 12 to 16 years after high school graduation. They find no significant effect on either men or women working in a STEM occupation 7 to 11 years after high school graduation. Notably, the effects that Zolitz and Brenoe find, while significant, are a much smaller fraction of the preexisting gender gap in occupational sorting, a 3.6 percent reduction, than the effects measured here. Zolitz and Feld (2021) similarly find, but in the university setting, that exposure to more male peers has no significant impact on earnings in the first job at graduation, but results in greater earnings for women one to five years after university graduation. Specifically, they find that a 10 percentage point increase in the share of male peers increases women’s earnings by 4.8 percent one to five years after graduation. The results in this paper differ in that the analysis shows robust and significant effects on women’s earnings even at the time of graduation. However, the magnitude of the effect on women’s relative earnings at graduation estimated here is in the range of the estimated effects that Zolitz and Feld find one to five years after graduation. In the next sections, I explore two different mechanisms through which peer gender composition may operate, and through which it may produce different effects on short- versus long-term earnings. I offer an explanation

⁶³To address the possibility that hours and earnings in an industry or occupation may be gender-specific, Appendix Figure B.V, Panels (i) and (ii), examines the effect of peers on expected wage profiles for women, conditional on initial job function and industry, where wages computed from the alumni survey are averaged over a sample of only women. Panels (iii) and (iv) examine the same effects, but where expected wages are taken only over a sample of women with children.

⁶⁴Panels (iii) and (iv) show that the estimated effect of peers on expected earnings for women and for women with children is non-negative for each year after graduation. The results suggest that while previously documented effects regarding the “child earnings penalty” may play a role concurrently, women with a greater share of male peers are sorting into occupations and industries at graduation with higher expected earnings, even when the earnings measure is the mean for women with children.

⁶⁵While both Zolitz and Brenoe (2020) and Zolitz and Feld (2021) examine the effects of a greater share of female peers, the estimated coefficients can be used to understand the effects of a greater share of male peers on women’s outcomes as well.

for why the effects of peer gender composition may be smaller or negligible at the time of graduation but larger and of economically significant magnitude several years after graduation.

B. Underlying Mechanisms: Peers' Effect on Human Capital (Coursework and Concentrations)

In order to understand the underlying mechanisms of the effect of peer gender composition on women's labor market outcomes, I investigate whether peer gender composition affects the types of coursework, fields of concentration, and grades that women attain in business school. This is particularly salient since prior literature documents that a substantial portion of the gender gap in earnings among MBAs can be explained by grades attained and the type of coursework taken in business school.⁶⁶ Because it is women's labor market outcomes that are primarily affected by peer gender composition, and these are the outcomes I seek to explain, I focus on the effects of peers on the coursework and concentrations of women in this subsection.

Figure III(i) shows the baseline gender difference in choices of concentration and coursework in business school. Women take roughly half a finance class less than men, fewer accounting courses, and fewer statistics courses than men on average. On the other hand, on average they take more than half a marketing course more than men, more business policy courses, and more general management and behavioral science courses than men. In addition, women are less likely to concentrate in quantitative fields such as finance and economics than men, but are more likely to concentrate in general management and marketing. Neither the total number of courses women take nor the breadth of courses across fields of study differs statistically significantly from that of men.⁶⁷ Figure III(ii) shows the estimated coefficients which, along with their 95 percent confidence intervals, reflect how the gender composition of their peers affects students' choice of coursework and concentrations. The results show that greater exposure to male peers causes female students to choose courses and fields of concentration that are relatively more male-dominated at baseline. In particular, a 10 percentage point increase in the share of male peers causes both male and female students, to take an additional sixth of a finance course on average, increase their likelihood of concentrating in finance by 3.3 percentage points (6.7 percent), and to decrease their likelihood of concentrating in general management by 1.0 percentage point (50 percent).⁶⁸ Women with a greater share of male peers take more economics courses, are more likely to concentrate in economics and in international business, and have a larger share

⁶⁶Bertrand, Goldin, and Katz (2010) note that each additional finance course increases earnings by about 8 log points and that women take about half a class less in finance than men.

⁶⁷The measure of course concentration across fields is calculated by summing the square of the share of courses taken in each of the nine largest fields of study, similar to the HHI index.

⁶⁸The estimated coefficients show that there is no statistically significant difference between men and women in the effect of male peers on the number of finance courses taken, the likelihood of concentrating in finance, or the likelihood of concentrating in general management. Therefore, only the coefficient on *ShareMale* is reported for those three dependent variables in Figure III(ii).

of their coursework made up of quantitative courses, relative to men. In addition, greater exposure to male peers causes female students to take fewer courses in and be less likely to concentrate in subjects that are relatively more female-dominated. Specifically, women with a greater share of men in their peer group take a lower fraction of general management and behavioral science courses, fewer product management courses, and are less likely to concentrate in marketing.

While the share of male peers does not affect the total number of courses taken by female students, a greater share of male peers does increase the concentration of courses women take across fields of study, as measured by the HHI (Herfindahl-Hirschmann) concentration index applied to coursework shares in each field of study. The increase in the share of coursework in quantitative fields and areas of concentration is not largely driven by a reduction in the *number* of courses women take in female-dominated fields of study, with the exception of product management courses. Rather, the findings, taken together, indicate that women with a greater share of male peers increase the *concentration* of their coursework in particular fields of study and that they are more likely to increase the concentration of coursework in quantitative fields of study. In other words, women with greater exposure to male peers specialize more.

Table VIII shows that the effect of peer gender composition on women’s fields of concentration in business school relative to men’s is driven primarily by women with more male peers changing their *most* male-dominated field of concentration: women with more male peers are neither more nor less likely to enter a single male-dominated area of concentration relative to men. Rather, women who already would have taken some male-dominated fields of concentration increase the male share of their *most* male-dominated field. In Table VIII, I distinguish between selecting a “male-dominated” field of concentration, which is a field that is disproportionately male relative to the cohort, and a “majority-male” field, a field in which more than 50 percent of the students choosing the field in the cohort are male.⁶⁹ While some of the change in coursework and fields of concentration takes place at the higher end of the male-dominated coursework distribution, column (3) shows that a greater share of male peers also causes women to be more likely to concentrate in any majority-male field, crossing the 50 percent male share threshold. Men with more male peers, on the other hand, are less likely to concentrate in any majority-male field, contributing not just to reducing but to reversing the gender gap in the likelihood of a student having any majority-male concentrations.⁷⁰ Appendix Table B.IX shows the effects of a greater share of male peers on fields of concentration, separately for men and women.

The results are largely consistent with those of Zolitz and Feld (2021), who find that an increase in the share of male peers leads to a decrease in gender segregation in major choices. In this context, where the

⁶⁹Note that a field can be “majority-male” but still be disproportionately female, relative to the cohort, in this context.

⁷⁰The gender gap is reversed with a 10 percentage point increase in the share of male peers relative to the mean.

average age of entry is higher, and where students have already attained undergraduate degrees and have significant work experience, it is notable that having a greater share of male peers causes women to significantly alter their coursework and fields of study in similar ways: women choose areas of concentration that are more male-dominated, such as finance and economics, and are less likely to concentrate in female-dominated fields, such as general management and marketing. While having a greater share of male peers causes both men and women to take a greater number and fraction of finance courses, which is often associated in previous literature with higher salaries at graduation, I explore in Sections VI.C. and VI.D. whether the effect on coursework and concentrations is the primary mechanism driving the effect on salaries at graduation.

C. Underlying Mechanisms: Human Capital versus Preferences

I next examine two possible mechanisms through which the effect of peer gender composition on earnings at graduation takes place. In particular, I exploit a unique aspect of the data, which is that for each of the 1999 through 2011 graduating classes, the employment offer survey records for each student the full set of job offers received through the centralized on-campus job market system, along with a variety of components of pay. Moreover, the data also include the job offer each student accepted. For the vast majority of students, the job offer accepted at graduation is within the set of job offers received through the centralized on-campus recruiting system.⁷¹ Therefore, an advantage of the data is that I can distinguish between the effect of peers on the distribution of *offers* and a possible effect on preferences: the choice of job students make from within their choice set.⁷²

I examine, separately, the effect of peer gender composition on the distribution of salary *offers* that a student receives and its effect on the likelihood that a student accepts the highest salary offered in his or her offer *set*. In this section, I explore the extent to which human capital explanations and their effect on the set of job offers received, versus an effect on the “willingness to accept” (WTA) the maximum salary offered, can explain the observed effects of peer gender composition on the gender gap in earnings at graduation.⁷³ I later explore in Section F. whether any observed effect on the WTA indeed reflects a change in preferences, or in the “willingness to pay” (WTP) for non-wage amenities.

Table IX presents the estimated coefficients from Equation 1, in which the dependent variable varies in each column, but each specification uses the full set of control variables as those used in column (5) of

⁷¹Approximately 97 percent of students who are offered at least one job accept one of the jobs offered.

⁷²Students hold the set of job offers recorded simultaneously in hand. In this setting, employers may not require students to make a decision until a fixed date, which is the same for all employers and after all of the interviews have taken place. Therefore, there is no uncertainty regarding potential future offers, nor in the opportunity cost of accepting an offer, as in Cortes et al. (2023). In addition, the timing is such that all negotiation for salary, benefits, and other forms of compensation has been completed, and offer terms are set prior to students making their decisions.

⁷³Of course, human capital may also alter preferences, or the choices one makes from within one’s choice set. Here, I distinguish between the effect of peers on the set of choices and the the effect on the offer chosen, conditional on the choice set.

Table III. In columns (1), (2), and (3), the dependent variables are the natural log of the mean, median, and maximum, respectively, of the base salary offers to the student. In column (4), the dependent variable is the natural log of the maximum “permanent salary” offer, which, in addition to the base salary, includes all other forms of guaranteed annual compensation, such as guaranteed year-end bonuses, profit-sharing, and stock options, as well as other forms of annual compensation that are guaranteed and are not performance-dependent. Finally, in columns (5) and (6), the dependent variable is whether the student accepted the maximum salary offered within his or her offer set, given the set of base salaries offered and the set of permanent salaries offered, respectively.

The estimated coefficients in Table IX show that there is no significant effect of peer gender composition on the mean, median, or maximum salary offer of female students relative to male.⁷⁴ Importantly, female students with a greater share of male peers are more likely to accept the maximum salary offer within their offer set, while there is no significant effect on male students’ likelihood of accepting their highest salary offer.⁷⁵ In particular, the estimates show that a 10 percentage point increase in the share of male peers leads to a 3-to-4 percentage point increase (4.4 percent) in the likelihood of female students accepting the highest salary offer in their offer set. The results indicate that the primary channel through which peer gender composition affects the gender gap in earnings at the time of graduation is through its effect on female students’ willingness to accept their highest salary offer rather than through an effect on their offer set.⁷⁶

Appendix Table B.X shows that, conditional on accepting a salary offer of less than the maximum salary offer, there is no significant effect of peers on the difference between the maximum salary offer and the salary offer accepted, for either measure of salary. The mean difference between the maximum base salary offered and the second-highest base salary offer is approximately 18.6 percentage points among those who received more than one offer. The magnitudes suggest that the effect of peer gender composition on female students’ salaries at graduation can be almost entirely explained by a change in the willingness to accept the maximum salary offer.⁷⁷

⁷⁴While there is an effect of peer gender composition on the maximum base salary offer of women relative to men (Column (3)), this is primarily due to the fact that an increase in the share of male peers decreases the maximum base salary offer men receive, but increases the bonuses offered and other forms of guaranteed pay. Column (4) shows that once annual, guaranteed bonuses are considered together with base salaries, there is no effect of peer gender composition on the maximum “permanent salary” offer for men, either.

⁷⁵There is no effect for male students for either base salary offers or permanent salary offers.

⁷⁶I distinguish between WTA and WTP because it is possible that, rather than reflecting a decrease in the WTP, the increase in the WTA is due to women with a greater share of male peers searching for jobs in different occupations and industries, specifically those with different trade-offs in the non-wage amenities offered as one goes down the salary offer distribution. I explore this more formally in Appendix VIII.

⁷⁷A back-of-the-envelope calculation suggests that a 3 to 4 percentage point increase in female students’ likelihood of accepting their highest salary offer (relative to their second-best offer), combined with a 1.5 percentage point reduction in the maximum salary offer to male students (when men have a mean 91 percent likelihood of accepting their highest offer), fully explains the 2.1 percentage point reduction in the gender gap in base earnings due to a 10 percentage point increase in the share of male peers.

Finally, the estimates in columns (5) and (6) of Table IX also show that female students are, on average, 2 percentage points less likely to accept their maximum salary offer than male students. Interestingly, these estimates suggest that a 10 percentage point increase in the share of male peers not only closes but reverses the gender gap in willingness to accept the maximum salary offer in the offer set.

D. Human Capital and Long-Term Earnings Paths

In spite of a significant change in the coursework and fields of concentration of female students with a greater share of male peers, the results in the previous section show that there is no significant effect of peers on the distribution of salary offers at graduation. This finding is perhaps surprising given that a well-documented source of the gender-earnings gap at graduation and beyond for graduates of top business schools is the fraction of quantitative coursework taken and in particular the fraction of finance courses taken during business school. Indeed, the results in this paper show that a greater share of male peers causes female students to increase the fraction of quantitative courses they take and their likelihood of concentrating in quantitative fields, including finance. Yet no effect on the distribution of salary offers at graduation is observed.

Does this mean that the changes in coursework and fields of concentration in this context have no effect on the earnings of women? To begin examining this question, a possible explanation is that the context studied here is different from those studied in the previous literature. First, I examine the effect of quantitative coursework on salary *offers*, rather than on accepted salaries.⁷⁸ Second, it is possible that in this particular environment, there is not the same positive correlation between the fraction of finance courses taken and salaries that has been documented in the previous literature. I therefore start by examining whether, in this context, concentrating in finance is associated with higher salary offers and whether women in particular who concentrate in finance also receive higher salary offers. Appendix Table B.XI presents the estimated coefficients from Equation (1), in which the dependent variables are the natural log of the mean, median, and maximum, respectively, of the base salary offers to the student, and each specification uses the full set of control variables (the same variables as those used in Column (5) of Table III). In addition, each regression here includes a dummy variable for whether the student concentrated in finance, and an interaction between concentration in finance and female. The results clearly show that a concentration in finance is indeed associated with a higher mean, median, and maximum salary offer, and in particular for women. Appendix Table B.XII shows that a greater fraction of courses in finance is associated with greater mean and median

⁷⁸It is possible that human capital has an effect on the offer accepted rather than on the set of offers, which would make the results shown here consistent with previous literature, even if human capital operated on salaries only through the choice of offer.

salary offers for women in particular.⁷⁹

The results taken together suggest a parsimonious hypothesis that the “movers”—those students who are motivated to concentrate in finance due to the peer effect—do not receive the same return to concentrating in finance as those who concentrated in finance for reasons unrelated to the peer effect. The model of this hypothesis can be written as follows:

$$Y_i = \phi_1 \text{ShareMale}_i \times \text{Female}_i + \phi_2 \text{ShareMale}_i + \mu_1 \text{concFin}_i \times \text{Female}_i + \mu_2 \text{concFin}_i + \beta'_1 X_{1i} + \varepsilon_{1i} \quad (2)$$

where Y_i represents the log mean, median, or maximum of the salary offers received by student i , concFin_i is a dummy variable for whether the student concentrated in finance, and X_{1i} includes pre-MBA characteristics (including Female_i) of student i and indicators for cohorts (the term $\beta'_1 X_{1i}$ includes cohort fixed effects). Note that Table B.XI reports the estimated coefficients from Equation (2).

Note that μ_1 and μ_2 are identified by variation in the component of concFin that is orthogonal to the peer effect. However, the hypothesis is one in which peer effects increase the likelihood of concentrating in finance, which may or may not increase salary offers for those “induced” to move into finance due to randomly assigned peers, and the component of concentration in finance due to the peer effect may have a different estimated effect on earnings from that of the orthogonal component. Specifically, the following decomposition may be helpful in interpreting the results. Suppose we construct the component of the concentration in finance “predicted” by the peer effect:

$$\text{concFin}_i = \pi_1 (\text{ShareMale}_i \times \text{Female}_i) + \pi_2 \text{ShareMale}_i + \beta'_2 X_{1i} + \eta_i \quad (3)$$

Let

$$\widehat{\text{concFin}}_i = \widehat{\pi}_1 (\text{ShareMale}_i \times \text{Female}_i) + \widehat{\pi}_2 \text{ShareMale}_i + \widehat{\beta}'_2 X_{1i}$$

be the component of the concentration in finance predicted by the peer effect, and let

$$\widetilde{\text{concFin}}_i = \text{concFin}_i - \widehat{\text{concFin}}_i$$

be the residual component, where $\widehat{\pi}_1$, $\widehat{\pi}_2$, and $\widehat{\beta}'_2$ are the estimated coefficients from Equation 3. The residual, η_i , is uncorrelated with ShareMale_i and $(\text{ShareMale}_i \times \text{Female}_i)$ by construction. The estimated residual, $\widetilde{\text{concFin}}_i$, is the uncorrelated component of concFin_i and can be interpreted as the component of concFin_i

⁷⁹For “maximum salary offer,” I use “permanent salary” as the main outcome measure, since, as described earlier, men with more male peers make trade-offs between up-front bonuses and annual guaranteed pay. Using “permanent salary” allows us to examine a measure of long-term earnings not subject to such short-term trade-offs and fluctuations.

that is orthogonal to the peer effects, $ShareMale_i$ and $(ShareMale_i \times Female_i)$ and would have occurred in the absence of treatment.

Substituting into Equation (2), we have a decomposition that can shed light on the proposed hypothesis:

$$Y_i = \phi_1 (ShareMale_i \times Female_i) + \phi_2 ShareMale_i + \mu_{11} (\widehat{concFin}_i \times Female_i) + \mu_{21} \widehat{concFin}_i \quad (4)$$

$$+ \mu_{12} (\widetilde{concFin}_i \times Female_i) + \mu_{22} \widetilde{concFin}_i + \beta'_1 X_{1i} + \varepsilon_{1i}$$

The decomposition can test whether the relationship between earnings and concentrating in finance for those randomly ‘induced to move into finance by the peer effect is different from the relationship between earnings and concentrating in finance for those who concentrate in finance for reasons unrelated to the peer effect. The coefficient on $\widehat{concFin}_i$, $\mu_{11} \times Female_i + \mu_{21}$, represents how much of the variation in the (mean, median, max) of earnings offers are explained by randomly induced differences in the likelihood of concentrating in finance.⁸⁰ The coefficient on $\widetilde{concFin}_i$, $\mu_{12} \times Female_i + \mu_{22}$, represents how much of the variation in earnings offers is explained by the component of concentrating in finance that is orthogonal to peer gender composition. These coefficients should be similar in magnitude to the estimated coefficients from Equation (2), μ_1 and μ_2 . Appendix Table B.XIII presents the estimated coefficients from Equation (4).

If there were no effect of peer gender composition on student outcomes independent of an effect mediated by the likelihood of concentrating in finance, then the coefficient on $\widehat{concFin}_i$ would represent the causal effect of concentrating in finance on earnings. Such an assumption would admittedly be strong, given literature that finds direct effects of peers in the MBA setting on entrepreneurial and labor market outcomes several years after graduation, through social network effects and social interactions (Shue 2013; Hampole, Truffa, and Wong 2023). However, I allow for the possibility that the exclusion restriction is violated using the zero-first-stage test (Bound and Jaeger 2000; Altonji et al. 2005; Angrist 2010; van Kippersluis and Rietveld 2018), and I implement the approach by finding a subsample of individuals for which the instrument is “locally irrelevant” - where the instrument, peer gender composition, does not have a significant effect on the treatment variable, concentration in finance. This condition turns out to be satisfied by students whose

⁸⁰Note that this coefficient does not represent a causal effect of finance concentration on earnings.

⁸¹If Equation (4) satisfied standard IV assumptions—in other words, that *all* peer gender composition effects and relative differences in the effects by gender were explained by differences in the extent to which peer gender composition changes the likelihood of concentrating in finance—then Equation (3) would be the first stage of a 2SLS procedure that uses $ShareMale$ and $(ShareMale \times Female)$ to instrument for $concFin$ and $(concFin \times Female)$, and the 2SLS procedure would identify the causal effect of concentrating in finance on the distribution of salary offers.

age of entry into the MBA program is at least 30.⁸²⁸³The reduced-form estimates of the effects of peer gender composition on the distribution [mean, median, and maximum] of salary offers for this subsample are insignificant, and I therefore fail to reject the exclusion restriction for these outcomes. The exclusion restriction in this context is made more palatable by noting that the outcomes in this case are the mean, median, and maximum of earnings offers *at graduation*, rather than in the years following graduation, when many of these network effects and social interaction effects have been observed.⁸⁴⁸⁵

Table X presents the estimated coefficients from Equation (4), where Equation (3) is the first stage for a 2SLS procedure that uses *ShareMale* to instrument for *concFin*, under the assumption that the exclusion restriction holds (ϕ_1 and ϕ_2 are zero). Note that Table B.XIII presents the estimated coefficients from just the decomposition, Equation (4), where ϕ_1 and ϕ_2 are not assumed to be zero, but where there is no causal interpretation of the coefficients on $\widehat{concFin}$ and $\widehat{concFin} \times Female$.

The results show that those female students who are randomly "induced to move" into concentrating in finance by the peer effect do not receive the same increase in their mean, median, and maximum salary offer as those female students who select into finance for reasons orthogonal to the peer effect. A standard Roy model would explain this result.

The results do not contradict the findings in the previous literature that show that a concentration in finance is associated with a higher starting salary for women at graduation. However, the results still suggest that a program that encourages or induces women to concentrate in finance or take more quantitative courses does not necessarily yield the same increase in opportunities at graduation as what is observed among women who elect to concentrate in finance or to take a large number of quantitative courses.

As an additional piece of evidence, Table B.XIV uses an AKM-style wage decomposition to examine the effect of peer gender composition on the distribution of the firms making offers, as measured by the firm component of pay offered. The results show that women with a greater share of male peers receive offers from higher-paying firms, yet their individual wage and salary offers are not higher. Mechanically, it can be concluded that the individuals "induced to move" by the peer effect are receiving offers from higher-paying firms but are those with lower-than-average (negative) individual wage effects. Thus, in spite of increasing quantitative coursework and the likelihood of concentration in quantitative fields, the net effect is that an

⁸²The approach of van Kippersluis and Rietveld (2018) expands upon the plausibly exogenous approach by Conley, Hansen, and Rossi (2012) by allowing for heterogeneous first-stage effects but homogenous reduced-form effects.

⁸³For older students, peer gender composition has little influence on their decision to concentrate in finance.

⁸⁴D'Haultfoeille, Hoderlein, and Sasaki (2021) provide assumptions under which the exclusion restriction can be relaxed in the control-function approach and show that identification of causal effects can be achieved in a set of common special cases. In particular, if the peer effect is jointly independent from all unobservables (ε_1 and η), first-stage monotonicity holds (Equation (3)), and if there exists a subset of individuals for whom there is no first-stage effect (no effect of peers on concentration in finance), then the causal effect of the treatment can still be identified, using a two-step estimation strategy. Importantly, the model allows for a direct effect of peer gender composition on the main outcome of interest.

⁸⁵Angrist and Krueger (1994), Altonji, Elder, and Taber (2005), Das et al. (2013), and van Kippersluis and Rietveld (2018) use two-step approaches with a similar spirit.

increase in the share of male peers does not result in higher (or lower) salary offers at graduation for female students.

However, it is possible that peer-induced changes in human capital choices affect the long-term expected earnings paths into which female students are placed, due to changes in their first job at graduation, even if the earnings at graduation are not affected through this channel. In order to investigate this possibility, I examine the effect of peer gender composition on the distribution of offers, where an offer at graduation is defined not only by the starting salary but by the future expected earnings trajectory, conditional on the characteristics of the first job. Expected earnings a given number of years after graduation are measured over all those students who begin their careers in such a job at graduation, regardless of whether the student remains in the same job or changes jobs over the course of his or her career. Thus, an “offer at graduation” is considered a stream of current and expected future wages, conditional on starting one’s career in such a job at graduation. Specifically, I examine the effect of peer gender composition on the distribution of “offers for wages 10 years after graduation,” where each offer is defined as the expected wage 10 years after graduation, computed using actual earnings from the MBA alumni survey data, averaged over the realized wages 10 years after graduation of all students who accepted their first job in the same job function or industry at graduation (each offer is matched with expected future wage profiles using the employment offer data).⁸⁶

Table XI shows the estimated coefficients of Equation (1), where the dependent variables are the mean, median, and maximum, respectively, of “offers for expected wages 10 years after graduation,” and where the expected value is conditional on the initial job function in columns (1) – (3) and conditional on the initial industry in columns (4) – (6). In contrast to the results shown in Table IX, the gender composition of a student’s peers indeed has large and significant effects on the distribution of “offers for future wages” received by female students at graduation when offers are measured in terms of their long-term expected value, conditional on the initial conditions. In particular, a 10 percentage point increase in the share of male peers increases the median offer for expected wages 10 years after graduation, conditional on occupation accepted at graduation, by \$9.89 per hour for female students—a 6 percent increase in the median expected wage offer. This reduces the gender-wage gap in offers for expected wages 10 years after graduation (due to differences in initial occupation offers) by nearly 30 percent. Moreover, a 10 percentage point increase in the share of male peers increases the median offer for expected wages 10 years after graduation, conditional on industry accepted at graduation, by approximately \$16 per hour for female students - more than a 10 percent increase in the median expected wage offer. This closes the gender-wage gap in offers for expected

⁸⁶I use the MBA alumni survey to construct each of these expected earnings trajectories, using the salaries reported 10 years after graduation divided by the reported weekly hours of work 10 years after graduation times 52, averaged over all students who accept an offer in the same initial industry or job function at graduation.

wages 10 years after graduation (due to differences in initial industry offers) by nearly *one-half*.⁸⁷

The results show that not only is a large fraction of the gender wage gap 10 years after graduation already present in expectation, in the differences in the offers received by men and women at the time of graduation, but also that the gender composition of one’s peers causes female students to receive a set of offers with different starting conditions, placing them on an entirely different expected wage trajectory.⁸⁸ Female students with a greater share of male peers receive job offers at graduation from occupations, industries, and firms with significantly higher expected wages 10 years after graduation, and these offers result in expected wage paths that are increasingly divergent over time from those they would have otherwise received.

To examine whether the effect of peer gender composition on offers for long-term expected wage trajectories is explained by peer-induced changes in human capital decisions, I estimate Equation (1), including a dummy variable for whether the student concentrated in finance and an interaction between concentration in finance and female, where the dependent variable is the mean, median, and maximum of the set of long-term expected wage offers received by the student at graduation. Table XII presents the estimated coefficients. The results show that the effect of peer gender composition on offers for long-term expected wages 10 years after graduation is entirely explained by peer-induced changes in human capital.

Finally, I examine the effect of the peer-induced change in human capital among those “induced to move” on long-term expected wage trajectories, again using the decomposition of concentration in finance into its predicted and orthogonal components, and I estimate Equation(4), where the dependent variables are the mean, median, and maximum of the wage offers for long-term expected wages.⁸⁹ The results, in Appendix Table B.XVI, show that female students who are “induced to move” into a finance concentration do, in fact, see a large and significant increase in the mean, median and maximum offer received at graduation when an offer is measured in terms of the long-term expected wages associated with starting in such a job at graduation.⁹⁰ Importantly, the effect of a finance concentration on the expected wages of female “movers” is comparable in magnitude to the associated increase in expected wages for those who select into a finance concentration for reasons orthogonal to the peer effect. No such effect is observed for male “movers.”

⁸⁷Appendix Table B.XV shows even greater effects of peer gender composition on the mean, median, and maximum of firm offers for long-term expected wages (expected wages, conditional on the starting firm at graduation.) The results show that a 10 percentage point increase in the share of male peers closes the gender-wage gap in firm offers for long-term expected wages by more than 100 percent.

⁸⁸In fact, it is particularly notable that peer gender composition affects the median wage offer more than the mean or maximum wage offer.

⁸⁹Here, I again use the zero-first-stage test (Bound and Jaeger (2000), Altonji et al. (2005), etc.) and again use the subsample of individuals for which the instrument is “locally irrelevant”: students whose age of entry into the program is at least 30. I again fail to reject the exclusion restriction for the outcome variables of interest.

⁹⁰Appendix Table B.XVII shows the estimated coefficients for the decomposition where ϕ_1 and ϕ_2 are not assumed to be zero.

E. Long-Term Effects

Finally, I examine the effects of peer gender composition on the longer-term labor market outcomes of female students relative to male. The results shown earlier in this paper indicate that increasing the share of a student’s male peers causes female students to accept jobs at graduation in occupations, industries, and firms with higher-paying long-run trajectories, in expectation. However, as we showed was the case in Section D., women may not necessarily receive the expected returns. In addition, female “movers” may not necessarily receive the expected female returns. In this section, I use the realized long-term earnings of students by linking data from the MBA alumni survey, which collects long-term employment and earnings data from a subset of the students, to the employment and job offer data, administrative data, coursework and course transcript information, and background characteristics prior to business school. The data from the MBA alumni survey allow us to observe labor market earnings information for each employment spell up to seven years after graduation, for each student whose peer group and administrative data is known.

As described earlier, the responses to the earnings questions from the MBA alumni survey were collected in discrete bins and were transformed into real-valued variables, using the midpoint of each bin. Therefore, the earnings measure for the long-term data has more measurement error than the data from the employment offer data at graduation, and estimated coefficients, though unbiased, will be less precise than with earnings data where the exact salary level is reported. Individual earnings in a given year were computed by linear extrapolation between the first and last year at each job.⁹¹

Table XIII shows the impact of the gender composition of one’s peers in business school on long-term labor market outcomes. It presents the estimated coefficients from a series of regressions similar to Equation (1), where the dependent variable is the log salary a given number of years after graduation. The results show that female students with a greater share of male peers receive higher earnings relative to male students at graduation and in the year following graduation. In fact, a 10 percentage point increase in the share of male peers in the first year following graduation increases the female advantage in earnings by 8.7 percent (log points)—a 74 percent increase relative to the mean. However, in the second, third, and fourth years following graduation, the estimated effects of peer gender composition both diminish in magnitude and are not significantly different from zero. However, the results show that women with a greater share of male peers do, in fact, receive significantly higher salaries six and seven years after graduation, and that the magnitude of the effect of a greater share of male peers on the salaries of female graduates also grows with time. Note that the estimated effect even five years after graduation is close to statistically significant at the 10 percent level, but more importantly, the magnitude as well as the precision of the effect increases starting in Year

⁹¹Nominal values in each year were converted into real earnings in 2006 dollars using the Consumer Price Index for Urban Consumers (CPI-U).

Five.

The effects are somewhat consistent with those found in Zolitz and Brenoe (2020) and Zolitz and Feld (2021), which find that women with greater exposure to male peers have significantly greater earnings 1 to 5 years after graduation (Zolitz and Feld 2021) and 11 to 16 years after graduation (Zolitz and Brenoe 2020). However, the results are different in some important ways from the previous literature, which finds little significant effect on labor market earnings in the first job after graduation. The results shown here, taken together, suggest that peer effects are operating on women’s relative earnings through two different channels: one, which primarily affects salaries at graduation, but whose effects are not persistent, and the second, which affects the types of jobs and earnings paths that women select into at graduation, whose effects do not materialize immediately in terms of earnings at graduation, but through which we see significant and persistent effects in terms of long-term earnings several years after graduation.

The results, taken together, suggest that women who are exposed to a greater share of male peers are more likely to move into higher-paying occupations, industries and even firms, but they receive below-average offers relative to the mean; they do not receive the expected earnings for the job functions, industries, and firms into which they are more likely to enter at graduation. While women with a greater share of male peers do receive a higher salary at graduation and in the first year following graduation, the results suggest that this is primarily due to a greater likelihood of accepting their maximum salary offer, rather than receiving a set of higher salary offers. Further evidence (shown in the appendix) suggests that this channel does not result in a persistent earnings difference. In fact, the effect due strictly to preferences dissipates relatively quickly. The human capital channel, on the other hand, moves female students into vastly different initial jobs at graduation, and these differences in the initial conditions of their career place them on different expected earnings paths. However, the results indicate that it is not a sufficient description to say that such women simply choose jobs with greater expected earnings growth. The results in Table XIII, combined with the previous results using the job offer data, show that women with a greater share of male peers do not receive the expected returns for the jobs that they choose at graduation. Yet even with realized earnings being below the mean, women with a greater share of male peers do eventually realize gains—in terms of long-term earnings relative to their female counterparts with fewer male peers—five, six, and seven years after graduation.⁹²

In particular, a 10 percentage point increase in the share of male peers results in a 27.4 percent increase in the relative earnings of female graduates six years after graduation, reducing the gender earnings gap six years out by more than 50 percent. Seven years after graduation, it increases women’s relative earnings by

⁹²Note that while the effects are not statistically significant five years after graduation, the long-term salary outcome variable is based on the midpoint of bins. Therefore, the precision of the effect may be underestimated.

50 percent, closing the gender earnings gap by more than two-thirds (71.4 percent).⁹³ While the previous literature as well as the results given here show that the gender earnings gap accumulates over time, this paper finds that the share of the gender earnings gap mitigated by peer gender composition also grows with time.

In order to investigate whether the human capital channel, through its effects on the characteristics of the first job at graduation, explains the long-term effects on the earnings of women, I examine how much of the long-term earnings effects of peers can be explained by a change in the initial occupation, the initial industry, and the initial firms accepted at graduation, using occupation, industry, and firm fixed effects of the first job at graduation. Each column in Table XIII represents a separate regression where the dependent variable is one to seven years after graduation.⁹⁴ Looking first at Panels B and C, I find that the initial industry at graduation explains much more of the effect of peer gender composition on women’s long-term earnings than the initial occupation. This is perhaps especially interesting given that the initial industry and occupation at graduation appear to explain similar fractions of the baseline gender-earnings gap. However, the effects of peer gender composition on the sorting of female students into different industries at graduation explains a larger fraction of the effects of peer gender composition five, six, and seven years after graduation than the change in occupational sorting.

Finally, in Panel D, I examine how much of the effect of peer gender composition on women’s long-term earnings is due to changes in the firms into which female graduates sort at graduation. The starting firm explains almost all of the gender earnings gap, even five, six, and seven years after graduation, where the documented magnitudes are the largest. In addition, the starting firm explains much more of the variation in long-term earnings than either the starting occupation or the starting industry. The results show that the starting firm explains almost all of the effect of peer gender composition on women’s relative earnings six years after graduation. The results appear to be consistent with recent literature on the importance of the first job at graduation or the first firm at which one lands a job for long-term earnings, even through subsequent jobs.⁹⁵ However, seven years after graduation, there appears to still be an additional “unexplained” effect of peer gender composition, beyond the effect of the starting firm. The results suggest that it is a combination of the initial characteristics of the first job at graduation—and the change in the sorting of female graduates across first jobs—that explains the long-term effects of peers on the relative

⁹³Because the estimated coefficients shown in Figure IV are based on salaries conditional on employment, and there may be a concern regarding selection bias, Appendix Figure B.V shows the effect of peer gender composition on the likelihood of ever not working and on the total number of years not working, for female students relative to male, a given number of years after graduation. The results show that women with a greater share of men in their peer group have a small but significant reduction in the likelihood of not working by the third year after graduation, though this effect dissipates by the fourth and fifth years.

⁹⁴This allows occupation, industry, and firm fixed effects to take a nonlinear time path, and the estimated effects of each initial job characteristic are specific to the years since graduation.

⁹⁵See Kahn (2010) and Arellano-Bover (2024).

earnings of women.

F. On the Formation of Preferences

Recall that in Section C., the results showed that a 10 percentage point increase in the share of male peers leads to a 4 percentage point increase in the likelihood that female students accept the highest salary offer in their choice set. This increase in the "willingness to accept" (WTA) the highest salary offer could reflect a change in preferences, as measured by the "willingness to pay" (WTP)—the monetary trade-off one is willing to accept for other desirable nonmonetary amenities of the job. Alternatively, peer gender composition may not influence preferences themselves, but rather, female students with a greater share of male peers may be searching in industries or among a set of jobs with a different distribution of non-wage amenity values. For example, suppose female students with a greater share of male peers take more finance courses and are therefore more likely to search for jobs in the finance industry relative to marketing. But suppose that the variance in the non-wage amenity values in marketing jobs is greater than the variance of non-wage amenities in finance. It is possible that the average gain to the worker in finance, in terms of the non-wage amenity value gained by accepting a job offer other than the maximum salary job offer, relative to a given income loss, may be much less than what one gains in non-wage amenity value by accepting a less-than-maximum salary offer in marketing. In other words, the trade-off in finance for accepting a job with greater non-wage amenities, in terms of the salary foregone—the price of non-wage amenities—may be much greater in finance than in marketing. Thus, it is important to test whether the distribution of the non-wage amenity value offers has changed in order to understand whether the increase in the WTA reflects a change in the WTP.

As in the discrete choice literature on the valuation of non-wage amenities, an inference about the value to the worker of the non-wage amenities at a given firm can be made if a student accepts a salary other than the maximum salary offered. The basic idea is as follows: if a student receives two job offers, from Firm A and Firm B, and Firm A is the higher-paying offer but we observe that the student chooses Firm B, it must be the case that there is some other non-wage benefit or nonpay job characteristic associated with offer B that is at least as valuable to the student as the foregone monetary value of choosing offer B over offer A.⁹⁶

The value of non-wage amenities is defined in a revealed preferences sense: the discrete choices reveal how

⁹⁶Discrete choice experiments are an extension of the contingent valuation literature, whereby rather than directly asking people for valuations over an attribute (the stated preference method), people are given the choice of two or more scenarios and are asked to choose their preferred option. These scenarios usually vary the attributes and the prices, and WTP can be estimated using random utility models (McFadden 1973; Manski 1977). Choice experiments have been shown to have better properties relative to stated preference valuation methods (Hanley, Wright, and Adamowicz 1998). A question is whether these experiments, which are usually survey-based, correspond to actual market behavior. In this case, the choices are based on acceptance decisions of real market behavior in a high-stakes setting with well-informed labor market participants. See Mas and Pallais (2017), Sorkin (2018) for similar approaches.

much income a student would be willing to give up in order to receive the increase in the non-wage amenities associated with a job other than the maximum salary offer, relative to the maximum salary offer. The goal is to determine whether the change in the WTA the maximum salary offer, documented in Section C., is indicative of a change in the WTP, or whether it is simply due to a change in the distribution of the value of non-wage amenity offers they receive in the new industries and job types in which they are searching. These values of non-wage amenities will therefore be measured in dollar terms.

Appendix Table B.XVIII presents some suggestive evidence that the gender composition of one's peers has an effect on preferences. Using survey data from a survey conducted by Career Services prior to the start of the interview process, I first examine the effect of the gender composition of one's peers on the stated "first choice," "second choice," and "third choice" jobs. From students' stated preferences, I see that women with a greater share of male peers had a greater likelihood of stating that their first-choice job was investment banking or venture capital and a lower likelihood of their first choice job being in product management.⁹⁷ However, this survey evidence still does not show, in a revealed preferences sense, whether students were indeed more likely to choose such jobs when faced with real offers in-hand.

Examining the choices of students at the final stage of the decision-making process, when final offers are made, and in an institutional setting where students can hold multiple offers simultaneously in hand, allows for a clear way to measure the WTP for the non-wage amenities of the job, using the data on the job offers they receive as well as their acceptance decisions. In order to do this, I use an approach from Mas and Thomas (2021), which builds upon the framework and methodology in Sorokin (2018), to estimate the dollar value of non-wage amenities at the firm level. The approach is summarized in Appendix VIII.

Using these estimated *dollar* values of non-wage amenities at the firm level, I then examine whether women with a greater share of male peers receive a different distribution of non-wage amenity offers at the firm level than those with a lower share of men in their peer group. XIV shows the results from this analysis. The estimates shown are the estimated coefficients of a specification similar to Equation (1), where the dependent variables in columns (1) through (3) are the mean, median, and maximum, respectively, of the non-wage amenity offers associated with the set of job offers the student receives, in dollar terms. The dependent variables in columns (4) through (6) are the mean, median, and maximum of the non-wage amenity values, estimated using only the acceptance decisions of female students rather than the entire sample, so that the values reflect a female-specific valuation of the non-wage amenities offered by each firm. Table B.XX in the Appendix shows that while women do, on average, receive job offers with a greater variance of the female-specific valuation of non-wage amenities, there is no effect of peer gender composition

⁹⁷Appendix Table B.XIX shows results where *ShareMale* is interacted separately with *Female* and *Male* in order to examine whether the likelihood of stated "first choice," "second choice," and "third choice" jobs increased for women, in the above-mentioned occupations, after taking into account that the likelihood for some of these was also influenced for men.

on the variance of non-wage amenity offers. Overall, the results show that there is no significant effect of peer gender composition on the distribution of non-wage amenity values offered. The evidence suggests that rather than affecting the distribution of the non-wage amenity values of the offers that female students receive, a greater share of male peers affects women’s likelihood of accept their highest salary offer due to its effect on preferences. Women with a greater share of male peers exhibit, through their acceptance decisions, a lower willingness to pay for the non-wage amenities of the job.

The finding that peer gender composition causally affects women’s preferences, as measured in a real-life, high-stakes environment where actual job offers and acceptance decisions are concerned—notably, ones that influence the start of one’s career—has not previously been documented in the existing literature. More broadly, this paper relates to a long-standing debate in the literature on the gender earnings gap, regarding how much of the earnings gap is due to differences in preferences for different job characteristics and the accumulated effects that anticipated future selection into such occupations and industries may generate (See, for example, Adda, Dustmann, and Stevens 2017). However, the findings here document that the preferences themselves often considered so closely tied to gender may themselves be malleable or subject to social and environmental influences.

Although peer gender composition has a large and significant effect on women’s likelihood of accepting the maximum salary offer, I show that this effect does *not* explain the effect of peers on women’s long-term expected wage paths. Appendix Table B.XXI shows that there is no significant effect of peer gender composition on the likelihood that female students accept the maximum offer for “expected earnings 10 years after graduation,” given the initial industry, occupation, or firm accepted at graduation.⁹⁸ This occurs despite the fact that the effect of peers on women’s likelihood of accepting their highest salary offer is driven primarily by those who have a choice between two or more occupations or industries, and in particular, those who have a choice across firms.⁹⁹ In other words, peer gender composition affects both human capital choices and preferences; while the effect of peers on women’s salaries at graduation are explained primarily by their effect on preferences, these effects due to preferences do not result in persistent effects on earnings . It is the effect of peers on human capital that affects the *set of choices* that women have and results in persistent earnings differences.

⁹⁸In fact, salaries accepted at graduation and expected salaries 10 years after graduation, conditional on initial industry and occupation accepted, are negatively correlated. The same is true of the maximum salary offered and the maximum offer for expected earnings 10 years after graduation.

⁹⁹See Appendix Table B.XXII. The effect of peer gender composition on women’s likelihood of accepting their maximum salary offer is also strongly significant in an absolute sense, not only in a relative sense, in samples where students have offers from more than one industry, occupation, and firm. Peer gender composition also has no significant effect on whether students or female students in particular receive a choice of industry, occupation, or firms.

VII. Discussion and Conclusion

Using novel data from a top business school in the United States, this paper provides causal evidence that the gender composition of a student's peers in business school affects the gender-earnings gap at graduation, choices of coursework and fields of concentration during business school, and importantly, the choice of first job at graduation. This paper provides evidence that women with a greater share of men in their peer group have significantly higher salaries at graduation and are more likely to enter male-dominated occupations and industries in their first job after graduation. In addition, the occupations and industries into which these women enter are those with a greater frequency of overtime work, a lower frequency of part-time work, greater weekly hours of work, and higher wages. The effects of a 10 percentage point increase in the share of male peers reduces the gender earnings gap at graduation by approximately two-thirds. Such an increase in the share of male peers also closes the existing gender gap in entry into each of the most male-dominated occupations and industries by 50 percent or more, and it reduces the gender segregation of entry into jobs at graduation by close to two-thirds.

Importantly, this paper shows that "initial conditions" matter. Peer gender composition has a dramatic effect on the long-term expected earnings paths of women through a change in the types of jobs in which they begin their careers—notably, the initial industries, occupations, and even initial firms into which women sort at graduation. Consistent with literature on graduating during a recession, the first job at graduation has large and persistent effects.¹⁰⁰ I show that the change in the initial conditions of the career causes a divergence in expected earnings paths. Women with a greater share of male peers enter occupations and industries at graduation with expected wages 10 years after graduation that are 15 and 30 times, respectively, the magnitude of the effect on hourly wages observed at graduation. The effects of peers on the characteristics of the first job at graduation—the starting industry, occupation, and firm—together explain the relatively large effects of peer gender composition on the long-term earnings of women relative to men. The findings demonstrate that while there are large gender gaps in the starting conditions of the career, increasing the share of male peers in business school also decreases gender segregation in the "initial conditions" of the career, which has large and persistent effects on the long-term earnings of women.

The effect of peer gender composition on fields of study as well as occupational sorting and earnings is consistent with previous literature based outside the U.S., such as Zolitz and Brenoe (2020) and Zolitz and Feld (2021). However, at first glance it may not appear to be consistent with findings from a recent working paper by Hampole, Truffa, and Wong (2023), which finds that in a similar top-business-school setting in the United States, women with more *female* peers are more likely to be promoted to senior management

¹⁰⁰See Kahn (2010).

positions, though the authors admittedly do not have wage or earnings data. Nonetheless, this paper offers additional insight using novel data on job offers, and it sheds light on why the two findings are not, in fact, inconsistent. I show evidence that women with a greater share of male peers do receive offers from higher-paying industries, occupations, and firms, but that the marginal student who is moved into concentrating in a quantitative field of study that is on average associated with higher earnings, such as finance, does not receive the average return to that major, at least not at graduation. Women with more male peers receive offers from higher-paying firms, but below-average offers from such firms at graduation. The two papers can indeed shed light on two different aspects of the same story, both of which can be true if the variance in wages across fields is sufficiently large relative to the wage variance within-field. In other words, a woman with greater exposure to male peers can simultaneously be more likely to receive below-average wages relative to her field (which can result from being less likely to be promoted), but still be better off in terms of earnings relative to entering a lower-paying field but advancing more within the field. Of course, the results in this paper describe primarily effects on earnings, but there may be other benefits to achieving a higher-level position within the field, such as prestige, influence, or job fulfillment.

In addition, this paper leverages a unique aspect of both the data and the institutional setting in order to disentangle two possible channels for the observed peer effects: it allows one to distinguish between the effect of peers on the *set of offers* received, or the choice set of students, from a potential effect on preferences: the choice of job students make from within their offer *set*. While this paper uncovers two different mechanisms through which earnings and future earnings growth are affected, it also shows that not all channels through which peer effects cause women to act more like the average male student result in long-term earnings differences. In particular, while there are short-term earnings gains for women at graduation from increasing the likelihood of women accepting their maximum salary offer, this particular effect on earnings is not necessarily persistent.¹⁰¹ It is the effect of peers on human capital choices that affects the overall offer *set* and the set of long-range earnings trajectories that results in significant earnings differences long-term.

Finally, this paper provides evidence that the gender composition of peer groups in business school has large and persistent effects on the earnings of women long after graduation. While the analysis of job offer data demonstrated that women with a greater share of male peers did not receive higher salary offers at graduation, this paper shows evidence that such students do receive higher salaries in the long term. In particular, a 10 percentage point increase in the share of male peers closes the gender earnings gap 6 years after graduation by more than 50 percent, and seven years after graduation by more than 70 percent.

¹⁰¹Conditional on the choice set, choosing the maximum salary offer at graduation is negatively correlated, if anything, with long-term earnings.

These results reveal some underlying mechanisms through which the gender-wage gap can accumulate to the documented magnitudes over the course of the lifecycle, but can also be mitigated in growing proportion. The findings also show that peer gender composition has lasting effects on human capital investment, occupational and industry sorting, the initial conditions of the career, and the long-term earnings of women.

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
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VIII. Tables and Figures


Figure I

Effect of Gender Composition of Peer Group on Evolution of Job Characteristics After Graduation



(i)

Expected Earnings Based on Combination of Highest Degree Type and Field of Study



(ii)

Expected Earnings Based on Gender-Specific Earnings Associated with Highest Degree Type and Field of Study

Notes: For the earliest birth cohorts (1950-1953), I use data from the American Community Survey (ACS) from 2012-2015, as in Bertrand (2017), and for the remaining cohorts, I use data from the ACS from 2016-2019 and focus on individuals born between 1954 and 1989 (ages 30 to 65). The sample is restricted to those that have completed at least a four-year college degree by age 30. For each birth cohort, I proxy for the earnings potential of a given individual based on each combination of highest degree type (bachelor's degree, master's degree, professional degree, doctorate) and field of study (economics, English literature, etc.). In subfigure (i), I compute mean earnings and 80th and 90th percentile earnings among men working full time who have completed that degree-field combination. I then report, by birth cohort, the gender gap ($\ln[\text{male potential earnings}] - \ln[\text{female potential earnings}]$) in the education-based earnings potential. In subfigure (ii), I complete the same exercise, except mean earnings, the 80th, and the 90th percentile of earnings are computed separately among men and among women, so the gender gap is not only based on differences in the degree-field combination, but also on a gender difference in the returns to each degree and field combination.

Table I
Summary Statistics for Classes of 1998-2012

	Obs.	Mean	SD	Min.	Max.
Female	8283	0.28	0.45	0	1
GMAT Total Score	7518		49.82	390	800
GMAT Quant Percentile	6544		26.11	0	99
GMAT Verbal Percentile	6544		26.67	0	99
Undergraduate GPA (4.0 scale)	5858		0.35	1.6	4
Work Experience	3911		1.94	0	14.08
Black	7694		0.20	0	1
Hispanic	7694		0.21	0	1
Asian	7694		0.37	0	1
South Asian	7694		0.23	0	1
Age at Graduation	7686		2.64	23	49
Married	8091		0.48	0	1
US/Canadian Citizenship	7661		0.49	0	1
Visa: US Cit/Perm Res/Work Perm	8283		0.45	0	1
Undergraduate Major: Economics	6534		0.34	0	1
Undergraduate Major: Finance	6534		0.15	0	1
Undergraduate Major Type: Business	6534		0.47	0	1
Undergraduate Major Type: Hard Science	6534		0.41	0	1
Top Twenty Undergraduate Institution	7636		0.40	0	1
Top Ten Undergraduate Institution	7636		0.32	0	1
Prev Ind: Ibanking	1401		0.35	0	1
Prev Ind: Consulting	1401		0.39	0	1
Prev Ind: Imanagement	1401		0.25	0	1
Peer Group Share Female	156		0.07	0.12	0.39
Share Undergrad Econ Majors	130		0.11	0.00	0.34
Share Undergrad Finance Majors	130		0.04	0.00	0.18
Share Major Type: Business	130		0.23	0.00	0.61
Share Major Type: Hard Science	130		0.20	0.00	1.00
Peer GMAT Score	146		14.81	658.79	720.53
Peer GMAT Quant Pctle	146		29.70	0.00	87.25
Peer GMAT Verbal Pctle	146		31.56	0.00	91.67
Share from Top 20 Undergraduate Inst.	146		0.06	0.06	0.31
Share from Top 10 Undergraduate Inst.	146		0.05	0.02	0.25
Share Prev Ind: Ibanking	96		0.11	0.00	0.42
Share Prev Ind: Consulting	96		0.10	0.00	0.43
Share Prev Ind: Imanagement	96		0.06	0.00	0.23
Share Prev Job: Ibanking	96		0.08	0.00	0.30
Share Prev Job: Consulting	96		0.09	0.00	0.43
Share Prev Job: Imanagement	96		0.07	0.00	0.25
Share Prev Job: Company Finance	96		0.07	0.00	0.43

Notes: The sample consists of all full-time students who were members of the entering classes of 1996–2010, excluding transfer students (1,123 students) and students whose peer-group assignment was unknown (15 students).

Table II
Share of Males Peers Regressed on Own Pretreatment Characteristics

VARIABLES	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Share Male	Share Male	Share Male	Share Male
GMAT Total Score	1.10e-06 [8.73e-06]	9.76e-07 [8.73e-06]	-3.94e-07 [1.07e-05]	4.69e-06 [1.46e-05]
GMAT Quant Score	7.68e-05 [1.01e-04]	7.51e-05 [1.01e-04]	6.86e-05 [1.29e-04]	7.02e-05 [1.54e-04]
GMAT Verbal Score	-2.57e-05 [8.89e-05]	-2.55e-05 [8.89e-05]	-3.56e-05 [1.07-04]	2.99e-05 [1.59e-04]
Undergraduate GPA	6.30e-04 [1.34e-03]	6.30e-04 [1.34e-03]	4.85e-04 [1.59e-03]	9.24e-04 [2.46e-03]
Undergraduate Major: Economics	-1.67e-03 [1.04e-03]	-1.67e-03 [1.04e-03]	-2.30e-03* [1.26e-03]	-9.48e-05 [1.80e-03]
Undergraduate Major: Finance	-2.55e-03 [2.38e-03]	-2.55e-03 [2.38e-03]	-3.15e-03 [2.90e-03]	-9.53e-04 [4.07e-03]
Undergraduate Major Type: Business	-6.32e-06 [8.45e-04]	-7.01e-06 [8.45e-04]	-1.09e-03 [1.02e-03]	2.36e-03 [1.47e-03]
Undergraduate Major Type: Hard Science	-2.17e-04 [9.05e-04]	-2.12e-04 [9.04e-04]	7.39e-04 [1.06e-03]	-2.30e-03 [1.73e-03]
Work Experience (years)	-4.89e-05 [9.37e-05]	-4.54e-05 [9.37e-05]	1.08e-05 [1.15e-04]	-1.38e-04 [1.64e-04]
Black	-9.82e-04 [2.09e-03]	-9.73e-04 [2.09e-03]	-8.74e-04 [2.63e-03]	-2.47e-04 [3.28e-03]
Hispanic	-3.29e-03* [1.98e-03]	-3.34e-03* [1.98e-03]	-3.14e-03 [2.30e-03]	-2.02 e-03 [3.92e-03]
Asian	-1.46e-03 [1.13e-03]	-1.43e-03 [1.13e-03]	-6.33e-04 [1.45e-03]	-3.47e-03* [1.74e-03]
Age at Graduation	-5.06e-05 [1.60e-04]	-5.26e-05 [1.60e-04]	-2.00e-04 [1.88e-04]	3.72e-04 [2.97e-04]
US/Canadian Citizenship	-1.25e-03 [9.13e-04]	-1.25e-03 [9.13e-04]	-1.51e-03 [1.08e-03]	-1.37e-04 [1.66e-03]
Top Twenty Undergraduate Institution	-1.12e-03 [1.04e-03]	-1.10e-03 [1.04e-03]	-8.17e-04 [1.28e-03]	-1.44e-03 [1.74e-03]
Observations	7,694	7,694	5,456	2,121
Cohort Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Sample	All	All	Males	Females

Standard errors in brackets
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Notes: Each coefficient represents a separate regression in which the share of male peers in the peer group is regressed on the individual pretreatment characteristic. Column (1) regressions each control for an indicator variable for female. Column (2) controls for the share of women in the respondent's cohort other than the respondent. Column (3) shows regressions on a sample of male students only. Column (4) shows regressions on a sample of female students only. All regressions include cohort fixed effects.

Table III
Effect of Peer Gender Composition on Salary Offer Accepted

VARIABLES	(1) Log Salary Accepted	(2) Log Salary Accepted	(3) Log Salary Accepted	(4) Log Salary Accepted	(5) Log Salary Accepted
Share Male Peers x Female	0.21** [0.091]	0.19** [0.093]	0.19** [0.095]	0.21** [0.096]	0.21** [0.096]
Share Male Peers	-0.09 [0.058]	-0.10 [0.060]	-0.10 [0.060]	-0.10 [0.062]	-0.10 [0.062]
Female	-0.04*** [0.005]	-0.03*** [0.006]	-0.03*** [0.006]	-0.03*** [0.007]	-0.03*** [0.007]
GMAT Total Score		-0.00 [0.000]	-0.00 [0.000]	-0.00 [0.000]	-0.00 [0.000]
GMAT Quant Score		0.00 [0.003]	-0.00 [0.003]	0.00 [0.003]	0.00 [0.003]
GMAT Verbal Score		0.00 [0.002]	0.00 [0.002]	0.00 [0.002]	0.00 [0.002]
Undergraduate GPA (4.0 scale)		0.01 [0.008]	0.01 [0.008]	0.01 [0.008]	0.01 [0.008]
Top Ten Undergraduate Institution			0.02 [0.010]	0.02* [0.010]	0.02* [0.010]
Top Twenty Undergraduate Institution			-0.00 [0.009]	0.00 [0.009]	0.00 [0.009]
Married at Entry				0.01* [0.006]	0.01* [0.006]
Married Female at Entry				-0.01 [0.011]	-0.01 [0.011]
Age at Entry				0.01 [0.018]	0.02 [0.019]
Age at Entry Squared				-0.00 [0.000]	-0.00 [0.000]
Work Experience					-0.01 [0.009]
Work Experience Squared					0.00 [0.001]
Race Indicator Variables	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
Observations	5,438	5,319	5,282	5,179	5,179
Cohort Fixed Effects	15	14	14	14	14
Mean	11.52	11.52	11.52	11.52	11.52

Robust standard errors in brackets
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Notes: This table reports estimated coefficients from the regression described in Equation (1). The dependent variable in all columns is equal to the natural log of the annual base salary of the job offer accepted, in terms of gross earnings, not including any bonuses, relocation expenses, tuition reimbursement, or stock options. “Share Male Peers” is the fraction of the student’s peer group (excluding the student) who are male, reported as a deviation from the mean. Column (1) includes no other pretreatment characteristics other than gender. Column (2) includes controls for student GMAT scores and undergraduate GPA, normalized to a 4.0 scale based on the maximum GPA attainable at the undergraduate institution, and includes a dummy for missing undergraduate GPA. Column (3) includes two additional dummy variables for whether the student attended a “Top 10” or a “Top 20” undergraduate institution. Column (4) includes additional dummy variables for marital status at the start of business school, marital status interacted with female, age at the start of business school, and age squared. In addition, column (4) includes race dummies (indicators for Black, Hispanic, Asian, and South Asian.) Column (5) controls for years of work experience prior to business school, and years of experience–squared, in addition to all controls included in column (4). All columns include cohort fixed effects and are clustered at the peer group level.

Table IV
Effect of Gender Composition on Industry and Job Function of Job Accepted at Graduation

VARIABLES	(1) Industry: IBanking	(2) Industry: IManagement	(3) Industry: Venture Capital	(4) Job Function: IBanking	(5) Job Function: Product Mgmt
Share Male Peers*Female	0.55** [0.217]	0.22* [0.120]	0.24*** [0.083]	0.48** [0.207]	-0.39** [0.166]
Share Male Peers	0.07 [0.198]	-0.08 [0.104]	-0.11** [0.042]	0.24 [0.143]	0.07 [0.093]
Female	-0.11*** [0.017]	-0.05*** [0.009]	-0.03*** [0.006]	-0.11*** [0.016]	0.09*** [0.011]
Observations	5,590	5,590	5,590	5,610	5,610
Cohort Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Mean	0.28	0.08	0.03	0.20	0.07

Table V
Effect of Peer Gender Composition on Male-Skewedness of Industry or Job Function Accepted

VARIABLES	(1) Industry Share Male	(2) Job Function Share Male
Share Male Peers*Female	0.42*** [0.086]	0.47*** [0.075]
Share Male Peers	-0.13** [0.051]	-0.08** [0.035]
Female	-0.06*** [0.007]	-0.06*** [0.006]
Observations	7,167	7,231
Cohort Fixed Effects	13.00	13.00
Mean	0.72	0.72

Robust standard errors in brackets
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Notes: This table reports estimated coefficients from the regression described in Equation (1). The dependent variable in each column of Table IV is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the job offer accepted by the student is in the industry or job function indicated, and 0 otherwise. In Table V, “Industry Share Male” is the fraction of graduating students in student i ’s cohort accepting a job in the industry in which student i accepts a job who are male (other than student i). “Job Function Share Male” is the fraction of graduating students in student i ’s cohort accepting a job in the job function accepted by the student i who are male (other than student i). All regressions control for gender, marital status, marital status interacted with gender, age at entry, age squared, experience at entry, experience squared, student GMAT scores, undergraduate GPA, a dummy for missing undergraduate GPA, whether the student attended a “Top 10” or “Top 20” undergraduate institution, and whether the student is Black, Hispanic, Asian, South Asian, or “other” (omitted category is white). All columns include cohort fixed effects, and standard errors are clustered at the peer group level.

Table VI
Effect of Gender Composition on Average Characteristics of Job Accepted at Graduation

Panel A: Average Hours and Wages in Job Function Accepted (First Year after Graduation)				
VARIABLES	(1) Average Weekly Hours	(2) Frequency of Part-Time Work	(3) Frequency of Overtime Work	(4) Average Hourly Wage
Share Male Peers*Female	13.82*** [4.987]	-0.00 [0.014]	0.34** [0.134]	6.90*** [1.934]
Share Male Peers	6.84* [3.510]	-0.02** [0.009]	0.18* [0.096]	-0.84 [2.229]
Female	-3.36*** [0.369]	0.01*** [0.001]	-0.09*** [0.010]	-1.70*** [0.167]
Observations	5,540	5,540	5,540	5,540
Cohort Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Mean	62.72	0.02	0.48	41.95

Panel B: Average Hours and Wages in Industry Accepted (First Year after Graduation)				
VARIABLES	(1) Average Weekly Hours	(2) Frequency of Part-Time Work	(3) Frequency of Overtime Work	(4) Average Hourly Wage
Share Male Peers*Female	11.50*** [4.246]	-0.05** [0.023]	0.26** [0.120]	12.06*** [2.441]
Share Male Peers	3.19 [3.572]	0.01 [0.014]	0.10 [0.097]	-2.93 [1.949]
Female	-2.39*** [0.321]	0.003** [0.001]	-0.06*** [0.009]	-1.85*** [0.206]
Observations	5,588	5,588	5,588	5,588
Cohort Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Mean	62.22	0.02	0.46	41.60

Robust standard errors in brackets
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Notes: The dependent variable in each column is the average characteristic in the job function or industry accepted by the student. The average characteristic of each job function is taken over all students working in the job function or industry of the accepted job in the first year after graduation, using data on job characteristics in the first year after graduation. “Average weekly hours” is defined as the job function average of self-reported usual weekly hours worked in the position. Responses are collected in discrete bins and transformed into real-valued variables (at the midpoint of each bin). “Frequency of part-time work” is the job function or industry average of the indicator variable for part-time work, where “part-time work” is defined as usual weekly hours less than 40 hours per week. “Frequency of overtime work” is the job function or industry average of the indicator variable for overtime work, where “overtime work” is defined as usual weekly hours greater than 60 hours per week. “Average hourly wage” is defined as the job function or industry average of the self-reported annual earnings divided by the product of usual weekly hours of work and 52. Annual earnings are reported in discrete bins and transformed into real-valued variables at the midpoint of each earnings bin. Wages are in 2006 dollars. All columns include cohort fixed effects, and standard errors are clustered at the peer group level.

Table VII
Effect of Gender Composition on Average Characteristics of Job Ten Years after Graduation

Panel A: Average Hours and Wages in Job Function Accepted (Ten Years after Graduation)

VARIABLES	(1) Average Weekly Hours	(2) Frequency of Part-Time Work	(3) Frequency of Overtime Work	(4) Average Hourly Wage
Share Male Peers*Female	8.48*** [2.638]	-0.07* [0.036]	0.30*** [0.086]	165.50*** [54.025]
Share Male Peers	1.69 [1.842]	0.02 [0.019]	0.08 [0.058]	-8.75 [52.557]
Female	-1.88*** [0.187]	0.01*** [0.002]	-0.07*** [0.006]	-38.13*** [4.179]
Observations	5,592	5,592	5,592	5,592
Cohort Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Mean	57.80	0.05	0.39	165.40

Panel B: Average Hours and Wages in Industry Accepted (Ten Years after Graduation)

VARIABLES	(1) Average Weekly Hours	(2) Frequency of Part-Time Work	(3) Frequency of Overtime Work	(4) Average Hourly Wage
Share Male Peers*Female	6.62*** [1.969]	-0.08*** [0.029]	0.17** [0.068]	178.53*** [45.365]
Share Male Peers	-0.10 [1.599]	0.03** [0.015]	0.04 [0.055]	-17.03 [39.810]
Female	-1.25*** [0.159]	0.01*** [0.002]	-0.04*** [0.006]	-35.62*** [3.580]
Observations	5,584	5,584	5,584	5,584
Cohort Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Mean	57.74	0.05	0.39	153.02


Robust standard errors in brackets

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1


Notes: The dependent variable in each column is the average characteristic in the job function or industry accepted by the student at graduation. The average characteristic of each job function is taken over all students working in the job function or industry of the accepted job 10 years after graduation. “Average weekly hours” is defined as the job function average of self-reported usual weekly hours worked in the position. Responses are collected in discrete bins and transformed into real-valued variables (at the midpoint of each bin). “Frequency of part-time work” is the job function or industry average of the indicator variable for part-time work, where “part-time work” is defined as usual weekly hours less than 40 hours per week. “Frequency of overtime work” is the job function or industry average of the indicator variable for overtime work, where “overtime work” is defined as usual weekly hours greater than 60 hours per week. “Average hourly wage” is defined as the job function or industry average of the self-reported annual earnings divided by the product of usual weekly hours of work and 52. Annual earnings are reported in discrete bins and transformed into real-valued variables at the midpoint of each earnings bin. Wages are in 2006 dollars. All columns include cohort fixed effects, and standard errors are clustered at the peer group level.

Figure II


Effect of Peer Gender Composition on Gender Gap in Expected Hours and Wages after Graduation
Conditional on Initial Job Function and Industry at Graduation




(i) Effect on Expected Weekly Hours Given Initial Job Function at Graduation



(ii) Effect on Expected Weekly Hours Given Initial Industry at Graduation




(iii) Effect on Gap in Expected Wages Given Initial Job Function at Graduation




(iv) Effect on Gap in Expected Wages Given Initial Industry at Graduation

Notes: Each regression coefficient shown in each of these figures represents a separate regression of the form described in Equation (1), where the dependent variable in (i) and (ii) is “Expected weekly hours of work X years after graduation, conditional on starting [job function/industry],” and the dependent variable in (iii) and (iv) is “Expected wages X years after graduation, conditional on starting [job function/industry].” The reported regression coefficients are the estimated coefficients on $Female_i \times ShareMale_{igc}$. The dependent variable is constructed by averaging actual hours or wages X years after graduation over all those who accepted the same initial job function or industry at graduation. Both expected wages and hours include “zeros”: wages and hours X years after graduation are averaged over both individuals who are working and those not working X years after graduation, where the value is zero for those who are not working.

Figure III
Effect of Peer Gender Composition on Coursework and Concentrations



(i) Baseline Gender Differences in Coursework and Concentrations



(ii) Effect of Peer Gender Composition on Coursework and Concentrations

Notes: Each row in Figure III(i) represents a separate regression in which the dependent variable (shown on the vertical axis) is regressed on the full set of controls (see notes for Table III, column [5]), including an indicator variable for female. Each row shows the estimated coefficient on *Female*, along with the 95 percent confidence interval, from the regression with the specified dependent variable. Each row in Figure III(ii) represents a separate regression of the following form:

$$Y_{igc} = \phi_0 + \phi_1 \text{ShareMale}_{igc} \times \text{Female}_i + \phi_2 \text{ShareMale}_{igc} + \beta X_i + \gamma_c + \varepsilon_{igc},$$

where Y_{igc} is the dependent variable specified on the vertical axis. Each row reports the estimated coefficient on either *ShareMale* or $\text{ShareMale} \times \text{Female}$, and for the sake of brevity, only those coefficients that are statistically significantly different from zero at the 5 percent level are reported (in no case is the coefficient on both *ShareMale* and $\text{ShareMale} \times \text{Female}$ significant.) All specifications include cohort fixed effects, and standard errors are clustered at the peer group level.

Table VIII
Effect of Gender Composition on Fields of Concentration

VARIABLES	(1) Max Proportion Male among Concentrations	(2) Any Male-Dominated Concentration	(3) Any Majority-Male Concentration	(4) All Male-Dominated Concentrations	(5) All Majority-Male Concentrations
Share Male Peers x Female	0.12*** [0.047]	0.06 [0.215]	0.26*** [0.071]	0.15 [0.388]	1.33*** [0.302]
Share Male Peers	-0.00 [0.020]	0.20** [0.081]	-0.05** [0.020]	0.09 [0.204]	-0.42*** [0.079]
Female	-0.01*** [0.003]	-0.08*** [0.011]	-0.01** [0.005]	-0.19*** [0.022]	-0.14*** [0.020]
Observations	4,815	4,815	4,815	4,815	4,815
Cohort Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Mean	0.78	0.95	0.87	0.47	0.87

Robust standard errors in brackets
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Notes: This table reports estimated coefficients from the regression described in Equation (1). The dependent variable in column (1) is the maximum proportion of male students in the field of concentration, among all of the concentrations chosen by the student. The dependent variable in column (2) is a dummy variable equal to 1 if at least one of the fields of concentration chosen by the student is disproportionately male relative to their cohort. The dependent variable in column (3) is a dummy variable equal to 1 if at least one of the fields of concentration chosen by the student is more than 50 percent male. The dependent variables in columns (4) and (5) are each dummy variables equal to 1 if all of the fields of concentration chosen by the student are disproportionately male or greater than 50 percent male, respectively. Proportion of male students in the field of concentration is determined separately within each cohort and excludes the student. All columns include cohort fixed effects, and standard errors are clustered at the peer group level.

Table IX
Effect of Gender Composition on Distribution of Offers and Salary Offer Accepted

VARIABLES	Distribution of Offers				Willingness-to-Accept	
	(1) Log Mean Salary Offer	(2) Log Median Salary Offer	(3) Log Max Salary Offer	(4) Log Max Perm. Salary	(5) Accepted Max Offer	(6) Accepted Max Perm. Salary
Share Male Peers x Female	0.13 [0.093]	0.06 [0.105]	0.17* [0.096]	0.12 [0.144]	0.36** [0.144]	0.41** [0.165]
Share Male Peers	-0.08 [0.051]	-0.06 [0.055]	-0.15*** [0.052]	-0.05 [0.097]	0.03 [0.135]	-0.08 [0.170]
Female	-0.03*** [0.006]	-0.02*** [0.007]	-0.03*** [0.006]	-0.06*** [0.010]	-0.02* [0.011]	-0.02* [0.012]
Married at Entry	0.01 [0.006]	0.01 [0.007]	0.01** [0.006]	0.02** [0.009]	-0.02** [0.010]	-0.02* [0.009]
Married Female at Entry	0.00 [0.011]	0.00 [0.011]	-0.00 [0.011]	-0.03* [0.015]	0.00 [0.022]	0.00 [0.020]
GMAT Total Score	-0.00 [0.000]	-0.00 [0.000]	-0.00 [0.000]	-0.00 [0.000]	-0.00 [0.000]	-0.00 [0.000]
GMAT Quant Score	0.00 [0.002]	0.00 [0.002]	0.00 [0.002]	0.00 [0.004]	0.00 [0.004]	0.00 [0.003]
GMAT Verbal Score	0.00** [0.002]	0.01** [0.002]	0.00** [0.002]	0.00 [0.003]	0.00 [0.003]	0.00 [0.003]
Undergraduate GPA	0.01 [0.008]	0.02* [0.008]	0.01 [0.008]	-0.02 [0.012]	0.01 [0.013]	0.01 [0.014]
Top 10 Undergrad Inst.	0.02** [0.010]	0.04** [0.018]	0.02** [0.010]	0.03* [0.018]	-0.00 [0.016]	-0.00 [0.017]
Top 20 Undergrad Inst.	-0.00 [0.009]	-0.01 [0.017]	-0.00 [0.009]	-0.01 [0.013]	-0.00 [0.013]	-0.01 [0.015]
Black	0.01 [0.013]	0.01 [0.012]	0.00 [0.015]	-0.01 [0.025]	0.02 [0.020]	-0.00 [0.023]
Hispanic	-0.04*** [0.014]	-0.03** [0.015]	-0.04*** [0.013]	-0.06*** [0.019]	-0.01 [0.018]	0.00 [0.018]
Observations	5,433	5,433	5,433	5,433	5,433	5,433
Cohort Fixed Effects	13	13	13	13	13	13
Mean	11.51	11.51	11.54	11.64	0.90	0.90

Robust standard errors in brackets

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Notes: The dependent variables in columns (1)–(3) are the natural log of the mean, median, and maximum of the base salaries offered to the student, respectively. The base salary is in terms of annual gross earnings in 2006 dollars, excluding any bonuses, relocation expenses, tuition reimbursement, or stock options. The dependent variable in column (4) is the log of the maximum “permanent salary” offered to the student. “Permanent salary” is equal to the base salary plus any other guaranteed compensation, including any guaranteed year-end bonuses, profit sharing, and stock options, as well as other forms of compensation that are guaranteed annually and are not performance-dependent. The dependent variables in columns (5) and (6) are indicator variables for whether the student accepted the job that offered the maximum salary within the student’s

offer set, for the set of base salaries and permanent salaries offered, respectively. The dependent variables in columns (5) and (6) are equal to 0 if the accepted salary is missing and if other salaries offered are nonmissing, when there is a range of salaries offered to a given student. Missing values of accepted salaries are imputed to be equal to the mean salary offered when all nonmissing salaries offered to a given student are the same. All regressions control for gender, marital status at the start of business school, marital status interacted with gender, age at the start of business school, age squared, student GMAT scores (quantitative, verbal, and total), undergraduate GPA (normalized to a 4.0 scale), a dummy for missing undergraduate GPA, indicator variables for whether the student attended a “Top 10” or “Top 20” undergraduate institution, for whether the student is Black, Hispanic, Asian, South Asian, or identifies as having another ethnic background (omitted category is white), and for years of work experience prior to business school and experience squared. All columns include cohort fixed effects, and standard errors are clustered at the peer group level.

Table X
Effect of Concentration in Finance on Distribution of Salary Offers

VARIABLES	(1) Log Mean Salary Offer	(2) Log Median Salary Offer	(3) Log Max Salary Offer	(4) Log Max Perm. Salary
$\widehat{Conc.Finance}$ x Female	-0.01 [0.044]	-0.00 [0.045]	-0.01 [0.046]	0.04 [0.064]
$\widetilde{Conc.Finance}$	-0.07 [0.178]	-0.09 [0.166]	-0.21 [0.198]	0.07 [0.322]
$\widetilde{Conc.Finance}$ x Female	0.04** [0.016]	0.03** [0.016]	0.04** [0.017]	0.05** [0.022]
$\widetilde{Conc.Finance}$	-0.01 [0.011]	-0.01 [0.011]	-0.02* [0.011]	-0.01 [0.016]
Female	-0.03 [0.042]	-0.04 [0.041]	-0.05 [0.044]	-0.08 [0.072]
Observations	3,855	3,855	3,855	3,855
Cohort Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Mean	11.51	11.51	11.54	11.64

Robust standard errors in brackets
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Notes: The dependent variables in columns (1)–(3) are the natural log of the mean, median, and maximum of the base salary offers received by the student, respectively. The dependent variable in column (4) is the natural log of the maximum “permanent” salary offer the student received. “Permanent salary” is equal to the base salary plus any other guaranteed compensation, including any guaranteed year-end bonuses, profit-sharing, and stock options, as well as other forms of compensation that are guaranteed annually and are not performance-dependent. Observations with missing values for concentration in finance from the first stage (Equation [3]) are omitted. All regressions control for gender, marital status at the start of business school, marital status interacted with gender, age at the start of business school, age squared, student GMAT scores (quantitative, verbal, and total), undergraduate GPA (normalized to 4.0 scale), a dummy for missing undergraduate GPA, indicator variables for whether the student attended a “Top 10” or “Top 20” undergraduate institution, indicator variables for race (omitted category is white), and for years of work experience prior to business school and experience squared. All columns include cohort fixed effects, and standard errors are clustered at the peer group level.

Table XI
Effect of Peer Gender Composition on Offers for Expected Future Wages
Conditional on Initial Industry and Job Function at Graduation

VARIABLES	Job Function Averages 10 Years Out			Industry Averages 10 Years Out		
	(1) Mean Wage Offer	(2) Median Wage Offer	(3) Max Wage Offer	(4) Mean Wage Offer	(5) Median Wage Offer	(6) Max Wage Offer
Share Male Peers x Female	93.68** [45.655]	98.92** [46.454]	73.61* [45.254]	151.92*** [40.671]	160.11*** [40.857]	137.20*** [43.600]
Share Male Peers	-7.44 [45.711]	-7.53 [45.765]	-15.09 [46.911]	-2.94 [31.490]	-9.59 [32.018]	-21.06 [37.829]
Female	-33.60*** [3.277]	-33.65*** [3.307]	-33.80*** [3.289]	-34.10*** [3.253]	-33.78*** [3.248]	-33.21*** [3.320]
Married at Entry	-12.84*** [2.926]	-12.75*** [2.949]	-12.11*** [2.992]	-9.11*** [2.638]	-8.57*** [2.618]	-8.70*** [2.757]
Married Female at Entry	-0.12 [5.189]	-0.15 [5.272]	-2.22 [5.253]	1.01 [4.995]	0.10 [5.027]	-0.67 [4.969]
GMAT Total Score	0.14 [0.147]	0.15 [0.149]	0.11 [0.150]	-0.03 [0.143]	-0.05 [0.146]	-0.03 [0.149]
GMAT Quant Score	-0.76 [1.121]	-0.86 [1.137]	-0.37 [1.152]	-0.05 [1.103]	0.10 [1.121]	0.11 [1.161]
GMAT Verbal Score	-1.27 [1.047]	-1.27 [1.058]	-1.08 [1.079]	0.09 [1.015]	0.30 [1.035]	0.18 [1.060]
Undergraduate GPA	-12.27*** [3.619]	-12.59*** [3.609]	-13.65*** [3.846]	-4.56 [3.360]	-4.92 [3.374]	-4.81 [3.505]
Top 20 Undergraduate Inst.	-3.00 [4.113]	-3.11 [4.176]	-3.49 [4.289]	-5.01 [3.799]	-5.55 [3.809]	-5.48 [3.776]
Top 10 Undergraduate Inst.	0.96 [4.659]	1.11 [4.778]	1.42 [4.833]	4.30 [4.392]	4.36 [4.431]	3.90 [4.433]
Black	-4.17 [6.538]	-3.76 [6.553]	-5.24 [6.447]	-15.14*** [5.552]	-16.00*** [5.591]	-16.15*** [5.579]
Hispanic	-5.12 [5.541]	-5.19 [5.582]	-4.29 [5.668]	-16.02*** [5.016]	-16.35*** [5.071]	-16.82*** [5.168]
Observations	5,712	5,712	5,712	5,746	5,746	5,746
Cohort Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Mean	156.89	156.84	163.64	150.36	150.43	157.74

Robust standard errors in brackets

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Notes: The dependent variables in columns (1)–(3) are the mean, median, and maximum of offers for “expected wages 10 years after graduation” of the offer set of the student at graduation, where expected wages for each job offer are calculated by averaging hourly wages, 10 years after graduation, over all graduates who accepted a job in the same initial job function at graduation as that of the job offer. The dependent variables in columns (4)–(6) are the mean, median, and maximum “expected wages 10 years after graduation” offered to the student at graduation, where expected wages for each offer are calculated by averaging hourly wages 10 years after graduation over all graduates who accepted a job in the same initial industry at graduation as that of the job offer.

Table XII
 Effect of Coursework and Concentration on Offers for Expected Future Wages
 Conditional on Initial Industry and Job Function at Graduation

VARIABLES	Job Function Averages 10 Years Out			Industry Averages 10 Years Out		
	(1) Mean Wage Offer	(2) Median Wage Offer	(3) Max Wage Offer	(4) Mean Wage Offer	(5) Median Wage Offer	(6) Max Wage Offer
Share Male Peers x Female	29.81 [58.193]	34.25 [59.084]	18.34 [61.671]	66.86 [52.735]	76.61 [52.463]	29.87 [57.880]
Share Male Peers	35.05 [54.475]	38.83 [53.976]	15.38 [58.624]	32.52 [36.327]	30.98 [35.161]	20.45 [41.139]
Conc. Finance	52.63*** [4.655]	52.18*** [4.684]	55.43*** [4.597]	44.93*** [4.046]	44.88*** [4.061]	48.39*** [3.994]
Conc. Finance x Female	6.52 [5.935]	7.36 [5.966]	4.92 [5.833]	5.99 [5.159]	6.81 [5.164]	6.78 [5.174]
Female	-33.16*** [4.992]	-33.78*** [5.085]	-32.06*** [5.002]	-33.78*** [4.583]	-34.27*** [4.641]	-32.05*** [4.490]
Observations	4,153	4,153	4,153	4,152	4,152	4,152
Cohort Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Mean	156.89	156.84	163.64	150.36	150.43	157.74

Robust standard errors in brackets

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Notes: Dependent variables are the mean, median, and maximum of offers for “expected wages 10 years after graduation” and are calculated by averaging realized wages 10 years after graduation over all those graduates who accepted the same job function industry at graduation as that of the job offer.

Table XIII
Initial Conditions and Long-Term Salary Outcomes

Dependent Variable	Years After Graduation							
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Share Male Peers x Female	0.21** [0.095]	0.87* [0.470]	0.43 [0.528]	0.79 [0.666]	0.50 [0.857]	1.19 [0.847]	2.74** [1.343]	4.99** [2.101]
Share Male Peers	-0.10 [0.061]	0.11 [0.295]	0.39 [0.365]	0.52 [0.461]	0.70 [0.530]	0.66 [0.550]	0.45 [0.849]	0.27 [1.292]
Female	-0.03*** [0.007]	-0.20*** [0.039]	-0.24*** [0.047]	-0.34*** [0.068]	-0.31*** [0.092]	-0.35*** [0.104]	-0.50*** [0.150]	-0.70*** [0.228]
R-squared	0.06	0.10	0.07	0.09	0.08	0.10	0.13	0.13
Observations	5,179	1,295	1,109	899	748	621	475	349
B. Fixed Effects for Starting Job Function								
Share Male Peers x Female	0.18** [0.078]	0.37 [0.323]	0.04 [0.445]	0.45 [0.561]	0.19 [0.746]	0.40 [0.755]	2.01** [0.935]	2.84* [1.598]
Share Male Peers	-0.10 [0.064]	-0.17 [0.245]	0.08 [0.299]	0.18 [0.348]	0.34 [0.391]	0.26 [0.413]	-0.21 [0.557]	-0.06 [0.904]
Female	-0.03*** [0.006]	-0.08** [0.035]	-0.09** [0.044]	-0.21*** [0.064]	-0.21** [0.082]	-0.21** [0.095]	-0.39*** [0.117]	-0.42** [0.197]
R-squared	0.27	0.42	0.37	0.42	0.40	0.41	0.45	0.41
Observations	5,179	1,295	1,109	899	748	621	475	349
C. Fixed Effects for Starting Industry								
Share Male Peers x Female	0.18** [0.081]	0.30 [0.330]	-0.32 [0.481]	0.17 [0.581]	-0.08 [0.819]	0.07 [0.902]	1.00 [1.159]	2.47 [1.977]
Share Male Peers	-0.10* [0.059]	0.02 [0.222]	0.20 [0.284]	0.36 [0.349]	0.49 [0.404]	0.44 [0.432]	0.27 [0.621]	-0.02 [0.992]
Female	-0.02*** [0.006]	-0.10*** [0.036]	-0.09* [0.050]	-0.22*** [0.071]	-0.21** [0.101]	-0.23* [0.128]	-0.27* [0.138]	-0.44** [0.213]
R-squared	0.29	0.44	0.40	0.40	0.37	0.38	0.42	0.41
Observations	5,179	1,295	1,109	899	748	621	475	349
D. Fixed Effects for Starting Firm								
Share Male Peers x Female	0.03 [0.072]	0.26 [0.584]	0.07 [0.765]	0.41 [1.069]	0.82 [1.528]	0.66 [1.603]	0.04 [2.136]	8.42* [4.281]
Share Male Peers	0.01 [0.045]	0.22 [0.318]	0.43 [0.456]	0.83 [0.737]	0.78 [0.745]	0.55 [0.857]	0.42 [1.132]	-2.61 [2.672]
Female	-0.01 [0.006]	-0.12** [0.045]	-0.10 [0.069]	-0.16 [0.114]	-0.18 [0.192]	-0.09 [0.216]	-0.11 [0.290]	-0.77 [0.487]
R-squared	0.71	0.73	0.71	0.68	0.65	0.66	0.66	0.69
Observations	5,179	1,035	858	674	544	443	338	229

Robust standard errors in brackets

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Notes: Dependent variable in each column is log earnings a given number of years after graduation. Column “0” (years after graduation) uses salary survey data on accepted jobs at graduation from Career Services data. Years 1–7 after graduation uses MBA alumni survey data. All specifications include cohort fixed effects, and standard errors are clustered at the peer group level. Specifications in Section B include fixed effects for the job function accepted at graduation. Specifications in Section C include fixed effects for the industry accepted at graduation.

Table XIV
Effect of Gender Composition on Distribution of Value of Non-Wage Amenity Offers

VARIABLES	Non-Wage Amenity Values (All)			Non-Wage Amenity Values (Female)		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Mean Value Non-Wage	Median Value Non-Wage	Max Value Non-Wage	Mean Value Non-Wage	Median Value Non-Wage	Max Value Non-Wage
Share Male Peers x Female	0.90 [1.417]	1.04 [1.414]	0.81 [1.539]	-0.21 [0.632]	-0.32 [0.627]	0.10 [0.731]
Share Male Peers	-1.51 [1.331]	-1.09 [1.333]	-3.49** [1.597]	-0.21 [0.413]	-0.13 [0.399]	-0.78* [0.439]
Female	-0.36*** [0.109]	-0.35*** [0.108]	-0.33*** [0.124]	-0.05 [0.053]	-0.06 [0.053]	0.08 [0.054]
Observations	5,032	5,032	5,032	4,483	4,483	4,483
Cohort Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Mean	-1.57	-1.60	-0.91	0.63	0.63	0.83

Robust standard errors in brackets

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Notes: The dependent variables in columns (1)–(3) are the mean, median, and maximum of offers for “the non-wage amenity value,” where the “non-wage amenity value” is defined at the firm level and in dollar terms, at the firm where student i received an offer. In columns (4)–(6), the “non-wage amenity values” are estimated using a sample of just women and therefore reflect women’s valuations for the non-wage amenities offered at the firm where student i has received an offer. Each specification uses the same control variables as in column (5) of Table III. All columns include cohort fixed effects and are clustered at the peer group level.

Appendix A: Measuring the Willingness to Pay

In Section F., we document that increase in the share of male peers leads to a 4 percentage point increase in the likelihood that female students accept the highest salary offer in their choice set. Furthermore, we argue that the increase in the "willingness to accept" (WTA) the highest salary offer reflects a change in the "willingness to pay" (WTP) for the non-wage amenities associated with the job offer. In order to measure the WTP for the non-wage amenities of the job, we exploit a unique facet of the data, which is that we have data on each of the job offers students receive, as well as their acceptance decisions. In order to do this, I use an approach from Mas and Thomas (2021), which builds upon the framework and methodology in Sorkin (2018), to estimate the dollar value of non-wage amenities at the firm level. As in the discrete choice literature on the valuation of non-wage amenities, an inference can be made if a student accepts a salary other than the maximum salary offered: if a student receives two job offers, A and B, and A is the higher-paying offer, but we observe that the student chooses B, it must be the case that there is some other non-wage benefit or non-pay job characteristic associated with offer B that is at least as valuable to the student as the forgone monetary value of choosing offer B over offer A.¹⁰²

Relative to the previous literature, this approach is closely related to Eriksson and Kristensen (2014), Wiswall and Zafar (2016), and Mas and Pallais (2017). Eriksson and Kristensen (2014) use a vignette method to elicit WTP for various job amenities and fringe benefits in an Internet sample of Dutch respondents. Wiswall and Zafar (2016) use a stated preference approach to understand how a sample of undergraduate students values job characteristics in hypothetical future jobs. The disadvantage of earlier approaches is that it is unclear to what extent responses to hypothetical questions are accurate and how well they approximate behavior in a market setting, one that involves real and significant stakes. Mas and Pallais (2017) elicit preferences on work arrangements by building a simple discrete-choice experiment into the application process for a national call center. However, preferences are still elicited by asking applicants for their stated preference between two jobs with varying characteristics. Here, I observe the actual choice that a student makes with two or more real-world offers in hand, wherein the job they choose from their choice set is the actual job they accept and in which they are employed after graduation.¹⁰³¹⁰⁴

Examining the choices of students in the final stage of the decision-making process, when all negotiation on offers has been completed, and when multiple final offers can be held simultaneously in hand, allows for a clean way to measure the value of non-wage amenities and empirically test whether an increase in the likelihood of acceptance indicates a decrease in the willingness to pay, or whether the distribution of the non-wage amenity values offered to a student has changed. In order to do this, I use an approach from Mas and Thomas (2021) to estimate the value of non-wage amenities at the firm level, which can be summarized as follows:

¹⁰²Discrete choice experiments are an extension of the contingent valuation literature whereby rather than directly asking people for valuations over an attribute (the stated preference method), people are given the choice of two or more scenarios and are asked to choose their preferred option. These scenarios usually vary the attributes and the prices and WTP can be estimated using random utility models (McFadden 1973; Manski 1977). Choice experiments have been shown to have better properties relative to stated preference valuation methods (Hanley, Wright, and Adamowicz 1998). A question is whether these experiments, which are usually survey-based, correspond to actual market behavior. In this case, the choices are based on acceptance decisions of real market behavior in a high-stakes setting with well-informed labor market participants. See Mas and Pallais (2017), Sorkin (2018) for similar approaches.

¹⁰³One may note that it is possible for the gender composition of one's peers to influence preferences even if no effect is observed on the likelihood of accepting the maximum salary offer, since preferences could play a role in the set of offers that a student receives in the first place. Therefore, not observing any significant effect on the likelihood of a student accepting the maximum salary offer does not eliminate the possibility that peer gender composition influences preferences.

¹⁰⁴The price of non-wage amenities (relative to the maximum salary job offer) can be considered the difference between the two salary offers, what one *must* pay, in terms of foregone income in order to receive the non-wage amenities of the lower-paying offer. See Rosen (1974, 1986) for the theoretical framework for hedonic pricing.

1. Use an AKM-style model to estimate the firm component of the wage, F_j :

$$\ln w_{ijt} = F_j + \delta_{i(t)} + \mu_{i(t)j} \quad (5)$$

where $\ln w_{ijt}$ is the log of the permanent salary offer from firm j in year t to student i . Using this model, the wage can be decomposed into firm, individual, and match effects, F_j , δ_i , and μ_{ij} , respectively.¹⁰⁵ The effects are identified because (many) firms make offers to multiple individuals each year, and (many) individuals receive multiple offers. The estimates are adjusted using standard empirical Bayes shrinkage techniques to account for estimation error.¹⁰⁶ Further details are provided in Mas and Thomas (2021).

2. The WTP is estimated with offer and acceptance data, using a conditional logit model:

$$U_{ij} = \beta w_{ij} + a_j + \lambda_i + \xi_{ij} \quad (6)$$

where U_{ij} is an indicator variable for whether student i accepts an offer from firm j , a_j is the coefficient on the firm dummy variable for firm j , and λ_i is an individual fixed effect. Note that including individual fixed effects equates to examining how variation in wages, within a student's choice set, conditional on other firm-level characteristics, a_j , influences the likelihood of acceptance of an offer at firm j . The willingness to pay for—or the value in dollar terms of—the non-wage amenities associated with firm j relative to the omitted firm, can be estimated by scaling the estimate of a_j by the inverse of the estimate of β .¹⁰⁷¹⁰⁸ In other words, the value of non-wage amenities associated with a firm is measured in terms of how many dollars, on average, students with offers from the same sets of firms are willing to give up in order to have the bundle of non-wage characteristics associated with the offer at the lower-paying firm. The estimate of β provides a scaling factor that converts the trade-off in utility into dollar terms.

3. Use the estimated worker-firm match component ($\hat{\mu}_{ij}$) of the wage as an instrument for wages.

An instrument for wages is needed because of the correlation of F_j and a_j in the solution to the firm's cost-minimization problem. Specifically, firms may choose to compensate workers through an allocation of wages and non-wage amenities that minimizes the cost of "producing" a given level of utility compensation to the worker. Their desired level of utility compensation may be produced using a combination of dollars and non-wage benefits, and the relative use of these "factors of production" of utility depends on their comparative advantage in producing utility through other non-wage benefits relative to dollars.¹⁰⁹ As in Mas and Thomas (2021), I use the match component of the wage, $\tilde{\mu}_{ij}$, which is orthogonal to F_j by construction, to exploit the uncorrelated component of wage variation as an instrument to estimate the effect of an additional dollar of income offered on the likelihood of offer acceptance.¹¹⁰ The underlying assumption is that $\tilde{\mu}_{ij}$ and ξ_{ij} are uncorrelated. In other words, it is assumed that there is no bargaining on the basis of idiosyncratic utility. More detail is provided in Mas and Thomas (2021).

¹⁰⁵The subscript i is written as a function of t because each student only receives offers in their final year, the year of graduation, so any year fixed effects are absorbed into the individual fixed effect.

¹⁰⁶See Morris (1983). $E[effect|Estimate] = \alpha Estimate + (1 - \alpha) Mean$, where α varies inverseley with the noise of the estimate.

¹⁰⁷The estimated dollar valuations are then adjusted using standard empirical Bayes shrinkage techniques to account for estimation error in the ratio.

¹⁰⁸Standard errors of the estimated ratio is computed using the "delta method," an approximation appropriate in large samples.

¹⁰⁹Firms may be heterogeneous in the cost of providing non-wage amenities to the worker, even for a given desired level of utility compensation. See Mas and Thomas (2021) for the full model.

¹¹⁰More precisely, we use the component of μ_{ij} that is uncorrelated with a time-varying firm effect (certain firms may be more productive in particular years, for example, with the business cycle, and thus, may also vary non-wage amenities due to a time-varying firm-specific productivity). Thus, we estimate: $\ln w_{ijt} = F_j + \delta_{it} + \tilde{F}_{jt} + \tilde{\mu}_{ij}$, where $\mu_{i(t)j} = \tilde{F}_{jt} + \tilde{\mu}_{ij}$. Because each individual is only observed during their final year in school, a time-varying firm effect would be absorbed by the match effect, $\mu_{i(t)j}$, if we did not specifically include it and use only the orthogonal component of the match effect.

Appendix B

Figure B.I
Quantifying the Treatment:
Average Peer Group Interaction outside of Compulsory Period




Table B.I
Average Peer Group Interaction in Courses
Relative to Randomly Selected Group of Same Size

VARIABLES	(1) Peer Group Course Share	(2) Has Peer in Course	(3) # of Peers in Course
Assigned Peer Group	0.070*** [0.001]	0.003** [0.001]	4.165*** [0.043]
Constant	0.074*** [0.000]	0.846*** [0.001]	3.821*** [0.030]
Observations	256,540	256,540	256,540
Mean	0.11	0.85	5.90

Standard errors in brackets
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Notes: Observations are at the individual-semester-course-group type level: each outcome variable is observed twice per individual-semester-course. For each individual-semester-course, the outcome variable is determined first as a function of the student's randomly assigned peer group (the "actual" peer group to which each student was randomly assigned prior to the start of business school), and then, as a comparison, using an arbitrary subset of students from the same cohort, of the same size as the actual peer group. "Assigned Peer Group" is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the outcome variable is determined using the peer group actually assigned, whereas the remainder of the observations are those where the outcome variable is determined using a randomly selected subset of students from the same cohort, of the same size as the actual peer group. "Peer Group Course Share" is equal to the number of students from the group, whether the actual peer group or the arbitrary group, who are enrolled in the same course in the same semester, divided by the total number of students enrolled in the same semester. "Has Peer in Course" is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the student has at least one member of the group enrolled in the same course.

Table B.II
Share of Male Peers Regressed on Own Pretreatment Characteristics

VARIABLES	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Share Male	Share Male	Share Male	Share Male
GMAT Total Score	1.08e-05 [4.46e-05]	1.12e-05 [4.46e-05]	2.59e-05 [5.40e-05]	-3.50e-05 [8.33e-05]
GMAT Quant Score	-1.17e-04 [3.56e-04]	-1.19e-04 [3.56e-04]	-1.99e-04 [4.36e-04]	1.98e-04 [6.53e-04]
GMAT Verbal Score	2.94e-05 [3.14e-04]	2.74e-05 [3.14e-04]	-9.53e-05 [3.73e-04]	4.20e-04 [6.02e-04]
Undergraduate GPA	2.04e-04 [9.56e-04]	2.00e-04 [9.56e-04]	6.71e-04 [1.11e-03]	-2.11e-03 [1.92e-03]
Undergraduate Major: Economics	1.28e-03 [9.56e-04]	1.28e-03 [9.59e-04]	1.09e-03 [1.18e-03]	1.66e-03 [1.66e-03]
Undergraduate Major: Finance	-7.93e-04 [1.34e-03]	-7.98e-04 [1.34e-03]	-1.04e-03 [1.59e-03]	-3.18e-04 [2.55e-03]
Undergraduate Major Type: Business	-2.05e-03** [1.03e-03]	-2.05e-03** [1.03e-03]	-1.45e-03 [1.35e-03]	-2.46e-03 [1.63e-03]
Undergraduate Major Type: Hard Science	-1.06e-04 [9.94e-04]	-1.07e-04 [9.94e-04]	1.05e-03 [1.27e-03]	-2.72e-03 [1.72e-03]
Work Experience (years)	1.71e-05 [2.15e-04]	1.75e-05 [2.15e-04]	2.25e-04 [2.63e-04]	-3.81e-04 [3.83e-04]
Black	7.71e-04 [1.51e-03]	7.70e-04 [1.51e-03]	1.51e-03 [1.81e-03]	-8.79e-04 [2.85e-03]
Hispanic	-8.29e-04 [1.42e-03]	-8.34e-04 [1.42e-03]	-6.85e-04 [1.64e-03]	-7.83e-04 [2.91e-03]
Asian	3.81e-04 [8.37e-04]	3.79e-04 [8.36e-04]	2.30e-04 [1.09e-03]	7.37e-04 [1.32e-03]
Age at Graduation	-3.66e-05 [1.97e-04]	-3.76e-05 [1.97e-04]	-2.37e-04 [2.41e-04]	3.57e-04 [3.52e-04]
US/Canadian Citizenship	-1.04e-04 [8.52e-04]	-1.09e-04 [8.52e-04]	1.26e-05 [1.03e-03]	-4.37e-04 [1.58e-03]
Top Twenty Undergraduate Institution	-7.48e-04 [7.83e-04]	-7.50e-04 [7.83e-04]	-6.28e-04 [9.39e-04]	-1.04e-03 [1.45e-03]
<i>F</i> -test: All student pre-MBA characteristics coeff = 0			<i>F</i> (15, 1103) = 0.78 <i>P</i> > <i>F</i> = .70	<i>F</i> (15, 468) = 0.65 <i>P</i> > <i>F</i> = .83
Observations	1,614	1,614	1,125	489
Cohort Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Sample	All	All	Males	Females

Standard errors in brackets
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Notes: Each column represents a single regression in which the share of male peers is regressed on a set of individual pretreatment characteristics. Columns (1) and (2) use the full sample. Column (1) includes a control for “female,” a dummy variable. Column (2) controls for the share of women in the respondent’s cohort other than the respondent. Column (3) shows the results of a regression on only male students. Column (4) shows the results of a regression on only female students. All regressions include cohort fixed effects.

Table B.III
Gender-Skewedness across Occupations (Job Functions)

Job Function	% Male among Offer Holders	% Male among Job Holders	Number/ % of Job Holders at Graduation		Gender Classification
Education	100	100	1	0.02	-
Engineering	100	100	2	0.03	Male-Dominated
Insurance	90.9	85.7	7	0.12	Male-Dominated
Venture Capital	86.3	84.3	254	4.32	Male-Dominated
Analysis	85.5	85.7	63	1.07	Male-Dominated
Investment Management	82.9	82.8	530	9.00	Male-Dominated
Investment Banking	82.4	81.4	1,169	19.86	Male-Dominated
Sales and Trading	82.3	81.1	424	7.20	Male-Dominated
Client Services	80.2	78.8	66	1.12	Male-Dominated
Applications	80.0	100	2	0.03	Male-Dominated
Real Estate	79.5	76.4	55	0.93	Male-Dominated
Law	79.4	74.1	27	0.46	Male-Dominated
Risk Management	78.5	76.5	17	0.29	Male-Dominated
Business Development	77.8	79.0	138	2.34	Male-Dominated
Commercial Banking	76.3	67.2	64	1.09	Female-Skewed
Customer Relations	75.0	66.7	3	0.05	Female-Skewed
Consulting	73.9	71.1	1,492	25.35	Female-Skewed
General Management	70.4	67.1	249	4.23	Female-Skewed
Company Finance	70.2	63.9	479	8.14	Female-Skewed
Strategic Planning	70.0	66.1	168	2.85	Female-Skewed
Sales	69.2	69.0	29	0.49	Female-Skewed
Operations	67.4	65.5	29	0.49	Female-Skewed
Healthcare Professional	66.7	88.9	9	0.15	Male-Dominated
Public Finance	66.7	66.7	3	0.05	Female-Skewed
Accounting	65.7	50	10	0.17	Female-Dominated
Project Management	65.2	55.6	27	0.46	Female-Skewed
Research and Development	62.5	62.5	8	0.14	Female-Skewed
Multiple	60.8	41.4	29	0.49	Female-Dominated
Research/ Analysis	56.4	38.9	18	0.31	Female-Dominated
Product Management	51.8	43.7	405	6.88	Female-Dominated
Human Resources	45.5	28.6	7	0.12	Female-Dominated
Marketing	42.6	37.1	35	0.59	Female-Dominated
Nonprofit	16.7	0	5	0.08	Female-Dominated

Table B.IV
Share Quantitative Coursework among Offer Holders, Gender-Skewedness, and Earnings across
Occupations (Job Functions)

Job Function	% Male among Offer Holders	Average % Finance Coursework among Offer Holders	Annual Earnings (in 2006 \$)
Engineering	100	19.82	\$105,438
Insurance	90.9	16.87	\$92,059
Venture Capital	86.3	15.50	\$111,105
Analysis	85.5	14.94	\$102,107
Investment Management	82.9	22.18	\$100,786
Investment Banking	82.4	19.10	\$96,026
Sales and Trading	82.3	28.51	\$98,394
Client Services	80.2	18.60	\$94,632
Applications	80.0	15.85	\$98,017
Real Estate	79.5	16.99	\$93,824
Law	79.4	10.26	\$140,630
Risk Management	78.5	22.20	\$89,746
Business Development	77.8	13.85	\$99,376
Commercial Banking	76.3	18.55	\$91,502
Customer Relations	75.0	12.28	\$87,141
Consulting	73.9	14.34	\$114,874
General Management	70.4	13.65	\$97,486
Company Finance	70.2	17.98	\$95,436
Strategic Planning	70.0	13.37	\$96,959
Sales	69.2	14.33	\$89,276
Operations	67.4	13.64	\$98,842
Healthcare Professional	66.7	11.78	\$94,822
Public Finance	66.7	-	\$73,872
Accounting	65.7	18.18	\$103,714
Project Management	65.2	14.91	\$93,895
Research and Development	62.5	22.22	\$96,266
Multiple	60.8	14.53	\$96,221
Research/ Analysis	56.4	10.56	\$85,538
Product Management	51.8	10.16	\$93,436
Human Resources	45.5	8.39	\$95,933
Marketing	42.6	7.72	\$92,918
Nonprofit	16.7	6.14	\$75,773


Table B.V
Gender-Skewedness across Industries

Industry	Percent Male among Offer Holders	Percent Male among Job Holders at Graduation	Number/ % of Job Holders at Graduation		Gender Classification
Wholesale	100	-	-	-	-
Extractive Minerals	100	100	1	0.02	-
Nonmanufacturing	100	100	1	0.02	-
Environment	100	100	4	0.07	Male-Dominated
Other Manufacturing	90.9	91.7	12	0.20	Male-Dominated
Accounting	89.6	72.2	18	0.31	Male-Dominated
Venture Capital	87.4	85.8	176	3.00	Male-Dominated
Machinery	85.3	86.7	15	0.26	Male-Dominated
Investment Management	84.4	84.9	451	7.68	Male-Dominated
Other Services	84.2	83.3	12	0.20	Male-Dominated
Transportation Services	83.8	78.0	41	0.70	Male-Dominated
Real Estate	81.9	79.2	53	0.90	Male-Dominated
Investment Banking	81.5	80.2	1,664	28.32	Male-Dominated
Construction	80.0	83.3	6	0.10	Male-Dominated
Agribusiness	80.0	77.8	18	0.31	Male-Dominated
Media	80.0	85.7	7	0.12	Male-Dominated
Banking	79.1	74.0	100	1.7	Male-Dominated
Computer Services	78.1	75.0	32	0.54	Male-Dominated
Telecommunications	77.8	73.3	45	0.77	Male-Dominated
Law	77.4	72.0	25	0.43	Male-Dominated
Software/ Printing	77.4	76.8	125	2.13	Male-Dominated
Energy	76.7	72.1	140	2.38	Male-Dominated
Automotive	76.3	77.1	35	0.60	Male-Dominated
Technology/Electronics	76.0	71.9	160	2.72	Male-Dominated
eCommerce	74.4	68.5	54	0.92	Female-Skewed
Consulting	74.0	71.2	1,470	25.02	Female-Skewed
Chemicals	73.7	67.7	31	0.53	Female-Skewed
Manufacturing	71.8	71.2	104	1.77	Female-Skewed
Diversified Services	70.8	71.4	14	0.24	Female-Skewed
Diversified Financial	68.9	66.2	299	5.09	Female-Skewed
Insurance	68.1	71.8	39	0.66	Female-Skewed
Government	68.0	65.0	20	0.34	Female-Skewed
Trading Companies	66.7	66.7	3	0.05	Female-Skewed
Packaging	66.7	75.0	4	0.07	Male-Dominated
Utilities	66.7	33.3	3	0.05	Female-Dominated
Healthcare Services	64.9	64.1	39	0.66	Female-Skewed
Education	63.6	66.7	21	0.36	Female-Skewed
Other	63.6	50.0	6	0.10	Female-Dominated
Advertising/Marketing	56.7	52.0	25	0.43	Female-Skewed
Rubber/ Plastics	55.6	57.1	7	0.12	Female-Skewed
Retail	55.4	51.3	78	1.33	Female-Skewed
Pharmaceutical	54.3	50.7	140	2.38	Female-Skewed
Entertainment	53.7	45.5	22	0.37	Female-Dominated
Food/ Beverage/ Tobacco	51.7	41.5	193	3.29	Female-Dominated
Aerospace	48.2	42.1	19	0.32	Female-Dominated
Lodging	47.6	40.0	15	0.26	Female-Dominated
Personal Products	41.2	34.0	97	1.65	Female-Dominated
Human Resources	33.3	50.0	2	0.03	Female-Dominated
Nonprofit	26.1	19.0	21	0.36	Female-Dominated
Textiles	25.0	28.6	7	0.12	Female-Dominated

Table B.VI
Share Quantitative Coursework among Offer Holders, Gender-Skewedness, and Earnings across Industries

Job Function	% Male among Offer Holders	Average % Finance Coursework among Offer Holders	Annual Earnings (2006 \$)
Wholesale	100	19.05	\$96,807
Extractive Minerals	100	19.11	\$77,283
Nonmanufacturing	100	17.65	\$97,231
Environment	100	9.30	\$86,070
Other Manufacturing	90.9	14.99	\$103,053
Accounting	89.6	15.82	\$109,358
Venture Capital	87.4	15.05	\$115,502
Machinery	85.3	16.27	\$98,728
Investment Management	84.4	21.44	\$103,270
Other Services	84.2	16.16	\$85,314
Transportation Services	83.8	16.45	\$89,502
Real Estate	81.9	16.61	\$96,104
Investment Banking	81.5	21.31	\$96,837
Construction	80.0	22.43	\$95,911
Agribusiness	80.0	15.38	\$92,608
Media	80.0	11.21	\$84,623
Banking	79.1	21.31	\$95,013
Computer Services	78.1	14.41	\$103,002
Telecommunications	77.8	15.21	\$98,403
Law	77.4	10.34	\$139,410
Software/ Printing	77.4	13.56	\$101,828
Energy	76.7	19.74	\$97,474
Automotive	76.3	15.80	\$96,112
Technology/Electronics	76.0	15.16	\$100,467
eCommerce	74.4	12.68	\$100,301
Consulting	74.0	14.38	\$114,903
Chemicals	73.7	17.02	\$99,976
Manufacturing	71.8	14.02	\$93,269
Diversified Services	70.8	15.92	\$98,623
Diversified Financial	68.9	18.44	\$93,920
Insurance	68.1	19.17	\$97,548
Government	68.0	14.99	\$83,974
Trading Companies	66.7	14.51	\$112,062
Packaging	66.7	9.43	\$77,855
Utilities	66.7	16.58	\$87,170
Health-Care Services	64.9	11.98	\$98,580
Education	63.6	12.43	\$81,403
Other	63.6	7.66	\$89,165
Advertising/ Marketing	56.7	11.01	\$77,565
Rubber/ Plastics	55.6	12.71	\$103,711
Retail	55.4	14.31	\$101,058
Pharmaceutical	54.3	12.62	\$94,435
Entertainment	53.7	12.84	\$91,514
Food/ Beverage/ Tobacco	51.7	11.69	\$92,132
Aerospace	48.2	10.72	\$91,508
Lodging	47.6	11.38	\$89,676
Personal Products	41.2	12.27	\$87,405
Human Resources	33.3	9.08	\$106,706
Nonprofit	26.1	12.42	\$74,778
Textiles	25.0	14.37	\$82,166

(A) Job Function



(B) Industry




Figure B.II
Relationship between Share of Finance Coursework of Offer Holders and Gender-Skewedness of Job Function and Industry Offer Holders

Table B.VII
Effect of Peer Gender Composition on Male-Skewedness of Industry or Job Function Accepted

VARIABLES	(1)	(2)
	Industry Share Male	Job Function Share Male
Share Male Peers*Female	0.29*** [0.081]	0.39*** [0.068]
Share Male Peers*Male	-0.13** [0.051]	-0.08** [0.035]
Female	-0.06*** [0.007]	-0.06*** [0.006]
Observations	7,167	7,231
Cohort Fixed Effects	13.00	13.00
Mean	0.72	0.72

Robust standard errors in brackets

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Notes: This table reports estimated coefficients from the regression described in Equation (1). “Industry Share Male” is the fraction of graduating students in student i ’s cohort accepting a job in the same industry in which student i accepts a job who are male (other than student i). “Job Function Share Male” is the fraction of graduating students in student i ’s cohort accepting a job in the same job function in which student i accepts a job who are male (other than student i). All regressions control for gender, marital status, marital status interacted with gender, age at entry, age squared, experience at entry, experience squared, student GMAT scores, undergraduate GPA, a dummy for missing undergraduate GPA, whether the student attended a “Top 10” or “Top 20” undergraduate institution, and whether the student is Black, Hispanic, Asian, South Asian, or “other” (omitted category is white). All columns include cohort fixed effects, and standard errors are clustered at the peer group level.

Table B.VIII
Effect of Gender Composition on Expected Hours and Wages Ten Years After Graduation

Panel A: Expected Hours and Wages Conditional on Initial Job Function Accepted

VARIABLES	(1) Average Weekly Hours	(2) Frequency of Part-Time Work	(3) Frequency of Overtime Work	(4) Average Hourly Wage
Share Male Peers*Female	7.31*** [1.719]	-0.07** [0.032]	0.21*** [0.053]	110.34** [46.294]
Share Male Peers	-0.59 [1.529]	0.01 [0.020]	-0.02 [0.041]	-8.14 [43.841]
Female	-6.70*** [1.240]	0.06** [0.023]	-0.19*** [0.038]	-113.80*** [32.834]
Observations	5,532	5,532	5,532	5,532
Cohort Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Mean	56.65	0.05	0.32	158.19

Panel B: Expected Hours and Wages Conditional on Initial Industry Accepted

VARIABLES	(1) Average Weekly Hours	(2) Frequency of Part-Time Work	(3) Frequency of Overtime Work	(4) Average Hourly Wage
Share Male Peers*Female	9.45*** [1.824]	-0.10*** [0.030]	0.25*** [0.050]	172.68*** [42.505]
Share Male Peers	-1.56 [1.499]	0.03* [0.015]	-0.04 [0.044]	-18.00 [35.637]
Female	-7.85*** [1.339]	0.08*** [0.022]	-0.21*** [0.036]	-158.98*** [30.549]
Observations	5,576	5,576	5,576	5,576
Cohort Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Mean	56.33	0.05	0.31	152.12

Robust standard errors in brackets
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Notes: The dependent variable in each column is the expected value of each characteristic of jobs held 10 years after graduation, averaged over all those in the same initial industry at the time of graduation as the student. “Average weekly hours” is defined as the average of self-reported usual weekly hours worked in the position. Responses are collected in discrete bins and transformed into real-valued variables (at the midpoint of each bin). “Frequency of part-time work” is the average of the indicator variable for part-time work, where “part-time work” is defined as usual weekly hours less than 40 hours per week. “Frequency of overtime work” is the average of the indicator variable for overtime work, where “overtime work” is defined as usual weekly hours greater than 60 hours per week. “Average hourly wage” is defined as the average of the self-reported annual earnings divided by the product of usual weekly hours of work and 52. Annual earnings are reported in discrete bins and transformed into real-valued variables at the midpoint of each earnings bin. Wages are in 2006 dollars. All columns include cohort fixed effects, and standard errors are clustered at the peer group by cohort level.

Table B.IX
Effect of Gender Composition on Fields of Concentration

Panel A: Effect of Gender Composition on Entry into Male-Dominated Fields of Concentrations

VARIABLES	(1) Any Male-Dominated Concentration	(2) Any Majority-Male Concentration	(3) All Male-Dominated Concentrations	(4) All Majority-Male Concentrations
Share Male Peers x Female	0.25 [0.204]	0.21*** [0.063]	0.24 [0.342]	0.91*** [0.277]
Share Male Peers x Male	0.20** [0.081]	-0.05** [0.020]	0.09 [0.204]	-0.42*** [0.079]
Female	-0.08*** [0.011]	-0.01** [0.005]	-0.19*** [0.022]	-0.14*** [0.020]
Observations	4,815	4,815	4,815	4,815
Cohort Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Mean	0.95	0.87	0.47	0.87

Panel B: Effect of Gender Composition on Male-Skewedness
of Fields of Concentration

VARIABLES	(1) Proportion Male in Most Male-Dominated Concentration	(2) Proportion Male in Least Male-Dominated Concentration
Share Male Peers x Female	0.12*** [0.043]	0.34*** [0.084]
Share Male Peers x Male	-0.00 [0.020]	-0.08** [0.034]
Female	-0.01*** [0.003]	-0.06*** [0.005]
Observations	4,815	4,815
Cohort Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes
Mean	0.78	0.68

Robust standard errors in brackets


*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Notes: This table reports estimated coefficients from the following regression:


$$Y_{igc} = \phi_0 + \phi_1 Female_i \cdot ShareMale_{igc} + \phi_2 Male_i \cdot ShareMale_{igc} + \beta X_{igc} + \gamma_c + \epsilon_{igc},$$

where $Male_i \cdot ShareMale_{igc}$ is the proportion of male peers interacted with a male dummy, and where X_{igc} is a vector of the student's individual pre-MBA characteristics, as defined in Equation (1). In Panel A, the dependent variable in column (1), Y_{igc} , is a dummy variable equal to 1 if at least one of the fields of concentration chosen by student i is disproportionately male relative to student i 's cohort. The dependent variable in column (2) is a dummy variable equal to 1 if at least one of the fields of concentration chosen by the student is more than 50 percent male. The dependent variables in columns (3) and (4) are each dummy variables equal to 1 if all of the fields of concentration chosen by the student are disproportionately male or greater than 50 percent male, respectively. In Panel B, the dependent variable in column (1) is the maximum proportion of male students in the field of concentration, among all of the concentrations chosen by the student, and in column (2), the minimum proportion of male students. Proportion of male students in the field of concentration is determined separately within each cohort and excludes the student. All columns include cohort fixed effects, and standard errors are clustered at the peer group level.

Figure B.III
 Effect of Peer Gender Composition on Gender Gap in Expected Hours and Wages after Graduation
 Conditional on Initial Firm at Graduation



(i) Effect on Expected Weekly Hours,
 Given Initial Firm at Graduation




(ii) Effect on Expected Wages,
 Given Initial Firm at Graduation


Notes: Each regression coefficient shown in each of these figures represents a separate regression of the form described in Equation (1), where the dependent variable is “Expected weekly [hours/wages] X years after graduation, conditional on starting firm.” The reported regression coefficients are the estimated coefficients on $Female_i \times ShareMale_{i,gc}$. The dependent variable is constructed by averaging (i) weekly hours of work or (ii) wages of respondents X years after graduation, averaged over all those who accepted a job at graduation in the same initial firm. Both expected weekly hours and wages include “zeros”: [weekly hours/wages] X years after graduation are averaged over both individuals who are working and those who are not working X years after graduation, where the value is zero for those who are not working.

Figure B.IV


Effect of Gender Composition of Peer Group on Gender Gap in Expected Hours and Wages (cond. on working),
Given Initial Occupation and Industry Accepted at Graduation




(i) Effect on Expected Weekly Hours Given Initial Job Function at Graduation



(ii) Effect on Expected Weekly Hours, Given Initial Industry at Graduation



(iii) Effect on Expected Wages, Given Initial Job Function at Graduation



(iv) Effect on Expected Wages, Given Initial Industry at Graduation

Notes: Each regression coefficient shown in each of these figures represents a separate regression of the form described in Equation (1), where the dependent variable in subfigures (i) and (ii) is “Expected weekly hours X years after graduation, conditional on starting [job function/industry].” In subfigures (iii) and (iv), the dependent variable is “Expected wages X years after graduation, conditional on starting [job function/industry].” The reported regression coefficients are the estimated coefficients on $Female_i \times ShareMale_{i_{gc}}$. The dependent variable is constructed by averaging weekly hours of work or wages of respondents X years after graduation over all those who accepted a job at graduation in the same initial job function or industry. Weekly hours and wages are only averaged over individuals who are working X years after graduation.

Table B.X
Effect of Gender Composition on Difference between Max Salary Offer and Salary Offer Accepted

VARIABLES	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Difference Log Base Salary	Difference Log Base Salary	Difference Log Perm. Salary	Difference Log Perm. Salary
Share Male Peers*Female	-0.06 [0.042]	-0.22 [0.297]	-0.06 [0.042]	-0.02 [0.287]
Share Male Peers	-0.01 [0.035]	-0.23 [0.208]	-0.01 [0.035]	-0.20 [0.166]
Female	0.00 [0.004]	-0.01 [0.029]	0.00 [0.004]	-0.00 [0.031]
Married at Entry	-0.00 [0.003]	-0.04 [0.029]	-0.00 [0.003]	-0.02 [0.027]
Married Female at Entry	-0.00 [0.005]	0.03 [0.048]	-0.00 [0.005]	-0.02 [0.047]
Undergraduate GPA	-0.01 [0.006]	-0.05 [0.042]	-0.01 [0.006]	-0.04 [0.035]
Top 10 Undergraduate Inst.	0.00 [0.004]	0.04 [0.033]	0.00 [0.004]	0.03 [0.029]
Top 20 Undergraduate Inst.	-0.00 [0.004]	-0.07** [0.031]	-0.00 [0.004]	-0.06** [0.029]
Black	0.01 [0.011]	0.20 [0.163]	0.01 [0.011]	0.13 [0.122]
Hispanic	-0.00 [0.004]	-0.02 [0.034]	-0.00 [0.004]	0.00 [0.034]
Observations	5,286	521	5,286	560
Sample	All	Diff > 0	All	Diff > 0
Cohort Fixed Effects	13	13	13	13
Mean	0.02	0.17	0.02	0.20


Robust standard errors in brackets

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1


Notes: This table reports estimated coefficients from the regression described in Equation (1). The dependent variable in columns (1) and (2) is the difference between the log maximum base salary offer received by the student and the log base salary associated with the job that the student accepted from his or her set of job offers. The dependent variable in columns (3) and (4) is the difference between the log maximum permanent salary offer and the log permanent salary associated with the job that the student accepted from his or her offer set. Columns (1) and (3) report estimates from specifications that use the full sample. Columns (2) and (4) show the results from a specification where the sample was restricted to only those who accepted a salary other than the maximum salary offered. All regressions control for gender, marital status, marital status interacted with gender, age at entry, age squared, experience at entry, experience squared, student GMAT scores (total, quantitative, and verbal scores), undergraduate GPA, whether the student attended a “Top 10” or “Top 20” undergraduate institution, and whether the student is Black, Hispanic, Asian, South Asian, or “other” (omitted category is white). All columns include cohort fixed effects, and standard errors are clustered at the peer group level.

Figure B.V


Effect of Peer Gender Composition on Gender Gap in Expected Wages of Women and Women w/ Children Conditional on Initial Occupation and Industry Accepted at Graduation




(i) Effect on Women's Expected Wages, Given Initial Job Function at Graduation



(ii) Effect on Women's Expected Wages, Given Initial Industry at Graduation



(iii) Effect on Expected Wages of Women with Children, Given Initial Job Function at Graduation



(iv) Effect on Expected Wages of Women with Children, Given Initial Industry at Graduation

Notes: Each regression coefficient shown in each figure above represents a separate regression of the form described in Equation (1), where the dependent variable in (i) and (ii) is “expected wages of women X years after graduation, conditional on starting [job function/industry].” The dependent variable in (iii) and (iv) is “expected wages of women with children X years after graduation, conditional on starting [job function/industry].” The reported regression coefficients are the estimated coefficients on $Female_i \times ShareMale_{igc}$. The dependent variable in (i) and (ii) is constructed by averaging actual wages of women a given number of years after graduation over all women who accepted the same initial job function or industry at graduation. The dependent variable in (iii) and (iv) is constructed by averaging actual wages of women who have children a given number of years after graduation over all such women who accepted the same initial job function or industry at graduation (whether or not they had children at the time of graduation). The regression is run on the full sample (male and female, with and without children). Average wages include “zeros”: the value for wages is zero for those who are not working.

Table B.XI
Effect of Concentrations on Distribution of Salary Offers

VARIABLES	(1) Log Mean Salary Offer	(2) Log Median Salary Offer	(3) Log Max Salary Offer
Share Male Peers x Female	0.11 [0.092]	0.04 [0.101]	0.10 [0.144]
Share Male Peers	-0.06 [0.053]	-0.03 [0.056]	-0.03 [0.091]
Conc. Finance x Female	0.03** [0.015]	0.03** [0.015]	0.05** [0.021]
Conc. Finance	-0.01 [0.011]	-0.01 [0.011]	-0.01 [0.016]
Female	-0.03*** [0.009]	-0.03*** [0.009]	-0.08*** [0.013]
Observations	5,323	5,323	5,323
Cohort Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
Mean	11.51	11.51	11.64

Robust standard errors in brackets

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Notes: The dependent variables in columns (1) and (2) are the natural log of the mean and median of the base salary offers to the student, respectively. The dependent variable in column (3) is the natural log of the maximum “permanent” salary offer. All regressions control for gender, marital status at the start of business school, marital status interacted with gender, age at the start of business school, age squared, student GMAT scores (quantitative, verbal, and total), undergraduate GPA (normalized to 4.0 scale), a dummy for missing undergraduate GPA, indicator variables for whether the student attended a “Top 10” or “Top 20” undergraduate institution, for whether the student is Black, Hispanic, Asian, South Asian, or identifies as having another ethnic background (omitted category is white), and for years of work experience prior to business school and experience squared. Data on concentrations come from administrative data that include coursework and transcript data. Dummy variables for missing concentration data and missing concentration data interacted with “female” are included. “Conc. Finance” is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the student’s concentration is nonmissing and is declared as finance and 0 otherwise. “Conc. Finance” is reported as the deviation from the mean. All columns include cohort fixed effects, and standard errors are clustered at the peer group level.

Table B.XII
Effect of Coursework on Distribution of Salary Offers

VARIABLES	(1) Log Mean Salary Offer	(2) Log Median Salary Offer	(3) Log Max Salary Offer
Share Male Peers xFemale	-0.06 [0.142]	-0.10 [0.148]	-0.05 [0.150]
Share Male Peers	0.06 [0.094]	0.08 [0.097]	0.01 [0.089]
Fraction Finance Courses x Female	0.20** [0.080]	0.16* [0.081]	0.20** [0.090]
Fraction Finance Courses	-0.09 [0.054]	-0.08 [0.055]	-0.15** [0.059]
Female	-0.06*** [0.010]	-0.06*** [0.010]	-0.06*** [0.010]
Observations	5,323	5,323	5,323
Cohort Fixed Effects	13.00	13.00	13.00
Mean	11.61	11.60	11.64

Robust standard errors in brackets
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Notes: The dependent variables in columns (1)–(3) are the natural log of the mean, median, and maximum of the “permanent” salaries offered to the student, respectively. All regressions control for gender, marital status at the start of business school, marital status interacted with gender, age at the start of business school, age squared, student GMAT scores (quantitative, verbal, and total), undergraduate GPA (normalized to a 4.0 scale), a dummy for missing undergraduate GPA, indicator variables for whether the student attended a “Top 10” or “Top 20” undergraduate institution, for whether the student is Black, Hispanic, Asian, South Asian, or identifies as having another ethnic background (omitted category is white), and for years of work experience prior to business school and experience squared. Data on coursework come from administrative data that include coursework, fields, and transcript data. Dummy variables for missing field data and missing field data interacted with “female” are included. “Fraction Finance Courses” is a variable equal to the fraction of total courses taken in the field of finance if the data on the field of the coursework is nonmissing, equal to 0 otherwise, and is reported as the deviation from the mean. All columns include cohort fixed effects, and standard errors are clustered at the peer group level.

Table B.XIII
Effect of Coursework and Concentrations on Distribution of Salary Offers
Predicted and Residual Components

VARIABLES	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Log Mean Salary Offer	Log Median Salary Offer	Log Max Salary Offer
Share Male Peers*Female	0.11 [0.094]	0.06 [0.101]	0.13 [0.100]
Share Male Peers	-0.03 [0.124]	-0.00 [0.123]	-0.09 [0.123]
$Conc.\widehat{Finance}$ xFemale	0.01 [0.013]	-0.00 [0.016]	0.02 [0.013]
$Conc.\widetilde{Finance}$	-0.16 [0.596]	-0.17 [0.583]	-0.19 [0.597]
$Conc.\widetilde{Finance}$ xFemale	0.04** [0.016]	0.03** [0.016]	0.04** [0.017]
$Conc.\widetilde{Finance}$	-0.01 [0.011]	-0.01 [0.011]	-0.01 [0.011]
Female	-0.05 [0.056]	-0.04 [0.055]	-0.05 [0.056]
Observations	5,323	5,323	5,323
Cohort Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
Mean	11.51	11.51	11.54

Robust standard errors in brackets
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table B.XIV
Effect of Gender Composition on Distribution of Firm Pay Offers

VARIABLES	(1) Mean Offer Firm Pay	(2) Median Offer Firm Pay	(3) Max Offer Firm Pay
Share Male Peers*Female	0.20* [0.112]	0.19* [0.111]	0.26** [0.128]
Share Male Peers	0.00 [0.084]	0.02 [0.078]	-0.11 [0.091]
Female	-0.05*** [0.009]	-0.05*** [0.008]	-0.05*** [0.009]
Black	-0.01 [0.013]	-0.01 [0.013]	-0.03** [0.014]
Hispanic	-0.08** [0.030]	-0.07** [0.029]	-0.08** [0.030]
Observations	5,140	5,140	5,140
Cohort Fixed Effects	13.00	13.00	13.00
Mean	0.00	0.00	0.04

Robust standard errors in brackets

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Notes: The dependent variables are the mean, median, and maximum of the firm component of pay, taken over the student's offer set. The firm component of pay comes from an AKM wage decomposition, where the firm fixed effect can be identified because we observe multiple offers per student. The firm component of pay comes from estimating: $\ln w_{ij} = F_j + \delta_i + \mu_{ij}$, where w_{ij} is the log of the permanent salary offered, δ_i is the individual fixed effect, and F_j is the firm fixed effect, or the firm component of pay. The estimation includes a term for a match effect, μ_{ij} . Salaries are measured in 2006 dollars.

Table B.XV
 Effect of Peer Gender Composition on Distribution of Offers for Expected Future Wages
 Conditional on Initial Firm at Graduation

VARIABLES	(1) Mean Wage Offer	(2) Median Wage Offer	(3) Max Wage Offer
Share Male Peers x Female	322.21*** [98.560]	335.76*** [98.009]	269.31** [105.749]
Share Male Peers	-25.33 [57.465]	-30.42 [58.450]	-54.42 [63.308]
Female	-26.56*** [7.363]	-26.49*** [7.407]	-26.55*** [8.240]
Black	-46.32*** [12.144]	-46.46*** [11.988]	-48.53*** [13.788]
Hispanic	-29.00*** [10.276]	-28.29*** [10.294]	-32.21*** [10.779]
Observations	3,008	3,008	3,008
Cohort Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
Mean	166.42	165.34	179.27

Robust standard errors in brackets
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Notes: The dependent variables are the mean, median, and maximum of the set of offers for “expected wages 8 years after graduation” in the offer set of the student at graduation, where expected wages for each job offer are calculated by taking the average of hourly wages, eight years after graduation, over all graduates who accepted a job with the same initial firm at graduation.

Table B.XVI
Effect of Concentration in Finance on Distribution of Offers for Expected Future Wages
Conditional on Initial Industry and Job Function at Graduation

VARIABLES	Job Function Averages 10 Years Out			Industry Averages 10 Years Out		
	(1) Mean Wage Offer	(2) Median Wage Offer	(3) Max Wage Offer	(4) Mean Wage Offer	(5) Median Wage Offer	(6) Max Wage Offer
<i>Conc.Finance</i> x Female	60.12*** [21.954]	59.98*** [22.245]	62.03*** [22.543]	60.07*** [19.558]	62.44*** [19.117]	60.39*** [21.409]
<i>Conc.Finance</i>	94.86 [125.402]	109.68 [124.272]	34.81 [134.237]	130.02 [86.129]	137.07 [83.561]	57.63 [100.907]
<i>Conc.Finance</i> x Female	1.64 [6.056]	2.64 [6.104]	0.12 [5.999]	1.42 [5.232]	2.18 [5.218]	2.43 [5.308]
<i>Conc.Finance</i>	53.82*** [4.655]	53.32*** [4.687]	56.55*** [4.593]	46.00*** [4.011]	45.95*** [4.026]	49.38*** [3.947]
Female	-61.89** [27.195]	-59.55** [27.148]	-72.65** [28.583]	-56.41*** [20.736]	-56.83*** [19.986]	-65.81*** [24.193]
Observations	4,153	4,153	4,153	4,152	4,152	4,152
Cohort Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Mean	158.98	158.94	165.73	152.56	152.61	159.99

Robust standard errors in brackets

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Notes: “Wage offers” 10 years after graduation are the expectation of wages, conditional on initial job function and industry at graduation. Expected wages are determined by averaging actual wages of graduates 10 years after graduation over students who began in the same initial job function in columns (1)–(3) and over those who began in the same initial industry in columns (4)–(6).

Table B.XVII
Effect of Concentration in Finance on Distribution of Offers for Expected Future Wages
Conditional on Initial Industry and Job Function at Graduation


VARIABLES	Job F	Averages	Years Out	Industry Averages 10 Years Out		
	(1) Mean W Offer	(2) Median W Offer	Max Wage r	(4) Mean Wage Offer	(5) Median Wage Offer	(6) Max Wage Offer
Share Male Peers*Female	-51.00 [65.063]	-51.31 [65.855]	-54.87 [71.123]	-25.49 [62.878]	-16.90 [62.940]	[69.766]
Share Male Peers	66.41 [60.460]	65.41 [59.993]	55.29 [64.831]	47.36 [44.753]	46.09 [43.698]	[48.195]
$\widehat{Conc.Finance}$ x Female	74.71*** [22.211]	74.48*** [22.416]	75.58*** [23.130]	69.35*** [20.306]	70.57*** [20.037]	[22.115]
$\widehat{Conc.Finance}$	-4.35 [91.021]	13.25 [93.430]	-33.11 [93.754]	46.41 [92.219]	46.36 [91.725]	[91.100]
$\widehat{Conc.Finance}$ x Female	1.60 [6.054]	2.61 [6.097]	0.09 [6.004]	1.39 [5.243]	2.16 [5.227]	[5.326]
$\widehat{Conc.Finance}$	53.65*** [4.666]	53.14*** [4.699]	56.39*** [4.605]	45.89*** [4.022]	45.85*** [4.034]	[3.963]
Female	-86.56*** [21.781]	-83.73*** [22.105]	-91.90*** [21.979]	-75.20*** [20.325]	-75.93*** [20.026]	[20.269]
Observations	4,153	4,153	4,153	4,152	4,152	
Cohort Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Mean	158.98	158.94	165.73	152.56	152.61	159.99

Robust standard errors in brackets


*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Notes: “Wage offers” 10 years after graduation are the expectation of wages, conditional on initial job function and industry at graduation. Expected wages are determined by averaging actual wages of graduates 10 years after graduation over students who began in the same initial job function in columns (1)–(3) and over those who began in the same initial industry in columns (4)–(6).

Figure B.VI
 Effect of Gender Composition of Peer Group on Long-Term
 Labor Force Participation and Probability of Not Working



(i) Effect of Peers on Ever Not Working



(ii) Effect of Peers on Total Years Not Working

Notes: Subfigure (i) shows the regression coefficients from a set of regressions where the dependent variable, “Ever Not Working X Years after Graduation” is the cumulative incidence of not working. It is defined as an indicator variable equal to 1 if there has been any spell of not working in the X years since graduation. Measures of employment or nonemployment a given number of years after graduation come from the MBA Alumni Survey.

Table B.XVIII
Effect of Gender Composition on Preferences: Stated First Choice Job

VARIABLES	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Job Function: Investment Banking	Job Function: Venture Capital	Job Function: Product Management
Share Male Peers*Female	0.63*** [0.119]	0.14** [0.072]	-0.37*** [0.108]
Share Male Peers	-0.15*** [0.051]	-0.03 [0.031]	0.17*** [0.034]
Female	-0.52*** [0.088]	-0.13** [0.055]	0.33*** [0.079]
Married at Entry	-0.02** [0.009]	-0.00 [0.007]	0.02*** [0.005]
Married Female at Entry	0.02 [0.015]	0.00 [0.009]	-0.02 [0.013]
Undergraduate GPA	-0.01 [0.013]	0.01 [0.008]	0.01 [0.007]
Top 10 Undergraduate Institution	0.02 [0.017]	0.01 [0.014]	-0.02** [0.011]
Top 20 Undergraduate Institution	-0.03*** [0.013]	0.00 [0.010]	0.01 [0.010]
Black	0.00 [0.022]	-0.05*** [0.009]	-0.03* [0.014]
Hispanic	-0.03 [0.019]	-0.02 [0.012]	0.00 [0.013]
Observations	6,494	6,494	6,494
Cohort Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
Mean	0.10	0.03	0.04

Robust standard errors in brackets

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Notes: This table reports estimated coefficients from the regression described in Equation (1). The dependent variable in each column is an indicator variable representing the job function of the student's stated first-choice job. The data come from employment offer data, where students indicate whether the offer was their "first choice," "second choice," or "third choice" job. All regressions control for gender, marital status, marital status interacted with gender, age at entry, age squared, experience at entry, experience squared, student GMAT scores, undergraduate GPA, whether the student attended a "Top 10" or "Top 20" undergraduate institution, and whether the student is Black, Hispanic, Asian, South Asian, or "other" (omitted category is white). All columns include cohort fixed effects, and standard errors are clustered at the peer group level.

Table B.XIX
Effect of Gender Composition on Preferences: Stated First Choice Job

VARIABLES	(1) Job Function: Investment Banking	(2) Job Function: Venture Capital	(3) Job Function: Product Management
Share Male Peers*Female	0.48*** [0.107]	0.11* [0.058]	-0.20** [0.090]
Share Male Peers*Male	-0.15*** [0.051]	-0.03 [0.031]	0.17*** [0.034]
Female	-0.52*** [0.088]	-0.13** [0.055]	0.33*** [0.079]
Married at Entry	-0.02** [0.009]	-0.00 [0.007]	0.02*** [0.005]
Married Female at Entry	0.02 [0.015]	0.00 [0.009]	-0.02 [0.013]
Undergraduate GPA	-0.01 [0.013]	0.01 [0.008]	0.01 [0.007]
Top 10 Undergraduate Institution	0.02 [0.017]	0.01 [0.014]	-0.02** [0.011]
Top 20 Undergraduate Institution	-0.03*** [0.013]	0.00 [0.010]	0.01 [0.010]
Black	0.00 [0.022]	-0.05*** [0.009]	-0.03* [0.014]
Hispanic	-0.03 [0.019]	-0.02 [0.012]	0.00 [0.013]
Observations	6,494	6,494	6,494
Cohort Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
Mean	0.10	0.03	0.04

Robust standard errors in brackets

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Notes: This table reports estimated coefficients from the following regression:

$$Y_{igc} = \phi_0 + \phi_1 Female_i \cdot ShareMale_{igc} + \phi_2 Male_i \cdot ShareMale_{igc} + \beta X_{igc} + \gamma_c + \epsilon_{igc},$$

where $Male_i \cdot ShareMale_{igc}$ is the proportion of male peers interacted with a male dummy, and where X_{igc} is a vector of the student's individual pre-MBA characteristics, as defined in Equation (1). The dependent variable in each column is an indicator variable representing the job function of the student's stated first-choice job. The data come from employment offer data, where students indicate whether the offer was their "first choice," "second choice," or "third choice" job. All columns include cohort fixed effects, and standard errors are clustered at the peer group level.

Table B.XX
Effect of Gender Composition on Variance of Non-Wage Amenity Values Offered

VARIABLES	(1)	(2)
	Variance of Non-Wage Amenity Values	Variance of Non-Wage Amenity Values (Female)
Share Male Peers x Female	0.12 [9.511]	0.60 [2.076]
Share Male Peers	-8.86 [6.845]	-1.36 [1.473]
Female	-0.88 [1.029]	0.38** [0.161]
Observations	1,561	1,168
Cohort Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes
Mean	9.11	1.35

Robust standard errors in brackets

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Notes: The dependent variable in column (1) is the variance of the non-wage amenity values offered to the student, where the “non-wage amenity value” is defined at the firm level and in dollar terms, and the variance of the offer set is over all firms where student i received an offer. The dependent variable in column (2) is the variance of the female-specific non-wage amenity values, which are estimated using a sample of just women and therefore reflect women’s valuations for the non-wage amenities offered at each firm where student i has received an offer. Each specification uses the same control variables as in column (5) of Table III. All columns include cohort fixed effects and are clustered at the peer group level.

Table B.XXI
Effect of Peer Gender Composition on Choice of Future Salary Offers
Based on Initial Job, Industry, and Firm Averages

VARIABLES	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Accepted Max Offer Job Func 10 Years Out	Accepted Max Offer Industry 10 Years Out	Accepted Max Offer Firm 10 Years Out
Share Male Peers*Female	-0.05 [0.209]	0.01 [0.205]	0.44 [0.305]
Share Male Peers	0.28 [0.170]	-0.07 [0.178]	-0.01 [0.219]
Female	-0.05*** [0.018]	-0.06*** [0.018]	0.05** [0.024]
Observations	6,289	6,388	2,907
Cohort Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
Mean	0.78	0.77	0.77

Robust standard errors in brackets

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Notes: The dependent variable in columns (1) and (2) are dummy variables for whether the respondent accepted the maximum offer for expected salary 10 years after graduation, given the starting industry and occupation of the offer at graduation. The dependent variable in column (3) is a dummy variable for whether the respondent accepted the maximum offer for expected salary 10 years after graduation, conditional on the starting firm. Each specification uses the same control variables as in column (5) of Table III. All columns include cohort fixed effects and are clustered at the peer group level.

Table B.XXII
 Effect of Peer Gender Composition on Salary Offer Accepted
 Among Those with and without Choice of Industry, Job Function or Firm

VARIABLES	(1) Accepted Max Salary Offer	(2) Accepted Max Salary Offer	(3) Accepted Max Salary Offer	(4) Accepted Max Salary Offer	(5) Accepted Max Salary Offer	(6) Accepted Max Salary Offer
Share Male Peers xFemale	0.16 [0.102]	1.13* [0.636]	0.14 [0.100]	1.17** [0.502]	0.02 [0.012]	1.40*** [0.430]
Share Male Peers	0.05 [0.094]	-0.56 [0.391]	0.04 [0.081]	-0.65** [0.315]	0.01 [0.013]	-0.46* [0.272]
Female	-0.01 [0.008]	-0.02 [0.050]	0.00 [0.007]	-0.03 [0.044]	-0.00 [0.001]	-0.03 [0.036]
Observations	4,439	994	4,272	1,161	3,782	1,651
Cohort Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Mean	0.96	0.63	0.97	0.63	1.00	0.66
Sample	No Choice	Choice Industry	No Choice Func	Choice of Func	No Choice Firm	Choice Firm

Robust standard errors in brackets

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Notes: Columns (1), (3), and (5) are restricted to the sample of students who received offers from only one industry, job function, or firm, respectively. Columns (2), (4), and (6) are each restricted to the sample of students who received offers from more than one industry, job function, or firm, respectively. The dependent variable in each column is whether the student accepted the maximum salary offer in his or her offer set. Each specification uses the same control variables as in column (5) of Table III. All columns include cohort fixed effects and are clustered at the peer group level.